Chapter IX: Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice (1)

_Relief of the 25th Division--Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and East Berlin--Enemy Probes, 11–18 July--Marine Air Operations--Fall of the Berlins--Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July--Last Day of the War_

_Relief of the 25th Division_[482]

[482] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _Pac Flt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
1stMarDiv ltr to CMC 3/cpc, A16-13, n.d., Subj: Berlin
and East Berlin Action, Rpt of, in 1stMarDiv Summary
of Activities, Jul 53 (G-3) file (Records Group 127,
61A-2265, Box 74, FRC, Alex., Va.), hereafter _CG,
1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–9 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar,
11th Mar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53.

For the first week of July the 1st Marine Division continued its mission as I Corps Reserve and its two-month period of intensive combat training that had begun on 5 May. Planning got under way on 1 July, however, for return of the division to its former sector of the MLR, as the western anchor of I Corps, in relief of the 25th Infantry Division.

Marine infantry components were directed by I Corps to effect the transfer of operational control during the night of 7–8 July. Tank and artillery units--already in the division sector throughout the reserve period--were to make whatever minor relocations were necessary at suitable times thereafter. Division Operation Plan 10-53 ordered the 7th Marines to reassume its responsibility for the right regimental sector of the MLR, eastward to the 1st Commonwealth boundary. The 5th Marines, which had been in reserve at the time of the May relief of lines, was assigned to the center sector of the MLR, while the 1st Marines was designated as divisional reserve.

Relief of the 25th Infantry Division by Marine units got underway on 6 July when the first incoming elements of Colonel Funk’s 7th Marines moved up to the right regimental sector manned jointly by the U.S. 14th Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Armed Forces Command. Advance personnel reported into the left sector, to be taken over by the Marine 1st Battalion, and at 1400 the 3d Battalion relieved the TAFC reserve battalion in the rear area.

Two platoons from the Marine regiment’s 4.2-inch Mortar Company, meanwhile, also began their phased relief of the Turkish Heavy Mortar Company. The incoming mortar crews had some unexpected early target practice. As the men took up their active MLR firing positions in the right battalion sector, they were promptly forced to put their tubes into action to silence a troublesome machine gun, enemy mortars, and hostile troops behind the Jersey Ridge to the north and Reno and Elko on the west. That evening the 2d Battalion opened its new command post in the eastern sector, occupied by two TAFC battalions.

Sharply at 0455 on 7 July, the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for the right regimental sector and came under operational control of the 25th Division. Shortly after noon that day, forward units of 1/7 reached the 25th Division sector after a three hour motor march from Camp Indianhead, through driving rains in their second day without letup. At the battalion sector, 1/7 joined the advance echelon of 40 men who had arrived the previous day and took over its MLR positions from the 14th Infantry. Additional 7th Marines units reporting in throughout the day and assuming new locations were the weapons, mortar, and antitank companies.

The first of Colonel Tschirgi’s 5th Marines returned to their center regimental sector before dawn that same day to begin their relief of the Army 35th Infantry Regiment. At 0300 the 3d Battalion assumed responsibility for the eastern half of the MLR. By late afternoon, antitank personnel and the 2d Battalion were in line, the latter taking over the western battalion sector at 1716. In the rear regimental area, early elements of Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines, locating just south of the Imjin River, had begun to arrive by 1300. The regiment would assume ground security for the Spoonbill and Libby (formerly X-Ray) bridges in the sector as well as MASRT #1.

No one needed to remind the 1st Marine Division that the territory it was moving back into was not the same--with respect to defense posts in the right regimental sector--that it had left two months earlier. Three of its six outposts there (Carson, Elko, Vegas) had fallen to the enemy in the late-May battle, despite the formidable resistance of the defending Turks. Outpost Ava remained at the far western end of the line, with the Berlin-East Berlin complex in the right battalion area. Some 6,750 yards of intervening MLR--more than four miles--lay in between, bereft of any protective outposts to screen and alert the defending line companies to sudden enemy assaults. The Marines were thus returning to a main line of resistance considerably weakened in its right regimental sector.

As the 1st Division CG, General Pate, observed:

Vegas [had] dominated the enemy approaches to Berlin from the
north and northwest and therefore made Berlin relatively secure.
Berlin, in turn, dominated the enemy approaches from the north
and northwest to East Berlin and made East Berlin relatively
secure. The loss of Outpost Vegas to the CCF placed Berlin and
East Berlin in very precarious positions and negated their being
supported by ground fire except from the MLR.[483]

[483] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_., p. 1.

Ground support fire from the MLR, moreover, tended to be only moderately successful in supporting the outposts because of the nature of the terrain. A major Communist stronghold, Hill 190, lay northeast of the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. Since Berlin (COP 19) and East Berlin (COP 19-A) were sited on extensions of this same hill mass, the enemy could make sudden “ridgeline” attacks against the Berlins. With buffer outpost Vegas now lost, the likelihood of CCF success in such attacks was “immeasurably increased.”[484]

[484] _Ibid._, p. 2.

_Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and East Berlin_[485]

[485] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10;
_CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–10 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 992, dtd
8–9 Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/7,
2/7, 3/7, 2/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1st MAW, VMF-311,
VMO-6, HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_;
MacDonald, _POW_.

It did not take the Chinese long to exploit this situation. At about 2100 on 7 July, while the relief of lines was in progress, the two Berlin outposts and newly-located MLR companies of Lieutenant Colonel Cereghino’s 2d Battalion (from the left: D, F, and E), were greeted by a heavy volume of Chinese mortar and artillery fire. The barrage continued unremittingly, followed by waves of a reinforced Chinese battalion that swept over the two platoon-sized outposts, from the direction of Vegas. By 2345 defending Marines at both outposts were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, identified as elements of the 407th Regiment, 136th Division, 46th CCF Army.

Berlin, manned at the time by TAFC[486] and Marine personnel, was unexpectedly strengthened by a Company F reinforced squad that had been dispatched on an earlier ambush patrol in the vicinity of the outpost. At East Berlin, however, the overwhelming hordes of Chinese soldiers advanced to the trenchline of the steep forward slope and quickly locked with the Marines at point-blank range. Despite the coordination of MLR machine gun, 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortar, and artillery fires from 2/11[487] and 4/11, the enemy overran the outpost at 2355 after heavy, close fighting. Chinese mortar and artillery barrages, by midnight, had continuously disrupted the Marine communications net at East Berlin, and by 0130 radio relay was also out at Berlin proper.

[486] Discussing this phase of operations, the 2/7 commander
stated: “As it turned out we were in great shape with
both Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some
instances. We had a great rapport with the Turks in that
they had previously relieved 2/7. In fact, they made
us honorary members of their battalions, giving each
2/7 Marine one of the unit patches.” Col Alexander D.
Cereghino ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 19 Jun 70.

[487] On 7 July, 2/11 had become the direct support battalion
for the 7th Marines.

A provisional platoon from Headquarters and Service Company of 2/7 was quickly ordered to reinforce the main line against any attempted breakthrough by the Chinese. This was a distinct possibility since the Berlins were only 325 yards from the MLR, nearer than most outposts. Men from Companies H and I of the rear reserve 3d Battalion (since 26 May commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Jones) were also placed under operational control of 2/7 and ordered to forward assembly areas in readiness for a thrust against the enemy at East Berlin.

At 0355 a Company F squad jumped off for the initial counterattack. This was made at 0415, without artillery preparation, in an attempt to gain surprise for the assault. It was thrown back. A second Company F unit, by 0440, was on its way to reinforce the first but got caught by 25 rounds of incoming, with 15 men wounded. It continued on, however, but an hour later the Marines were ordered to disengage so that the artillerymen could place TOT fire on the area preparatory to a fresh attempt to dislodge the enemy soldiers.

During the early morning hours of 8 July, large numbers of Chinese were seen at their new Vegas and Reno strongholds. Marines of the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery blanketed hostile troops there and at the Berlin outposts with four ripples. On another occasion, a time-on-target mission launched by the 2/11 direct support battalion, landed in the midst of an enemy company assembled on Vegas. Friendly firepower by this time consisted of all four battalions of the 11th Marines, as well as seven Army and Turkish artillery battalions still emplaced in the area during the relief period and thus under tactical control of 25th Division Artillery.

Throughout 7–8 July, 11 Marine tanks from Company B placed 800 shells on enemy installations and troops. In the characteristic pattern, use of Marine armor heightened unfriendly response. The tanks drew in return 2,000 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery on their own positions, but without any serious damage. Elements of the Army 14th Infantry Regiment Tank Company, still in the area, also opened up with some additional shells and bullets.

Despite the Chinese attack, the relief of lines continued during the night. In the center MLR sector, the 5th Marines had taken over regimental responsibility at 2130, with 3/11 becoming its direct supporting unit. And in the western half of the 7th Marines line--about the only undisturbed part of the regimental sector--1/7 had routinely completed is battalion relief at 0335 on 8 July.

At 0630 it was confirmed that East Berlin, an extension of the ridge on which Berlin was located, was under enemy control. Better news at first light was that Berlin,[488] 500 yards west, had repulsed the enemy, a fact not definitely known earlier due to communication failure. At this time, G-3 reported that 18 effectives were holding Berlin, and 2/7 assigned an 18-man reinforced squad to buttress the defense. It was not considered feasible to send a larger reinforcement “since the Berlin area [could] accommodate only a small garrison.”[489]

[488] The ridge on which COP Berlin was located was split by
two valleys. Both of these and the ridge itself served
as approaches to the Marine MLR. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6,
Chap. 9, p. 9-169.

[489] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, p. 2.

Meanwhile, another 7th Marines counterforce was being organized for a massed assault to retake East Berlin. At 1000, under cover of a thundering 1,600-round mortar and artillery preparation by Marine and TAFC gunners, a reinforced two-platoon unit from Companies George and How, launched the attack. The unlucky H/3/7 platoon, in the lead, got caught between well-aimed Chinese shells and the Marines’ own protective wire. In less than 15 minutes the platoon had been reduced to 20 effectives, with Company G passing through its ranks to continue the attack. By 1123 the Marines were in a violent fire fight and grenade duel in the main trenchline at East Berlin.

Tank guns, meanwhile, blasted away at Chinese troops, bunkers, active weapons, and trenches. On call they placed their fire “only a few yards in front of the friendly attacking infantry and moved this fire forward as the foot troops advanced.”[490] Heavy countermortar and artillery rounds were also hitting their mark on forward, top, and reverse slopes of East Berlin to soften the Chinese defenses. A few minutes later the 3d Battalion men had formed for the assault. During the heavy hand-to-hand fighting of the next hour the Marines “literally threw some of the Chinese down the reverse slope.”[491] Gaining the crest of the hill, the Marines by force and fire dispatched the enemy intruders. At 1233 they were again in possession of East Berlin. With just 20 men left in fighting condition at the outpost, a reinforcing platoon from I/3/7 was dispatched to buttress the assault force.

[490] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2.

[491] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 136.

North of the 7th Marines sector four F9F Panthers, led by the commanding officer of VMF-311, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane, found their way through the rainy skies that had restricted aerial support efforts nearly everywhere. In a noon MPQ mission, the quartet delivered five tons of ordnance on Chinese reinforcement troops and bunkers.

Promptly at 1300--a half hour after retaking the outpost--the 7th Marines effected the relief of the last Turkish elements at Berlin and occupied the twin defense positions. And by 1500 on 8 July, the 1st Marine Division assumed operational control of the entire division sector from the Army 25th Infantry Division. Relief of individual units would continue, however, through several more days. At the same time, the mission of the 11th Marines, since 5 July under a new regimental commander, Colonel Manly L. Curry, changed from general support of U.S. I Corps, reinforcing the fires of the 25th Division Artillery, to direct support of the Marine Division. The 1st Tank Battalion similarly took over its regular direct support role. Other units under temporary Army jurisdiction, such as the Kimpo Provisional Regiment and Division Reconnaissance Company, reverted to Marine control.

During the rest of the day, gunners of the 11th Marines continued their fire missions despite reduced visibility that hindered surveillance by the OY spotting planes and forward observers. Only 42 Chinese were sighted during the daytime, although shortly before dusk a CCF group reportedly heading toward the Berlins area southwest from Frisco was taken under fire. Estimates of enemy incoming throughout the 7–8 July action from 17-odd battalions of Chinese artillery dug in across the division sector was placed at 19,000 rounds of all types. Marine and Army-controlled battalions, for their part, pounded Chinese strongholds with a total of 20,178 rounds.

That night Colonel Funk authorized a 3d Battalion platoon to bolster the MLR. Five tanks were also ordered to locate in the Hill 126 area, the Marine high-ground terrain feature to the rear of the frontlines. This foresight was well rewarded. During the late evening hours strange motor noises “sounding like a convoy pulling in and then back out again”[492] floated over the Korean hills and the tanks immediately swept suspected hostile installations with their 90mm guns. Later that night of 8–9 July, the Chinese suddenly renewed their probing efforts at the battered Marine outposts. Moving in from Vegas, an estimated reinforced enemy company attacked Berlin at 0104, then brushed on to East Berlin. An intense fire fight ensued off and on for nearly two hours at the two posts. Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars, plus artillery illumination, boxing fires, and tanks blunted the assaults. At 0315 the enemy broke contact and action quieted down at both locations.

[492] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 9 Jul 53.

Throughout the rest of the day, eight Company C[493] armored vehicles assisted the infantrymen in consolidation of positions. A total of 25 rounds of shells and 19,140 rounds of .30 and .50 caliber machine gun bullets were expended on CCF strongpoints and troops during a 24-hour firing period that ended at 1700.

[493] On 9 July Company C relieved Company B on the MLR in
support of the 7th Marines. Both tank companies had been
in action with the TAFC during the entire 60-day period
the division was in I Corps reserve. Due to the rotation
system, however, Baker Company had been on line longer
and transferred to the rear ranks for a “much needed rest
and rehabilitation.” 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 3.

Because of the casualties at Berlin, an H/3/7 reinforcement squad was sent to augment the Marine force there. Losses suffered by the 7th Marines for the two successive nights were 9 killed, 12 missing,[494] 126 wounded and evacuated, and 14 with minor wounds. The cost to the CCF was 30 known dead, and an estimated 200 killed and 400 wounded.

[494] Later it was determined that only two were actually
captured and they were subsequently repatriated.
MacDonald, _POW_, p. 211.

With the Marines back on line, VMO-6 and HMR-161 which were under division operational control again resumed normal combat routine. Returning on 8 July to their forward airstrip in the center regimental sector, VMO-6 helicopters made eight frontline helicopter evacuations. Observation planes that same day conducted four artillery spotting missions behind enemy lines. HMR-161, assuming normal operations on 10 July, resupplied Marine division outposts with 1,200 pounds of rations, water, and gear as part of its 25.3 hours flight time this first day back in full service.

_Enemy and Marine Probes, 11–18 July_[495]

[495] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 10–17 Jul 53;
1stMarDiv PIRs 923–930, dtd 10–17 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar,
7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53;
Hermes, _Truce Tent_.

After the flare-up on the Berlin front, there was relatively little action for the next 10 days. Marines continued the relief of the last of the outgoing 25th Division units. When this was completed on 13 July, 1st Marine Division units, including the 1st KMC/RCT[496] and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, were all back in their accustomed sectors. They thus rejoined the 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, Kimpo Regiment, and Division Reconnaissance Company which had remained on line throughout the period. The July relief was one that could hardly be characterized as routine. Interfering elements had included not only the Chinese but torrential summer rains. These had continued virtually nonstop from 5–8 July causing bridge and road washouts, rerouting of supply trucks, and juggling of manifests at a time when the regiments were using an average of 90 transport vehicles daily.

[496] The 1st KMC/RCT turned over its sector of the 1st ROK
Division front to the 1st ROK Regiment at 1800 on 8 July
and relieved the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment on 12 July.
_ROKMC Comments._

Forward of the MLR the regular nightly patrols probed enemy territory, often with no contact. On at least three occasions division intelligence reported entire 24-hour periods during which the elusive Chinese could not be sighted anywhere in No-Man’s-Land by friendly patrols operating north of the Marine division front.

More rain,[497] continual haze, and ground fog for 6 of the 10 days between 9–18 July not only reduced the activity of air observers and Marine pilots, but apparently inspired the ground-digging Chinese to pursue--at least across from the division sector of I Corps--a more mole-like existence than ever. Enemy troop sightings during the daytime decreased from as many as 310 CCF to a new low of 14. Incoming, for one 24-hour period, totaled no more than 48 rounds of Chinese artillery and 228 of mortar fire that struck Marine positions, causing only slight damage.

[497] Spoonbill Bridge was submerged under 11 feet of water and
destroyed by the pressure against it on 7 July. Flood
conditions existed again on 14–15 July when the Imjin
crested at 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads in the vicinity
were impassable for three days. Resupply of forward
companies was made via Freedom Bridge. One command diary
writer, discussing the elaborate series of six moves made
by 1/1 during July, added a touch of unconscious humor
when he observed, “During the month, it seemed as if the
Battalion was constantly on the move.... Rain hampered
these moves considerably. The weather between moves was
generally clear and dry.” 1/1 ComdD, July 53, p. 1; 1st
TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, pp. 5, 11–12, 23; _PacFlt EvalRpt_
No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-68, 9-136.

The same could not be said for their mines. One 7th Marines reconnaissance patrol located a new minefield staked out with Soviet antipersonnel mines (POMZ-2) of an unfamiliar type with both pull and tension fuses. It appeared that mines which had lain dormant during the winter months had suddenly come to life with the warm weather, or else been recently re-laid. Nearly a dozen were uncovered by 5th and 7th Marines patrols, soon after their return to the front, and sometimes the discovery came too late. Probably the worst day was 12 July when four Marines were killed and eight wounded as a result of accidentally detonating mines.

At the same time, in the 5th Marines sector near the vicinity of truce corridor COP-2, the persistent voice of the Dragon Lady taunted Marines with such lackluster gambits as “Surrender now! What is your girl doing back home?” in the stepped-up pace of its midnight propaganda broadcasts.

The regular nightly patrols checked in and out, performing their mission routinely. Even during this last month of the war, when word of the final truce agreement was expected daily, fire fights ensued. On 12 July, a 5th Marines 13-man reconnaissance patrol clashed briefly north of COP Esther, while a 7th Marines platoon-size combat patrol brushed with a Chinese squad west of Elko in an 18-minute fire fight. The same night the 11th Marines reported increased enemy sightings of 318 CCF soldiers--the most seen since the Berlin probe of 7–8 July. No follow-up was made. The Chinese were busy with major offensives elsewhere along the UNC front, devoting their primary efforts to ROK divisions on the central and eastern sectors of the Eighth Army line. Apparently they fully intended to demonstrate to the South Koreans that continuation of the war would be a costly business.[498]

[498] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 470.

Along the Marine front, three patrol contacts took place on the night of 16–17 July. Two of them were grim reminders that despite the promising look (and sound) of the peace talks, for those men lost the toll of the war was as final and unremitting as it had been at any time during the past three years of combat. The first was a routine maneuver for a 5th Marines 13-man combat patrol that, at 2252, engaged an enemy squad just north of outpost Hedy. After an eight-minute fire fight the enemy withdrew, with two Chinese soldiers counted dead and one wounded and no friendly casualties.

Not so lucky was a 2/5 reconnaissance patrol. At midnight, its 15 members encountered a band of 30 to 40 Chinese, deployed in a V-shaped ambush in the Hill 90 area, an enemy stronghold two miles east of Panmunjom. The Marines set up a base of fire, beating off the enemy with their rifles, BARs, mortars, and bare fists. Reinforcements and artillery fires were called in. The first relief unit was intercepted by vicious mortar shelling which wounded the entire detail. A second relief squad, also taken under mortar fire, continued the action in an intense fire contest that lasted nearly two hours. In the meantime, the direct support artillery battalion, 3/11, reinforced by 1/11, showered 280 rounds of countermortar on Chinese long-range machine guns and mortars barking from the surrounding hills.

During the engagement the Chinese made several attempts to capture prisoners. When the enemy finally began to withdraw, CCF casualties were 10 known dead, an estimated 9 more dead, and 3 wounded. Seven Marines were found to be missing after the Chinese broke contact. A 5th Marines platoon that extensively screened the battalion front during the hours of darkness on the 17th returned at 2210 with six bodies.

The third encounter took place not long after midnight in the 7th Marines territory. This brief skirmish was also to have an unpleasant aftermath and, inadvertently, fulfill the psywar broadcast of the previous day that had warned Marines “not to go on patrols or be killed.” As it was leaving the Ava Gate (250 yards northwest of the outpost proper) at 0045, a 30-man combat patrol from Company A was challenged on three sides by 40–50 CCF employing small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and mortars. After a 15-minute fire exchange, during which the patrol lost communications with its MLR company, the enemy withdrew. Six CCF had been counted dead, and 12 more estimated killed or wounded.

Upon returning to the outpost, a muster of the men engaged in the action showed four Marines were missing. A rescue squad recovered three bodies. When, several hours later, daylight hampered movements of the search party, 2/11 laid down a smoke screen to isolate the sector. Between 0050 and 0455, its gunners also directed 529 rounds of close support and countermortar fire on Chinese troops and active weapons in the area. The recovery unit continued to sweep the area for the last missing man until 0545 when it was decided that the search would have to be terminated with negative results. Marine casualties from the encounter were 3 killed, 1 missing, 19 wounded (evacuated), and 2 nonseriously wounded.

The following day patrol activity and enemy contacts quieted down. Action shifted to the 1st KMC/RCT sector. Here, during the late hours of the 18th, four Korean combat patrols brushed quickly and briefly with Chinese squad and platoon units in light skirmishes of but a few minutes duration. The Korean Marines killed 2 of the enemy and estimated they accounted for 16 more.[499]

[499] _ROKMC Comments._

The only activity in the Marine right regimental sector occurred when a 7th Marines 36-man combat patrol, on prowl the night of 17–18 July, advanced at 0112 as far as hand-grenade range of the Chinese trenchline at Ungok. Undetected by the enemy, a patrol member fired a white phosphorus rifle grenade squarely at the CCF machine gun that was harassing the friendly MLR. The Marines then engaged 15 Chinese defending the position in a brief 20-minute skirmish. Although two men were wounded,[500] the Company C patrol members in a somewhat roguish gesture as they left also planted a Marine Corps recruiting sign at their FPOA (Farthest Point of Advance), facing the enemy.

[500] One, who died that morning, was squad leader Sergeant
Stephen C. Walter, posthumously presented the Navy Cross.
Also awarded the nation’s second highest combat medal
for extraordinary heroism in a patrol action on 16–17
July was Private First Class Roy L. Stewart, of the 5th
Marines.

_Marine Air Operations_[501]

[501] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 10, No.
5, Chap. 9, No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;
1stMarDiv PIR 924, dtd 10–11 Jul 53; 1st MAW, MAGs-12,
-33, VMAs-121, -212, -251, -323, VMF(N)-153, VMF-311
ComdDs, Jul 53; Field, _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF,
Korea_.

If the monsoon rains of July hung like a shroud over the infantryman, they were an even more serious impediment to air operations of MAGs-12 and -33. There were 24 days of restricted flying when the weather at home base or target area was recorded as marginal to non-operational. On 12 full days air operations were cancelled entirely. Precipitation for July rose to 7.38 inches, with 22 days of rain recorded throughout the month. The generally unfavorable weather conditions not only limited the normal support missions flown by 1st MAW but delayed the arrival of VMA-251[502] en route from Japan to relieve VMA-323.

[502] Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Lieutenant Colonel Harold A.
Harwood) administratively joined MAG-12 on 6 July for
323, which had rotated back to MCAS, El Toro three days
earlier. Movement of -251 aircraft to Korea could not
take place, however, until 12 July. When VMA-323 (Major
Woten) departed, the famous “Death Rattlers” had the
distinction of being the Marine tactical (VMA/VMF) air
squadron in longest service during the Korean War. The
unit’s final combat mission on 2 July brought its total
Korean operations to 20,827 sorties and 48,677.2 hours.
On 6 August 1950, roaring up from the flight deck of the
USS _Badoeng Strait_, the VMA-323 Corsairs (then VMF-323)
had launched their opening blow against North Korean
installations, led by Major Arnold A. Lund, CO. The
initial Marine air offensive action of the Korean War had
been flown three days earlier by VMF-214. This unit was
reassigned to CONUS in November 1951, giving the Death
Rattlers the longest continuous service flight record.
Jul 53 ComdD, 1st MAW, p. 2; _USMC Ops Korea-Pusan_, v.
I, pp. 89–90, 98; VMF-214 Squadron History, HRB.

During July the wing’s nearly 300 aircraft (250 operational, 43 assigned to pool status in Korea) flew 2,688 combat sorties[503] and 5,183.1 combat hours. The bulk of the sorties, 1,497, were CAS operations flown for 19 different UNC divisions. Nearly 900 supported the 12 ROK divisions involved in the heavy fighting on the central UNC sector. Approximately 250 of the CAS sorties were for the 1st Marine Division, with more than 200 being day or night MPQ drops and the rest, daytime CAS runs. No night close support missions were conducted.

[503] Individual reports by the two groups result in a
slightly higher figure. MAG-12 recorded 2,001 combat
sorties (including more than 400 flown by carrier-based
VMA-332, not in the 1st MAW sortie rate). MAG-33 listed
945 sorties, or a combined group total of 2,946 for the
month. ComdDs Jul 53 MAG-12, p. C-1 and MAG-33, p. I.

When nearly a week of inclement weather finally lifted, Colonel Arthur R. Stacy’s[504] MAG-33 pilots based at Pohang welcomed a brisk change in the tempo of operations. In seven MPQ strikes on 11 July, they hurled 13 tons of ordnance on Chinese fortifications north of the 7th Marines sector. It was the wing’s first active day in support missions for the 1st Marine Division, newly back on the line.

[504] Colonel Stacy was group commander until 24 July, when he
was detached for assignment to 1st MAW as Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2. He was succeeded at MAG-33 by Colonel John
L. Smith.

During the interim period of 9–18 July, between the two Berlin outpost attacks, F9F jet fighters from MAG-13 again carried out approximately 35 MPQ missions for the division. (MAG-12 attack planes, during this time, were assigned to the flaming central Allied line.) Nearly 20 of these were on a single day, 14 July, when VMFs-311 and -115 Panther jets roared over enemy country from morning to sundown unleashing 25 tons north of the Marine troubled right regimental sector and 9 more tons on hostile emplacements near the western end of the division line.

In middle and late July, however, the majority of missions by Marine fliers bolstered UNC operations in the central part of the Allied front where a major enemy counterthrust erupted. The peak operational day for MAG-33 pilots during this period occurred 17 July when 40 interdiction and MPQ missions (136 combat sorties) were executed for Army and ROK divisions. The corresponding record day for Colonel Carney’s MAG-12 aviators was 19 July when 162 combat sorties were flown on heavy destruction missions to support UNC action.

Marine exchange pilot Major John F. Bolt, of VMF-115, chalked up a record of a different kind on 11 July. Attached to the Fifth Air Force 51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, he shot down his fifth and sixth MIG-15 (the previous four having been bagged since 16 May) to become the first Marine jet ace in history. Major Bolt was leading a four-plane F-86 flight in the attack on four MIGs east of Sinuiju and required only 1,200 rounds of ammunition and five minutes to destroy the two enemy jet fighters. Bolt thereby became the 37th jet ace of the Korean War.

Earlier in the month, Navy Lieutenant Guy P. Bordelon won a Silver Star medal and gold star in lieu of a second Silver Star. Attending the K-6 ceremonies were General Megee and Admiral Clark, 1st Wing and Seventh Fleet commanders. Bordelon, flying with the Marine Corsair night fighters, had downed four of the harassing “Bedcheck Charlie” planes. A member of VC-3 attached to MAG-12, Lieutenant Bordelon on 17 July made his fifth night kill and was subsequently awarded the Navy Cross.

On the minus side, the 1st Marine Air Wing this last month of the war suffered a higher rate of personnel losses on combat flights than in any month since June 1952.[505] Captain Lote Thistlethwaite and Staff Sergeant W. H. Westbrook, of VMF(N)-513, were killed in an air patrol flight on 4 July. (Two nights earlier, the same squadron had lost a Navy pilot and crewman on temporary duty with the night-fighters when their F3D-2 similarly failed to return to Pyongtaek.) Another MAG-12 casualty was Captain Carl F. Barlow, of VMA-212, killed 13 July on a prebriefed CAS mission when he crashed while flying instruments.

[505] Wing casualties for July 1953 were listed as three
killed, seven missing, and two wounded in action. Names
of enlisted crew members on flights are not always given
in air diaries, which accounts for the discrepancies.

On 17 July, Captain Robert I. Nordell, VMF-311, flying his third mission that day, and wingman First Lieutenant Frank L. Keck, Jr. were hit by intense automatic weapons fire while on an interdiction flight. Their planes reportedly went down, at 2000, over the Sea of Japan. After a four-day air and surface search conducted by JOC, they were declared missing and subsequently reclassified killed in action. Another MAG-33 pilot listed KIA was Major Thomas M. Sellers, VMF-115, on exchange duty with the Air Force, shot down 20 July in a dogfight after he had scored two MIG-15s. Two days earlier a VMO-6 pilot, First Lieutenant Charles Marino, and his artillery spotter, First Lieutenant William A. Frease, flying a flak suppression mission, were struck by enemy fire and crashed with their ship in the 5th Marines center regimental sector.

_Fall of the Berlins_[506]

[506] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
_CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 933–934,
dtd 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMar ComdD, Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar,
11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11,
1stTkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar Preliminary Special Action
Report, period 8–27 Jul 53 in ComdD, Jul 53, hereafter
1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212
ComdDs, Jul 53.

Despite their preoccupation with other corps sectors on the central front of the Eighth Army line, the Chinese had not forgotten about the Berlin complex held by the Marines. On the night of 19–20 July,[507] the enemy lunged against the two Marine outposts in reinforced battalion strength to renew his attack launched 12 days earlier. Beginning at 2200, heavy Chinese mortar and artillery fire struck the two COPs and supporting MLR positions of the 3d Battalion, which had advanced to the front on 13 July in relief of 2/7.[508] In the center regimental sector, 5th Marines outposts Ingrid and Dagmar, and the line companies were also engaged by small arms, mortar, and artillery fires. An attempted probe at Dagmar was repulsed, aided by 3/11.

[507] The 19th of July, ironically, was the date that truce
negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final
agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff
officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details
of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the
demilitarized zone. USMA, _Korea_, p. 51.

[508] Company E and a detachment of the 81mm mortar platoon
from the 2d Battalion remained on line. They were
attached to the 3d Battalion when the sector command
changed.

Concentrating their main assault efforts on the Berlins, however, the Chinese forces swarmed up the slopes of the outposts at 2230, with more troops moving in from enemy positions on Jersey, Detroit, and Hill 139, some 700 yards north of Berlin. The Chinese struck first at East Berlin, where 37 Marines were on duty, and then at Berlin, held by 44 men. Both positions were manned by First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Turner’s Company I personnel and employed the maximum-size defenses which could be effectively utilized on these terrain features.

By 2300 hostile forces were halfway up Berlin. Continuous volumes of small arms and machine gun fire poured from the defending MLR companies. Defensive boxes were fired by 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortars. Eight Company C tanks augmented the close-in fires, with their lethal direct-fire 90mm guns tearing into Chinese troops and weapons. Within two hours after the initial thrust, the 11th Marines had fired 20 counterbattery and 31 countermortar missions. Artillerymen from 2/11 and 1/11 had expended 1,750 rounds. In addition, 4/11 had unleashed 124 of its 155mm medium projectiles. More countermortar fire came from the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. Despite the heavy fire support, by midnight the situation was in doubt and at 0146 the twin outposts were officially declared under enemy control. Nearly 3,000 rounds of incoming were estimated to have fallen on division positions by that time, most of it in the 7th Marines sector.

During the early morning hours of the 20th, Marine tank guns and continuous shelling by six[509] artillery battalions wreaked havoc on Chinese hardware, reinforcing personnel, supply points, and fortifications. Reserve units from 2/7 were placed on 30-minute standby, with Companies D, E, and F already under 3/7 operational control. Battalion Operation Order 20-53, issued at 0400 by Lieutenant Colonel Jones, called for Easy and Dog to launch a two-company counterattack at 0730 to restore Berlin and East Berlin respectively. Incoming, meanwhile, continued heavy on the MLR; at 0520, Company I, located to the rear of the contested outposts, reported receiving one round per second.

[509] Three Marine, one TAFC, and two Army battalions.

The Marine assault was cancelled by I Corps a half hour before it was scheduled to take place. A decision subsequently rendered from I Corps directed that the positions not be retaken.[510]

[510] At a routine conference that same morning attended by
CG Eighth Army (General Taylor), CG I Corps (General
Clarke) and CG 1st Marine Division, the earlier decision
about not regaining the outposts was affirmed. General
Taylor maintained the positions “could never be held
should the Chinese decide to exert sufficient pressure
against them” and recommended instead that the sector
be organized on a wide front defense concept. Actually,
following the initial Berlins attack of 7–8 July, a
discussion about possible readjustment of the Marine
sector defense had been initiated by General Pate. A
staff study recommending that just such a “strongpoint”
concept (rather than the customary linear defense) be
adopted had been completed by Marine Division officials
on 15 July. I Corps staff members had concurred with the
study and it was awaiting consideration by CG, I Corps
when the Berlins were attacked for the second time on 19
July. _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, pp. 3–4.

Since the outposts were not to be recaptured,[511] efforts that day were devoted to making the two hills as untenable as possible for their new occupants. Heavy destruction missions by air, armor, and artillery blasted CCF defenses throughout the day. Air observers were on station from 0830 until after dark, with nine CAS missions conducted by MAG-12 pilots from VMA-121 and -212. The day’s series of air strikes on the Berlin-East Berlin positions (and Vegas weapons emplacements) began at 1145 when a division of ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Penne’s[512] -121 hurled nine and a half tons of ordnance on enemy bunkers and trenches at East Berlin.

[511] Commenting on this point, the I Corps commander noted:
“The outposts in front of the MLR had gradually lost
their value in my opinion because, between the MLR and
the outposts, minefields, tactical wire, etc. had made
their reinforcement and counterattacks very costly.”
Resupply was thus restricted to narrow paths on which
the CCF had zeroed in and “holding poor real estate
for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue
casualties.” Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA, ltr to Dir,
MCHist, HQMC, dtd 20 May 70.

[512] The new squadron commander had taken over 16 July from
Major Braun.

The artillery was having an active day, too. Six firing battalions had sent more than 3,600 rounds crashing against the enemy by nightfall. The 1st 4.5-inch rocketeers also contributed four ripples to the melee. Heavy fire missions were requested and delivered by the Army 159th Field Artillery Battalion (240mm howitzers) and 17th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzers) using 11th Marines airborne spotters. The precision fire on enemy positions, which the air spotters reported to be “the most effective missions they had conducted in Korea”[513] continued for several hours. By 1945 the big guns had demolished the bunkers and all but 15 yards of trenchline at East Berlin. For their part the Chinese had fired an estimated 4,900 rounds of mortar and artillery against the 3d Battalion right hand sector in the 24-hour period ending at 1800 on the 20th.

[513] BGen Manly L. Curry ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May
70, hereafter _Curry ltr_.

Armored vehicles, meanwhile, during 19–20 July had expended 200 rounds of HE and WP shells and 6,170 machine gun rounds.[514] Tank searchlights had also effectively illuminated enemy positions on the East Berlin hill. The tankers’ performance record included: 20 Chinese bunkers and 2 57mm recoilless rifles destroyed; an estimated 30 enemy soldiers killed; a dozen more firing apertures, caves, and trenchworks substantially damaged.

[514] Tank and artillery ammunition allocations had been cut
50 percent the afternoon of the 19th, with a subsequent
reduction of normal destruction missions and elimination
of H&I fires. ComdDs Jul 53 1st TkBn, p. 3 and App. 2, p.
4 and 1/11, p. 5.

MAP 30 K. White

7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

(Division Right)

LINEAR DEFENSE

19–20 July 1953]

Between noon and the last flight of the day, when a trio of AUs from Lieutenant Colonel Wallace’s VMA-212 attacked a northern enemy mortar and automatic weapons site, 35 aircraft had repeatedly streaked over the Berlin territory and adjacent Chinese strongpoints. Strikes by VMA-121 at 1145, 1320, 1525, 1625, 1700, 1750; and VMA-212 at 1413, 1849, and 1930 had released a combined total of 69½ tons of bombs and 6,500 rounds of 20mm ammunition on hostile locations.

The Chinese casualty toll during this renewed flareup in the fighting on 19–20 July was conservatively placed by 3/7 at 75 killed and 300 wounded. It was further believed that “the enemy battalion was so weakened and disorganized by the attacks that it was necessary for the CCF to commit another battalion to hold the area captured.”[515] Regimental reports indicated that 6 Marines had been killed, 56 listed missing,[516] 86 wounded and evacuated, and 32 not seriously wounded.

[515] 3/7 ComdD, 20 Jul 53, p. 5. With respect to the number
of enemy casualties that night, battalion, regimental,
artillery support, and division command diaries given
differing accounts. Other figures cited are: 9 CCF
killed, between 234–284 estimated killed, and 630
estimated wounded.

[516] Subsequently, it was learned that of 56 Marines
unaccounted for at the time, 12 were actually captured.
They were returned after hostilities ended. Several men
from 1st Marines units under operational control of the
7th were also taken in this battle. MacDonald, _POW_, pp.
212, 268–269.

As a result of the critical tactical situation and number of casualties suffered during the Berlins operation, the 7th Marines regimental commander requested that units of the division reserve be placed under his control to help check any further aggressive moves of the enemy. For it now appeared that the Chinese might continue their thrust and attempt to seize Hill 119 (directly south of Berlin and East Berlin) in order to be in position to deny part of the Imjin River to UNC forces after signing of the armistice.

While the lost outposts were being neutralized on the morning of the 20th, the CO of the incoming 1st Marines, Colonel Nelson, also ordered an immediate reorganization and strengthening of the MLR. This employed the defense in depth concept, used by the British Commonwealth Division in the sector adjacent to the Marines on the east. The wide front defense concept was fully developed with one company occupying a portion of the MLR to the rear of the Berlin complex, known as Hill 119 or more informally, Boulder City. Three companies organized the high ground to the right rear of the MLR east to Hill 111, the limiting point on the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions. Three more companies fortified the Hill 126 area to the rear and left of Berlin to its juncture with the western battalion sector held by Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd’s 1/7. (See Maps 30 and 31.)

MAP 31 K. WHITE

7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

Defense-in-depth

20–21 July 1953]

The afternoon of the 20th, 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Long) was transferred to 7th Marines control and positioned in the center of the regimental MLR, as the first step in the scheduled relief of the 7th, due off the line on 26 July. For the next three days the regiment continued to develop the sector defense to the rear of the MLR. Elements of the regimental reserve, 2/7, were employed to reinforce the 3/7 sector. Initially, on 20–21 July, F/2/7, under operational command of 3/7, was assigned the mission of reinforcing Hill 119. Later a 2/1 platoon was also ordered to strengthen the position.

MAP 32 K. WHITE

7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

Defense-in-depth

22–23 July 1953]

Incoming 1st Marines platoons and companies from the 2d and 3d (Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Miller) Battalions augmented the forces at the two critical Hill 119 and 111 locations. As it turned out, 1st Marines personnel returning to the front from division reserve were to see the last of the war’s heavy fighting in the course of their relief of the 7th Marines. Ultimately, the regimental forward defense, instead of being divided into two battalion sectors as before, now consisted of three--a left, center, and right sector. By 23 July the depth reorganization had been completed and these sectors were manned by 1/7, 2/1, and 3/7. (See Map 32.)

_Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July_[517]

[517] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, dtd 21–28 Jul 53;
1stMarDiv PIRs 935–941, dtd 21–27 Jul 53 and 942, dtd 7
Aug 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7,
3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 53;
1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -251,
VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_;
Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley,
_Korea, 1951–1953_; Martin Russ, _The Last Parallel: A
Marine’s War Journal_ (New York: Rinehart and Company,
1957); USMA, _Korea_.

Sightings of enemy troops for the next few days were light. A large scale attack expected on the 21st by the 5th Marines at Hedy and Dagmar failed to materialize. Instead, a token force of a dozen Chinese dressed in burlap bags made a limited appearance at Hedy before departing, minus three of its party, due to Marine sharp-shooting skills. In the skies, MAG-33 fliers from VMF-115 and -311 had been transferred by Fifth Air Force from exclusive missions for the central and eastern UNC front (the IX, ROK II, and X Corps sectors) to join VMA-121 in MPQ flights supporting the 1st Marine Division. During the 21–23 July period, despite layers of thick stratus clouds and rain that turned off and on periodically like a water spigot, more than 15 radar missions were executed by the three squadrons.[518] They unleashed a gross 33-ton bomb load on CCF mortar and 76mm gun positions, supply areas, CPs, bunkers, and trenches.

[518] One additional flight expending three 1,000-lb. bombs
was made 22 July by a single AD from replacement
squadron VMA-251. This was the unit’s first combat
sortie in support of the 1st Marine Division after its
indoctrination flights. VMA-251 also flew four MPQ
flights for the 7th Marines in the early hours of 24
July, the day the outposts were attacked again. VMA-251
ComdD, Jul 53.

The lull in ground fighting lasted until late on the 24th. Then, at 1930, a heavy preparation of 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars combined with 76mm and 122mm artillery shells began to rain down on Boulder City. Men of G/3/1, under command of First Lieutenant Oral R. Swigart, Jr., were deployed at that time in a perimeter defense of the position having that morning completed the relief of G/3/7.

Enemy troops were reported massing for an assault. One regiment located by forward observers behind Hill 139, some 700 yards northwest of Berlin, was taken under fire at 1940 by artillery and rocket ripple. At 2030, following their usual pattern of laying down a heavy mortar and artillery barrage, the CCF began to probe the MLR at Hills 119 and 111 in the Marine right battalion sector. They hit first at Hill 111, the far right anchor of the division line, currently held by 7th Marines personnel. Then the CCF moved westward to Hill 119. Their choice of time for the attack once again coincided with the relief of 7th Marines units by the 1st Marines.[519] When the assault began, H/3/1 was moving up to relieve H/3/7 at the easternmost point of the line in the Hill 111 vicinity, and Company I was preparing to relieve I/3/7, to its left.

[519] A similar incident had occurred on 7 July when the 7th
Marines was attacked while in the process of relieving a
regiment of the 25th Infantry. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p.
9-58.

The Communist troops temporarily penetrated Hill 111 positions. At Boulder City, where the main force of the CCF two-battalion unit had struck, they occupied a portion of the trenchline. Attempting to exploit this gain, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted the Berlin Gate, on the left flank of Company G’s position and the East Berlin Gate, to its right. Marine units of the two regiments posted at the two citadel hills were heavily supported by MLR mortar, artillery, and tank fires. No artillery spotter or CAS flights were flown through the night, once again due to weather conditions.

By 2120, the bulk of Chinese soldiers had begun to withdraw from Hill 111, this attack apparently being a diversionary effort. But the enemy’s main thrust continued against the central Hill 119 position. Here the close, heavy fighting raged on through the morning hours, with enemy troops steadily reinforcing from the Jersey Ridge and East Berlin, by way of the Berlin Gate, the best avenue of approach to forward positions of Hill 119. At approximately 2100, the Chinese hurled a second attack against Hill 119 in the strength of two companies, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire. An hour later hand-to-hand combat had developed all along the 700 yards of the forward trenches. Company G men of the 1st Marines were down to half their original number, ammunition was running low, and evacuation of casualties was slowed by the fact that two of the eight corpsmen had been killed and most of the rest were themselves casualties.

By midnight, the front, left, and right flanks of the perimeter had been pushed back to the reverse slope of the hill and a 1st Marines participant commented “... only a never-say-die resistance was keeping the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position.”[520] At 0015, the thinning ranks of G/3/1 Marines (now down to 25 percent effectives) were cheered by the news that Company I men were about to reinforce their position. This latter unit itself suffered 35 casualties while moving into the rear area, when the Chinese intercepted a coded message and shifted a substantial amount of their mortar and artillery fires to the rear approaches of Hill 119.

[520] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” Aug 53, p. 4.

In response to the enemy bombardment, Marine artillery fires crashed against the Chinese continuously from 2100 to midnight. Four ripples were launched in support of the Hill 119 defenders. In one of the regiment’s most intense counterbattery shoots on record, the 11th Marines in three hours had fired 157 missions. By 2400, an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 hostile rounds had fallen in the division sector.

Meanwhile, the Chinese were also attempting to punch holes in the 5th regimental sector. In a second-step operation, rather than striking simultaneously as was customary, the enemy at 2115 had jabbed at outposts Esther and Dagmar in the right battalion of the 5th Marines. The reinforced Chinese company from the 408th Regiment quickly began to concentrate its attention on Esther, outposted by Company H Marines. During the heavy fighting both Marines and Chinese reinforced. By early morning, the enemy had seized part of the front trenchline, but the Marines controlled the rear trenches and reorganized the defense under rifle platoon commander, Second Lieutenant William H. Bates. The Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to isolate the position by heavy shelling and patrolled vigorously between Esther and the MLR.