Chapter 19: (p. 473) (1)

A New Era Begins

On 30 October 1954 the Secretary of Defense announced that the last racially segregated unit in the armed forces of the United States had been abolished.[19-1] Considering the department's very conservative definition of a segregated unit--one at least 50 percent black--the announcement celebrated a momentous change in policy. In the little more than six years since President Truman's order, all black servicemen, some quarter of a million in 1954, had been intermingled with whites in the nation's military units throughout the world. For the services the turbulent era of integration had begun.

[Footnote 19-1: New York _Times_, October 31, 1954;
ibid., Editorial, November 1, 1954.]

The new era's turbulence was caused in part by the decade-long debate that immediately ensued over the scope of President Truman's guarantee of equal treatment and opportunity for servicemen. On one side were ranged most service officials, who argued that integration, now a source of pride to the services and satisfaction to the civil rights movement, had ceased to be a public issue. Abolishing segregated units, they claimed, fulfilled the essential elements of the executive order, leaving the armed forces only rare vestiges of discrimination to correct. Others, at first principally the civil rights bloc in Congress and civil rights organizations, but later black servicemen themselves, contended that the Truman order committed the Department of Defense to far more than integration of military units. They believed that off-base discrimination, so much more apparent with the improvement of on-base conditions, seriously affected morale and efficiency. They wanted the department to challenge local laws and customs when they discriminated against black servicemen.

This interpretation made little headway in the Department of Defense during the first decade of integration. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations made commitments to the principle of equal treatment within the services, and both admitted the connection between military efficiency and discrimination, but both presumed, at least until 1963, severe limitations on their power to change local laws and customs. For their part, the services constantly referred to the same limitations, arguing that their writ in regard to racial reform ran only to the gates of the military reservation.

Yet while there was no substantive change in the services' view of their racial responsibilities, the Department of Defense was able to make significant racial reforms between 1954 and 1962. More than expressing the will of the Chief Executive, these changes reflected the fact that military society was influenced by some of the same forces that were operating on the larger American society. Possessed of a discipline that enabled it to reform rapidly, military society still shared the prejudices as well as the reform impulses of the (p. 474) body politic. Racial changes in the services during the first decade of integration were primarily parochial responses to special internal needs; nevertheless, they took place at a time when civil rights demands were stirring the whole country. Their effectiveness must be measured against the expectations such demands were kindling in the black community.

_The Civil Rights Revolution_

The post-World War II civil rights movement was unique in the nation's history. Contrasting this era of black awakening with the post-Civil War campaign for black civil rights, historian C. Vann Woodward found the twentieth century phenomenon "more profound and impressive ... deeper, surer, less contrived, more spontaneous."[19-2] Again in contrast to the original, the so-called second reconstruction period found black Americans uniting in a demand for social justice so long withheld. In 1953, the year before the Supreme Court decision to desegregate the schools, Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP gave voice to the revolutionary rise in black expectations:

Twenty years ago the Negro was satisfied if he could have even a
half-decent school to go to (and took it for granted that it
would be a segregated school) or if he could go to the hotel in
town or the restaurant maybe once a year for some special
interracial dinner and meeting. Twenty years ago much of the
segregation pattern was taken for granted by the Negro. Now it is
different.[19-3]

[Footnote 19-2: C. Vann Woodward, _Strange Career of
Jim Crow_, p. 170. This account of the civil rights
movement largely follows Woodward's famous study,
but the following works have also been consulted:
Benjamin Muse, _Ten Years of Prelude: The Story of
Integration Since the Supreme Court's 1954
Decision_ (New York: Viking Press, 1964); Constance
M. Green, _The Secret City: A History of Race
Relations in the Nation's Capital_ (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967); Anthony Lewis
and the New York _Times_, _Portrait of a Decade_
(New York: New York _Times_, 1964); Franklin, _From
Slavery to Freedom; Freedom to the Free: A Report
to the President by the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights_ (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1963); _Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders_; Interv, Nichols with Clarence
Mitchell, 1953, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

[Footnote 19-3: Interv, Nichols with Mitchell.]

The difference was understandable. The rapid urbanization of many black Americans, coupled with their experience in World War II, especially in the armed forces and in defense industries, had enhanced their economic and political power and raised their educational opportunities. And what was true for the war generation was even truer for its children. Possessed of a new self-respect, young Negroes began to demonstrate confidence in the future and a determination to reject the humiliation of second-class citizenship. Out of this attitude grew a widespread demand among the young for full equality, and when this demand met with opposition, massive participation in civil rights demonstrations became both practical and inevitable. Again historian Woodward's observations are pertinent:

More than a black revolt against whites, it was in part a
generational rebellion, an uprising of youth against the older
generation, against the parental "uncle Toms" and their
inhibitions. It even took the N.A.A.C.P. and CORE (Congress of
Racial Equality) by surprise. Negroes were in charge of their (p. 475)
own movement, and youth was in the vanguard.[19-4]

[Footnote 19-4: Woodward, _Strange Career of Jim
Crow_, p. 170.]

To a remarkable extent, this youthful vanguard was strongly religious and nonviolent. The influence of the church on the militant phase of the civil rights movement is one of the movement's salient characteristics.

This black awakening paralleled a growing realization among an increasing number of white Americans that the demands of the civil rights leaders were just and that the government should act. World War II had made many thoughtful Americans aware of the contradiction inherent in fighting fascism with segregated troops. In the postwar years, the cold war rivalry for the friendship and allegiance of the world's colored peoples, who were creating a multitude of new states, added a pragmatic reason for ensuring equal treatment and opportunity for black Americans. A further inducement, and a particularly forceful one, was the size of the northern black vote, which had become the key to victory in several electorally important states and had made the civil rights cause a practical political necessity for both major parties.

The U.S. Supreme Court was the real pacesetter. Significantly broadening its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reversed a century-old trend and called for federal intervention to protect the civil rights of the black minority in transportation, housing, voting, and the administration of justice. In the _Morgan_ v. _Virginia_ decision of 1946,[19-5] for example, the Court launched an attack on segregation in interstate travel. In another series of cases it proclaimed the right of Negroes to be tried only in those courts where Negroes could serve on juries and outlawed the all-white primary system, which in some one-party states had effectively barred Negroes from the elective process. The latter decision partly explains the rise in the number of qualified black voters in twelve southern states from 645,000 in 1947 to some 1.2 million by 1952. However, many difficulties remained in the way of full enfranchisement. The poll tax, literacy tests, and outright intimidation frustrated the registration of Negroes in many areas, and in some rural counties black voter registration actually declined in the early 1960's. But the Court's intervention was crucial because its decisions established the precedent for federal action that would culminate in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

[Footnote 19-5: 328 U.S. 373 (1946).]

These judicial initiatives whittled away at segregation's hold on (p. 476) the Constitution, but it was the Supreme Court's rulings in the field of public education that dealt segregation a mortal blow. Its unanimous decision in the case of _Oliver Brown et al._ v. _Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas_, on 17 May 1954[19-6] not only undermined segregation in the nation's schools, but by an irresistible extension of the logic employed in the case also committed the nation at its highest levels to the principle of racial equality. The Court's conclusion that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" exposed segregation in all public areas to renewed judicial scrutiny. It was, as Professor Woodward described it, the most far-reaching Court decision in a century, and it marked the beginning of the end of Jim Crow's reign in America.[19-7]

[Footnote 19-6: 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also 349 U.S.
294 (1955).]

[Footnote 19-7: Woodward, _Strange Career of Jim
Crow_, p. 147.]

But it was only the beginning, for the Court's order that the transition to racially nondiscriminatory school systems be accomplished "with all deliberate speed"[19-8] encountered massive resistance in many places. Despite ceaseless litigation and further affirmations by the Court, and despite enforcement by federal troops in the celebrated cases of Little Rock, Arkansas, and Oxford, Mississippi, and by federal marshals in New Orleans, Louisiana,[19-9] elimination of segregated public schools was painfully slow. As late as 1962, for example, only 7.6 percent of the more than three million Negroes of school age in the southern and border states attended integrated schools.

[Footnote 19-8: 349 U.S. 294 (1955).]

[Footnote 19-9: For an outline of the federal and
National Guard intervention in these areas, see
Robert W. Coakley, Paul J. Scheips, Vincent H.
Demma, and M. Warner Stark, "Use of Troops in Civil
Disturbances Since World War II" (1945 to 1965 with
two supplements through 1967), Center of Military
History Study 75.]

The executive branch also took up the cause of civil rights, albeit in a more limited way than the courts. The Eisenhower administration, for instance, continued President Truman's efforts to achieve equal treatment and opportunity for black servicemen. Just before the _Brown_ decision the administration quickly desegregated most dependent schools on military bases. It also desegregated the school system of Washington, D.C., and, with a powerful push from the Supreme Court in the case of the _District of Columbia_ v. _John R. Thompson Co._ in 1953,[19-10] abolished segregation in places of public accommodation in the nation's capital. Eisenhower also continued Truman's fight against discrimination in federal employment, including jobs covered by government contracts, by establishing watchdog committees on government employment policy and government contracts.

[Footnote 19-10: 346 U.S. 100 (1953).]

Independent federal agencies also began to attack racial discrimination. The Interstate Commerce Commission, with strong assistance from the courts, made a series of rulings that by 1961 had outlawed segregation in much interstate travel. The Federal Housing Authority, following the Supreme Court's abrogation of the state's power to enforce restrictive covenants in the sale of housing, began in the early 1950's to push toward a federal open-occupancy policy in public housing and all housing with federally guaranteed loans. (p. 477) The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, an investigatory agency appointed by the President under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, examined complaints of voting discrimination and denials of equal protection under the law. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy dispatched federal officials to investigate and prosecute violations of voting rights in several states.

But civil rights progress was still painfully slow in the 1950's. The fight for civil rights in that decade graphically demonstrated a political fact of life: any profound change in the nation's social system requires the concerted efforts of all three branches of the national government. In this case the Supreme Court had done its part, repeatedly attacking segregation in many spheres of national life. The executive branch, on the other hand, did not press the Court's decisions as thoroughly as some had hoped, although Eisenhower certainly did so forcibly and spectacularly with federal troops at Little Rock in 1957. The dispatch of paratroopers to Little Rock,[19-11] a memorable example of federal intervention and one popularly associated with civil rights, had, in fact, little to do with civil rights, but was rather a vivid example of the exercise of executive powers in the face of a threat to federal judicial authority. Where the _Brown_ decision was concerned, Eisenhower's view of judicial powers was narrow and his leadership antithetical to the Court's call for "all deliberate speed." He even withheld his support in school desegregation cases. Eisenhower was quite frank about the limitations he perceived in his power and, by inference, his duty to effect civil rights reforms. Such reforms, he believed, were a matter of the heart and, as he explained to Congressman Powell in 1953, could not be achieved by means of laws or directives or the action of any one person, "no matter with how much authority and forthrightness he acts."[19-12]

[Footnote 19-11: For an authoritative account of
Little Rock, see Robert W. Coakley's "Operation
Arkansas," Center of Military History Study 158M,
1967. See also Paul J. Scheips, "Enforcement of the
Federal Judicial Process by Federal Marshals," in
_Bayonets in the Streets; The Use of Troops in
Civil Disturbances_, ed. Robin Higham (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1969), pp. 39-42.]

[Footnote 19-12: Ltr, Eisenhower to Powell, 6 Jun 53,
G 124-A-1, Eisenhower Library. For a later and more
comprehensive expression of these sentiments, see
"Extemporaneous Remarks by the President at the
National Conference on Civil Rights, 9 June 1959,"
_Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1959_, pp. 447-50.]

Despite the President's reluctance to lead in civil rights matters, major blame for the lack of substantial progress must be assigned to the third branch of government. The 1957 and 1960 civil rights laws, pallid harbingers of later powerful legislation in this field, demonstrated Congress's lukewarm commitment to civil rights reform that severely limited federal action. The reluctance of Congress to enact the reforms augured in the _Brown_ decision convinced many Negroes that they would have to take further measures to gain their full constitutional rights. They had seen presidents and federal judges embrace principles long argued by civil rights organizations, but to little avail. Seven years after the _Brown_ decision, Negroes were still disfranchised in large areas of the south, still (p. 478) endured segregated public transportation and places of public accommodation, and still encountered discrimination in employment and housing throughout the nation. Nor had favorable court decisions and federal attempts at enforcement reversed the ominous trend in black unemployment rates, which had been rising for a decade. Above all, court decisions could not spare Negroes the sense of humiliation that segregation produced. Segregation implied racial inferiority, a "constant corroding experience," as Clarence Mitchell once called it. It was segregation's seeming imperviousness to governmental action in the 1950's that caused the new generation of civil rights leaders to develop new civil rights techniques.

Their new methods forced the older leaders, temporarily at least, into eclipse. No longer could they convince their juniors of the efficacy of legal action, and the 1950's ended with the younger generation taking to the streets in the first spontaneous battles of their civil rights revolution. Under the direction of the Southern Christian Leadership Council and its charismatic founder, Martin Luther King, Jr., the strategy of massive civil disobedience, broached in 1948 by A. Philip Randolph, became a reality. Other organizations quickly joined the battle, including the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), also organized by Dr. King but soon destined to break away into more radical paths, and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), an older organization, now expanded and under its new director, James Farmer, rededicated to activism.

Rosa Parks's refusal to move to the rear of the Montgomery bus in 1955 and the ensuing successful black boycott that ended the city's segregated transportation pointed the way to a wave of nonviolent direct action that swept the country in the 1960's. Thousands of young Americans, most notably in the student-led sit-ins enveloping the south in 1960[19-13] and the scores of freedom riders bringing chaos to the transportation system in 1961, carried the civil rights struggle into all corners of the south. "We will wear you down by our capacity to suffer," Dr. King warned the nation's majority, and suffer Negroes did in the brutal resistance that met their demands. But it was not in vain, for police brutality, mob violence, and assassinations set off hundreds of demonstrations throughout the country and made civil rights a national political issue.

[Footnote 19-13: For an account of the first major
sit-in demonstrations, which occurred at
Greensboro, North Carolina, and their influence on
civil rights organizations, including the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, see Miles Wolff,
_Lunch at the Five and Ten; The Greensboro Sit-in_
(New York: Stein and Day, 1970). See also Clark,
"The Civil Rights Movement," pp. 255-60.]

The stage was set for a climatic scene, and onto that stage walked the familiar figure of A. Philip Randolph, calling for a massive march on Washington to demand a redress of black grievances. This time, unlike the response to his 1940 appeal, the answer was a promise of support from both races. The churches joined in, many labor leaders, including Walter Reuther, enlisted in the demonstration, and even the President, at first opposed, gave his blessing to the national event. A quarter of a million people, about 20 percent of them white, marched to Lincoln Memorial on 28 August 1963 to hear King appeal to the (p. 479) the nation's conscience by reciting his dream of a just society. In the words of the Kerner Commission:

It [the march] was more than a summation of the past years of
struggle and aspiration. It symbolized certain new directions: a
deeper concern for the economic problems of the masses, more
involvement of white moderates and new demands from the most
militant, who implied that only a revolutionary change in
American institutions would permit Negroes to achieve the dignity
of citizens.[19-14]

[Footnote 19-14: _Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders_, p. 109.]

_Limitations on Executive Order 9981_

The decade of national civil rights activity that culminated symbolically at the Lincoln Memorial in 1963 was closely mirrored in the Department of Defense, where the services' definition of equal treatment and opportunity underwent a marked evolution. Here, a decade that had begun with the department's placing severe limitations on its defense of black servicemen's civil rights ended with the department's joining the vanguard of the civil rights movement.

In the early 1950's the services were constantly referring to the limitations of Executive Order 9981. The Air Force could not intervene in local custom, Assistant Secretary Zuckert told Clarence Mitchell in 1951. Social change in local communities must be evolutionary, he continued, either ignoring or contrasting the Air Force's own social experience.[19-15] Defending the practice of maintaining large training camps in localities discriminating against black soldiers, the Army Chief of Staff explained to Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan that while its facilities were open to all soldiers regardless of race, the Army had no control over nearby civilian communities. There was little its commanders could do beyond urging local civic organizations to cooperate.[19-16] The Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel was even more blunt. "The housing situation at Key West is not within the control of the Navy," he told the Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1953. Housing was segregated, he admitted, but it was the Federal Housing Authority, not the Navy, that controlled the location of off-base housing for black sailors.[19-17]

[Footnote 19-15: Memo, Lt Col Leon Bell, Asst Exec,
Off, Asst SecAF, for Col Barnes, Office, SecAF, 9
Jan 51, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 19-16: Ltr, CofSA to Ferguson, 7 May 51; see
also Ltr, Under SA Earl D. Johnson to Sen. Robert
Taft, 19 Jul 51; both in CS 291.2 (27 Apr 51).]

[Footnote 19-17: Memo, Dep Chief, NavPers for ASD
(M&P), 19 Feb 53, sub: Alleged Race Segregation at
U.S. Naval Base, Key West, Florida, P 8 (4)/NB Key
West, GenRecs Nav.]

These excuses for not dealing with off-base discrimination continued throughout the decade. As late as 1959, discussing a case of racial discrimination near an Army base in Germany, a Defense Department spokesman explained to Congressman James Roosevelt that "since the incident did not take place on one of our military bases, we are not in a position to offer direct relief in the situation...."[19-18] Even James Evans, the racial counselor, came to use this explanation. "Community mores with respect to race vary," Evans wrote in 1956, and "such matters are largely beyond direct purview of the Department (p. 480) of Defense."[19-19]

[Footnote 19-18: Ltr, ASD (MP&R) Charles C. Finucane
to James Roosevelt, 3 Jun 59, ASD (MP&R) files.]

[Footnote 19-19: Evans and Lane, "Integration in the
Armed Services," p. 83.]

Understandably, in view of the difficulties they perceived, the services tried to avoid the whole problem. In 1954, for example, a group of forty-eight black soldiers traveling on a bus in Columbia, South Carolina, were arrested and fined when they protested the attempted arrest of one of them for failing to comply with the state's segregated seating law. In the ensuing furor, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson explained to President Eisenhower that soldiers were subject to community law and his department contemplated no investigation or disciplinary action in the case. In view of the civil rights issues involved, Wilson continued,[19-20] the Judge Advocate General of the Army discussed the matter with the Justice Department and referred related correspondence to that department "for whatever disposition it considered appropriate." "This reply," an assistant noted on Wilson's file copy of the memo for the President, "gets them off our neck, but I don't know about Brownell's [the Attorney General]."[19-21]

[Footnote 19-20: Wilson, former president of General
Motors Corporation, became President Eisenhower's
first Secretary of Defense on 28 January 1953.]

[Footnote 19-21: Memo, CofS, G-1, for ASA, 6 Jan 54,
sub: Mass Jailing and Fining of Negro Soldiers in
Columbia, S.C.; Memo, ASA for ASD (M&P), same date
and sub; Memo, SecDef for President, 7 Jan 54. All
in G-1 291.2 (10 Dec 53).]

But the services never did get "them" off their neck, and to a large extent defense officials could only blame themselves for their troubles. Their attitude toward extending their standards of equal treatment and opportunity to local communities implied a benign neutrality on their part in racial disputes involving servicemen. This attitude was belied by the fact that on numerous and sometimes celebrated occasions the services helped reinforce local segregation laws. In 1956, for example, Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott explained that military commanders were expected to foster good relations with local authorities and in many areas were obliged to "require" servicemen to conform to the dictates of local law "regardless of their own convictions or personal beliefs."[19-22]

[Footnote 19-22: SecAF statement, 1 May 56, quoted in
Address by James P. Goode, Employment Policy
Officer for the Air Force, at a meeting called by
the President's Committee on Government Employment
Policy, 24 May 56, AF File 202-56, Fair Employment
Program.]

This requirement could be rather brutal in practice and placed the services, the nation's leading equal opportunity employer, in questionable company. In 1953 a black pilot stationed at Craig Air Force Base, Alabama, refused to move to the rear of a public bus until the military police ordered him to comply with the state law. The Air Force officially reprimanded and eventually discharged the pilot. The position of the Air Force was made clear in the reprimand:

Your actions in this instance are prejudicial to good order and
military discipline and do not conform to the standards of
conduct expected of a commissioned officer of the United States
Air Force. As a member of the Armed Forces, you are obliged to
abide by all municipal and state laws, regardless of your
personal feelings or Armed Forces policy relative to the issue at
hand. Your open violation of the segregation policy established
by this Railroad Company and the State of Alabama is (p. 481)
indicative of extremely poor judgment on your part and reflects
unfavorably on your qualifications as a commissioned
officer.[19-23]

[Footnote 19-23: Memo, CG, 3380th Tactical Training
Wing, Keesler AFB, Miss., for (name withheld), Jul
53, sub: Administrative Reprimand; NAACP News
Release, 23 Nov 53; copies of both in SecAF files.]

As the young pilot's commanding officer put it, the lieutenant had refused to accept the fact that military personnel must use tact and diplomacy to avoid discrediting the United States Air Force.[19-24]

[Footnote 19-24: Memo, Cmdr, 3615th Pilot Tng Wing,
Craig AFB, Ala., for Cmdr, Flying Dir, Air Tng Cmd,
Waco, Tex., 4 Aug 53, sub: Disciplinary Punishment,
copy in SecAF files.]

Tact and diplomacy were also the keynote when the services helped enforce the local segregation practices of the nation's allies. This became increasingly true even in Europe in the 1950's, although never with as much publicity as the events connected with the carrier _Midway's_ visit to Capetown, South Africa, in 1955. Its captain, on the advice of the U.S. consul, agreed to conform with a local law that segregated sailors when they were ashore. This agreement became public knowledge while the ship was en route, but despite a rash of protests and congressional demands that the visit be canceled, the _Midway_ arrived at Capetown. Later a White House spokesman tried to put a good face on the incident:

We believe that a far greater blow was struck for the cause of
equal justice when 23,000 South Africans came aboard the Midway
on a non-segregated basis--when the whole community saw American
democracy in action--than could have been made if we had decided
to by-pass Capetown. Certainly no friends for our cause would
have been gained in that way![19-25]

[Footnote 19-25: Ltr, Maxwell M. Rabb, President's
Assistant for Minority Affairs, to Dr. W. Montague
Cobb, as reproduced in Cobb, "The Strait Gate,"
_Journal of the National Medical Association_ 47
(September 1955):349.]

The black serviceman lacked the civilian's option to escape community discrimination. For example, one black soldier requested transfer because of discrimination he was forced to endure in the vicinity of Camp Hanford, Washington. His request was denied, and in commenting on the case the Army's G-1 gave a typical service excuse when he said that the Army could not practically arrange for the mass reassignment of black soldiers or the restriction of their assignments to certain geographical areas to avoid discrimination.[19-26] The Air Force added a further twist. Replying to a similar request, a spokesman wrote that limiting the number of bases to which black airmen could be assigned would be "contrary to the policy of equality of treatment."[19-27] There was, however, one exception to the refusal to alter assignments for racial reasons. Both the Air Force and the Army had an established and frequently reiterated policy of not assigning troops involved (p. 482) in interracial marriages to states where such unions were illegal.[19-28]

[Footnote 19-26: Memo, ACofS, G-1, for TIG, 30 Nov 53,
sub: Complaint of Cpl Israel Joshua, G-1 291.2 (3
Nov 53). For an earlier expression of the same
sentiments, see ACofS, G-1, Summary Sheet for CofS,
27 Nov 50, sub: Request for Policy Determination,
G-1 291.2 (9 Nov 50). Camp Hanford was originally
the Hanford Engineer Works, which played a part in
the MANHATTAN project that produced the atom bomb.]

[Footnote 19-27: Memo, Maj Gen Joe Kelly, Dir, Legis
Liaison, USAF, for Lt Col William G. Draper, AF
Aide to President, 1 Sep 54, with attachments, sub:
Segregation in Gulfport, Mississippi; Memo, Col
Draper for Maxwell Rabb, 6 Oct 54; both in GF
124-A-1, Eisenhower Library.]

[Footnote 19-28: Career Management Div, TAGO, "Policy
Paper," Jul 54, AGAM 291.2 For other pronouncements
of this policy, see ibid.; DF, ACS/G-1 to TAG, 4
Jan 54, sub: Assignment of Personnel; and in G-1
291.2 the following: Memo, Chief, Classification
and Standards Br, G-1, for Planning Office, G-1, 28
Feb 50, sub: Assignment of Personnel; DF, G-1 to
TAG, 8 Mar 50, same sub.]

At times the services' respect for local laws and ordinances forced them to retain some aspects of the segregation policies so recently abolished. Answering a complaint made by Congressman Powell in 1956, for example, The Adjutant General of the Army explained that off-duty entertainment did not fall within the scope of the Truman order. Since most dances were sponsored by outside groups, they had to take place "under conditions cited by them." To insist on integration in this instance, The Adjutant General argued, would mean cancellation of these dances to the detriment of the soldiers' morale. For that reason, segregated dances would continue on post.[19-29]

[Footnote 19-29: Ltr, TAG to Powell, 9 Aug 56, GF
124-A-1, Eisenhower Library.]

This response illustrates the services' approach to equal opportunity and treatment during the Eisenhower administration. The President showed a strong reluctance to interfere with local laws and customs, a reluctance that seemed to flow out of a pronounced constitutional scruple against federal intervention in defiance of local racial laws. The practical consequence of this scruple was readily apparent in the armed forces throughout his administration. In 1955, for example, a black veteran called the President's attention to the plight of black soldiers, part of an integrated group, who were denied service in an Alabama airport and left unfed throughout their long journey. Answering for the President, Maxwell M. Rabb, Secretary to the Cabinet, reaffirmed Eisenhower's dedication to equal opportunity but added that it was not in the scope of the President's authority "to intervene in matters which are of local or state-wide concern and within the jurisdiction of local legislation and determination."[19-30] Again to a black soldier complaining of being denied service near Fort Bragg, North Carolina, a White House assistant, himself a Negro, replied that "outside of an Army post, there is little that the Federal Government can do, except to appeal to the decency of the citizens to treat men in uniform with courtesy and respect." He then suggested a course of action for black soldiers:

The President's heart bleeds when any Americans are victims of
injustice, and he is doing everything he possibly can to rectify
this situation in our country.

You can hold up his hand by carrying on, despite the unpleasant
things that are happening to you at this moment, realizing that,
on this end, we will work all the harder to make your sacrifices
worthwhile.[19-31]

[Footnote 19-30: Ltrs, C. B. Nichols to President, 28
Mar 55, and Rabb to Nichols, 20 Apr 55; both in
G-124-1, Eisenhower Library.]

[Footnote 19-31: Ltr, E. Frederic Morrow to Pfc John
Washington, 9 Apr 57, in reply to Ltr, Washington
to President, 5 Mar 57; both in G-124-A-1,
Eisenhower Library.]

But as the record suggests, this promise to rectify the situation was never meant to extend beyond the gates of the military reservation. Thus, the countless incidents of blatant discrimination encountered by black GI's would continue largely unchallenged into the 1960's, masking the progress made by the Eisenhower administration in ordering the sometimes reluctant services to adopt reforms. This presidential (p. 483) resolution was particularly obvious in the integration of civilian facilities at Navy shipyards and installations and in schools for dependent children on military posts.

_Integration of Navy Shipyards_

The Navy employed many thousands of civilians, including a large number of Negroes, at some forty-three installations from Virginia to Texas. At the Norfolk shipyard, for example, approximately 35 percent of the 15,000 employees were black. To the extent dictated by local laws and customs, black employees were segregated and otherwise discriminated against. The degree of segregation depended upon location, and, according to a 1953 newspaper survey, ranged "from minor in most instances to substantial in a few cases."[19-32]

[Footnote 19-32: UPI News Release, 20 Aug 53, copy in
CMH files.]

In January 1952 the Chief of the Office of Industrial Relations, Rear Adm. W. McL. Hague, all but absolved Navy installations from the provisions of Executive Order 9980.[19-33] He announced that segregation would continue if "the station is subject to local laws of the community in which located, and the laws of the community require segregated facilities," or if segregation were "the norm of the community and conversion to common facilities would, in the judgment of the commanding officer, result in definite impediment to productive effort." Known officially as "OIR Notice CP75," Hague's statement left little doubt that segregation would remain the norm in most instances. It specified that a change to integrated facilities would be allowed only after the commander had decided that it could be accomplished without "inordinate interference with the Station's ability to carry out its mission." If other facilities stood nearby, the change would be allowed only after he had coordinated with the naval district commander.[19-34] Shortly thereafter the Acting Secretary of the Navy expressed his agreement with Hague's statement,[19-35] thus elevating it to an official expression of Navy policy.

[Footnote 19-33: Executive Order 9980, announcing
regulations governing fair employment practices
within the federal government, was signed by
President Truman on 26 July 1948, the same day and
as a companion to his order on equal treatment and
opportunity in the services.]

[Footnote 19-34: OIR Notice CP75, Chief, Office of
Industrial Relations, to Chiefs, Bureaus, et al.,
23 Jan 52, sub: Segregation of Facilities for Civil
Service Employees; Navy Department Policy.]

[Footnote 19-35: Ltr, Actg SecNav Francis Whitehair to
Jerry O. Gilliam, Norfolk Branch, NAACP, 19 Mar 52,
P 8(4), SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]

Official protestations to the contrary, the Navy was again segregating people by race. Evans, in the Department of Defense, charged that this was in fact the "insidious intent" of Hague's notice. He pointed out to Assistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg that signs and notices of segregation were reappearing over drinking fountains and toilets at naval installations which had abandoned such practices, that men in uniform were now subjected to segregation at such facilities, and that the local press was making the unrefuted claim that local law was (p. 484) being reestablished on federal properties.[19-36] Somewhat late to the battle, Dennis D. Nelson seemingly a permanent fixture in the Pentagon, spoke out against his department's policy, but from a different angle. He warned the Secretary of the Navy through his aide that Notice 75 was embarrassing not only for the Navy but for the White House as well.[19-37]

[Footnote 19-36: Draft Memo, Evans for Rosenberg,
SecDef 291.2. Evans delivered the draft memo to
Mrs. Rosenberg and discussed the situation with her
at length "in the spring of 1952." See Interv,
author with Evans, 28 Mar 72, CMH files. On Mrs
Rosenberg's request for a survey of the situation,
see Memo, ASD (M&P) for Under SecNav, 23 Dec 52.
See also Memo, CO, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, for
Chief, NavPers, 23 Apr 52, P 8(4), BuPersRecs.]

[Footnote 19-37: Memo, Nelson for Aide to Asst SecNav,
20 May 53, P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

Nelson was right of course. The notice quickly won the attention of civil rights leaders. Walter White condemned the policy, but his protest, along with the sharp complaints of the NAACP's Clarence Mitchell and Jerry Gilliam and the arguments of the Urban League's Lester Granger, failed to move Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball.[19-38] The secretary insisted that integrating these installations might jeopardize the fulfillment of the Navy's mission, dependent as it was on the "efficiency and whole-hearted cooperation" of the employees. "In a very realistic way," he told Walter White, the Navy must recognize and conform to local labor customs and usages.[19-39] Answering Rosenberg's inquiry on the subject, the Navy gave its formula for change:

This Department cannot take the initiative in correcting this
social ill but must content itself with being alert to take
advantage of the gradual dissolution of these racial prejudices
which can be effectively brought about only by a process of
social education and understanding. This Department is ever ready
to dissolve segregation practices of long standing as soon as
that can be done without decreasing the effectiveness of our
activities.[19-40]

[Footnote 19-38: Kimball succeeded Sullivan as
Secretary of the Navy on 31 July 1951.]

[Footnote 19-39: Ltrs, White to SecNav, 26 May 52;
Mitchell to same, 8 Feb 52; Jerry Gilliam to same,
10 Feb 52; Granger to same, 22 May and 27 Jun 52;
SecNav to Granger, 16 Jun 52; same to White, 20 Jun
52; Chief, OIR, to Mitchell, 4 Feb 52; Under SecNav
to Mitchell, 5 Mar 52. All in P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-40: Memo, Actg SecNav for ASD (M&P), 22
Jan 53; Memo, ASD (M&P) for Under SecNav, 23 Dec
52; both in P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

President Eisenhower's newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, Robert B. Anderson, endorsed Notice 75 along the same lines, informing Mitchell that the Navy would "measure the pace of non-segregation by the limits of what is practical and reasonable in each area."[19-41]

[Footnote 19-41: Ltr, SecNav to Mitchell (ca., Apr
53), OIR 161, GenRecsNav.]

But what seemed practical and reasonable in the Navy was not (p. 485) necessarily so in the White House, where the President had publicly pledged his administration to the abolition of segregation in the federal government. Should Eisenhower falter, there was always his 1952 campaign ally, Congressman Powell, to remind him of his "forthright stand on segregation when federal funds are expended."[19-42] In colorful prose that pulled no punches, Powell reminded the President of his many black supporters and pressed him on the Navy's continuing segregation. Although he denied Powell's charge of obstructionist tactics in the executive branch, the President had in fact been told by Maxwell Rabb, now serving as his minority affairs assistant, that "some government agencies were neglecting their duty."[19-43] The President responded to this news promptly enough by ordering Rabb to supervise the executive agencies in their application of the presidential racial policy. Rabb thereafter discussed the Navy's policy with Secretary Anderson and his assistants on 11 June 1953.

[Footnote 19-42: Ltr, Powell to Eisenhower, 17 Apr 53,
copy in SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-43: Dwight D. Eisenhower, _Mandate for
Change 1953-1956_ (New York: New American Library,
1963), p. 293.]

With his policy openly contradicting the President's, Anderson was in an awkward position. He had been unaware of the implications of the problem, he later explained, and had accepted his predecessor's judgment. His mistake, he pled, was one of timing not intent.[19-44] Yet Anderson had conducted a wide correspondence on the subject, discussed the matter with Lester Granger, and as late as 28 May was still defending Notice 75, telling Special White House Assistant Wilton B. Persons that it represented a practical answer to a problem that could not be corrected by edict. Nor could he introduce any changes, he maintained, adopting his predecessor's argument that the Navy should "be alert to take advantage of its [segregation's] gradual dissolution through the process of social education and understanding."[19-45]

[Footnote 19-44: Interv, Nichols with Anderson, 18 Sep
53, and Nichols UPI Release, 21 Sep 53; both in
Nichols Collection, CMH.]

[Footnote 19-45: Ltrs, SecNav to W. Persons, 28 May
53; SecNav to Granger, 28 May and 29 Jul 53;
Granger to Anderson, 24 Apr and 2 Jul 53. See also
Memo, Chief, NavPers for SecNav, 11 May 53. All in
SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]

But neither the civil rights leaders nor the White House could be put off with gradualism. Anderson's stand was roundly criticized. In an address to the NAACP annual convention, Walter White plainly referred to the secretary's position as a "defiance of President Eisenhower's order."[19-46] If such barbed criticism left the secretary unmoved, Rabb carried a stronger weapon, and in their 11 June meeting the two men discussed the President's order to integrate federally owned or controlled properties, the possibility of a Supreme Court decision on the same subject, and, more to the point, Powell's public statements concerning segregation at the Norfolk and Charleston naval shipyards.[19-47]

[Footnote 19-46: White, Address Delivered at 44th
NAACP Annual Convention, 28 Jun 53, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 19-47: Memo, Under SecNav for President, 23
Jun 53, sub: Segregation in Naval Activities,
attached to Ltr, Under SecNav to Sherman Adams, 24
Jun 53, P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

Anderson then proceeded to reverse his position. He began by (p. 486) ordering a survey of a group of southern installations to estimate the effect of integration on their civilian programs. He learned segregation could be virtually eliminated at these shipyards and stations within six months, although Under Secretary Charles S. Thomas, who prepared the report, agreed with the local commanders that an integration directive would be certain to cause trouble. But the formula chosen by the commanders for eliminating segregation, in which Thomas concurred, might well have given Anderson pause. They wanted to remove racial signs from drinking fountains and toilets, certain that the races would continue using separate facilities, and leave the problem of segregated cafeterias till later. It was the unanimous opinion of those involved, Thomas reported, that the situation should not be forced by "agitators," a category in which they all placed Powell.

On 20 August Anderson directed commanders of segregated facilities to proceed steadily toward complete elimination of racial barriers. Furthermore, each commander was to submit a progress report on 1 November and at sixty-day intervals thereafter.[19-48] Although the secretary was concerned with the possible reaction of the civil rights groups were integration not achieved in the first sixty days, he was determined to give local commanders some leeway in carrying out his order.[19-49] But he made it clear to the press that he did not intend "to put up with inaction."

[Footnote 19-48: ALL NAV, 20 Aug 53; Ltr, Chief,
Industrial Relations, to Commandant, 6th Naval
District, 21 Aug 53, OIR 200, GenRecsNav. For an
example of how the new policy was transmitted to
the field, see COMFIVE Instruction 5800, 15 Sep 53,
A. (2), GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-49: Interv, Nichols with Anderson;
Nichols News Release, 23 Sep 53, in Nichols
Collection, CMH.]

He need not have worried. Evans reported on 29 October that integration of the Charleston shipyard was almost complete and had occurred so far without incident. In fact, he told Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hannah, the reaction of the local press and community had been "surprisingly tolerant and occasionally favorable."[19-50] Evans, however, apparently overlooked an attempt by some white employees to discourage the use of integrated facilities. Although there was no disorder, the agitators were partly successful; the Chief of Industrial Relations reported that white usage had (p. 487) dropped severely.[19-51] Nevertheless by 14 January 1954 this same officer could tell Secretary Anderson that all racial barriers for civilian employees had been eliminated without incident.[19-52]

[Footnote 19-50: Evans, Weekly Thursday Report to ASD
(M&P), 29 Oct 53, SD 291.2. Begun by Evans as a
means of informing Rosenberg of activities in his
office, the Weekly Thursday Report was adopted by
the assistant secretary for use in all parts of the
manpower office.]

[Footnote 19-51: Memo, Chief, Industrial Relations,
for SecNav, 5 Nov 53, sub: Segregation of
Facilities for Civil Service Employees; see also
Ltr, SecNav to President, 9 Nov 53; both in P 8(4),
GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-52: Memo, Chief, Industrial Relations,
for SecNav, 5 Nov 53, sub: Segregation of
Facilities for Civil Service Employees, P 8(4),
GenRecsNav.]

_Dependent Children and Integrated Schools_

The Department of Defense's effort to integrate schools attended by servicemen's children proved infinitely more complex than integrating naval shipyards. In a period when national attention was focused on the constitutional implications of segregated education, the Eisenhower administration was thrust into a dispute over the intent of federal aid to education and eventually into a reappraisal of the federal role in public education. Confusing to the Department of Defense, the President's personal attitude remained somewhat ambiguous throughout the controversy. He had publicly committed himself to ending segregation in federally financed institutions, yet he had declared scruples against federal interference with state laws and customs that would prevent him from acting to keep such a pledge when all its ramifications were revealed.

In fact not one but four separate categories of educational institutions came under scrutiny. Only the first category, schools run by the U.S. Office of Education for the Department of Defense overseas and on military reservations in the United States, operated exclusively with federal funds. The next two categories, schools operated by local school districts on military reservations and schools on federal land usually adjacent to a military reservation, were supported by local and state funds with federal subsidies. The fourth and by far the largest group contained the many community schools attended by significant numbers of military dependents. These schools received considerable federal support through the impact aid program.

The federal support program for schools in "federally impacted" areas added yet another dimension to the administration's reappraisal. The impact aid legislation (Public Laws 815 and 874),[19-53] like similar programs during World War II, was based on the premise that a school district derived no tax from land occupied by a federal installation but usually incurred an increase in school enrollment. In many cases the enrollment of military dependents was far greater than that of the communities in the school district. Actually, these programs were not limited to the incursion of military families; the most extreme federal impact in terms of enrollment percentages was found in remote mountain districts where in some cases almost all students were children of U.S. Forest Service or National Park Service employees.

[Footnote 19-53: PL 815, 23 Sep 50, 64 U.S. 967; PL
874, 30 Sep 50, 64 U.S. 1100.]

In recognition of these inequities in the tax system, Congress gave such school systems special "in-lieu of tax" support. Public Law 815 provided for capital projects, land, buildings, and major equipment; Public Law 874 gave operating support in the form of salaries, (p. 488) supplies, and the like. If, for example, a school district could prove at least 3 percent of its enrollment federally connected, it was eligible to receive from the U.S. Office of Education a grant equal to the district's cost of instruction for federally connected students. If it could show federally connected enrollment necessitated additional classrooms, the school district was eligible for federally financed buildings. Such schools were usually concentrated in military housing areas, but examples existed of federally financed schools, like federal dependents, scattered throughout the school district. Students from the community at large attended the federally constructed schools and the school district continued to receive state support for all students. Although Public Law 874 was far more important in terms of general application and fiscal impact, its companion piece, Public Law 815, was more important to integration because it involved the construction of schools. From the beginning Congress sought to prevent these laws from becoming a means by which federal authorities exercised control over the operation of school districts. It stipulated that "no department, officer or employee of the United States shall exercise any direction, supervision or control over the personnel, curriculum or program of instruction" of any local school or school system.[19-54] The firmness of this admonition, an indication of congressional opinion on this important issue, later played a decisive part in the integration story.

[Footnote 19-54: Sec. 7a, PL 874, 64 U.S. 1100.]

Attacks on segregation in schools attended by military dependents did not begin until the early fifties when the Army, in answer to complaints concerning segregated schools in Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia, began using a stock answer to the effect that the schools were operated by state agencies as part of the state school system subject to state law.[19-55] Trying to justify the situation to Clarence Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of the Army Fred Korth cited Public Law 874, whose intent, he claimed, was that educating children residing on federal property was the responsibility of "the local educational agency."[19-56]

[Footnote 19-55: DA Office of Legislative Liaison
Summary Sheet for ASA, 27 Sep 51, sub: Alleged
Segregation Practiced at Fort Bliss, Texas, CS
291.2 Negroes (17 Sep 51); Ltr, CG, The Artillery
School, to Parents of School Age Children, 2 Sep
52, sub: School Information, AG 352.9 AKPSIGP. For
examples of complaints on segregated schools, see
Ltrs, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey to ASD (M&P), 16 Jun
52, and Dir, Washington Bureau, NAACP, to SecDef, 2
Oct 52; both in OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-56: Draft Ltr, ASA (M&P) to Mitchell.
Although he never dispatched it, Korth used this
letter as a basis for a discussion of the matter
with Mitchell in an October 1952 meeting.]

Senator Humphrey, for one, was not to be put off by such an interpretation. He reminded Assistant Secretary Rosenberg that President Truman had vetoed an education bill in 1951 because of provisions requiring segregation in schools on federal property. As a member of the subcommittee that guided Public Law 874 through Congress, Humphrey could assure Rosenberg that at no time did Congress include language requiring segregation in post schools. Thanks to the Army's interpretation, he observed, local community segregation practices were being extended for the first time to federal property under the guise of compliance with federal law. He predicted further incursions by the segregationists if this move was left unchallenged.[19-57]

[Footnote 19-57: Ltr, Humphrey to ASD (M&P), 16 Oct
52, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

After conferring with both Humphrey and Mitchell, Rosenberg took (p. 489) the matter of segregated schools on military posts to the U.S. Commissioner of Education, Earl J. McGrath. With Secretary of Defense Lovett's approval she put the department on record as opposed to segregated schools on posts because they were "violative not only of the policy of the Department" but also of "the policy set forth by the President."[19-58] Evidently McGrath saw Public Law 874 in the same light, for on 15 January 1953 he informed Rosenberg that if the Department of Defense outlawed segregated dependent schooling and local educational agencies were unable to comply, his office would have to make "other arrangements" for the children.[19-59]

[Footnote 19-58: Ltr, ASD (M&P) to U.S. Commissioner
of Educ, 10 Jan 53, SecDef 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-59: Ltr, U.S. Commissioner of Educ to ASD
(M&P), 15 Jan 53; Ltr, ASD (M&P) to Humphrey, 10
Jan 53; both in OASD 291.2.]

Commissioner McGrath proposed that his office discuss the integration question further with Defense Department representatives but the change in administrations interrupted these negotiations and Rosenberg's successor, John A. Hannah, made it clear that there would be no speedy change in the racial composition of post schools. Commenting at Hannah's request on the points raised by McGrath, the Army's principal personnel officer concluded that integration should be considered a departmental goal, but one that should be approached by steps "consistent with favorable local conditions as determined by the installation commander concerned." In his opinion, committing the department to integration of all on-post schools, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense had proposed earlier, would create teacher procurement problems and additional financial burdens.[19-60] This cautious endorsement of integrated schools was further qualified by the Secretary of the Army. It was a "desirable goal," he told Hannah, but "positive steps to eliminate segregation ... should be preceded by a careful analysis of the impact on each installation concerned."[19-61] Hannah then broke off negotiations with the Office of Education.

[Footnote 19-60: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 13 Feb
53, sub: Segregation of School Children on Military
Installations, G-1 291.2 (15 Jan 53).]

[Footnote 19-61: Memo, Exec Off, SA, for ASD (M&P), 20
Feb 53, sub: Proposed Reply to U.S. Commissioner of
Education Regarding Segregation in Dependent
Schools, copy in G-1 291.2 (15 Jan 53).]

The matter was rescued from bureaucratic limbo when in answer to a question during his 19 March 1953 press conference President Eisenhower promised to investigate the school situation, adding:

I will say this--I repeat it, I have said it again and again:
whenever Federal funds are expended for anything, I do not see
how any American can justify--legally, or logically, or
morally--a discrimination in the expenditure of those funds as
among our citizens. All are taxed to provide these funds. If
there is any benefit to be derived from them, I think they must
all share, regardless of such inconsequential factors as race and
religion.[19-62]

[Footnote 19-62: President's News Conference, 19 Mar
53, _Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1953_, p. 108.]

The sweeping changes implied in this declaration soon became apparent. Statistics compiled as a result of the White House investigation revealed that federal dependents attended thousands of schools, a complex mix of educational institutions having little more in common than their mutual dependence in whole or part on federal funds.[19-63] (p. 490) Most were under local government control and the great majority, including the community public schools, were situated a long distance from any military base. The President was no doubt unaware of the ramifications of federal enrollment and impacted aid on the nation's schools when he made his declaration, and, given his philosophy of government and the status of civil rights at the time, it is not surprising that his promise to look into the subject came to nothing. From the beginning Secretary of Defense Wilson limited the department's campaign against segregated schools to those on federal _property_ rather than those using federal _funds_. And even this limited effort to integrate schools on federal property encountered determined opposition from many local officials and only the halfhearted support of some of the federal officials involved.