Chapter X: Return of the Prisoners of War (2)

Adjacent to a steeply-walled valley, the Obul camp was also known as “No Name Valley.” Although the inmates of the annex were aware of other POWs in the main compound and throughout the valley, they were under heavy guard to prevent contact between the groups. An Air Force officer, the senior member, and Major Harris, the ranking Marine, went about organizing the prisoners in a military manner. In order to exchange information, notes were hidden under rocks at common bathing points or latrines. Messages were baked in bread by POWs on kitchen detail, and songs were loudly sung to convey information. Hospitalized POWs, meanwhile, were held at the Pyoktong (Camp 5) hospital or, in the southern sector, at a second hospital a few miles north of Pyongyang. Other locations where prisoners were confined in 1952 were “Pike’s Peak,” also in the same general southern area, and the Manpo Camp on the Yalu.

For POWs incarcerated behind the bamboo curtain, 1952 marked several other developments. It was the year that American airmen began to receive special grilling and threats from their Communist captors. This was in connection with the germ warfare hoax, to be discussed later. It was also the year that Marine POWs at Pi-chong-ni (Camp 2) observed their own traditional 10 November Marine Corps birthday ceremony. Eggs, sugar, and flour were stolen for a cake surreptitiously baked and suitably decorated with the Marine Corps globe and anchor. Another group accomplished the task of bootlegging rice wine. When the special date arrived, the Marine officers toasted the President, Commandant, and Marine Corps and spiritedly sang the National Anthem and Marine Corps hymn. One of the invited guests, Quartermaster Sergeant James Day of the Royal Marines, later recalled the reaction of other prisoners:

Firstly some were apprehensive in case of trouble with the
Chinese, and its always consequent rash of gaol [jail] victims.
Some thought it a little childish, and not worth the trouble
of interrupting the daily routine of the place. And I feel
that quite a lot were rather envious that the small band of
USMC should be able to get together and do this sort of thing
quite seriously, quite sincerely, and with no thought of any
consequence.[590]

[590] _Ibid._, p. 190.

This same month the Chinese staged a “Prisoner of War Command Olympics” at Pyoktong. Although most Marines opposed the idea of participation in the event, because of its inevitable propaganda exploitation by the CCF, the decision rendered by the senior UN officer was that POW athletes would be represented. Much improved quality food was served for the occasion, Communist photographers were everywhere, and a CCF propaganda brochure (with articles written by POW turncoats) was later distributed in Geneva purportedly to show the healthy recreational activities available to UNC prisoners. An Air force pilot, in describing the performance of Major McLaughlin, noted that “his skill as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by the enemy’s propaganda.”[591]

[591] _Ibid._, p. 195.

More important, he defied the guards by deliberately circulating among the enlisted men (often younger, impressionable, less mature individuals) to point out lies in enemy propaganda tactics designed to slander the U.S. government and its leaders. The Marine officer also collected names of American POWs held in isolated places who it was suspected the enemy might attempt to hold as hostages at the end of the war--possibly as a bargaining tool for the granting of a seat to Red China in the UN.

During the last year of the war although a number of prisoners were still being captured in some of the most savage attacks unleashed by the enemy, the lot of the average POW had improved. More attention was being paid to the former pitiful medical care. The men were more warmly clad, even though still huddled into filthy, crowded huts. And the monotonous poor chow had improved. Most POWs, although carefully kept from learning developments of the outside world, naturally suspected that some reason lay behind the changes. And so there was: the Communists had no desire to repatriate skeletonized prisoners.

_CCF “Lenient Policy” and Indoctrination Attempts_[592]

[592] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Barclay, _Commonwealth_;
Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_;
Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.

As early in the war as July 1951, the CCF was seeking propaganda benefits out of its so-called “lenient” policy toward captured United Nations personnel. Basically, this could be described as “calculated leniency in return for cooperation, harassment in return for neutrality, and brutality in return for resistance.”[593] Others have characterized the CCF psychological techniques of indoctrination as monotonous and single-minded “repetition, harassment and humiliation.”[594]

[593] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 61. One former Marine POW commented:
“The ‘lenient policy’ applied to the ‘liberated
soldiers,’ who had supposedly been ‘liberated’ from the
American capitalists by the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
Unless a prisoner accepted this absurd concept, he was a
‘war criminal’ and subject to being treated as such. The
North Vietnamese use this same characterization (‘war
criminal’) in reference to U.S. POWs when queried by
U.S. representatives at the Paris talks.” MajGen John N.
McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 17 Jul 70.

[594] Rees, _Korea_, p. 337.

In some respects, it is true that the Chinese treatment of prisoners appeared to be more humane than that of the North Koreans. The latter freely used physical cruelty and torture, to the point of being barbaric.[595] Sometimes it appeared that Allied POWs did not receive any harsher treatment from the CCF than did local civilian prisoners.

[595] There were, for example, instances when POW columns were
being marched north and the NKPA treatment was so rough
that “Chinese guards intervened to protect the prisoners
from the North Koreans.” MacDonald, _POW_, p. 43.

Whereas the NKPA regularly resorted to physical brutality, the Chinese “introduced a more insidious form of cruelty.”[596] Although they used physical violence less often, it was usually more purposeful and combined with deliberate mental pressure. CCF officials announced that treatment of captives would be “fair and lenient,” but that wrongdoers would be publicly punished. Usually this CCF punishment took the form of less drastic methods--solitary confinement, prolonged interrogation, and a reduced diet. Even under this decreed lenient policy, however, no relief parcels were delivered to POWs, nor were any neutral observers ever allowed to inspect the prison camps.

[596] _Ibid._, p. 60.

In any event, the Chinese were considerably more effective than the NKPA in their intelligence activities. Often their skilled interrogators were officers who spoke excellent English. Occasionally, they had even attended such U.S. schools as the University of Chicago and had considerable insight into American psychology, customs, and values--even slang. Interrogation sessions usually employed recording devices and sometimes were further equipped with one-way mirrors. One Marine, subjected to frequent interrogation, was kept awake by the Chinese who slapped his face and blew smoke in his eyes.

From early 1951 to the end of the war UNC prisoners were subjected to a systematic attempt at mass conversion to Communism. This intensive indoctrination effort--like the riots of Communist prisoners in Allied POW camps and the CCF germ warfare fabrications--was designed to gain a propaganda advantage. From highest-ranking officer to lowly private, no one was immune to this thought-reform process. General Dean, prize Communist captive, who was subject to three years of intense Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, upon his release commented wryly, “I’m an authority now on the history of the Communist Party and much of its doctrine.”[597]

[597] Rees, _Korea_, p. 334.

English-speaking POWs, both American and British, particularly became the target for Communist thought-control conditioning. Many experts have discussed glowingly the superb example and iron discipline--both on the battlefield and in POW camp--displayed by the Turkish soldiers. This is true, and their outstanding performance is to their credit as a national group. The fact remains, however, that the Turks were long-term professional soldiers. Usually they were left alone by the Communists who neither spoke their language nor needed them for propaganda purposes. As a rule all non-American troops of the United Nations received better treatment than American and British personnel.

The basic tenet of the Communist party line was that this aggressive war against the peace-loving people of Korea had been caused by American imperialists seeking additional foreign markets. All UNC soldiers were, therefore, by simple definition war criminals who deserved no better treatment than death. But as most UN soldiers were misguided and misled by their capitalist rulers they would “not be shot if they admitted their mistakes and showed themselves to be progressive”[598] by becoming properly indoctrinated.

[598] _Ibid._, p. 335.

Often, the thought-reform processing started long before prisoners reached their permanent camps, while they were under initial interrogation in the transit collection center. Captain Samuel J. Davies, Anglican Chaplain of the British Gloucestershire Regiment,[599] noted that lecture subjects presented to his officer group at one North Korean temporary collection center included:

Corruption of the UN by the American warmongers;
The Chinese Peoples’ right to Formosa;
The Stockholm Peace Appeal;
Progress in Peoples’ China;
Churchill, tool of the Truman-MacArthur-Dulles Fascist clique;
The Soviet Union heads the World Peace Camp.[600]

[599] Davies was the only one of the four captured UNC
chaplains who survived the war. During his imprisonment,
he visited hospitalized POWs at the makeshift hospital
near Camp 2 and held weekly community services. Another
well-remembered chaplain was Captain Emil J. Kapaun,
Chaplains Corps, USA. The Catholic priest stole food
and sneaked into the enlisted compounds at Camp 5 to
distribute it. His heroic behavior and selfless interest
in his fellow-men were an inspiration to fellow POWs.
MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 77, 136.

[600] Rees, _Korea_, p. 336.

Systematically the enemy ground away at theory and practice of Communism, with its superiority to American democracy. From emphasis on the Korean War as imperialist aggression, the programmed thinking then dealt with shortcomings of western countries (particularly Southern lynchings, poor treatment of Negroes, and colonialism) to the idyllic socialism in people’s democracies where “everyone is equal.” “Together with the emotional pressures involved, this dramatic presentation of Marxism-Leninism to prisoners who often not only failed to comprehend why they had fought in Korea, but even the rudiments of democracy itself, was bound to have some sort of effect.”[601]

[601] _Ibid._, p. 337.

Compulsory lectures and discussions often went on until 2200. Together with the unceasing indoctrination efforts, the CCF attempted to maintain complete control over every aspect of POW life. Each camp was divided into POW companies (ranging from 60 to 300 men), platoons, and squads. Squad leaders, appointed by the Chinese, reported regularly to authorities the opinions of men in their group. “Converted” progressives were responsible for much of the internal policing. Every prisoner with reactionary tendencies was isolated. The varied pressures of hunger, fear, constant threats of torture, coercion, nonrepatriation, anxiety, and guilt[602] were used to break him down.

[602] Some analysts have pointed out that the Lenient Policy
with its “emphasis on confession and repentance, and
its propaganda exploitation” closely resembled POW
indoctrination tactics developed by the Russians with
their German prisoners in World War II. Rees, _Korea_, p.
338.

In an attempt to convert the Marines and other prisoners to their own beliefs, the Communists prohibited the use of the term “prisoner of war.” Instead they used the phrase “newly liberated friends” and insisted the POWs do likewise. They also denounced religion as a superstition and device for controlling people’s minds. Curiously, POWs were often permitted to retain whatever religious articles they had on them when captured, so that Bibles, rosaries, etc., were available for squad groups that sought to hold informal religious discussions and readings. Such religious expression was, of course, strictly forbidden. It might be noted here that Marines, as a group, did not appear to be any more or less interested in religious services than other POWs.

By mid-1952 the compulsory lectures were considered a failure, and the emphasis shifted to “voluntary” study groups led by progressives. More insidious methods of indoctrination were being used--books, papers, and articles written by camp progressives. Personal interrogation and indoctrination had proved it could have a more powerful effect than attempts at mass conversion. Then, too, the Chinese had by this time perfected another propaganda tool that admirably suited their purposes. It was to have even still more effective, far reaching results.

_The Germ Warfare Issue_[603]

[603] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of
War_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.

Besides their routine interrogations and indoctrinations, by 1952 the Communists had found a new angle to exploit. This was to have strong repercussions on the treatment of some captured personnel. And, ultimately, it was to affect American public reaction to the entire Korean War and to shake the nation’s confidence in some of its fighting men who became POWs.

The germ warfare issue developed from an incident in January 1952 when the Communists shot down a U.S. Air Force B-26 bomber. Several months later, in May, the enemy propaganda campaign moved into high gear when the navigator and pilot both purportedly confessed that they took part in a raid in which germ bombs were dropped on North Korean towns. After the CCF successfully extracted false confessions from the two USAF officers, the enemy exposed both prisoners to a select group of Oriental medical specialists and newspapermen. The two Americans apparently performed according to plan, and a relentless flood of Communist propaganda was unleashed on the world.

While the allegation of bacteriological warfare was not new in the Korean War, it was not until 1952 that the Chinese successfully exploited it. After suffering their first reverses in Korea in September 1950, the Communists charged that Americans were waging germ warfare. Even after they regained the tactical initiative in late 1950 they continued their campaign of vilification. In early 1951, while the UNC battled epidemics of smallpox, typhus, and amoebic dysentery prevalent among the civil population and within the POW camps, the CCF branded medical efforts to curb the diseases as experiments in germ warfare. A formal complaint was made by the CCF to the United Nations in May 1951; thereafter, the germ warfare charges lay dormant for the rest of the year.

The effect of the two airmen’s “confessions” in 1952 was far-reaching. From that time until the end of hostilities “captured aviators of all services were subjected to a degree of pressure and coercion previously unknown by prisoners of war. Prior to the turn of the year aviation and ground personnel received relatively the same treatment in Communists’ hands. After January 1952, aviators were singled out for a special brand of treatment designed to wring bacteriological warfare confessions from them.”[604] North Korean officials joined the CCF spokesmen in loudly denouncing American bacteriological attacks. As the campaign gained momentum, an elaborate, cleverly-concocted “War Crimes Exhibit” was set up in Peiping in May. Similar displays were later on view at the UNC officers’ camp at Pi-chong-ni, including hand-written and sound-recorded confessions by the two American pilots, as well as a convincing array of photos depicting the lethal “bomb containers.”

[604] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 175.

All the while air personnel were being put under acute stress to confess alleged war crimes. Captured Marine aviation personnel encountered this new subject in their interrogations. Lieutenant Henry, captured in February, was asked about germ warfare. Major Judson C. Richardson, of VMF(N)-513, during interrogations at Pak’s was told he would never leave Korea when he denied that the U.S. was waging bacteriological warfare. Master Sergeant John T. Cain, VMO-6, a well-known Marine enlisted pilot whose plane was shot down in July 1952, was questioned, confined to the hole, and taken before a firing squad when he refused to acknowledge American participation. Captain Flynn was also subjected to intensive and brutal interrogation by North Korean and Chinese Communist Air Force personnel who sought a confession. Others were to meet similar pressure and be questioned until their nerves shrieked.

On 8 July 1952, the first of a chain of events occurred that was to link the Marine Corps with the spurious bacteriological warfare propaganda. Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 1st MAW Chief of Staff and Major Roy H. Bley, wing ordnance officer, were struck by Communist ground fire while making a reconnaissance flight. The enemy had little difficulty in compiling Colonel Schwable’s biography. Although he repeatedly maintained he had just arrived in Korea and had not yet received an assignment, he was in uniform with insignia and full personal identification. A Department of Defense press release issued two days later gave considerable data, correctly identifying him as the Marine Wing Chief of Staff. The Chinese knew they had a prize.

Two weeks after his capture, the colonel was taken to an interrogation center where he remained in solitary confinement until December. He quickly became aware of CCF intentions to utilize him for their propaganda mill. He was interrogated relentlessly, badgered, accused of being a war criminal, fed a near-starvation diet, denied proper latrine privileges, refused medical and dental attention, and subjected to extremes of temperature. Ultimately the discomfort, almost constant diarrhea, extreme pain from being forced to sit in unnatural positions, fatigue, and naked threats wore him down. At the same time he was also convinced that had he continued to resist Communist demands for a confession the enemy would have affixed his forged signature to a document to achieve their ends. He later commented:

In making my most difficult decision to seek the only way out, my
primary consideration was that I would be of greater value to my
country in exposing this hideous means of slanderous propaganda
than I would be by sacrificing my life through non-submission or
remaining a prisoner of the Chinese Communists for life, a matter
over which they left me no doubt.[605]

[605] _Ibid._, p. 180.

General Dean, held in solitary confinement for much of his three years’ captivity, stated the greatest problem facing a prisoner of war is “maintaining his judgment--he has no one on whom he can try out his ideas before turning them into decisions.”[606] Possibly this was also Colonel Schwable’s problem. Many drafts of his confession were made before the Chinese were satisfied that specific details reinforced the information earlier obtained in other prisoners’ false statements. The confession that finally evolved in December cleverly combined factual order of battle data and technical terminology to create a most convincing lie. It was more sophisticated than efforts of earlier captives and was, unquestionably, damaging.

[606] _Ibid._, p. 182.

_Problems and Performance of Marine POWs_[607]

[607] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10;
MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_.

Problems faced by Marine and other UNC prisoners ranged from the fundamentals of sheer survival to more abstract questions involving honor and duty that have less sharply defined interpretations. Was it, for instance, a prisoner’s duty to overtly resist the enemy at all costs and on all possible occasions? Or was an attitude of passive resistance that created less hostility and attention better in the long run? Were such passive techniques liable to render a POW unable to continue making fine distinctions in his conduct and behavior so that he unwittingly went over the line to become a collaborator with the enemy? What about a ranking POW’s responsibility of leadership?

In a practical, day-in, day-out way, every prisoner had to decide for himself as to how actively or passively he would resist the enemy. In a number of cases Marine (and other Allied) POWs gave deliberately false or misleading information in response to threats, coercion, or maltreatment. Three Marines at Pak’s regularly held counsel “to determine their courses of action and to coordinate their false stories.”[608] Captain Fink’s list of ships, all sunk in World Wars I and II, was similar to the story told by an Air Force officer of the new B-108 bomber (three B-36s).

[608] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 121.

Not infrequently a POW faced threats of death, reduced rations, still worse medical care, solitary, or physical beatings and torture if he failed to make some response to questions. Major Richardson finally wrote untruthful answers to five questions about the Navy, although his NKPA interrogators told him his lies were detected. Master Sergeant Cain authored a fanciful report about the Fleet Logistic Wing, an organization about which he knew nothing, not too surprisingly since it did not exist. He later admitted, however, that he felt he’d “made a mistake at that time [his first interrogation] by lying about inconsequential things.”[609]

[609] _Ibid._, p. 185.

Expressed in simplistic terms, a spirit of cohesion and of group identity seemed to be the key factor in--to use a bromide that is particularly apt here--separating the men from the boys. Even when avowed reactionary leaders were removed to serve one of their many solitary tours, there seems little doubt that their example served to instill a spirit of resistance (either open or underground) in fellow POWs. This was particularly true when the leadership gap was filled by the next senior man and the chain of command remained unbroken.

Prisoners who were able to rise above their own personal situation (_i.e._, to adjust, without giving in) and to assist others seemed, unquestionably, to have gained greater resiliency and determination. Whether this is a cause-or-effect reaction, however, might be a grey area difficult to pinpoint precisely. In any event, glimpses of Marines from behind the barbed wire indicated that steadfastness under pressure, ingenuity, and outstanding leadership earned them the respect of fellow prisoners as well as a place in Marine Corps history.

Even in a situation as inhospitable and hazardous as a POW camp, it is not surprising that characteristic behavior and certain distinctive personality traits tend to show through, no matter what. Captain Fink, captured early in the war, endured unspeakable humiliations at the hands of the North Koreans. Although he felt his morale was at its lowest point at this time, and was not sure he could go on, he was later responsible for providing a high degree of civility for POWs confined to Camp 2. His most notable artistic and mechanical achievement was probably the construction of an artificial leg[610] for USAF Major Thomas D. Harrison. This prosthetic was so expertly fashioned that its owner could play volley ball using his new limb! Fink also built stethoscopes for POW doctors, using resonant wood and tubing stolen from Chinese trucks. After a discussion with other POWs on the need for a religious symbol in camp, the resourceful Marine made a 22-inch crucifix, christened “Christ in Barbed Wire.”[611] His efforts on behalf of religion earned him a 10-day sentence in the hole.

[610] A hollowed-out compartment of the leg was used to
hide written records on deaths, atrocities, and other
administrative data. Ultimately, the records were
brought back to the U.S. The Air Force officer was a
cousin, interestingly enough, of the chief Allied truce
negotiator, General Harrison. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 227,
and _Washington Post_, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 1.

[611] The crucifix was brought back to freedom by Camp 2 POWs
and later placed in the Father Kapaun High School, in
Wichita, Kansas. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 172.

Captain Arthur Wagner, VMF(N)-513, spent an unusually long six-month tour at Pak’s during 1951. For new captives headed in that direction, the word via USMC grapevine was that he “could be trusted.”[612] Captain Wagner counselled other prisoners at Pak’s, helped chop wood, draw water, cook, ease the burden of sick POWs, and resisted the Communists at every turn.

[612] _Ibid._, p. 121.

Another member of the same squadron, Captain Flynn, had completed 59 combat missions against the enemy in North Korea before being shot down in May 1952.[613] While captive, the veteran Marine fighter pilot withstood intense interrogation, influenced others to suppress CCF-inspired talks made by progressives, and strengthened morale by planning a group escape. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a mock court. Throughout it all, according to Master Sergeant Cain, the POWs “owed much to Flynn who kept them amused.”[614] First Lieutenant Robert J. Gillette’s “reactionary” attitude resulted in his being placed in the hole on several occasions. Once, at No Name Valley, he managed to scribble a novel on toilet paper which subsequently provided some light moments for fellow prisoners. And First Lieutenant Felix L. Ferranto, 1st. Signal Battalion, spent more than two years of his 33 months’ imprisonment in solitary confinement or isolated with small units of “non-cooperative” POWs. The CCF pronounced him a “hopeless capitalist, an organizer with an ‘unsincere attitude.’”[615]

[613] Parachuting from his burning plane after it was struck
by hostile AA fire, Captain Flynn duplicated an earlier
action from World War II. In July 1945 he had bailed out
of an aircraft similarly hit by fire while on a combat
patrol over Japan. Biog File, HRS, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC.

[614] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 185.

[615] _Ibid._, p. 122.

The type of amiable accommodation that could sometimes be made, without compromising one’s standards, was once successfully demonstrated by Captain Jack E. Perry, VMF-311 briefing officer. On a bombing run his F9F fuel tank was hit, and he parachuted down. Seized almost immediately by the Chinese, his captors “showed him bomb holes from numerous strikes in the area, and they pointed out several wounded soldiers. Then, as he describes it, ‘They laughed like hell.’ Although Captain Perry failed to see anything funny, he laughed along with them.’”[616]

[616] _Ibid._, p. 109.

Three Marines captured during the Korean War had suffered a similar fate in World War II. Ironically, Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, of the Military Police Company; Warrant Officer Felix J. McCool, of 1st Service Battalion; and Master Sergeant Frederick J. Stumpges, Headquarters Company, were all captured in the same 29 November 1950 action. Comparisons of treatment by the Communists and Japanese were inevitable. A survivor of the Bataan Death March, Stumpges felt that although the Japanese confinement was more difficult physically, imprisonment in North Korea was a far worse mental ordeal. “They [the Communists] were around all the time and you could never speak your mind.”[617]

[617] _New York Times_, dtd 30 Aug 53, p. 2.

The other two Marines similarly thought that the Japanese were more brutal but had more character. Harrison, captured at Wake Island, said he admired them because “they really believed in their cause and were loyal to it.”[618] The Chinese, on the other hand, he characterized as employing “false friendship and deceit.”[619] McCool, who had spent 70 hours in a slimy, lice-infested hole for refusing to confess to a phony charge of rape and pillage, knew that he “hated the Chinese Communists far more than he had hated the Japanese.”[620]

[618] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 79.

[619] _Ibid._

[620] _Ibid._, p. 167.

Master Sergeant Cain had distinguished himself by flying little OE reconnaissance planes 184 hours and had 76 combat missions in one month. Just before his capture, Cain had paid for six months’ education for nine Korean youngsters who lived near his air base. Because of his graying hair and lack of rank insignia, Sergeant Cain was mistaken for a senior officer. In fact, the Chinese insisted that he was Lieutenant Colonel Cain, CO of VMF-121. His equal amount of insistence that he was not a Marine officer, plus his refusal to reveal any significant information, made him a particular nuisance to the CCF. He was subjected to intensive interrogation sessions, confined to the hole, and stood at attention for periods of five to eight hours. Describing the occasion on which he thought it was all over, Sergeant Cain related that he:

... was taken to a hillside, blindfolded, and placed in front of
a firing squad. He heard rifle bolts click. The commander of the
firing squad asked if he was ready to tell all.[621]

[621] _Ibid._, p. 186.

When the Marine sergeant replied that he was not going to talk, the Chinese returned him to solitary confinement. Eventually, after questioning him for 84 days, the CCF gave up trying to indoctrinate him in the ways of Communism. Major Harris, senior officer of the Obul complex, freely acknowledged that Sergeant Cain “assumed more than his share of duties and responsibilities and set an example for all to follow.”[622]

[622] _Ibid._, pp. 186–187.

_Marine Escape Attempts_[623]

[623] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Korean War casualty cards
from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, HQMC.

As the Korean War came to a close, assessments were being made of America’s role in it. Operation BIG SWITCH swung into high gear and national attention focused on the returning POWs and their experiences in Communist camps. The widely-accepted statement was that no prisoners had escaped. Even more discrediting was the prevailing belief that, “worse, not a single American attempted to escape from captivity.”[624] These reported facts are not borne out by the actual record.

[624] Leckie, _Conflict_, p. 389.

In May 1951, a group of 18 Marines and a U.S. Army interpreter found their way back to American control through a combination of fortuitous events and quick thinking. All of the Marines had been captured several months earlier, in the 28 November-11 December period, the majority on the night of 29–30 November. There were peculiar circumstances connected with their escape. In early April, a group of nearly 60 UNC prisoners had been brought south by the enemy from the Majon-ni area. Presumably they were to perform working details in the rear of Communist front lines.

While a larger number of prisoners, both Army and Marine, were marched westward to Pyoktong, First Lieutenant Frank E. Cold and a group of 17 enlisted were sent further south to the general Chorwon area, not far from the 38th Parallel. In the meantime the Chinese launched their spring counteroffensive on 22 April. It appears that, subsequently, the Marines and Army interpreter, Corporal Saburo “Sam” Shimamura, who had been attached to the 1st Marine Division, were told they would be taken to the area in which the Marine division was operating and released there.

The group was then trucked southeast to Chunchon, just below the Parallel, under guard, and marched toward the vicinity of the front lines. On 24 May, while in proximity to the main battle area, an artillery preparation suddenly registered nearby. The CCF guards fled, while the prisoners ran in the opposite direction, heading for high ground where they successfully eluded the guards. For the rest of that day and night the escapees quietly watched Communist troops retreat past them. The next day, 25 May, the Marines fashioned make-shift air panels from wallpaper they stripped from a ruined Korean house in the area. They spelled out “POWS--19 RESCUE.” Their signal attracted the attention of an Army observation pilot who radioed their position to an Army reconnaissance unit.

Three Army tanks were dispatched and escorted the ex-prisoners to safety. They entered friendly lines in the vicinity of Chunchon, “the first and only group of prisoners to experience Communist indoctrination and to reach freedom after a prolonged period of internment.”[625] Two members of the unit[626] were of special interest. One man was 56-year-old Master Sergeant Gust H. Dunis, who had barely survived the brutal, frozen death march to Kanggye in late December. The other was Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, previously introduced as a unique two-time prisoner of war.

[625] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 84, reporting news stories in _The
Washington Post_, dtd 27 Aug 53, p. 7, and _Saturday
Evening Post_, 25 Aug 51, p. 109.

[626] Roster of this May 1951 escape group: 1stLt Cold,
H&S/3/7; MSgt Dunis, Military Police Co; SSgt Harrison,
MPCo; SSgt James B. Nash, MPCo; Sgt Charles W. Dickerson,
1stTkBn; Sgt Morris L. Estess, 1stSigBn; Sgt Paul M.
Manor, A/7 MT Bn; Cpl Clifford R. Hawkins, 1stTkBn; Cpl
Ernest E. Hayton, 1stTkBn; Cpl Frederick G. Halcomb,
11thMar; Cpl Leonard J. Maffioli, 1stTkBn; Cpl Theodore
R. Wheeler, 1stServBn; Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Hq,
1stDiv; PFC John A. Haring, 7thMar; PFC Theron L.
Hilburn, 1stTkBn; PFC Charles M. Kaylor, W/2/7; PFC
Paul J. Phillips, A/7 MTBn; and PFC Charles E. Quiring,
5thMar. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 260–263.

_Ice-Breaker at Work--Amphibian tractor of 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion destroys thick-crusted ice to prevent its backing up
against Spoonbill Bridge. Below, the 1st Engineer Battalion
maintenance shop in operation at Ascom City._

_Captured Enemy Weapons--Various types of mortar and artillery
shells, machine guns, rifles, and a 60mm mortar are displayed at
1st Marine Division CP. Below, F9F Pantherjet fighter taxies down
runway for takeoff._

_Outpost Defense--Inside view of one of the many sleeping
caves, which shelter two to four men, on Marine outpost Carson.
Below, COP Dagmar under artillery bombardment preceding enemy
diversionary ground attack on 26 March 1953._

_POW Exchange--Frontline Marines watch Army convoy bringing first
UN prisoners to Freedom Village in Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH.
_Below, NKPA and CCF delegation upon adjournment of first day’s
truce talks, April 1953._

_Freedom Village--Marines of 1st Engineer Battalion raise
welcoming sign at entrance to camp. Rear Admiral John C. Daniel,
USN, senior delegate at truce talks, reports progress at press
conference. Below, KSC workers and Marine reroll barbed wire for
use at the front._

_Ready to Strike--Ground crew loads rockets on “Devilcat” Corsair
in preparation for day’s mission. Below, protective screen of
M-46 dozer of 1st Tank Battalion is designed to explode 3.5-inch
rockets before they hit armored vehicle. The wire fence turns
with the turret._

_Evacuation from MLR--Improvised trolley rigged up by 2d
Battalion, 1st Marines, safely transfers Marine casualty. Below,
front view of first aid bunker, built on reverse slope, by 1st
Engineer Battalion personnel._

_Marine Relief--Advance party of the Turkish 3d Battalion arrives
at 3/7 CP to reconnoiter its new sector preparatory to relief
of 1st Marine Division, May 1953. Below, mine damage absorbed
by thermo boot. Its sturdy construction saved limb of wounded
Marine. Navy corpsman displays armored jacket worn by infantryman
who survived blast of 5 lbs. of TNT accidentally exploded at
close range._

_Street Signs--Markers for the new Marine division CP at Camp
Casey await completion of road work. Casey is command post of 1st
MarDiv while in I Corps reserve. Marine tank fires in support
of Turkish Brigade during May attack. Below, 5th Marines slog
through flooded area on way back from day’s training._

_Defense of Boulder City--Men of 1st and 7th Marines receive
supplies during CCF assaults in July 1953 against Boulder City.
Below, aerial view of pock-marked terrain in front of Boulder
City as seen from HMR-161 helicopter._

_Cease-fire--1st Marines move off MLR on 28 July, following
cease-fire order. How Company marches to Camp Lee from position
at the front. Below, contemplative Marine surveys trench line
being filled in in accordance with armistice agreement._

_Operation_ BIG SWITCH_--Road map of route taken by repatriated
UN prisoners of war as convoy reaches radio check points.
Progress of convoy is immediately relayed to Freedom Village and
entered on map._

_UN Custodial Forces--Indian troops board Marine helicopter on
deck of USS Point Cruz. They are then flown to the buffer zone to
guard CCF and NKPA nonrepatriated POWs. Below, LtCol William G.
Thrash receives naval aviator wings upon his release at Freedom
Village from MajGen Vernon E. Megee, CG, 1st MAW._

_Dismantling the MLR--KSCs, under Marine supervision, load and
carry lumber from torn-down bunkers to new sector. Below, guard
shack at entrance to 1/1 CP show results of flood waters, August
1952. Road approach to Spoonbill Bridge completely submerged by
annual summer rains, in July 1953._

_Shore-to-Ship Operation--F3D is hauled aboard ship after being
ferried by four DUKWs, as 1st MAW redeploys from Korea to Japan
in June 1956. Below, 1st Marine Division in Korea functions as
security force. Marine DMZ policemen inspect enemy positions,
February 1955._

_Mission Completed--1st Marine Division equipment and records at
dockside prior to loading for division’s return to the States.
Below, 1st Marines march across Freedom Gate Bridge on their way
to Ascom City and thence home to U.S., March 1955._

An additional four enlisted Marines returned to military control after a brief period of capture. Corporal William S. Blair, B/1/7, and PFC Bernard W. Insco, D/2/11, were taken prisoner on 24 April 1951 while the 1st Marine Division was operating as a component of IX Corps. Although originally sent north to a POW camp, both were released on 12 May by the enemy after less than a month’s captivity. Another pair of lucky Marines were PFC Richard R. Grindle and Corporal Harold J. Kidd, both of B/1/7. Seized on 11 May in patrol actions, they were the only Marines captured in ground fighting that month, and escaped to return to the division four days later.

At least six escape attempts are known to have been made by Marine POWs, and another elaborate plan late in the war was foiled before it got under way. The incidents follow:

#1. In the early winter months of 1951, Sergeant Donald M.
Griffith, F/2/5, became increasingly upset by the filth, steady
attrition of POWs, and semi-starvation diet at The Valley. He
vowed to escape. Late one night he pretended to go to the latrine
and finding the guard asleep, instead hurried down the path
leading out of the valley. He walked until dawn, then found a
hut where he hid among a pile of rice bags for some much-needed
sleep. Later, he knocked at a hut, asking for food. While he ate,
however, his genial host’s son was out contacting a military
patrol which even then was on Griffith’s trail.

A group of Communist soldiers closed in to recapture him. As
early punishment, Griffith’s shoe pacs were taken from him and
he was forced to walk back to the Valley in his threadbare ski
socks. Returned to the camp, the Marine sergeant was beaten
across the face. He was also directed to walk up a nearby hill
and for three successive times a rifle bullet tearing by his head
barely missed him. Later he learned that plans of his escape were
leaked to the CCF by an informer, thus triggering an early search.

#2. In May 1951, Captain Bryon H. Beswick, VMF-323, was a member
of a large POW column being marched north. Although still
suffering severe burns on his face, hands, and leg incurred
while bailing out of his plane that had caught fire, Beswick and
four others attempted to outwit their guards while on the march.
All the would-be escapees were placed in solitary confinement.

#3. Shortly after his capture in July 1951, PFC Alfred P. Graham,
Jr., H/3/5, was interned temporarily at what appeared to be a
divisional headquarters. One afternoon when the guards seemed
slack, Graham and another Marine sneaked off. Ultimately they
approached a farmhouse to get food and there stumbled into a half
dozen Koreans who took them into custody. The two Marines were
beaten with a submachine gun and their hands were bound behind
their back with communications wire. On their forced reappearance
at the original site of escape, a Korean officer beat and
interrogated them for three days.

#4. A short-lived escape attempt at Pak’s Palace, not long after
his capture in October 1951, had earned Lieutenant Gillette
a solitary confinement tour. Arriving at Officers’ camp in
Pi-chong-ni the following spring, the former VMF(N)-513 squadron
member and a South African air force pilot laid plans for a
mutual escape. Gillette deliberately set himself on a course of
reduced rations to prepare himself for the coming feat. When the
two men made their break, they were shot at but managed to safely
clear the camp.

The first night out the other pilot so badly injured himself in
a fall that Gillette had to leave him and go on alone. Although
the apparent escape route lay to the west, nearer the coast, the
Marine chose to go east across rugged mountains that offered
little in the way of cover, concealment, or food. His unorthodox
planning nearly paid off. “Whereas most escapees were recaptured
within hours, or at best within days, Lieutenant Gillette was
free for several weeks before the Communists found him halfway
across Korea.”[627] One Royal Marine described the attempt as
“the finest and most determined one he knew of.”[628]

[627] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 169.

[628] _Ibid._

#5. In July 1952, three Marine officers were involved in an abortive escape attempt at Camp 2. They were Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, Major McLaughlin, and Second Lieutenant Richard L. Sill, 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion. When detected outside of camp they were able to get back inside the compound, but the Chinese did identify Lieutenant Still. His escape attempt earned him a three-month sentence in the hole from which he later “emerged unbothered and steeled against the Communists.”[629]

[629] _Ibid._, p. 170.

#6. Captain Martelli escaped from the Camp 2 compound in September 1952. Retaken 10 days later, he was put in the same hole for two months. On release from the confinement, he was visibly upset by the experience, but quickly recovered. As a matter of interest, Martelli, like the other men whose exploits are recounted here, returned home in Operation BIG SWITCH.

#7. In the spring of 1953 a group of 30 officers, including two British Marines, at Camp 2 organized classes in mathematics, physics, and survival lectures. Conferences on escape and evasion techniques were held and the men formed escape groups. The teams drew straws to pick priorities for escape, and each one presented its plan to a senior body for approval. On 1 July, with support of the other teams, the first group went over the fence surrounding their house. Their freedom was brief, however, and the camp guard doubled. When rumors of armistice began circulating, further escape plans were cancelled. Clandestine prisoner escape committees--although unsuccessful in terms of actual results achieved--had existed at various camps. Second Lieutenant Rowland M. Murphy had been a member of such an organization at Obul. Major McLaughlin had assumed similar responsibilities at Camp 5, in 1951, and later at Camp 2 served on the secret all-UNC prisoners escape committee and senior officers’ organization within Camp 2. In early 1953 Major Harris became senior officer at the Camp 2 Annex. He organized Spanish classes as a facade for having a regular meeting place to announce policy and issue orders. Maps of North Korea were prepared for use in escape attempts and counter-Chinese political indoctrination was disseminated.

The Camp 2 officers performed another useful service. As rumor leaked out of the impending truce, they drafted a policy guide on POW behavior that was secretly circulated to other camps. UNC prisoners were directed to refrain from any appearance of fraternizing with the enemy, or acts of exuberance or violence. Specifically, they were reminded not to show any great enthusiasm upon their release, to prevent the Communist cameras on the scene from recording this as another propaganda victory.

_Evaluation and Aftermath_[630]

[630] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 “CMC
Statements on Korean POWs”; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv,
HQMC; MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_; Elliot
Harris, _The “UnAmerican” Weapon--Psychological Warfare_
(New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie,
_Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.

With but a few exceptions, circumstances indicated that capture of most Marines was unavoidable. Theoretically, it can be argued that several seized in bunkers might have avoided captivity had they been occupying fighting-holes instead. On the other hand, they might just as readily have become statistics on a KIA list, instead, by falling victim to preparatory fire that preceded the enemy’s main assault.

As Marine historian, then-Major, MacDonald has noted:

A shadow fell over American POWs in the aftermath of the Korean
War. Courts-martial and other official inquiries revealed that
a small segment of the Americans captured by the Communists
had been guilty of behavior ranging from questionable to
treasonable.[631]

[631] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 3.

Both the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War and the United States Congress, which investigated the entire POW issue, returned favorable verdicts for Marine POW conduct. The U.S. Senate report summarized its findings:

The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the
Colombians as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted
upon them by the Communists and did not cooperate or collaborate
with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and
credit.[632]

[632] _Ibid._, p. 237.

In commenting on prisoner attitudes and activities that seemed to account for those men who became “survival types”, an Army psychiatrist, Major William F. Mayer, observed:

The Marines were a statistically significant group from the
standpoint of size, something over two hundred; the only thing
I can say about them is that more of them survived than we. I
think this is a function of discipline and morale and esprit; and
the attitude in the Marine Corps I expressed a little while ago,
that if something happens to me, these jokers will take care of
me.[633]

[633] _Ibid._, pp. 236–237, address to U.S. Army Chaplain
School, 1957.

In the nature of self-judgment, Sergeant Griffith referred to “that certain ‘something’ that seems to weld men together prevailed more among the Marine POWs than it did with the other captured UN Troops.”[634] The Marine with probably more experience as a POW than anyone else, Sergeant Harrison, noted that “without USMC training I would never have lived through several tight spots. I am not talking strictly about physical training as I am mental conditioning. It is something that causes you to think ... about what the other guy will think or how it [your action] might affect or endanger them.”[635]

[634] _Ibid._, p. 88.

[635] _Ibid._, p. 238.

A senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, who headed POW units at Camp 2 and 5 between his tours of solitary confinement, declared:

I was extremely proud of the conduct of U.S. Marine Corps
personnel with whom I came in contact during my period of
confinement. Their esprit de corps was perhaps the highest of
any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States during this
period.[636]

[636] _Ibid._, p. 220.

And Navy Chief Duane Thorin, a former inmate of the Camp 2 annex, who later inspired the character of the helicopter pilot in James A. Michener’s _The Bridges of Toko-ri_, pointed out:

The Navy and Marine Corps POWs were generally excellent.
The Marines who left something to be desired were more than
compensated for by the majority of them.[637]

[637] _Ibid._, p. 223.

Another view was offered by a prominent neurologist and consultant to the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee, Dr. Harold G. Wolff. After investigating the performance of American POWs in Korea, Dr. Wolff concluded they had not “behaved much differently from other men in other armies and places” but that Americans had been made to appear much worse “by the enemy’s propaganda devices and our own initial ineptitude in countering the Communist propaganda.”[638]

[638] _Ibid._, p. 237.

As a postscript to the POW story, five Marines received awards, on 11 January 1954, for their exceptionally meritorious conduct while serving as prisoners of the Communists in Korea. They were:

Lieutenant Colonel Thrash--awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a
second Legion of Merit;

Major McLaughlin--awarded the Legion of Merit;

Major Harris--also awarded the Legion of Merit;

Captain Flynn--awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal; and

Master Sergeant Cain--awarded a Letter of Commendation with
Ribbon.

On the negative side, one enlisted Marine was disciplined for his cooperation with the enemy in writing a pro-Communist magazine article. A Court of Inquiry, convened in March 1954, did not recommend a court-martial for the 45-year-old pilot, Colonel Schwable. After a month-long review of circumstances involved in the case, the court opined that he had resisted Communist pressure and torture “to the limit of his ability before giving in.”[639] Its final judgment was that Schwable--a Naval Academy graduate, veteran of 20 years’ military service, and distinguished WW II night-fighter pilot and squadron CO--not be subjected to disciplinary action. At the same time the court held that his future usefulness as a Marine officer was “seriously impaired” by his conduct as a war prisoner.

[639] _Ibid._, p. 233.

On a larger scale, 192 Americans were found guilty of misconduct against fellow prisoners or various degrees of collaboration with the enemy. None of these was a Marine. In comparison with some 22,000 Communists who refused repatriation, 21 U.S. and 1 British prisoner succumbed to CCF brainwashing tactics. Twelve of the Americans have since returned to the U.S., apparently disenchanted with the Communist version of “people’s democracy” after getting a closer look at it.

Investigations later showed that “only a handful of the POWs in Korea were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the [Geneva Convention] ‘absolute’, name, rank, serial number, and date of birth restriction.”[640] Although giving false or misleading information was a common occurrence in POW camps, such testimony was usually quickly detected. American military authorities, drawing up a revised Code of Conduct (1955) subsequently recommended against making untruthful statements. Further, even though several Marines seemed to have suffered none the worse for giving false information, in at least one case a prisoner’s own situation was weakened by enemy detection of his lie and increasing pressure was brought against him.

[640] _Ibid._, p. 230.

It was found too, that in every group of prisoners there were always gradations of those more cooperative with the enemy (“progressives”) and those who offered open or passive resistance (“reactionaries”). One Korean War analyst, in seeking the final explanation of what POW tactics succeeded best against a dedicated enemy, cited the Turkish “chain of command that was never broken” and which helped to mold them together. He noted the “permissive” culture and background of Americans where freedom of choice and individual decisions are basic tenets. Despite the effect of military indoctrination and discipline, this concept of individualism and freedom appeared to be so strongly engrained that unless there was a corresponding emphasis on responsibility and strong beliefs it tended to weaken a man when his action and values were put to a prolonged test--as in the POW compound. The analyst concluded:

Only an extremely cohesive group, with tight leadership and great
spiritual strengths, coupled with inner toughness and concern for
one another, could have survived the shocks visited upon their
minds and bodies.... They [the Turks] remained united against the
enemy, and they survived.[641]

[641] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, pp. 541–542.

This judgement, to a large degree, tells the Marine POW story.