Chapter III: The Battle of Bunker Hill (2)

Division intelligence subsequently reported that the 2100 attack on 13 August had been made by an enemy battalion with a reinforced company in assault. This same unit again sent a small band of Chinese soldiers against Hill 122 at 0225 the following morning. This clash was to be the briefest of all offensives for control of Bunker Hill during the 11–17 August period. Prior to launching this four-minute fire fight, an enemy machine gun at Siberia had attempted to harass the Marines at Bunker Hill. In retaliation, Marine tanks illuminated this enemy weapon with their searchlights and immediately took it under fire with their 90mm guns, knocking it out of action. At the same time, enemy artillery attempted to shell friendly tanks. During this brief fire exchange, one tanker was wounded slightly and the lens of one fighting light was splintered by fragments from enemy shells bursting around the tanks. The inconsequential probe was made, Marines believed, not so much to seriously challenge Marines holding Hill 122 as it was to retrieve CCF dead and wounded from the major attack a few hours earlier that night.

Anticipating that a much heavier ground attack was close at hand, the 1st Marines ordered a reinforcement of the Bunker Hill position. Even before the heavy action on the 13th, this machinery had been set in motion. To this end, the 3d Battalion was to reinforce the Bunker defense by sending a 1/1 platoon to the hill and the 2d Battalion was instructed to return Company A (minus this platoon) to the reserve battalion. At 0415 on the 14th, Company E/2/1, led since 10 August by Captain Stanley T. Moak, took over from A/1/1 the responsibility for the 2d Battalion’s MLR “Siberia sector,” adjacent to the Bunker Hill area held by the 3d Battalion. The Company A reinforcing platoon arrived at Hill 122 just before dusk, preceding another CCF company attack by only a few hours.

At midnight the 1st Marines front was suspiciously quiet for a few minutes. Forward on Hill 122, there was no apparent enemy activity. Captain Demas sent out a two fire-team patrol from Bunker to reconnoiter northwest of Bunker towards the Chinese lines. Shortly after the eight Marines returned with a negative report of contact with the enemy, the regiment received a report about the outbreak of a small arms clash between defenders on the left flank of Bunker and an enemy unit farther west. At 0118 on 15 August what had initially appeared to be a minor contest suddenly erupted into a heated fire fight all along the 124–122 Bunker Ridge complex. At the request of Captain Dumas, Marine artillery fired protective boxes around the Bunker positions. This defensive maneuver held the attackers in check.

At this moment, Chinese infantrymen in the draw running alongside the 124–122–120 ridge system were massed for an assault on Bunker from the northeast. The plan might have been successful had not a fighting light from a tank on the main line intercepted the Communists in this state of their preparations. In a matter of moments, friendly artillery, mortar, and tank fire struck the Chinese and scattered the formation.

After discovering he could not successfully pull a sneak attack, the enemy reverted to his usual procedure, employing a preassault bombardment prior to his infantry assault. This preparation began at 0206; it reached the rate of approximately 100 rounds of 82 and 122mm mortar shells per minute. While supporting weapons pounded the Marines, the Chinese assault commander reorganized his attack force that the Marine shelling had scattered. Communist infantry then moved forward and fired on the Bunker Marines, who replied with rifles and machine guns and box-me-in fires. Unable to penetrate this protective mask around the positions, the Chinese gradually decreased their small arms and artillery fire until, at 0315, the rate of exploding shells at Hill 122 had dropped to only four or five per minute. Soon thereafter the small arms fire slacked off entirely and by 0400 even the mortars had stopped. Across the entire 1st Marines front, all was quiet again.

During the Company H defense of the hill, enemy losses, caused mostly by friendly artillery and mortar fire, were placed at 350, including 40 counted dead. Captain Demas’ Marines suffered 35 casualties, of whom 7 were killed. En route to the MLR after relief by B/3/1, the company suffered four more casualties, including two KIAs, all the victims of Chinese mortars.

It was not long before these weapons inflicted casualties on Company B, which had six of its men wounded even before the H/3/7 unit had reached JAMESTOWN. Another Marine at Bunker was wounded by enemy mortars later that morning. At 1640 the Communists again probed Bunker Hill, this time in company strength. Striking in daylight during a thunderstorm and without any preparatory fires, the Chinese attackers failed to achieve any tactical surprise. The defenders fired both infantry and supporting weapons; some threw grenades at the few Communists who did manage to get close to the fighting positions. At 1750, the Chinese withdrew, this time leaving 35 of their dead in the attack area. Four Marines had been wounded; five others suffering from battle fatigue were later evacuated.

Exactly when the enemy would strike next at Bunker Hill was not known by the Marines. Most believed that the Communists would return but only speculated as to when. Although the battalion felt that “the enemy was not expected to attack again for some time,”[188] events were to prove otherwise. In any case, the battalion was prepared, having an adequate force on Bunker and sufficient local reserves to absorb an attack up to the strength of any received so far. Division supporting arms were readily available for commitment at critical points.

[188] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.

The Chinese soon put an end to the conjecture about the next attack. At 0040, 16 August, an enemy force, later estimated as a battalion, came out of positions to the west and north of Hill 122. Supported by mortars at first, and later on by artillery, the battalion sent one company against the Marine outpost. Several attacking elements were able to penetrate the defensive fires. These Chinese reached the crest of the hill and began using their rifles, automatic weapons, and hand grenades against the defenders. Captain Scranton called for reinforcements. A platoon from I/3/7 was dispatched promptly from the 3/1 sector. The reinforcements departed JAMESTOWN just as the fire fight on Bunker began to subside. By 0315, the enemy had begun his withdrawal, and another reinforcing element, I/3/1, had moved forward, this time from regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s CP.

About two hours later a brief fire fight flared up in the Company B sector. No ground assault was made on Marine positions. The enemy force, of undetermined strength, never closed with the Marines and within 10 minutes, the firing stopped. No casualties to the Marines resulted during this exchange. The earlier clash had resulted in the death of 3 Marines and the wounding of 27. Enemy losses were estimated at 40 killed and 30 wounded.

Before it came off the hill, Company B was engaged by enemy fire three more times. At 1945, Chinese mortars (82mm) wounded two Marines. Later, heavier mortars placed 20 rounds on Hill 122, but these caused no casualties. There were some losses, however, early on the morning of the 17th when C/1/1 was relieving the Bunker defenders. Captain Scranton’s Marines sustained five more wounded from automatic weapons, five during the relief.

The second relief of Company B on Bunker brought to a close the battle that had been waged for possession of the vital hill complex. During the Hill 122 tours of Company C and other 1st Marines units that followed in August, seven more ground actions tested the Bunker Hill defenses. Only one of them, during the night of 25–26 August, was of significant size. This attack also failed to dislodge the Marines from the hill.

_Supporting Arms at Bunker Hill_[189]

[189] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 4–16 Aug 52;
1st Mar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs,
Aug 52.

It was quite natural that the flurry of ground activity during the battle of Bunker Hill created a need for increased participation from Marine supporting arms. The magnitude of infantry action during the contest for Hill 122 resulted in a monthly record to date in 1952 for the amount of air support received as well as the volume of both artillery and tank fires supporting the division. During this critical 9–16 August period, the 11th Marines played a part in every ground action except the feint attack on Siberia and the seizure of Bunker Hill, both of which were purposely executed without an artillery preparation. Medium tanks fired day and night missions during most of the infantry action. Close air support at times amounted to a strike every 20 minutes.

During the ground action around Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli, the division received close air support in amounts unparalleled for JAMESTOWN Marines to that time. Marine and U.S. Air Force pilots flew a total of 458 missions (including 27 ground controlled MPQ-14 radar bombing attacks) during five of the most critical days, 9–13 August. On two of them, the 1st Marine Division received priority of close air support along the whole EUSAK front. Fifth Air Force assigned 1st MAW aircraft to Marine requests for close air support as long as Marine aircraft were available.

The initial air strike by Marines in the Bunker fighting was on 9 August in support of counterattack plans for Siberia. MAG-33 provided a morning and evening flight of four F9F jet fighters to destroy enemy forces and defensive works on 58A (Siberia). USAF fighter-bombers attacked Siberia and other outposts nearby and enemy artillery positions supporting the Chinese forward line. On the next day, air operations, concentrating on Siberia, were stepped up considerably against enemy outposts. Thirty-five aircraft in nine missions attacked 58A with bombs, rockets, and napalm. These strikes were carried out by MAG-12 and U.S. Air Force pilots at irregular intervals during daylight hours. Air controllers reported good results. Other aircraft hit known mortar locations capable of supporting the Chinese. During the morning, Marine Attack Squadron 121 (Lieutenant Colonel Philip “L” Crawford) bombed and burned Bunker Hill. Just before sunset, F-80 and -84 jets of the U.S. Air Force dropped 15 tons of bombs on mortar positions and troops on and around Hill 120. Four F-80s also participated with eight Marine AD-2 propeller-driven attack aircraft in the morning attack on Bunker.

Air activity in support of the 1st Marines continued unabated on 11 August. Before the diversionary ground attack just after dusk that day, Marine and Fifth Air Force fliers repeated the treatment that Hills 58A and 122 had received the previous day. During daylight, supporting weapons positions were hit by FAF fighter planes. At night, MAG-12 air attacks guided by the MPQ-14 radar bombing system destroyed hostile artillery and mortars. Also during the dark, the medium bombers of the FEAF Bomber Command struck deeper in the rear at heavy weapons locations.

These Air Force bombers conducted four more controlled-bombing attacks against Chinese artillery during the early hours of 12 August, when Company B was consolidating its positions and hastily organizing the defense of Bunker Hill. After daylight and until dusk, MAGs-12 and -33 and USAF squadrons provided four-plane flights to strike troop assembly areas, supporting weapons positions, and observation posts close to Hill 122. In late afternoon, Marine pilots in four F9F Panther jets and three ADs bombed and burned the enemy side of Bunker Hill during the shelling and subsequent ground attack against the Marines on the eastern slope.

Marines flew, on 13 August, all of the daylight close air support missions in support of the actions on both Bunker in the center and Stromboli in the right of the 1st Marines sector. On 13 August, a total of 94 aircraft were committed over the regimental sector to conduct strikes in support of ground operations. Enemy Hill 104, commanding the 2/1 outpost on 48A (Stromboli), received four attacks. Fighter bombers (F4U propeller-driven Corsairs) carrying napalm, rockets, and 1,000-pound bombs, raided the hill mass at 0535. The other strikes against this key terrain-feature were made by attack and fighter aircraft during the afternoon. Other targets on the regimental right were weapons positions beyond Hill 104 and an enemy outpost one thousand yards west of Stromboli.

Most of the air support received by the 1st Marines on the 13th was directed against targets that were participating--or that were capable of taking part--in the battle on Bunker Hill. Against the enemy on the height itself, the Marines directed only three strikes, and these came late in the morning. A majority of the air attacks were dispatched against observation and command posts and the firing positions of both automatic and large caliber weapons. Chinese artillery and mortar fire had inflicted more casualties and punishment on the Marines than the enemy infantry assaults. As a consequence, the main effort of the close air support strikes was directed against these hostile supporting weapons.

After dark on the 13th, VMF(N)-513 commanded by Colonel Peter D. Lambrecht,[190] took up the air offensive against the heavy firing positions in the rear of the enemy line. The squadron conducted four attacks with its night fighters. Two of its attacks were made just before sunrise.

[190] Two days later, Colonel Lambrecht, flying a F3D twin jet
night fighter with his radar operator, Second Lieutenant
James M. Brown, disappeared while on a night flight. The
last known position of the plane was over the Yellow
Sea, 50 air miles west of Pyongyang. At about that point
the aircraft faded from the radar screen. Efforts to
reestablish communications failed. It was reported that
observers at sea sighted a crash and explosion at about
this same time. Extensive search failed to uncover any
trace of the Marines or their aircraft.

During the remainder of the battle of Bunker Hill, the ground fighting subsided and the requirement for close air support abated accordingly. On the 14th, only four daylight strikes were flown in the 1st Marines area. These, all by Marine squadrons, were against active artillery and mortars in the defilade of Hill 120 and others to the west on the far slope of Hill 123, and Chinese outpost positions, west of 48A, which had been pestering the Stromboli garrison. There were no flights after dark on the 14th, but on the following night, two MPQ missions were flown by VMF(N)-513. Each was a single plane flight against a reported artillery location. This was the final night air action in the battle for Bunker Hill. Daylight missions in support of Hill 122 defense after the sharp decrease of attacks on the 14th numbered only seven attacks, each by four planes. These, flown by Marines, continued to emphasize the destruction of enemy artillery.

Marine artillery continued its support of ground troops and air strikes. Cannoneers of the 11th Marines fired 21 flak suppression missions during the five days beginning on 11 August. This type of close coordination between Marine supporting arms further reduced combat losses of aircraft providing CAS to the division. The Marine artillerymen had played a vital part in the defense of the besieged outposts. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage credited the box-me-in fires with an important role in thwarting each enemy attack on Bunker.[191]

[191] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, pp. 3–4.

In the 24-hour period beginning at 1800 on 12 August, Marine artillery directly supporting the 1st Marines fired 10,652 rounds. Most of the ammunition was expended in support of the Bunker Hill defense; some was used in behalf of the Marines outposting Stromboli during the Communists’ early morning diversion that day. On the 9th, the direct support battalion, 3/11 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Rogers), had fired about one-fourth of the 12–13 August total. Many of the shells that first day of the Bunker battle were preparatory to counterattacks for regaining Siberia.

When the retaking of Hill 58A was discarded in favor of the surprise attack on 122, the amount of artillery support was reduced, during the 1st Marines infantry preparations on the 10th and 11th, in keeping with the fire support plan. Upon seizure of Bunker, Lieutenant Colonel Rogers’ business immediately picked up and quickly reached a crescendo the following day, when the 10,652 shells fired became a Marine one-day battalion record for western Korea until the last stages of fighting in 1953. Other Marine artillery battalions fired reinforcing missions during the critical period as did the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery which fired a large number of on-call ripples. The regimental commander later recalled that “during some of the crises every gun that could bear on Bunker in the 11th Marines and reinforcing units was shooting there.”[192]

[192] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC and MS comments, dtd 20 Jun 67, hereafter _Henderson
ltr III_.

After a sharp drop on the 14th, the artillery support gradually decreased in proportion to the amount and strength of the enemy’s action against Hill 122. By 20 August, 3/11 was firing only 244 rounds a day. Only on the 26th, during a serious Chinese attempt to retake Bunker, did the number of artillery rounds match the intensity of the fire support rendered during the earlier part of the month.

It was not only the quantity of 11th Marines support that the infantry called for during the battle of Bunker Hill; quality was equally important. A majority of the more than 28,000 rounds that 3/11 fired during the eight days of Bunker Hill fell around the besieged outposts. Many rounds were fired in defense of MLR positions. In both of these types of protective fires, extreme accuracy and precision were required due to the proximity of enemy and friendly lines in order to prevent any “short” rounds from falling among Marine positions. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage recalled that during the height of the battle on the night of 12 August, “we did have a bad scare ... when Captain Connolly reported that friendly mortar fire was falling short.”[193] The battalion immediately ceased fire with its 60mms, 81mms, and 4.2s and each piece was checked; the culprit was quickly located and within 5–10 minutes 3/1 resumed fire.

[193] _Armitage ltr_ and comments, p. 12.

During the August battle, artillery in general support of the entire division and I Corps artillery reinforcing the fires of Colonel Henderson’s regiment, stepped up their efforts to destroy the distant and more difficult targets, including mortars and artillery. These continued to be the main cause of Marine casualties. Some of the labors of the 11th Marines gun crews did silence enemy heavy weapons, but personnel losses from enemy shellings still mounted, especially in the infantry units. To assist in the location and destruction of the enemy artillery, aerial observers spent considerable time in spotting and fixing Chinese weapons positions.

Besides these counterbattery efforts, the 11th Marines employed other artillery means to provide the additional support the 1st Marine Division requested during Bunker Hill. Two of these were the counter-counterbattery and the countermortar programs, the former being a passive defense-deception program to minimize Chinese counterbattery fires against 11th Marines weapons. Nearly every day C Battery, 17th Field Artillery Battalion, fired special request missions.[194] Another type of fire, flak suppression, aided the cause of close air support pilots delivering ordnance against those Chinese positions taking Bunker Hill and Stromboli under fire. At night, illumination shells helped outpost and frontline Marines in locating groups of enemy massing for assault on Hill 122.

[194] Many of these targets were CCF choke points, dumps,
and weapons emplacements. Targets were identified and
confirmed by a highly developed system that employed air
spotting, aerial photographic interpretation, artillery
evaluation, and POW interrogation.

Mortars (4.2-inch) of the 1st Marines contributed heavily to the defense of the outposts. Operations reached a peak on 12–13 August when, in a 24-hour period, Captain Carl H. Benson’s mortar company fired 5,952 rounds--4,084 high explosive and 1,868 illuminating. In addition to their defensive fires, these hard-hitting weapons attacked Chinese mortars, automatic weapons, defensive positions, and troop formations with deadly accuracy.

No less precise and lethal were the fires of Captain Gene M. McCain’s gun tanks (Company C, 1st Tank Battalion), and the battalion flame tanks. Three of the latter had fired their 105s in support of the KMC on the morning of the 9th before the vehicles received orders to move east to join Company C temporarily. On the next day, 90s fired on enemy bunkers, observation posts, and trenches in the vicinity of Siberia and Stromboli. During 11 August, two gun tanks blasted at targets immediately beyond Siberia and others to the west of that outpost.

Towards the end of the 11th, the critical part of Bunker battle began for the tankers also. Those elements of Lieutenant Colonel John I. Williamson’s battalion supporting the diversion and the subsequent main attack pulled into positions south of Hill 122 on the MLR and to the right in the Company F sector. It was not until the next day that the tanks operating with the 1st Marines reached a peak in gun support for the Bunker fight. Beginning with the defense of Hill 122 from 1600 that day, and for the next 26 hours, the tankers placed 817 shells on targets effecting the Chinese capability of capturing Bunker and Stromboli. In addition to the heavy ammunition, the Company C tanks, augmented by the 1st Marines antitank platoon and five tanks from the division tank reserve, fired 32,000 rounds of .30 caliber machine gun ammunition.

Except on the 11th, most of the tank firing in the fight for Bunker Hill through 14 August was accomplished during the hours of darkness. On the latter date, the cannons and machine guns of the mediums blasted directly at Chinese outposts opposite Colonel Layer’s regiment. The number of rounds that day fell off considerably from the high on the 13th; on the 15th the tanks in the 1st Marines area did not fire at all. Heavy rain that had accompanied the late afternoon thundershower that day made movement forward to firing positions impractical. By the next day, however, the ground was solid enough to permit some maneuvering by the tracked vehicles. They fired 52 rounds of 90mm shells and 14,750 machine gun rounds at automatic weapons positions and bunkers on the western slope of Hill 122. This marked the final tank mission in support of the 1st Marines in the battle for Bunker Hill.

During the early part of the August fighting, tanks of the division were able to get the first real test of a technique of night support,[195] and at the same time experiment with a towing device to permit retrieval of disabled vehicles under fire without getting outside the tank. The use of the lights to support both the diversionary force and the defense of Hill 122 showed the value of these instruments. Lieutenant Colonel Williamson recommended that tanks be employed in pairs, one to spot and adjust fire and the other to fire. With respect to the towing device, he considered the new piece of equipment an improvement over the manual hook-up method, but noted that the device limited tank maneuverability and had a tendency when bouncing up and down over rough terrain to dig into the ground, impeding the forward progress of the vehicle.

[195] The use of fighting lights to illuminate targets for tank
gunners had been undertaken in July, but the results were
inconclusive, owing to failure of one of the bulbs of the
two lights tested. 1st TkBn ComdD, Aug 52, App. VI, Encl.
2. Declared the G-3, 1stMarDiv: “The diversion on Siberia
was 100 percent effective, due largely to the new tank
battle lights which we were using for the first time.”
_Honsowetz ltr II._

_In Retrospect_[196]

[196] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_;
_PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar
ComdDs, Aug 52.

Whether the sacrifice of Siberia in favor of the seizure of Bunker justified the outcome can be determined, in part, by looking back to the division commander’s reasons for this decision. He had cited three advantages in seizing and occupying Hill 122 instead of 58A. One, tactical surprise achieved by an attack on the former, was an unqualified success. That Bunker Hill would provide more defensible terrain and at the same time add strength to the main line were two sound judgments that the test of time would bear out. The third point, that observation into the enemy’s outpost line would be increased from the higher hill, also proved to be correct.

Only the inability to neutralize Hill 58A effectively from Bunker cast any doubt on the considerations. At night the enemy could occupy Siberia both for firing positions and flank security to attack friendly forces moving down the corridor east of Hill 122. Action to counter these two enemy actions came mainly from MLR forces.

One measure of the results of the Bunker Hill fighting is seen in the price paid. Chinese losses were estimated by the 1st Marine Division at approximately 3,200, including more than 400 known dead. Marine casualties in the action were 48 killed and 313 seriously wounded. Several hundred additional wounded were treated at 1st Marines medical facilities and returned to duty shortly thereafter.

To replace combat losses in the infantry regiment, General Selden on 12 August directed that rear area service and support units fill the vacancies. Two hundred Marines, nearly all of them volunteers, were provided to Colonel Layer by the 14th. To offset other losses within the division, its commander similarly had requested on 12 August that the Commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., authorize an air-lifting of 500 enlisted Marine infantrymen to the 1st Marine Division as soon as possible. Pointing out that mounting battle casualties had reduced the effective strength of the division, General Selden also urged that each of the next two monthly replacement drafts scheduled for the division be increased by 500 more enlisted men. After some debate at the next senior administrative headquarters,[197] the request was granted by General Shepherd, and the emergency replacements were made available from the 3d Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California. The initial replacement of 500 Marines arrived on 21 August.

[197] CG, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Hart, requested the
Commandant to delay decision until FMFPac could
survey the combat replacement situation and aircraft
availability. After a quick evaluation of both these
factors, General Hart on the 14th recommended approval.
FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App. I, Encl. (6). The air lift
of 500 replacements to Korea was an “all out effort for
Marine Aviation Transport based on the West Coast. This
general support of Korean based forces demonstrated the
total capability of Marine Aviation in support of ground
forces.” MajGen Samuel S. Jack to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 27 Jun 67, hereafter _Jack ltr_.

More men to replace divisional combat losses might have been required had not the medical support been such an efficient operation. After the battle, the regimental surgeon, Lieutenant Robert E. Murto, called for a review of the medical facilities in effect during the Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli fighting. In attendance were the battalion doctors and the division surgeon, Captain Lawrence E. Bach. Participants discussed both the major difficulties and routine procedures involved in medical care of the wounded. Problem areas were the high incidence of heat exhaustion, ground transportation of the wounded, enemy artillery fire that interfered with helicopter evacuations, and the need for increased medical support under battle conditions.

Regarding the last category, the surgeons noted that medical supplies during the heavy fighting of 9–16 August were never at a dangerously low level. The only shortage that had developed was in stretchers, due to the normal delay in transfer of stretchers from medical stations along the evacuation route to the company forward medical facilities. To help combat the Chinese artillery problem, medical officers had placed aid stations on the reverse slopes of hills. There was no available or known solution to hastening and easing the movement of battlefield casualties over the ground. The armored personnel carrier offered some protection from ground fire and a ride less painful than one in a truck, but the wheeled vehicles remained the most widely used.

There was little that could be done about the number of heat exhaustion cases. High temperature and humidity, vigorous activity, and the wearing of the armored vest (and to some degree, the steel helmet), combined to produce the casualties. All the surgeons agreed that regardless of the number of heat casualties, the wearing of these two items must continue. Regimental doctors credited the armored vest with saving the lives of 17 Marines. Several other Marines, they noted, had received only slight head wounds from bullets that had spent most of their velocity penetrating the steel helmet.

Helicopter evacuation saved the lives of other Marines. The doctors credited the flying skills and bravery of the evacuation pilots for these rescues. Immediate response to day and night calls was instrumental in the recovery of numerous Marines. Rear Admiral Lamont Pugh, Surgeon General of the U.S. Navy, commented upon the value of the helicopter and on other reasons for success of medical support. After a Far East inspection trip, which included a visit to the 1st Marine Division during the battle of Bunker Hill, Admiral Pugh expressed the following opinion:

... [I] attributed the new low record “2% mortality” of
those men wounded in action to the bullet resistant vest, to
skillful frontline surgery with availability of whole blood,
the utilization of helicopters for casualty evacuation direct
to hospital ships and rear area hospitals, and the efficient
manner in which the Hospital Corpsmen of the Navy fulfilled their
mission with the Marines.[198]

[198] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 12. p. 12-8.

In another logistical area, the performance was not quite as satisfactory, for the level of supply of one important item--illuminating shells--fell dangerously low during the Bunker fighting. On 16 August, 3/1 reported early in the morning that “artillery illumination was exhausted and 81mm mortar illumination was fast diminishing.”[199] To replace the shell-produced light, the regiment used a flare plane.[200]

[199] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.

[200] Earlier, on 13 August, a flare drop requested by the 1st
Marines went awry when the aircraft got off course and
dropped the flares forward of the 5th Marines main line.
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 13 Aug 52.

Ammunition supply appeared to be no problem to the Chinese. The rate and frequency of mortar and artillery fire proved that the enemy had a vast store of these shells. During the heavy fighting, the division observed that the enemy expended approximately 17,000 mortar and artillery rounds in the 11–16 August period of the battle. It was noted for the first time that the Chinese used mortars primarily in support of limited attacks.

About the enemy’s reliance on mortars and the technique of their employment, the 1st Marine Division reported:

This was particularly true of his 60 and 82mm mortars, which are
easily displaced forward and shifted to alternate positions.
These light mortars were difficult to locate by our observers
mainly because of the small size and limited development of
their positions, and the fact that they are moved frequently. A
large number of enemy mortars were fired from bunkers deep in
the ground with only a narrow aperture at the top through which
to fire. There were some instances, during the Battle of Bunker
Hill, when the enemy brought his 60mm mortars out from cover on
the forward slope and set them up in the open near the crest of
the ridge. After delivering several rounds, the mortars would
then displace quickly back to a covered position. During August,
mortar fire averaged between 50 and 60 percent of the total
incoming received by the 1st Marine Division.[201]

[201] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, p. 2.

Further information about the Chinese was also derived at this time, although not always directly associated with the battle. Deserters picked up in the left sectors of the 1st and 5th Marines on 12 and 13 August and papers taken from enemy dead on the 13th confirmed earlier-reported dispositions of Chinese units. One prisoner, from the artillery regiment of the 118th Division, the unit facing the major part of the 1st Marines line, indicated that another artillery regiment had been assigned to support his division. If true, this extra unit would account for both the increased Chinese fires in the Bunker area and the additional artillery emplacements that photo planes had spotted in the 118th Division sector. Infantry units of this division, the Marines observed, introduced no new techniques or equipment during the battle. Prior intelligence had provided the 1st Marines with typical enemy ground attack tactics. Neither the Chinese envelopment of Siberia, Stromboli, and Bunker nor the diversion against Hill 48A before the main attack on Hill 122 represented a departure from normal CCF practice.

Nor was the earlier Marine diversion new, but unlike the Chinese attempt, the 1st Marines tactic was successful. Just before the maneuver, the division pulled off another strategem, described by General Selden in a letter to General Shepherd:

I worked a ruse that morning which proved to be very profitable.
Throughout the Eighth Army front, it had been routine to put on
a strike, this to be followed by smoke, then a good artillery
barrage, with troops following for the assault. This was done
with the exception that there were no troops. The enemy,
thinking that there were troops, opened up with everything. The
only damage inflicted was on their own forces.... While they
were firing on their own troops, we again opened fire with our
artillery, just to help the situation along.[202]

[202] MajGen John T. Selden ltr to Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,
dtd 14 Aug 52.

One technique the Marines employed in the Bunker Hill battle was defense of the reverse (protected) side of the hill. Although counter to the usual American military practice, the reverse slope defense was required by the intense artillery and mortar fire massed upon the front slope defenders. As the 3/1 battalion commander later commented:

It’s true, we suffered from the heavy incoming--but had we had to
work replacements, casualties, and supplies all the way up to the
(forward) military crest of Bunker--the losses would have been
prohibitive. With the weight of the incoming and our inability
to get greater infantry mass onto the battlefield at one time, a
conventional defense would have been far more costly ... [after]
the damage done to Baker Company in the [12 August] afternoon
attack ... had we not gone into a reverse slope defense, we could
not [have held] with the strength at hand.[203]

[203] _Armitage ltr_ and draft MS comments, p. 7. For further
details of the Bunker Hill action, see _Armitage ltr_ in
v. V, Korean comment file.

On the other hand, a tactical weakness of the reverse slope defense, that “plagued us until the end of the battle,”[204] was the fact that the 1st Marines initial gain was not more fully exploited. As the battalion commander explained:

[204] _Ibid._, p. 8.

To be successful, in a reverse slope defense, the defender
must immediately counterattack, retake and reoccupy the
_forward_ slope of the position as soon as enemy pressure
diminishes. Because of the incoming and primarily because of
our overextension in regiment, we ... [employed] piecemeal
commitment ... and fed units into the battle by company, where we
should have employed our entire battalion in counterattacks to
punish the withdrawing force and restore the forward slope. To
the very end, lack of decisive strength prevented this. We stayed
on the reverse slope all the way, except for brief forays to the
forward slope.[205]

[205] _Ibid._

Some officers felt, in retrospect, that a more feasible solution during the August battle might have been to move all three battalions on line--3/1, 1/1, and 2/1, with the reserve battalion (1/1) deployed on a narrow front. This would have provided decisive strength on Bunker and the MLR behind it to give greater depth counterattack capability, and better control at the point where needed.[206] Departure from standard doctrine by employment of the reverse slope defense furthered the existing controversy as to the best method of ground organization in the division sector. But it was to be some months before a change would be effected.[207]

[206] _Ibid._, p. 9.

[207] As the military situation changed in Korea to become
increasingly one of a battle of position and attrition,
the Marine Corps Basic School, Quantico, Va. curriculum
was revised to give greater emphasis to tactics of
positional warfare. Close attention was paid to terrain
evaluation, employment of infantry units, offensive and
defensive use of automatic and supporting weapons, night
counterattacks, field problems of reverse slope defense,
and even tasks of “research into WW I--and the American
Civil and Revolutionary Wars for the tactic of Reverse
Slope defense.” _Armitage ltr._

Tank, artillery, air, and ground Marines participating in the battle of Bunker Hill gave up one outpost but took another, one that added strength not only to the outpost defense but also to the main line. A well thought-out plan and its skillful execution permitted Marines to take the critical terrain quickly without crippling casualties. Defense of the position on Hill 122 was complicated not so much by the Chinese infantry action but by the intensive mortar and artillery shelling. The Marines’ capability to defend was enhanced by close coordination among artillery, air, and tank units. Chinese casualties, by estimate, were 500 percent more than the losses actually suffered by the Marines. The battle of Bunker Hill resulted in the first major Marine action and victory in West Korea. It ushered in two straight months of hard fighting, the most difficult ones yet for Marines on the western front.