Chapter XII: Korean Reflection (3)

A well dug-in secondary line was located four to eight miles to the rear of the Chinese MLR. Intelligence indicated that an attack to infiltrate CCF defenses would “require the penetration of a fortified area to a minimum depth of 10 miles.”[766] Some Korean War analysts maintained that behind their front line the Chinese had entrenched the ridges to an average depth of 14 miles and that the enemy “could have fallen back upon successive prepared positions for all that distance.”[767] Although the trench warfare period of the Korean War was often likened to World War I, the Chinese defensive works were estimated to have “ten times the depth of any belt of entrenchments in World War I.”[768] Some areas had even been engineered for defense against nuclear attack. Caves, tunnels, and particularly reverse slope positions also showed CCF skill in the selection and organization of terrain features.

[766] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-29.

[767] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, p. 24.

[768] _Ibid._, p. 116.

Both the nature of the ground fighting and weather in Korea quickly indicated that our bunker construction needed to be improved. Siting them lower into the ground, so that the outline of the bunkers would not make them such ready targets, and reinforcing them to withstand a 105mm direct hit were steps in this direction. Use of sandbags (of which there was a continuing shortage) for both bunkers and trenches proved to be almost as much a problem as a solution. Bunkers above ground shored up with sandbags frequently collapsed in times of heavy rains or Korean spring thawing conditions.

Outpost warfare also proved that the average bunker often became a deathtrap when used defensively. This was due to the enemy proclivity for sealing entrances with their satchel charges, as occurred in the Vegas Cities battle. It became evident that large living-fighting bunkers could easily turn into traps in which many men could become casualties simultaneously, and from which few could fight. Despite their exposed nature, fighting holes were often safer. Some Korean combat officers were of the opinion that rather than our six- to eight-man bunkers, smaller two-man fighting units would be obviously faster to build, more effective, and safer since they would present a smaller target.

A 1st Marine Division training bulletin issued near the end of the war stated categorically:

As a rule no bunker or cave should be large enough to accommodate
more than four men. If the cave is bombardment proof, there
is another greater danger that the men will fail to man their
fighting positions quickly enough after the enemy fire lifts or
ceases.[769]

[769] _Lessons Learned_, 5-53, p. 11.

UNC reconnaissance and security activities also showed need for improvement. Night raids, patrol operations, and ambushes were conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him off balance, and obtain intelligence. This type of mobile, small-unit action repeatedly indicated an urgent need for more basic training in night combat operations at the squad and platoon level. The frequent breakdown of communications in night fighting, whether it involved a small patrol or besieged outpost, was particularly critical. Some regimental commanders noted the failure to employ properly organic small arms in combat action during darkness before requesting heavier supporting fires. It was felt that the practice of calling for mortar or artillery fire to the exclusion of using small arms was a dangerous practice which was being overused and that “_even in the defense the spirit of the offensive must be maintained_.”[770] Meticulous planning was vital for effective fire plans, alternate avenues of approach, and evacuation. Detailed rehearsals of raids were essential.

[770] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.

Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience, Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively on “pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be silhouetted.”[771] Some commanders declared that such circumstances often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields--their own, as well as the enemy’s.

[771] Batterton, _Korea Notes_, p. 34.

In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953, enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity in intelligence activities.

The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans:

Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches,
and at the same time heavily bombard our positions.

For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of
men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale
attacks, they intensely bombard our positions.

An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance
indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack
within a short period.[772]

[772] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army
PIR No. 948.

As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of established procedures:

The same tactics and techniques should not be followed in every
raid. The pattern should be altered to the extent that the
tactics and techniques employed will not indicate the objective
to the enemy. The time selected for raids should vary to permit
the conduct of both daylight and night raids. Employment of
supporting arms including the delivery of smoke must be varied to
prevent indication of the objective.[773]

[773] _Lessons Learned 5-53_, p. 2.

Enemy ability to locate listening posts and take them under direct fire or mortar attack also dictated the need for frequent change in location.

Regarding the use of supporting arms, the Korean terrain itself dictated a need for modification of traditional practices of employing both direct and indirect fire weapons in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Standard Marine Corps use of both crew-served infantry weapons and artillery centered around the concept of interlocking and mutually reinforcing bands of fire. Neither the frontage nor terrain in Korea was what could be termed “normal.” Battalion frontages were often more than twice the accepted maximum. The terrain consisted of steep main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges leading off both sides. Such contours require twice as many machine guns for adequate defense against enemy attacks if employed in positions affording the usual interlocking grazing fire.

For both infantry weapons on the forward COPs and MLR, and supporting artillery batteries, the combination of “stretching unit fronts and unstretchable ranges”[774] of the weapons caused them to lose a considerable amount of their mutual support capability, as one artillery regimental commander commented about the experience of the 1st Marine Division in Korea. As a result, a compromise was often effected whereby machine guns were emplaced on the high ground of the ridge line, with their individual sectors of fire extended to 180 degrees. Although the guns were no longer mutually supporting, the numerous finger ridges could be better covered by fire to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on them prior to assault on the main ridge line.

[774] Col F. P. Henderson, “Amphibious Artillery of the
Future,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55),
p. 30.

As previously noted, the Marine division also modified its concept about occupying the military crest, rather than the topographical crest, of forward slopes.[775] In view of CCF tactics, forward slope positions offered the advantage of observation and superior fields of fire and assisted in bringing fire on the enemy in those areas and approaches masked from the view of reverse slope positions.

[775] See Chapter VI.

Under conditions of stabilized defensive lines in Korea, the great offensive power of Marine tanks was somewhat limited. They were used extensively as direct fire weapons and supplemented the artillery regiment by firing deep H&I (harassing and interdiction) missions. In West Korea, it proved expedient to have friendly tanks positioned in defiladed assembly areas where they were on call and ready to move into MLR firing slots on short notice. They often provided close fire support to Marine patrols and outpost defense actions, sometimes being called in for fire missions before the direct support artillery.

Since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire, they usually remained in firing positions on the MLR only long enough to complete their fire mission. Deployment of several M-46s in mutually supporting MLR positions, however, tended to reduce the volume of hostile fire. When operating forward of the MLR, it was important that the armored vehicles be protected by infantry from enemy tank-killer teams. Often the Marine artillery observer’s knowledge of the terrain and familiarity with objective targets upon which the tank could be effectively used was thus relayed to the tanker, particularly when such targets were themselves obscured to the tank gunner. In registering the target, however, the adjustment system used by the gunner differed from that of the artillery FOs. It was recommended that use of tank guns and lights be made part of the regular COP fire plan.

The Korean experience demonstrated in particular the need for better rehearsed tank-infantry patrols. It also showed the need for a reliable tank-mounted searchlight with a range up to 2,000 yards. Smoke and muzzle blast of the 90mm gun often reduced the effectiveness of the tank searchlight. When two tanks were employed as a team (one spotting targets and adjusting fire with the light, while the other zeroed in on the illuminated targets), the searchlight was markedly more effective.

Outpost warfare, which was predominantly night fighting, was thus characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery dueling, and sharp battles for contested terrain that would offer improved observation. In this stand-off period of positional warfare, ground defenses were developed to the point where “both sides were incomparably stronger than they had been in actual [moving] battle.”[776]

[776] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 72.

Lessons from Korea dealt not only with modified battle tactics, but involved an evaluation of enemy performance and capabilities, as well as certain strategic considerations which had so markedly affected the course of the war. UNC forces in Korea faced an adversary who had vast resources of manpower and, accordingly, was wholly indifferent to the cost of victory in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances Chinese commanders did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly unit.

Combat effectiveness of the CCF was evaluated as good to excellent. Chinese officers demonstrated good combat leadership. They were well schooled in both offensive and defensive military tactics. Some units had been trained for amphibious operations. During the long period of positional warfare, the CCF had built up their military capability (troops, artillery, AA guns) and resupplied their forward units. Maintaining a steady flow of supplies had been an earlier weakness of the CCF logistics system. During the last six months of the war Chinese stockpiles were adequate for 35 days of offensive operations; the enemy was capable of supporting a major offensive for a 17–24 day period.

By contrast, the North Korean soldier was considerably less effective. The larger number of NKPA prisoners taken and their greater desertion rate indicated poorer discipline and lower morale. NKPA units were rated from poor to good. After 1951, NKPA forces decreased in importance while the CCF assumed a greater role in the combat effort as well as in the truce negotiations.

Chinese weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign manufacture--Japanese, U.S., German, Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and Chinese design. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and had “proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.”[777]

[777] 1st MAW PIR 127-53, Encl (1), p. 1.

Individually and as units, the CCF exhibited the traditional Oriental characteristics of extreme patience, passivity, and determination. Some authorities went so far as to declare that the Chinese ability to:

... remain quiet for a long period and to patrol stealthily are
the main reasons for the success of his engagements. The enemy’s
successes which have resulted from his patience and stealth show
that our troops need more training in the same technique.[778]

[778] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-41.

The enemy’s tenacious determination to hold key terrain, regardless of the costs of lives, was well known. Another evaluation concluded:

The Chinese [is] well and courageously led at the small unit
level. He is thoroughly disciplined. He is an industrious digger.
His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN
superiority in the air, his inferior communications equipment and
his hodgepodge of weapons and equipment.[779]

[779] _Ibid._, No. 5, p. 8-31.

Battlefront lightweightness and mobility, particularly in Korean winter operations, was another important object lesson from the enemy. Marine cold weather clothing, including thermal boot and body armor which had saved so many lives, was of excellent design and quality. Despite this, some authorities felt that during the Korean War the Marine was “placed at a disadvantage when he met the CCF soldier,”[780] because of bulky cold-weather clothing that hindered freedom of movement. The weight of some of the Marine infantryman’s weapons, such as the 16½ lb. BAR (plus magazines) and the 9½ lb. M-1 rifle, was felt to contribute further to this lack of mobility. In contrast, “the CCF soldier dressed in his quilted uniform and armed with a ‘burp’ [submachine] gun, moved freely and quietly over the roughest of terrain, thereby gaining a not inconsiderable advantage over his heavily burdened adversary.”[781]

[780] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-82.

[781] _Ibid._

This superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical surprise. Since CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often there was no preliminary warning until the CCF were virtually within grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed their presence from UN air reconnaissance.

One observer of the Korean scene, both in the early battles of 1950 and again in 1953, has compared the CCF development of military skills during this period, as follows:

In 1950, the Red Chinese were a crude lot, given more to
pell-mell attacks and diehard stands than to deception and
protection. But they stayed and they learned as they went along.
When they entered the war, apart from their exceptional skill and
persistence with the machine gun, they were not accurate users
of hand weapons ... by 1953, few of the old signs remained. They
had become as tenacious and as earth-seeking as ants, and in that
lay a great part of their success. Two and one-half years of war
in Korea were a bonanza for Communist China. On that training
ground her armies became as skilled as any in the world in the
techniques of hitting, evading and surviving.[782]

[782] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, pp. 20–21.

The most telling characteristic of the Chinese Communist soldier, who essentially was a guerrilla fighter, may thus be his ready capacity to learn from experience, particularly the fine art of deception.

As important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce table. Cease-fire talks dragged on interminably over a period of 2 years and 17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years of the truce talks, from July 1951-July 1953, an additional 56,000 Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. combat losses to more than 136,000.[783] (U.S. forces suffered some 80,000 casualties in the first year of the war.) And in the end, the final solution to the POW problem was substantially that first proposed by the UNC in April 1952.

[783] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, pp. 77, 78.

Commenting on the Communist strategem that opened the truce talks in July 1951, U.S. government officials observed at the time the negotiations began:

The suggestion was received with caution since the free people of
the world have learned that Communist words and Communist intent
seldom coincide. Regardless, our leaders initiated action for
preliminary ceasefire talks with the hope that the Communists
were acting in good faith.[784]

[784] Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.

Despite this early realistic appraisal of the enemy, the degree to which the Communists were to employ truce negotiations as simply an extension of the battlefield was not immediately evident.

A key factor is involved here. The proverbial Chinese quality of passivity and seemingly endless patience, both on the individual and national level, was fully utilized to their advantage. In contrast, the Western people, particularly Americans, are characteristically impatient to complete a task once it is started. As Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, who initially headed the UNC delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference, commented, “We are a people who like to get things _done_.... The Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience through the imposition of endless delays.”[785] The American attitude is to feel that a deadlocked issue should be resolved by mutual concessions, which puts the enemy on favorable ground in employing his delaying tactics. The Communist view is that by deliberately slowing the progress toward completion of the armistice the position of their opponent will gradually be undermined. Thus, Communists regard any concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Whereas Westerners often feel that to accept part of a negotiating proposal will encourage the Communists to respond in kind, such an action is apt to lead to an even more unyielding position on their part.

[785] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 39.

* * * * *

The armistice effort in Korea also taught the following lessons:

Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for [an]
armistice. Increase it.

Armistice conferences should be brief ... to allow ... talks to
become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This
encourages your Communist opponents.

The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the
area of conflict.

Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to
make progress.[786]

[786] _Ibid._, pp. 166–173, _passim_.

Possibly no one had more first-hand experience in negotiating with the enemy in the Korean War than Colonel James C. Murray, the Marine Corps staff officer who was involved in the truce talks from 8 July 1951 to 27 July 1953. In these two years he served as liaison officer between the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in meetings. On three different occasions he negotiated the truce line which was to separate UNC and Communist forces. In July 1953, as Senior Liaison Officer, he was in charge of the UNC staff group that determined the final line of demarcation. He has noted that Communist rationalizations readily disregard whatever facts or logic which do not fit their purpose, no matter how inconsistent.

While customarily ignoring all restrictions of the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners, for example, when it was expedient to their interests the Communists would then argue for an incredibly narrow interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Declared Colonel Murray: “Having come to the conference table only because they were near defeat, the Communists were prepared from the very first to make the most of the negotiations to create ... a ‘climate of victory’.”[787] This accounts for their concern with even the smallest detail of “stage setting,” for maintaining “face,” and for practical advantages from negotiating conditions, such as the physical setting of the truce talk site.

[787] Col J. C. Murray, “Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice
Negotiations,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep
55), p. 30.

* * * * *

As the Marine officer further observed:

A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the
truce was the appearance of the Communist victory in Korea....
An armistice, no less than war, could be looked upon only as
a means to an end ... to this end they negotiate patiently and
skillfully ... temporary inconveniences must be borne for ... the
attainment of long-range political objectives.[788]

[788] _Ibid._, p. 29.

Certainly, the close interaction between Communist military operations and truce negotiations, a key factor since 1951, was particularly apparent during April-July 1953 as the war drew to an end.

In addition to Communist China which had emerged stronger and with considerably more prestige from the war, the other Asian nation to have undergone marked military growth was the Republic of Korea. In June 1950, the ROK army had numbered approximately 98,000 inadequately trained troops, armed chiefly with hand-carried weapons such as rifles and carbines, ill-prepared to hold back a determined enemy attack. The ROK army was little more than a constabulary force organized by KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) for internal police duty. Only 65,000 men had actually received unit combat training. ROK armed forces during the three years of the war had increased six-fold and by July 1953 totaled nearly 600,000 men.

Training and equipment had steadily improved the ROK battle efficiency which, in the 1950–1951 period, had been handicapped by lack of heavy tanks, mortars, artillery, antitank mines and shells, and other heavy weapons. By the spring of 1951 the ROK army was being transformed into an effective fighting force, due largely to the determination of General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander. In 1952 the ROK army had been enlarged to 12 divisions and the ROK Marine forces had been similarly expanded. Gradual augmentation resulted in a total of 16 ROK divisions, most of these with organic artillery; by July 1953 ROK troops had assumed responsibility for the majority of the UN line.

Marine Corps experience with its ROK counterpart had been instructive and generally encouraging.[789] Organized in 1949 by the Republic of Korea with assistance from KMAG, the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment had taken part in antiguerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion. With the outbreak of hostilities, the KMCs engaged in UN delaying actions in southwest Korea until September 1950 when the Korean regiment of nearly 3,000 men was attached to the 5th Marines as part of the Inchon assault force. Later the KMCs were involved in defense of Wonsan and the Hamhung-Hungnam beachhead as well as the Pohang patrol. After serving as a maneuver element with the ROK forces in early 1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was attached permanently to the 1st Marine Division in March of that year, participating in the Hwachon Reservoir fighting and performing valuable service in the interrogation of POWs.

[789] See “1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the
1stMarDiv,” “SAR” File (Korea), Type “C” Rpt.

The KMCs modeled themselves after U.S. Marines, particularly emulating the traditional offensive Marine _esprit de corps_ and overriding goal to “close with the enemy and seize the objective” regardless of strong resistance. The combat courage and determination of the KMCs was cited by CG, 1st Marine Division, on several occasions.

During the 1952–1953 period, the KMC/RCT provided the Marine division with nearly a quarter of its combat strength and became the fourth regiment of the division. The ROK Marine Corps also consisted of the 2d KMC Regiment, which furnished personnel for the WCIDU/ECIDU island security forces, and the 5th KMC Battalion, attached to the Marine division in 1952. Classes in infantry tactics for KMC officer and enlisted personnel were conducted at the Korean Marine Corps Training Center at Chinhae. This was patterned after U.S. Marine Corps recruit and officers’ basic schools, under supervision of USMC staff personnel. Coupled with an offensive spirit and desire to attain U.S. Marine Corps standards and combat performance, the Korean Marines largely overcame early major problems resulting from the language barrier, translation of U.S. basic training materials, and the insufficient number of qualified and experienced Korean military instructors. One early recruit class possibly established a record for brevity in training when its members, after only a few weeks, were ordered to participate in the Inchon assault which was the Korean Marines’ first specialized amphibious operation.

Many of the hard lessons of Korea--as well as some of its unique problems--resulted from the fact that this was America’s first major experience in a modern, undeclared, and limited war. Accustomed to the tradition of hard-hitting, all-out war and decisive victory, both the fighting man at the front and Nation tended to view the conflict as well as its ultimate accomplishments as inconclusive.[790]

[790] The course of the war, particularly its protracted and
static nature, had led to growing national apathy and
opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late
1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the
people were in favor of the war and seven months later
that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front
lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground
actions or large scale air attacks. _Washington Post_,
dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 1-16.

Most importantly, immediate collective security action by the UNC had prevented another small country from being subdued by direct, armed aggression. And the Communists had failed to attain their objective: the forced unification of Korea, not as a free nation but as a Russian satellite, as was North Korea. The balance sheet for UNC military intervention showed that 22 nations (including the ROK) had provided assistance, either personnel or materiel in defense of South Korea. Many of these countries had supplied token units of battalion-size or less and several had furnished noncombat medical facilities. Despite the fact these detachments from other Allied countries totalled “only 44,000 men they were disproportionately valuable in emphasizing the collective, coalition nature of the Korean war effort.”[791] Major losses, however, had been borne by ROK and American troops.

[791] Rees, _Korea_, p. 33.

UNC casualties numbered 996,937 killed, wounded, and missing. U.S. losses were 136,937, of which 33,629 represented battle deaths and 103,308 wounded in action. A measure of the role that ground forces played in Korea “may be judged from the fact that, of the total United States battle casualties for the entire conflict, the Army and Marines accounted for 97 percent.”[792] Casualties of other UNC countries, exclusive of the U.S. and ROK, totaled approximately 17,000 although no other Allied nation lost as many as 1,000 dead. ROK casualties were listed at 850,000. Communist losses were estimated at 1,420,000 (CCF: 900,000 killed and wounded; NKPA: 520,000 killed and wounded).

[792] Ridgway, _Korean War_, p. viii.

For the Republic of South Korea, the end of the war in some respects represented a _status quo ante bellum_. Korea still remained politically partitioned and geographically divided. Whereas the 38th Parallel had been the territorial boundary prior to the Communist attack of 25 June 1950, the cease-fire line dividing North and South Korea in 1953 was the point of contact between ground forces at the time the armistice was signed. This demarcation line, however, “represented a stronger defense than the 38th Parallel as it possessed a geographical basis all along its approximately 155-mile length.”[793] The new boundary ran above the KANSAS Line, the commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel.

[793] Rees, _Korea_, p. 431. In the three years of war, North
Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest
of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square
miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.

Possibly the single, most important lesson to be drawn from the Korean War is that many of our nation’s military assumptions--and resulting tactical decisions--tended to be based on a lack of appreciation of enemy capabilities. In many instances intelligence evaluations focused on “probable intentions of the enemy rather than on his capabilities.”[794]

[794] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, p. 175.

While America put great military value and reliance on its massive destructive air power, for example, we were confronted by an enemy who practically never employed his own air capability, but instead moved freely at night and hid by day and was thus little deterred by our aerial harassment. And while our own battle summaries regularly cited kill ratios of 1 USMC to 3.75 CCF and substantial Communist losses,[795] we seemed to ignore an enemy mind that thought in terms of numerical superiority and was little concerned about the high human cost of holding key terrain or annexing a desired position. In the last month of the war alone, Eighth Army estimated that CCF casualties numbered 72,000, with more than 25,000 killed.

[795] Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted
approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111
estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs)
during the Apr 52-Jul 53 period on the western front.
For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were
approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/RCT.

In both battlefield tactics and high-level strategy, the Korean War revealed a strong tendency on the part of the UNC to predict enemy action by values and ideology largely reflecting our own. Whether because of wishful thinking, basic mistakes in judgment, or international _naiveté_, the 1950–1953 experience repeatedly indicated a need on the part of Allied nations for considerably more hard-headed realism in dealing with a Communist adversary. The original UNC military objective of halting Communist aggression in Korea had been successfully accomplished, without enlarging the conflict into a nuclear war. At the same time, Korea had also provided a sobering lesson. It demonstrated how, in a limited war, overriding political considerations may permit the enemy to operate from a privileged sanctuary and allow him to seize and, in many respects, retain the initiative.

The Korean War had made America more aware of the threat of world Communism and had resulted in the strengthening of our national defense commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe. It had also validated the concept of a balanced defense force. In contrast to the emphasis on air capability and atomic power that had dominated the strategic thinking in the post-World War II era, the Korean hostilities pointed to the requirement for a balanced, diversified military force of sufficient strength and readiness to cope effectively and on short notice with any emergency. Korea had underscored how severe peacetime budgetary cut-backs had led to unpreparedness. The Korean experience had also shown the need for flexibility in mobilization planning. Previously, this had been projected for an all-out, general war, based on America’s role in World War II. The Nation’s post-Korean policy thus sought, for the first time, a military strategy that would effectively deter either a major war or local aggression.

Korean hostilities illustrated another important lesson. South Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant violation of the Cairo Declaration and U.N. Charter. It was apparent that, despite the defense treaties and mutual aid pacts which the United States had signed during and after World War II, “any number of alliances, if not supported by strong military preparedness, would never restrain aggression.”[796] It had taken the Korean War to drive home the harsh reality that military preparedness, possession of superior power, and _the willingness to use that power_ were the only deterrent to enemy aggression throughout the world.

[796] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 2.

The Korean War also caused the Communists to modify their strategy from one of overt aggression to more insidious means of gaining their political and economic objectives. As the Marine Corps Commandant, General Shepherd, warned: “Their tactic is to use war by proxy, war by satellite, war by threat and subversion.”[797] And, although it was not fully apparent at the time, the Korean attack “was to prove to be one of the first in a series of ‘wars of liberation’”[798] that the world would be witness to.

[797] Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.

[798] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, pp. 3–4.

In the final analysis, the Korean War evolved into a prolonged battle of position and attrition in which the Communists, operating close to their base of supply, were fought to a standstill by United Nations forces under unfavorable conditions of climate and logistics. In countering the enemy threat in Korea, the American units committed there initially suffered from the effects of peacetime apathy that had followed the rapid demobilization following World War II. As the Korean War, originally visualized as a “police action” of brief duration, ground on into a major effort spanning a period of three years and one month, loud voices were raised on the home front to protest the expenditure of lives and materiel in a venture that was not always clearly understood by all Americans.

Among the U.S. forces committed on this far flung battlefront, it was once again the Marine Corps component that stood out in its sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. When rushed into the battle during the first desperate weeks and months of the war, the quickly-augmented Marine units helped to restore stability to the shattered EUSAK front line. During the daringly conceived and executed operation at Inchon, Marines accomplished this incredibly complex amphibious operation with their customary spirit and precision. Never was their courage and tenacity more conspicuous than during those bitter days of the Chosin Reservoir campaign following the Chinese Communist intervention.

In the static, or positional, warfare that marked the final operations in Korea, the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing executed their respective missions with professional skill and dispatch, regardless of tactical problems and the dreary monotony that characterized a large part of the Korean War. U.S. Marines had seen combat throughout much of the Korean peninsula. The fighting had taken them from Pusan to Inchon and Seoul, to the Chosin, to Inje and the Hwachon Reservoir in the Punchbowl area, and finally, in 1952–1953, to the critical 35-mile front in West Korea near Panmunjom. In Korea, as in past wars, Marines demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and readiness which has always been a tradition of the Corps.

Marine courage and combat performance went far toward removing the image of Western softness and decadence which the Communists had so mistakenly construed in their own minds. It is a record of which all Americans and the Free World can be proud.