Chapter VII: Vegas (1)

_The Nevada Cities--Supporting Arms--Defense Organization at the Outposts--Chinese Attack on 26 March--Reinforcements Dispatched--Massed Counterattack the Next Day--Push to the Summit--Other Communist Probes--Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost--Vegas Consolidation Begins--Aftermath_

_The Nevada Cities_[352]

[352] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5
ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdD, Apr 53, Special Action Rpt
Period 26–30 Mar 53, “Battle of the Cities,” hereafter
5thMar SAR “Cities”; Maj Norman W. Hicks, “U.S. Marine
Operations in Korea, 1952–1953 with Special Emphasis
on Outpost Warfare” (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Maryland,
1962), hereafter Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; 1stLt Peter
Braestrup, “Outpost Warfare,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v.
37, no. 11 (Nov 53) and “Back to the Trenches,” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 3 (Mar 55); MSgt Robert T.
Fugate, “Vegas, Reno, and Carson,” _Leatherneck_, v. 36,
no. 6 (Jun 53), hereafter Fugate, “Vegas.”

As the third winter of war in Korea began to draw to an inconclusive end in late March 1953, some 28,000 Marines of the 1st Division stationed on the western front suspected that coming weeks would bring a change of pace. Consider just the matter of basic logistics. Rising temperatures, tons of melting snow, and the thawing of the Imjin River, located north of the rear Marine support and reserve areas, would turn vital road nets into quagmires to tax the patience and ingenuity of men and machinery alike.

With the arrival of another spring in Korea there was strong likelihood that the Chinese Communists facing the Marines across a 33-mile front of jagged peaks and steep draws would launch a new offensive. This would enable them to regain the initiative and end the stalemate that had existed since October when they were rebuffed in the battle for the Hook.

Winning new dominating hill or ridge positions adjacent to the Marine MLR, in that uneasy No-Mans-Land buffer zone between the CCF and UN lines, would be both militarily and psychologically advantageous to the Communists. Any new yardage or victory, no matter how small, could be exploited as leverage against the “Wall Street capitalists” when truce talks resumed at the Panmunjom bargaining table. Further, dominant terrain seized by the CCF would remain in Communist hands when the truce went into effect. Although wise to the tactics of the Chinese,[353] UN intelligence had not anticipated the extent or intensity of the surprise CCF attack that opened up at 1900 on 26 March when the Communists sent battalions of 700 to 800 men against Marine outposts of 50 men.

[353] Since the first of the year division intelligence reports
had given the CCF the capability of mounting limited
objective attacks ranging from company to regimental
size. _PacFlt EvalRpt_, p. 9-28, quoting 1stMarDiv PIR
860, dtd 4 Mar 53.

The late March attack centered primarily on a trio of peaks where Marines had dug in three of their key outposts--Carson, Reno, and Vegas. Rechristened from earlier, more prosaic names of Allen, Bruce, and Clarence, respectively, the Nevada Cities hill complex was located approximately 1,500 yards north of the MLR fronting the 5th Marines right sector. The trio was the province of 1/5, which manned the western (left) part of the regimental area. Ultimately, however, reverberations ran through nearly 10,000 yards of division front, from the two Berlin outposts, 1,000 yards east of Vegas, to COP Hedy, midpoint in the 1st Marines center sector. Continuous attacks and counterattacks for possession of the key Vegas outpost raged unabated for five days. The action escalated into the bloodiest fighting to date in western Korea, resulted in loss of a major outpost, and the killing or wounding of nearly 1,000 Marines. It was a partial success for the enemy, but he paid a high price for the real estate: casualties amounting to more than twice the Marine losses, including 800 known killed and a regiment that was decimated by the Marine defenders.

The three Nevada outposts lay just below the 38th Parallel, approximately 10 miles northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance north of the Marine railhead at Munsan-ni. Possession of the area would give the Communists improved observation of I Corps MLR positions to the west. Indeed, the enemy had cast covetous eyes (an ambition translated into action through his well-known creeping tactics) on the semi-circular net of outposts since the preceding summer.

Mindful of this, the I Corps commanding general back in September had stressed the importance of holding key terrain features that could be of major tactical value to the enemy. This included Bunker Hill and COP Reno, both considered likely targets for renewed enemy aggression in the future. Particularly, the enemy had indicated he wanted to annex Reno. The object of increasing hostile attacks since July 1952, Reno was the closest of the three Nevadas to CCF lines and tied in geographically with two of the enemy’s high ground positions--Hill 190, to the northeast, and Hill 101, overlooking the site of the destroyed village of Ungok. (See Map 22.)

Reno’s companion outpost on the right, Vegas, at 175 meters, was the highest of the three while Carson, on the left flank, was nearest JAMESTOWN and also assisted in defense of Reno and Vegas. Each of the three outposts was manned by a rifle platoon (40 Marines plus two Navy hospital corpsmen), heavily reinforced with weapons company personnel. A small hill between Reno and Vegas, known as the Reno Block, further supported the Nevada Cities complex and at night was defended by a reinforced squad.

Since they commanded the historic Korean invasion route to Seoul, 30 air miles south, the strategic importance of the Nevada outposts had been one of the reasons for transfer of the Marines from East Korea to the West, in 1952. Both Reno and Vegas, moreover, overlooked Chinese rear area supply routes. This was a matter of special concern to the enemy at this time since he had recently doubled his stockpiling efforts and wanted to prevent UNC intelligence from learning about the build-up. Possession of the Nevada hills would enable the Chinese to harass the Marines at even closer range and--hopefully--to conduct new thrusts at the MLR which would ultimately weaken the UNC position.

MAP 22 K. WHITE

5TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

26 March 1953]

In mid- and late March, the units forward in the 1st Marine Division sector of the main defense line, JAMESTOWN, remained much as they had been in recent months. Left to right, the defending components were the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (1st KMC/RCT),[354] 1st Marines, and 5th Marines. One change had occurred when the 1st Marines relieved the 7th in the center sector earlier in the month. The latter was now in division reserve in the Camp Rose rear area. Before long, this regiment was to see more offensive action in a hotly contested, five-day period than it had during its entire recent tour on line. Overall, the 1st Marine Division continued as one of the four infantry divisions in the I Corps sector of EUSAK[355] and, in fact, the month itself marked exactly one year since the Marines had arrived on the western front.

[354] The 1st KMC Regiment had been redesignated the 1st
KMC/RCT on 15 Dec 52. Continuing under opcon of the
1stMarDiv, the Korean RCT consisted of four infantry
battalions, plus attached artillery, armor, engineer, and
service units. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-64.

[355] To the Marine division right were the U.S. 2d Infantry,
ROK 1st, and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.

Occupying the far eastern end of the division sector, the 5th Marines, under command of Colonel Walt,[356] had been assigned to the MLR since late January. The regiment manned six miles of the JAMESTOWN front. It was flanked on the left by the 1st Marines while to the right its neighbor was the 38th Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, U.S. Army.

[356] No stranger to the 5th Marines, Colonel Walt had served
with this regiment during World War II at Guadalcanal,
Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. He had commanded, on
separate occasions, 2/5 and 3/5 and had earned two Navy
Crosses for combat leadership and bravery.

Since 20 February, the western part of the 5th regimental sector had been held by Lieutenant Colonel Platt’s 1/5, with Companies A, B, and C on line, from left to right. The battalion area held four outposts. COP Ava was tucked down near the boundary between the 1st and 5th Regiments, while the Nevada, or Three Cities, triangle screened the central part of the latter regimental sector. A Company A squad[357] outposted Ava, some 325 yards forward of the main line. Personnel of Company C were stationed on Carson and Reno. Vegas had a unique command situation. Due to its proximity to the boundary between 1/5 and 3/5, Vegas came under operational control of the former battalion while personnel charged with its defense belonged to Company H of 3/5.

[357] Normally Ava was a squad-size outpost. Prior to and
during the late March attacks, all 5th Marine COPs were
strengthened.

The right flank of the regimental sector was the responsibility of 3/5, which had moved to the front on 23 March, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Oddy. Companies H, G, and I were forward, in that order from the west, with George personnel on duty at the two reinforced squad size outposts, Berlin and East Berlin. In regimental reserve was Lieutenant Colonel James H. Finch’s 2/5.

Westward along JAMESTOWN from Colonel Walt’s 5th Marines was the center regimental sector, held by the 1st Marines commanded by Colonel Adams. (See Map 23.) The extreme western part of the regimental line came to a juncture with KMC territory just as it looped around the critical Panmunjom peace corridor. This left battalion sector was manned by Lieutenant Colonel George A. Gililland’s 2/1. Companies E, D, B from 1/1,[358] and F were forward, outposting COPs 1, 2, Marilyn, Kate, and Ingrid. To the right 3/1, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest G. Atkin, defended Hedy, Bunker, Ginger, Esther, Dagmar, and Corinne, with Companies H, G, and I on line. Occupying the area adjacent to the secondary defense installations, WYOMING and the western part of the KANSAS line, was Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Findtner’s reserve 1/1. And located to the rear of the 1st and 5th Regiments was the 7th Marines (Colonel Haffner), in reserve,[359] and the division rear support units, also south of the Imjin.

[358] Company B from 1/l had been assigned to operational
control of 2/1 when the latter unit relieved 1/7 on
line on 10 March. The increased personnel enabled the
battalion to position a company-size detachment at the
strategic high ground, COP 2, that overlooked Panmunjom
and the critical truce talk site.

[359] Regimental command changed 27 March when Colonel Glenn C.
Funk, former commanding officer of the 1st Shore Party
Battalion, was assigned to the 7th Marines, succeeding
Colonel Haffner, who became G-2.

_Supporting Arms_[360]

[360] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10;
1stMarDiv, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1st MAW,
MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Mar 53.

In support of the three infantry regiments were the artillerymen, guns, and howitzers of Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines. Two of its three light battalions, 1/11 and 3/11, provided 105mm direct fires to the 5th and 1st Marines, respectively. The general support battalion was 2/11, prepared to reinforce the fires of 1/11. The regimental medium battalion, 4/11, was in general support of the division, as was the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery. To the southwest of the division sector, the 75mm guns of the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion, also attached to the 11th Marines, were in direct support of the 1st KMC/RCT. Newly formed the preceding month, the 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery-Automatic Weapons Platoon had the mission of defending two of the Imjin River Bridges--Freedom and Spoonbill--in the division sector.

MAP 23 K. WHITE

1ST MARINES MLR SECTOR

(Division Center)

26 March 1953]

In addition to organic and attached units of the 11th, four I Corps artillery components, located within division territory, further reinforced 11th Marines capabilities. The 623d Field Artillery Battalion, with batteries in the 5th and 7th Marines sectors, like 4/11 consisted of 155mm howitzers. Three heavy artillery units were also available for counterbattery missions. These 8-inch howitzers belonged to Battery C of the 17th Field Artillery, Battery B of the 204th Field Artillery, and the 158th Field Artillery Battalion. These Army units were assigned to general support of I Corps, reinforcing Marine fires on call, and were under operational control of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion Group.

Active armored support for the division’s ground troops during March was provided by three of the four companies from the 1st Tank Battalion. Company A’s M-46s, flame tanks, and retrievers, well forward in the right sector, were in direct support of the 5th Marines; Company D tanks were assigned to the 1st Marines. Company B functioned as the forward reserve unit, ready to move into firing positions on the MLR if the tactical situation called for it. The rear reserve unit, Company C, conducted refresher training and performed equipment checks on the rest of the battalion tanks. The battalion commander, since May 1952, was Lieutenant Colonel John I. Williamson.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with a personnel strength of 6,400, was located throughout Korea. Wing headquarters, Marine Air Control Group 2, and Marine Air Group 33, with its F9F day jet fighters and the VMJ-1 photo reconnaissance squadron operated from K-3, Pohang. VMF(N)-513, with all weather jet fighters, flew out of K-8, Kunsan, on the west coast, 105 miles below Seoul. MAG-12 and its squadrons of attack ADs and Corsairs was relatively near the 1st Marine Division sector, at K-6, Pyongtaek, 30 miles southeast of Inchon. Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, with its heavy maintenance capability, remained at Itami, Japan.

Tactical control had been altered radically the previous month when the Fifth Air Force had relinquished its command of Marine pilots and planes and they returned to operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for the first time since the early days of the war. Direction of the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6 used in transport and reconnaissance missions had for some time been closer to home; both squadrons were under 1st Marine Division operational control. HMR-161 was based at A-17, in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division command post. VMO-6, a composite unit consisting of single-engine OE-1 observation planes and a copter section of the HTL-4 and the new larger HO5S-1 craft, was located at A-9, three miles south of division headquarters. The squadron provided regularly scheduled helicopter evacuation of night frontline combat-casualties, artillery spotting flights, and airborne control of air strikes. Both squadrons performed routine liaison and reconnaissance, administrative, and resupply flights.

_Defense Organization on the Outposts_[361]

[361] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR
“Cities.”

Carson (Hill 27), furthest west of the three Nevada Cities was, at 820 yards, also nearest the Marine main line of resistance. It overlooked enemy terrain to the northwest and dominated an important approach from that same direction--the Seoul road. Organized as a perimeter defense position, Carson security was oriented toward two major Chinese strongpoints. These were the twin-peaked Ungok Hill mass (31-31A), approximately 650 yards west of the Seoul road which lay between Ungok and Carson, and Hill 67 (Arrowhead), an equal distance due northwest. Other critical features in the immediate Carson vicinity included, on the right, the west finger of Reno; the ridgeline south from Reno to a point known as “Ambush Alley,” in the vicinity of enemy Hill 47; and the ridgeline approaches by the two listening posts--Fox finger and George finger. (See Map 24.)

MAP 24 K. WHITE

COP CARSON

March 1953]

Little cover or concealment existed, other than that offered by the trenchline and a cave used as living quarters. Four weapons positions--light machine guns and Browning automatic rifles--covered main enemy avenues of approach. These and two listening posts were each manned by two men after 1800 and throughout the night. Of Carson’s customary strength of 38 (1 officer and 37 enlisted), 28 stood watch and worked on fortifications at night. A six-man security team was on duty during the day. All posts connected by land line to battalion headquarters, where a 24-hour phone watch was maintained. Sound power phones and radios also provided communication with the company CP.

Nearly 350 yards of trenchline encircled the outpost. Most was in good condition, five or more feet deep and two feet wide. The main trench on the reverse slope was in spots shallow, only three to five feet, and a new trench was being dug. Fields of fire for small arms protection were considered good, although some of the 28 fighting holes were overly close to culvert and sandbag overheading, which prevented complete fire coverage of forward slopes. Adequate fire support could be given along the southern slope of the west finger extending from COP Reno, which was also mutually supporting with that of the Reno Block. Forward observer teams for the 60mm and 81mm mortars provided observation for supporting arms. The arsenal of weapons at Carson included 4 A-4 light machine guns, 2 flamethrowers, 2 3.5-inch rocket launchers, 9 Browning automatic rifles, 36 M-1 rifles, 2 carbines, 2 pistols, and 4 grenade launchers.

Some 450 yards northeast, COP Reno (Hill 25) was dug in on a ridgeline that fronted enemy Hill 25A (also known as Hill 150), immediately north. Approximately 1,600 yards away from the MLR, Reno was the central of the three outposts and also the one most distant from Marine lines. West to east, critical terrain consisted of five enemy positions--Hills 31, 67, 25A, 190, and 153--and friendly companion outpost Vegas, on the right flank. (See Map 25.)

Two main trenches led into the outpost, a reverse slope fortification. The forward trench, perpendicular to the ridgeline fronting the position, was approximately 20 yards long and 8 feet deep. The second, to the rear and about the same length, traversed the outpost in an east-west direction. Approaching from the entrance, or “Gate” of the MLR, the two trenches joined on the left, forming a 90 degree angle. A cave, located in the arc between the trenches, provided overcrowded living quarters where personnel slept either on the dirt floor or atop sandbags, since there were no bunkers at Reno. Ammunition supplies, as well as the corpsman’s first aid facilities, were cached in the cave.

MAP 25 K. WHITE

COP RENO

March 1953]

A major blocking position, some 100 yards south, and to the rear of Reno itself was covered by troops posted in the trenchline. Left of the forward trench, protective wire was placed across the topographical crest. This left finger had good observation to Ungok and Arrowhead but also served as an approach to Carson. Most likely enemy approach, however, was considered to be the ridgeline from Hill 150, on the north. The Seoul road, rear trenchline, and valley to the right were alternate approaches. Twenty-four hour security at Reno included an automatic rifleman at the Gate, at Post 1, on the forward trench, and Post 2, which was at the extreme right of the rear trench. Ten machine gunners were also detailed as night watch on the guns. During the daytime they were responsible for maintenance of ammunition and weapons which consisted of 18 M-1 rifles, 6 BARs, 5 A-4 LMGs, 2 flamethrowers, 1 carbine, and 7 pistols.

The biggest defense problem at Reno stemmed from restricted fields of fire. Able gun, for instance, covered the rear of the topographical crest and Hills 31 and 67, on the left. But dead space masked its effectiveness practically from the base of Hill 67 to the gun itself. The Baker gun, protecting the reverse slope, had a lateral firing range of from 10 to 30 feet. Charlie gun maintained an unlimited sector of fire, approximately 180 degrees, and Dog gun covered the rear. As there were no prepared machine gun positions, they were fired from the parapet protecting both the fighting holes and firing positions in the trenchline. Two fighting holes were manned by BARs and two were used as machine gun posts.

Customarily 40 to 43 men were on duty at COP Reno. In fact this number had been viewed dubiously as being “far too many to man defensive positions at any one time,” by the commanding officer of the 1/5 Weapons Company during a survey earlier in the month, noting that “about 20 could adequately defend the position.”[362] A six-man force was detailed as a permanent working party for the improvement of fortifications. Sound power phones linked all positions and field phones connected the forward observer with gun positions. Overall, for proper defense, Reno depended heavily upon support fires from Carson and Vegas, on its right flank. Morale was considered “very good to excellent” with Reno personnel being relieved every 8 to 10 days.

[362] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Reno Report, by Capt
Henry A. Checklou, dtd 12 Mar 53, p. 4.

Vegas (Hill 21), the highest of the three outposts, was located approximately 1,310 yards in front of the MLR. Observation of the surrounding terrain from the east slope of enemy Hill 190 on the north, clockwise to the ridge south of Reno had been pronounced “excellent” on an inspection trip made earlier the day the outposts were attacked. From north to south this observation included in its 180-degree sweep, enemy hill mass 57 to the right, friendly outpost Berlin, the MLR, key Marine defense highpoints, Hills 229 and 181 in the 1st Marines rear sector, and intervening terrain. (See Map 26.)

The north-south ridge leading to COP Reno masked the view from Vegas on the west. To the north full observation was partially limited by outpost Reno itself and enemy Hills 150, 153, and 190. The latter was particularly strategic for two reasons. First, it shielded a major assembly area. And, although the Chinese had observation of the entire right battalion MLR from Hill 190 on the north, Vegas prevented enemy close-in view of Marine rear areas. It also dominated the approach to a major Marine observation point, Hill 126, to the rear of the front lines in the western part of the 3/5 sector.

Organized as a perimeter defense, Vegas was surrounded by 250 yards of trenchline. The forward, or north trench, averaged four feet in depth but deepened to about eight feet as it progressed to the rear. The most solidly constructed part was the western portion. A center communication trench was in good condition between the rear and topographical crest. From this point to the forward trench its depth decreased to about four feet. The trench leading back to the MLR, about five feet deep and two wide, was in good condition. A total of 13 fighting holes had been constructed.

Outpost troops, numbering approximately 40, consisted of six fire teams, heavy weapons and machine gunners, two 81mm mortar crews and two artillery observers, one corpsman, and a wireman at night. Strength was reduced during the day, with replacements to make up the normal complement arriving on position early each evening.

MAP 26 K. WHITE

COP VEGAS

March 1953]

Major approaches to Vegas included the large draws to the west and north of the outpost, the ridgeline to the COP from Hill 153 to the northwest, and the rear trenchline. Several ancillary trenchlines to the east tended to reinforce this latter approach. A hindrance to the enemy, however, was the slope leading into the draw west of the outpost. For security purposes, the perimeter was divided into three sectors, each manned by two fire teams augmented by heavy weapons personnel. The outpost detachment stood nighttime posts on a 50 percent basis and remained within the several living bunkers or other shelters during daylight hours because of heavy shelling and sniper fire. Incessant enemy pressure at the exposed outpost made it expedient to rotate infantry Marines at Vegas every three days and observers, at the end of four or five days.

Weapons on position included two flamethrowers, one 3.5-inch bazooka, four machine guns, three pistols, and other small arms. Fields of fire at Vegas, rated fair to good, were generally restricted due to the proximity of overheading. Most of the light machine guns had plunging fields of fire except for the approach along the ridgeline from Hill 153, covered by grazing fire. A fighting hole to the left of Able Gate, which overlooked the trenchline leading to the MLR, was manned during the day. No other sentries or listening posts were in effect. Nine sound power phones were operative. Three were located in the CP bunker (connecting to C/1/5, G/3/5, and the CP net); one, each, at the four main posts, the rear Able Gate, and the cave.

Other than periodic work being done by 10 Korean Service Corps personnel in clearing out the trenches, no construction was in process at Vegas. KSCs, lugging their traditional A-frames and guided by Marines, also ran a nightly “supply train” to Vegas as they did to Carson and Reno. Sufficient personnel manned the outpost for adequate defense, although an inspecting officer opined that the “one 3.5 rocket launcher on position did not appear to be necessary for defense of this type position.”[363]

[363] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Vegas Report, by
Capt Henry A. Checklou, on 26 Mar, dtd 31 Mar 53, p. 4.

_The Chinese Assault of 26 March_[364]

[364] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 26–27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv
PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 86-53, dtd 27
Mar 53, 87-53, dtd 28 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar,
11thMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11,
3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR, 18–28
Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Fugate, “Vegas.”

Until the final days of March, the CCF units opposite the 5th Marines had shown little aggressiveness. Regimental reports had officially cited Chinese actions as having been “extremely limited” other than their expected resistance to patrols and the Marine ITEM raid staged earlier in the month by the 1/5 two-platoon unit on Hill 31A, part of the Ungok complex. The enemy posture had, in fact, been described as one “reluctant to meet our patrols except in their positions.”[365]

[365] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, dtd 4 Apr 53, p. 2.

A regimental patrol policy early in March established as SOP a minimum of four reconnaissance and two combat patrols in each MLR battalion sector daily. Nevertheless, 3/5 had reported no contact with the enemy for the three-day period prior to the attack which was launched at 1900 on 26 March. Since the middle of the month, 1/5 had conducted nearly a dozen night combat patrols and ambushes in one- and two-squad strength to test the enemy in the Carson-Reno-Vegas area. Terminology of the operation orders read that the Marines were to make contact, capture prisoners, and deny the ground to the enemy, an injunction that--in view of events shortly to transpire--was to turn out more prophetic than anticipated.

That last Thursday in March 1953 was clear, almost unseasonably warm. Just after darkness had settled down over the Korean ridges, gullies, MLR, outposts, and rice paddies, the enemy suddenly made his presence known. Up until that time it had been an average day of activity, and there had been no especially ominous overtones to the start of the night.

Suddenly, at 1900, small arms and machine gun fire cracked from enemy strongholds on Hills 44, 40, 35, and 33, and tore into the left and center part of the 1/5 sector. Almost immediately, a heavy mortar and artillery preparation of 15 minutes duration exploded all along the 5th Marines MLR. A Chinese rifle platoon and half a dozen machine guns on Hill 140, about 500 yards west of Kumgok, directed additional fire on the sector.

At the same time 5th Marines outposts Carson and Reno, each manned by a reinforced rifle platoon from C/1/5, came under attack from Chinese mortars and 76mm artillery. Approximately 1,200 mortar rounds struck COP Carson by 1920. As men of D/2/5, some of whom had been detailed to Carson earlier that night for an ambush, reported, “one round per second from Chinese 60mm and 82mm landed in or around [our] position during the first 20 minutes of the engagement. Thereafter, one round was received every 40 seconds until about 2200.”[366] Interdiction fires also raked Marine rear areas and supply routes. Counterbattery fire struck Marine direct support artillery positions in the 5th’s regimental sector while heavy shelling of the MLR and its battalion CPs shattered wire communication between those installations and their advance outposts.

[366] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, p. 10.

Within ten minutes, Vegas, furthest east of the four OPs in 1/5 territory, became the object of serious enemy attention. Outposts Berlin and East Berlin, meanwhile, still further east in the 3/5 sector proper were also engaged by fire from hostile small arms and mortars from Chinese occupying Hills 15 (Detroit), 13 (Frisco), and 98 to the northeast. As the coordinated fire attack raged throughout the 5th Marines regimental front, preparatory fire and diversionary probes hit the 1st Marines sector. Outposts Hedy, Bunker, Esther, and Dagmar, in the center regimental area, were struck by small arms, mortars, and artillery shells a few minutes before 1900. Platoon and squad strength limited attacks were conducted against Dagmar, Hedy, and Esther, and enemy units were sighted moving in front of the KMC, further west along the MLR.

At precisely 1910, a force of 3,500 Chinese from the 358th Regiment, 120th Division, 46th CCF Army began to swarm down from Ungok, Arrowhead, Hill 25A, and Hill 190 and launched a massive assault in regimental strength against the 5th Marines sector. (Map 27.) Elements of six companies from three battalions converged on the area from three directions. Two enemy platoons of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion from Ungok struck Carson while one infantry company each, initially, began a direct assault on Reno and Vegas. Units from the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, from Arrowhead and Hill 29, crossed the Seoul road to hit Reno in a direct frontal assault. Elements of the 7th Company, 3d Battalion moved down from Hill 190, a mile north, to encircle the left flank of Reno and thus strike from the rear of the Marine position. Other Chinese soldiers of the 8th Company, 3d Battalion, supported by the 9th Company, moved some 500 yards south of their ridgeline positions on Hill 25A and 155 immediately north of Vegas to attack the outpost head-on.

Another enemy unit, the 2d Company, 1st Battalion, swept south from Hill 57A and made diversionary probes of the two most remote outposts of the entire 1st Marine Division line, Berlin and East Berlin in the 3d Battalion sector. These two smaller positions, each manned by a reinforced squad-size detachment from G/3/5, were to be successful in driving off the enemy’s less determined efforts there with a rain of small arms, mortar, and artillery fires.

As the enemy regiment advanced toward its objectives in a coordinated three-pronged attack, Marine artillery fired protective boxes and VT on the outposts and routes of approach from the west, north, and east. Defending infantry also called down organic 60mm and 81mm mortar barrages. Actually, prior to the Chinese onslaught at 1900, 1/11, the direct support battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Olin W. Jones, Jr.) for the 5th Marines, began a registration and had laid its howitzer fires on the active area. The artillery regiment had also set up conference calls linking its four organic battalions and supporting Army units. The fire plan for the 11th Marines provided for its three light battalions (1/11, 2/11, and 3/11) to cover enemy approaches and assembly areas, deliver protective boxing and VT fires requested by the outposts, and furnish countermortar missions called in by forward observers. Medium battalions (4/11 and the 623d Field Artillery) were to reinforce defensive fires and destroy hostile mortars and artillery emplacements. Heavy 8-inch howitzer support (Battery C, 17th FA Battalion and Battery A, of the 204th) would silence enemy counterbattery weapons.

As it happened on the night of the 26th, Marine tanks, in addition to artillery, were also registered before the time of the actual attack. Eleven of Captain Hunter’s Company A tanks had earlier rumbled into firing position on the MLR to provide mechanized support for an infantry raid scheduled at dawn the next morning.

MAP 27 K. WHITE

ATTACKS ON 5TH MARINES FRONT

26–30 MARCH 1953]

Despite this immediate response of Marine fire support, the Chinese invaders outnumbered the platoons holding the outposts by a 20 to 1 ratio. The sheer weight of numbers was the decisive factor. By 1935 the enemy had penetrated the lower trenches of both Carson and Reno. An hour after the onset of the attack, at 2000, the Marines were throwing back Chinese forces with bayonets, knives, rifles, and bare fists in the close, heavy fighting at Carson. There, where 54 men had been on duty at the time of initial attack, the outpost was successfully holding off the Communists. Four reinforcing squads quickly dispatched by battalion were designed to further strengthen the position. At 2000, just when D/1/5 and C/1/5 relief squads were leaving for the outpost, the Chinese unexpectedly began to release their grip on Carson as they concentrated on the two more isolated COPs, Reno and Vegas, that were further from the MLR.

No other attempt was made by the enemy to occupy Carson that night or the next day. Barrage fires gradually ceased as the enemy began to withdraw about 2135. Sporadic bursts of his 60mm and 82mm mortars and 76mm guns, however, continued to rock the position until midnight.

Developments at Reno and Vegas, by 2000, were vastly more ominous. At Reno, two companies of CCF soldiers thrust into the position from a frontal and flank attack. Within a half hour they made their way into the trench defenses. Although VT fires placed on the outposts and WP flare shells outlined the enemy for the gunners, Chinese in overpowering numbers continued to batter the Marine post. Due to the lack of fighting trenches, bunkers, and to limited fields of fire, Reno defenders fell back on a cave defense within a half hour of the assault.[367]

[367] At both Reno and Vegas the Marines had moved into the
caves for protection from VT fire. This was the plan in
event of an overwhelming enemy attack. In contrast, the
detachment at Carson fought from covered fighting holes
and employed the cave there only to get their wounded out
of direct fire. 5thMar SAR “Cities,” pp. 2–3.

A message received at 2030, requesting more VT rounds and reinforcements, indicated that the enemy had sealed all entrances to the cave and that the men were suffering from lack of air. Of the 40 Company C Marines on the outpost at the time of attack an hour and a half earlier, only 7 were then reported still able to fight. More illumination to enable friendly machine guns and rockets to chop up the enemy was furnished by artillery and a flare plane that arrived on station at 2205. Two Marine tanks, in position behind Reno, were alerted and put their 90mm fires to good use on the enemy and his weapons emplacements.

Meanwhile, at Vegas, the situation was also deteriorating. More than a hundred Chinese had moved up under the perimeter of exploding shells and Marine defensive fires into the lower trenches by 1950, less than an hour after the enemy’s first volley. Ten minutes later, the Marines were forced to give way to the overwhelming number of enemy soldiers which began to swarm over the outpost.

In addition to the sudden force and onslaught of the enemy, communication difficulties also plagued Marine detachments on the outposts, particularly at Vegas. Enemy mortar and artillery, aimed at the mainline CPs, had wrecked the ground lines. As early as 1940, communications between the 1st Battalion CP and Vegas went dead and continued to be broken despite repeated attempts to reestablish contact. Carson and Reno also had wire troubles about this time, but radio contact was shortly established. For the most part, operational reports and orders during the night and early morning hours were sent over company and battalion tactical nets. The intensity of the Chinese fire was not restricted just to forward positions; the 1/5 CP, a mile south of the MLR, at one point received up to 100 rounds per minute.

_Reinforcements Dispatched_[368]

[368] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
26–27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW
PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 1/5,
2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR; 5thMar
SAR “Cities”; VMO-6, HMR-161 ComDs, Mar 53; MacDonald,
_POW_; USMC Biog.

While the Marines on the outposts were trying to drive off the enemy, reinforcements back at the MLR and in the reserve ranks quickly saddled up. A F/2/5 advance platoon dispatched to Reno at 2015 by way of the Reno Block was ambushed near Hill 47 an hour later by two enemy squads which had moved south to cut off Marine reinforcements. After a fire exchange, the platoon made its way to the blocking position. Another relief unit, from Company C, 1st Battalion, that jumped off for Reno 15 minutes later had poorer luck. The men had scarcely gone a half mile before being shelled. After briefly taking cover the Marines moved out again, only to draw fire from the enemy at Hill 47. Advancing for a third time, the Company C two-squad unit was again halted by fire from two hostile platoons. By this time 10 Marines had been wounded and evacuated.

A D/2/5 reinforcement platoon ordered to Vegas, at 2129, encountered strong opposition in the Block vicinity, but it threw back the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting and prevented him from gaining fire supremacy at the position. Leading units of F/2/5, meanwhile, had been ordered to operational control of 1/5 to augment the earlier Company C platoon at the Block and then move north with them to Reno. After being issued ammunition and hand grenades at the Company C supply point, the “F” 1st Platoon left the MLR at 2227, with the 2d Platoon filing out in column 400 yards behind them. Under a constant rain of 76mm artillery and 82mm and 122mm mortar shells--and with casualties for one platoon reaching as high as 70 percent within minutes--the F/2/5 men fought their way into the trenches at the Block. Here they joined the depleted ranks of Company C which had established a base of fire. Despite the incessant barrage of Chinese incoming that continued to inflict heavy casualties, the Marines maintained their precarious grip on the Block and cleared out large numbers of Chinese attempting to infiltrate the trenches and approaches from the north and south to the Marine position.

While the Reno and Vegas relief units were pinned down at the Block, the situation at the outposts remained critical. Throughout the night new waves of Communist soldiers poured out from their positions behind Chogum-ni, Hills 31 and 31D. When a company of enemy troops were observed at 2100 massing near Chogum-ni for a new assault, it was quickly disposed of by Marine artillery and Company A tankers. At Reno where the immediate situation was the most grim, a message at 2145 reported the enemy still in the trenches, trying to dig down into the cave while the Marines were attempting to work their way out by hand. The final report from Reno received late that night, about 2300, was weak and could not be understood.

At Vegas, meanwhile, communications failure continued to complicate defensive measures at the outpost. Because of this, on the order of regimental commander, Colonel Walt, operational control had been transferred, at 2119, from 1/5 to 3/5. Three minutes before midnight all contact with Vegas was lost. As with Reno, reinforcements sent out with the mission of buttressing the Vegas detachment had been delayed. When it became evident that the Company D platoon had been pinned down at the Block, a platoon from E/2/5 jumped off at 2323 for the Vegas position.

Shored up to reinforced company strength, the composite unit at the Block had prepared to move on for the ultimate relief of C/1/5 forces at Reno. Chinese firepower and troops continued to lash the position, however. There seemed to be no limit to the number of reserve troops the enemy could throw into the attack. At 2157, two Chinese platoons had hit the Block. Twenty minutes later, another two platoons struck. By 2300, the Marines had repulsed three attacks, numbering more than 200 troops, amid a continuing withering avalanche of bullets and shells. Shortly before midnight, a full enemy company had deployed south from Reno to the Block, but had been largely cut down by friendly 90mm tank fire and VT rounds from 1/11. Reinforced and reorganized, the Marines again prepared for a counterpunch on Reno.

By midnight on the 26th, after five blistering hours of battle--to develop into five days of intense conflict and continuing counterattacks--the early efforts of the enemy were partly successful. Two of the Nevada Hill outposts had fallen, and Marine attempts to strengthen them were initially being thwarted by Chinese troops that had overflowed the Block and southward toward the MLR. COP Carson was holding. But the enemy was in control of Reno and Vegas and was using the Reno position to mass troops and firepower to further brace his continuing assault on Vegas.

Initially, the 5th Marines had expected to launch an immediate counterattack to regain Reno. In the early hours of the 27th, however, it became apparent this plan would have to be revised. Reinforcing elements from the 5th Marines, composed largely of F/2/5, had been unable to mount out effectively from the Block for Reno. At 0144, the commanding officer of Company F, Captain Ralph L. Walz, reported he had one platoon left. Between then and 0220 his diminishing unit had rallied for attack three times. It had successively engaged the enemy in fire fights, one of 30 minutes’ duration, evacuated its wounded, regrouped, and then had come under heavy incoming again. Countermortar fire had been requested and delivered on active enemy positions at Arrowhead, Hills 29, 45, and 21B, some 500 yards northwest of Vegas.

But as the Marines girded their defending platoon at the Block to company-plus size, the Chinese had done likewise, throwing in continuous rounds of new mortar attacks and additional troops. When, at 0246, another hostile company was seen spreading south from Reno toward the Block, the 1st Battalion directed artillery fires on the enemy and ordered its troops to disengage and return to the MLR. By 0300, early efforts to retake Reno were suspended. Relief forces from Companies F and C were on their way back to the battalion area. Ground action had ceased.

During these early attempts to rescue Reno and its defenders on the night of 26–27 March, Marine elements had struggled for more than four hours trying to get to Reno, but the enemy had completely surrounded it. At Reno itself, the Marine in command of the outpost when the Chinese struck, Second Lieutenant Rufus A. Seymour, machine gun platoon commander of C/1/5, had been taken prisoner along with several of his men. Of the Marines originally on duty there, all but five had been killed. Casualties of the Reno reinforcing units were later estimated by the regimental commander as being “as high as 35 percent, with many dead.”[369]

[369] Statement by LtGen Lewis W. Walt, as cited in Eloise
Engle, _Medic_ (New York, N.Y.: John Day, May 1967), p.
211.

A 21-year-old Navy hospital corpsman from Alexandria, Virginia,[370] attached to a Company C relief platoon from 1/5, helped save many Marine lives that night in the Reno Block area. He was Hospitalman Francis C. Hammond, who lost his own life but was awarded posthumously the nation’s highest honor for bravery under fire. For more than four exhausting hours the young hospitalman helped others to safety, even though he had been struck early in the fighting and was hobbling around with a leg injury. When his unit was ordered to withdraw from its attack against a strongly fortified CCF position, Hammond skillfully directed the evacuation of wounded Marines and remained behind to assist other corpsmen. Shell fragments from a mortar blast struck him, this time, fatally.

[370] In 1956, a newly-completed school in Alexandria, Virginia
was named the Francis C. Hammond High School and
dedicated in his memory.

The Vegas reinforcing units, in those dark early hours of the 27th, had come closer to their objective. Shortly after midnight two platoons, composed of elements from D/2/5 and C/1/5, had reached a point 400 yards from the outpost, in the vicinity of the entrance to the communication trench. When the enemy threw in powerful new assault forces at Vegas, F/2/7, a company from the regimental reserve, came under operational control of 3/5 and moved out from the MLR to reinforce the position. By 0300 the first relief platoon, despite heavy and continuing Chinese barrages, got to within 200 yards of the outpost. At this time, however, it was found that the enemy was in control of Vegas as well as Reno. Marines from D/2/5, C/1/5, E/2/5, and F/2/7 relief forces, on order, began to pull back to the MLR at 0417. Initial attempts to regain control of the two outposts were temporarily halted, and instead it was decided to launch a coordinated daylight attack.

At about the same time, 0430, the boundary between 1/5 and 3/5 was moved 250 yards westward to give 3/5 total responsibility for Vegas, although operational control had been transferred seven hours earlier the previous night.

Enemy casualties for the eight hours of action were heavy. An estimated 600 Chinese had been wounded and killed. Marine losses were also heavy. In the action First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Taft, Jr., Officer-in-Charge at Vegas, was killed and, as it was later learned, some of his H/3/5 defenders had been captured by the Chinese. By midnight the two line battalions, 3/5 and 1/5, had reported a total of nearly 150 casualties,[371] and this figure did not include those wounded or killed from the relief platoons and companies being shuttled into action from the 2/5 reserve battalion. One platoon from E/2/5 had arrived at the Company C supply point about 0210 and, together with a provisional unit from Headquarters and Service Company, 1/5, began to evacuate casualties in front of the MLR. By 0325, a total of 56 wounded had passed through the C/1/5 aid station and a cryptic entry in the G-3 journal noted that “more who are able are going back to assist in evacuation of casualties.”

[371] 1/5 and 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53. At this time 1/5 had suffered
5 killed, 30 wounded, 21 wounded not evacuated, 39
missing (personnel at Reno), or 95. Reports from 3/5
showed 1 killed, 8 wounded/evacuated, and 40 missing (at
Vegas), or 49.

Similar recovery efforts were being made at the same time in the 3d Battalion. Two alternate routes for evacuation were in effect. From a checkpoint located just south of the MLR in the H/3/5 sector, casualties were taken to the Company H supply point and thence to the battalion aid station, or else to the KSC camp from which they were evacuated to the 1st Battalion aid station. VMO-6 and HMR-161 helicopters flew out the critically-injured to USS _Haven_ and _Consolation_ hospital ships at Inchon Harbor and transported blood from supply points to Medical Companies A, E, and C forward stations. Excepting the original personnel killed or missing at Reno and Vegas, 1st Battalion forces from Companies C and F dispatched to Reno had returned to the MLR by 0445. Vegas units, ordered to disengage later than the Reno reinforcements, were back by 0530.

Diversionary probes by the Chinese during the night of the 26th at the 3/5 right flank outposts Berlin and East Berlin, as well as in the 1st Marines sector, had been beaten back by the Marines. Following the preassault fire at 1900, a CCF company had sent two platoons against Berlin and one against satellite East Berlin, both manned by Company G. These reinforced squad outposts, both only about 325 yards forward of the MLR, had stymied the enemy’s attempts. Boxing fires and VT on approach routes had forced the Chinese to retreat at 2115. Ten minutes later Company G reported that communication, which had temporarily gone out, had been restored. One squad dispatched by the 3d Battalion to Berlin and a second, to East Berlin an hour later, further buttressed the companion positions.

Action in the 1st Marines center regimental sector had also been relatively brief. Immediately after the 1900 mortar and artillery preparation, the Chinese in company strength attempted to penetrate outposts Hedy, Bunker, Esther, and Dagmar. Shelling had been heaviest at Dagmar and, shortly after 1900, two squads of Chinese began to assault the outpost with automatic weapons and satchel charges. Machine guns positioned on enemy Hills 44, 114, and 116 and small arms fire from Hill 108 supported the attack. The enemy was hurled back at all places except Dagmar where approximately 25 Chinese breached the wire entanglement.

Two hours of intense, close fighting in the trenches followed as the 27 defending Marines, directed by outpost commander Second Lieutenant Benjamin H. Murray of I/3/1, strongly resisted the invaders. More than 300 rounds of mortar and artillery fire supported the action. A counterattack from the MLR led by the I/3/1 executive officer, Second Lieutenant John J. Peeler, restored the position, and at 2120 the CCF finally withdrew. Less determined efforts had been made by the enemy at Esther and Bunker. By 2200 the Chinese had departed from the scene there, too. Altogether, the 1st Marines sector skirmishes had cost the CCF 10 killed, 20 estimated killed, and 17 estimated wounded to Marine casualties of 4 killed and 16 wounded.

_Massed Counterattack the Next Day_[372]

[372] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR Nos. 882–4, dtd 26–28
Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53, 87-53, dtd 28
Mar 53, 88-53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar,
1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn
ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar “Artillery
in the Defense of Outpost Vegas, 26–30 Mar 53,” hereafter
11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212,
-323; VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate,
“Vegas”; USMC Biog.

While the 5th Marines reorganized during the morning hours of the 27th for a new attack to recapture the lost outposts, General Pollock ordered mortars, tanks, and artillery, including rockets, to neutralize the Reno and Vegas areas and enemy approaches.

From the time of the 1900 attack the preceding evening until the temporary break in fighting eight hours later, at 0300, early estimates indicated 5,000 rounds of enemy mixed fire had been received in the “Wild” sector (code name for the 5th Marines, and appropriate it was for this late-March period). And this did not include the vast number of shells that had fallen on the three Nevada COPs. During the same period 1/11, in direct support of the 5th, reported it had delivered some 4,209 rounds on the enemy. Throughout the early hours, two battalions from the 11th Marines continued to pound away at Reno and Vegas with neutralizing fires to soften enemy positions, deter his resupply efforts, and silence those mortars and batteries that were troubling the Marines.

By 0330 observation planes from VMO-6 had made 28 flights behind enemy lines which enabled artillery spotters to direct nearly 60 fire missions on CCF active artillery, mortars, and self-propelled guns. From nightfall on the 26th through 0600 the following morning a total of 10,222 rounds of all calibers had been fired by Marine cannoneers supporting the 1st Division in its ground battles from Berlin to Hedy.

Revised intelligence reports from the 5th Marines S-2, Major Murray O. Roe, meanwhile, indicated that between 1900 on the 26th and 0400 the next day the Chinese had sent 14,000 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery crashing into Marine positions. It was also determined that a reinforced regiment had initially hit the Carson, Reno, and Vegas posts.

Early on the 27th, at 0345 as the 5th Marines prepared for the counterattack, the division reserve, 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander D. Cereghino), was placed under operational control of the 5th Marines. (Previously put on alert the battalion had moved into an assembly area behind 1/5 shortly after midnight, and its F/2/7 had taken part in the predawn relief attempt.) During the early morning hours a section of Skyknights, from Lieutenant Colonel Conley’s night fighter squadron, VMF(N)-513, had made radar controlled bombing runs to strike CCF artillery positions in the Hill 190 area and enemy troops at Hill 98. Precisely at 0650, friendly Panthers from VMF-115 began arriving on station to help the neutralizing artillery fire on Reno and Vegas. Originally, a dawn ground attack had been envisioned for Reno, but that was delayed to wait for air support.