Chapter II: , it follows that it is the female rather than the male that (9)

There were also instances of a definite failure over a long period to achieve adjustment. Such a case is that of Ireland in the eighteenth century. The potato was introduced about 1585, and when taken into cultivation throughout the country could have enabled a larger population to subsist at a higher standard of living. So degraded, however, did the social conditions become, that the introduction of the potato merely enabled a larger population to subsist at the lowest standard which would support life. The conditions of that period have been described in the following passage by Goldwin Smith: ‘The mass of the people were socially and economically in a state the most deplorable, perhaps, which history records as having existed in any civilized nation.... The Irish gentry were probably the very worst upper class with which a country was ever afflicted. Their habits grew beyond measure brutal and reckless. Their drunkenness, their blasphemy, their ferocious duelling, left the squires of England far behind.... Over the Roman Catholic poor on their estates these “vermin of the kingdom”, as Arthur Young calls them, exercised a tyranny compared with which the arbitrary rule of the old chiefs over their clans was probably a parental authority used with beneficence and justly repaid by gratitude and affection.... All moral restraints on the growth of population were removed by the compulsory ignorance into which Protestant ascendancy and the penal laws had plunged the Catholic peasantry and by the abject wretchedness of their lot.... The island became utterly overcharged with population.’[1470]

In this period it is not common to find over-population on this scale for so long a time. In all countries there were periods when population was excessive, but as a rule the circumstances were seldom such that the vigour of the people did not before long bring about a return to a higher standard.

12. In the fourth sub-group there is available a far larger amount of information, and more exact estimates as to the position are rendered possible than could be the case before. We have first to ask whether there is evidence of over-population. Where, as in this period, there has been a rapid increase in numbers the question is more easy to answer than when asked in connexion with periods which, compared with the present conditions, were relatively static. We can form a judgement based upon the relative increase in wealth and in population and upon the average real wages over a number of years. The following figures show that wealth has grown more quickly than population.[1471]

_Wealth of Great _Population._
Britain._
£
1865 6,113,000,000 1861 28,927,485
1875 8,548,000,000 1871 31,484,661
1885 10,037,000,000 1881 34,884,848
1895 10,663,000,000 1891 37,732,922
1905 13,036,000,000 1901 41,458,721
1909 13,986,000,000 1911 45,216,665

The following figures show that real wages have risen during the period.[1472] With regard to the drop in real wages in the last years shown in this table it has to be remembered that such minor fluctuations may be due under complex modern conditions to a variety of causes. The condition of credit, the share taken of the total income by capital and many other factors, the action of some of which, there is good reason to think, was the cause of the decline in real wages noticeable in the early years of the present century, all affect real wages.

_Nominal Wages._ _Cost of Living._ _Real Wages._ 1880 100 100 100 1881–5 101 96 105 1886–90 104 89 117 1891–5 110 88 125 1896–1900 115 87 132 1901–5 121 91 133 1906–10 126 94 134 1911 128 96 133 1912 132 100 132 1913 134 100 134

All the evidence points to the same conclusion—namely, that throughout this period there has, on the whole, been an increase in the average real income per head, and that therefore there has been no over-population in England. On the whole the same conclusion applies to other countries in which the industrial conditions are more or less similar. It is well known that during this period there have been very remarkable fluctuations in the birth-rate. In England it was stationary from about 1840 to 1880. Since that date it has declined by about one-third.[1473] It seems clear that during this latter period the rapid increase of the former period ceased to be economically advantageous. In other words the decline has been in response to changing economic conditions. What we have now to ask is how the desirability of a limited increase under the conditions existing in this period can have been so realized that the adjustment of numbers to economic requirements took place.

13. The factors bearing upon fertility and elimination are in this sub-group in the main the same as those in the former sub-group. The factors which did or may have limited fertility in the earlier groups are again absent. Postponement of marriage is, as in the third sub-group, an important factor and in addition for the first time contraceptive practices play a large part. The importance of contraceptive practices, together with the decline in the birth-rate, due to the start made in this period towards the mastering of disease, are the chief differences to be noticed when comparing conditions in this sub-group with those in the former. It may also be noticed that the factors of elimination are more regular in their operation; epidemics of disease are rare and war does not now, as so often formerly, indirectly cause a large death-rate. The methods of limiting increase are confined to those which reduce fertility with the exception of the practice of abortion, which is still of some importance in the lower social classes. It is important to observe that, although the postponement of marriage has throughout the period had an important bearing upon fertility, it has not been, as in the former sub-group, by raising or reducing the age of marriage that the change in fertility has been chiefly due.[1474] This change has been due to diminished fertility which is to be chiefly accounted for by the conscious limitation of fertility in the form either of abstention from intercourse between married persons or of the use of contraceptive practices. We are not able to measure the prevalence of the different forms of conscious limitation and thus definitely to associate them with the declining birth-rate. We do not find, however, any such increase in other factors, such as venereal disease, which diminish fertility, as will account for the facts. We have no reason for supposing that fecundity has diminished, and as we have strong reasons for thinking that conscious limitation has been increasingly practised, we must attribute the changes to this cause.[1475]

14. In this sub-group we may roughly distinguish between property owners, professional classes, peasant proprietors, and wage earners. The distinguishing feature has been the rise of a very large wage-earning class not possessed of property. The peasant proprietor, who, though a property owner, is to be distinguished from other property owners, is of little importance in England. In other countries, however, the class of peasant proprietors is of importance, and we may first ask how the desirability of limiting increase is brought home to them.

As we have seen, wherever men owe their living to the produce of a definite area of land, whether ownership is vested in families or in village communities, the situation is in the main always much the same. That more than a certain number cannot maintain the standard of living upon a certain area must be obvious. It may be more or less definitely realized by each individual; it is also enshrined in the social conventions of such people. The conditions in French rural districts have been much studied, and there is a large amount of evidence pointing to the conclusion that families are consciously limited owing to the realization that large families are not economically advantageous. Legal regulations and social customs as to the inheritance of landed property are of considerable importance in France and other countries in this connexion, but there is no space to enter upon the subject here. The conditions are, generally speaking, clear; any one who is acquainted with the conditions of life in the country districts of France, Switzerland, or Norway, for instance, has probably observed what is going on. Somewhat as has been described for the Middle Ages in England, the number of houses, and consequently the number of families, is not increased. Further, when marriage takes place the number of children is clearly limited by considerations based on the economic conditions. There is, of course, always an opportunity for the young people to go to the towns and work for wages, and we must now ask what the conditions are among the wage-earning classes.

Hitherto, with the exception of the artisans of the Middle Ages, we have always found men in groups of varying size supporting themselves upon a restricted area. In the case of the wage earners it is more difficult to understand how the desirability of limitation can become translated into customs or habits whether consciously or unconsciously followed, because, first, we are no longer dealing with a small group confined in the knowledge of all of them to a certain area, and, secondly, because restrictive customs in the nature of taboos have little chance of establishing themselves to-day. There are no restrictions of importance on the entrance to various trades; there is at least nothing comparable to the restrictions imposed by the guilds. A young man of the wage-earning class finds no hindrance to marriage and further finds that the maximum rate of earning he is ever likely to attain to is within his grasp at an early age. Why therefore should he not marry early? Compared with the mediaeval period he does marry early. As Rubin says, ‘the journeymen and servants of former times were as a rule unmarried, while in our times skilled workmen and factory employees, on account of the high level of their earnings (and the fact that they are received in money, not in kind), and because, for the greater part, as stated earlier, they attain no better position by waiting—are married as journeymen or labourers.’[1476] We have now to ask why the wage earners should, if they do not limit fertility by postponing marriage, limit fertility by conscious restriction of their families.

This is not an easy question to answer. As there are no barriers to marriage, so to the production of a large family there are no barriers in the form of social conditions or customs which must be conformed to. There is apparently no hindrance to the production of as many children as can be fed—that is to say, to the increase of population to the level at which life can just be supported. Such an increase, however, does not take place. To understand why it is so we must first realize how powerful the desire to better the social conditions and to raise the standard of living has been among the wage earners. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond have lately described the conditions under which the village labourer existed in the earlier years of the last century.[1477] During the agricultural depression which followed the Napoleonic Wars the most determined effort was made by the governing classes to induce the labourer to lower his standard of living in the very mistaken hope that such a change would ease the position. Above all things the labourers were urged to abandon the use of wheaten bread and to accept some substitute. All kinds of arguments and many forms of pressure were employed. The labourers, however, were obstinate. They clung to their standard of living and in England, at least since the Industrial Revolution, this determination to maintain, and if possible to raise, the standard has been powerfully manifested by the wage-earning class.[1478] Returning now to the question we have to answer, we may say that this determination becomes translated into a system of family limitation, and that the decline in the birth-rate which is due to conscious limitation has been in correspondence with changing economic conditions. The previous rate of increase was no longer desirable in the interest of the wage-earning classes, and it has been checked. Nevertheless it has not been checked by a fully conscious realization of the position. At the most there has only been a semi-conscious understanding of what is involved. In the main we have to think of this determination as achieving its end by an unconscious adaptation of social habits and practices to the needs of the time. There have been other factors at work tending in the same direction. The influence of factory legislation in restricting the employment of children has been to render large families of less economic advantage. Again among more highly paid sections of the wage-earning classes certain influences, which are not economic at all but rather social, have also tended towards reduction in fertility.

It may be observed that, where the determination to maintain the standard of living is not strongly manifested, there over-population may occur. Thus in England, and in all industrial countries, there is at the bottom of the social scale a thriftless, unskilled, and casually employed class in which the limitation of families is little, if at all, practised. Among this class the desire to improve conditions is seldom shown and in consequence the birth-rate is not limited. If the members of this class ‘restricted considerably their rate of growth, there is’, says Hobson, ‘reasonable ground for holding that they would make a double economic gain, being paid at a higher rate, for more efficient and more regular work.’[1479]

The conditions among the professional classes need not detain us. In addition to feeling, as do the working classes, the benefit in a general way of restriction, there are many other factors which come in. Of these perhaps the most important is the question of the age at which the maximum income is attained. As these classes form only a small proportion of the population, and as we shall have to discuss in the following chapter the causes of the lower rate of increase in these classes than among the wage-earning class—having in view the possible bearing upon certain problems of qualitative change—we can omit any further discussion here, merely observing that no question of over-population arises. Possibly there may be relative under-population in something the same way as there is over-population in the lowest grade—whether this is so or not depending largely upon the ease with which the professional classes are recruited from below.

15. The discussion of historical races has been brief and was only entered upon in order to round off the subject. There are other points in connexion with the adjustment of numbers to which allusion must be made. It will be convenient, however, first to review shortly our conclusions regarding the problem of adjustment as a whole and then to ask in respect of the various periods in turn what we are led to think that the position must have been.

Reasons have been given for thinking that, if any general change in fecundity has taken place in the course of history, it has been in the direction of increase. In any case fecundity is very large—the theoretical power of increase, that is to say, is very great. Some figures were given at the end of the fourth chapter in illustration of this fact. There is a tendency noticeable in nearly all discussions of questions of quantity to under-estimate the power of increase. Another calculation previously given may therefore be recalled. It has been shown that at the present average rate of increase of the population of the world—a rate of increase which is obviously everywhere very severely restricted—a single pair would produce in 1,750 years descendants equal in number to the present population of the world.

In connexion with the under-estimation of the power of increase, is the over-estimation of the relief given by any factor which allows of a growth of population—increase in skill or migration, for example. It is constantly assumed that, when such a factor can be detected in operation, there is, so to speak, a complete outlet for fecundity. This is the idea which lies at the basis of such statements as those which speak of ‘surplus population’ as being drawn off by migration. When, however, a calculation is made, it is seen that the relief given is, except under very unusual circumstances, almost negligible. It was shown on p. 105 that under the circumstances mentioned a population of 1,000,000 would remain stable so long as to each married woman there was born an average of two children. But if the average was 2½ children, then in a hundred years the population would be 3,050,000. It follows, therefore, that most unusually favourable circumstances only make room for a fraction of the possible increase and that migration likewise only draws off an insignificant fraction of the possible additions to the population.

Starting with such considerations and taking into account the fact that, wherever social co-operation exists, there must be within any area a certain desirable density of population—the optimum number—it has been argued that there will come about an approximation to this number owing to the practice of certain habits and customs restrictive of increase. It has further been argued that, except under most unusual circumstances, habits and customs having primarily, and not merely incidentally, this result, must everywhere exist. This is seldom realized. Professor Myres, for instance, after remarking upon the fertility of ancient Egypt and of Assyria, says that ‘anything like infanticide was out of the question’.[1480] It is clear from the context that he is thinking not of infanticide in particular but of any practices restrictive of increase—the implication being that in a fertile country, where skill is increasing, there is a sufficient outlet for the increase of population resulting from the power of human increase. Again, it has been asserted that the Bantu races do not commit infanticide—at least on a large scale—as do many other primitive races, because, inasmuch as they have been in movement for an unknown length of time, the attrition following upon the war that is always in progress at the fringe of the movement is sufficient to absorb the ‘surplus population’. But it has been forgotten that the Bantu races practise prolonged abstention from intercourse—a custom quite as effective as abortion and infanticide—as may be seen when the evidence as to the small average number in a family is considered;[1481] for the average number in a Bantu family is as small as among primitive races in general, and it cannot be held that attrition through war falls seriously upon others than adults. It therefore follows that war among these people affords but an insignificant amount of relief.

16. Turning now to the methods of adjustment, we may take the first two groups together and afterwards the third group. War and migration, however, may be put aside and considered separately at the end of the chapter. As regards the first two groups it is necessary to say no more than this: evidence has been produced to show that everywhere among primitive races either abortion, infanticide, or prolonged abstention from intercourse are practised in such a degree and in such a manner as to have as their primary result the restriction of increase.

The question as to how far these practices are effective in bringing about an approximation to the desirable number is not easily answered. As regards those primitive races which have come under European observation there is no definite evidence because, before exact observation could be made, the conditions of life had wholly changed. But, putting aside the fact that the evidence, such as it is, does suggest an approximation, it may be observed that conditions were such as to render an approximation easy. Skill increased so slowly that for long periods of time the desirable number remained about the same; the factors of elimination, such as war and disease, were not erratic in their action; social organization was not complex in the economic sense and therefore the danger of break-downs followed by changes in the desirable number was absent. Thus we may conclude that, in all probability, in primitive society an approximation was normally attained.

In the third period we meet with wholly different conditions. Social organization becomes elaborate in the economic sense, war and disease become erratic in their operation, and, relatively to what was the case before, skill increases rapidly. As a result the desirable number frequently changes, becoming on the whole larger, particularly in those periods with which we are best acquainted. There has in consequence grown up an idea that throughout human history population has been increasing, whereas in fact it is far more correct to regard population as normally having been stable. It may not improbably turn out that the third period is in this respect peculiar and we may be approaching a period when population will again normally be stable. However that may be, the changes mentioned tend to make adjustment more difficult; on the other hand, there have been at the same time at work changes tending to facilitate adjustment among which growing freedom from convention and increasing sensitiveness to the economic situation may be particularly noticed. As regards the methods of adjustment, evidence has been adduced to show that, up to the opening of what we have called the mediaeval period, one or other of the same methods were in use that were in vogue before, that all these methods ceased to be practised in the mediaeval period and were replaced by postponement of marriage, and that finally in the modern period deliberate restriction has replaced postponement of marriage.

The question of the effectiveness of adjustment in this period has been touched upon. In general it may be said that under-population is rare. Under-population seldom arises and then generally as a result of the abnormal incidence of war or disease. It sometimes happens that for a long period an area once densely populated maintains but a sparse population and this is not infrequently taken to indicate under-population. But such situations generally arise when for one reason or another—such as the destruction of capital during prolonged war, or the breakdown of artificial works upon which the food-supply depends—there has been a decrease in the density desirable. Thus the Mesopotamian watercourses were neglected by the Mongol conquerors in the thirteenth century and in consequence the optimum number for that area declined. Such a situation should therefore not be taken as indicating, without further inquiry, under-population.

Over-population is less rare. It may be due to the neglect of ancient practices having as their effort the restriction of increase without the taking into use at the same time of new practices. This sometimes happens when a higher and a lower civilization come into contact and has been one of the causes of over-population in India. It may also arise when on the passing away of old practices some influence may militate against the taking up of new practices. In this manner the influence of the Catholic Church, which has been directed against contraceptive practices, may have tended to produce over-population in Ireland. More commonly, however, over-population arises in this period as the result of a spirit of apathy and listlessness. Under such circumstances, which are usually the result of social oppression or political misfortunes, no effort is made to keep up the standard of living and in consequence the machinery designed to restrict increase breaks down.

Taking the third period in more detail, we have as regards the last section of that period definite evidence to the effect that approximation is fairly close. There are minor fluctuations in the nearness of approach to the desirable number. That, however, which it is in any broad view of the whole problem of quantity desirable to emphasize, is the nearness of approach—the fact that in any country at any given time within this period the numbers present are, roughly speaking, those economically desirable. We shall, indeed, find later, when dealing with war and when referring again to this subject in the next chapter, that minor differences in the nearness of approach as between countries in close proximity may be of considerable importance.

Within the mediaeval period, in spite of the very high death-rate from disease, over-population occurred in England from time to time. The fact that wages rose after the Black Death, and that, after the decline in the population which took place in the last years of the seventeenth century and in the opening years of the eighteenth century, the average man was more prosperous, points to this conclusion, as does the fact that frequent attempts were made to render the restrictions upon marriage more severe. It seems probable that there was a similar tendency towards over-population in most European countries, and the reason would appear to be that postponement of marriage did not bring about a sufficient restriction of increase; postponement of marriage was not in fact a sufficient substitute for abortion, infanticide, and abstinence from intercourse, in spite of the prevalence of disease. Under-population was less frequent; when it occurred it was sometimes due in part to a spirit of luxury and selfishness following upon a period of expansion and prosperity, as in the later history of Spain. There may for similar reasons be under-population among the richer classes in Europe and America to-day.

With regard to the preceding period we have considerable knowledge of the conditions in Greece and Rome. The history of both countries presents very similar features. In the earlier times practices restrictive of increase comparable with those found among primitive races were operative. There followed a vigorous epoch of colonization and then a period of decadence. These periods of decadence have been much discussed. In these discussions it is sometimes forgotten that the destruction of capital in civil war on a large scale, especially in the last century B. C. in Rome, must have diminished the numbers desirable. But in spite of this it is clear that we are here again in the presence of examples of decline, at least among the richer classes, owing to the presence of selfishness and luxury; this is certainly the conclusion to which a study of Polybius leads as regards Greece, while the admirable works of Sir Samuel Dill render the position in Rome equally clear.[1482] Our knowledge of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia is insufficient to enable any judgement to be passed on conditions in these countries.

18. Our conclusions, therefore, are broadly as follows. Within the first two periods failure to approach the optimum number is rare. Within the third period departures away from the desirable number are less rare but are usually checked so long as the tone of society remains healthy and vigorous. In an oppressed society over-population not infrequently arises; in a selfish and luxurious society there may at times be under-population.

In the main, changes in numbers come about in response to economic requirements. We should not therefore attribute directly to changes in the quantity of population great historical events. Thus we may agree with Mr. Keynes when he says that ‘some of the catastrophes of past history, which have thrown back human progress for centuries, have been due to the reactions following on the sudden termination, whether in the course of Nature or by the act of man, of temporarily favourable conditions which have permitted the growth of population beyond what could be provided for when the favourable conditions were at an end’.[1483] But we cannot agree when he says that ‘the great events of history are often due to secular changes in the growth of population and other fundamental economic causes, which, escaping by their gradual character the notice of contemporary observers, are attributed to the follies of statesmen or the fanaticism of atheists. Thus the extraordinary occurrences of the past two years in Russia, that vast upheaval of Society, which has overturned what seemed most stable—religion, the basis of property, the ownership of land, as well as forms of government and the hierarchy of classes—may owe more to the deep influences of expanding numbers than to Lenin or Nicholas; and the disruptive powers of excessive national fecundity may have played a greater part in bursting the bonds of convention than either the power of ideas or the errors of autocracy.’[1484] In the first passage it is suggested that consequences of great import may follow when events so derange social organization that the numbers previously maintained cannot be supported. To this we may agree; the attribution of the catastrophe is not directly to changes in numbers. In the second passage it is suggested that national fertility may be so much in excess of requirements as to disrupt social organization. To this we cannot agree. In general increase is in response to economic requirements and, when it is in excess and is not within a reasonable time curbed, the conditions which result are not those which, though they may have important consequences, produce the kind of result here attributed to them.

19. Both war and migration are frequently said to be the consequences of over-population. We may take migration first.

It may be as well to give some typical expressions of this point of view. Mr. Haddon says, ‘when reduced to its simplest terms a migration is caused by an expulsion and an attraction, the former nearly always resulting from a dearth of food or from over-population, which practically comes to the same thing. Sooner or later a time comes when the increase of the population of a country exceeds its normal food-supply.’[1485] In the Report of the National Birth-Rate Commission we read that ‘a pressure of population in any country brings as a chief historic consequence overflows and migrations into neighbouring and other accessible countries’.[1486] Professor Myres, speaking of the Greek migrations of the eighth to the sixth centuries B. C., attributes them to the fact that ‘population had overtaken the means of subsistence’.[1487]

It is not altogether clear what is meant by such statements. Very frequently it seems to be implied that there commonly exists a condition in which there is more than enough food in an area occupied by an existing population, that sooner or later population catches up, so to speak, the food-supply and that migration afterwards follows any further increase of population. We may first look at this point of view. All that has so far been said goes to show that only for very short periods and under very unusual circumstances can there be under any conditions of social organization a state of under-population. Even if we put aside the idea of an optimum number, we must regard the population, which any area is capable of supporting, as strictly limited. Given the vast power of increase that we know always to be present, there cannot commonly be a condition of under-population—a condition, that is to say, in which population has ceased to increase before it was checked by the food limit. For we are not dealing with the spread of population into unoccupied areas; that occurred perhaps before there was any social organization. We are dealing with a period in which all portions of the earth’s surface, relative to the degree of skill attained, had long been fully occupied. Though increase of skill may at times enable regions previously quite infertile to be occupied, this is altogether an exceptional case; increase of skill normally merely allows of an increase of density in the same area. General considerations point to the normal condition being of necessity either one in which population has increased up to the level of subsistence or one in which it has increased to the optimum level, and the evidence presented shows that as a rule some approximation to the latter condition is attained. General considerations on the one hand and the evidence on the other both render wholly unacceptable the idea that commonly there is a condition of under-population which is followed by migration when the pressure due to the catching up of the amount of food available by the increase of population begins to be felt. Further, no support is given to this view by the facts known regarding any particular migration. What evidence is there, with regard to the Greek migrations referred to by Professor Myres, that for some unknown length of time, for some unknown reason, the increase of population had not reached the limit made possible by the food-supply? Unless there is definite evidence of peculiar circumstances in some peculiar combination, such a theory cannot be held to account for migration. The idea of population catching up the means of subsistence and bringing about a crisis followed by migration is the product of an altogether unhistorical view of the matter.[1488]

We do know, indeed, that at times a condition of under-population arises chiefly owing to the irregular action of certain factors of elimination. Disease has been known to remove one-third of the population of a country in two or three years. There does not, however, appear to be a single instance in which migration can be traced to the recovery from such a catastrophe. What appears usually to happen is that there is a certain relaxation of the pressure which before either hindered marriage or caused abortion or infanticide to be practised; population increases until the pressure again makes itself felt. And it may be observed that it is not following upon exceptional conditions such as these that migration is supposed by the authors quoted to take place. It is supposed to take place because not infrequently there is a condition of under-population for which there is in fact no evidence whatever. This view further clearly implies an over-estimate of the relief afforded by migration. The calculations given on a previous page apply here.

The view criticized above is sometimes so expressed as not to lay stress upon under-population as the condition which ultimately gives rise to migration. It is merely asserted that over-population is in some manner the cause of migration, and we may now examine this view. Let us recall what we found to be the condition in those countries in which over-population had undoubtedly occurred. We found the distinguishing feature of the social conditions of those countries to be the absence of hope, of a spirit of enterprise, and of a determination to maintain a standard of living. It most emphatically is not where such conditions are prevalent that migration takes place. All that we know of migration points to precisely the opposite. It is not from countries in the condition of India and China at the present day or of Ireland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that waves of migration arise. Migrating races exhibit the opposite characters. With them we associate enterprise, hopefulness, courage, and so on. The conclusion cannot on general grounds be doubtful. Migration does not arise where a condition of over-population has come about. Further, if we examine the evidence of particular migration in no case can it be shown that migration has begun as a direct result of those conditions.[1489] It is true that compared with the numerous migrations of which we have knowledge, there are but few cases concerning which we have detailed information of the social conditions. But where this information does exist, in no instance do we find evidence that migration began after a condition of over-population had come about.

It may be that what is implied by those who put forward the view that migration is somehow connected with over-population is somewhat different. It may be implied that migration occurs when what we have called the optimum number has been attained. If our general conclusions on this subject are borne in mind, it is clear that something more than this is required as an explanation. Migration occurs irregularly at long intervals; adjustment of population to some point approximating to the desirable level is always going on. Clearly it cannot be in the ordinary process of adjustment that some impetus to migration occurs; there must be some particular predisposing factor or factors at work. What are these factors? It would seem to rest with those who put forward the theory to show what they are, and this has not been done.

On the other hand, there is another explanation which appears to account at least in part for nearly every migration of which we have some knowledge of the circumstances, and it may be that an explanation on similar lines accounts at least in part for most of the later migrations in history. There is nothing novel in this explanation; it is admitted as an explanation of many migrations by Mr. Haddon.[1490] He admits that many migrations have been undertaken for political or religious reasons and instances the voyage of the _Mayflower_ and the Islamic and Buddhistic movements. That which is common to these explanations is that migration is undertaken in response to some idea. There is no question of over-population at all, and in all those cases in which we have any detailed knowledge of the conditions connected with migration we find that we can point to some idea as the motive force. Why, therefore, when details are not known, should another explanation be sought? It is suggested that essentially the same explanation is the most reasonable explanation of all migrations, at least in historical times. With regard to the earlier movements we find that migrations appear to occur where a high level of skill has been reached in some area. Where races are in contact with others of a markedly lower degree of skill there arises a tendency for the former to eject the latter. The immediate motive is desire to possess their land where the land is fertile relative to the skill of the first mentioned race. Thus the Bantu people have pushed back the Bushmen until the latter were left with regions infertile relatively to the Bantu culture. Throughout human history there must have been this tendency for migrations to follow the great steps in the acquirement of power over nature. But there is no reason to think that, even in early times, migrations only arose as a result of increase of skill. What we know of even the most primitive races, such as the Australians, shows that we can imagine movements to have been initiated quite apart from any differences in skill. The accounts given of the respect in which the older men are held among the Australians renders it possible to understand how an impulse to movement might be initiated by them which, once having taken shape, might have far-reaching consequences. We have further accounts of the existence of a spirit of restlessness among primitive races. This restlessness proves on analysis to be nothing more than the currency of an idea—an idea that some benefit would arise if a movement took place.

We have, however, to remember when dealing with this matter that many if not most of the migrations of pre-history were probably not migrations at all in the usual sense of the term. They are probably better thought of as driftings of people; they may have occupied very long periods of time and have been connected with slow changes in climate. At any one time the movement may have been quite imperceptible, and, when this was so, such driftings are seen clearly enough to have had nothing to do with over-population if the immensity of the power of increase is borne in mind.

Some reference may now be made to the much-discussed theory to the effect that historical migrations are due to climatic changes. Ellsworth Huntington has put forward in a number of publications the view that not only have important climatic changes occurred within the historical period, but that these changes have been what he calls ‘pulsatory’—that is to say, there has been an alteration between humid and arid conditions in many parts of the world.[1491] This view has been contested.[1492] In particular doubt has been cast upon the ‘pulsatory’ nature of such changes as have taken place. Whether this view as to climatic change is correct or not is of no particular importance for our present purpose; for on the one hand it has been shown that certain migrations, particularly those in Central Asia, where the evidence as to the pulsatory nature of the change is said to be most clear, are explicable as due to political changes,[1493] while on the other hand it does not appear to be possible in general to correlate the migrations of history, which are essentially rapid movements, with slow changes of climate. It seems likely that population would adjust itself to slow climatic changes without difficulty or with as little difficulty as it adjusts itself to other changes which alter the optimum density. Extreme climatic changes very slowly brought about, as doubtless took place in pre-history, might result in driftings,[1494] but the less extreme changes in climate during the historical period have in all probability been without any pronounced effect upon movement.

Enough has been said to show that, whereas there is much that can be adduced both on theoretical grounds and after a review of the evidence against the theory attributing migration to over-population, there is much to recommend the extension of the explanation already admitted in many cases. But even if migration is not a result of over-population, it may seriously affect the adjustment of population, once it has been set on foot. And it is to the observation of the secondary disturbing effect of migration on population that we may attribute the error of tracing migration to over-population.

When, however, all allowances are made, the easy manner in which the common theory of migration is assumed to be true and is used by writers of great authority is very surprising. Mr. Hogarth, for instance, in a well-known and very delightful book alluding to the Chaldean or fourth great wave of migration from Arabia, is led to explain all these Arabian migrations as follows: ‘The great Southern Peninsula’, he says, ‘is for the most part a highland steppe endowed with a singularly pure air and an uncontaminated soil. It breeds, consequently, a healthy population whose mortality, compared with its death-rate, is unusually high; but since the peculiar conditions of its surface preclude the development of its internal food-supply beyond a point long ago reached, the surplus population which rapidly accumulates within it is forced from time to time to seek its sustenance elsewhere.’[1495] Let us consider this theory for a moment. To begin with, so far as relatively to the civilizations of the valleys of the Nile and of the Euphrates disease was rare and the death-rate on that account low, so far the position in Arabia merely approximated to that normal among primitive races. Therefore the healthy conditions taken by themselves do not necessarily form an incentive to migration. The remainder of the argument rests upon an over-estimate of the relief afforded either by increased skill or by migration. It is implied by Mr. Hogarth that, could additional skill have been applied to the increase of food, the ‘surplus population’ would have been absorbed; but that it was not so absorbed and found relief in migration. The calculations already given show how illusory is the idea that relief can be thus afforded. In such arguments the strength of human fecundity is always under-estimated. Further the theory assumes a condition of things within Arabia which is very difficult to understand. The Chaldean migration took place about 800 B. C., the third or Aramean, about 1500 B. C., the second or Canaanite, about 2500 B. C., and we may add a fifth or Islamic in the seventh century A. D. The shortest interval between these movements is 800 years. We are asked to suppose that for several hundred years there was an increase of population over and above that which could properly be supported; for evidently it is not supposed that the increases occurred only shortly before the migrations. Now we know that abortion and infanticide were practised regularly in Arabia. The increase therefore must have been small compared with the possible increase, and yet these methods were not according to the theory effective in producing that position which it must be the object of every vigorous society to attain. A very small increase in the degree to which these practices were performed would have brought about this result, and is it not far more reasonable to suppose that an approximation to this desirable position was normally attained rather than to suppose that there was a chronic failure the results of which could only have been socially disastrous?

There are two other considerations which may be adduced in favour of the view here advanced. Migration, in the first place, takes place rather from vigorous communities than from countries where social conditions have long been depressed by over-population. In the second place, the migrations in question are susceptible of another explanation. Regarding the only one of these migrations of which we have detailed knowledge—the Islamic—we know that it was prompted by the currency of an idea, and why should we not assume that the previous migrations were so prompted rather than fall back on the theory of over-population which raises so many difficulties?

20. It has often been said that war is a ‘biological necessity’. ‘Wherever we look in nature’, says General von Bernhardi, ‘we find that war is a fundamental law of development. This great verity, which has been recognized in past ages, has been convincingly demonstrated in modern times by Charles Darwin. He proved that nature is ruled by an unceasing struggle for existence, by the right of the stronger, and that this struggle in its apparent cruelty brings about a selection eliminating the weak and the unwholesome.’[1496] This has been a favourite contention of German publicists.[1497] It is not necessary to show here that such views rest upon a fundamental misunderstanding as to what is implied by the term ‘struggle for existence’. The error has been recently exposed by Mr. Chalmers Mitchell, who in particular has pointed out that there is nothing in the relationship between species in a state of nature which can in any sense be called war and further that modern nations are not units of the same order as species.[1498]

It has also been held that war originates from the necessity for the search for food. ‘La guerre’, said Comte, ‘constitue à l’origine le moyen le plus simple de se procurer les subsistances.’[1499] There is no foundation whatever for this view based either on what we know of species in a state of nature or of the conditions obtaining among primitive races. The same may be said of the theory that ‘eagerness to acquire property was originally the cause and object of war’.[1500]

The idea that over-population is the cause of war is sometimes carried back to some such ‘biological’ origin as that indicated above; in disproof of such views no more need be said. More often we meet with statements such as the following: ‘The population question pushes Germany on. For the most part it is inland peoples that have most severely felt that pressure of a growing population. Islanders and coast dwellers can expand over the seas. But when inland peoples outgrow their bounds, they must burst them.’[1501] Such a statement is a striking example of the over-estimation of the relief afforded by war and by migration and of the under-estimation of the power of fecundity. What has been said above regarding migration is again applicable here.

If our contention that over-population is not the cause of migration is well founded, then the argument that war is also due to over-population falls to the ground. Precisely the same conditions which are supposed to push nations on to fight are also supposed to push them on to migrate. As we shall see later, this by no means implies that questions of population do not at times enter into the situation when war breaks out.

What then is the cause of war? It is probable that the instinct of pugnacity led to fighting when men lived in groups of families—at least between the males for the headship of the family. It is further probable that, as social organization slowly evolved, sporadic fighting of this kind was continued and led to fighting between groups. But in very early times tradition began to overlay and obscure the manifestations of instinct; the manner in which this occurs will form an important part of the discussion in the second part of this book. It is enough to say here that among primitive races tradition can be of such a nature as altogether to overlay the instinct of pugnacity, as among certain peoples, who though not devoid of the instinct scarcely ever fight because of the existence of powerful social conventions and customs inhibiting its expression. Thus, though war may form an outlet for pugnacity, it can no longer be said that it is the direct consequence of pugnacity. War, in fact, gradually becomes a custom. That this is now essentially the nature of war needs no proof. It is obviously at the present day a mode of action whereby the highly organized governments of modern nations try to achieve some political end.[1502]

It has, however, to be remembered that warfare takes a place among the factors of elimination and that the greater the amount of elimination through war, the less need there is for the practices of abortion and infanticide. But this is quite a different thing from saying that warfare results from over-population or from the pressure of population. It merely implies that, given the power of increase, warfare is a factor which may perform to a small degree the elimination necessary in order that numbers should not exceed the desirable limit and is therefore tolerated—other things being equal—as a factor in social life by the natural selection of customs.

It has nevertheless to be allowed that, when war breaks out, the position as regards population may form an element in the situation—just as the passions which have been aroused may do so though they cannot be regarded as the cause of modern war. Let us consider the late war. Broadly speaking in all European countries increase in population was in response to economic requirements. Yet there were what we have called minor fluctuations away from the desirable economic density. France and Germany represented two opposite tendencies—towards under- and over-population respectively. These relatively slight differences were greatly exaggerated in popular opinion owing to the attention paid to the birth-rate. The Germans were thinking and talking of expansion whereas the French were stay-at-home people. The Germans looked across the frontier and thought they saw a half-empty country which they could well develop with their ‘surplus’ population, while the French thought they saw a teeming population ready to burst its bonds and overwhelm them. Again, as between England and Germany it appeared to many Germans that, while Germany had little or no opportunity of expansion, Great Britain had owing to her overseas dominions ample opportunity. But increase is governed by the conditions within a country, and the fact that emigration from Great Britain to Greater Britain was possible did not enter into the situation as regards the control of increase in Great Britain; very many people in this country, however, as well as in Germany, if they did not actually think that it did so, at least held opinions which were in fact founded upon this supposition. Thus though in actual fact England broadly speaking restricted her population as did Germany in accordance with the economic situation within the country, yet the position of England with reference to Greater Britain had an influence upon the situation, and many Germans thought that unless there was an outlet for ‘surplus population’ Germany would eventually be over-populated, whereas the fact is that, as we have seen, so long as conditions remain healthy in a country, over-population does not arise.[1503]

This subject could be elaborated at great length. Upon analysis it would always be found that, though certain aspects of the population problem and certain mistaken views of the position may and do predispose nations and governments towards war, it is not true strictly speaking to say that the population question is in any sense a cause of war. War has now merely become a mode of action whereby an organized state tries to achieve certain political ends. It is within the power of mankind to renounce this mode of action. There is nothing in the nature of man or of social organization which renders war inevitable. ‘Dieu ne leur a donné ni des canons de vingt-quatre ni des baïonnettes, et ils se sont fait des baïonnettes et des canons pour se détruire.’[1504]

XII
SOME MODERN PROBLEMS