Chapter 14: (p. 343) (2)

To some extent the Army had an advantage over the Navy in its dealings with Johnson and Fahy. It never had an integration policy to defend, had in fact consistently opposed the imposition of one, and was not, therefore, under the same psychological pressures to react positively to the secretary's latest rebuff. Determined to defend its current interpretation of the Gillem Board policy, the Army resisted the Personnel Policy Board's use of the Air Force plan, Secretary Johnson's directive, and the initial recommendations of the Fahy Committee (p. 360) to pry out of it a new commitment to integrate. In lieu of such a commitment, Acting Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray[14-64] offered Secretary Johnson another spirited defense of Circular 124 on 26 May, promising that the Army's next step would be to integrate black companies in the white battalions of the combat arms. This step could not be taken, he added, until the reactions to placing black battalions in white regiments and black companies in composite battalions had been observed in detail over a period of time. Gray remained unmoved by the committee's appeal for the wider use and broader training of the talented black soldiers in the name of combat efficiency and continued to defend the _status quo_. He cited with feeling the case of the average black soldier who because of his "social environment" had most often missed the opportunity to develop leadership abilities and who against the direct competition with the better educated white soldier would find it difficult to "rise above the level of service tasks." Segregation, Gray claimed, was giving black soldiers the chance to develop leadership "unhindered and unfettered by overshadowing competition they are not yet equipped to meet." He would be remiss in his duties, he warned Johnson, if he failed to report the concern of many senior officers who believed that the Army had already gone too far in inserting black units into white units and that "we are weakening to a dangerous degree the combat efficiency of our Army."[14-65]

[Footnote 14-64: Following the resignation of
Secretary Royall, President Truman nominated Gordon
Gray as Secretary of the Army. His appointment was
confirmed by the Senate on 13 June 1949. A lawyer,
Gray had been a newspaper publisher in North
Carolina before his appointment as assistant
secretary in 1947.]

[Footnote 14-65: Memo, Actg SA for SecDef, 26 May 49,
sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Services; see also P&A Summary Sheet, 19 May
49, same sub, FC file.]

The Army's response found the Fahy Committee and the office of the Secretary of Defense once again in agreement. The committee rejected Gray's statement, and Kenworthy drew up a point-by-point rebuttal. He contended that unless the Army took intermediate steps, its first objective, a specific quota of black units segregated at the battalion level, would always block the realization of integration, its ultimate objective.[14-66] The secretary's Personnel Policy Board struck an even harder blow. Chairman Reid called Gray's statement a rehash of Army accomplishments "with no indication of significant change or step forward." It ignored the committee's recommendations. In particular, and in contrast to the Navy, which had agreed to restudy the enlistment parity question, the Army had rejected the committee's request that it reconsider its quota system. Reid's blunt advice to Johnson: reject the Army's reply and demand a new one by a definite and early date.[14-67]

[Footnote 14-66: Memo, Kenworthy for Fahy, 30 May 49,
sub: Replies of Army and Navy to Mr. Johnson's May
11 Memo, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-67: Memo, Reid for SecDef, 1 Jun 49, sub:
Army and Navy Replies to Your Memorandum of 6 April
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Army Services; Min, PPB Mtg, 2 Jun 49; both in FC
file.]

Members of the Fahy Committee met with Johnson and Reid on 1 June. Despite the antagonism that was growing between the Secretary of Defense and the White House group, the meeting produced several notable agreements. For his part, Johnson, accepting the recommendations of Fahy and Reid, agreed to reject the Army's latest response and (p. 361) order the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff to confer informally with the committee in an attempt to produce an acceptable program. At the same time, Johnson made no move to order a common enlistment standard; he told Fahy that the matter was extremely controversial and setting such standards would involve rescinding previous interdepartmental agreements. On the committee's behalf, Fahy agreed to reword the recommendation on schooling for all qualified Negroes within eighteen months of enlistment and to discuss further the parity issue.[14-68]

[Footnote 14-68: Min, PPB Mtg, 2 Jun 49; Ltr, Fahy to
Johnson, 25 Jul 49, FC file.]

General Lanham endorsed the committee's belief that there was a need for practical, intermediate steps when he drafted a response to the Army for Secretary Johnson to sign. "It is my conviction," he wanted Johnson to say, "that the Department of the Army must meet this issue [the equal opportunity imposed by Executive Order 9981] squarely and that its action, no matter how modest or small at its inception, must be progressive in spirit and carry with it the unmistakable promise of an ultimate solution in consonance with the Chief Executive's position and our national policy."[14-69]

[Footnote 14-69: Draft Memo, Lanham for SecDef, 2 Jun
49, FC file.]

But the Army received no such specific instruction. Although Johnson rejected the Army's second reply and demanded another based on a careful consideration of the Fahy Committee's recommendations,[14-70] he deleted Lanham's demand for immediate steps toward providing equal opportunity. Johnson's rejection of Lanham's proposal--a tacit rejection of the committee's basic premise as well--did not necessarily indicate a shift in Johnson's position, but it did establish a basis for future rivalry between the secretary and the committee. Until now Johnson and the committee, through the medium of the Personnel Policy Board, had worked in an informal partnership whose fruitfulness was readily apparent in the development of acceptable Navy and Air Force programs and in Johnson's rejection of the Army's inadequate responses. But this cooperation was to be (p. 362) short-lived; it would disappear altogether as the Fahy Committee began to press the Army, while the Secretary of Defense, in reaction, began to draw closer to the Army's position.[14-71]

[Footnote 14-70: Memo, SecDef for SA, 7 Jun 49, sub:
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services; NME, Off of Pub Info, Press Release
78-49A, 7 Jun 49. The secretary gave the Army a new
deadline of 20 June, but by mutual agreement of all
concerned this date was postponed several times and
finally left to the Secretary of the Army to submit
his program "at his discretion," although at the
earliest possible date. See Memo, T. Reid for Maj
Gen Levin Allen, 6 Jul 49, sub: Army Reply to the
Secretary of Defense on Equality of Treatment; Min,
PPB Mtg, 18 Aug 49. All in FC file.]

[Footnote 14-71: Interv, author with Kenworthy.]

_A Summer of Discontent_

The committee approached its negotiations with the Army with considerable optimism. Kenworthy was convinced that the committee's moderate and concrete recommendations had reassured Reid and the Personnel Policy Board and would strengthen its hand in dealing with the recalcitrant Army,[14-72] and Fahy, outlining for the President the progress the committee had made with the services, said that he looked forward to his coming meetings with Gray and Bradley.[14-73]

[Footnote 14-72: Ltr, Kenworthy to Fahy, 20 May 49,
Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-73: Fahy Cmte, "A Progress Report for the
President," 7 Jun 49, FC file.]

To remove any unnecessary obstacle to what Fahy hoped would be fruitful sessions, the committee revised its initial recommendations to the Army. First, as Fahy had promised Johnson, it modified its position on guaranteeing qualified black soldiers already assigned to units the opportunity to attend Army schools within eighteen months. Calling the imbroglio over this issue a mere misunderstanding--the committee did not intend that preferential treatment be given Negroes nor that the Army train more people than it needed--Fahy explained to Johnson that the committee only wanted to make sure that qualified Negroes would have the same chance as qualified white men. It would be happy, Fahy said, to work with the Army on rewording the recommendation.[14-74] The committee also added the suggestion that so long as racial units existed, the Army might permit enlisted men in the four lowest grades, at their request, to remain in a unit predominantly composed of men of their own race. This provision, however, was not to extend to officers and noncommissioned officers in the top three grades, who received their promotions on a worldwide competitive basis. Finally, the committee offered a substitute for the numerical quota it wanted abolished. So that the Army would not get too many low-scoring recruits, either black or white, the committee proposed a separate quota for each category in the classification test scores. Only so many voluntary enlistments would be accepted in categories I through III, their numbers based on the normal spread of scores that existed in both the wartime and peacetime Army. If the Army netted more high scorers than average in any period, it would induct fewer men from the next category. It would also deny reenlistment to any man scoring less than eighty (category IV).[14-75]

[Footnote 14-74: Ltr, Fahy to Johnson, 15 Jun 49, FC
file.]

[Footnote 14-75: Idem to SA, 25 Jul 49, FC file.]

After meeting first with Gray and then the Chief of Staff, Fahy called the sessions "frank and cordial" and saw some prospect of accord, although their positions were still far apart.[14-76] Just how far apart had already become apparent on 5 July when Gray presented (p. 363) Fahy with an outline for yet another program for using black soldiers. This new program was based in part on the comments of the field commanders, and the Director of Personnel and Administration warned that "beyond the steps listed in this plan, there is very little major compromise area left short of complete integration."[14-77] While the Army plan differed from the committee's recommendations in many ways, in essence the disagreement was limited to two fundamental points. Determined to retain segregated units, the Army opposed the reassignment of school-trained Negroes to vacancies in white units; and in order to prevent an influx of Negroes in the low achievement categories, the Army was determined to retain the numerical quota.[14-78]

[Footnote 14-76: Idem to SecDef, 25 Jul 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-77: P&A Summary Sheet to DC/S (Adm), 24
Jun 49, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, CSUSA
291.2 Negroes. For comments of Army commanders, see
the following Memos: Wade H. Haislip (DC/S Adm) for
Army Cmdrs, 8 Jun 49, sub: Draft Recommendations of
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity;
Lt Gen M. S. Eddy for CofS, 10 Jun 49, same sub; Lt
Gen W. B. Smith for CofS, 10 Jun 49, same sub; Lt
Gen S. J. Chamberlain, 5th Army Cmdr, for CofS, 13
Jun 49, same sub; Lt Gen John R. Hodge for CofS, 14
Jun 49, same sub; Gen Jacob Devers, 13 Jun 49, same
sub; Gen Thomas T. Handy, 4th Army Cmdr, for CofS,
10 Jun 49, sub: Comments on Fahy Committee Draft
Recommendations. All in CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 14-78: An Outline Plan for Utilization of
Negro Manpower Submitted by the Army to the
President's Committee, 5 Jul 49, Incl to Ltr, Fahy
to SecDef, 25 Jul 49, FC file. See also Ltr,
Kenworthy to Fahy, 23 Jun 49, Fahy Papers, Truman
Library; Fahy Cmte, "Meeting to Discuss the
Proposals Made by the Army as Preliminary to the
Third Response," 11 Jul 49, FC file.]

The committee argued that if the Army was to train men according to their ability, hence efficiently, and in accord with the principle of equality, it must consider assigning them without regard to race. It could not see how removal of the numerical quota would result in a flood of Negroes joining the Army, but it could see how retaining the quota would prevent the enlistment of blacks for long periods of time. These two provisions--that school-trained Negroes be freely assigned and that the quota be abolished--were really the heart of the committee's plan and hope for the gradual integration of the Army. The provisions would not require the abolition of racial units "at this time," Fahy explained to President Truman, but they would gradually extend the integration already practiced in overhead installations and Army schools. The committee could not demand any less, he confessed, in light of the President's order.[14-79]

[Footnote 14-79: Ltrs, Fahy to SecDef and SA, 25 Jul
49; idem to President, 27 Jul 49. All in FC file.]

The committee and the Army had reached a stalemate. As a staff member of the Personnel Policy Board put it, their latest proposal and counterproposals were simply extensions of what had long been put forth by both parties. He advised Chairman Reid to remain neutral until both sides presented their "total proposal."[14-80] But the press was not remaining neutral. The New York _Times_, for example, accused the Army of stalling and equivocating, engaging in a "private insurrection," and trying "to preserve a pattern of bigotry which caricatures the democratic cause in every corner of the world." There was no room for compromise, the _Times_ added, and President Truman could not retreat without abdicating as Commander in Chief.[14-81] Secretary Gray countered with a statement that the Army was still (p. 364) under injunction from the Secretary of Defense to submit a new race program, and he was contemplating certain new proposals on the military occupational specialty issue.[14-82]

[Footnote 14-80: Memo, Col J. F. Cassidy for Reid, 23
Aug 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity
in the Department of the Army, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-81: New York _Times_, July 16 and 18,
1949.]

[Footnote 14-82: Interv, NBC's "Meet the Press" with
Gordon Gray, 18 Jul 49; Ltr, SecDef to Charles
Fahy, 3 Aug 49, FC file.]

The Army staff did prepare another reply for the Secretary of Defense, and on 16 September Gray met with Fahy and others to discuss it. General Wade H. Haislip, the Vice Chief of Staff, claimed privately to Gray that the new reply was almost identical with the plan presented to the committee on 5 July and that the new concessions on occupational specialties would only require the conversion of some units from white to black.[14-83] Haislip, however, had not reckoned with the concession that Gray was prepared to make to Fahy. Gray accepted in principle the committee's argument that the assignment of black graduates of specialist schools should not be limited to black units or overhead positions but could be used to fill vacancies in any unit. At the same time, he remained adamant on the quota. When the committee spoke hopefully of the advantages of an Army open to all, the Army contemplated fearfully the racial imbalance that might result. The future was to prove the committee right about the advantages, but as of September 1949 Gray and his subordinates had no intention of giving up the quota.[14-84] Gray did agree, however, to continue studying the quota issue with the committee, and Fahy optimistically reported to President Truman: "It is the Committee's expectation that it will be able within a few weeks to make a formal report to you on a complete list of changes in Army policy and practices."[14-85]

[Footnote 14-83: Memo, VCofS for Gray, 29 Aug 49, sub:
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 14-84: Interv, Nichols with Gordon Gray,
1953, in Nichols Collection, CMH; Memo, Kenworthy
for Cmte, 19 Sep 49, sub: Meeting With Gray, 16 Sep
49, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-85: Ltrs, Fahy to President, 21 Sep and
26 Sep 49, both in FC file.]

Fahy made his prediction before Secretary of Defense Johnson took a course of action that, in effect, rendered the committee's position untenable. On 30 September Johnson received from Gray a new program for the employment of black troops. Without reference to the Fahy Committee, Johnson approved the proposal and announced it to the press. Gray's program opened all military occupational specialties to all qualified men, abolished racial quotas for the Army's schools, and abolished racially separate promotion systems and standards. But it also specifically called for retention of the racial quota on enlistments and conspicuously failed to provide for the assignment of black specialists beyond those jobs already provided by the old Gillem Board policy.[14-86] Secretary Gray had asked for Fahy's personal approval before forwarding the plan discussed by the two men at such length, but Fahy refused; he wanted the plan submitted to his full committee. When Johnson received the plan he did not consult the committee at all, although he briefly referred it to the acting chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, who interposed no objection.[14-87]

[Footnote 14-86: Memo, SA for SecDef, 30 Sep 49, sub:
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, CSGPA 291.2; DOD, Off of Pub Info, Press
Release 256-49, 30 Sep 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-87: Memo, Kenworthy for Cmte, 27 Sep 49,
sub: Army's Reply to Secretary Johnson, Fahy
Papers, Truman Library; Note, handwritten and
signed McCrea, attached to memo, SA for SecDef, 30
Sep 49; Memo, Thompson for Leva, 3 Oct 49, sub:
Army Policy of Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity, CD 30-1-4; both in SecDef files.]

It is not difficult to understand Johnson's reasons for ignoring (p. 365) the President's committee. He had been forced to endure public criticism over the protracted negotiations between the Army and the committee. Among liberal elements on Capitol Hill, his position--that his directive and the service replies made legislation to prohibit segregation in the services unnecessary--was obviously being compromised by the lack of an acceptable Army response.[14-88] In a word, the argument over civil rights in the armed forces had become a political liability for Louis Johnson, and he wanted it out of the way. Glossing over the Army's truculence, Johnson blamed the committee and its recommendations for his problem, and when his frontal assault on the committee failed--Kenworthy reported that the secretary tried to have the committee disbanded--he had to devise another approach.[14-89] The Army's new proposal, a more reasonable-sounding document than its predecessor, provided him with a convenient opportunity. Why not quickly approve the program, thereby presenting the committee with a _fait accompli_ and leaving the President with little excuse for prolonging the civil rights negotiations?

[Footnote 14-88: Ltr, SecDef to Congressman Vinson, 7
Jul 49; Memo, Lanham for Reid, 29 Mar 49; both in
PPB files.]

[Footnote 14-89: Ltr, Kenworthy to Nichols, 28 Jul 53,
in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

Unfortunately for Johnson the gambit failed. While Fahy admitted that the Army's newest proposal was an improvement, for several reasons he could not accept it. The assignment of black specialists to white units was a key part of the committee's program, and despite Gray's private assurances that specialists would be integrated, Fahy was not prepared to accept the Army's "equivocal" language on this subject. There was also the issue of the quota, still very much alive between the committee and the Army. The committee was bound, furthermore, to resent being ignored in the approval process. Fahy and his associates had been charged by the President with advising the services on equality of treatment and opportunity, and they were determined to be heard.[14-90] Fahy informed the White House that the committee would review the Army's proposal in an extraordinary meeting. He asked that the President meanwhile refrain from comment.[14-91]

[Footnote 14-90: Memo, Kenworthy to Cmte, 27 Sep 49,
sub: Army's Reply to Secretary Johnson, and Ltr,
Kenworthy to Joseph Evans, 30 Sep 49, both in Fahy
Papers, Truman Library; Memo, Worthington Thompson
for Leva, 3 Oct 49, sub: Army Policy of Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity, SecDef files; Ltr,
Kenworthy to Nichols, 28 Jul 53, in Nichols
Collection, CMH.]

[Footnote 14-91: Memo for Rcd, probably written by
Philleo Nash, 3 Oct 49, Nash Collection, Truman
Library.]

The committee's stand received support from the black press and numerous national civil rights organizations, all of which excoriated the Army's position.[14-92] David K. Niles, the White House adviser on racial matters, warned President Truman about the rising controversy and predicted that the committee would again reject the Army's proposal. He advised the President to tell the press that Johnson's news release was merely a "progress report," that it was not final, and that the committee was continuing its investigation.[14-93] The President did just that, adding: "Eventually we will reach, I (p. 366) hope, what we contemplated in the beginning. You can't do it all at once. The progress report was a good report, and it isn't finished yet."[14-94] And lest his purpose remain unclear, the President declared that his aim was the racial integration of the Army.

[Footnote 14-92: See Los Angeles _Star Review_,
October 6, 1949; _Afro-American_, October 8, 1949;
Washington _Post_, October 6, 1949; Pittsburgh
_Courier_, Octobers, 1949; Norfolk _Journal and
Guide_, October 15, 1949; New York _Amsterdam
News_, October 15, 1949.]

[Footnote 14-93: Ltr, Niles to President, 5 Oct 49,
Nash Collection, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-94: News Conference, 6 Oct 49, as quoted
in _Public Papers of the President: Harry S.
Truman, 1949_, p. 501.]

The President's statement signaled a victory for the committee; its extent became apparent only when the Army tried to issue a new circular, revising its Gillem Board policy along the lines of the outline plan approved by Johnson on 30 September. During the weeks of protracted negotiations that followed, the committee clearly remained in control, its power derived basically from its willingness to have the differences between the committee and the Army publicized and the reluctance of the White House to have it so. The attitudes toward publicity were already noticeable when, on 11 October, Fahy suggested to Truman some possible solutions to the impasse between the committee and the Army. The Secretary of Defense could issue a supplementary statement on the Army's assignment policy, the committee could release its recommendations to the press, or the Army and the committee could resume discussions.[14-95]

[Footnote 14-95: Memo, Fahy for President, 11 Oct 49,
FC file.]

President Truman ordered his military aide to read the committee's 11 October suggestion and "then take [it] up with Johnson."[14-96] As a result the Secretary of Defense retired from the controversy. Reminding Gray through intermediaries that he had approved the Army's plan in outline form, Johnson declared that it was "inappropriate" for him to approve the plan's publication as an Army circular as the Army had requested.[14-97] About the same time, Niles informed the Army that any revision of Circular 124 would have to be submitted to the White House before publication, and he candidly admitted that presidential approval would depend on the views of the Fahy Committee.[14-98] Meanwhile, his assistant, Philleo Nash, predicting that the committee would win both the assignment and quota arguments, persuaded Fahy to postpone any public statement until after the Army's revised circular had been reviewed by the committee.[14-99]

[Footnote 14-96: Penciled Note, signed HST, on Memo,
Niles for President, Secretary's File (PSF), Truman
Library.]

[Footnote 14-97: Memo, Maj Gen Levin C. Allen, Exec
Secy, SecDef, for SA, 14 Oct 49; Memo, Vice Adm
John McCrea, Dir of Staff, PPB, for Allen, 25 Oct
49; both in CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 14-98: Memo for Rcd, Karl Bendetsen, Spec
Consultant to SA, 28 Nov 49, SA files; Ltr,
Kenworthy to Fahy, 22 Nov 49, and Memo, Kenworthy
for Fahy Cmte, 29 Oct 49, sub: Background to
Proposed Letter to Gray; both in Fahy Papers,
Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-99: Ltr, Fahy to Cmte, 17 Nov 49, Fahy
Papers, Truman Library.]

Chairman Fahy was fully aware of the leverage these actions gave his committee, although he and his associates now had few illusions about the speedy end to the contest. "I know from the best authority within P&A," Kenworthy warned the committee, that the obstructionists in Army Personnel hoped to see the committee submit final recommendations--"what its recommendations are they don't much care"--and then disband. Until the committee disbanded, its opponents would try to block any real change in Army policy.[14-100] Kenworthy offered in evidence the current controversy over the Army's instructions to its field commanders. These instructions, a copy of the outline plan (p. 367) approved by Secretary Johnson, had been sent to the commanders by The Adjutant General on 1 October as "additional policies" pending a revision of Circular 124.[14-101] Included in the message, of course, was Gray's order to open all military occupational specialties to Negroes; but when some commanders, on the basis of their interpretation of the message, began integrating black specialists in white units, officials in the Personnel and Administration and the Organization and Training Divisions dispatched a second message on 27 October specifically forbidding such action "except on Department of Army orders."[14-102] Negroes would continue to be authorized for assignment to black units, the message explained, and to "Negro spaces in T/D [overhead] units." In effect, the Army staff was ordering commanders to interpret the secretary's plan in its narrowest sense, blocking any possibility of broadening the range of black assignments.

[Footnote 14-100: Memo, Kenworthy for Cmte, 29 Oct 49,
sub: Background to Proposed Letter to Gray, Fahy
Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-101: Msg, TAG to Chief, AFF, et al., WCL
45586, 011900Z Oct 49, copy in AG 220.3.]

[Footnote 14-102: Memo, D/PA for TAG, 25 Oct 49, sub:
Assignment of Negro Enlisted Personnel, with
attached Memo for Rcd, Col John H. Riepe, Chief,
Manpower Control Gp, D/PA; Memo, Deputy Dir, PA,
for Gen Brooks (Dir of PA), 3 Nov 49, same sub;
Msg, TAG to Chief, AFF, et al., WCL 20682, 27 Oct
49. All in CSGPA 291.2 (25 Oct 49).]

Kenworthy was able to turn this incident to the committee's advantage. He made a practice of never locking his Pentagon office door nor his desk drawer. He knew that Negroes, both civilian and military, worked in the message centers, and he suspected that if any hanky-panky was afoot they would discover it and he would be anonymously apprised of it. A few days after the dispatch of the second message, Kenworthy opened his desk drawer to find a copy. For the first and only time, he later explained, he broke his self-imposed rule of relying on negotiations between the military and the committee and its staff _in camera_. He laid both messages before a long-time friend of his, the editor of the Washington _Post_'s editorial page.[14-103] Thus delivered to the press, the second message brought on another round of accusations, corrections, and headlines to the effect that "The Brass Gives Gray the Run-Around." Kenworthy was able to denounce the incident as a "step backward" that even violated the Gillem Board policy by allocating "Negro spaces" in overhead units. The Army staff's second message nullified the committee's recommendations since they depended ultimately on the unlimited assignment of black specialists. The message demonstrated very well, Kenworthy told the committee, that careful supervision of the Army's racial policy would be necessary.[14-104] Some newspapers were less charitable. The Pittsburgh _Courier_ charged that the colonel blamed for the release of the second message had been made the "goat" in a case that involved far more senior officials, and the Washington _Post_ claimed that the message "vitiates" even the limited improvements outlined in the Army's plan as approved by Secretary Johnson. The paper called on Secretary Gray to assert himself in the case.[14-105]

[Footnote 14-103: Memo, Kenworthy for Chief of
Military History, 13 Oct 76, CMH.]

[Footnote 14-104: Idem for Cmte, 29 Oct 49, sub:
Instructions to Commanding Generals on New Army
Policy, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-105: Lem Graves, Jr. (Washington
correspondent of the Pittsburgh _Courier_), "A
Colonel Takes the Rap," Pittsburgh _Courier_,
October 29, 1949; Washington _Post_, November 3,
1949.]

A furious secretary, learning of the second message from the press (p. 368) stories, did enter the case. Branding the document a violation of his announced policy, he had it rescinded and, publicizing a promise made earlier to the committee, announced that qualified black specialists would be assigned to some white units.[14-106] At the same time Gray was not prepared to admit that the incident demonstrated how open his plan was to evasion, just as he refused to admit that his rescinding of the errant message represented a change in policy. He would continue, in effect, the plan approved by the Secretary of Defense on 30 September, he told Fahy.[14-107]

[Footnote 14-106: DOD, Off of Pub Info, Release
400-49, 3 Nov 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-107: Ltr, SA to Fahy, 17 Nov 49, FC
file.]

The Army staff's draft revision of the Gillem Board circular, sent to the committee on 25 November, reflected Gray's 30 September plan.[14-108] In short, when it emerged from its journey through the various Army staff agencies, the proposed revision still contained none of the committee's key recommendations. It continued the severe restrictions on the assignment of Negroes who had specialty training; it specifically retained the numerical quota; and, with several specific exceptions, it carefully preserved the segregation of Army life.[14-109] Actually, the proposed revision amounted to little more than a repetition of the Gillem Board policy with minor modifications designed to make it easier to carry out. Fahy quickly warned the Deputy Director of Personnel and Administration that there was no chance of its winning the committee's approval.[14-110]

[Footnote 14-108: Ltr, Bendetsen to Fahy, 25 Nov 49;
Memo for Rcd, Kenworthy, 28 Nov 49; both in Fahy
Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-109: Army Draft No. 1 of Revised Circular
124, 16 Nov 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-110: Ltr, Fahy to Maj Gen C. E. Byers, 30
Nov 49, FC file.]

_Assignments_

The quota and assignments issues remained the center of controversy between the Army and the committee. Although Fahy was prepared to postpone a decision on the quota while negotiations continued, he was unwilling to budge on the assignments issue. As the committee had repeatedly emphasized, the question of open, integrated assignment of trained Negroes was at the heart of its program. Without it the opening of Army schools and military occupational specialties would be meaningless and the intent of Executive Order 9981 frustrated.

At first glance it would seem that the revision of Circular 124 supported the assignment of Negroes to white units, as indeed Secretary Gray had recently promised. But this was not really the case, as Kenworthy explained to the committee. The Army had always made a distinction between _specialists_, men especially recruited for critically needed jobs, and _specialties_, those military occupations for which soldiers were routinely trained in Army schools. The draft revision did not refer to this second and far larger category and was intended to provide only for the placement of the rare black specialist in white units. The document as worded even limited (p. 369) the use of Negroes in overhead units. Only those with skills considered appropriate by the personnel office--that is, those who possessed a specialty either inappropriate in a black unit or in excess of its needs--would be considered for racially mixed overhead units.[14-111]

[Footnote 14-111: Memo, Kenworthy for President's
Cmte, 18 Nov 49, sub: Successor Policy to WD Cir
124; idem for Fahy, 28 Nov 49, sub: Revised WD Cir
124; both in Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

Fahy was determined to have the Army's plan modified, and furthermore he had learned during the past few weeks how to get it done. On 9 December Kenworthy telephoned Philleo Nash at the White House to inform him of the considerable sentiment in the committee for publicizing the whole affair and read to him the draft of a press statement prepared by Fahy. As Fahy expected, the White House wanted to avoid publicity; the President, through Nash, assured the committee that the issues of assignment and quota were still under discussion. Nash suggested that instead of a public statement the committee prepare a document for the Army and the White House explaining what principles and procedures were demanded by the presidential order. In his opinion, Nash assured Kenworthy, the White House would order the Army to meet the committee's recommendations.[14-112]

[Footnote 14-112: Memo for Rcd, Kenworthy, 9 Dec 49,
sub: Telephone Conversation With Nash, Fahy Papers,
Truman Library.]

White House pressure undoubtedly played a major role in the resolution of the assignment issue. When on 14 December 1949 the committee presented the Army and the President with its comments on the Army's proposed revision of Circular 124, it took the first step toward what was to be a rapid agreement on black assignments. At the same time it would be a mistake to discount the effectiveness of reasonable men of good will discussing their very real differences in an effort to reach a consensus. There is considerable evidence that when Fahy met on 27 December with Secretary Gray and General J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff, he was able to convince them that the committee's position on the assignment of black graduates of specialist schools was right and inevitable.[14-113]

[Footnote 14-113: Interv, Nichols with Fahy. J. Lawton
Collins became Chief of Staff of the Army on 1
August 1949, succeeding Omar Bradley who stepped up
to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.]

While neither Gray nor Collins could even remotely be described as social reformers, both were pragmatic leaders, prepared to accept changes in Army tradition.[14-114] Collins, unlike his immediate predecessors, was not so much concerned with finding the Army in the vanguard of American social practices as he was in determining that its racial practices guaranteed a more efficient organization. While he wanted to retain the numerical quota, lest the advantages of an Army career attract so large a number of Negroes that a serious racial imbalance would result, he was willing to accept a substantive revision of the Gillem Board policy.

[Footnote 14-114: Intervs, Nichols with Gray and Fahy,
and author with Collins.]

Gray was perhaps more cautious than Collins. Confessing later that he had never considered the question of equal opportunity until Fahy brought it to his attention, Gray began with a limited view of the executive order--the Army must eliminate racial discrimination, (p. 370) not promote racial integration. In their meeting on 27 December Fahy was able to convince Gray that the former was impossible without the latter. According to Kenworthy, Gray demonstrated an "open and unbiased" view of the problem throughout all discussions.[14-115]

[Footnote 14-115: Ltr, Kenworthy to Gray, 20 Jul 50,
FC file; Intervs, Nichols with Gray, Davenport, and
Fahy.]

The trouble was, as Roy Davenport later noted, Gordon Gray was a lawyer, not a personnel expert, and he failed to grasp the full implications of the Army staff's recommendations.[14-116] Davenport was speaking from firsthand knowledge because Gray, after belatedly learning of his experience and influence with the committee, sent for him. Politely but explicitly Davenport told Gray that the staff officers who were advising him and writing the memos and directives to which he was signing his name had deceived him. Gray was at first annoyed and incredulous; after Davenport finally convinced him, he was angry. Kenworthy, years later, wrote that the Gray-Davenport discussion was decisive in changing Gray's mind on the assignment issue and was of great help to the Fahy Committee.[14-117]

[Footnote 14-116: Interv, author with Davenport, 31
Oct 71.]

[Footnote 14-117: Memo, Kenworthy for Chief of
Military History, 13 Oct 76, CMH.]

Fahy reduced the whole problem to the case of one qualified black soldier denied a job because of color and pictured the loss to the Army and the country, eloquently pleading with Gray and Collins at the 27 December meeting to try the committee's way. "I can't say you won't have problems," Fahy concluded, "but try it." Gray resisted at first because "this would mean the complete end of segregation," but unable to deny the logic of Fahy's arguments he agreed to try.[14-118] There were compromises on both sides. When Collins pointed out some of the administrative difficulties that could come from the "mandatory" language recommended by the committee, Fahy said that the policy should be administered "with latitude." To that end he promised to suggest some changes in wording that would produce "a policy with some play in the joints." The conferees also agreed that the quota issue should be downplayed while the parties continued their discussions on that subject.[14-119]

[Footnote 14-118: Memo for Rcd, Karl R. Bendetsen,
Spec Asst to SA, 27 Dec 49, sub: Conference With
Judge Charles Fahy, SA files. Intervs, Nichols with
Gray and Fahy, author with Fahy, and Blumenson with
Fahy.]

[Footnote 14-119: Memo for Rcd, Bendetsen, 27 Dec 49,
SA files; Ltr, Fahy to Cmte, 27 Dec 49, Fahy
papers, Truman Library.]

Agreement followed rapidly on the heels of the meeting of the principals. Roy Davenport presented the committee members with the final draft of the Army proposal and urged that it be accepted as (p. 371) "the furthest and most hopeful they could get."[14-120] Lester Granger, Davenport later reported, was the first to say he would accept, with Fahy and the rest following suit,[14-121] and on 16 January 1950 the Army issued Special Regulation 600-629-1, _Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army_, with the committee's blessing.

[Footnote 14-120: Interv, Nichols with Davenport.]

[Footnote 14-121: Ltr, Kenworthy to Nichols, 29 Jul
53, in Nichols Collection, CMH; Interv, Nichols
with Davenport.]

Fahy reported to Truman that the new Army policy was consistent with the executive order. Its paragraphs on assignments spelled out the principle long advocated by the committee: "Negro manpower possessing appropriate skills and qualifications will be utilized in accordance with such skills and qualifications, and will be assigned to any ... unit without regard to race or color." Adding substance to this declaration, the Army also announced that a list of critical specialties in which vacancies existed would be published periodically and ordered major commanders to assign Negroes who possessed those specialties to fill the vacancies without regard to race. The first such list was published at the same time as the new regulation. The Army had taken a significant step, Fahy told the President, toward the realization of equal treatment and opportunity for all soldiers.[14-122]

[Footnote 14-122: Memo, Fahy for President, 16 Jan 50,
FC file; SR 600-629-1, 16 Jan 50; DOD, Off of Pub
Info, Release 64-50, 16 Jan 50. The special
regulation was circulated worldwide on the day of
the issue; see Memo, D/P&A to TAG, 16 Jan 50, WDGPA
291.2.]

Secretary of Defense Johnson was also optimistic, but he warned Gordon Gray that many complex problems remained and asked the Army for periodic reports. His request only emphasized the fact that the Army's new regulation lacked the machinery for monitoring compliance with its provisions for integration. As the history of the Gillem Board era demonstrated, any attempt to change the Army's traditions demanded not only exact definition of the intermediate steps but also establishment of a responsible authority to enforce compliance.

_Quotas_

In the wake of the Army's new assignment regulation, the committee turned its full attention to the last of its major recommendations, the abolition of the numerical quota. Despite months of discussion, the disagreement between the Army and the committee over the quota (p. 372) showed no signs of resolution. Simply put, the Fahy Committee wanted the Army to abolish the Gillem Board's racial quota and to substitute a quota based on General Classification Test scores of enlistees. The committee found the racial quota unacceptable in terms of the executive order and wasteful of manpower since it tended to encourage the reenlistment of low-scoring Negroes and thereby prevented the enlistment of superior men. None of the Negroes graduating from high school in June 1949, for example, no matter how high their academic rating, could enlist because the black quota had been filled for months. Quotas based on test scores, on the other hand, would limit enlistment to only the higher scoring blacks and whites.

Specifically, the committee wanted no enlistment to be decided by race. The Army would open all enlistments to anyone who scored ninety or above, limiting the number of blacks and whites scoring between eighty and eighty-nine to 13.4 percent of the total Army strength, a percentage based on World War II strengths. With rare exception it would close enlistment to anyone who scored less than eighty. Applying this formula to the current Army, 611,400 men on 31 March 1949, and assessing the number of men from seventeen to thirty-four years old in the national population, the committee projected a total of 65,565 Negroes in the Army, almost exactly 10 percent of the Army's strength. In a related statistical report prepared by Davenport, the committee offered figures demonstrating that the higher black reenlistment rates would not increase the number of black soldiers.[14-123]

[Footnote 14-123: D/PA Summary Sheet for SA, 28 Feb
50, sub: Fahy Committee Proposal re: Numerical
Enlistment Quota, CSGPA 291.2 (2 Nov 49); Roy
Davenport, "Figures on Reenlistment Rate and
Explanation," Document FC XL, FC file; Memo, Fahy
for SA, 9 Feb 50, sub: Recapitulation of the
Proposal of the President's Committee for the
Abolition of the Racial Quota, FC file; Memo,
Kenworthy for Dwight Palmer (cmte member), 8 Feb
50, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

The Army's reply was based on the premise that "the Negro strength of the Army must be restricted and that the population ratio is the most equitable method [of] limitation." In fact, the _only_ method of controlling black strength was a numerical quota of original enlistments. The personnel staff argued that enlistment specifically unrestricted by race, as the high rate of unrestricted black reenlistment had demonstrated, would inevitably produce a "very high percentage of Negroes in the Army." A quota based on the classification test scores could not limit sufficiently the number of black enlistments if, as the committee insisted, it required that identical enlistment standards be maintained for both blacks and whites. Looking at the census figure another way, the Army had its own statistics to prove its point. Basing its figures on the number of Negroes who became eighteen each month (11,000), the personnel staff estimated that black enlistments would total from 15 to 20 percent of the Army's monthly strength if an entrance quota was imposed with the cut-off score set at ninety or from 19 to 31 percent if the enlistment standards were lowered to eighty. It also pointed to the experience of the Air Force where with no quotas in the third quarter of 1949 black enlistments accounted for 16.4 percent of the total; even when a (p. 373) GCT quota of 100 was imposed in October and November, 10 percent of all Air Force enlistees were black.[14-124]

[Footnote 14-124: Memo, Actg D/PA for Karl R.
Bendetsen, Spec Asst to SA, 13 Dec 49, sub: Ten
Percent Racial Quota; D/PA Summary Sheet, with
Incl, for SA, 28 Feb 50, sub: Fahy Committee
Proposals re: Numerical Enlistment Quota; both in
CSGPA 291.2 (2 Nov 49). The quotations are from the
former document.]

The committee quickly pointed out that the Army had neglected to subtract from the monthly figure of 11,000 blacks those physically and mentally disqualified (those who scored below eighty) and those in school. Using the Army's own figures and taking into account these deductions, the committee predicted that Negroes would account for 10.6 percent of the men accepted in the 8,000 monthly intake, probably at the GCT eighty level, or 5 percent of the 6,000 men estimated acceptable at the GCT ninety level.[14-125]

[Footnote 14-125: Memo, Kenworthy for Karl Bendetsen,
19 Oct 49, sub: Manpower Policy, Fahy Papers,
Truman Library.]

On 14 December 1949 the Army, offering to compromise on the quota, retired from its statistical battle with the committee. It would accept the unlimited enlistment of Negroes scoring 100 or better, limiting the number of those accepted below 100 so that the total black strength would remain at 10 percent of the Army's population.[14-126] Attractive to the committee because it would provide for the enlistment of qualified men at the expense of the less able, the proposal was nevertheless rejected because it still insisted upon a racial quota. Again there was a difference between the committee and the Army, but again the advantage lay with the committee, for the White House was anxious for the quota problem to be solved.[14-127]

[Footnote 14-126: Memo for Rcd, Kenworthy, 14 Dec 49,
sub: Conference With Maj Lieblich and Col Smith, 14
Dec 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 14-127: Memo, Fahy for President's Cmte, 1
Feb 50, Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

Niles warned the President that the racial imbalance which had for so long frustrated equal treatment and opportunity for Negroes in the Army would continue despite the Army's new assignment policy unless the Army was able to raise the quality of its black enlistees. Niles considered the committee's proposal doubly attractive because, while it abolished the quota, it would also raise the level of black recruits. The proposal was sensible and fair, Niles added, and he believed it would reduce the number of black soldiers as it raised their quality. It had been used successfully by the Navy and Air Force, and, as it had in those services, would provide for the gradual dissolution of the all-black units rather than a precipitous change.[14-128] The Army staff did not agree, and as late as 28 February 1950 the Director of Personnel and Administration was recommending that the Army retain the racial quota at least for all Negroes scoring below 110 on the classification test.[14-129]

[Footnote 14-128: Ltr, Niles to President, 7 Feb 50,
Secretary's File (PSF), Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-129: D/PA Summary Sheet for SA, 28 Feb
50, sub: Fahy Committee Proposal re: Numerical
Enlistment Quota, CSGPA 291.2 (2 Nov 49).]

Secretary Gray, aware that the Army's arguments would not move the committee, was sure that the President did not want to see a spectacular and precipitous rise in the Army's black strength. He decided on a personal appeal to the Commander in Chief.[14-130] The Army would drop the racial quota, he told Truman on 1 March, with (p. 374) one proviso: "If, as a result of a fair trial of this new system, there ensues a disproportionate balance of racial strengths in the Army, it is my understanding that I have your authority to return to a system which will, in effect, control enlistments by race."[14-131] The President agreed.

[Footnote 14-130: Interv, Nichols with Gray.]

[Footnote 14-131: Ltr, SA to President, 1 Mar 50, Fahy
Papers, Truman Library.]

At the President's request, Gray outlined a program for open recruitment, fixing April as the date when all vacancies would be open to all qualified individuals. Gray wanted to handle the changes in routine fashion. With the committee's concurrence, he planned no public announcement. From his vacation quarters in Key West, Truman added a final encouraging word: "I am sure that everything will work out as it should."[14-132] The order opening recruiting to all races went out on 27 March 1950.[14-133]

[Footnote 14-132: Memo, President for SA, 27 Mar 50,
FC file; Memo, SA for President, 24 Mar 50, sub:
Discontinuance of Racial Enlistment Quotas, copy in
CSGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 14-133: Msg, TAG to Chief, AFF, et al., Fort
Monroe, Va., WCL 44600, 27 Mar 50, copy in FC
file.]

Despite the President's optimism, the Fahy Committee was beginning to have doubts about just how everything would work out. Specifically, some members were wondering how they could be sure the Army would comply with the newly approved policies. Such concern was reasonable, despite the Army's solemn commitments, when one considers the committee's lengthening experience with the Defense Department's bureaucracy and its familiarity with the liabilities of the Gillem Board policy. The committee decided, therefore, to include in its final report to the President a request for the retention of a watchdog group to review service practices. In this its views clashed directly with those of Secretary Johnson, who wanted the President to abolish the committee and make him solely responsible for the equal treatment and opportunity program.[14-134]

[Footnote 14-134: Memo, Clark Clifford for President
(ca. Mar 50), Nash Collection, Truman Library.]

Niles, anxious to settle the issue, tried to reconcile the differences[14-135] and successfully persuaded the committee to omit a reference in its final report to a successor group to review the services' progress. Such a move, he told Kenworthy, would imply that, unless policed, the services would not carry out their programs. Public discussion about how long the committee was to remain in effect would also tend to tie the President's hands. Niles suggested instead that the committee members discuss the matter with the President when they met with him to submit their final report and perhaps suggest that a watchdog group be appointed or their committee be retained on a standby basis for a later review of service actions.[14-136] Before the committee met with the President on 22 May, Niles recommended to Truman that he make no commitment on a watchdog group.[14-137] Privately, Niles agreed with Clark Clifford that the committee should be retained for an indefinite period, but on an advisory rather than an operating basis so that, in Clifford's words, "it will be in a position to see that there is not a gap between policy and an (p. 375) administration of policy in the Defense Establishment."[14-138]

[Footnote 14-135: Interv, author with Kenworthy.]

[Footnote 14-136: Memo, Kenworthy for Fahy, 28 Apr 50,
Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-137: Ltr, Niles to President, 22 May 50,
Nash Collection, Truman Library.]

[Footnote 14-138: Memo, Clifford for President, Nash
Collection, Truman Library.]

The President proceeded along these lines. Several months after the committee presented its final report, _Freedom to Serve_,[14-139] in a public ceremony, Truman relieved the group of its assignment. Commenting that the services should have the opportunity to work out in detail the new policies and procedures initiated by the committee, he told Fahy on 6 July 1950 that he would leave his order in effect, noting that "at some later date, it may prove desirable to examine the effectuation of your Committee's recommendations, which can be done under Executive Order 9981."[14-140]

[Footnote 14-139: _Freedom to Serve: Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services; A
Report by the President's Committee_ (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950).]

[Footnote 14-140: Ltr, President to Fahy, 6 Jul 50,
Fahy Papers, Truman Library.]

_An Assessment_

Thus ended a most active period in the history of armed forces integration, a period of executive orders, presidential conferences, and national hearings, of administrative infighting broadcast to the public in national headlines. The Fahy Committee was the focus of this bureaucratic and journalistic excitement. Charged with examining the policies of the services in light of the President's order, the committee could have glanced briefly at current racial practices and automatically ratified Secretary Johnson's general policy statement. Indeed, this was precisely what Walter White and other civil rights leaders expected. But the committee was made of sterner stuff. With dedication and with considerable political acumen, it correctly assessed the position of black servicemen and subjected the racial policies of the services to a rigorous and detailed examination, the first to be made by an agency outside the Department of Defense. As a result of this scrutiny, the committee clearly and finally demonstrated that segregation was an inefficient way to use military manpower; once and for all it demolished the arguments that the services habitually used against any demand for serious change. Most important is the fact that the committee kept alive the spirit of reform the Truman order had created. The committee's definition of equal treatment and opportunity became the standard by which future action on racial issues in the armed forces would be measured.

Throughout its long existence, the Fahy Committee was chiefly concerned with the position of the Negro in the Army. After protracted argument it won from the Army an agreement to abolish the racial quota and to open all specialties in all Army units and all Army schools and courses to qualified Negroes. Finally, it won the Army's promise to cease restricting black servicemen to black units and overhead installations alone and to assign them instead on the basis of individual ability and the Army's need.

As for the other services, the committee secured from the Navy a pledge to give petty officer status to chief stewards and stewards of the first, second, and third class, and its influence was discernible in the Navy's decision to allow stewards to transfer to the general service. The committee also made, and the Navy accepted, several practical suggestions that might lead to an increase in the number (p. 376) of black officers and enlisted men. The committee approved the Air Force integration program and publicized the success of this major reform as it was carried out during 1949; for the benefit of the reluctant Army, the committee could point to the demonstrated ability of black servicemen and the widespread acceptance of integration among the rank and file of the Air Force. In regard to the Marine Corps, however, the committee was forced to acknowledge that the corps had not yet "fully carried out Navy policy."[14-141]

[Footnote 14-141: _Freedom to Serve_, p. 27.]