Chapter V: Freethought in Greece (1)

The highest of all the ancient civilizations, that of Greece, was naturally the product of the greatest possible complex of culture-forces; [396] and its rise to pre-eminence begins after the contact of the Greek settlers in Æolia and Ionia with the higher civilizations of Asia Minor. [397] The great Homeric epos itself stands for the special conditions of Æolic and Ionic life in those colonies; [398] even Greek religion, spontaneous as were its earlier growths, was soon influenced by those of the East; [399] and Greek philosophy and art alike draw their first inspirations from Eastern contact. [400] Whatever reactions we may make against the tradition of Oriental origins, [401] it is clear that the higher civilization of antiquity had Oriental (including in that term Egyptian) roots. [402] At no point do we find a "pure" Greek civilization. Alike the "Mycenæan" and the "Minoan" civilizations, as recovered for us by modern excavators, show a composite basis, in which the East is implicated. [403] And in the historic period the connection remains obvious. It matters not whether we hold the Phrygians and Karians of history to have been originally an Aryan stock, related to the Hellenes, and thus to have acted as intermediaries between Aryans and Semites, or to have been originally Semites, with whom Greeks intermingled. [404] On either view, the intermediaries represented Semitic influences, which they passed on to the Greek-speaking races, though they in turn developed their deities in large part on psychological lines common to them and the Semites. [405]

As to the obvious Asiatic influences on historic Greek
civilization, compare Winwood Reade, The Martyrdom of Man, 1872,
p. 64; Von Ihering, Vorgeschichte der Indo-Europäer, Eng. tr. ("The
Evolution of the Aryan"), p. 73; Schömann, Griech. Alterthümer,
2te Aufl. 1861, i, 10; E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. ii, 155;
A. Bertrand, Études de mythol. et d'archéol. grecques, 1858,
pp. 40-41; Bury, introd. p. 3. It seems clear that the Egyptian
influence is greatly overstated by Herodotos (ii. 49-52, etc.),
who indeed avows that he is but repeating what the Egyptians
affirm. The Egyptian priests made their claim in the spirit
in which the Jews later made theirs. Herodotos, besides, would
prefer an Egyptian to an Asiatic derivation, and so would his
audience. But it must not be overlooked that there was an Egyptian
influence in the "Minoan" period.

A Hellenistic enthusiasm has led a series of eminent scholars to carry so far their resistance to the tradition of Oriental beginnings [406] as to take up the position that Greek thought is "autochthonous." [407] If it were, it could not conceivably have progressed as it did. Only the tenacious psychological prejudice as to race-characters and racial "genius" could thus long detain so many students at a point of view so much more nearly related to supernaturalism than to science. It is safe to say that if any people is ever seen to progress in thought, art, and life, with measurable rapidity, its progress is due to the reactions of foreign intercourse. The primary civilizations, or what pass for such, as those of Akkad and Egypt, are immeasurably slow in accumulating culture-material; the relatively rapid developments always involve the stimulus of old cultures upon a new and vigorous civilization, well-placed for social evolution for the time being. There is no point in early Greek evolution, so far as we have documentary trace of it, at which foreign impact or stimulus is not either patent or inferrible. [408] In the very dawn of history the Greeks are found to be a composite stock, [409] growing still more composite; and the very beginnings of its higher culture are traced to the non-Grecian people of Thrace, [410] who worshipped the Muses. As seen by Herodotos and Thucydides, "the original Hellenes were a particular conquering tribe of great prestige, which attracted the surrounding tribes to follow it, imitate it, and call themselves by its name. The Spartans were, to Herodotos, Hellenic; the Athenians, on the other hand, were not. They were Pelasgian, but by a certain time 'changed into Hellenes and learnt their language.' In historical times we cannot really find any tribe of pure Hellenes in existence." [411] The later supremacy of the Greek culture is thus to be explained in terms not of an abnormal "Greek genius," [412] but of the special evolution of intelligence in the Greek-speaking stock, firstly through constant crossing with others, and secondarily through its furtherance by the special social conditions of the more progressive Greek city-states, of which conditions the most important were their geographical dividedness and their own consequent competition and interaction. [413]

The whole problem of Oriental "influence" has been obscured, and
the solution retarded, by the old academic habit of discussing
questions of mental evolution in vacuo. Even the reaction against
idolatrous Hellenism proceeded without due regard to historical
sequence; and the return reaction against that is still somewhat
lacking in breadth of inference. There has been too much on
one side of assumption as to early Oriental achievement; and
too much tendency on the other to assume that the positing of
an "influence" on the Greeks is a disparagement of the "Greek
mind." The superiority of that in its later evolution seems too
obvious to need affirming. But that hardly justifies so able a
writer as Professor Burnet in concluding (Early Greek Philosophy,
2nd ed. introd. pp. 22-23) that "the" Egyptians knew no more
arithmetic than was learned by their children in the schools;
or in saying (id. p. 26) that "the" Babylonians "studied and
recorded celestial phenomena for what we call astrological
purposes, not from any scientific interest." How can we have
the right to say that no Babylonians had a scientific interest
in the data? Such interest would in the nature of the case miss
the popular reproduction given to astrological lore. But it might
very well subsist.

Professor Burnet, albeit a really original investigator, has
not here had due regard to the early usage of collegiate or
corporate culture, in which arcane knowledge was reserved for the
few. Thus he writes (p. 26) concerning the Greeks that "it was not
till the time of Plato that even the names of the planets were
known." Surely they must have been "known" to some adepts long
before: how else came they to be accepted? As Professor Burnet
himself notes (p. 34), "in almost every department of life we find
that the corporation at first is everything and the individual
nothing. The peoples of the East hardly got beyond this stage at
all: their science, such as it is, is anonymous, the inherited
property of a caste or guild, and we still see clearly in some
cases that it was once the same among the Hellenes." Is it not then
probable that astronomical knowledge was so ordered by Easterns,
and passed on to Hellenes?

There still attaches to the investigation of early Greek philosophy
the drawback that the philosophical scholars do not properly posit
the question: What was the early Ionic Greek society like? How did
the Hellenes relate to the older polities and cultures which they
found there? Professor Burnet makes justifiable fun (p. 21, note)
of Dr. Gomperz's theory of the influence of "native brides"; but he
himself seems to argue that the Greeks could learn nothing from the
men they conquered, though he admits (p. 20) their derivation of
"their art and many of their religious ideas from the East." If
religion, why not religious speculation, leading to philosophy
and science? This would be a more fruitful line of inquiry than
one based on the assumption that "the" Babylonians went one way
and "the" Greeks another. After all, only a few in each race
carried on the work of thought and discovery. We do not say that
"the English" wrote Shakespeare. Why affirm always that "the"
Greeks did whatever great Greeks achieved?

On the immediate issue Professor Burnet incidentally concedes what
is required. After arguing that the East perhaps borrowed more
from the West than did the West from the East, he admits (p. 21):
"It would, however, be quite another thing to say that Greek
philosophy originated quite independently of Oriental influence."

§ 1

By the tacit admission of one of the ablest opponents of the theory of foreign influence, Hellenic religion as fixed by Homer for the Hellenic world was partly determined by Asiatic influences. Ottfried Müller decided not only that Homer the man (in whose personality he believed) was probably a Smyrnean, whether of Æolic or Ionic stock, [414] but that Homer's religion must have represented a special selection from the manifold Greek mythology, necessarily representing his local bias. [415] Now, the Greek cults at Smyrna, as in the other Æolic and Ionic cities of Asia Minor, would be very likely to reflect in some degree the influence of the Karian or other Asiatic cults around them. [416] The early Attic conquerors of Miletos allowed the worship of the Karian Sun-God there to be carried on by the old priests; and the Attic settlers of Ephesos in the same way adopted the neighbouring worship of the Lydian Goddess (who became the Artemis or "Great Diana" of the Ephesians), and retained the ministry of the attendant priests and eunuchs. [417] Smyrna was apparently not like these a mixed community, but one founded by Achaians from the Peloponnesos; but the genera] Ionic and Æolic religious atmosphere, set up by common sacrifices, [418] must have been represented in an epic brought forth in that region. The Karian civilization had at one time spread over a great part of the Ægean, including Delos and Cyprus. [419] Such a civilization must have affected that of the Greek conquerors, who only on that basis became civilized traders. [420]

It is not necessary to ask how far exactly the influence may have gone in the Iliad: the main point is that even at that stage of comparatively simple Hellenism the Asiatic environment, Karian or Phoenician, counted for something, whether in cosmogony or in furthering the process of God-grouping, or in conveying the cult of Cyprian Aphrodite, [421] or haply in lending some characteristics to Zeus and Apollo and Athênê, [422] an influence none the less real because the genius of the poet or poets of the Iliad has given to the whole Olympian group the artistic stamp of individuality which thenceforth distinguishes the Gods of Greece from all others. Indeed, the very creation of a graded hierarchy out of the independent local deities of Greece, the marrying of the once isolated Pelasgic Hêrê to Zeus, the subordination to him of the once isolated Athênê and Apollo--all this tells of the influence of a Semitic world in which each Baal had his wife, and in which the monarchic system developed on earth had been set up in heaven. [423] But soon the Asiatic influence becomes still more clearly recognizable. There is reason to hold with Schrader that the belief in a mildly blissful future state, as seen even in the Odyssey [424] and in the Theogony ascribed to Hesiod, [425] is "a new belief which is only to be understood in view of oriental tales and teaching." [426] In the Theogony, again, the Semitic element increases, [427] Kronos being a Semitic figure; [428] while Semelê, if not Dionysos, appears to be no less so. [429] But we may further surmise that in Homer, to begin with, the conception of Okeanos, the earth-surrounding Ocean-stream, as the origin of all things, [430] comes from some Semitic source; and that Hesiod's more complicated scheme of origins from Chaos is a further borrowing of oriental thought--both notions being found in ancient Babylonian lore, whence the Hebrews derived their combination of Chaos and Ocean in the first verses of Genesis. [431] It thus appears that the earlier oriental [432] influence upon Greek thought was in the direction of developing religion, [433] with only the germ of rationalism conveyed in the idea of an existence of matter before the Gods, [434] which we shall later find scientifically developed. But the case is obscure. Insofar as the Theogony, for instance, partly moralizes the more primitively savage myths, [435] it may be that it represents the spontaneous need of the more highly evolved race to give an acceptable meaning to divine tales which, coming from another race, have not a quite sacrosanct prescription, though the tendency is to accept them. On the other hand, it may have been a further foreign influence that gave the critical impulse.

"It is plain enough that Homer and Hesiod represent, both
theologically and socially, the close of a long epoch, and
not the youth of the Greek world, as some have supposed. The
real signification of many myths is lost to them, and so is
the import of most of the names and titles of the elder Gods,
which are archaic and strange, while the subordinate personages
generally have purely Greek names" (Professor Mahaffy, History
of Classical Greek Literature, 1880, i, 17).

§ 2

Whatever be the determining conditions, it is clear that the Homeric epos stands for a new growth of secular song, distinct from the earlier poetry, which by tradition was "either lyrical or oracular." The poems ascribed to the pre-Homeric bards "were all short, and they were all strictly religious. In these features they contrasted broadly with the epic school of Homer. Even the hexameter metre seems not to have been used in these old hymns, and was called a new invention of the Delphic priests. [436] Still further, the majority of these hymns are connected with mysteries apparently ignored by Homer, or with the worship of Dionysos, which he hardly knew." [437] Intermediate between the earlier religious poetry and the Homeric epic, then, was a hexametric verse, used by the Delphic priesthood; and to this order of poetry belongs the Theogony which goes under the name of Hesiod, and which is a sample of other and older works, [438] probably composed by priests. And the distinctive mark of the Homeric epos is that, framed as it was to entertain feudal chiefs and their courts, it turned completely away from the sacerdotal norm and purpose. "Thus epic poetry, from having been purely religious, became purely secular. After having treated men and heroes in subordination to the Gods, it came to treat the Gods in relation to men. Indeed, it may be said of Homer that in the image of man created he God." [439]

As to the non-religiousness of the Homeric epics, there is a
division of critical opinion. Meyer insists (Gesch. des Alt. ii,
395) that, as contrasted with the earlier religious poetry, "the
epic poetry is throughout secular (profan); it aims at charming
its hearers, not at propitiating the Gods"; and he further sees in
the whole Ionian mood a certain cynical disillusionment (id. ii,
723). Cp. Benn, Philos. of Greece, p. 40, citing Hegel. E. Curtius
(G. G. i, 126) goes so far as to ascribe a certain irony to the
portraiture of the Gods (Ionian Apollo excepted) in Homer, and to
trace this to Ionian levity. To the same cause he assigns the lack
of any expression of a sense of stigma attaching to murder. This
sense he holds the Greek people had, though Homer does not
hint it. (Cp. Grote, i, 24, whose inference Curtius implicitly
impugns.) Girard (Le Sentiment religieux en Grèce, 1869), on the
contrary, appears to have no suspicion of any problem to solve,
treating Homer as unaffectedly religious. The same view is taken
by Prof. Paul Decharme. "On chercherait vainement dans l'Iliade et
dans l'Odyssée les premières traces du scepticisme grec à l'égard
des fables des dieux. C'est avec une foi entière en la réalité
des événements mythiques que les poètes chantent les légendes ...;
c'est en toute simplicité d'âme aussi que les auditeurs de l'épopée
écoutent...." (La critique des traditions religieuses chez les
grecs, 1904, p. 1.) Thus we have a kind of balance of contrary
opinions, German against French. Any verdict on the problem must
recognize on the one hand the possibilities of naïve credulity in
an unlettered age, and on the other the probability of critical
perception on the part of a great poet. I have seen both among
Boers in South Africa. On the general question of the mood of
the Homeric poems compare Gilbert Murray, Four Stages of Greek
Religion, 1912, p. 77, and Hist. of Anc. Greek Lit. pp. 34, 35;
and A. Benn, The Philosophy of Greece in Relation to the Character
of its People, 1898, pp. 29-30.

Still, it cannot be said that in the Iliad there is any clear hint of religious skepticism, though the Gods are so wholly in the likeness of men that the lower deities fight with heroes and are worsted, while Zeus and Hêrê quarrel like any earthly couple. In the Odyssey there is a bare hint of possible speculation in the use of the word atheos; but it is applied only in the phrase ouk atheei, "not without a God," [440] in the sense of similar expressions in other passages and in the Iliad. [441] The idea was that sometimes the Gods directly meddled. When Odysseus accuses the suitors of not dreading the Gods, [442] he has no thought of accusing them of unbelief. [443] Homer has indeed been supposed to have exercised a measure of relative freethought in excluding from his song the more offensive myths about the Gods, [444] but such exclusion may be sufficiently explained on the score that the epopees were chanted in aristocratic dwellings, in the presence of womenkind, without surmising any process of doubt on the poet's part.

On the other hand, it was inevitable that such a free treatment of things hitherto sacred should not only affect the attitude of the lay listener towards the current religion, but should react on the religious consciousness. God-legends so fully thrust on secular attention were bound to be discussed; and in the adaptations of myth for liturgical purposes by Stesichoros (fl. circa 600 B.C.) we appear to have the first open trace of a critical revolt in the Greek world against immoral or undignified myths. [445] In his work, it is fair to say, we see "the beginning of rationalism": "the decisive step is taken: once the understanding criticizes the sanctified tradition, it raises itself to be the judge thereof; no longer the common tradition but the individual conviction is the ground of religious belief." [446] Religious, indeed, the process still substantially is. It is to preserve the credit of Helena as a Goddess that Stesichoros repudiates the Homeric account of her, [447] somewhat in the spirit in which the framers of the Hesiodic theogony manipulated the myths without rejecting them, or the Hebrew redactors tampered with their text. But in Stesichoros there is a new tendency to reject the myth altogether; [448] so that at this stage freethought is still part of a process in which religious feeling, pressed by an advancing ethical consciousness, instinctively clears its standing ground.

It is in Pindar, however (518-442 B.C.), that we first find such a mental process plainly avowed by a believer. In his first Olympic Ode he expressly declares the need for bringing afterthought to bear on poetic lore, that so men may speak nought unfitting of the Gods; and he protests that he will never tell the tale of the blessed ones banqueting on human flesh. [449] In the ninth Ode he again protests that his lips must not speak blasphemously of such a thing as strife among the immortals. [450] Here the critical motive is ethical, though, while repudiating one kind of scandal about the Gods, Pindar placidly accepts others no less startling to the modern sense. His critical revolt, in fact, is far from thoroughgoing, and suggests rather a religious man's partial response to pressure from others than any independent process of reflection. [451]

"He [Pindar] was honestly attached to the national religion and to
its varieties in old local cults. He lived a somewhat sacerdotal
life, labouring in honour of the Gods, and seeking to spread a
reverence for old traditional beliefs. He, moreover, shows an
acquaintance with Orphic rites and Pythagorean mysteries, which
led him to preach the doctrine of immortality, and of rewards
and punishments in the life hereafter. [Note.--The most explicit
fragment (thrênoi, 3), is, however, not considered genuine by
recent critics.]... He is indeed more affected by the advance of
freethinking than he imagines; he borrows from the neologians the
habit of rationalizing myths, and explaining away immoral acts
and motives in the Gods; but these things are isolated attempts
with him, and have no deep effect upon his general thinking"
(Mahaffy, Hist. of Greek Lit. i, 213-14).

For such a development we are not, of course, forced to assume a foreign influence: mere progress in refinement and in mental activity could bring it about; yet none the less it is probable that foreign influence did quicken the process. It is true that from the beginnings of the literary period Greek thought played with a certain freedom on myth, partly perhaps because the traditions visibly came from various races, and there was no strong priesthood to ossify them. After Homer and Hesiod, men looked back to those poets as shaping theology to their own minds. [452] But all custom is conservative, and Pindar's mind had that general cast. On the other hand, external influence was forthcoming. The period of Pindar and Æschylus [525-455 B.C.] follows on one in which Greek thought, stimulated on all sides, had taken the first great stride in its advance beyond all antiquity. Egypt had been fully thrown open to the Greeks in the reign of Psammetichos [453] (650 B.C.); and a great historian, who contends that the "sheer inherent and expansive force" of "the" Greek intellect, "aided but by no means either impressed or provoked from without," was the true cause, yet concedes that intercourse with Egypt "enlarged the range of their thoughts and observations, while it also imparted to them that vein of mysticism which overgrew the primitive simplicity of the Homeric religion," and that from Asia Minor in turn they had derived "musical instruments and new laws of rhythm and melody," as well as "violent and maddening religious rites." [454] And others making similar à priori claims for the Greek intelligence are forced likewise to admit that the mental transition between Homer and Herodotos cannot be explained save in terms of "the influence of other creeds, and the necessary operation of altered circumstances and relations." [455] In the Persae of Æschylus we even catch a glimpse of direct contact with foreign skepticism; [456] and again in the Agamemnon there is a reference to some impious one who denied that the Gods deigned to have care of mortals. [457] It seems unwarrantable to read as "ridicule of popular polytheism" the passage in the same tragedy: [458] "Zeus, whosoever he be; if this name be well-pleasing to himself in invocation, by this do I name him." It may more fitly be read [459] as an echo of the saying of Herakleitos that "the Wise [= the Logos?] is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus." [460] But in the poet's thought, as revealed in the Prometheus, and in the Agamemnon on the theme of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, there has occurred an ethical judgment of the older creeds, an approach to pantheism, a rejection of anthropomorphism, and a growth of pessimism that tells of their final insufficiency.

The leaning to pantheism is established by the discovery that
the disputed lines, "Zeus is sky, earth, and heaven: Zeus is all
things, yea, greater than all things" (Frag. 443), belonged to the
lost tragedy of the Heliades (Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks,
1896, p. 88). For the pessimism see the Prometheus, 247-51. The
anti-anthropomorphism is further to be made out from the lines
ascribed to Æschylus by Justin Martyr (De Monarchia, c. 2)
and Clemens Alexandrinus (Stromata, v, 14). They are expressly
pantheistic; but their genuineness is doubtful. The story that
Æschylus was nearly killed by a theatre audience on the score
that he had divulged part of the mysteries in a tragedy (Haigh,
The Attic Theatre, 1889, p. 316; Tragic Drama, pp. 49-50)
does not seem to have suggested to Aristotle, who tells it
(Nicomachean Ethics, iii, 2), any heterodox intention on the
tragedian's part; but it is hard to see an orthodox believer
in the author either of the Prometheus, wherein Zeus is posed
as brutal might crucifying innocence and beneficence, or of
the Agamemnon, where the father, perplexed in the extreme, can
but fall back helplessly on formulas about the all-sufficiency
of Zeus when called upon to sacrifice his daughter. Cp. Haigh,
Tragic Drama, p. 86 sq. "Some critics," says Mr. Haigh (p. 88),
"have been led to imagine that there is in Æschylus a double
Zeus--the ordinary God of the polytheistic religion and the one
omnipotent deity in whom he really believed. They suppose that he
had no genuine faith in the credibility of the popular legends,
but merely used them as a setting for his tragedies; and that his
own convictions were of a more philosophical type," as seen in
the pantheistic lines concerning Zeus. To this Mr. Haigh replies
that it is "most improbable that there was any clear distinction
in the mind of Æschylus" between the two conceptions of Zeus;
going on, however, to admit that "much, no doubt, he regarded
as uncertain, much as false. Even the name 'Zeus' was to him a
mere convention." Mr. Haigh in this discussion does not attempt
to deal with the problem of the Prometheus.

The hesitations of the critics on this head are noteworthy. Karl
Ottfried Müller, who is least himself in dealing with fundamental
issues of creed, evades the problem (Lit. of Anc. Greece, 1847,
p. 329) with the bald suggestion that "Æschylus, in his own
mind, must have felt how this severity [of Zeus], a necessary
accompaniment of the transition from the Titanic period to the
government of the Gods of Olympus, was to be reconciled with the
mild wisdom which he makes an attribute of Zeus in the subsequent
ages of the world. Consequently, the deviation from right ... would
all lie on the side of Prometheus." This nugatory plea--which is
rightly rejected by Burckhardt (Griech. Culturgesch. ii, 25)--is
ineffectually backed by the argument that the friendly Oceanides
recur to the thought, "Those only are wise who humbly reverence
Adrasteia (Fate)"--as if the positing of a supreme Fate were not
a further belittlement of Zeus.

Other critics are similarly evasive. Patin (Eschyle, éd. 1877,
p. 250 sq.), noting the vagaries of past criticism, hostile and
other, avowedly leaves the play an unsolved enigma, affirming only
the commonly asserted "piety" of Æschylus. Girard (Le sentiment
religieux en Grèce, pp. 425-29) does no better, while dogmatically
asserting that the poet is "the Greek faithful to the faith of his
fathers, which he interprets with an intelligent and emotional
(émue) veneration." Meyer (iii, §§ 257-58) draws an elaborate
parallel between Æschylus and Pindar, affirming in turn the "tiefe
Frömmigkeit" of the former--and in turn leaves the enigma of the
Prometheus unsolved. Professor Decharme, rightly rejecting the
fanciful interpretations of Quinet and others who allegorize
Prometheus into humanity revolting against superstition,
offers a very unsatisfying explanation of his own (p. 107),
which practically denies that there is any problem to solve.

Prof. Mahaffy, with his more vivacious habit of thought, comes
to the evaded issue. "How," he asks, "did the Athenian audience,
who vehemently attacked the poet for divulging the mysteries,
tolerate such a drama? And still more, how did Æschylus, a pious
and serious thinker, venture to bring such a subject on the
stage with a moral purpose?" The answers suggested are: (1) that
in all old religions there are tolerated anomalous survivals;
(2) that "a very extreme distortion of their Gods will not
offend many who would feel outraged at any open denial of them";
(3) that all Greeks longed for despotic power for themselves,
and that "no Athenian, however he sympathized with Prometheus,
would think of blaming Zeus for ... crushing all resistance to his
will." But even if these answers--of which the last is the most
questionable--be accepted, "the question of the poet's intention
is far more difficult, and will probably never be satisfactorily
answered." Finally, we have this summing-up: "Æschylus was, indeed,
essentially a theologian ... but, what is more honourable and
exceptional, he was so candid and honest a theologian that he did
not approach men's difficulties for the purpose of refuting them
or showing them weak and groundless. On the contrary, though an
orthodox and pious man, though clearly convinced of the goodness
of Providence, and of the profound truth of the religion of
his fathers, he was ever stating boldly the contradictions and
anomalies in morals and in myths, and thus naturally incurring
the odium and suspicion of the professional advocates of religion
and their followers. He felt, perhaps instinctively, that a vivid
dramatic statement of these problems in his tragedies was better
moral education than vapid platitudes about our ignorance, and
about our difficulties being only caused by the shortness of our
sight" (Hist. of Greek Lit. i, 260-61, 273-74).

Here, despite the intelligent handling, the enigma is merely
transferred from the great tragedian's work to his character: it is
not solved. No solution is offered of the problem of the pantheism
of the fragment above cited, which is quite irreconcilable with
any orthodox belief in Greek religion, though such sayings are
at times repeated by unthinking believers, without recognition
of their bearing. That the pantheism is a philosophical element
imported into the Greek world from the Babylonian through the early
Ionian thinkers seems to be the historical fact (cp. Whittaker,
as last cited): that the importation meant the dissolution of
the national faith for many thinking men seems to be no less
true. It seems finally permissible, then, to suggest that the
"piety" of Æschylus was either discontinuous or a matter of
artistic rhetoric and public spirit, and that the Prometheus is
a work of profound and terrible irony, unburdening his mind of
reveries that religion could not conjure away. The discussion
on the play has unduly ignored the question of its date. It is,
in all probability, one of the latest of the works of Æschylus
(K. O. Müller, Lit. of Anc. Greece, p. 327; Haigh, Tragic Drama,
p. 109). Müller points to the employment of the third actor--a
late development--and Haigh to the overshadowing of the choruses
by the dialogue; also to the mention (ll. 366-72) of the eruption
of Etna, which occurred in 475 B.C. This one circumstance goes
far to solve the dispute. Written near the end of the poet's life
the play belongs to the latest stages of his thinking; and if it
departs widely in its tone from the earlier plays, the reasonable
inference is that his ideas had undergone a change. The Agamemnon,
with its desolating problem, seems to be also one of his later
works. Rationalism, indeed, does not usually emerge in old age,
though Voltaire was deeply shaken in his theism by the earthquake
of Lisbon; but Æschylus is unique even among men of genius; and
the highest flight of Greek drama may well stand for an abnormal
intellectual experience.

In this primary entrance of critical doubt into drama we have one of the sociological clues to the whole evolution of Greek thought. It has been truly said that the constant action of the tragic stage, the dramatic putting of arguments and rejoinders, pros and cons--which in turn was a fruit of the actual daily pleadings in the Athenian dikastery--was a manifold stimulus alike to ethical feeling and to intellectual effort, such as no other ancient civilization ever knew. "The appropriate subject-matter of tragedy is pregnant not only with ethical sympathy, but also with ethical debate and speculation," to an extent unapproached in the earlier lyric and gnomic poetry and the literature of aphorism and precept. "In place of unexpanded results, or the mere communication of single-minded sentiment, we have even in Æschylus, the earliest of the great tragedians, a large latitude of dissent and debate--a shifting point of view--a case better or worse--and a divination of the future advent of sovereign and instructed reason. It was through the intermediate stage of tragedy that Grecian literature passed into the Rhetoric, Dialectics, and Ethical speculation which marked the fifth century B.C." [461]

This development was indeed autochthonous, save insofar as the germ of the tragic drama may have come from the East in the cult of Dionysos, with its vinous dithyramb: the "Greek intellect" assuredly did wonderful things at Athens, being placed, for a time, in civic conditions peculiarly fitted for the economic evocation of certain forms of genius. But the above-noted developments in Pindar and in Æschylus had been preceded by the great florescence of early Ionian philosophy in the sixth century, a growth which constrains us to look once more to Asia Minor for a vital fructification of the Greek inner life, of a kind that Athenian institutions could not in themselves evoke. For while drama flourished supremely at Athens, science and philosophy grew up elsewhere, centuries before Athens had a philosopher of note; and all the notable beginnings of Hellenic freethought occurred outside of Hellas proper.

§ 3

The Greeks varied from the general type of culture-evolution seen in India, Persia, Egypt, and Babylon, and approximated somewhat to that of ancient China, in that their higher thinking was done not by an order of priests pledged to cults, but by independent laymen. In Greece, as in China, this line of development is to be understood as a result of early political conditions--in China, those of a multiplicity of independent feudal States; in Greece, those of a multiplicity of City States, set up first by the geographical structure of Hellas, and reproduced in the colonies of Asia Minor and Magna Graecia by reason of the acquired ideal and the normal state of commercial competition. To the last, many Greek cults exhibited their original character as the sacra of private families. Such conditions prevented the growth of a priestly caste or organization. [462] Neither China nor Pagan Greece was imperialized till there had arisen enough of rationalism to prevent the rise of a powerful priesthood; and the later growth of a priestly system in Greece in the Christian period is to be explained in terms first of a positive social degeneration, accompanying a complete transmutation of political life, and secondly of the imposition of a new cult, on the popular plane, specially organized on the model of the political system that adopted it. Under imperialism, however, the two civilizations ultimately presented a singular parallel of unprogressiveness.

In the great progressive period, the possible gains from the absence of a priesthood are seen in course of realization. For the Greek-speaking world in general there was no dogmatic body of teaching, no written code of theology and moral law, no Sacred Book. [463] Each local cult had its own ancient ritual, often ministered by priestesses, with myths, often of late invention, to explain it; [464] only Homer and Hesiod, with perhaps some of the now lost epics, serving as a general treasury of myth-lore. The two great epopees ascribed to Homer, indeed, had a certain Biblical status; and the Homerids or other bards who recited them did what in them lay to make the old poetry the standard of theological opinion; but they too lacked organized influence, and could not hinder higher thinking. [465] The special priesthood of Delphi, wielding the oracle, could maintain their political influence only by holding their function above all apparent self-seeking or effort at domination. [466] It only needed, then, such civic conditions as should evolve a leisured class, with a bent towards study, to make possible a growth of lay philosophy.

Those conditions first arose in the Ionian cities; because there first did Greek citizens attain commercial wealth, [467] as a result of adopting the older commercial civilization whose independent cities they conquered, and of the greater rapidity of development which belongs to colonies in general. [468] There it was that, in matters of religion and philosophy, the comparison of their own cults with those of their foreign neighbours first provoked their critical reflection, as the age of primitive warfare passed away. And there it was, accordingly, that on a basis of primitive Babylonian science there originated with Thales of Miletos (fl. 586 B.C.), a Phoenician by descent, [469] the higher science and philosophy of the Greek-speaking race. [470]

It is historically certain that Lydia had an ancient and close
historical connection with Babylonian and Assyrian civilization,
whether through the "Hittites" or otherwise (Sayce, Anc. Emp. of
the East, 1884, pp. 217-19; Curtius, Griech. Gesch. i, 63, 207;
Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. i, 166, 277, 299, 305-10; Soury,
Bréviaire de l'hist. du matérialisme, 1881, pp. 30, 37 sq. Cp. as
to Armenia, Edwards, The Witness of Assyria, 1893, p. 144); and in
the seventh century the commercial connection between Lydia and
Ionia, long close, was presumably friendly up to the time of the
first attacks of the Lydian Kings, and even afterwards (Herodotos
i, 20-23), Alyattes having made a treaty of peace with Miletos,
which thereafter had peace during his long reign. This brings us
to the time of Thales (640-548 B.C.). At the same time, the Ionian
settlers of Miletos had from the first a close connection with the
Karians (Herod. i, 146, and above pp. 120-21), whose near affinity
with the Semites, at least in religion, is seen in their practice
of cutting their foreheads at festivals (id. ii, 61; cp. Grote,
ed. 1888, i, 27, note; E. Curtius, i, 36, 42; Busolt, i, 33;
and Spiegel, Eranische Alterthumskunde, i, 228). Thales was thus
in the direct sphere of Babylonian culture before the conquest
of Cyrus; and his Milesian pupils or successors, Anaximandros
and Anaximenes, stand for the same influences. Herakleitos in
turn was of Ephesus, an Ionian city in the same culture-sphere;
Anaxagoras was of Klazomenai, another Ionian city, as had been
Hermotimos, of the same philosophic school; the Eleatic school,
founded by Xenophanes and carried on by Parmenides and the elder
Zeno, come from the same matrix, Elea having been founded by
exiles from Ionian Phokaia on its conquest by the Persians; and
Pythagoras, in turn, was of the Ionian city of Samos, in the same
sixth century. Finally, Protagoras and Demokritos were of Abdera,
an Ionian colony in Thrace; Leukippos, the teacher of Demokritos,
was either an Abderite, a Milesian, or an Elean; and Archelaos,
the pupil of Anaxagoras and a teacher of Sokrates, is said to
have been a Milesian. Wellhausen (Israel, p. 473 of vol. of
Prolegomena, Eng. tr.) has spoken of the rise of philosophy
on the "threatened and actual political annihilation of Ionia"
as corresponding to the rise of Hebrew prophecy on the menace
and the consummation of the Assyrian conquest. As regards Ionia,
this may hold in the sense that the stoppage of political freedom
threw men back on philosophy, as happened later at Athens. But
Thales philosophized before the Persian conquest.

§ 4

Thales, like Homer, starts from the Babylonian conception of a beginning of all things in water; but in Thales the immediate motive and the sequel are strictly cosmological and neither theological nor poetical, though we cannot tell whether the worship of a God of the Waters may not have been the origin of a water-theory of the cosmos. The phrase attributed to him, "that all things are full of Gods," [471] clearly meant that in his opinion the forces of things inhered in the cosmos, and not in personal powers who spasmodically interfered with it. [472] It is probable that, as was surmised by Plutarch, a pantheistic conception of Zeus existed for the Ionian Greeks before Thales. [473] To the later doxographists he "seems to have lost belief in the Gods." [474] From the mere second-hand and often unintelligent statements which are all we have in his case, it is hard to make sure of his system; but that it was pantheistic [475] and physicist seems clear. He conceived that matter not only came from but was resolvable into water; that all phenomena were ruled by law or "necessity"; and that the sun and planets (commonly regarded as deities) were bodies analogous to the earth, which he held to be spherical but "resting on water." [476] For the rest, he speculated in meteorology and in astronomy, and is credited with having predicted a solar eclipse [477]--a fairly good proof of his knowledge of Chaldean science [478]--and with having introduced geometry into Greece from Egypt. [479] To him, too, is ascribed a wise counsel to the Ionians in the matter of political federation, [480] which, had it been followed, might have saved them from the Persian conquest; and he is one of the many early moralists who laid down the Golden Rule as the essence of the moral law. [481] With his maxim, "Know thyself," he seems to mark a broadly new departure in ancient thought: the balance of energy is shifted from myth and theosophy, prophecy and poesy, to analysis of consciousness and the cosmic process.

From this point Greek rationalism is continuous, despite reactions, till the Roman conquest, Miletos figuring long as a general source of skepticism. Anaximandros (610-547 B.C.), pupil and companion of Thales, was like him an astronomer, geographer, and physicist, seeking for a first principle (for which he may or may not have invented the name [482]); rejecting the idea of a single primordial element such as water; affirming an infinite material cause, without beginning and indestructible, [483] with an infinite number of worlds; and--still showing the Chaldean impulse--speculating remarkably on the descent of man from something aquatic, as well as on the form and motion of the earth (figured by him as a cylinder [484]), the nature and motions of the solar system, and thunder and lightning. [485] It seems doubtful whether, as affirmed by Eudemus, he taught the doctrine of the earth's motion; but that this doctrine was derived from the Babylonian schools of astronomy is so probable that it may have been accepted in Miletos in his day. Only by inferring a prior scientific development of remarkable energy can we explain the striking force of the sayings of Anaximandros which have come down to us. His doctrine of evolution stands out for us to-day like the fragment of a great ruin, hinting obscurely of a line of active thinkers. The thesis that man must have descended from a different species because, "while other animals quickly found food for themselves, man alone requires a long period of suckling: had he been originally such as he is now, he could never have survived," is a quite masterly anticipation of modern evolutionary science. We are left asking, how came an early Ionian Greek to think thus, outgoing the assimilative power of the later age of Aristotle? Only a long scientific evolution can readily account for it; and only in the Mesopotamian world could such an evolution have taken place. [486]

Anaximenes (fl. 548 B.C.), yet another Milesian, pupil or at least follower in turn of Anaximandros, speculates similarly, making his infinite and first principle the air, in which he conceives the earth to be suspended; theorizes on the rainbow, earthquakes, the nature and the revolution of the heavenly bodies (which, with the earth, he supposed to be broad and flat); and affirms the eternity of motion and the perishableness of the earth. [487] The Ionian thought of the time seems thus to have been thoroughly absorbed in problems of natural origins, and only in that connection to have been concerned with the problems of religion. No dogma of divine creation blocked the way: the trouble was levity of hypothesis or assent. Thales, following a Semitic lead, places the source of all things in water. Anaximandros, perhaps following another, but seeking a more abstract idea, posited an infinite, the source of all things; and Anaximenes in turn reduces that infinite to the air, as being the least material of things. He cannot have anticipated the chemical conception of the reduction of all solids to gases: the thesis was framed either à priori or in adaptation of priestly claims for the deities of the elements; and others were to follow with the guesses of earth and fire and heat and cold. Still, the speculation is that of bold and far-grasping thinkers, and for these there can have been no validity in the ordinary God-ideas of polytheism.

There is reason to think that these early "schools" of thought were really constituted by men in some way banded together, [488] thus supporting each other against the conservatism of religious ignorance. The physicians were so organized; the disciples of Pythagoras followed the same course; and in later Greece we shall find the different philosophic sects formed into societies or corporations. The first model was probably that of the priestly corporation; and in a world in which many cults were chronically disendowed it may well have been that the leisured old priesthoods, philosophizing as we have seen those of India and Egypt and Mesopotamia doing, played a primary part in initiating the work of rational secular thought.

The recent work of Mr. F. M. Cornford, From Philosophy to Religion
(1912), puts forth an interesting and ingenious theory to the
effect that early Greek philosophy is a reduction to abstract
terms of the practice of totemistic tribes. On this view, when
the Gods are figured in Homer as subject to Moira (Destiny),
there has taken place an impersonation of Nomos, or Law; and just
as the divine cosmos or polity is a reflection of the earthly,
so the established conception of the absolute compulsoriness of
tribal law is translated into one of a Fate which overrules the
Gods (p. 40 sq.). So, when Anaximandros posits the doctrine of
four elements [he did not use the word, by the way; that comes
later; see Burnet, ch. i, p. 56, citing Diels], "we observe that
this type of cosmic structure corresponds to that of a totemic
tribe containing four clans" (p. 62). On the other hand, the
totemistic stage had long before been broken down. The "notion
of the group-soul" had given rise to the notion of God (p. 90);
and the primitive "magical group" had dissolved into a system of
families (p. 93), with individual souls. On this prior accumulation
of religious material early philosophy works (p. 138).

It does not appear why, thus recognizing that totemism was at
least a long way behind in Thales's day, Mr. Cornford should
trace the Ionian four elements straight back to the problematic
four clans of the totemistic tribe. Dr. Frazer gives him no data
whatever for Aryan totemism; and the Ionian cities, like those
of Mesopotamia and Egypt, belong to the age of commerce and of
monarchies. It would seem more plausible, on Mr. Cornford's own
premises, to trace the rival theories of the four elements to
religious philosophies set up by the priests of four Gods of water,
earth, air, and fire. If the early philosophers "had nothing but
theology behind them" (p. 138), why not infer theologies for the
old-established deities of Mesopotamia? Mr. Cornford adds to the
traditional factors that of "the temperaments of the individual
philosophers, which made one or other of those schemes the more
congenial to them." Following Dr. F. H. Bradley, he pronounces
that "almost all philosophic arguments are invented afterwards, to
recommend, or defend from attack, conclusions which the philosopher
was from the outset bent on believing before he could think of
any arguments at all. That is why philosophical reasonings are
so bad, so artificial, so unconvincing."

Upon this very principle it is much more likely that the
philosophic cults of water, earth, air, and fire originated in
the worships of Gods of those elements, whose priests would tend
to magnify their office. It is hard to see how "temperament"
could determine a man's bias to an air-theory in preference to a
water-theory. But if the priests of Ea the Water-God and those
of Bel the God of Air had framed theories of the kind, it is
conceivable that family or tribal ties and traditions might set
men upon developing the theory quasi-philosophically when the
alien Gods came to be recognized by thinking men as mere names
for the elements. [489] (Compare Flaubert's Salammbô as to the
probable rivalry of priests of the Sun and Moon.) A pantheistic
view, again, arose as we saw among various priesthoods in the
monarchies where syncretism arose out of political aggregations.

What is clear is that the religious or theistic basis had ceased to exist for many educated Greeks in that environment. The old God-ideas have disappeared, and a quasi-scientific attitude has been taken up. It is apparently conditioned, perhaps fatally, by prior modes of thought; but it operates in disregard of so-called religious needs, and negates the normal religious conception of earthly government or providence. Nevertheless, it was not destined to lead to the rationalization of popular thought; and only in a small number of cases did the scientific thinkers deeply concern themselves with the enlightenment of the mass.

In another Ionian thinker of that age, indeed, we find alongside of physical and philosophical speculation on the universe the most direct and explicit assault upon popular religion that ancient history preserves. Xenophanes of Kolophon (? 570-470), a contemporary of Anaximandros, was forced by a Persian invasion or by some revolution to leave his native city at the age of twenty-five; and by his own account his doctrines, and inferribly his life, had gone "up and down Greece"--in which we are to include Magna Graecia--for sixty-seven years at the date of writing of one of his poems. [490] This was presumably composed at Elea (Hyela or Velia), founded about 536 B.C., on the western Italian coast, south of Paestum, by unsubduable Phokaians seeking a new home after the Persian conquest, and after they had been further defeated in the attempt to live as pirates in Corsica. [491] Thither came the aged Xenophanes, perhaps also seeking freedom. He seems to have lived hitherto as a rhapsode, chanting his poems at the courts of tyrants as the Homerids did the Iliad. It is hard indeed to conceive that his recitations included the anti-religious passages which have come down to us; but his resort in old age to the new community of Elea is itself a proof of a craving and a need for free conditions of life. [492]

Setting out on his travels, doubtless, with the Ionian predilection for a unitary philosophy, he had somewhere and somehow attained a pantheism which transcended the concern for a "first principle"--if, indeed, it was essentially distinct from the doctrine of Anaximandros. [493] "Looking wistfully upon the whole heavens," says Aristotle, [494] "he affirms that unity is God." From the scattered quotations which are all that remain of his lost poem, On Nature (or Natural Things), [495] it is hard to deduce any full conception of his philosophy; but it is clear that it was monistic; and though most of his later interpreters have acclaimed him as the herald of monotheism, it is only in terms of pantheism that his various utterances can be reconciled. It is clearly in that sense that Aristotle and Plato [496] commemorate him as the first of the Eleatic monists. Repeatedly he speaks of "the Gods" as well as of "God"; and he even inculcates the respectful worship of them. [497] The solution seems to be that he thinks of the forces and phenomena of Nature in the early way as Gods or Powers, but resolves them in turn into a whole which includes all forms of power and intelligence, but is not to be conceived as either physically or mentally anthropomorphic. "His contemporaries would have been more likely to call Xenophanes an atheist than anything else." [498]

The common verdict of the historians of philosophy, who find
in Xenophanes an early and elevated doctrine of "Monotheism,"
is closely tested by J. Freudenthal, Ueber die Theologie des
Xenophanes, 1886. As he shows, the bulk of them (cited by him,
pp. 2-7) do violence to Xenophanes's language in making him
out the proclaimer of a monotheistic doctrine to a polytheistic
world. That he was essentially a pantheist is now recognized by
a number of writers. Cp. Windelband, as cited, p. 48; Decharme,
as cited, p. 46 sq. Bréton, Poésie philos. en Grèce, pp. 47,
64 sq., had maintained the point, against Cousin, in 1882,
before Freudenthal. But Freudenthal in turn glosses part of the
problem in ascribing to Xenophanes an acceptance of polytheism
(cp. Burnet, p. 142), which kept him from molestation throughout
his life; whereas Anaxagoras, who had never attacked popular
belief with the directness of Xenophanes, was prosecuted for
atheism. Anaxagoras was of a later age, dwelling in an Athens in
which popular prejudice took readily to persecution, and political
malice resorted readily to religious pretences. Xenophanes
could hardly have published with impunity in Periklean Athens
his stinging impeachments of current God-ideas; and it remains
problematic whether he ever proclaimed them in face of the
multitude. It is only from long subsequent students that we get
them as quotations from his poetry; there is no record of their
effect on his contemporaries. That his God-idea was pantheistic
is sufficiently established by his attacks on anthropomorphism,
taken in connection with his doctrine of the All.