Chapter VIII: Marking Time (2)

The new 1st Marine Division CG was coming to his Korean post from Camp Lejeune, N. C. where (like General Pollock before him) he had most recently commanded the 2d Marine Division. Commissioned originally in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1921, General Pate was to later rise to four-star rank. Prior to World War II, he had seen expeditionary service in Santo Domingo, in 1923–1924, and in China from 1927–1929, and also served in Hawaii. For his outstanding service and skill in complicated staff duties, first at Guadalcanal, and later during amphibious operations at Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, General Pate had been awarded the Legion of Merit and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit.

After the war, he had served two tours as head of the Division Reserve, in 1946 and 1951. Other assignments included Director of the Marine Corps Educational Center at Quantico and Deputy Director of Logistic Plans in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[426]

[426] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Jan
56, rev.

_Heavy May-June Fighting_[427]

[427] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 15 May, 28–30
May 53; 11thMar, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1st
MAW ComdD, May 53; 1st MAW PIR 136-53, dtd 14–15 May 53
and PIR 150-53, dtd 28–29 May 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323,
VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, May 53; Hermes, _Truce Tent_;
Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_.

After the early May change of lines, the Chinese lost little time in testing the new UNC defenses. Shortly after 0200 on 15 May, the CCF directed a two-battalion probe on the Carson-Elko-Vegas trio and the Berlin-East Berlin outposts newly held by the Turkish brigade. Supported by heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery, one battalion of enemy soldiers moved against each of the two major defense complexes. Marine Company C tanks, occupying the firing slots that night, accounted for heavy enemy losses in the action, estimated at 200 CCF killed and 100 wounded. Assisting the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion in throwing back the attack were 1/11, 2/11, and 4/11 which sent 3,640 rounds into the sharp four-hour engagement.

The TAFC defense was further reinforced later that day with 21 air strikes against hostile personnel and weapons positions north of the Turkish sector. Adding their weight to the clash, 3/11 and the rocket battery also brought their guns into action, for a combined 5,526 Marine rounds[428] dispatched against the enemy.

[428] Total ammunition expenditure by the 11th Marines and the
25th Division artillery batteries was 11,527 rounds,
to the Chinese output of approximately 10,000 rounds.
11thMarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 13.

It was not until 25 May, after the UNC had made its final offer at the truce talks, however, that CCF artillery really began to open up on the Nevada complex. The increased activity by hostile pieces, during the 25–27 May period, was duly noted by the artillery Marines who laconically reported, “Operations followed the recent pattern: enemy shelling of the Turkish Brigade increased during the afternoon; no contacts were reported.”[429]

[429] 11thMar ComdD, May 53, dtd 27 May, p. 19.

This latter situation changed abruptly on 28 May. Beginning at 1800, major elements of the Chinese 120th Division launched simultaneous attacks over 17,500 yards of I Corps front that stretched from COP-2 eastward to that consistent trouble-spot, the Nevada Cities, on to the Berlins, and finally the Hook area in the adjacent Commonwealth Division sector. Supported by heavy artillery fires, one CCF battalion moved in towards Carson and Elko. Another battalion,[430] under cover of smoke, attacked central COP Vegas, while a third struck Berlin and East Berlin on the right flank. Three hours after the initial attack, defenders at Carson and Elko were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Chinese.

[430] Some historians indicate that the 120th Division
initially sent four battalions forward in the action,
with two against the main objective, Vegas. Hermes,
_Truce Tent_, p. 463.

By midnight the men of the 35th Infantry had beaten back the attack at COP-2. The Turks, likewise, were still in possession of the two Berlin (platoon-strength) outposts, but Commonwealth forces were involved in a pitched battle at Ronson and Warsaw. The situation was even grimmer at this time in the Nevada Cities area outposted by the TAFC. Although the Turkish troops continued to hold Vegas, where 140 men were dug in, Carson (two-platoon size) had fallen and Elko (platoon-strength) was heavily besieged. Shortly thereafter, the 25th Division ordered that the TAFC withdraw from the latter position to its own MLR. The diversionary attack against Berlin-East Berlin had been broken off and the twin positions were secured.

During the first six hours of the attack, the night of 28–29 May, Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines, now under I Corps command, had sent 9,500 rounds crashing into Chinese strongpoints, while Marine air observers directed eight missions against active enemy artillery positions. Ripples from the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, transferred to the Commonwealth sector to support the Hook defense, were fired on CCF troop activity there. Another curtain of flame engulfed the Carson intruders. When the fighting started, 15 Marine tanks were positioned in the Turkish sector. Company B and C vehicles, under Captains James M. Sherwood and Robert J. Post, relentlessly pounded the approaching CCF columns, while Company D was put on a 30-minute standby. As the action developed, additional tanks were committed until 33 were on line at one time or another.[431]

[431] Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR
positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although
many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this
procedure, “I am forced to confess that it worked well
in that static defensive situation.” A major advantage
resulting from this change was that tanks effectively
linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and
radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out
the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was
“generally the only reliable means of communications with
the scene of action.” _Post ltr._

When savage Chinese pummeling of the 25th Division outposts continued the following day, Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines was transferred at 1315 to operational control of I Corps. The regiment’s three infantry battalions, antitank, and heavy mortar companies promptly moved out from their Britannia headquarters and within two hours had relocated at 25th Division bivouac areas south of the KANSAS line in readiness for counterattack orders. The 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company was similarly ordered to 25th Division control to relieve a 14th Infantry Regiment reserve company in position along the east bank Imjin River defenses.

Overhead, close air support runs were being conducted by pilots of Marine Attack Squadrons 212, 121, and 323. A series of seven 4-plane strikes hit repeatedly from noon on those Chinese troops, hardware, and resupply areas north of the 25th Division line. The aerial assault continued late into the night with MPQ missions executed by VMA-121 and VMF-311.

During the 29th, control of the Vegas outposts--where 1st Division Marines had fought and died exactly two months earlier--changed hands several times between the indomitable Turkish defenders and the persistent Chinese. By dark, the CCF had wrested the northern crest from the TAFC which still held the southeastern face of the position. In the 24-hour period from 1800 on the 28th through the 29th, the 11th Marines had expended 41,523 rounds in 531 missions. At one point in the action Chinese counterbattery fire scored a direct hit on Turkish gun emplacements, knocking six howitzers out of action from the explosions of charges already loaded. As a result 2/11, under its new battalion commander, Major Max Berueffy, Jr., took over the direct support mission of the TAFC Brigade. Marine artillery spotters on station from 0450 to midnight directed 42 fire missions on CCF guns, while the rocket battery unleashed 20 ripples against troop activity, one of which caused 50 WIAs. Although an Allied counterattack early in the day had restored Elko to friendly control, the enemy refused to be dislodged from Carson.

I Corps had previously regarded the defensive positions of the Nevada complex as “critical,” with the TAFC having been “instructed to hold them against all enemy attacks.”[432] By midday on the 29th, however, the I Corps commander, General Clarke, and 25th Division CG, General Williams, had apparently had a change of mind. The Vegas strength was down to some 40 Turks. Altogether more than 150 men under the 25th command had been killed and another 245 wounded in defense of Nevada positions. It appeared that the Chinese, constantly reinforcing with fresh battalions despite estimated losses of 3,000, intended to retain the offensive until the outposts were taken.

[432] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 462.

With Carson and Vegas both occupied by the enemy, the Elko position became untenable without the support of its sister outposts. Six times the CCF had crossed over from Carson to Elko to try to retake the latter position, but had been thus far deterred by Allied firepower. Accordingly, at 2300, the 25th Division ordered its reserve 14th Regiment, earlier committed to the Elko-Carson counterattack, to withdraw from Elko and the Turks to pull back from Vegas to the MLR. By daybreak the withdrawal was completed and 25th Division and Turkish troops had regrouped on the MLR.

The Army reported that more than 117,000 rounds of artillery and 67 close air support missions had buttressed the UNC ground effort. Official estimates indicated that in the three-day action the Chinese had fired 65,000 rounds of artillery and mortar, “up to this point an unprecedented volume in the Korean War.”[433] The Marine artillery contribution from its four active battalions during this 28–30 May period totaled 56,280 rounds in 835 missions.

[433] _Ibid._, p. 464.

During the three-day siege, 15 to 33 Marine tanks poured their lethal 90mm projectiles on the enemy from MLR firing slots. At times the action was so heavy that the tanks were refueled on line. As they ran out of ammunition and fuel, “armored utility vehicles of the battalion, with a basic load of ammunition aboard, maneuvered beside the tanks in position and rearmed them on the spot,”[434] to permit virtual uninterrupted tank firing. One Marine was killed in the action the first night. Although 4,162 rounds of Chinese fire fell near the tank positions, no damage to materiel was reported. For their part the M-46s and flames were responsible for 721 enemy deaths, an estimated 137 more killed, 141 wounded, and an estimated 1,200 injured.

[434] 1st TkBn ComdD, May 53, p. 3.

During the second day of action, nearly 20 missions were flown by Corsairs and Skyraiders of the three Marine attack squadrons and the jet fighters of VMF-311 and -115. Altogether throughout 28–30 May, Marine aircraft had flown no less than 119 sorties for the inflamed sectors of the U.S. Army 25th Division and adjacent British 1st Commonwealth Division. Of these, 99 were in support of the sagging Carson-Elko-Vegas-Berlins line.

Ground action ceased the following day as rain drenched the battlefield, although the 11th Marines reported sightings of more than 200 Chinese soldiers, most of them on the three recently lost outposts. Benched while the fierce battle was going on, the 1st Marines remained under operational control of I Corps as a possible contingency force from 29 May to 5 June. On the latter date, following the Eighth Army decision not to retake the Carson-Elko-Vegas outposts, the regiment reverted to Marine control and returned to Camp Britannia. The previous day the Communists had agreed on all major points of the UNC final offer and it appeared that a ceasefire was close at hand.

Diplomats and military leaders both felt this latest Chinese assault was to show a strong military hand and win dominating terrain features along the MLR. Thus the enemy would be able to improve his defensive posture when final battlelines were adjusted at the truce. It was not believed that the CCF effort was an attempt to expand their operations into a general offensive. In any event, the Nevada positions were downgraded from their previous designation as major outposts. I Corps also decreed no further effort would be made to retake them and that a “revaluation of the terrain in view of the destruction of the defensive work indicates these hills are not presently essential to defense of the sector.”[435]

[435] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 7thInfDiv, CG, 25thInfDiv, CG,
1stMarDiv, GOC, 1stComWelDiv, CG I Corps Arty, dtd 9 Jun
53 in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 53, App. 1, p. 1.

If things were now relatively quiet along the battlefront of the I Corps coastal sector, the situation had begun to heat up in the central part of the UNC defense line. On 10 June, following a CCF realignment of troops and supply buildup that had not gone unnoticed by Eighth Army intelligence officials, elements of the CCF 60th and 68th Armies struck the ROK II Corps area, on the east-central front. (See Map 29.) Advancing south along both sides of the Pukhan River with two divisions, the Chinese struck at the ROK II defense line which originally had bulged out to form a salient in the Kumsong vicinity. Within six days the ROK line had been forced back 4,000 yards. In subsequent assaults the enemy made new penetrations further west in the ROK II MLR. Although the main Communist thrust was directed against the ROK II Corps, secondary attacks were also made in the X Corps sector east of ROK II, in the Punchbowl area manned by the ROK 20th Division. It was the heaviest, all-out drive since the CCF spring offensive of April-May 1951, when the UNC had been pushed south approximately 30 miles across the entire Korean front.

By 18 June, the CCF assaults started to settle down. During the nine days of flaming action, ROK units had suffered some 7,300 casualties to enemy losses of 6,600. Boundaries had been redrawn and three ROK divisions had been redeployed in counterattacks to plug holes in the line that the Chinese had punched open. Nearly 15,000 yards of ROK front had been pushed 4,000 yards south and several hill positions east of the Pukhan had been lost.

MAP 29 K. WHITE

EIGHTH ARMY SECTORS

1 JANUARY-27 JULY 1953]

The brief respite ended 24 June when the CCF again directed heavy blows against the ROK troops, ignoring other UN forces in the Eighth Army line. It was generally considered a retaliatory move for the 18 June mass release of anti-Communist prisoners by South Korean President Rhee. This time the major target of the renewed Chinese offensive was the ROK 9th Division, in the IX Corps sector immediately west of the ROK II Corps. On 25 June the 1st ROK Division on the eastern flank of I Corps, to the right of the 1st Commonwealth Division, was pounded by another Chinese division. Significantly, the date was the third anniversary of the invasion of South Korea.[436] The 7th Marines, training in I Corps reserve, was put on standby status. The regiment was removed the following day when the 1st KMC/RCT (minus its 3d Battalion) was instead placed in readiness,[437] and subsequently moved out from its Indianhead area to be committed as a relief force in the left sector of the 1st ROK line.

[436] The strong likelihood of such attacks at this time
had been noted by Eighth Army in a warning issued
the previous day that reminded all commanders to be
“particularly alert” at this time. CG, 8th Army msg to
CG, 1stMarDiv and addees, G-3 Jnl, dtd 24 Jun 53.

[437] This change was due to the existing policy of not having
a United States unit serving under operational control
of a Korean commander. Had the 7th Marines or other U.S.
unit been so committed, it is expected that a provisional
task force would have been created for the assignment,
under a non-Korean commander. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6,
Chap. 9, p. 9-20. Actually, the 7th Marines alert on the
25th was of such short duration that no mention of it
appears in the regimental command diary, although the
fact is so noted in division records. The 1st KMC/RCT
was ordered to move out from the Indianhead area at 1630
on 26 June and came under operational control of 1st ROK
Division at 1540, 27 June. By 0100 the following day, it
had relieved 11th ROK Regiment. _ROKMC Comments._

By the 26th, the persistent Chinese probes of the 1st ROK sector had resulted in several forward outposts being overrun. To help stem the action the Marine 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery was displaced on I Corps Artillery order from its regular position (in the right regimental sector) 20 miles east to support the hard-pressed ROK division. On at least two occasions the battery placed ripples between ROK positions only 600 yards apart and it was felt that these “continued requests for fire close to friendly troops attested to the gunnery of the unit.”[438] Between that date and the 30th, the rocket battery remained in the ROK sector, firing a total of 25 ripples. For the 25th Infantry Division sector, however, the front continued undisturbed throughout the entire month of June.

[438] 11thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 15.

_Developments in Marine Air_[439]

[439] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap 10, No. 5,
Chap 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1/7
ComdD, Apr 53, App. IV, Rpt of Night Air Strikes; 1st
MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311,
VMF(N)-513, VMJ-1 ComdDs, Apr-Jun 53; VMA-312 ComdDs,
Apr-May 53; VMA-251 ComdD, June 53; VMO-6 ComdD, Apr 53;
Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_.

While the division was in I Corps reserve during the greater part of the April-June period, the 6,800-man 1st Marine Aircraft Wing continued its missions as an operational component of Fifth Air Force. For the Marine air arm it was a time of a major tactical innovation, a number of new air records set, and rapid personnel changes in the squadrons.

Shortly before the Marine division went off the line, a new method of close air support at night was introduced. This employed the use of two or more ground controlled 24-inch searchlights located on prominent terrain features along the MLR in the 7th Marines left battalion sector where the missions were to be flown. Enemy-held reverse slopes--in some cases less than 500 yards from Marine positions--were thereby pinpointed by the powerful intersecting searchlight beams. These long pencil-shaped beams created an excellent artificial horizon and enabled pilots to make bombing or strafing runs with a high degree of accuracy even on the blackest of nights. Manned by ANGLICO personnel, the lights were employed either for target location or illumination (both shadow and direct). A tactical airborne observer in an OE light liaison plane of VMO-6 directed the searchlight teams and controlled the missions.

A week of experimentation and trial runs to perfect the night close air support (NCAS) was conducted by several VMF(N)-513 pilots under direction of Colonel Jack R. Cram. Formerly CO of Marine Air Control Group Two at K-3, he had extended his tour in Korea to complete work on the new program. On 12 April, the first night of operations, Major Charles L. Schroeder and Second Lieutenant Thomas F. St. Denis flew two night support missions in F7F Tigercats. Although employed only a few weeks prior to the division going into reserve on 5 May, the new system rated an enthusiastic response from both pilots and ground commanders, all the way up to the division CG. As the latter reported to the Commandant following the first week of night close support missions, “results ... exceeded all expectations.”[440]

[440] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 18 Apr 53; in 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 53, App. II, p. 2.

Between 12 April and 5 May, the night fighter squadron conducted 58 NCAS sorties in the division right sector employing this new control system with excellent results.[441] The procedure was a marked success and made it possible to provide continuous 24-hour-a-day close support to Marine infantry units. It was considered a supplement to, not a replacement for the MPQ (radar controlled bombing) missions of MASRT-1. Plans called for F9F aircraft to be integrated into the program, since the F7F Tigercats were being replaced by jets. Allied psychological warfare teams on 17 April introduced a different theme in their broadcasts to the enemy: that of the dangers to the CCF from the new searchlight marking of targets. As a Marine training bulletin noted: “It is believed that this method of attack by aircraft is particularly demoralizing to the enemy because he is unable to anticipate where the strike will hit, and therefore has no means of defending himself against it.”[442]

[441] Confirmed damage assessment in this period: 75 enemy
KIA, 5 WIA; 25 bunkers, 12 personnel shelters, 20 mortar
positions, 32 automatic weapons positions, 1 ammunition
bunker, and 1 37mm AA position destroyed; 1 supply area,
3 weapons damaged; 1,545 yards trenchline destroyed;
and 190 secondary explosions or fires. Due to operating
conditions, these figures represented only 80 percent of
the total flights made on which TAOs confirmed results.
VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr-May 53.

[442] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-106, quoting
1stMarDiv Training Bulletin No. 5-53, dtd 10 Jun 53.

Another tactical improvement about this same time dealt with artillery flak suppression in support of close support aircraft. Two refinements made in the procedure in the late spring of 1953 involved firing of HE rounds during the actual run of planes over the target. Basically, the plan consisted of releasing a TOT or VT concentration on the most lucrative enemy antiaircraft positions within a 2,500-yard circle around the strike area. A continuous rain of HE-fuzed projectiles was placed on these targets for a three-minute period, during which Marine planes made their runs.

Favorable results were achieved in that new system tended to keep enemy antiaircraft gunners off-balance for a longer period of time and thus decreased the danger to friendly attacking aircraft. On the other hand, pilots quickly noted that this became an “unimaginative employment of an unvarying flak suppression schedule which Communist AA gunners soon caught onto and turned to their own advantage.”[443]

[443] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-70.

With respect to squadron hardware, Marine combat potential increased substantially during the spring months with the phasing out of F7Fs in Night Fighter Squadron 513 and introduction of the new F3D-2 twin-jet Skyknight intruder. By late May the Allocation of 24 of these jet night fighters had been augmented by 4 more jets from the carrier USS _Lake Champlain_ and the squadron “assumed its primary night-fighter mission for the first time in the Korean War.”[444] While the sturdy, dependable Tigercats[445] made their final contribution to the United Nations air effort early in May with the experimental NCAS program, the new Skyknights continued the squadron’s unique assignment inaugurated in late 1952 as night escort to Air Force B-29 bombers on their strike missions. Not a single B-29 was lost to enemy interceptors after 29 January 1953. The capabilities of the skilled Marine night-fighters were noted in a “well done” message received by the CO, VMF(N)-513 in April from the Air Force.[446]

[444] _Ibid._, p. 10-99.

[445] Also characterized by squadron members as the “tired old
Tigercats” in reference to the war-weary, 1945-vintage
aircraft. VMF(N)-513 ComdD, May 53, p. 6.

[446] CO, 19th Bomber Group (Col Harvey C. Dorney, USAF)
msg to CO, VMF(N)-513 (LtCol Robert F. Conley), n.d.,
reading: “19th Bomber Group Airborne Commander and crews
participating in attack on Sinanju Bridge Complex, 11
April, have high praise for night fighter protection. All
feel that without their protection severe damage or loss
of B-29’s would have resulted.” VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Apr 53,
p. 6.

Organizational changes within the wing included the arrival, on 29 May, of a new MAG-12 unit to replace the “Checkerboard” squadron. VMA-332 (Lieutenant Colonel John B. Berteling) was slated to operate on board the USS _Bairoko_ (CVE-115) for the F4U carrier-based squadron VMA-312[447] due for return to CONUS. Veteran of 33 months of combat while attached to the wing as West Coast (CTE 95.1.1) aerial reconnaissance and blockade squadron, VMA-312 (Lieutenant Colonel Winston E. Jewson) was officially relieved 10 June. The change, moreover, was the first phase of a new personnel policy, carrier unit rotation, that was expected to implement a unit rotation program for land-based squadrons. It was anticipated that the new unit rotation program would eliminate inherent weakness of the individual pilot rotation system and thus increase the combat effectiveness of the wing.[448]

[447] Prior to early May, VMA-312 had been based aboard the USS
_Bataan_ (CVL-29). The carrier itself was scheduled for
relief from the Korean Theater shortly before the new
afloat MAG-12 squadron reported in, and a transfer was
made by 312 to the new, larger escort carrier on 8 May.

[448] Comments _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-33:
“Severe tactical operations weakness developed throughout
the war in Korea which can be traced directly to the
individual pilot rotation system. These weaknesses are
inherent in any system which precludes pre-combat unit
training of pilots in the tactical squadron with which
they later go into combat. The situation is aggravated
further when pilots, many of them inadequately pre-combat
trained, are rotated through combat engaged units so
rapidly that squadron esprit cannot develop to a degree
which will insure a high standard of tactical efficiency.”

During the period other organizational changes included transfer of administrative control of VMF(N)-513 on 15 May from MAG-33 to MAG-12.[449] The squadron, with its new twin-engined jet fighters, moved from K-8 (Kunsan) further up the coast to the MAG-12 complex at K-6 (Pyongtaek), upon completion of the new 8,000-foot concrete runway there. This phased redeployment of nightfighter personnel and equipment began in late May and was concluded on 6 June without any interim reduction of combat commitments. Replacement of the squadron F7F-3Ns with F3D-2s was also completed in early June.

[449] MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B.
Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel
Bowman to the States.

Late that month, plans were underway for two additional changes: the Marine photographic squadron, VMJ-1, was due to be separated administratively and operationally from MAG-33 on 1 July and revert to 1st MAW; and Marine Wing Service Squadron One (MWSS-1) was to be deactivated, effective 1 July.

The change of command relationships between CG, FAF and CG, 1st MAW earlier in the year[450] which had restored operational control of certain designated Marine air units to the wing commander, increased the efficiency of 1st MAW operations. Despite the fact that VMJ-1 at times contributed nearly 40 percent to the total FAF input of all daylight combat photographs,[451] aerial intelligence (both pre- and post-strike photos) supplied to wing and group headquarters was considered inadequate. As a MAG-33 intelligence officer commented with some exasperation as late in the war as May 1953:

[450] See Chapter VI.

[451] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load “can be gauged by
one day’s peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid
end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one
half miles long.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p.
10-67.

The Section continued to experience difficulty in obtaining
1:50,000 scale overlays of friendly MLR and OP positions. These
overlays are important for making up target maps for close
support missions, but they are continually held up for long
periods by higher echelons, and, if received here at all, are
then often too old to be considered reliable.[452]

[452] MAG-33 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2.

Similarly, at the individual squadron level, the carrier unit VMA-312 shortly before its relief, reported: “The one limitation on squadron activities continued to be photo coverage of the strikes. With limited facilities available, the squadron has no clear cut pictures of strike results.”[453] Return of VMJ-1 to operational control of General Megee ultimately “gave the Wing adequate photo-intelligence for the first time since commencement of combat operations in Korea.”[454]

[453] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2.

[454] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65.

Indoctrination of new replacement personnel within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing took a swift upturn during the spring period. Pilots who had completed 100 combat missions were transferred to staff duty elsewhere in the wing in Korea or rotated Stateside. The average squadron personnel strength ran to 88 percent of T/O for enlisted; and officer strength, considerably less, frequently dipped as low as 61 percent. Under the 100-missions policy, it was a time of rapid turnover of unit commanders, too, as witnessed from the following squadron diary entries:

_VMA-212_--Lieutenant Colonel James R. Wallace assumed command
from Major Edward C. Kicklighter, effective 19 June; the latter
had been squadron ExO and acting CO in interim period following
30 April departure of former CO, Lieutenant Colonel Smunk;

_VMA-323_--Lieutenant Colonel Clarence H. Moore vice Lieutenant
Colonel Frash, on 11 April; and Major Robert C. Woten succeeding
Lieutenant Colonel Moore on 27 June;

_VMA-121_--Major Richard L. Braun vice Lieutenant Colonel Hughes,
on 21 April;

_VMF(N)-513_--Lieutenant Colonel Ross S. Mickey vice Lieutenant
Colonel Conley, on 6 May; in June, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
L. Conrad, acting CO, named CO for Lieutenant Colonel Mickey,
hospitalized for injuries received in a May aircraft accident;

_VMJ-1_--Lieutenant Colonel Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. vice Lieutenant
Colonel William M. Ritchey, on 15 May;

_VMF-311_--Lieutenant Colonel Arthur M. Moran vice Lieutenant
Colonel Coss, on 21 April; Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane
vice Lieutenant Colonel Moran, on 1 June;

_VMF-115_--Lieutenant Colonel Lynn H. Stewart vice Lieutenant
Colonel Warren, 5 June.

With respect to CAS activities, excellent weather in April--only a single day of restricted flying--brought the 1st MAW air tally that month for its land-based squadrons to 3,850 effective combat sorties (440 more by VMA-312) and 7,052.8 combat hours. This was a substantial increase over the preceding months. Not surprisingly, the average daily sortie rate for the month was correspondingly high: 128.3. Of 1,319 CAS sorties the largest proportion, 579 and 424 (43.9 percent, 32.1 percent), were for Marine and ROK operations, respectively.

The outstanding day of the month was 17 April. During the 24-hour reporting period, 262 sorties were completed by MAGs-33 and -12 pilots,[455] who expended a combined total of 228.3 tons of bombs and 28,385 rounds of 20mm ammunition. For the two MAG-33 fighter bomber squadrons, it represented maximum effort day. Preparation had been made a week earlier to devise the targeting and best all-round flight schedules for ordnance and line sections. Objective areas for the mass attack were picked by the wing G-3 target selection branch and approved by the EUSAK-Fifth Air Force JOC. It was decided that “flights of eight aircraft staggered throughout the day would offer the best efficiency in expediting reloading and refueling with not more than sixteen aircraft inactive on the flight line at one time.”[456] Throughout the day, from 0410 to 2030, VMFs-311 and -115 continuously pounded designated targets in support of the U.S. 7th and 3d Infantry Divisions.[457] Commented MAG-33:

[455] Between 15–18 April the west coast carrier squadron
was under a FEAF order restricting normal interdiction
missions. This was to protect UNC sick and wounded POWs
in transit from China to Kaesong for final exchange
at Panmunjom. VMA-312 air operations were held to CAS
along the bombline. “Marine fliers of the ‘Checkerboard’
squadron proved adept at this unusual role [CAS support
missions along the front lines], and received a ‘well
done’ from JOC Korea as the Corsairs flew more than 100
close air support sorties from 16–18 April.” _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-110.

[456] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

[457] Their respective locations were: 7th Division, at the
extreme right of I Corps sector; and further east, the
3d Division occupied the corresponding right flank of IX
Corps sector. VMF-311 concentrated on the 7th Division
targets while VMF-115 efforts were devoted primarily to
the 3d Division.

Hitting an all-time high in the annals of memorable days, this,
the seventeenth of April not only further proved MAG-33’s ability
to cripple the enemy’s already diminishing strength but it also
allowed VMF-115 to set records in total airborne sorties launched
in a single day plus a record total ordnance carried and expended
in one day by jet type aircraft.[458]

[458] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

VMF-115 alone, with 30 pilots and 23 aircraft, had flown 114 sorties and delivered 120 tons of bombs on North Korean targets.

A sample of the intensity of this maximum day was a series of three early-morning interdiction strikes led by three VMF-115 pilots that launched the effort. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Joe L. Warren, Major Samuel J. Mantel, Jr., and Major John F. Bolt, the 23 attacking Panther jets lashed the objective with 22.35 tons of ordnance and 4,630 rounds of 20mm ammunition. The three missions destroyed half of the buildings and inflamed 95 percent of the target area in the enemy supply concentration point T’ongch’on on the Korean east coast.

By contrast, wing operations in May were considerably hampered by the bad weather peculiar to this time of the year in Korea. Restricted flying conditions were recorded for 18 days of the month. A total of 153 CAS sorties were flown for the Marine division before its 5 May relief from the front lines. Of the wing’s 3,359 sorties[459] during the month, 1,405 were for close support to forward units beating back Communist encroachment efforts. The allocation of CAS sorties was 412 for U.S. infantry divisions (including 211 for the 25th Division occupying the customary Marine sector); 153 for the 1st Commonwealth Division at the Hook which the Communists assaulted on 27–28 May as part of their overall thrust against western I Corps defenses; 412 sorties for ROK units; and 63, miscellaneous. Heaviest action for Marine aviators took place towards the end of the month to thwart enemy blows in the I Corps sector where Army and Turkish units were attempting to repulse the Chinese.

[459] This figure does not include sorties by VMA-312
(carrier-based), VMO-6, or HMR-161, the latter two under
operational control of the 1st Marine Division.

The renewed effort of the Chinese Communists against UNC ground forces in late May continued sporadically the following month. A number of new records were set by Marines flying CAS assignments under the Fifth Air Force. During the intense mid-June attacks on the ROK II Corps area and adjacent X Corps sector, MAGs-12 and -33 pilots chalked up some busy days. Between 10–17 June, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft had flown 8,359 effective sorties, the bulk of this massive FAF effort to buttress the crumbling ROK defense. Of this number, Marine sorties totaled 1,156, or nearly 14 percent. (Combat sorties for the 1st MAW throughout June came to 3,276 despite 23 days of marginal to nonoperational weather.) Marine pilots scored as high as 48 percent of a single day’s interdiction strikes made by FAF. This occurred 15 June when the 1st MAW flew a record-breaking 283 sorties, followed by another peak 227 sorties the next day.

Actually, when the ground situation in the ROK II Corps front began to deteriorate on 12 June, the new Fifth Air Force commander, Lieutenant General Samuel E. Anderson, “waived the [3,000 foot] minimum-altitude restrictions on his fighter-bombers and ordered his wings to give all-out support to the Eighth Army.”[460] The Seventh Fleet commander, Admiral Clark, likewise kept his carriers on line for seven days and ordered its naval pilots to “team with Marine and Fifth Air Force airmen for a close-support effort exceeding anything up to that time.”[461] When the ROK II Corps defenses cracked open on 15 June, temporary clearing weather “allowed General Anderson and Admiral Clark to hit the Reds with everything they had. FEAF planes flew a total of 2,143 sorties of all kinds for the largest single day’s effort of the war.”[462]

[460] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 631.

[461] _Ibid._

[462] _Ibid._

Commenting on this heavy action period, 14–17 June, a dispatch to General Megee from the new FAF commander, who had succeeded General Barcus the previous month, noted:

The figures are now in. From 2000, 14 Jun 53, to 0001, 17 Jun
53, Fifth Air Force units flew a total of 3,941 combat sorties.
The cost was 9 pilots lost, 11 aircraft lost, 11 aircraft major
damage, 42 aircraft minor damage. The results: 1 enemy offensive
stopped cold. I very deeply appreciate the splendid efforts of
all members of the 5th AF at all levels. Only a concerted team
effort made the foregoing possible.[463]

[463] CG, FAF msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 17 Jun 53, in 1st MAW
ComdD Jun 53 (Vol I), p. 3 and App., IV (Vol III).

This came, incidentally, only five days after receipt by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing of the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.[464] The award cited the wing’s “outstanding and superior performance of duty” between 27 February 1951 and 11 June 1953. During this period Marine fliers executed more than 80,000 combat sorties for UNC divisions.

[464] Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW
was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive
ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among
the many ranking military officials attending the
ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and
newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The fighter-bombers of MAG-33 and the MAG-12 attack planes saw heavy action during 24–30 June when the Chinese again concentrated their attention on ROK divisions in the UNC line. Peak operational day was 30 June. Marine squadrons alone executed 301 sorties, including 28 percent of the CAS and 24 percent of total FAF interdiction missions. It was also an outstanding day for MAG-12 which “outdid itself by flying 217 combat sorties against enemy forces. The 30th of this month saw MAG-12 establish a new ordnance record when an all-time high of 340 tons of bombs and napalm were dropped on North Korea.”[465] Contributing heavily to this accomplishment was Marine Attack Squadron 121. It unleashed 156 tons of ordnance, a squadron record. It was believed this also established an all-time record for tonnage expended on the enemy by a Marine single-engine propeller squadron.

[465] MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1.

_Other Marine Defense Activities_[466]

[466] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No.
6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U)
ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War,
Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_.

Like their counterparts on the Korean mainland, the Marines, naval gunfire teams, and ROK security troops comprising the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Commands felt the alternating pressure build-up and slow-down that typified the closing months of the war. At both installations the defense had been recently strengthened, more or less by way of response to a CINCPacFleet intelligence evaluation in December 1952. This alerted the isolated island forces to the possibility of a renewed Communist attempt to recapture their positions. The Allied east coast defense structure at Wonsan, right at the enemy’s own front door just above the 39th Parallel, was considered particularly vulnerable.

As in the preceding months, the mission of the west coast island group remained unchanged--namely, the occupation, defense, and control of its six island components. These, it will be remembered, were: Sok-to, Cho-do, Paengyong-do (command headquarters), Yongpyong-do, and the two lesser islands at Taechong-do and Tokchok-to.[467] Formal designation of the island commands was modified on 1 January 1953. At this time the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Elements (TE 95.15 and TE 95.23) were redesignated as Task Units (TU 95.1.3 and TU 95.2.3) respectively. Korean Marines, who represented the bulk of these task units, were provided from the 2d KMC Regiment, the island security force. This unit constituted the main defense for the important U.S. Marine-controlled islands off the Korean west and east coasts.

[467] Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II.

Approximately 17 Marine officers and 100 enlisted men were assigned to the western coastal complex, with two battalions of Korean Marines fleshing out the garrison defense. The primary mission of this island group was to serve as offshore bases for UNC intelligence activities, including encouragement of friendly guerrilla operations conducted by anti-Communist North Korean personnel. Artillery based on the Marine-controlled islands provided both defensive fires and counterbattery missions against enemy guns sited on the nearby mainland.

The secondary mission of WCIDU, that of training Korean troops in infantry and weapons firing exercises, continued to be hampered somewhat by faulty communication. As one officer observed, the training program to qualify selected KMCs for naval gunfire duties “met with only modest success, due primarily to the language barrier and lack of communications equipment in the Korean Marine Corps. Personnel who had received this training did prove to be extremely helpful in accompanying raiding parties on the mainland in that they were able to call for and adjust fires.”[468]

[468] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also