Chapter II: , it follows that it is the female rather than the male that (10)

1. The present period, which may be dated from 1760 in England and from rather a later date in most European countries, has been marked by an unparalleled increase of population. The rate of increase has for some years been slowing down. This outburst of population is sometimes referred to as though there was something mysterious about it. It was, in fact, merely the response to increase in skill, and similarly the declining birth-rate is, at least for the most part, merely the response to the fact that skill is no longer increasing so fast.[1505] The fact that the upper social classes began to restrict their increase before the lower social classes is partly due to the fact that they are more sensitive to economic requirements. This point is almost always overlooked in discussions of the question of differential fertility, and when forming any judgement on this subject the possible loss in quality has—though it is a very difficult problem—to be balanced against the gain in arriving at an adjustment of quantity. There may be more to be said for Mill’s opinion quoted on a previous page than most eugenists would be willing to admit.

Before we go on to notice some of the many problems that arise, something may be said as to the future. So deeply have men been impressed by this increase that the most pessimistic prophecies have been published as to the fate in store for the human race. Numerous calculations have been made to show that within a certain length of time there will only be standing room. Mr. Knibbs has calculated that, if the rate of increase of the population of the world obtaining in the five years preceding 1911 was to be continued, there would in 500 years be 246,114 millions. He is appalled by the prospect. ‘No artifices of cultivation,’ he says, ‘nor any possible diminutions of human stature, so as to decrease the necessary quantity of food per person, can possibly relieve the gravity of the situation. In no case can the increase of 1 per cent. per annum be maintained for five centuries.’[1506] This pessimism is baseless; he appears to regard increase as something inevitable that cannot be stopped—forgetting that throughout the greater part of human history numbers have been for all practical purposes stationary, and that increase only exceptionally outruns economic requirements.[1507] There is no room, it is true, for mere complacency. Though the desirable density may as a rule result from economic pressure without conscious effort, it does not follow that it would not be better if adjustment was consciously brought about. And it may be that if and when men begin consciously to adjust numbers, they may have to take some criterion other than the economic into account. To this point we may now turn.

2. So far we have proceeded on the assumption that the only criterion was the economic criterion—that the only test whereby the desirable number might be ascertained was the test founded on the average income per head. There does not seem to be any reason for supposing that there is any limit to the increase of skill in the production of food, and that therefore there is any limit to the desirable number so long as the criterion remains economic. This suggests that at some point mankind will have to introduce another method of estimating what density is desirable, as it is clear that the economic advantages of increase somewhere come into conflict with other ideals as to desirable social conditions. In other words, at some point a larger income would not be worth having if it necessitated too large a population.

It would require a lengthy discussion of many points and the weighing up of many factors before it would be possible to come to any definite conclusion on this subject. It may be observed that there are those who with some apparent reason doubt whether, taking the broadest view of human welfare, a denser population than that now existing in Belgium can be thought desirable. It also seems reasonable to hold that our great cities, and in particular London, have passed the limit that allows of the development of the most healthy social conditions. It is a matter of doubt whether such agglomerations of population are or will remain necessary even if the total population of the country was to increase. There are two considerations which are relevant here. First it may be objected that in spite of the high average density of population in this and other countries, it is still easy to find large areas which are sparsely populated, and that their existence shows that there can be as yet no question of overcrowding beyond what is the socially desirable limit. But it must be remembered that the great mass of the population scarcely ever moves out of the densely populated areas, and that if they attempted to get out into the country, if only for holidays—as with increased leisure and higher incomes they will soon attempt to do—there would soon be little left of the solitude which can now be easily found.

The other consideration that is very relevant in this connexion is the average income per head. ‘Before the war’, says Professor Bowley, ‘the home income would not have yielded more than £230 gross annually per family of five, or £170 net after all rates and taxes were paid and an adequate sum invested in home industries.’[1508] No one can regard this position as satisfactory. On all hands it is agreed that it must be increased even by those who with justice insist upon the fact that any general improvement must be accompanied by a decrease in the emphasis now laid upon material comfort. Income can, of course, be increased without increasing population, but probably it cannot be increased so fast.

3. There are at least two other points of view from which the density desirable may be considered. England, for instance, is in a peculiar position with regard to her food-supply, a fraction only of which is produced in the country while the rest is imported. Only by this method can England maintain her present population. How far in the case of war, or in a lesser degree in the case of social or economic disturbances elsewhere, such a position is compatible with national safety is certainly a matter for careful consideration. It seems scarcely likely that the decision would ever be taken to limit population on this account alone in view of the economic sacrifices which it would entail.

In addition to treating the question as it affects safety in the sense just alluded to, it may also be treated from the purely military point of view. The desire for a dense population so frequently expressed from the sixteenth century onwards, as noted in the first chapter, is largely based on the fact that the larger the population the more potential soldiers there are. Harrison, for instance, wrote as follows: ‘Some also do grudge at the great increase of people in these days thinking a necessary brood of cattle far better than a superfluous augmentation of mankind. But if it should come to pass that any foreign invasion should be made, which the Lord God forbid for his mercy’s sake, then should these men find that a wall of men is far better than stacks of corn and bags of money, and complain of the want when it is too late to seek the remedy.’[1509] This attitude was especially noticeable in Germany before the war. A German author comments on the ‘mad craze for numbers’, and goes on to add that ‘at the back is rather the desire, which I admit is often vague, for as many soldiers as possible’.[1510] It is by no means absent in England. In the second Report of the National Birth-Rate Commission we read as follows: ‘But in the event of a war similar to that which we have just experienced, what would happen to us with a greatly reduced birth-rate? Surely all we have would be taken, and we must become slaves—as we should be to-day if we had entered on the struggle with Germany without adequate man-power. Moreover what would happen to our Empire?’[1511] It may be doubted whether there has been produced by such considerations in recent times even in Germany any effect upon numbers; probably economic forces have overruled such considerations altogether. It is possible that they may have had some influence upon military nations in earlier days. It is to be imagined and certainly to be hoped that they will not mould views on this subject in future.

4. As has been indicated, such departures as there are among European nations at the present day from the desirable density are of the nature of minor fluctuations. Europe is not from the point of view of productiveness over-populated (or was not in 1914; it is very difficult to sum up the position in this respect since the loss of capital owing to the war). There is no ground for the pessimism of Sir Thomas Holdich, who says that ‘Asia affords no asylum for overcrowded Europe’.[1512]

It may be observed that the phenomenon of unemployment as generally seen in industrial countries is not evidence of over-population. It has been shown by Beveridge that unemployment, such as now occurs in England, is in no way connected with over-population. It is due to certain maladjustments in the industrial system, such as the decay of industries, the seasonal and cyclical fluctuations of trade, and the position as to the normal reserve of labour. The industrial system so functions that, unless special measures are adopted, there is always a certain amount of unemployment. Unemployment is thus ‘a problem of industry’ as Beveridge has called it.[1513] It may also be observed that the remarkable differences in the return per head as between different countries are in any case very largely due to the amount of skill employed and not to the nearness of approximation to the desirable number.[1514]

At any given time in any nation it is desirable either that population should be stable or that there should be a certain ratio of increase. It is clear that increase may be brought about under many different conditions. A high birth-rate and a high death-rate may give the same ratio of increase as a low birth-rate and a low death-rate. These conditions have been much studied; the consideration of them falls outside this book. But we may note that, as far as numbers and the direct effect of the environment are concerned, but not necessarily so far as quality is concerned, a low birth-rate and a low death-rate represent more healthy conditions than a high birth-rate and a high death-rate. There is a certain correlation between the birth-rate and the death-rate, though it is often exaggerated. In Japan, for instance, there has recently been a tendency towards a decrease in the birth-rate and an increase in the death-rate. It is necessary to beware of those sweeping generalizations which assert that a high birth-rate means a high death-rate and vice versa. It may also be noted that the decrease in the birth-rate has been attained in different European countries in very different ways. Thus, whereas in England the decrease has been general throughout the country, in Germany it has been almost entirely confined to the towns.[1515]

Here, however, the discussion is limited to general principles; problems of this nature cannot be further inquired into. We have already noted that minor fluctuations in the nearness of approach to the optimum number as between neighbouring countries may increase, if it does not give rise to, friction between them. We may further note here that such consequences only follow when there are differences of nationality involved. When within an area inhabited by one nationality some part of it is becoming under-populated—say the urban districts—population flows in from other districts and in this case from the country. But when one country is tending towards under-population and a neighbouring country towards over-population, there is but little flow of population and but little adjustment. Various difficulties, some legal, others sentimental, check the movement towards the less fully populated country. Nevertheless, there is some movement. Thus there were resident in France in 1911 1,132,696 foreigners.[1516] But this immigration only went a little way towards bringing up the population towards the level which was apparently economically desirable, and there thus arose a position which aggravated the tension between France and Germany.

There are certain ‘new’ countries where curious conditions obtain. Their position cannot be judged in the same manner as can that of a country which has long been settled. The occupation of such countries can only proceed at a certain pace, and if it went more quickly we should have a peculiar condition of relative over-population. There is reason to think that population in many of these countries has not grown as quickly as it might have done, and that there is, in fact, a condition of relative under-population.

5. This leads us to refer to the methods of limiting increase in use at the present day. It is clear that some methods are necessary. Even if it should be thought advisable that population should increase, it cannot possibly be desirable that it should increase as fast as is possible. It therefore falls to those who disapprove of certain methods to suggest others. This problem is seldom faced by those who would dissuade men and women from certain practices. The attempt to advise in these matters without regarding the problem as a whole is strongly to be deprecated.[1517]

Abortion is condemned on every hand, and we are thus left with postponement of marriage, restriction of intercourse between married persons, and the use of contraceptive methods as the means of bringing about the limitation of families. There is much to be said for the postponement of marriage for a certain period after the age of puberty. That education should be completed, and that a certain experience of life should be gained, before the choice of a partner is made and the responsibilities of setting up a home are undertaken, are obviously desirable. In order, however, that postponement of marriage should be effective, it would require that the average age at marriage should be so late as to produce many undesirable consequences. It seems certain that, not only under present conditions, but under almost any conditions of social life that we can picture, late marriage must be accompanied by a system of prostitution and irregular sexual habits which nearly every one agrees in deploring. Apart from this almost overwhelming argument against late marriages, there are many other objections. It is not a good thing on the whole for children that their parents, should be beyond a certain age.[1518] Much can be urged with force against late marriage on the lines that after a certain age the outlook and habits of celibates so change as to render them less fitted to bring up a family. As few will be found to advocate late marriage as the only method, we may leave the matter at this point.

With regard to restriction of intercourse, the most important question is whether it can possibly be effective. Very serious doubts arise on this account when it is proposed to rely on this method alone. Late marriage might be in practice effective because sexual desire would find its satisfaction apart from marriage. Abstention from intercourse implies that sexual desire will not find its satisfaction; on this account it is likely that it can only be effective when accompanied by a system of prostitution that we have already agreed to regard as undesirable. Apart from this there are strong arguments against this method founded on the undesirable psychological results of abstention. It is in fact perhaps scarcely possible to think of a marriage system as satisfactory in which what we must regard as the physical object of marriage is not realized.

We are thus led to speak of the use of contraceptive methods and we may glance at two sides of the matter—ethical and physiological. It is a notable fact that all religious bodies, so far as their opinions can be discovered, are strongly opposed to this method.[1519] This objection is founded upon many considerations, of which the most striking is perhaps that the method allows of, or rather that it encourages, self-indulgence. Those whose attention has been drawn to the problem of the causes of the progress and decay of civilization will not fail to feel the force of any argument against the spread of habits which encourage self-indulgence. But it may be suggested that the normal exercise of any physical function can scarcely be called self-indulgence. There is a mean in the satisfaction of physical appetites, on the one side of which is self-indulgence and on the other side asceticism. It is a question whether those who disapprove of these methods because they encourage self-indulgence are not in fact demanding an ascetic life. As a form of self-discipline there may be much to recommend ascetic practices, but that is another matter. The fact is that in the use of these methods there is nothing which necessarily encourages self-indulgence. They make it possible to exercise a normal function; they do not necessarily lead to its over-use. This would seem to be without doubt the most tangible objection to these methods. The other objections are on the whole rather of a religious than of an ethical nature, and as such fall outside the scope of this book.[1520]

In addition to the ethical there is the physiological aspect of the matter. There are several different methods employed to prevent conception. It is a matter of great importance to know which of them can be employed without causing ill health. With regard to this little is known and opinions vary. More than this need not be said.

It is no part of the object of this book to advocate any particular methods;[1521] it is only intended here to show what problems arise at the present day from the quantitative aspect of the whole matter. It may be suggested that upon the question of the methods of limiting population it is desirable that there should be some consensus of opinion. Man has not only to settle how far he is going to limit population, but how he is going to do it.

6. We may now glance at certain questions which if they are to be referred to at all in this part of the book are most easily introduced here. These questions are not directly concerned with the quantitative aspect of the problem; their importance lies chiefly in their bearing upon the qualitative aspect.

It is a familiar fact that at the present day the birth-rate is higher among certain sections of the population than among others. There is reason to believe that this was also the case in some of the older civilizations—notably in Rome. We may first look at the facts and afterwards at the causes. Many investigations have shown that there is a higher fertility among the lower social grades. Heron found that there is a high average correlation between the birth-rate and conditions which indicate a lower social grade, such as the number of pawnbrokers per 1,000 inhabitants, the amount of child employment, pauperism, overcrowding, and other indications of poverty and lack of culture.[1522] Whether a differential birth-rate results or not in a differential contribution to the next generation depends on whether there is a differential survival rate, and if so, whether it compensates for or not the differences in the birth-rate. The following extract from the Report of the National Birth-Rate Commission throws light upon this point. Using material provided by the Registrar-General for England and Wales giving the births for 1911 classified according to the occupation of the father, the following is the position:

‘Classifying into groups arranged in descending order of social grade we have:

_Social Class._ _Births per 1,000 married males aged under 55 years._ Upper and middle classes 119 Intermediate 132 Skilled workmen 153 Intermediate 158 Unskilled workmen 213

‘The rate of mortality in the first year of life is also provided in these groups, and follows the same order, viz. 76·4, 106·4, 112·7, 121·5, 152·5. If, however, we multiply the birth-rate by the difference between unity and the proportion of deaths, i. e. the proportion of survivals in the first year, the resulting effective birth-rates are still in the same order, viz. 110, 118, 136, 139, 181, after the hazards of the first twelve months have passed. We must conclude, therefore, that the initially higher birth-rate of the lower classes is not so reduced by heavier infant mortality that their effective birth-rates are brought into approximate equality with those of the wealthier classes. We have no material allowing us to extend the comparison to later years of life; but equally we have no reason to suppose that such an extension would change the order.’[1523]

All available evidence goes to support this conclusion, namely, that the higher the social status the lower is the fertility, and that this initial difference is not removed by subsequent differential mortality. This is apparently true not only for England but also for other countries in which the economic situation is similar, and is a relatively recent phenomenon.[1524]

7. In looking for the causes of this differential increase as between various sections of the population, we have to remember that, in accordance with what has been said in the last chapter, we suppose the position in regard to population in the nation as a whole to be ruled by economic factors. If there is an increase, then we suppose that increase to be somewhere about that which the economic situation demands in order that the greatest income per head should be gained. It follows that generally speaking the conditions we find among the mass of the industrial population excluding the lowest class approximate to those which are demanded; but it is possible that, just as the increase among the lowest class is excessive, so the increase among the higher social class may be too small judging from the economic standpoint. We have here to ask what factors there are which bring about a lower fertility among the upper classes, recollecting that this low fertility may not be wholly due to an approximation to economic requirements, but may represent a failure in adjusting increase to the economic situation.

Among the factors which bring about a low fertility in these classes, those connected with differences in education and the age at which the maximum income is obtained are the most important. Education is continued in these classes up to an age at which men in the industrial classes are earning almost the maximum wage to which they will ever attain. Even when education in the ordinary sense of the word is finished, there usually follows a period when the salary gained is low, or when perhaps a premium has to be paid in order to obtain a start in whatever profession is chosen. Doctors and barristers seldom begin to earn until some years after their education is complete. Further, when they do begin to earn, the income is often for many years low, and may in some cases not reach the maximum until late in life. Among the industrial population conditions are wholly different, and the maximum rate of wages is soon reached. Whatever forces, therefore, may be playing upon the industrial population, there are in addition the above forces playing upon the professional classes which account for the lower rate of increase among them.

There are also many other factors at work in the same direction. In the life led by the upper social classes there are more numerous ways in which the desire for relaxation, change, and pleasure may find satisfaction than among the lower classes. Life is in many ways more varied. This has an influence upon fertility in two ways. When a marriage takes place among the upper social classes it involves to a far more considerable extent than among the lower classes a renunciation of much that has given pleasure hitherto. When a man marries and ‘settles down’ he gives up, as a rule, many activities from which he had derived pleasure before. Further, after marriage the possibility of indulging in many of the pleasures which this varied life offers is often incompatible with the bringing up of a family. Children are often in the way. Again, though children are no longer the economic asset among the lower classes which they were before the passing of the Factory Acts, the possession of children is generally looked upon among those classes as a support in old age when the power of earning has gone. Children, on the other hand, among the upper classes have rather to be provided for, and in any case are seldom regarded as a support.[1525]

Very many other factors might be mentioned, but enough has been said to show how in the main the different fertilities may be explained. The insufficient income of many of the less well-paid groups of the higher classes is often alleged as a cause of low fertility. This view is well founded when, as often occurs, social conventions force a so-called higher standard of living upon them—a standard which merely involves the expenditure of more money than among the industrial classes in preserving appearances without adding to welfare. When, however, this is extended to classes in which income has reached, say, between £600 and £1,000 a year, it cannot be allowed that income is truly insufficient. It is in such cases only insufficient when more than is reasonable is expended in the way of material satisfaction. A man cannot be heard to say that he cannot afford a large family as otherwise he will not be able to keep a motor-car—so long, that is to say, as the motor-car is not necessary to his profession.

7. This differential fertility occurs in countries where the population is less homogeneous than in England, and thus assumes importance in another aspect. For whether we assume the differences between the elements in the population to be due to inherited characters or to varying social traditions—a question to be discussed later—a change in the proportion of the different elements will be of great importance. According to Hill, who has investigated this matter in America, the percentage of white women of native parentage under 45 years of age bearing no children is 13·1, while the percentage of foreign women is 5·7. The average number of children for white married women of native parentage is 2·7, and for similar women of foreign parentage 4·4. Among the foreign women the average number of children for a married English woman is 3·4, for a German 4·3, for an Italian 4·9, for a Pole 6·2.[1526] The above is only one example of conditions which obtain in many countries raising difficult problems.

The same problem arises in an even more important form when there are in the same country races as different as the white and the negro. In the United States and in South Africa the problem assumes greater importance than elsewhere. In the latter country the negroes are increasing faster than the white element of the population. In America this has not been the case in the last hundred years; but the fact that the white element has maintained its relative position is due to the fact that in addition to the increase in the native-born white population there has been an increase due to immigration.[1527]

8. The question of the relative rate of increase of the population of different countries is a somewhat different matter. It is due to many factors, one of the less important of which is that the population of various countries does not approach equally closely to the number desirable in each country. The chief factor is the variation in the arts of production in use in each country. It is only an extension of this fact that the natural resources of different countries have been more exploited in some cases than in others. In Russia the arts of production in use are less advanced than in more western countries. The introduction of western methods into such a country enables a rapid increase of population to take place. During the same period the increase can only be slow in countries which already use these methods, and thus, so long as the knowledge of the arts of production is not equal in all countries, different rates of increase are liable to arise when knowledge spreads into a more backward country.[1528]

Such changes are altering the composition of the population of the world. The following figures have been given for Europe. Out of 1,000 inhabitants there were in the years named the following proportion of Teutonic, Romance, and Slav elements:

1801 1850 1905
Teutonic 375 369 273
Romance 355 321 251
Slav 268 310 375

XIII
THE QUALITATIVE PROBLEM

We now approach the second part of the problem, and turn from a consideration of the quantity to a consideration of the quality of the population. In the second and third chapters we found that reproduction was a necessity, and that to the fact of reproduction can be traced the origin of problems both of quantity and of quality. In the third chapter we further found that the position of animals and plants in a state of nature as regards problems of quality was in its broadest aspect simple. The changes in the forms of organisms, which, when viewed as a whole, we call evolution, are due to changes in the physical basis from which new generations arise. The long procession of organisms, usually of increasing complexity, from the simplest type to the immediate ancestor of rational man, thus owes its being to a long procession of changes in the germ-cells.

When treating of the quantitative problem among men, we considered a large amount of evidence which bears also upon quality, and this evidence, supplemented as and where necessary, will enable us to make some estimate of the importance of qualitative changes among men. This is the object of the remaining chapters. We have to try and estimate how far human history is comparable with changes among species in a state of nature—is due, in other words, to germinal changes. There are two other possible causes of change among men—the direct influence of the environment and the influence of tradition—and in order to estimate the importance of germinal change, it will be necessary also to consider what importance is attributable to these two factors. To one of them—namely to tradition—we shall find reason to attribute great importance. Tradition, in fact, comes ultimately to be of more importance than germinal change among the underlying causes of history. But tradition is profoundly influenced by the quantity of population among other factors, and, therefore, to the extent to which this is so, the determining factor in human history is still bound up with the population problem. As history ceases to be strictly correlated with changes in quality, it comes to be influenced by a factor the nature and strength of which is largely determined by the quantity of population. Thus the two aspects of the whole problem are linked together in the case of man in a manner that does not obtain among species in a state of nature.

The attempt to deal with this problem will be undertaken in the following manner. In Chapter III reference was made to the influence of the environment upon growth and upon the adult form. In Chapter XIV this subject will be developed so far as species in a state of nature are concerned, and the results of the inquiry will be applied to man in