Chapter IV: Outpost Fighting Expanded (2)

Some of the enemy ground pressure against the outposts in September and October had been relieved by the increase in the number of air strikes received by the 1st Marine Division. De-emphasis of the Air Force interdiction strategy in favor of striking the enemy wherever (and whenever) it hurt him most had made available more aircraft for close support of ground operations.[233] The UN commander, General Clark, who had given the green light to the shift in USAF policy and targets, followed the giant hydroelectric strike in June with a mass attack the next month on 30 military targets located near the North Korean Capital. During a year’s freedom from air attack (July 1951-July 1952) Pyongyang had become not only the major logistics center for combat equipment and personnel but also the focal point for command and control of Communist ground and air defense efforts.

[233] The 1st MAW chief of staff during this period, then
Colonel Samuel S. Jack, offered the opinion that “the
Fifth Air Force was most sympathetic to Division
requirements for close air support from Wing sources. The
Eighth Army in the Joint Operations Center proved to be
the principal limiting factor in the assignment of air
in accordance with these requests. Also, requirements
that Division CAS requests filter through I Corps and JOC
constituted a major factor in Wing response.” _Jack ltr._

Designated Operation PRESSURE PUMP, the 11 July strike against Pyongyang called for three separate attacks during daylight and a fourth at night. This extended time over the target would give enemy fighters more than ample time to take to the skies in defense of the Capital. Because Pyongyang “was defended by 48 guns and more than 100 automatic weapons, making it one of the worst ‘flak traps’ in Korea,”[234] there was considerable hazard in the operation. Added danger to the pilots resulted from the decision to forewarn the North Korean civilian population of the air assault. General Clark explained the reason for dropping warning leaflets prior to the attack on Pyongyang:

[234] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482.

The objective was in part humanitarian and in part practical. We
had to hit Pyongyang because the Communists had made it a major
military headquarters and stockpile area. We wanted to warn the
people away from danger areas. By warning them away we disrupted
their daily lives and made it difficult for the Communists to
maintain any kind of schedules in their work in the city.[235]

[235] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, pp. 208–209.

Results indicated that both the destructive and the psychological aspects of the mission were successful. American, British, and ROK planes completely destroyed 3 of the 30 military targets attacked. Of the rest, only two escaped major damage:

According to ... reports, the North Korean Ministry of Industry’s
underground offices were destroyed and a direct hit on another
shelter was said to have killed 400 to 500 Communist officials.
Off the air for two days, Radio Pyongyang finally announced
that the ‘brutal’ strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had
inflicted 7,000 casualties.[236]

[236] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482.

Of the far-reaching effect of the leaflets, the UN commander later wrote:

The warning leaflets, coupled with the bombing, hurt North Korean
civilian morale badly. The very audacity of the United Nations
in warning the Communists where bombers would strike hurt morale
because it emphasized to the North Koreans just how complete was
UN mastery of the air. Contrarily, it made them see even more
clearly that the Communists were ineffectual in their efforts to
ward off our air blows....

As a result of the warnings, the bombings, the failure of
the Communists to provide protection, and the refusal of the
Communists to permit evacuation of the clearly defined target
areas, civilian resentment was channeled away from the UNC
bombers and towards the Communist rulers.[237]

[237] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 209. “I told you so” leaflets
were dropped after the raid to impress the inhabitants
with the importance of believing the warning leaflets.
USAF, _Ops in Korea_, No. 127, pp. 36, 37.

The record set by the 1,254 sorties flown in this 11 July operation was to last only seven weeks. On 29 August, 1,403 sorties were employed in a new strike against the Capital. The massed raids against military targets in Pyongyang, known as the “All United Nations Air Effort” turned out to be the largest one-day air assault during the entire three years of the Korean War. Again attacking at four-hour intervals three times during daylight, Allied aircraft blasted a list of targets that “read like a guide to public offices in Pyongyang and included such points of interest as the Ministry of Rail Transportation, the Munitions Bureau, Radio Pyongyang, plus many factories, warehouses, and troop billets.”[238] Of the 45 military targets in the city, 31 received moderate-to-severe damage according to post-strike photographs.

[238] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 489.

Substitution of the previous interdiction strategy by PRESSURE attacks brought increased close air support to frontline troops. As a result of this expanded number of CAS sorties, wing pilots and ground forward air controllers greatly increased their operational proficiency.[239] The Marines were still not satisfied with the close support picture, however, and neither were a number of U.S. Army commanders. Some of the latter regarded General Clark as the champion of more extensive close air support missions for frontline units, but he quickly dispelled this view. Instead, he cautioned these supporters of Marine-type close air support to accept the existing procedures, which were derived from the “vast reservoir of experience ... [representing] the composite view of senior members of the Armed Forces [with] the longest and most responsible experience in close support during World War II.”[240] At the same time the UN commander, on 11 August 1952, had advised his force commanders to study the factors affecting the close air support situation in Korea and comment on certain UNC proposals for improving the CAS system.

[239] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-53.

[240] _Ibid._, p. 9-143.

In the close air support picture for the Marines, October was a bright month. In the outpost battles of early October, the 1st MAW put 319 sorties in the air during both day and night to strike, strafe, bomb, and burn enemy positions and troops facing General Pollock’s division. A new level of achievement had been reached during the Bunker Hill battle in August. That month nearly 1,000 aircraft, predominantly Marine, loosed ordnance at targets on and near the Chinese MLR and OPLR.

During the first six months of Marine ground operations in defense of JAMESTOWN, wing squadrons and pilots had made major contributions to the U.S. air effort in Korea. On 7 June 1952, First Lieutenant John W. Andre, VMF(N)-513, piloting a World War II model Corsair on a night armed reconnaissance mission over the west coast of North Korea, shot down an enemy piston-driven Yak fighter. It was the first time that a Russian-built plane of that model had been knocked out of the skies at night by another plane. This aircraft was also the fifth kill for the lieutenant, making him the first Marine nightfighter ace in Korea.[241]

[241] The first Marine night ace was Captain Robert Baird, who
shot down six Japanese planes between 9 June and 14 July
1945. Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_, p. 404. Lieutenant
Andre’s first four planes were also downed during World
War II. See Appendix F for Marine air kills during the
Korean War.

Nearly three months after that record, another one emerged: the first Marine to down an enemy jet with a propeller-driven aircraft. Late on the afternoon of 10 September, Captain Jesse G. Folmar and First Lieutenant Willie L. Daniels, both of VMA-312, had taken off from the _Sicily_ to attack an enemy troop concentration reported to be south of Chinnampo, on the west coast just below the 39th Parallel. Shortly after reaching the vicinity of the target, the Marine Corsairs were jumped by a pair of MIG-15s. Two more Russian-made jets tore into the fight. During a fast exchange of cannon and machine gun fire, the Marine captain was able to score lethal hits on one of the MIGs. When four more of them picked up the chase, the vastly outnumbered Marines broke for home, heading westward in a diving turn.

Captain Folmar’s return to the _Sicily_ was delayed almost immediately:

I had just started picking up good diving speed when I saw balls
of tracer ammo passing on my left and at the same instant felt a
severe explosion in my left wing ... I saw that the left aileron
and four feet of my left wing were gone.[242]

[242] VMA-312 ComdD, Sep 52.

This damage caused the plane to rapidly go out of control. While still able to maneuver, the Marine aviator headed for the sea and as he neared it, bailed out of his Corsair and parachuted into the ocean. A rescue plane out of Cho-do picked him up and returned the captain, who had sustained a slight shoulder injury, to the carrier. Lieutenant Daniels, who had alerted the rescue force, circled his descending flight leader until he hit the water. After ascertaining that the waterborne flier’s condition was satisfactory, the lieutenant turned his plane towards the _Sicily_. In a short while he was safely home.

In late September, Major Alexander J. Gillis, VMF-311, assigned earlier that summer to the Air Force’s 335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 4th Fighter Group, as an exchange pilot.[243] distinguished himself by becoming not only the first naval aviator to destroy three enemy aircraft in Korea but also the second one to get a multiple killing in a single day.[244] Flying in a four-plane Sabrejet formation near the vicinity of the mouth of the Yalu on 28 September, Major Gillis led another plane after two MIG-15s. By superior pilot technique and aggressive tactics, he forced one of the enemy to crash during a low altitude chase. Later on during the sortie, the Marine initiated an attack on a solo MIG, closing on it and scoring hits that caused the plane to become uncontrollable and the pilot to eject. Major Gillis also had to eject from his F-86 after it became disabled by the MIG. The incident had occurred on the Marine aviator’s 50th combat mission with the Air Force. He spent nearly four hours in the Yellow Sea before a rescue helicopter picked him up.

[243] The exchange program “appears to have originated with the
participation--at Tactical Air Command’s invitation--of
two Marine Corps and two Navy pilots ... in the fall
of 1947.” Within two years, the program designed to
“indoctrinate selected Air Force and Navy pilots in the
air operational and air training activities of each
other’s service, had received Department of Defense
approval.” On 1 October 1949 the program went into
effect. Initially the exchange period was one year,
but after the Korean fighting broke out, the period
was reduced to approximately three months. Marine
participation began late in 1951. Atch 1 to Hq, USAF
(AFCHO) memo to Maj J. M. Yingling, HQMC, dtd 16 Jan 67
in v. V, Korean comment file.

[244] On 15 September, Major Gillis had shot down a solo MIG-15.

Another feat, this one a study in determination and perseverance, had occurred early in the summer. On 22 July, the VMJ-1 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vernon O. Ullman, had taken to the air for a photo mission over North Korea in the vicinity of Sinanju, located near the Yellow Sea 40 miles above Pyongyang. During the first of seven scheduled flights, he encountered heavy flak but nevertheless completed his first mapping run in the area. Further, the Marine flier decided that the antiaircraft menace was not going to force him to abandon the remaining part of his task. He continued. On the second of his seven runs, some 40 enemy jets (MIG-15s) appeared on the scene. These were dissuaded from close-in interference, however, by the photo escort of 24 USAF single-engine Sabrejet fighters. Thereafter, the Russian-made aircraft disappeared; Lieutenant Colonel Ullman continued, despite the intense, accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, until he concluded his mission.

The type of determination displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Ullman helped Marine tactical squadrons achieve some kind of distinction nearly every month from late spring to the fall of 1952. In May, VMF-323 (“the Death Rattlers”), then commanded by Major William A. Weir, established a squadron one-month record for number of combat sorties, 1,160, and total combat hours, 2,362.7. A high percentage of aircraft availability, 95.6, helped make this mark possible. On 1 June, VMA-312 received the congratulations of CTF 95 for its “outstanding performance under difficult conditions” during the spring months. During this period the squadron, based on board the USS _Bataan_, had been particularly hampered by excessive turnover of key squadron officers and flight leaders. This continual squadron rotation resulted in considerable variation in pilot indoctrination and need for field carrier landing qualification, due to the “close tolerances in pilot skill required by carrier operations.”[245] Despite these difficulties, VMA-312 had scored an impressive 80-sortie mission, flown by 24 aircraft, on 18 April.

[245] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-77.

Additional recognition of professional excellence was conferred upon Marine squadrons in July. On the 17th, the senior advisor to the ROK I Corps expressed the gratitude of the corps commander for the magnificent support the 1st MAW pilots had provided during the second week of the month. All four attack squadrons in MAG-12 and both fighter units in MAG-33 had taken part in these CAS missions. A week later, eight planes from Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Miller’s VMA-323, (which, along with Lieutenant Colonel Graham H. Benson’s VMA-212, had been redesignated from fighter to attack squadrons the previous month), completed an unusually successful interdiction mission at Hago.

Located 25 miles northwest of Kaesong, the village reportedly was the site of heavy troop concentrations, active mortar positions, and antitank weapons. Leaving K-6 at 1725, the eight Marine VMA-323 pilots were soon over the target. Comprising the Death Rattler’s flight were Majors John M. Dufford, Raymond C. Holben, William H. Irvin, Jr., and Curtis E. Knudson; Captain John Church, Jr.; First Lieutenant William A. Poe, Jr.; and Second Lieutenants Stuart L. Spurlock and James S. Thompson. At 1810 their attacks were launched, using 1,000-pound bombs, napalm, rockets, and 20mm ammunition. The strike was over almost as soon as it had started, and when the Marines departed, not one building remained in useful condition. But it was not until several days later that the final results of the strike were known. Intelligence sources reported that the raid had caught the enemy troops at the evening meal; more than 500 had been killed by the Corsairs, aptly called “Whistling Death” by the Japanese in World War II.

For the remainder of the summer and into the fall Marine groups and squadrons continued their record-breaking and efficient support of ground troops and naval forces. With four squadrons (two day, one night-fighter, and one photo), MAG-33 sent 141 sorties against the enemy on 6 August. This one-day group record occurred just before the departure of Colonel Condon, who turned over the reins of the organization to Colonel Herbert H. Williamson on the 11th, and then took command of MAG-12.

Shortly before Colonel Condon relinquished command, he was particularly pleased by the success of a four-plane strike by VMF-311 (Major William J. Sims) in support of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division commanded by Brigadier General Samuel T. Williams. Major Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., strike leader, was accompanied in this flight by Captain George R. Brier and Second Lieutenants Charles E. Pangburn and Whitlock N. Sharpe. Up until this time the infantry had been particularly harassed by several enemy frontline fortifications and supporting artillery. The four pilots destroyed three bunkers and two heavy guns and also caved in approximately 50 feet of trenchline on the 7 August strike. Upon learning of the success of the Marine pilots and the conditions under which the attacks were carried out--dangerous terrain and constant ground fire directed towards the planes--the general dispatched a letter, commending the “skill, courage, and determination displayed by these pilots....”[246]

[246] MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 16.

Another congratulatory message was received in September, this one from General Pollock for the excellent support given by MAG-12 on the 20th. With three attack squadrons participating, Colonel Condon’s group had neutralized Chinese weapons and troops at OP 36 to help prevent a takeover of the Korean position. The pilots reported well over 100 Chinese casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Chamberlain’s VMA-323 contributed most of the 23 Marine sorties. The other attacking squadrons were VMA-121 (Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Cargill, who 10 days earlier had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Crawford), and VMA-212, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice W. Fletcher.

September was a month of mixed fortunes in the air war over Korea. The successful CAS strikes of the 20th followed only a few days after another high point set on 14 September, when Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s attack squadron flew its 5,000th combat sortie since arrival in the Korean theater in October 1951. Then on 15 September, General Jerome commissioned a new kind of unit in the wing, Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1), whose mission was to provide electronic counter-measures (ECM) for UN aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence F. Fox headed the squadron, the only one in the naval service with an ECM primary mission in Korea.

Three days after the commissioning, a strange incident transpired. North of the UN line and at an altitude of 9,500 feet, a F-84 Thunderjet fighter, with U.S. Air Force markings and insignia, attacked a propeller-driven Air Force trainer. The slower plane immediately began defensive maneuvering, flying in tight circles. After making five turns, the trainer pilot saw the supposedly friendly jet fly off.

It was believed that such a paradoxical occurrence was due to the substantial number of F-84 losses and the enemy’s ability to piece together and fly an aircraft of that model. A few similar episodes--attacks by apparently friendly aircraft on UN planes--had previously taken place. In each case, the impostor was a model of U.S. aircraft that had suffered particularly heavy losses.

Another incident in September had dire consequences. On the 10th, MAG-33 dispatched 22 fighter aircraft from VMF-115 (Lieutenant Colonel Royce W. Coln) to attack reported troop concentrations near Sariwon, 35 miles directly south of Pyongyang. The F9F Panther jets had completed the strike and were returning to their K-3 base when they were diverted to land at K-2, Taegu, where the weather was better. Fog had suddenly swept over the field at K-3, reducing visibility to zero. Sixteen Panthers landed safely at K-2, 45 miles southwest of the Marine field at Pohang. The remaining six, piloted by Majors Raymond E. Demers and Donald F. Givens, First Lieutenant Alvin R. Bourgeois, and by Second Lieutenants John W. Hill, Jr., Carl R. Lafleur, and Richard L. Roth, flying in formation in poor weather, crashed into the side of a 3,000-foot mountain while descending.[247] They would have required only an additional 600 feet of altitude to clear the summit.

[247] Although not definitely proven, there were “some
indications of false radio beacons being used by the
enemy in clandestine operations in the K-2 area.” _Jack
ltr._

Losses of Marine pilots and aircraft had been of growing concern to the wing command. The initial success of the flak suppression fires had eliminated the one successful Communist source of air defense, accurate antiaircraft firing. One result was that noncombat accidents for a while during the summer became the principal cause of pilot and plane attrition. To help reduce these operational accidents as well as the combat losses, the two Marine air groups instituted squadron training programs and also directed the adoption of several new corrective procedures. In MAG-12, for example, a study of results from the FAF policy that limited bombing runs to one for interdiction and two for CAS targets revealed a sharp reduction in hits from flak. Tactical squadron commanders in MAG-12 drew up a syllabus during September to test proposed defensive tactics for their propeller aircraft to employ against enemy jets. The carrier squadron, VMA-312, began that same month the additional practice of field carrier landing qualification at K-6 for new pilots before permitting them to operate from the carriers.

In spite of these efforts, pilot losses spiralled alarmingly in October. For the rest of 1952, the monthly totals remained near that month’s level. On the other hand, aircraft losses during October dropped sharply to 10 from the September total of 22. This lower figure was not to be exceeded until May 1953. These remedial procedures were considered at least partially responsible for the substantial decrease in aircraft losses.

In another area, a mid-October landing at Kojo, on the east coast immediately south of the 39th Parallel, did not work out as planned. The amphibious operation was in reality a feint intended to draw troops away from frontline positions and expose them to naval air and gunfire as they rushed in reinforcements. The enemy failed to rise to the bait, and actually only a few Communist troops were sighted. VMA-312 provided armed reconnaissance, tactical air operation, and naval gunfire spotting during the feint. Although they made little enemy contact, the Marine “Checkerboard” pilots operating off the _Sicily_ gained much experience in landings and take-offs under the adverse conditions of rough seas and high winds.

_Rockets, Resupply, and Radios_[248]

[248] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1st
MAW ComdD, Oct 52; HMR-161 ComdDs Aug-Sep 52.

Through October 1952, operational control of Korean based Marine fighter and attack squadrons was still vested in commanders other than General Jerome. Tactical squadrons continued to be directed by the FAF or Navy in their missions; the observation and helicopter squadrons were under operational control of the 1st Marine Division and utilized, as before, at its discretion.

HMR-161, commanded since 8 August by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Carey, continued its primary mission of evaluating rotary wing aircraft and their methods of employment. One tactical innovation, movement of elements of the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, was undertaken during August soon after the Bunker Hill battle. With ground-fired rockets, the problem of a tell-tale cloud of dust and brilliant flash of the rockets after each salvo had always plagued the artillerymen. This seldom went unnoticed by the enemy, who often showered the marked area with counterbattery fire. On 19 and 20 August, in Operation RIPPLE, HMR-161 and the rocket battery proved that these two units could successfully shoot and scoot to a new location and fire effectively again without drawing an enemy reprisal. This Marine Corps innovation in air mobility--the first displacement of field artillery under combat conditions--offered a major time-saving advantage. Whereas previously it took approximately a half-hour for rocket launchers to move from their bivouac area to firing position,[249] deployment by helicopter could be made in a matter of minutes, a time factor that could be critical in event of an enemy attempted breakthrough.

[249] _Henderson ltr III._

The operation demonstrated that helicopters not only could transport rocket crews with weapons and ammunition to firing areas far more rapidly than conventional wheeled vehicles, but that the rotary craft could airlift these weapons into places inaccessible by road. The nature of the mountainous terrain proved advantageous in that hills and valleys provided defiladed areas for loading and firing the weapons as well as protected routes for helicopter movements. An observation made by pilots for operations in other types of environment, not offering as much cover and concealment, was that the shiny blue paint on their birds would make detection easy in most surroundings and that camouflage paint would lessen the risk from enemy AA.

Transport helicopters of HMR-161 continued to augment those of VMO-6 in casualty evacuation and ferrying Marines and other frontline troops. The observation squadron maintained its policy and outstanding record of emergency flights of the wounded under any weather conditions except dense fog (electronic navigational aids still were not available). In August, various mechanical failures developed among the newly received HO5S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. These three-place observation aircraft were underpowered but superior in many flight characteristics to the HTL-4 helicopters then in the squadron. Mechanical difficulties with the newer aircraft increased until it became necessary to ground them late in October until replacement parts became available in the supply system.

Employment of transport helicopters for logistical support continued to be a principal use of such rotary wing aircraft as the end of 1952 approached. Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory that this versatile aircraft could resupply a battalion manning the MLR. The next step was to determine if the logistical support for an entire combat regiment could be accomplished by helicopter. Operation HAYLIFT, conducted during 22–26 September, the last of five operations that month for HMR-161, was to test and evaluate helicopter resupply of Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines. Plans called for delivering all Class I, III, and V items and such Class II and IV items as could be accommodated. Two loading and four unloading sites were prescribed. All but extremely valuable cargo, such as mail, was to be carried externally in slings or wire baskets.

HAYLIFT did show that at least for a short period of time--five days--a helicopter squadron, utilizing 40 percent of its aircraft, could sustain a MLR regiment. Following the general procedures employed previously with the battalion, HMR-161 found that no great changes were necessary for resupply of the regiment. Two recommendations emerged from an evaluation of HAYLIFT. One stressed the need for establishment of an operations center manned by representatives of each unit participating in the exercise. The second called for development of a more flexible loading system, one that would permit rapid weight increases or decreases of 50 pound increments, as the situation demanded. Such a method would make possible a more efficient payload for each lift.[250]

[250] For example, on 25 September, rain soaked the cardboard
cover of the rations, adding extra weight to each
preloaded lift of these Class I supplies. On the other
hand, a heavier load could have been used at times. As
the helicopter used up its fuel, a commensurate increase
in cargo could have been carried.

Transport on a larger scale in the 1st MAW was accomplished by General Jerome’s few transport aircraft reinforced by the eight R5Ds from the VMR-152 detachment. In June, the passenger-carrying operations reached the peak for the entire Korean War; that month, 17,490 troops and military-associated civilians utilized the reinforced wing transport aircraft. June 1952 was also the second busiest month in freight transportation (7,397,824 pounds, nearly double the figure for June 1951).

Squadrons that were unable to better their performance records in some cases could trace their trouble to the inability to get all of their planes off the ground. Several models were subject to spare parts shortages.[251] New aircraft, the F3D-2s and the AU-1s received in June by VMF(N)-513 and VMA-212, respectively, had preceded an adequate stocking of normal replacements for worn out or defective parts. The night fighter squadron was handicapped also by introduction into the supply system of inadequate radio tubes, which burned out rapidly. The most critical shortage, however, was parts for starter units of jet engines. This deficiency was not corrected until summer. One problem never quite eliminated was the confusion of supply orders intended for the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6. It was believed that the close resemblance of Sikorsky HRS and HO5S part numbers and nomenclatures had caused the improperly-marked requisitions and mix-up.

[251] Spare parts shortages are “inherent in the introduction
of new equipment into the field and prior to the
development of usage data.” a major effort was made at
this time by 1st MAW to improve its critical spare parts
support by improved stock control procedures and complete
inventory. _Jack ltr._

The 1st Marine Division logistical situation during the summer and fall of 1952 was generally excellent. General Pollock’s units did not suffer from the shortage of spare parts experienced by the 1st MAW whose aircraft sometimes had to be grounded because of a missing spare part. U.S. Army support in the replacement of worn-out Marine vehicles for new Army ones proved satisfactory. No major problems arose in engineer support. Medical evacuation and treatment and the level of supplies in the five companies of the 1st Medical Battalion remained excellent.

There were two significant changes in the logistical support provided the Marine division early in the fall. One dealt with employment of the division’s 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, located in the rear support areas. Beginning in September, the companies were placed in direct support of the four infantry regiments, with liaison by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Martin, division motor transport officer. It was believed this decentralization would have the following advantages:

1. Decreased vehicle mileage and therefore less driver fatigue
and prolonged vehicle life.

2. Increased dispersal as a safeguard against loss of wheeled
vehicle support in event of an unexpected and successful enemy
attack.

The other change was a shift in the emphasis of support rendered by the Korean Service Corps. During October, each of the three frontline regiments received 300 more laborers, raising the total to 800. Rear area units paid for the increase, since the KSCs were detached from support units and sent forward to the MLR.

Logistical support from the 1st Signal Battalion left little to be desired. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Morris[252] when the Marines moved to western Korea, the signalmen helped establish and maintain an extensive communications net, with 5,200 miles of wire within the division and several vital links to adjacent and higher commands.[253] Wiremen worked around the clock to lay and maintain the telephone lines, which suffered considerable damage from the artillery and mortar barrages. When possible, the signalmen raised the wires off the ground. The battalion set in more than 1,400 telephone poles. After the system had been installed and was working efficiently, the July floods washed away part of the major communications. By improvising and by setting up emergency equipment, the battalion was able to maintain the flow of communications traffic at a satisfactory level. Replacement items were provided by the U.S. Army on a reimbursable basis in accordance with existing directives.

[252] On 4 April Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Hicks assumed
command of the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob E.
Glick relieved him on 3 August.

[253] Communication with General Kendall’s I Corps consisted of
radio-teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane,
and motor messenger. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-68.
The 11th Marines also had an additional 1,100 miles of
communication wire. _Henderson ltr III._

In September it became apparent that the signal equipment used to maintain division communications was no longer equal to the demands placed upon it. The extensive ground area plus the number and size of reinforcing units had not only put a heavy burden on radio, telephone, and teletype equipment but also caused the depletion of reserve stocks. With the spare equipment in use, there was no pool to draw upon when units turned in defective equipment for repair. Neither were there available replacements for materiel destroyed by enemy action. Items most urgently needed were flown in from the States. Other critical parts came from Army sources in Japan and Korea. By the end of October, the communication resupply had returned to a more normal condition.

Before the month ended a different type of critical situation was to confront the division. It appeared that the enemy’s success in seizing a half-dozen outposts earlier in October had only whetted his appetite for more. Chinese eyes were turned towards positions that held still more potential value than the stepping-stones just acquired. The extreme right battalion in the division front held by the 7th Marines was the focal point of the new effort.