Chapter XV: , does enable us in the main to understand how the physical (4)

Summing up a review of this subject Huntingdon writes as follows: ‘So far as I am aware, every exact test which has been made on a large scale indicates mental superiority on the part of the white race, even when the two races have equal opportunities. For example, in Washington the coloured children remain in school quite as long as the white; they do not accomplish so much in the way of study and do not reach so high a grade. In the cities of the south, Mayo and Leram find that where the races are given essentially the same instruction, the proportion of whites who are promoted is greater than than of negroes. Moreover, the differences seem to increase with years, which suggests that the average coloured child not only stands below the average white child in mental development at all ages, but ceases to develop at an earlier age. In the High Schools of New York, superiority of the white race is shown by Mayo’s examination of the average marks. By the time the children reach the High School, the processes of promotion have weeded out a much larger proportion of coloured children than of white. Hence, the negroes form a specially selected group whose superiority to the average of their race is more marked than the superiority of the white High School children when compared with the rest of the race. Nevertheless, the average marks of the white children are distinctly higher than those of the coloured.’[1644] Here again, as in the case of Miss Strong’s investigation, it is not improbable that the conditions are to some extent weighted against the coloured race.

5. A third method of arriving at some indication of the relative degree of mental capacity is to notice what has happened where for some generations the two races have lived under more or less similar conditions. ‘One of the best places for comparing the two races is in the Bahama Islands’, writes Huntington. For reasons which I shall present later, the process of making ‘poor whites’ has probably gone farther in the Bahamas than in almost any other Anglo-Saxon community. Part of the white population are like their race in other regions, but a large portion have unmistakably degenerated. Witness their intense and bigoted speech, their sunken cheeks and eyes, their sallow complexion, and their inert way of working. In spite of racial prejudice, there is no real colour line in the Bahamas. Persons with more or less negro blood are worthy occupants of the highest positions, and are universally accepted in the most exclusive social circles. The British Government gives the negro every possible opportunity. The state of affairs may be judged from the remarks of a ‘poor white’ sailor, who said to me: ‘You want to know why I like the Southern States better than the North. It is because they hate a nigger and I hates him too. What kind of a place is this where they do everything for the nigger and nothing for the white man? It is bad enough to have to go to jail, but it’s pretty hard for a white man to be taken there by a nigger constable.’ In one Bahaman village I saw negro girls teaching white children in the public school. In that same village a number of the leading white men cannot read or write.

‘When they were children, their parents would not send them to school with negroes. The despised negroes learnt to read and write but have now largely forgotten these accomplishments. The proud whites grow up in abject ignorance. To-day the same thing is going on. I visited two villages where the white children are staying away from school because they will not go to negro teachers. The homes of such whites are scarcely better than those of their coloured neighbours, and their fathers are called “Jim” and “Jack” by the black men with whom they work. Racial prejudice apparently works more harm to the whites than to the blacks. So far as occupations go there is no difference, for all alike till the soil, sail boats, and gather sponges.

‘When the lumber industry was introduced into the islands, whites and blacks were equally ignorant of the various kinds of work involved in cutting trees and converting them into lumber. The managers did not care who did the work so long as it was done. They wanted three things: strength, docility or faithfulness, and brains. They soon found that in the first two the negroes were superior. Time and again persons in authority, chiefly American but also some of the more capable native whites, told me that if they wanted a crew of men to load a boat or some such thing, they would prefer negroes every time. The poor white shirks more than the coloured man. He is not so strong, he is proud and touchy. Other things being equal, the negro receives the preference, but other things are not equal. The very man who praised the negroes generally added: “But you can’t use a negro for everything. They can’t seem to learn some things, and they don’t know how to boss a job.” The pay roll reflects this. Even though the negroes receive the preference the 400 who are employed earn on an average only about 60 per cent. as much as the 57 white men. If we take only the 57 most competent negroes their average daily wages are still only 88 per cent. as great as those of the native whites. The difference is purely a matter of brains. Although the white man may be ignorant and inefficient, with no more training than the negro, and although his father and grandfather were scarcely better, he possesses an inheritance of mental quickness and initiative which comes into evidence at the first opportunity.’[1645]

6. What conclusions are we to draw from this varied evidence? Let us first ask how we should view the differences between the negro and the modern European. There seems to be no marked difference in innate intellectual power; the differences are rather differences in disposition and temperament. The white man has initiative, inventiveness, versatility, and power of leadership; the black man has humility, patience, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. It is remarkable with what unanimity observers of the negro race in its own country speak of the high degree of intellectual development. Certain points are noteworthy. The apparent arrest of development is associated with an absorption at a certain age in practical matters, in tribal habits and customs, in sex and in settling down to a normal married existence as much on the lines of their ancestors as is possible under the altered conditions. Several passages quoted above strongly suggest that what we are here witnessing is a turning away from the training felt to be strange and foreign, owing to the strength of the native tradition which claims all the affection and interest of the young man. In other words this arrest may not be so much an inevitable result of the kind of mental faculties which are inherited as a result of the coming into play of a peculiar tradition. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, when in Africa education begins earlier, when, that is to say, there is more of a break with native tradition, the arrest is less well marked. Further, in America, it is still less marked though it can be detected. The conclusion would thus seem to be that, though there may be some tendency for intellectual development to stop at a rather lower stage than among European races, it is nothing like so well marked as the observations of residents in South Africa would seem at first sight to show.

The evidence quoted has chiefly been drawn from observations upon the negro races. It must suffice here to say that what is known regarding the intellectual development of other races included in the first and second groups leads to the conclusion that, although there are signs of differences as between these races, yet these differences are not remarkable, and further that the degree to which so apparently low a race as the Australians differs from Europeans is not in any case much greater than the degree in which negroes differ from Europeans.

It remains to ask how far this evidence supplements that derived from a study of fossil remains. Judging from the fact that the general level of the development of the mental faculties of any primitive race is not separated markedly farther from that of modern European man than are the negro races in this respect from modern European man, it seems that we must allow to Upper Palaeolithic man on the average a degree of mental development at least equivalent to that of the negro. It is further only reasonable to suppose that the ancestors of Upper Palaeolithic man in the Middle Palaeolithic were little inferior in mental capacity, inasmuch as to Neanderthal man, to whom they were superior and whom they apparently exterminated, we must attribute a degree of intelligence little, if at all, inferior to that of the Australians. Of Lower Palaeolithic man we know much less. We do not know, for example, whether he buried his dead. But if we consider the variety of instruments fashioned and used by him, it is not unreasonable to attribute to him, in view of the nature of the general conclusions to which we are being led, a degree of intelligence again but little inferior to that of Middle Palaeolithic man.

Our conclusions can only be tentative; nevertheless such indications as we have all point the same way. It would seem that the major part of the progress in the evolution of the intellectual faculties had been accomplished far back in Palaeolithic times. Those living races which, with all due reservations and qualifications, may be held to represent in mental and bodily characters Palaeolithic races, differ from modern European man rather in disposition than in intellect. And it is important to note that it is in the growth of the intellect rather than in the growth of the other mental faculties that modern man is distinguished from his pre-human ancestor.

7. We may again follow the same procedure as in the last chapter. We may recall the general conditions to which man was subject in the intermediate and early periods and ask how the evolution of mental characters was influenced by them. We may further ask to what degree and in what direction the conditions of life among primitive races influence the selection of mental characters since in general we may assume the same influences to have been at work among prehistoric races. With regard to the intermediate period we have to remember that it was far longer than, perhaps many times as long as, the period which has elapsed since the rise of Palaeolithic industry. Within this period man descended to the ground, spread, if not into every continent, at least far over the surface of the world and came to dominate all other living organisms as no species had ever done before. Clearly he was enabled to achieve this result by his intellectual powers and by them alone. He did not develop any other means of attack or means of defence: he conquered by his intellect.

In a general way it is possible to understand how this came about. To begin with, the pre-human ancestor was favourably situated for such a development because he was a generalized and not a specialized type. Once specialization of form has set in, as it has among the anthropoid apes, there are two bars to such a development as occurred in man. The specialization of bodily form in order to cope with a peculiar environment renders the body less adaptable to any changes in the environment which may take place. Further, unless the body is of the nature of an instrument capable of being readily employed to perform various functions, the intellect is unable to manifest itself. We have only to think of the specialized fore and hind limbs of most mammalian types to see how poor an instrument the body would in those cases make in the service of the intellect.

Under these favourable circumstances, evolution took this momentous turn. We can understand how, since the pre-human ancestor depended for his survival almost solely upon his intellect, there would be a high premium upon intellectual development. It is reasonable to suppose that he lived in groups of polygamous families and that differential fertility thus intensified selection. There is, of course, never at any time only a single factor governing selection, and though undoubtedly intellect was the chief factor in selection, climatic and other factors were, as we have noticed, also in operation, bringing about those changes in bodily form that we have observed.

The instincts of the pre-human ancestor were doubtless, in common with those of other mammals, of a generalized type compared with what we find among some lower groups of animals. The tendency has been for them to become even more generalized, though not on the whole any less powerful. It seems likely, for instance, that the instinct of flight was definitely associated with the snakes among other objects from the attacks of which presumably the ancestor was at one time in danger. We assume this because we occasionally meet with cases in which this specialization of the instinct of flight still obtains. The instinct of flight has now become wholly generalized, being aroused by general conditions and not by specialized occurrences. If it is correct to think of the ancestor as living in groups of families, for the leadership of which there must have been continual struggles, we may conclude that the instincts of pugnacity and of self-assertion were favoured, and we may make other similar deductions in estimating the value of which, however, it must be remembered that we are very largely in the region of hypothesis and speculation. The one thing to which we may with certainty hold fast is the premium upon intellect.

8. At length the intermediate period gave place to the period marked by the origin of society of the primitive type, defined by the fact that men are bound together by rigid custom. Obedience to custom involves a considerable measure of control of the impulses. Before society of this kind could have arisen, mental evolution must have reached a still higher level.

Let us consider what is implied. To begin with, the dependence of man upon his intellect for his position in the world accounts, as we have seen, for the evolution of his mental faculties up to a relatively high level in the intermediate period. When this level had been reached, the next step was rendered possible. What was now required was that man should be able to enjoy the advantages of social co-operation. To this end law was necessary. McDougall quotes Bagehot as saying that ‘law, rigid, definite, concise law, was a primary want of early mankind; that which they needed above everything else, that which was requisite before they could gain anything else’, and that: ‘in early times the quantity of government is much more important than its quality. What is wanted is a comprehensive rule binding men together, making them do the same things, telling them what to expect of each other, fashioning them alike, and keeping them so. What this rule is, does not matter so much. A good rule is better than a bad one, but a bad one is better than none.’[1646] That man should acquiesce in the restrictions imposed by society involves prudence, which inhibits those impulses which would lead to a contravention of custom. Now; fear is a simple emotion, but prudence implies something more. It involves ‘a capacity for deliberation and the weighing of motives in the light of self-consciousness.’[1647] In order that society might become established, there was thus required a further evolution of the intellect, and, since the advantages to be gained by the establishment of society were so great, there must have been a heavy premium upon evolution in this direction.

The beginning of the first period in history thus marks the successful completion of a step in mental evolution raising man above the stage reached in the intermediate period. It is important to observe that all primitive races known to us are representatives of man after he had completed this step. So far, therefore, as their mental faculties throw light upon the mental evolution of man, it is the level of evolution reached after and not before the evolution of social organization that is illustrated.

We may now glance at the conditions characteristic of primitive races and ask how they bear upon the selection of mental characters. Primitive society we found to be characterized by hard and fast rules which must be implicitly obeyed if social organization is to be maintained. Obedience to these conventions is of the utmost importance; we may remember incidentally that, unless the conventions are observed, an approximation to the optimum population will not be made. There is in consequence a tendency towards the elimination of those exhibiting characteristics incompatible with due subservience to the prevailing tradition. Such characteristics are any marked developments of intellect or of disposition away from the average. The man who will not conform is not tolerated. However advantageous to the individual certain developments might be, such developments are not favoured because the importance of maintaining intact the group to which he belongs is of greater moment. Thus, as in the case of physical characters, the general tendency is on the whole against further evolution and towards the preservation of those types which have reached the position characteristic of any primitive race. And it is to be noted that, whereas bodily form is on the whole adapted to the physical environment, mental characters are adapted on the whole to the traditional environment. Men come to be selected in accordance with the needs of social organization, and as tradition grows in amount also in accordance with their capability of absorbing tradition.

It is difficult to point to any factors which markedly favour further evolution of mental characters. On reading the admirable accounts of the daily life and customs of the Australians as given by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, or of a much more advanced people—the tribes of Borneo, as described by Messrs. Hose and McDougall—we observe, it is true, the respect paid to men of experience and of rather more than average intelligence. We can understand how men not up to the average level of intelligence would not in all respects fare as well as others, but we do not find that there are factors distinctly favouring unusual intelligence. Some progress there probably was. On the whole those men who attained the leadership were probably rather more intelligent than the average, though among the qualities which assisted such men to gain the leadership many other mental qualities played a more prominent part than intellect; thus, by practising polygamy, or practising it to a greater extent than the rest, they left more than the average number of descendants—and, while perhaps raising the intellectual level of the race, more certainly altering the average mental endowment in respect of these other qualities.

Such an examination also shows that a somewhat different disposition is favoured in different cases. Thus a warlike type is favoured among the American Indians, for, though possibly the most warlike may be killed off the most quickly, this is more than counterbalanced by the ease which with such men get numerous wives. But such differences in no way conflict with the fact that the tendency is towards the preservation of a mean, which though it may vary somewhat, is in general outline the same among all these races.

There still remains to be noticed the result of conflict between groups, other than normal warfare, which at times led to the substitution, whole or partial, of a less intelligent by a more intelligent race, or at least of a less skilled by a more skilled race; for by this time the outward manifestation of intellect was to a considerable extent overlaid by tradition. But such substitution, though it changes the average germinal constitution of the species as a whole, scarcely accounts in any noteworthy degree for the evolution of a higher level of intellectual capacity. The conditions which did favour further evolution within these two periods are the same as those which, when present to a more marked degree and acting over a longer period of time, finally gave rise to the races of the third period, and to these conditions we may now turn.

9. There are certain regions of the world’s surface which contain within them areas abutting one upon the other and differing sharply one from the other. Such a region is found in that part of Western Asia which embraces Asia Minor, Armenia, Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Western Iran. In such areas races live in close contact with other races of very different habits, customs, and modes of life; hunting and fishing races, pastoral races, agricultural races, races predominately sea-faring, all come into contact and conflict. Under conditions of these kinds there is more tendency for advantage to accrue to intellect not only as between members of different races but as between members of the same race than in conflicts between races of similar culture. Where these conditions have ruled, therefore, there has been a tendency, though perhaps not a very marked tendency, for a premium to have been set upon intellect. It so happens, however, that this region of Western Asia is endowed above all other regions with plants and animals that can be domesticated and with other features offering rewards to skill. In this region there was thus an additional premium upon intellect, and it was apparently in this region that the races who initiated the third period made their appearance. To the favouring of intellect under these conditions we may thus attribute what superiority of intellect the races of this group exhibit over the races of other groups. But it is rather in disposition and temperament that the predominant races of this group differ from those of the preceding groups. In them we meet with a power of leadership, a resourcefulness, a versatility, that marks them off from the primitive races, and it is precisely these qualities which would be chiefly favoured in conflict and competition of the kind described. The outward manifestation of these qualities may indeed be largely a matter of tradition, but that they are also in part innate in the modern European we have seen to be the case, and the explanation of this further evolution is clearly to be found in the conditions to which they have long been subject.

Turning to the conditions within the races of the third period and neglecting the Asiatic races, those races which in fact have been left in a backwater out of the main stream of progress, we find ourselves faced with the difficulty that tradition has so far come to overlay the innate qualities of intellect and disposition, that we are only with great difficulty at present able to estimate the result of any factors which we may see at work favouring or otherwise particular types. We may note, however, that success both between and within races has fallen rather to character than to skill. There is, in other words, little reason for thinking that intellect, so far as it is measured by skill, has been markedly favoured. On the other hand, character as outwardly manifested has been clearly favoured. But how far we should see in this process a favouring of certain innate types of disposition and of temperament must be left for consideration until later. These reservations regarding the passing at present of any judgement apply with the greatest force to the results of the differential fertility between the social classes in many countries at the present day. But we may say that, as in the case of physical characters, there has now ceased to be any strong tendency towards the preservation of a mean type. Conditions allow of the existence of variations away from the mean—but, as regards intellect, unfavourable equally with favourable variations.

10. We have seen that the evidence derived both from a study of fossil remains and from a study of primitive races leads to the conclusion that the evolution of human intellectual capacity early reached a relatively advanced stage. An inquiry into the forces which we must assume to have been at work shows that intellectual capacity was more favoured in the intermediate stage than after primitive society had come into being. It was favoured at first as the character which enabled man to obtain his dominating position in the world and afterwards again as the necessary trait which enabled him to enjoy the benefits of co-operation. When dwelling on the fact that the advance since the setting up of primitive society has been relatively small, it must not be forgotten that the latter period has been far shorter than the former. The period of time which has elapsed since the ancestors of man set out, so to speak, to conquer the world, must at a minimum estimate be five to ten times as long as the period since the establishment of primitive society to the present day.

The general conclusion to which we are led is that of the whole degree of mental evolution which has taken place by far the greater part was achieved at a time when only a beginning had been made with progress in skill. To the question whether the historical process outlined in the fifth chapter is comparable with progress among wild species—is based, in other words, upon changes in the germinal constitution—these conclusions suggest the answer that the happenings in the intermediate period are very largely in any case to be accounted for in this manner. There can be little doubt that the increasing domination of man was largely proportional to the growth of his innate intellectual capacity. But to the question as to how far the happenings within the period since the origin of primitive society are connected with the further evolution of innate capacity we can at present return no answer. We may note the striking fact that within this period progress in skill has been immense and has latterly gone on at a greatly increased speed, whereas changes in the germinal constitution have been relatively small. This clearly suggests that there has been but little connexion between the course of history as usually understood and changes in the germinal constitution. But before we can pass any judgement, we must gain some idea as to the manner in which tradition contributes to the shaping of history. Only then shall we be in a position to estimate the part played by such changes in innate characters as have occurred, and to this task we may now turn.

XIX
THE NATURE OF TRADITION

1. So far as bodily characters are concerned, we have seen that we have to look for the explanation of human history primarily in changes in the germinal constitution. With regard to mental characters the position is different. It is evident that, at least in the later stages of history, the outstanding features are not correlated strictly with changes in the germinal constitution underlying mental faculties. To some extent, possibly to a large extent, they are independent of such changes. The influence of the environment in the second sense has to be considered, and until it has been considered we cannot arrive at any conclusion as to the importance to be attributed to the former factor in bringing these events about. What is now required, therefore, is a study of the influence of the environment in the second sense. It will be very briefly undertaken in this and the following chapter. In this chapter we are concerned with the nature of tradition, and the manner in which it is passed on, stored up, and retained. In the next chapter we have to examine the influence of the various factors in building up tradition.

In Chapter II we saw that, as far as mental development is concerned, the distinguishing characteristic of man is the conceptual process of thought. Man is, of course, also possessed of all the simpler mental processes there described. We have here in particular to study the consequences which follow the attainment to this higher level of mental process. It has already been observed that the circumstances were favourable to the evolution of this faculty. They also enabled the fullest use to be made of it.[1648] In the first place the human instincts are very generalized. They provide a basis for all kinds of vaguely directed activities in response to vaguely discriminated impressions from a large class of objects. Since it is only through the instinctive faculties that the intellect gets to work, the generalized nature of the instincts is a great advantage. Secondly the immature period is prolonged. In comparison with the higher animals the immature period occupies a far longer proportion of the normal term of life and thus there is provided a far longer period in which learning can proceed. Lastly there is the power of speech.

The question has been much debated as to whether there can be thought on the conceptual level without language. It would seem that conceptual thought can only exist without language when of a very rudimentary kind. ‘Language is not merely an accompaniment of conceptual activity; it is an instrument essential to its development. It is an appropriate means of fixing attention upon ideally represented objects as distinguished from percepts.’[1649] Language, on the other hand, so far as it is a means of communication concerning objects outside the actual range of perception, can only arise between persons capable of conceptual thought. And this is essentially the function of language. It reflects the conceptions by which empirical data are brought into relation. ‘Resemblances of quality are expressed by general terms, continuity of existence by individual names, the relation of ideas and the order of connexion in thought by the arrangement of words in a sentence.’[1650] Language expresses that breaking up and re-combination of the elements of experience which we have seen to be the essential features of conceptual thought.

Language makes possible the influence of mind upon mind, and is the basis of all human social development. It fixes the mind of a thinker upon his own ideas, and, when in communication with another person, it fixes the mind of the hearer upon the ideally represented objects present in the mind of the speaker. Into its origin it is not necessary to go. But it may be observed that, just as the generalized nature of the instincts and the prolonged immature period enabled the fullest use to be made of the power of conceptual thinking, so the fact that the mouth and the throat, usually otherwise unoccupied, were ready at hand as convenient instruments of communication enabled speech to be developed without occupying other organs, such as the hands, which could be profitably employed at the same time for other purposes.

2. Before we go on to consider how tradition—the product of conceptual thought—is passed on and stored up, it should be noticed that we have not to regard the process of conceptual thought as one which sprang into being in its present form and continued as such ever since. There has been a movement of thought up from dim and rudimentary beginnings to its present stage. This movement may be considered as consisting essentially in the clarification of concepts. It is possible to examine the nature of this movement without reference to the question as to how far the later stages are dependent upon the evolution of innate mental characters. It may be that the higher stages of conceptual thought are possible only when the evolution of the intellect has proceeded beyond the point where lower stages of thought alone are manifested. This question may be neglected for the present and we may consider very briefly the nature of this movement, which is best illustrated if we contrast in a few words the stage which conceptual thought has reached among primitive peoples as a whole with the stage it has reached in the everyday life of the so-called civilized races of the present time, and in so doing we may follow Professor Hobhouse’s recent exposition.[1651]

With the origin of language arises the first sign of the power to grasp the data of experience in accordance with their affinities and so to build up conceptions of individuals, groups, and classes as the subject of rough-and-ready generalizations. ‘With regard to matters standing out very plainly in experience or very close to practical interests there is not room for much divergence in method.... But outside the limited area of readily tested belief lies a mass of more doubtful ideas of great significance in human life. In this region we find in the first stage that the movements of fancy under the sway of feeling take the lead in forming belief, and that the ideas formed are so obscure and inconsistent as to blur the deepest lines of distinction drawn for more developed thought in the logical categories. We may then consider the first stage in human thought to be one of which the process of organizing experience into common categories is incomplete, and the evidence for the truth of an idea is not yet separate from the quality which renders it pleasant.’[1652] This is the stage characteristic of the most primitive peoples. The categories—particularly the category of substance—are not clearly defined. Thus vital functions may be confused with material substance, men and animals may be identified with their shadow, and a pain may be confused with a stone that can be extracted. So, too, it is thought that a man’s qualities can be obtained by eating him. Relations and qualities tend to become substances, substances deliquesce into a series of changes, and the general is confused with the particular. These tendencies of early thought underlie animism and magic, which are characteristic of all primitive races. Mr. Frazer, for instance, has distinguished two forms of sympathetic magic which he calls homoeopathic and contagious magic. Dancing and leaping to make the crops grow high is an example of the former; ‘the sympathy that is supposed to exist between a man and any severed portion of his person, as his hair or nails, so that whoever gets possession of human hair or nails may work his will at any distance upon the person from whom they were cut’,[1653] is an example of the latter. ‘Homoeopathic magic is founded on the association of ideas by similarity: contagious magic is founded on the association of ideas by contiguity. Homoeopathic magic commits the mistake of assuming that things which resemble each other are the same; contagious magic commits the mistake of assuming that things which have once been in contact with each other are always in contact.’[1654]

There follows a second stage which Professor Hobhouse calls the stage of ‘common sense’. It is characterized by the organization of ideas in accordance with the categories and by the differentiation of feeling from belief. At this stage the categories are no longer ordinarily confused and the difficulty of affirming what a man does not like to believe is no longer so strongly felt as in the previous stage. Experience is tested and good evidence is recognized as such. It is no longer believed that an enemy can be harmed by maltreating a likeness of him or that qualities like courage are substances that may be transferred. This is the stage of conceptual thought reached by the ordinary man in everyday life in a modern community when he is not specifically engaged in work of a scientific nature or in problems of religion or philosophy. Just as the simpler mental processes are present among men who have reached the conceptual level, so the earliest stage of conceptual thought can be recognized where later stages have been reached, as, for instance, when grace is conferred by the laying on of hands in a modern community.

The beginnings of the common-sense stage may perhaps be found in the second period. Essentially it is characteristic of the third period, and it was only within this period that this stage came to its full development. When this stage is contrasted with that which preceded it, it is seen that it is the clarification of concepts which is the distinguishing feature of the movement of thought. In other words there has been an improvement in the instrument whereby the intellect works—comparable to any other process through which skill is increased. Just as the bow and arrow and the plough have been improved by a series of inventions, so has the instrument of thought been improved; and just as further improvements in the plough and the bow and arrow after a certain stage has been reached may possibly depend upon further evolution of mental capacity, so possibly progress in the movement of thought may depend upon further evolution of the intellect. Again it should be observed that just as tools such as the plough are handed down as part of the tradition, so, too, the instrument of thought is handed down as part of the tradition and that, therefore, in studying in what follows the manner in which tradition is passed on and stored up, we are studying the methods whereby the instrument of thought as much as any other skilled process is transmitted.

Further stages in the movement of thought maybe distinguished. It is not necessary to go into them here. They arise within the third period, and relatively late within that period. They are characterized by the rise and development of science, philosophy, and religion—religion, that is to say, which has passed beyond the stage of folk-religion.

3. Let us now consider the passing on and storing up of the products of conceptual thinking. We may take the latter point first. Ideas may be stored up in language, customs, folk-lore, institutions, tools, and so on, using tools in the narrower sense of material implements. In one sense language is in itself a great storehouse of ideas quite apart from its function as a means of transmitting ideas regarding specific customs and rights. Slowly and painfully concepts have been elaborated, distinguished, clarified; and as a child learns his native language, in a few years he acquires the products of the thinking of untold generations from whom he is descended. It is difficult to exaggerate the immense importance of this method of storing ideas. Very largely through language alone, though not without the acquirement of ideas otherwise stored, a man passes, by the time he has reached maturity, through a stage of thought corresponding to the primitive stage, to the common-sense stage, and even to the higher stages.

It is obvious enough that at the present day ideas are largely stored in books and the vast importance of writing and printing—inventions of the third period[1655]—is a commonplace. Similarly, ideas are stored in customs, institutions, rites, folk-lore, and so on. Behind all institutions, ceremonies for example, we must seek ideas. The original ideas which gave birth to customs have often been lost, but whether this is so or not, where an institution exists and is passed on there we are witnessing the perpetuation of an idea, if it is merely an idea that it is the correct thing to perform some simple action on certain occasions. Many valuable ideas are stored up in the making and use of tools and in the practice of skilled processes, especially those which are concerned with the provision of food. We can understand how by the exercise of thought improvements in some tool or in some method are now and again made, and, once made, how they are stored up. What is less easy is to understand precisely how the passing on of ideas so stored is brought about.

4. Something has already been said as to the manner in which by means of language ideas present in the mind of the speaker are transmitted to the hearer; and it has been pointed out that apart from this the learning of any language is in itself a process by which the ideas elaborated by former generations are acquired. Bearing in mind the manner in which ideas are transmitted by language, it is clear how, after the invention of writing and more especially after the invention of printing, ideas thus stored up are transmitted. But before these inventions, and indeed to a large extent after them also, ideas committed to memory by each generation are passed on by language. Among primitive people there is a vast store of ideas affecting conduct, belief, and every side of life which is so passed on. But the storing up of ideas is not merely a matter of memory and the passing on is not merely a matter of language. Rites, ceremonies, implements, and so on, are themselves storehouses of ideas, and the transmission of the ideas therein contained, as well indeed as the ideas solely retained in the memory of past generations, is accomplished in large part by a process of absorption.

This process of absorption is due to the presence of certain innate tendencies. These tendencies have sometimes been grouped under one head and called imitation—as, for instance, by Tarde and others who have studied the process and emphasized its great importance in social life. Following McDougall we may distinguish three innate tendencies. By sympathy is meant that the exhibition of emotional excitement on the part of the agent may induce a similar emotional excitement on the part of the patient. By imitation is meant that there may be a tendency for the patient to assimilate his bodily movements to those of the agent. Important as are these innate tendencies in facilitating the transmission of customs and so on—themselves ultimately the product of conceptual thought—suggestion assumes a far more prominent place.

McDougall’s definition of suggestion has already been quoted. According to his view it is essentially the acceptance with conviction of a proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance. He points out that a proposition is not necessarily communicated in formal language, and further distinguishes certain conditions which are favourable for the communication of propositions by suggestion. Chief among these are deficiency of knowledge relating to the topic in regard to which the suggestion is made, imperfect organization of knowledge, and the impressive character of the source from which the suggested proposition is communicated. These conditions are very prominent among children and in all primitive society. There is no doubt that it is largely by virtue of suggestion that children absorb the tradition of their race and time. Children have little knowledge and what they have is imperfectly organized; further propositions come to them from a source which is impressive and has prestige whether it is from parents or grown-up people or from the conventions ruling in society. Just as children in modern society absorb tradition by suggestion, so do men among primitive races where the conditions are even more favourable for transmission by this means. Thus, in order that the products of conceptual thinking of former generations should be transmitted, it is not necessary that there should be convictions based on logical grounds or that formal language should be employed. Tradition can be, and is to a large extent, ‘absorbed’.

5. Tradition, having thus passed on, is retained, and in the process of retention habit plays an important part. Habit applies to all forms of mental process and to all forms of action. Once something has been performed in one way, it is easier to do it again in that way than in any other. ‘This is the great principle’, says McDougall, ‘by which all acquisitions of the individual mind are preserved’,[1656] whatever the mode of acquisition may be.

6. The products of the thinking of past generations are thus stored up, transmitted, and retained. Additions are made to the store, and improvements are made in the method of storing. Tradition, by which is meant this store, is thus cumulative. The acquirements of past generations are passed on to the present generation and, modified in some degree, are transmitted to future generations. New generations, therefore, so far as acquired knowledge is concerned, begin at the point where the former generation left off. It does not, of course, follow that additions are always being made to tradition; it may be for all practical purposes stagnant or much that has been acquired may be lost.[1657] It does, however, permit of accumulation, and this fact introduces an element of vast importance into the life of man as compared with his pre-human ancestors.

It is not, however, correct to say that this is a wholly new element. Tradition may be and is present before the level of conceptual thinking has been reached. Many animals, for example, live in herds and instinctively take shelter when one member of a herd utters a warning cry. If at some past time a new enemy has appeared, they will have learnt by experience to take shelter. Subsequent generations will raise the warning cry on the appearance of the enemy, because what we may think of as a tradition has grown up concerning the hostile nature of the species with which past generations were brought into contact. Thus we may think of a tradition among horses that motorcars are not dangerous. When cars were first introduced horses tended instinctively to avoid them. Many horses learnt from experience that cars were harmless, and young horses, seeing motorcars for the first time in the presence of older horses, which have learnt the lesson, absorb the tradition that they are not dangerous. Tradition among animals can go even farther than this. To some degree it seems that the manner of nest building among birds is traditional and not instinctive.[1658] But compared with the vast importance of tradition among men, tradition among animals is an almost negligible feature in their lives, and for all practical purposes we can think of tradition as a peculiar characteristic of man due to the higher mental process to which he has attained.

7. In any race at any given time there is thus a vast body of tradition. These traditions govern both the degree and the direction in which the various mental processes function. What is meant will be clearer if we think of the influence of the mass of traditions upon physical characters. At any given time there are a number of tools and skilled processes known and employed and, in the first place, the degree in which the body is exercised will depend upon their nature. It may be that hunting with bow and arrow, or fishing in canoes, is the chief occupation of the men. The degree of physical exercise will be conditioned by these traditions and so too will, in the second place, the nature and direction of physical exercise. Similarly with regard to the intellectual faculties, the degree to which they are used will be conditioned by the form of language, by the necessity of learning what custom lays down as the acquirement of an average member of society, and by the opportunities and inducements generally to the employment of reasoning. The direction in which the intellectual faculties work will also be closely conditioned by tradition. Having absorbed the traditions of the race and time, the direction which reasoning follows will always be very largely governed by what has been acquired. Few men strike out new paths, and, when they do, the direction of the path is seen to be greatly influenced by the previous trend of thought. Tradition, as it advances, thus tends to proceed in grooves.

The manner in which tradition conditions the degree and nature of the manifestation of the instinctive tendencies is equally well marked. Among some races, such as the Eskimos, fighting is almost unknown. Though among such races the instinct of pugnacity is probably less strongly given in the germinal constitution than among other races, to a large extent the relative absence of fighting is certainly due to tradition. Among the Eskimos we find a great body of custom and ideas all of which tend to impress upon them that fighting is wrong. An emotion again may be greatly developed by some racial tradition. Self-assertion is much more developed among the members of the larger and more prosperous European races than among the smaller and weaker races. The attitude of the Englishman is very different from that of the Dane, who will tell you that Denmark is only a little country that wants to be let alone. Latterly the attention of the world has been drawn to the peculiar manner in which the teaching of various historians, moralists, philosophers and others has moulded the outlook of the Germans and come to direct the expression of their emotions. Thus in a most striking manner it has been made obvious how a peculiar body of tradition, ultimately the product of conceptual thinking, has directed the emotions and sentiments of a whole people into certain channels with such disastrous results. The direction of an instinct is often changed; the tender emotion may be diverted among the childless to charitable works, and the instincts of celibates obviously become much changed. Any instinct indeed is capable of manifesting itself in very different forms according to the outlet which it finds, and the nature of the outlet is determined chiefly by tradition. ‘On a, aujourd’hui’, says Joubert, ‘non seulement la cupidité mais l’ambition du gain.’[1659] The simpler emotion has, that is to say, become more complex under the influence of the traditional environment.

8. Lastly we may note that the tradition acquired and present at any one time may form the basis for the selection of men and of groups of men. There are often, especially among the higher races, differences in tradition as between the groups and classes in the same race. The differences are usually much greater between different races. The tradition present in a race, whether because it includes a higher degree of skill, enables a greater degree of coherence to be realized, is the foundation of more vigorous endeavour, or because it is a combination of these and other elements, may enable one race, when in conflict with other races, to overcome those other races, should the latter be possessed of a tradition, which, taken as a whole, is, relatively to the conditions of the contest, less valuable. There is thus a process of natural selection based upon differences in tradition, just as there is a natural selection based upon differences due to modifications and also upon differences due to mutations. Selection of modifications, as we have seen, produces no permanent results. But selection of tradition, like selection of mutations, has results which may be permanent. In primitive society, where tradition within a race tends to be uniform, this selection of tradition chiefly comes into play in the conflict between races. In more advanced societies where there are considerable differences in tradition between the classes, it also comes into play within races.

The conflict between races is always in large measure a conflict between traditions whether or not the differences in tradition are a measure of more fundamental differences. In these conflicts a mass of tradition may be wiped out and lost for good or any degree of amalgamation of tradition may take place.

At length within modern races there arises a competition of ideas of a rather different nature. Within civilized races there is no longer a mass of tradition which has to be accepted as a whole; there are different ideas which may be said to compete. One idea may get the better of another within the minds of the majority without involving any elimination of men who hold any other idea, because men can now change their outlook—not, of course, in the case of the great majority by any logical process. Thus a struggle comes into being between ideas, customs, and institutions in modern communities which leads to change without involving human selection.

These considerations pave the way to an examination of the influence of the actual conditions under which tradition has been elaborated. We have seen that conceptual thinking develops with, and is furthered by, the use of speech. It does not develop merely to a particular level and there stop. There is a movement of thought which at least in its earlier stages takes the form of a clarification of concepts. The products of conceptual thinking are stored up and handed on in the form of tradition. This tradition is cumulative. Not only are additions made to it but the methods of storing are improved. Elements may also be lost. Finally, forming, as it does, a very important element in the manifestation of human mental character, men, and more particularly races of men, may be selected in accordance with the degree and quality of tradition acquired by them.

XX
THE ORIGIN OF TRADITION