Chapter 19: (p. 473) (2)

[Footnote 19-63: Memo for Rcd, Human Relations and
Research Br, G-1 (ca. Mar 53), copy in CMH. See
also Memo, Under SecNav for ASD (M&P), 11 Mar 53,
sub: Schools Operated by the Department of the Navy
Pursuant to Section 6 and 3 of Public Law 874, 81st
Congress, A18, GenRecsNav; "List of States and
Whether or Not Segregation is Practiced in Schools
for Dependents, as Given by Colonel Brody, OPNS
Secn, AGO, In Charge of Dependents Schools, 16 Oct
51," OSA 291.2 Negroes.]

The Department of Defense experienced few problems at first as it integrated its own schools. Its overseas schools, especially in Germany and Japan, had always been integrated, and its schools in the United States now quickly followed suit. Eleven in number, they were paid for and operated by the U.S. Commissioner of Education because the states in which they were located prohibited the use of state funds for schools on federal property. With only minimal public attention, all but one of these schools was operating on an integrated basis by 1953. The exception was the elementary school at Fort Benning, Georgia, which at the request of the local school board remained a white-only school. On 20 March 1953 the new Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, informed the White House that this school had been ordered to commence integrated operations in the fall.[19-64]

[Footnote 19-64: Memo, SA for James Hagerty, White
House Press Secretary, 20 Mar 53, sub: Segregation
in Army Schools, copy in CMH.]

The integration of schools operated by local school authorities on military posts was not so simple, and before the controversy died down the Department of Defense found itself assuming responsibility for a number of formerly state-operated institutions. As of April 1953, twenty-one of these sixty-three schools in the United States were operating on a segregated basis. (_Table 12_)

Table 12--Defense Installations With Segregated Public Schools

State Installation

Alabama (C)[1] Maxwell Air Force Base
Craig Air Force Base

Arkansas (S)[2] Pine Bluff Arsenal (Army)

Florida (C) MacDill Air Force Base
Eglin Air Force Base
Tyndall Air Force Base
Naval Air Station, Pensacola
Patrick Air Force Base

Maryland (S) Andrews Air Force Base
Naval Air Station, Patuxent
Naval Powder Factory, Indianhead

Oklahoma (C) Fort Sill (Army)

Texas (C) Fort Bliss (Army)
Fort Hood (Army)
Fort Sam Houston (Army)
Randolph Air Force Base
Reese Air Force Base
Shepherd Air Force Base
Lackland Air Force Base

Virginia (C) Fort Belvoir (Army)
Langley Air Force Base

[Tablenote 1: (C) indicates segregation required by
state constitution.]
[Tablenote 2: (S) indicates segregation required by
state statute.]

The Secretary of the Army promised to investigate the possibility of integrating schools on Army bases and to consider further action with the Commissioner of Education "as the situation is clarified." He warned the President that to "prod the commissioner" into setting up integrated federal schools when segregated state schools were available would invite charges in the press and Congress of squandering money. Moreover, newly assembled faculties would have state accreditation problems.[19-65] Admitting that there were complicating factors, the President ignored the secretary's warnings and noted that if integrated schools could not be provided by (p. 491) state authorities "other arrangements will be considered."[19-66]

[Footnote 19-65: Ibid.]

[Footnote 19-66: Memo, Eisenhower for SecDef, 25 Mar
53, sub: Segregation in Schools on Army Posts;
Memo, Bernard Shanley (Special Counsel to
President) for SA, 25 Mar 53; both in 124A-4
Eisenhower Library.]

Others in the administration took these complications more seriously. Oveta Culp Hobby, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, was concerned with the attitude of Congress and the press. She pleaded for more time to see what the Supreme Court would rule on the subject and to study the effect of the conversion to federally operated schools "so that we can feel confident of our ground in the event further action should be called for." Going a step further than the Secretary of the Army, Hobby suggested delaying action on the twenty-one segregated schools on posts "for the immediate present."[19-67]

[Footnote 19-67: Ltr, Secy of HEW, to SecDef, 13 Apr
53, copy in CMH.]

In marked contrast to Hobby's recommendation, and incidentally buttressing popular belief in the existence of an interdepartmental dispute on the subject, Secretary of Defense Wilson told the President that he wanted to end segregation in all schools on military installations "as swiftly as practicable." He admitted it would be difficult, as a comprehensive and partially covert survey of the school districts by the local commanders had made clear. The commanders found, for example, that the twenty-one school districts involved would not operate the schools as integrated institutions. (p. 492) Wilson also stressed that operating the schools under federal authority would be very expensive, but his recommendation was explicit. There should be no exact timetable, but the schools should be integrated before the 1955 fall term.[19-68]

[Footnote 19-68: Ltr, SecDef to President, 29 May 53,
copy in CMH. On the Army's investigation of the
schools, see also G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 6 Apr
53, sub: Segregation in Schools on Army Posts, CS
291.2 Negroes (25 Mar 53), and the following: Ltrs,
TAG to CG's, Continental Armies et al., 30 Mar 53,
and to CG, Fourth Army, 17 Apr 53, sub: Segregation
in Schools on Army Posts, AGAO-R 352.9 (17 Apr 53);
Memo, Dir of Pers Policy, OSD, for ACS/G-1 and
Chief of NavPers, 6 May 53; Statement for Sherman
Adams in reply to Telg, Powell to President, as
attachment to Memo, ASD (M&P) for SecNav, 5 Jun 53;
last two in OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

Although both Wilson and Hobby later denied that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was opposed to integrating the schools, rumors and complaints persisted throughout the summer of 1953 that Hobby opposed swift action and had carried her opposition "to the cabinet level."[19-69] Lending credence to these rumors, President Eisenhower later admitted that there was some foot-dragging in his official family. He had therefore ordered minority affairs assistant Rabb, already overseeing the administration's fight against segregated shipyards, to "track down any inconsistencies of this sort in the rest of the departments and agencies of the government."[19-70]

[Footnote 19-69: DOD OPI Release, 1 Feb 54; UPI News
Release, 31 Jan 54; Telg, Powell to President, ca.
1 Jun 53; Ltr, President to Powell, 6 Jun 53; Press
Release, Congressman Powell, 10 Jun 53; NAACP Press
Release, 16 Nov 53; White, Address Delivered at
44th NAACP Annual Convention, 28 Jun 53. Copies of
all in Nichols Collection, CMH. See also New York
_Times_, February 1, 1954.]

[Footnote 19-70: Eisenhower, _Mandate for Change_, p.
293.]

The interdepartmental dispute was quickly buried by Wilson's dramatic order of 12 January 1954. Effective as of that date, the secretary announced, "no new school shall be opened for operation on a segregated basis, and schools presently so conducted shall cease operating on a segregated basis, as soon as practicable, and under no circumstances later than September 1, 1955."[19-71] Wilson promised to negotiate with local authorities, but if they were unable to comply the Commissioner of Education would be requested to provide integrated facilities through the provisions of Public Law 874. Interestingly, the secretary's order predated the Supreme Court decision on segregated education by some four months.

[Footnote 19-71: Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 12 Jan
54, sub: Schools on Military Installations for
Dependents of Military and Civilian Personnel,
SecDef 291.2.]

The order prompted considerable public response. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith telegraphed "hearty approval of your directive ... action is consonant with democratic ideals and in particular with the military establishment's successful program of integration in the armed forces."[19-72] Walter White added the NAACP's approval in a similar vein, and many individual citizens offered congratulations.[19-73] But not all the response was favorable. Congressman Arthur A. Winstead of Mississippi asked the secretary to outline for him "wherein you believe that procedure will add anything whatsoever to the defense of this country. Certainly it appears to me that you have every reason anyone could desire to refuse to take action which is in total (p. 493) violation of certain state laws."[19-74]

[Footnote 19-72: Telg, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith to Wilson, 1 Feb 54, SecDef 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-73: Telg, Walter White to SecDef, 1 Feb
54; and as an example of a letter from an
individual citizen, see Ltr, Mrs. Louis Shearer to
SecDef, 1 Feb 54; both in SecDef 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-74: Ltr, Winstead to SecDef, 18 Feb 54,
SecDef 291.2.]

The three services quickly responded to the order. By 18 February all had issued specific directives for enforcing it. The Secretary of the Navy, for example, declared that the "policy of non-segregation" would apply

to the operation of existing schools and school facilities
hereafter constructed on Navy and Marine Corps installations
within the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands, the area in which Public Law 874 and ... 815 ...
are operative.... In the case of PL 874 this area will be
extended, effective 1 July 1954, to include Wake Island ... the
same policy of non-segregation will apply in all Navy-operated
schools for dependent children of military and civilian personnel
of the Department of Defense.[19-75]

[Footnote 19-75: SecNav Instruction 5700.1, 18 Feb 54,
which was renewed by SecNav Instruction 17755.1A,
31 Jul 58. For other services, see Memo, Chief,
Pers Ser Div, USAF, for all Major ZI Commands and
Alaskan Air Command, 8 Feb 54, sub: Elimination of
Segregation in On-Base Schools, AFPMP-12, AF files;
Ltr, TAG to CG's, Continental Armies, MDW, 4 Feb
54, sub: Elimination of Segregation in On-Post
Public Schools, AGCP 352.9 (4 Feb 54).]

Any local school official hoping for a reprieve from the deadlines expressed in these orders was likely to be disappointed. In response to queries on the subject, the services quoted their instructions, and if they excused continued segregation during the 1954 school year they were adamant about the September 1955 integration date.[19-76] The response of Secretary of the Air Force Talbott to one request for an extension revealed the services' determination to stick to the letter of the Wilson order. Talbott agreed with the superintendent of the Montgomery County, Alabama, school board that local school boards were best qualified to run the schools for dependent children of the military, but he refused to extend the deadline. "Unilateral action in the case of individual Air Force base schools would be in violation of the directive," he explained, adding: "At such time as the Alabama legislature acts to permit your local board of education to operate the school at Maxwell AFB on an integrated basis, the Air Force will return operational responsibility for the school to the local board at the earliest practicable date."[19-77]

[Footnote 19-76: Ltr, SecNav to Clarence Mitchell, 30
Apr 54; Ltr, Jack Cochrane, BuPers Realty Legal
Section, to B. Alden Lillywhite, Dept of HEW, 20
Apr 54; both in P 11-1, GenRecsNav. See also Ltr,
ASD (M&P) to Commissioner of Educ, 3 May 55; Ltr,
ASD (M&P) to Dr. J. W. Edgar, Texas Education
Agency, 3 May 55; both in OASD (M&P) 291.2 (3 May
55).]

[Footnote 19-77: Ltr, SecAF to Superintendent of
Montgomery Public Schools, 12 Jan 55, SecAF files.]

As a result of this unified determination on the part of departmental officials, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense could announce in December 1954 that two of the schools, the one at Craig Air Force Base, Alabama, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia, were integrated; two others, the Naval Air Station school at Pensacola, Florida, and Reese Air Force Base, Texas, had been closed; the remaining seventeen would be fully integrated by the September 1955 deadline.[19-78] Lee Nichols, a prolific writer on integration, reported in November 1955 that schools segregated for generations suddenly had black and white children sitting side by side. This move by the armed forces, he (p. 494) pointed out, could have far-reaching effects. Educators from segregated community schools would be watching the military experiment closely for lessons in how to comply with the Supreme Court's desegregation order.[19-79]

[Footnote 19-78: Memo for Rcd, Chief, Morale and
Welfare Br, ASD (M&P), 17 Dec 54, sub: Integration
of Certain Schools Located on Military
Installations, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-79: UPI News Release, Incl to Memo, Dir,
DOD Office of Public Information, for ASD (M&P), 10
Nov 55, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

Strictly speaking there were more than twenty-one segregated schools operating on federal installations. A small group of institutions built and operated by local authorities stood on land leased from the services. At the time of Secretary Wilson's order this category of schools included three with 75-year leases, those at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Fort Bliss and Biggs Air Force Base, Texas, and one with a 25-year lease at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas.[19-80] The Air Force's general counsel believed the lease could be broken in light of the Wilson order, but the possibility developed that some extensions might be granted to these schools because of the lease complication.[19-81] The Secretary of the Army went right to the point, asking the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Carter L. Burgess, for an extension in the case of Fort Meade pending Maryland's integration of its schools under the Supreme Court's decision.[19-82] In response Burgess ordered, as of 1 June 1955, the exemption of four schools. "No attempt shall be made," he informed the services, "to break the lease or take over operation of the schools pending further instruction from the Secretary of Defense."[19-83]

[Footnote 19-80: Ltr, Col Staunton Brown, USA,
District Engineer, Little Rock District, to
Division Engineer, Southwestern Div, 8 Jun 56, sub:
Meeting With Representatives of White Hall School
District, Pine Bluff Arsenal; Memo, Asst Adjutant,
Second Army, for CG, Second Army, 7 Jun 56, sub:
Lease for Meade Heights Elementary School; copies
of both in OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-81: Memo, AF General Counsel for Dir of
Mil Pers, 29 Mar 55, sub: Lease on Property
Occupied by Briggs Air Force Base Dependent's
School; Memo, Asst SecAF for ASD (M&P), 24 May 55,
sub: Biggs Air Force Base Dependent School; both in
SecAF files.]

[Footnote 19-82: Memo, ASA for ASD (M&P), 3 May 55,
sub: Elimination of Segregation in On-Post Public
Schools, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-83: Memo, ASD (M&P) for SA et al., 1 Jun
55, sub: Operation of Dependent Schools on Military
Installations on an Integrated Basis; idem for
SecDef et al., 25 Aug 55, sub: Status of Racial
Integration in Schools on Military Installations
for Dependents of Military and Civilian Personnel;
both in OASD (M&P) 291.2 (25 Aug 55).]

It was some time before the question of temporary extensions was resolved. Two of the leased property schools, Biggs and Fort Bliss, were integrated before the September deadline as a result of a change in state law in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision. Then, on 16 July 1956, the Assistant Secretary of the Army reported that the phased integration of Fort Meade's elementary school had started.[19-84] The Pine Bluff Arsenal case was still unresolved in 1956, but since at that time there were no black dependents at the installation it was not considered so pressing by Burgess, who allowed the extension to continue beyond 1956. Besides, it turned out there were still other schools in this category that the Navy had temporarily exempted from the September 1955 deadline. The school at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station, for example, which had no black dependents eligible for attendance, was allowed to continue to operate as usual while negotiations were under way for the transfer of the school and property to the St. Mary's County, Maryland, school (p. 495) board.[19-85] A lease for the temporary use of buildings by local authorities for segregated schools on the grounds of the New Orleans Naval Air Station was allowed to run on until 1959 because of technicalities in the lease, but not, however, without considerable public comment.[19-86]

[Footnote 19-84: Memo, ASA for ASD (M&P), 16 Jul 56,
sub: Status of Racial Integration in Schools at
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, and Pine Bluff
Arsenal, Arkansas, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-85: Memo, Cmdr Charles B. Reinhardt, OASD
(M&P), for Brig Gen John H. Ives, Mil Policy Div,
OASD (M&P), 26 Oct 55, sub: School at Patuxent
River Naval Air Stations, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-86: See the following Memos: ASD (M&P)
for SecNav, 18 Nov 55, sub: Integration in Schools
on Military Installations for Department of
Military and Civilian Personnel; idem for Asst
SecNav (P&RF), 23 Jan 56, sub: Segregation in
Schools at the New Orleans Naval Base, Algiers,
Louisiana; Asst SecNav (P&RF) for ASD (M&P), 7 Apr
56, same sub; ASD (M&P) for Asst SecNav (FM), 15
Aug 58, sub: U.S. Naval Station, New Orleans,
Louisiana: One Year Extension of Outlease With
Orleans Parish School Board, New Orleans,
Louisiana; Ltrs, CO, New Orleans Naval Station, to
Rev. Edward Schlick, 24 Feb 56, and Rear Adm John
M. Will, OASD (M&P), to Clarence Mitchell, NAACP, 6
Dec 55 and 18 Apr 56. All in OASD (M&P) 291.2. For
public interest in the case, see the files of the
Chief of Naval Personnel (P 11-1) for the years
1956-59.]

The Department of Defense could look with pride at its progress. In less than three years after President Eisenhower had promised to look into segregated schools for military dependents, the department had integrated hundreds of classrooms, inducing local authorities to integrate a series of schools in areas that had never before seen blacks and whites educated together. It had even ordered the integration of classes conducted on post by local universities and (p. 496) voluntarily attended by servicemen in off-duty hours.[19-87] Yet many dependent schools were untouched because Wilson's order applied only to schools on federal property. It ignored the largest category of dependent schools, those in the local community that because of heavy enrollment of federal dependents were supported in whole or part by federal funds. In these institutions some 28,000 federal dependents were being educated in segregated classes. Integration for them would have to await the long court battles that followed _Brown_ v. _Board of Education_.

[Footnote 19-87: Ltr, Sen. Herbert Lehman to SecDef,
10 Oct 56; Ltr, SecDef to Lehman, 15 Oct 56, both
in SD 291.2.]

This dreary prospect had not always seemed so inevitable. Although Wilson's order ignored local public schools, civil rights advocates did not, and the problem of off-base segregation, typified by the highly publicized school at the Little Rock Air Force Base in 1958, became an issue involving not only the Department of Defense but the whole administration. The decision to withhold federal aid to school districts that remained segregated in defiance of court orders was clearly beyond the power of the Department of Defense. In a memorandum circulated among Pentagon officials in October 1958, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot C. Richardson discussed the legal background of federal aid to schools attended by military dependents, especially congressional intent and the definition of "suitable" facilities as expressed in Public Laws 815 and 874. He also took up the question of whether to provide off-base integrated schooling, balancing the difficult problem of protecting the civil rights of federal employees against the educational advantages of a state-sponsored education system. Richardson mentioned the great variation in school population--some bases having seven high school aged children one year, none the next--and the fact that the cost of educating the 28,087 dependents attending segregated schools in 1957 would amount to more than $49 million for facilities and $8.7 million annually for operations. He was left with one possible conclusion, that "irrespective of our feelings about the unsuitability of segregated education as a matter of principle, we are constrained by the legislative history, the settled administrative construction, and the other circumstances surrounding the statutes in question to adhere to the existing interpretation of them."[19-88]

[Footnote 19-88: Memo, Asst Secy of HEW for Secy of
HEW, 4 Oct 58, sub: Payments of Segregated Schools
Under P.L. 815 and P.L. 874, Incl to Ltr, Asst Secy
of HEW to ASD (M&P), 10 Oct 58, OASD (M&P)291.2 (10
Oct 58).]

Richardson might be "constrained" to accept the _status quo_, but some black parents were not. In the fall of 1958 matters came to a head at the school near the Little Rock air base. Here was a new facility, built by the local school board exclusively with federal funds, on state land, and intended primarily for the education of dependents living at a newly constructed military base. On the eve of the school's opening, the Pulaski County school board informed the Air Force that the school would be for white students only. The decision was brought to the President's attention by a telegram from a black sergeant's wife whose child was denied admission.[19-89] The telegram was only the first in a series of protests from congressmen, civil (p. 497) rights organizations, and interested citizens. For all the Defense Department had a stock answer: there was nothing the Air Force could do. The service neither owned nor operated the school, and the impact aid laws forbade construction of federal school facilities if the local school districts could provide public school education for federal dependents.[19-90]

[Footnote 19-89: Memo, Dir of Pers Policy, OSD, for
Stephen Jackson, 29 Aug 58, sub: Air Force
Segregated School Situation in Pulaski County,
Arkansas (San Francisco _Chronicle_ article of Aug
26, 58); Memo for Rec, Stephen Jackson, OASD (M&P),
8 Oct 58, sub: Integration of Little Rock Air Force
Base School, Jacksonville, Ark., attached to Memo,
ASD (M&P) for SA et al., 10 Oct 58. All in OASD
(M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-90: See, for example, Ltrs, Dir of Pers
Policy, OSD, to Sen. Richard L. Neuberger, 10 Sep
58, and ASD/M to Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr.,
23 Oct 58. See also Memo, Dep Dir of Mil Pers,
USAF, for Asst SecAF (Manpower, Pers, and Res
Forces), 9 Oct 58, sub: Dependent Schools. All in
OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

The department would not get off the hook so easily; the President wanted something done about the Little Rock school, although he wanted his interest kept quiet.[19-91] Yet any action would have unpleasant consequences. If the department transferred the father, it was open to a court suit on his behalf; if it tried to force integration on the local authorities, they would close the school. Since neither course was acceptable, Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles C. Finucane ordered his troubleshooter, Stephen Jackson, to Little Rock to investigate.[19-92]

[Footnote 19-91: Memo, Lt Col Winston P. Anderson,
Exec Off, Asst SecAF (M&P), for Asst SecAF (M&P),
24 Nov 58, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 19-92: Memo, ASD (MP&R) for SA et al., 10
Oct 58, OASD (MP&R) 291.2; Memo for Rcd, Spec Asst
to Asst SecAF, 17 Oct 58, sub: Meeting With Mr.
Finucane and Mr. Jackson re Little Rock Air Force
Base, SecAF files.]

Before he went to Little Rock, Jackson met with officials from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and decided, with the concurrence of the Department of Justice, that the solution lay in government purchase of the land. The school would then be on a military base and subject to integration. Should local authorities refuse to operate the integrated on-base school, the Air Force would do so. In that event, Jackson warned local officials on his arrival in Arkansas, the school district would lose much of its federal enrollment and hence its very important federal subsidy. Nor could the board be assured that the federal acquisition would be limited to one school. Jackson later admitted the local black school had also been constructed with federal funds, and he could not guarantee that it would escape federal acquisition. Board members queried Jackson on this point, introducing the possibility that the federal government might try to acquire local high schools, also attended in large numbers by military dependents and also segregated. Jackson assured the school board that the department "had no desire to change the community patterns where schools were already in existence merely because they received federal aid,"[19-93] a statement that amounted to a new federal policy.

[Footnote 19-93: Memo for Rcd, Dep ASD (MR&P), 8 Oct
58, sub: Integration of Little Rock Air Force Base
School, Jacksonville, Ark.; attached to Memo, ASD
(MP&R) for SA et al., 10 Oct 58, OASD (MP&R)
291.2.]

Jackson failed to convince the board, and in late October 1958 it rejected the government's offer to run an integrated school on land purchased from them.[19-94] Jackson thereupon met with justice officials and together they decided that sometime before 1 January 1959 the Justice Department would acquire title to the school land for one year by taking a leasehold through the right of eminent domain. They did not at that time, however, formulate any definite plan of (p. 498) action to accomplish the school take-over.[19-95]

[Footnote 19-94: Memo for Rcd, Dep Asst SecAF, 24 Nov
58, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 19-95: Ibid.; Memo, Lt Col Winston P.
Anderson, Exec Off, Asst SecAF (M&P) for Asst SecAF
(M&P), 24 Nov 58, SecAF files.]

It was just as well, for soon after this decision was reached the NAACP brought up the subject of dependent schools near the Air Force bases at Blytheville, Arkansas, and Stewart, Tennessee.[19-96] Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary James P. Goode was quick to point out that there were at least five other segregated schools constructed with federal funds, situated near Air Force bases, and attended almost exclusively by federal dependents. He also predicted that a careful survey would reveal perhaps another fifteen schools in segregated districts serving only Air Force dependents. In light of these facts, and with a frankly confessed aversion to the administration's acquisition of the properties by right of eminent domain, Goode preferred to have the schools integrated in an orderly manner through the supervision of the federal courts.[19-97]

[Footnote 19-96: Memo, Asst SecAF (M&P) for Under
SecAF, 26 Nov 58, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 19-97: Memo, Dep Asst SecAF (MP&R) for Asst
SecAF (MP&R), 26 Nov 58, sub: Little Rock Air Force
Base Elementary School, SecAF files.]

This attitude was to prevail for some time in the Department of Defense. In April 1961, for example, the Assistant Secretary for Manpower informed a Senate subcommittee that, while schools under departmental jurisdiction were integrated "without reservation and with successful results," many children of black servicemen stationed in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and elsewhere still attended segregated off-post schools. Adjacent to military posts and attended "in whole or in part by federal dependents," these schools "conformed to state rather than federal laws."[19-98] And as late as May 1963, a naval official admitted there was no way for the Navy to require school officials in Key West, Florida, to conform to the Department of Defense's policy of equal opportunity.[19-99]

[Footnote 19-98: Memo, ASD (M) for Chmn, Subcommittee
on Education, Cmte on Labor and Pub Welfare, of the
U.S. Senate, 25 Apr 61, OASD (M) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-99: Ltr, Rear Adm C. K. Duncan, Asst
Chief for Plans, BuPers, to Mrs. Rosetta
McCullough, 16 May 63, P 8, GenRecsNav.]

Yet even as the principle of noninterference with racial patterns of the local community emerged intact from the lengthy controversy, exceptions to its practical application continued to multiply. In the fall of 1959, less than a year after the administration suspended its campaign to integrate off-base schools in Arkansas, black Air Force dependents quietly entered the Little Rock school. At the same time, schools catering predominantly to military dependents near bases in Florida and Tennessee integrated with little public attention.[19-100] Under pressure from the courts, and after President Eisenhower had discussed the case in a national press conference in terms of the proper use of impact aid in segregated districts, the city of Norfolk, Virginia, agreed to integrate its 15,000 students, roughly one-third of whom were military dependents.[19-101]

[Footnote 19-100: Morton Puner, "What the Armed Forces
Taught Us About Integration," _Coronet_ (June
1960), reprinted in the _Congressional Record_,
vol. 106, pp. 11564-65.]

[Footnote 19-101: Press Conference, 21 Jan 59, _Public
Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower,
1959_, p. 122; see also Washington _Post_ January
28, 1959.]

The controversy over schools for dependents demonstrated the (p. 499) limits of federal intervention in the local community on behalf of the civil rights of servicemen. Before these limits could be breached a new administration would have to redefine the scope of the Defense Department's power. Nevertheless, the armed forces had scored some dramatic successes in the field of race relations by 1960. Some five million servicemen, civilians, and their dependents were proving the practicality of integration on the job, in schools, and in everyday living. Several writers even suggested that the services' experience had itself become a dynamic force for social change in the United States.[19-102] The New York _Times's_ Anthony Lewis went so far as to say that the successful integration of military society led to the black crusade against discrimination in civilian society.[19-103] Others took the services' influence for granted, as Morton Puner did when he observed in 1959 that "the armed services are more advanced in their race relations than the rest of the United States. Perhaps it is uniquely fitting that this should be so, that in one of the greatest peacetime battles of our history, the armed forces should be leading the way to victory."[19-104]

[Footnote 19-102: See Fred Richard Bahr, "The
Expanding Role of the Department of Defense as an
Instrument of Social Change" (Ph.D. dissertation,
George Washington University, February 1970), ch.
III.]

[Footnote 19-103: As quoted, ibid., p. 87.]

[Footnote 19-104: Morton Puner, "Integration in the
Army," _The New Leader_ 42 (January 12, 1959).]

As such encomiums became more frequent, successful integration became a source of pride to the services. Military commanders with experience in Korea had, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah, universally accepted the new order as desirable, conceding that integration worked "very well" despite predictions to the contrary.[19-105] Nor was this attitude limited to military commanders, for there had been considerable change in sentiment among senior defense officials. Citing the major economies realized in the use of manpower and facilities, Secretary Wilson reported to President Eisenhower in March 1955 that the results of integration were encouraging:

Combat effectiveness is increased as individual capabilities
rather than racial designations determine assignments and
promotions. Economics in manpower and funds are achieved by the
elimination of racially duplicated facilities and operations.
Above all, our national security is improved by the more
effective utilization of military personnel, regardless of
race.[19-106]

[Footnote 19-105: Extracted from an interview given by
Hannah and published in _U.S. News and World
Report_ 35 (October 16, 1953):99. See also Ltr, Lt
Col L. Hill, Chief, Public Info Div, CINFO, to Joan
Rosen, WCBS Eye on New York, 17 Apr 64, CMH Misc
291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 19-106: _Semiannual Report of the Secretary
of Defense, January 1-June 30, 1954_ (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 21-22.]

In other reports he expatiated on this theme, explaining how integration cut down racial incidents in the services and improved "national solidarity and strength."[19-107] After years of claiming the contrary, defense officials were justifying integration in the name of military efficiency.

[Footnote 19-107: Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Manpower, "Advances in the Utilization of
Negro Manpower: Extracts From Official Reports of
the Secretary of Defense, 1947-1961." The quotation
is from Secretary Wilson's report, 10 Dec 53.]

Certainly racial incidents in the armed forces practically (p. 500) disappeared in the immediate post-integration period, and the number of complaints about on-base discrimination that reached the Pentagon from individual black servicemen dropped dramatically. Moreover, supporting Secretary Wilson's claim of national solidarity, major civil rights organizations began to cite the racial experiences of the armed forces to strengthen their case against segregated American society. Civil rights leaders continued to press for action against discrimination outside the military reservation, but in the years after Korea their sense of satisfaction with the department's progress was quite obvious. At its national conventions in 1953 and 1954, for example, the NAACP officially praised the services for their race policy. As one writer observed, integration not only increased black support for the armed forces and black commitment to national defense during the cold war, but it also boosted the department's prestige in the black and white community alike, creating indirect political support for those politicians who sponsored the racial reforms.[19-108]

[Footnote 19-108: Bahr, "The Expanding Role of the
Department of Defense," pp. 86-87.]

But what about the black serviceman himself? A Negro enlisting in the armed forces in 1960, unlike his counterpart in 1950, entered an integrated military community. He would quickly discover traces of discrimination, especially in the form of unequal treatment in assignments, promotions, and the application of military justice, but for a while at least these would seem minor irritants to a man who was more often than not for the first time close to being judged by ability rather than race.[19-109] It was a different story in the civilian community, where the black serviceman's uniform commanded little more respect than it did in 1950. Eventually this contrast would become so intolerable that he and his sympathizers would beleaguer the Department of Defense with demands for action against discrimination in off-base housing, schools, and places of public accommodation.

[Footnote 19-109: Ginzberg, _The Negro Potential_, p.
90.]