Chapter 15 (1)

[Footnote 7-14: Memo, Actg Chief, Pac Theater Sec,
OPD, for Maj Gen H. A. Craig, Dep ACofS, OPD, 12
Feb 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, WDGOT
291.2.]

Both commands protested the War Department decision. Representatives from the European theater arrived in Washington in mid-February 1946 to propose a black strength of 8.21 rather than the prescribed 15 percent. Seeking to determine where black soldiers could be used "with the least harmful effect on theater operations," they discovered in conferences with representatives of the War Department staff only the places Negroes were not to be used: in infantry units, in the constabulary, which acted as a border patrol and occupation police, in highly technical services, or as supervisors of white civilian laborers.[7-15]

[Footnote 7-15: Memo, Chief, Eur Sec, OPD, for Maj
Gen Howard A. Craig, Dep ACofS, OPD, 15 Feb 46,
sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel, WDGOT 291.2.]

The commander of Army Forces, Pacific, was even more insistent on a revision, asking how he could absorb so many Negroes when his command was already scheduled to receive 50,000 Philippine Scouts and 29,500 Negroes in the second half of 1947. These two groups, which the command considered far less adaptable than white troops to occupational duties, would together make up about 40 percent of the command's total strength. Although Philippine Scouts in the theater never exceeded 31,000, the command's protest achieved some success. The War Department agreed to reduce black troops in the Pacific to 14 percent by 1 January 1947 and 13 percent by 1 July 1947.[7-16]

[Footnote 7-16: Memo for Rcd, Lt Col French, Theater
Group, OPD, 7 May 46, sub: Negro Enlisted Strength,
Pacific Theater, 1947, WDGOT 291.2. For a
discussion of the Philippine Scouts in the Pacific
theater, see Robert Ross Smith, "The Status of
Philippine Military Forces During World War II,"
CMH files.]

No sooner had the demands of the overseas theaters been dealt with (p. 180) than the enlarged black quotas came under attack from the commanders of major forces. Instead of planning to absorb more Negroes, the Army Air Forces wanted to divest itself of some black units on the premise that unskilled troops were a liability in a highly technical service. General Spaatz reported that some 60 percent of all his black troops stationed in the United States in January 1946 were performing the duties of unskilled laborers and that very few could be trained for skilled tasks. He predicted that the Army Air Forces would soon have an even higher percentage of low-scoring Negroes because 15 percent of all men enlisting in his Regular Army units--expected to reach a total of 45,000 men by 1 July 1946--were black. To forestall this increase in "undesirable and uneconomical" troops, he wanted to stop inducting Negroes into the Army Air Forces and suspend all black enlistments in the Regular Army.[7-17]

[Footnote 7-17: Memo, CG, AAF, for ACofS, G-1, 25 Jan
46, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
Postwar Army, WDGAP 291.2.]

The Army Air Forces elaborated on these arguments in the following months, refining both its estimates and demands. Specifically, its manpower officials estimated that to reach the 15 percent black strength ordered by 1 July 1946 the Air Forces would have to take 50,500 Negroes into units that could efficiently use only 22,000 men. This embarrassment of more than 28,000 unusable men, the Army Air Forces claimed, would require eliminating tactical units and creating additional quartermaster car companies, mess platoons, and other service organizations.[7-18] The Air staff wanted to eliminate the unwanted 28,000 black airmen by raising to eighty the minimum classification test score for Regular Army enlistment in the Army Air Forces. In the end it retreated from this proposal, and on 25 February requested permission to use the 28,000 Negroes in service units, but over and above its 400,000-man troop basis. It promised to absorb all these men into the troop basis by 30 June 1946.[7-19]

[Footnote 7-18: Memo, Brig Gen William Metheny, Off,
Commitments Div, ACofS Air Staff-3, for ACofS Air
Staff-3, 18 Feb 46, WDGOT 291.2.]

[Footnote 7-19: DF, DCofAS (Maj Gen C. C. Chauncey)
to G-3 25 Feb 46, sub: Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the Postwar Army, WDGOT 291.2.]

The Army staff rejected this plan on the grounds that any excess allowed above the current Air Forces troop basis would have to be balanced by a corresponding and unacceptable deficit in the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces.[7-20] The Army Air Forces countered with a proposal to discharge all black enlistees in excess of Air Forces requirements in the European theater who would accept discharge. It had in mind a group of 8,795 Negroes recently enlisted for a three-year period, who, in accordance with a lure designed to stimulate such enlistments, had chosen assignment in the Air Forces and a station in Europe. With a surplus of black troops, the Air Forces found itself increasingly unable to fulfill the "overseas theater of choice" enlistment contract. Since some men would undoubtedly refuse to serve anywhere but Europe, the Air staff (p. 181) reasoned, why not offer a discharge to all men who preferred separation over service elsewhere?

[Footnote 7-20: Memo, Actg ACofS, G-3, for CG, AAF,
14 Mar 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in
the Postwar Army, WDGOT 291.2.]

Again the Army staff turned down a request for a reduction in black troops. This time the Air Forces bowed to the inevitable--15 percent of its enlisted strength black--but grudgingly, for a quota of 50,419 Negroes, General Spaatz charged, "seriously jeopardizes the ability of the AAF to perform its assigned mission."[7-21]

[Footnote 7-21: Memo, ACofS, G-3, for CG, AAF, 21 Mar
46, sub: Authorized Military Personnel as of 31
December 1946 and 30 June 1947, WDGOT 320.2 (21 Mar
46); DF, CG, AAF, to ACofS, G-3, 26 Mar 46, same
sub, WDGOT 291.21 (12 Feb 46).]

The Army Service Forces also objected. When queried,[7-22] the chiefs of its technical and administrative services all agreed they could use only small percentages of black troops, and only those men in the higher categories of the classification test. From the replies of the chiefs it was plain that none of the technical services planned to use Negroes in as much as 10 percent of spaces, and several wanted to exclude black units altogether. Furthermore, the test qualifications they wanted set for many jobs were consistently higher than those achieved by the men then performing the tasks. The staff of the Army Service Forces went so far as to advocate that no more than 3.29 percent of the overhead and miscellaneous positions in the Army Service Forces be entrusted to black troops.[7-23]

[Footnote 7-22: Memo, Actg Dir, Plans and Policy,
ASF, for PMG et al., 23 May 46, sub: Utilization of
Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army, AG 291.2 (23
May 46).]

[Footnote 7-23: The replies of the individual
technical and administrative service chiefs, along
with the response of the ASF Personnel Director,
are inclosed in Memo, Chief, Plans and Policy Off,
Dir of SS&P, for Dir, O&T, 21 Jun 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army,
WDGSP 291.2 (Negro).]

These answers failed to impress the War Department's Director of Personnel and Administration and the Director of Organization and Training.[7-24] Both agreed that the technical and administrative services had failed to appreciate the problems and responsibilities outlined in War Department Circular 124; the assumption that black troops would not be used in certain types of duty in the future because they had not been so used in the past was unwarranted, General Paul added. Limited or token employment of Negroes, he declared, was no longer acceptable.[7-25]

[Footnote 7-24: Under WD Circular 134, 14 May 46, the
War Department General Staff was reorganized, and
many of its offices, including G-1 and G-3, were
redesignated as of 11 June 1946. For an extended
discussion of these changes, see James E. Hewes,
Jr., _From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and
Administration, 1900-1963_ (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1975), Chapter IV.]

[Footnote 7-25: DF, D/OT to D/PA, 13 Jul 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army,
WDGOT 291.21 (21 Jun 46); DF, D/PA to D/OT, 30 Jul
46, same sub, WDGAP 291.2 (15 Jul 46).]

Yet somehow the reality of black enlistments and inductions in 1946 never quite matched the Army's dire predictions. According to plans for 1 April 1946, Negroes in the continental United States would comprise 15.2 percent of the Army Service Forces, 15.4 percent of the Army Ground Forces, and 17 percent of the Army Air Forces. Actually, Negroes in continental commands on 30 April 1946 made up 14.86 percent of the Army Service Forces, 5.62 percent of the Army Ground Forces, and 11.86 percent of the Army Air Forces. The 116,752 black soldiers amounted to 12.35 percent of all troops based in the United States; overseas, the 67,372 Negroes constituted 7.73 percent of American (p. 182) force. Altogether, the 184,124 Negroes in the Army amounted to 10.14 percent of the whole.[7-26]

[Footnote 7-26: Strength of the Army (STM-30), 1 May
46; see also Memo, ACofS, G-1, for Chief, MPD, ASF,
3 Jun 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel,
WDGPA 291.2. (12 Jul 46).]

_The Quota in Practice_

While the solution to the problem of too many black enlistees and too many low-scoring men was obvious, it was also replete with difficulty. The difficulty came from the complex way the Army obtained its manpower. It accepted volunteers for enlistment in the Regular Army and qualified veterans for the Organized Reserves; until November 1946 it also drafted men through the Selective Service and accepted volunteers for the draft.[7-27] At the same time, under certain conditions it accepted enlistment in the Regular Army of drafted men who had completed their tours. To curtail enlistment of Negroes and discharge low-scoring professionals, the Army would be obliged to manipulate the complex regulations governing the various forms of enlistment and sidestep the egalitarian provisions of the Selective Service System at a time when the service was trying to attract recruits and avoid charges of racial discrimination. Altogether it was quite a large order, and during the next two years the Army fought the battle of numbers on many fronts.

[Footnote 7-27: Volunteers for the draft were men
classified 1-A by Selective Service who were
allowed to sign up for immediate duty often in the
service of their choice. The volunteer for the
draft was only obliged to serve for the shorter
period imposed on the draftee rather than the
36-month enlistment for the Regular Army.]

It first took on the draft. Although to stop inducting Negroes when the administration was trying to persuade Congress to extend the draft act was politically unwise, the Army saw no way to restrict the number of Negroes or eliminate substandard men so long as Selective Service insisted on 10 percent black calls and a minimum classification test score of seventy. In April 1946 the Army issued a call for 126,000 men, boldly specifying that no Negroes would be accepted. Out of the battle of memos with Selective Service that followed, a compromise emerged: a black call of 4 percent of the total in April, a return to the usual 10 percent call for Negroes in May, and another 4 percent call in June.[7-28] No draft calls were issued in July and August, but in September the Army staff tried again, canceling the call for Negroes and rejecting black volunteers for induction.[7-29] Again it encountered resistance from the Selective Service and the black community, and when the Secretary of War was sued for violation of the Selective Service Act the Army issued a 3 percent call for Negroes in October, the last call made under the 1940 draft law. In all, 16,888 Negroes were drafted into the Army in 1946, some 10.5 percent of the total.[7-30]

[Footnote 7-28: Report of the Director, Office of
Selective Service Review, 31 March 1947, Table 56,
copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 7-29: Memo, Chief, Manpower Control Gp,
D/PA, for TAG, 6 Sep 46, Utilization of Negro
Manpower in Postwar Army, WDGPA 291.2; D/PA Memo
for Rcd, 1 Sep 46. WDGPA 291.2 (1 Sep 46-31 Dec
46).]

[Footnote 7-30: Figures vary for the number actually
drafted; those given above are from Selective
Service Monograph No. 10, _Special Groups_,
Appendix, p. 201. See also "Review of the Month,"
_A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race
Relations_ 4 (October 1946):67.]

The Army had more success restricting black enlistments. In April (p. 183) 1946, at the same time it adopted the Gillem Board recommendations, the Army began to deny enlistment or reenlistment in the Regular Army to anyone scoring below seventy on the Army General Classification Test. The only exceptions were men who had been decorated for valor and men with previous service who had scored sixty-five and were recommended for reenlistment by their commanders.[7-31] The Army also stopped enlisting men with active venereal disease, not because the Medical Department was unable to cure them but because by and large their educational levels were low and, according to the classification tests, they had little aptitude for learning. The Army stopped recruiting men for special stations, hoping a denial of the European theater and other attractive assignments would lower the number of unwanted recruits.

[Footnote 7-31: WD Cir 110, 17 Apr 46.]

Using the new enlistment standards as a base, the Army quickly revised its estimated black strength downward. On 16 April 1946 the Secretary of War rescinded the order requiring major commands to retain a black strength of 15 percent.[7-32] The acting G-3 had already informed the commanding general of the Army Air Forces of the predicted drop in the number of black troops--from 13.3 percent in June 1946 to 10 percent a year later--and agreed the Army Air Forces could reduce its planned intake accordingly.[7-33] Estimating the European theater's capacity to absorb black troops at 21,845 men, approximately 10 percent of the command total, the Army staff agreed to readjust its planned allotment of Negroes to that command downward by some 1,500 spaces.[7-34]

[Footnote 7-32: Ltr, TAG to CG, AAF, et al., 16 Apr
46, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel, AGAO-S-A-M
291.2 (12 Apr 46).]

[Footnote 7-33: Memo, Actg ACofS, G-3, for CG, AAF,
12 Apr 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel,
WDGOT 291.21 (12 Feb 46).]

[Footnote 7-34: Memo, ACofS, OPD, for CofS, 13 May
46, sub: Augmentation of the ETO Ceiling Strengths
as of 1 Jul 46 (less AAF), WDCSA 320.2 (1946).]

These changes proved ill-advised, for the effort to curb the number of Negroes in the Regular Army was largely unsuccessful. The staff had overlooked the ineffectiveness of the Army's testing measures and the zeal of its recruiters who, pressed to fill their quotas, accepted enlistees without concern for the new standards. By mid-June the effect was readily apparent. The European theater, for example, reported some 19,000 Negroes in excess of billets in black units and some 2,000 men above the theater's current allotment of black troops. Assignment of Negroes to Europe had been stopped, but the number of black regulars waiting for overseas assignment stood at 5,000, a figure expected to double by the end of the summer. Some of this excess could be absorbed in eight newly created black units, but that still left black units worldwide 18 to 40 percent overstrength.[7-35]

[Footnote 7-35: G-1 Memo for Rcd (signed Col E. L.
Heyduck, Enl Div), 18 Jun 46, WDGAP 291.2; see also
EUCOM Hist Div (prepared by Margaret L. Geis),
"Negro Personnel in the European Command, 1 January
1946-30 June 1950," Occupation Forces in Europe
Series (Historical Division, European Command,
1952) (hereafter Geis Monograph), pp. 14-18, copy
in CMH.]

Notice that Negroes totaled 16 percent of the Regular Army on 1 July 1946 with the personnel staff's projections running to a 24 percent level for the next year precipitated action in the War Department. (p. 184) On 15 July Marcus Ray and Dean Rusk, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War, met with representatives of the Army staff to discuss black strength. Basing his decision on the consensus of that meeting, the Secretary of War on 17 July suspended enlistment of Negroes in the Regular Army. He excepted two categories of men from this ruling. Men who qualified and had actually served for six months in any of forty-eight unusual military occupational specialties in which there were chronic manpower shortages would be enlisted without promise of specific assignment to branch or station. At the same time, because of manpower shortages, the Army would continue to accept Negroes, already regulars, who wanted to reenlist.[7-36]

[Footnote 7-36: Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 17
Jul 46, sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06 (9
Jul 46); D/PA Summary Sheet to CofS, 9 Jul 46, sub:
Enlistment of Negroes in Regular Army, WDGPA
291.2.]

While the new enlistment policy would help restore the Gillem Board's quantitative equilibrium to the Army, the secretary's exception allowing reenlistment of regulars would only intensify the qualitative imbalance between black and white soldiers. The nation's biracial educational system had produced an average black soldier who scored well below the average white soldier on all the Army's educational and training tests. The segregation policy had only complicated the problem by denying the talented Negro the full range of Army occupations and hence an equal chance for advancement. With the suspension of first-time enlistments, the qualitative imbalance was sure to grow, for now the highly qualified civilian would be passed over while the less qualified soldier was permitted to reenlist.

This imbalance was of particular concern to Marcus Ray who was present when the suspension of black enlistments had been decided upon. Ray had suggested that instead of barring all new enlistees the Army should discharge all Class V soldiers, whites and blacks alike, for the convenience of the government and recruit in their place an equal number of Class I and II candidates. Manpower officials had objected, arguing there was no point in enlisting more Negroes in Class I and II until the 10 percent ratio was again reached. Such a reduction, with current attrition, would take two years. At the same time, the Army manpower shortages made it impractical to discharge 92,000 soldiers, half of whom were white, in Class V. The organization and training representatives, on the other hand, agreed with Ray that it was (p. 185) in the best interest of the Army to discharge these men, pointing out that a recent increase in pay for enlisted men together with the continuing need for recruits with greater aptitude for learning would make the policy palatable to the Congress and the public.[7-37]

[Footnote 7-37: D/OT Memo for Red, 15 Jul 46; DF,
D/OT to D/PA, 15 Jul 46, sub: Basic Training of
Negro Personnel; both in WDGOT 291.2.]

The conferees deferred decision on the matter, but during the following months the War Department set out to achieve a qualitative balance between its black and white recruits. On 10 August 1946 the Chief of Staff directed commanders, under the authority of Army Regulation 615-369 which defined ineptness for military service, to eliminate after six months men "incapable of serving in the Army in a desirable manner after reasonable attempts have been made to utilize their capabilities." He went on to explain that this category included those not mentally qualified, generally defined as men scoring below seventy, and those repeatedly guilty of minor offenses.[7-38] The Army reissued the order in 1947, further defining the criteria for discharge to include those who needed continued and special instruction or supervision or who exhibited habitual drunkenness, ineptness, or inability to conform to group living. A further modification in 1949 would deny reenlistment to married men who had failed during their first enlistment to make corporal or single men who did not make private first class.[7-39]

[Footnote 7-38: WD Cir 241, 10 Aug 46.]

[Footnote 7-39: WD Cir 93, 9 Apr 47; D/PA Summary
Sheet, 1 Sep 49, sub: Method of Reducing Negro
Reenlistment Rate, WDGPA 291.2 (6 Apr 49).]

The measures were aimed at eliminating the least qualified men of both races, and in October 1946 General Paul decided the Army could now begin taking black recruits with the qualifications and background that allowed them "to become useful members of the Army."[7-40] To that end The Adjutant General announced on 2 October that as a further exception to the prohibition against black enlistments in the Regular Army all former officers and noncommissioned officers who volunteered would be accepted without limitation.[7-41] On 31 October he announced the establishment of a selective procurement program. With the exception of men who had been in certain specialized occupations for six months, all Negroes enlisting in the Regular Army had to score one hundred on the Army General Classification Test; the minimum score for white enlistees remained seventy.[7-42] At the same time, The Adjutant General rescinded for Negroes the choice-of-assignment provision of Regular Army enlistment contracts.

[Footnote 7-40: P&A Memo for Red, 30 Sep 46, attached
to copy of Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 2 Oct
46, sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06, WDGAP
291.2.]

[Footnote 7-41: Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 2
Oct 46, sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06
(30 Sep 46).]

[Footnote 7-42: Ibid., 31 Oct 46, sub: Enlistment of
Negroes, AGSE-P342.06 (23 Oct 46); see also WD Cir
103, 1947. An exception to the AGCT 70 minimum for
whites was made in the case of enlistment into the
AAF which remained at 100 for both races.]

These measures helped lower the percentage of Negroes in the Army and reduced to some extent the differential in test scores between white and black soldiers. The percentage of Negroes dropped by 30 June 1947 to 7.91 percent of the Army, 8.99 percent of its enlisted strength (p. 186) and 9.4 percent of its Regular Army strength. Black enlisted strength of all the overseas commands stood at 8.75 percent, down from the 10.77 percent of the previous December. Percentages in the individual theaters reflected this trend; the European theater, for example, dropped from 10.33 percent black to 9.96, the Mediterranean theater from 10.05 to 8.03, and Alaska from 26.6 to 14.54.[7-43]

[Footnote 7-43: All figures are from STM-30, Strength
of the Army. Figures for the Pacific theater were
omitted because of the complex reorganization of
Army troops in that area in early 1947. On 30 June
1947 the Army element in the Far East Command, the
major Army organization in the Pacific, had 18,644
black enlisted troops, 8.56 percent of the
command's total.]

Precise figures on the number of poorly qualified troops eliminated are unknown, but the European command expected to discharge some 12,000 low-scoring and unsuitable men, many of them black, in 1947.[7-44] Several commands reported that the new regulations materially improved the quality of black units by opening vacancies to better qualified men. General Paul could argue with considerable justification that in regulating the quality of its recruits the Army was following the spirit if not the letter of the Gillem Board Report. If the Army could set high enough standards it would get good men, and to this end the General Staff's Personnel and Administration Division asked for the support of commanders.[7-45]

[Footnote 7-44: Memo, Brig Gen J. J. O'Hare, Dep Dir,
P&A, for SA, 9 Mar 48, sub: Implementation of WD
Cir 124, CSGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 7-45: G-1 Memo for Rcd, 30 Sep 46, attached
to Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 2 Oct 46,
sub: Enlistment of Negroes, AGSE-P342.06 (30 Sep
46).]

Although these measures were helpful to the Army, they were frankly discriminatory, and they immediately raised a storm of protest. During the summer of 1946, for example, many black soldiers and airmen complained about the Army's rejection of black enlistments for the European theater. The NAACP, which received some of the soldiers' complaints, suggested that the War Department honor its pledges or immediately release all Negroes who were refused their choice of location.[7-46] The Army did just that, offering to discharge honorably those soldiers who, denied their theater of choice, rejected any substitute offered.[7-47]

[Footnote 7-46: Ltr, Walter White to SW, 18 Jun 46;
Telg, White to SW, 24 Jun 46; both in SW 291.2
(Negro Troops).]

[Footnote 7-47: DF, OTIG to D/PA, 23 Jul 46, sub:
Assignment of Negro Enlistees Who Have Selected ETO
as Choice of Initial Assignment, WDSIG 220.3--Negro
Enlistees.]

Later in 1946 a young Negro sued the Secretary of War and a Pittsburgh recruiting officer for refusing to enlist him. To make standards for black applicants substantially higher than those for whites, he alleged, violated the Preamble and Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, while the inducements offered for enlistment, for example the GI Bill of Rights, constituted a valuable property right denied him because of race. The suit asked that all further enlistments in the Army be stopped until Negroes were accepted on equal terms with whites and all special enlistment requirements for Negroes were abolished.[7-48] Commenting on the case, the chief of the War Department's Public Relations Division, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, defended the Gillem Board's 10 percent quota, but agreed that (p. 187) "we are on weak ground [in] having a different standard for admission between white and colored.... I think the thing to do is to put a ceiling over the number you take in, and then take the best ones."[7-49]

[Footnote 7-48: Pittsburgh _Post Gazette_, December
19, 1946.]

[Footnote 7-49: Memo, D/PRD for SW, ASW, and D/P&A,
19 Dec 46, ASW 291.2.]

The suit brought to a climax the feeling of indignation against Army policy that had been growing among some civil rights activists. One organization called on the Secretary of War to abandon the Gillem Board policy "and unequivocably and equitably integrate Negroes ... without any discrimination, segregation or quotas in any form, concept or manner."[7-50] Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin called the decision to suspend black enlistments race discrimination.[7-51] Walter P. Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers and the codirector of his union's Fair Practices Department, branded the establishment of a quota "undemocratic and in violation of principles for which they [Negroes] fought in the war" and demanded that black enlistment be reinstated and the quota abolished.[7-52] Invoking American tradition and the United Nations Charter, John Haynes Holmes, chairman of the board of directors of the American Civil Liberties Union, called for the abolition of enlistment quotas. The national commander of the United Negro and Allied Veterans of America announced that his organization unreservedly condemned the quota because it deliberately deprived citizens of their constitutional right to serve their country.[7-53]

[Footnote 7-50: Ltr, American Veterans Committee,
Manhattan Chapter, to SW, 17 Jul 46, SW 291.2
(NT).]

[Footnote 7-51: Ltr, LaFollette to SW, 25 Jul 46, SW
291.2.]

[Footnote 7-52: Ltr, Reuther and William Oliver to
SW, 23 Jul 46, SW 291.2.]

[Footnote 7-53: Ltr, J. H. Holmes to SW, 26 Jul 46;
Ltr, Arthur D. Gatz, Nat'l Cmdr, United Negro and
Allied Veterans of America, to SW, 20 Jul 46; both
in SW 291.2.]

The replies of the Secretary of War to all these protests were very much alike. The Army's enlistment practices, he wrote, were based on a belief that black strength in the Army ought to bear a direct relationship to the percentage of Negroes in the population. As for the basic premise of what seemed to him a perfectly logical course of action, Patterson concluded that "acceptance of the Negro-white ratio existing in the civilian population as a basis for the Army's distribution of units and personnel is not considered discriminatory."[7-54] The secretary's responses were interesting, for they demonstrated a significant change in the Army's attitude toward the quota. There is evidence that the quota was devised by the Gillem Board as a temporary expedient to guarantee the substantial participation of Negroes. It was certainly so viewed by civil rights advocates. As late as December 1946 Assistant Secretary Petersen was still echoing this view when he explained that the quota was a temporary ceiling and the Army had no right to use it as a permanent bar to black enlistment.[7-55]

[Footnote 7-54: See Ltrs, SW to Wesley P. Brown,
Adjutant, Jesse Clipper American Legion Post No.
430, Buffalo, N.Y., 30 Aug 46, and to Jesse O.
Dedmon, Jr., Secy, Veterans Affairs Bureau, NAACP,
18 Nov 46; both in SW 291.2. The quote is from the
latter document.]

[Footnote 7-55: Memo, Maj Gen Parks for SW, et al.,
19 Dec 46 (with attached note signed "HP"), SW
291.2.]

Nevertheless it is also clear that the traditionalists considered the quota a means of permanently limiting black soldiers to a percentage equivalent to Negroes in the population. Assistant Secretary (p. 188) McCloy belonged to neither group. More than a year before in reviewing the Gillem Board's work he had declared: "I do not see any place for a quota in a policy that looks to utilization of Negroes on the basis of ability."

After a year of dealing with black overstrengths and juggling enlistment standards, General Paul and his staff thought otherwise. They believed that a ceiling must be imposed on the Army's black strength if a rapid and uncontrolled increase in the number of black troops was to be avoided. And it had to be avoided, they believed, lest it create a disproportionately large pool of black career soldiers with low aptitudes that would weaken the Army. Using the quota to limit the number of black troops, they maintained, was not necessarily discriminatory. It could be defended as a logical reading of the Gillem Board's declaration that "the proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists in the civil population" should be accepted in the peacetime Army to insure an orderly and uniform mobilization in a national emergency. With the Gillem policy to support it, the Army staff could impose a strict quota on the number of black soldiers and justify different enlistment standards for blacks and whites, a course that was in fact the only alternative to the curtailment of white enlistment under the manpower restrictions being imposed upon the postwar Army.[7-56]

[Footnote 7-56: DF, D/P&A to D/O&T, 28 Apr 47, sub:
Negro Enlisted Strength, WDGPA 291.2 (12 Jul 46);
idem for SA, 6 Aug 48, sub: Removing Restrictions
on Negro Enlistments, CSGPA 291.2.]

Paul's reasoning was eventually endorsed by the new Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, Secretary Patterson, and his successor, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall.[7-57] Beginning in mid-1947 the enlistment of Negroes was carefully geared to their percentage of the total strength of the Army, not to a fixed quota or percentage of those enlisting. This limitation on black enlistment was made more permanent in 1949 when it was included in the Army's mobilization plan, the basic manpower planning document.[7-58]

[Footnote 7-57: Memo, ONB (Gen Bradley) for Gen Paul,
9 Aug 48, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (6 Aug 48). Bradley
succeeded Eisenhower as Chief of Staff on 7
February 1948, and Royall succeeded Patterson on 19
July 1947. Royall assumed the title Secretary of
the Army on 17 September 1947 under the terms of
the National Security Act of 1947.]

[Footnote 7-58: AMP-1 Personnel Annex, 1 Jun 49, P&D
370.0 (25 Apr 49); see also Memo, Chief, Planning
Office, P&A, for Brig Gen John E. Dahlquist (Dep
P&A), 4 Feb 49, sub: Utilization of Negroes in
Mobilization, D/PA 291.2 (4 Feb 49).]

The adjustment of enlistment quotas to increase or curtail black strength quickly became routine in the Army. When the number of Negroes dropped below 10 percent of the Army's total strength in June 1947, The Adjutant General set a quota for the enlistment of black soldiers.[7-59] When this quota was met in late August, the enlistment of Negroes with no special training was reduced to 500 men per month.[7-60] As part of a Personnel and Administration Division program to increase the number and kinds of black units, the quota was temporarily increased to 3,000 men per month for four months beginning in December 1947.[7-61] Finding itself once again exceeding the 10 (p. 189) percent black strength figure, the Army suspended the enlistment of all Negroes for nine months beginning in April 1949.[7-62]

[Footnote 7-59: Ltr, TAG to CG, Each Army, et al., 9
Jul 47, sub: Enlistment of Negroes AGSE-P291.2. (27
Jun 47).]

[Footnote 7-60: T-7286, TAG to CO, Gen Ground, Ft.
Monroe (AGF), 27 Aug 47, 291.254 Negroes; Ltr, TAG
to CG, Each Army, et al., 3 Sep 47, sub: Enlistment
of Negroes, AGSE-P291.2.]

[Footnote 7-61: Msg, TAG to CG's, All ZI Armies, 19
Dec 47, AGSE-P 291.254.]

[Footnote 7-62: Msg, TAG to CG, All Armies (ZI), et
al., 17 Mar 49, WCL 22839; D/PA Summary Sheet for
VCofS, 1 Sep 49, sub: Method of Reducing the Negro
Reenlistment Rate, CSGPA 291.2 (6 Apr 49).]

In effect, the Gillem Board's critics who predicted that the quota would become permanent were correct, but the quota was only the most publicized manifestation of the general scheme of apportioning manpower by race throughout the Army. General Paul had offered one solution to the problem in July 1946. He recommended that each major command and service be allocated its proportionate share of black troops; that such troops "have the over-all average frequency of AGCT grades occurring among Negro military personnel"; and that major commands and services submit plans for establishing enough units and overhead positions to accommodate their total allocations.[7-63] But Paul did not anticipate the low-scoring soldier's penchant for reenlistment or the ability of some commanders, often on the basis of this fact, to justify the rejection of further black allotments. Thus, in pursuit of a racial policy designed to promote the efficient use of manpower, the G-1 and G-3 sections of the General Staff wrestled for almost five years with the problem of racial balances in the various commands, continental armies, and training programs.

[Footnote 7-63: DF, D/PA to D/OT, 30 Jul 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army,
WDGPA 291.2 (15 Jul 46).]

_Broader Opportunities_

The equitable distribution of Negroes throughout each major command and service was complicated by certain provisions of Circular 124. Along with the quota, the policy prescribed grouping black units, not to exceed regimental size, with white units in composite organizations and integrating black specialists in overhead organizations. The composite organizations were primarily the concern of the G-3 (later the Organization and Training Division) section of the General Staff, and in June 1946 its director, Lt. Gen. Charles P. Hall, brought the matter to the attention of major commanders. Although the War Department did not want to establish an arbitrary number of black combat units, Hall explained, the new policy stressed the development of such units to provide a broader base for future expansion, and he wanted more black combat units organized as rapidly as trained troops became available. To that end he called for a survey of all black units to find out their current organization and assignment.[7-64]

[Footnote 7-64: Cir as Memo, TAG for CG, AAF et al.,
10 Jun 46, sub: Organization of Negro Manpower in
Postwar Army, AG 291.2 (4 Jun 46).]

Army Ground Forces reported that it had formed some composite units, but its largest black unit, the 25th Regimental Combat Team, had been attached to the V Corps at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, instead of being made an organic element in a division. Practically all service group headquarters reported separate black and white battalions (p. 190) under their control, but many of the organizations in the Army Service Forces--those under the Provost Marshal General and the Surgeon General, for example--still had no black units, let alone composite organizations. The Caribbean Defense Command, the Trinidad Base Command, and the Headquarters Base Command of the Antilles Department reported similar situations. The Mediterranean theater was using some Negroes with special skills in appropriate overhead organizations, but in the vast European Command Negroes were assigned to separate regiments and smaller units. There were two exceptions: one provisional black regiment was attached to the 1st Infantry Division, and a black field artillery battalion was attached to each of the three occupation divisions. The Alaskan Department and the Okinawa Base Command had black units, both separate and grouped with white units, but the Yokohama Base Command continued to use specially skilled Negroes in black units because of the great demand for qualified persons in those units.[7-65]

[Footnote 7-65: Memo, D/O&T for ASW, 18 Jul 46, sub:
Organization of Negro Manpower in Postwar Army,
WDGOT 291.2.]

To claim, as Hall did to Assistant Secretary Petersen, that black units were being used like white units was misleading. Despite the examples cited in the survey, many black units still remained independent organizations, and with one major exception black combat units grouped with white units were attached rather than assigned as organizational elements of a parent unit. This was an important distinction.[7-66] The constant imposition of attached status on a unit that under normal circumstances would be assigned as an organic element of a division introduced a sense of impermanence and alienation just as it relieved the division commander of considerable administrative control and hence proprietary interest in the unit.

[Footnote 7-66: An attached unit, such as a tank
destroyer battalion, is one temporarily included in
a larger organization; an assigned unit is one
permanently given to a larger organization as part
of its organic establishment. On the distinction
between attached and assigned status, see Ltr, CSA
to CG, CONARC, 21 Jul 55, CSUSA 322.17 (Div), and
CMH, "Lineages and Honors: History, Principles, and
Preparation," June 1962, in CMH.]

Attached status, so common for black units, thus weakened morale and hampered training as Petersen well understood. Noting the favorable attitude of the division commander, he had asked in April 1946 if it was possible to assign the black 555th Parachute Battalion to the celebrated 82d Airborne Division.[7-67] The answer was no. The commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, General Devers, justified attachment rather than assignment of the black battalion to the 82d on the grounds that the Army's race policy called for the progressive adoption of the composite unit and attachment was a part of this process. Assignment of such units was, on the other hand, part of a long-range plan to put the new policy into effect and should still be subject to considerable study. Further justifying the _status quo_, he pointed to the division's low strength, which he said resulted from a lack of volunteers. Offering his own variation (p. 191) of the "Catch-22" theme, he suggested that before any black battalion was assigned to a large combat unit, the effect of such an assignment on the larger unit's combat efficiency would first have to be studied. Finally, he questioned the desirability of having a black unit assume the history of a white unit; evidently he did not realize that the intention was to assign a black unit with its black history to the division.[7-68]

[Footnote 7-67: Memo, Actg, ACofS, G-3, for CG, AGF,
3 Jun 46, sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro
Units, with attachment, WDGOT 291.21 (30 Apr 46).]

[Footnote 7-68: Memo, CG, AFG, for CofS, 21 June 46,
sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro Units,
GNGCT-41 291.2 (Negro) (3 Jun 46).]

In the face of such arguments Hall accepted what he called the "nonfeasibility" of replacing one of the 82d's organic battalions with the 555th, but he asked whether an additional parachute battalion could be authorized for the division so that the 555th could be assigned without eliminating a white battalion. He reiterated the arguments for such an assignment, adding that it would invigorate the 555th's training, attract more and better black recruits, and better implement the provisions of Circular 124.[7-69] General Devers remained unconvinced. He doubted that assigning the black battalion to the (p. 192) division would improve the battalion's training, and he was "unalterably opposed" to adding an extra battalion. He found the idea unsound from both a tactical and organizational point of view. It was, he said, undesirable to reorganize a division solely to assign a black unit.[7-70]

[Footnote 7-69: DF, D/O&T to CG, AGF, 24 Jul 46, sub:
Formation of Composite White-Negro Units, WDGOT
291.21 (30 Apr 46).]

[Footnote 7-70: Memo, CG, AGF, for D/O&T, 1 Aug 46,
sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro Units, CMT
2 to DF, D/O&T to CG, AGF, 24 Jul 46, same sub,
WDGOT 291.21 (30 Apr 46).]

General Hall gave up the argument, and the 555th remained attached to the 82d. Attached status would remain the general pattern for black combat units for several years.[7-71] The assignment of the 24th Infantry to the 25th Infantry Division in Japan was the major exception to this rule, but the 24th was the only black regiment left intact, and it was administratively difficult to leave such a large organization in attached status for long. The other black regiment on active duty, the 25th Infantry, was split; its battalions, still carrying their unit designations, were attached to various divisions to replace inactive or unfilled organic elements. The 9th and 10th Cavalry, the other major black units, were inactivated along with the 2d Cavalry Division in 1944, but reactivated in 1950 as separate tank battalions.

[Footnote 7-71: Memo, D/O&T for SW, 19 Sep 46, sub:
Request for Memorandum, WDGOT 291.21 (12 Sep 46).]

That this distinction between attached and assigned status was considered important became clear in the fall of 1947. At that time the personnel organization suggested that the word "separate" be deleted from a sentence of Circular 124: "Employment will be in Negro regiments or groups, separate battalions or squadrons, and separate companies, troops, or batteries." General Paul reasoned that the word was redundant since a black unit was by definition a separate unit. General Devers was strongly opposed to deletion on grounds that it would lead to the indiscriminate organization of small black units within larger units. He argued that the Gillem Board had provided for black units as part of larger units, but not as organic parts. He believed that a separate black unit should continue to be attached when it replaced a white unit; otherwise it would lose its identity by becoming an organic part of a mixed unit. Larger considerations seem also to have influenced his conclusion: "Our implementation of the Negro problem has not progressed to the degree where we can accept this step. We have already progressed beyond that which is acceptable in many states and we still have a considerable latitude in the present policy without further liberalizing it from the Negro viewpoint."[7-72] The Chief of Staff supported Paul's view, however, and the word "separate" was excised.[7-73]

[Footnote 7-72: DF, CG, AGF, to D/P&A, 15 Sep 47,
sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar
Army. Policy; AGF DF, 27 Aug 47, same sub; both in
GNGAP-M 291.2 (27 Aug 47). The quote is from the
former document.]

[Footnote 7-73: DA Cir 32-III, 30 Oct 47. The life of
Circular 124 was extended indefinitely by DA
Circular 24-II, 17 Oct 47, and DA Ltr AGAO 291.2
(16 Mar 49).]

But the practice of attaching rather than assigning black units continued until the end of 1949. Only then, and increasingly during 1950, did the Army begin to assign a number of black units as organic parts of combat divisions. More noteworthy, Negroes began to be assigned to fill the spaces in parts of white units. Thus the 3d (p. 193) Battalion of the 9th Infantry and the 3d Battalion of the 188th became black units in 1950.

Despite the emergence of racially composite units, the Army's execution of the Gillem Board recommendation on the integration of black and white units was criticized by black leaders. The board had placed no limitation on the size of the units to be integrated, and its call for progressive steps to utilize black manpower implied to many that the process of forming composite black and white units would continue till it included the smaller service units, which still contained the majority of black troops. It was one thing, the Army staff concluded, to assign a self-sustaining black battalion to a division, but quite another to assign a small black service unit in a similar fashion. As a spokesman for the Personnel and Administration Division put it in a 1946 address, the Army was "not now ready to mix Negro and white personnel in the same company or battery, for messing and housing." Ignoring the Navy's experience to the contrary, he concluded that to do so might provoke serious opposition from the men in the ranks and from the American public.[7-74]

[Footnote 7-74: Col. H. E. Kessinger, Exec Off,
ACofS, G-1, "Utilization of Negro Manpower, 1946,"
copy in WDGPA 291.2 (1946).]

Accordingly, G-1 and G-3 agreed to reject the Mediterranean theater's 1946 plan to organize composite service units in the 88th Infantry Division because such organization "involves the integration of Negro platoons or Negro sections into white companies, a combination which is not in accordance with the policy as expressed in Circular 124."[7-75] In the separate case of black service companies--for example, the many transportation truck companies and ordnance evacuation companies--theater commanders tended to combine them first into quartermaster trains and then attach them to their combat divisions.[7-76]

[Footnote 7-75: DF, ACofS, G-1, to CofS, 3 Jun 46,
sub: Implementation of the Gillem Board, WDGAP
291.2 (24 Nov 45); see also Routing Form, ACofS,
G-1, same date, subject, and file.]

[Footnote 7-76: For the formation of quartermaster
trains in Europe, see Geis Monograph, pp. 89-90.]

Despite the relaxation in the distinction between attached and assigned status in the case of large black units, the Army staff remained adamantly opposed to the combination of small black with small white units. The Personnel and Administration Division jealously guarded the orthodoxy of this interpretation. Commenting on one proposal to combine small units in April 1948, General Paul noted that while grouping units of company size or greater was permissible, the Army had not yet reached the stage where two white companies and two black companies could be organized into a single battalion. Until the process of forming racially composite units developed to this extent, he told the Under Secretary of the Army, William H. Draper, Jr., the experimental mixing of small black and white units had no place in the program to expand the use of Negroes in the Army.[7-77] He did not say when such a process would become appropriate or possible. Several months later Paul flatly told the Chief of Staff that integration of black and white platoons in a company was precluded by stated Army policy.[7-78]

[Footnote 7-77: Memo, D/P&A for Under SA, 29 Apr 48,
sub: Negro Utilization in the Postwar Army, CSGPA
291.2.]

[Footnote 7-78: Idem for CofS, 21 Jun 48, CSGPA
291.2.]

_Assignments_ (p. 194)

The organization of black units was primarily the concern of the Organization and Training Division; the Personnel and Administration Division's major emphasis was on finding more jobs for black soldiers in keeping with the Gillem Board's call for the use of Negroes on a broader professional scale. This could best be done, Paul decided, by creating new black units in a variety of specialties and by using more Negroes in overhead spaces in unit headquarters where black specialists would be completely interspersed with white. To that end his office prepared plans in November 1946 listing numerous occupational specialties that might be offered black recruits. It also outlined in considerable detail a proposal for converting several organizations to black units, including a field artillery (155-mm. howitzer) battalion, a tank company, a chemical mortar company, and an ordnance heavy automotive maintenance company. These units would be considered experimental in the sense that the men would be specially selected and distributed in terms of ability. The officers, Negroes insofar as practical, and cadre noncommissioned officers would be specially assigned. Morale and learning ability would be carefully monitored, and special training would be given men with below average AGCT scores. At the end of six months, these organizations would be measured against comparable white units. Mindful of the controversial aspects of his plan, Paul had a draft circulated among the major commands and services.[7-79]

[Footnote 7-79: DF, D/P&A to CG, AGF, et al., 16 Nov
46, sub: Proposed Directive, Utilization of Negro
Military Personnel; see also P&A Memo for Rcd, 14
Nov 46; both in WDGPA 291.2 (12 Jul 46).]

The Army Ground Forces, first to answer, concentrated on Paul's proposal for experimental black units. Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, speaking for the commanding general, reported that in July 1946 the command had begun a training experiment to determine the most effective assignments for black enlisted men in the combat arms. Because of troop reductions and the policy of discharging individuals with low test scores, he said, the experiment had lasted only five weeks. Five weeks was apparently long enough, however, for Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Caffey, commander of the 25th Regimental Combat Team (Provisional), to reach some rather startling conclusions. He discovered that the black soldier possessed an untrained and undisciplined mind and lacked confidence and pride in himself. In the past the Negro had been unable to summon the physical courage and stamina needed to withstand the shocks of modern battle. Integrating individual Negroes or small black units into white organizations would therefore only lower the standard of efficiency of the entire command. He discounted the integration after the Battle of the Bulge, saying that it succeeded only because it came at the end of the war and during pursuit action. "It still remains a moot question," Caffey concluded, "as to whether the Negroes in integrated units would have fought in a tough attack or defensive battle." Curiously enough he went on to say that until Negroes reached the educational level of whites, they should be organized into small combat units--battalions and smaller--and attached to white organizations in order to learn the proper standards of military discipline, conduct, administration, (p. 195) and training. Despite its unfavorable opinion of experimental black units, the Army Ground Forces did not reject the whole proposal outright but asked for a postponement of six months until its own reorganization, required by the War Department, was completed.[7-80]

[Footnote 7-80: Ltr, Brig Gen B. F. Caffey, CG, 25th
RCT (Prov), Ft. Benning Ga., to CG, AGF, 4 Dec 46,
AGF 291.2; DF, CG, AGF, to D/P&A, 22 Nov 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Military Personnel, WDGPA
291.2 (Negro) (16 Nov 46).]

The other forces also rejected the idea of experimental black units. General Spaatz once again declared that the mission of the Army Air Forces was already seriously hampered by budgetary and manpower limitations and experimentation would only sacrifice time, money, manpower, and training urgently needed by the Army Air Forces to fulfill its primary mission. He believed, moreover, that such an experiment would be weighted in favor of Negroes since comparisons would be drawn between specially selected and trained black units and average white units.[7-81] In a similar vein the Director of Organization and Training, General Hall, found the conversion "undesirable at this time." He also concluded that the problem was not limited to training difficulties but involved a "combination of factors" and could be solved through the application of common sense by the local commander.[7-82] The Chiefs of Ordnance and the Chemical Corps, the technical services involved in the proposed experiment, concurred in the plan but added that they had no Negroes available for the designated units.[7-83]

[Footnote 7-81: DF, CG, AAF, to D/P&A, 27 Nov 45,
sub: Utilization of Negro Military Personnel, WDGPA
291.2 (16 Nov 46).]

[Footnote 7-82: Memo, D/O&T for D/P&A, 4 Dec 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Military Personnel, WDGOT
291.2 (16 Nov 46).]

[Footnote 7-83: Tabs E and F to DF, D/P&A to DCofS,
10 Jan 47, sub: Utilization of Negro Military
Personnel in Overhead Installations, WDGPA 291.2
(12 Jul 46).]

In the face of this strong opposition, Paul set aside his plan to establish experimental black units and concentrated instead on the use of Negroes in overhead positions. On 10 January 1947 he drew up for the Chief of Staff's office a list of 112 military occupational specialties most commonly needed in overhead installations, including skilled jobs in the Signal, Ordnance, Transportation, Medical, and Finance Corps from which Negroes had been excluded. He called for an immediate survey of the Army commands to determine specialties to which Negroes might be assigned, the number of Negroes that could be used in each, and the number of Negroes already qualified and available for immediate assignment. Depending on the answers to this survey, he proposed that commanders assign immediately to overhead jobs those Negroes qualified by school training, and open the pertinent specialist courses to Negroes. Black quotas for the courses would be increased, not only for recruits completing basic training, who would be earmarked for assignment to overhead spaces, but also for men already assigned to units, who would be returned to their units for such assignments upon completion of their courses. Negroes thus assigned would perform the same duties as whites alongside them, but they would be billeted and messed in separate detachments or (p. 196) attached to existing black units for quarters and food.[7-84]

[Footnote 7-84: DF, D/P&A to DCofS, 10 Jan 47, sub:
Utilization of Negro Military Personnel in Overhead
Installations, WDGPA 291.2 (12 Jul 46).]