Chapter 20: (p. 501) (2)

From the beginning the new administration found itself criticized by civil rights organizations, including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, for not moving quickly against segregated National Guard units.[20-68] A delegation from the NAACP's 1961 convention visited Assistant Secretary Runge in July and criticized--to the exclusion of all other subjects--discrimination in the National Guard. This group wanted the federal government to withhold funds from states that continued to bar black participation. Repeating the old claim that special federal-state relationships precluded direct action by the Secretary of Defense, Runge nevertheless promised the delegates a renewed effort to provide equal opportunity. He also made a somewhat irrelevant reference to the recent experience of a black citizen in Oklahoma who had secured admission to the state guard by a direct appeal to the governor.[20-69] How futile such appeals would be in some states was demonstrated a week later when the Adjutant General of Florida declared that since the guard was a volunteer organization and his state had always drawn its members from among white citizens, Florida was under no obligation to enlist black men.[20-70]

[Footnote 20-68: See petitions signed by thousands of
Negroes to the President demanding redress of
grievances against the discriminatory practices of
the National Guard, in White House Cen files, 1962,
J. F. Kennedy Library.]

[Footnote 20-69: Memo for Rcd, James C. Evans, OASD
(M), 17 Jul 61, sub: Mr. Runge Receives NAACP
Delegation, ASD (M) 291.2.]

[Footnote 20-70: Washington _Post_, July 28, 1961.]

That the new administration had quietly adopted different policies toward the guard and the regular forces was confirmed when Runge responded to a report prepared by the American Veterans Committee on the lack of racial progress in the guard. The veterans group called on the administration to use the threat of withdrawal of federal recognition to alter guard practices.[20-71] The administration refused. A policy of force might be acceptable for the active armed forces, but voluntary persuasion seemed more appropriate for the National Guard. Enunciating what would become the Defense Department's position on the National Guard through 1963, Runge declared that the federal government had no legal authority to force integration on the guard when it was not serving in a federal status. Furthermore, (p. 519) withdrawal of federal recognition or withholding federal funds as a means of bringing about integration, though legally sound, would cause some states to reject federal support and inactivate their units, thereby stripping the country of a portion of its military reserve and damaging national security. Citing the progress being made by persuasion, Runge predicted that some recalcitrant states might in time voluntarily move toward integration.[20-72] Noting instances of recent progress and citing legal restrictions against forcing state compliance, McNamara endorsed the policy of encouraging voluntary compliance.[20-73]

[Footnote 20-71: Ltr, Murray Gross, Chmn of the AVC,
to SecDef, 22 Jun 61, SD 291.2. The report on the
integration of the National Guard was inclosed.]

[Footnote 20-72: Ltrs, Runge to Murray Gross, 19 Jul
and 29 Nov 61, ASD (M) 291.2, and n.d. (ca. Nov
61), copy in Wofford Collection, J. F. Kennedy
Library.]

[Footnote 20-73: Ltr, SecDef to Rep. Carl Vinson of
Georgia, Chmn, House Armed Services Cmte, 5 Aug 61,
reprinted in Appendix to _Congressional Record_,
87th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 107, p. A6589.]

Although unauthorized, similar patterns of discrimination persisted in parts of the organized reserves. Reserve units had links with both the regular forces and the guard. Like the regulars, the reserve was legally a creature of the federal government and subject to policies established by the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, the reserve drew much of its manpower from the pool of soldiers separating from active duty with a reserve obligation still to fulfill, and within some limits the Defense Department could assign such men to units in a manner that could influence the reserve's racial composition. But like the guard, the reserve also had a distinct local flavor, serving almost as a social club in some parts of the country. This characteristic was often an important factor in maintaining a unit at satisfactory strength. Since segregation sometimes went hand in hand with the clublike atmosphere, the services feared that a strong stand on integration might cause a severe decline in the strength of some units.[20-74] When the Army staff reviewed the situation in 1956, therefore, it had not pressed for integration of all units, settling instead for merely "encouraging" commanders to open their units to Negroes.[20-75]

[Footnote 20-74: ACofS (Reserve Components) Summary
Sheet, 11 Feb 57, sub: Race Issue in Armory Debate,
copy in DCSPER 291.2.]

[Footnote 20-75: DCSPER Summary Sheet, 6 Apr 56, sub:
Policy for Reserve Training Assignments of
Obligated Non-Caucasian Personnel of the Ready
Reserve Who Reside in Segregated Areas, DCSPER
291.2.]

The move toward complete integration of the reserves was slow. In 1956, for example, more than 75 percent of the Army's reserve units in southern states were still segregated. The other services followed a similar pattern; in 1962 more than 40 percent of all reserve units in the country were white; the Army retained six all-black reserve units as well. Racial exclusion persisted in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps also, although here the fault was probably not so much a matter of reserve policy as the lingering segregation pattern in some state school systems. At the same time, the reserves had more blacks in nondrill status than in drill status. In other words, more blacks were in reserve pools where, unassigned to specific units, they did not participate in active duty training. In 1962, some 75 percent of the black reservists in the Army and Air Force, 85 percent in the Navy, and 38 percent in the Marine Corps were assigned to such pools. For many reservists, paid drill status was desirable; apart from the money received for such active duty, they had the opportunity to gain (p. 520) credit toward retirement and pensions.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric reminded the services in April 1962 that the Truman order applied to the reserves and called on the under secretaries to integrate the all-black and all-white units "as rapidly as is consistent with military effectiveness."[20-76] He also wanted a review of black assignments for the purpose of removing the disproportionate number of Negroes in pools "consistent with the military requirements and the skills of the personnel involved."

[Footnote 20-76: Memo, Dep SecDef for Under Secys, 3
Apr 62, sub: Compliance With E.O. 9981 in the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserves, in SD
files. The secretary's memo was distributed to the
commands; see, for example, Memo, TAG for CINCARPAC
et al., 15 May 62 (TAG 291.2/15 May 62).]

A defense manpower team surveyed the reserves in November 1962. It tried to soften the obvious implication of its racial statistics by pointing out that the all-black units were limited to two Army areas, and action had already been taken by the Third Army and Fourth Army commanders to integrate the six units as soon as possible. The team also announced initiation of a series of administrative safeguards against discrimination in the enlistment and assignment of men to drilling units. As for the all-white units, the reviewers cautioned that discrimination was not necessarily involved since Negroes constituted a relatively small proportion of the strength of the reserves--4.8 percent of the Army, 4.4 percent of the Air Force, and an estimated 3.2 percent of the Navy. Furthermore, the data neither proved nor disproved allegations of discrimination since the degree to which individuals volunteered, the skills and aptitudes they possessed, and the needs of the services were all factors in the assignment and use of the men involved.[20-77]

[Footnote 20-77: Office of the ASD (M), Review of
Compliance With E.O. 9981 in the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps Reserves, 7 Nov 62, copy in
CMH.]

Pleas of an absence of legal authority in regard to the National Guard and generalized promises of racial reform in the reserves were not going to still the complaints of the civil rights organizations nor discourage the interest of their allies in the administration. Clearly, the Department of Defense would be hearing more about race in the reserve components in the months to come.

The sudden reemergence in the early 1960's of complaints of discrimination in the regular forces centered around a familiar litany: the number of Negroes in some of the services still fell significantly short of the black percentage of the national population; and separate standards, favorable to whites, prevailed in the promotion and assignment systems of all the services. There had to be some discrimination involved, Congressman Diggs pointed out to the Secretary of the Air Force in July 1960. With extensive help from the services, Diggs had been investigating servicemen's complaints for some time. While his major concern remained the discrimination suffered by black servicemen off base, he nevertheless concluded that the service regulations developed in consultation with the Fahy Committee more than a decade earlier had not been fully implemented and discriminatory practices existed "in varying degrees" at (p. 521) military installations around the world. Diggs admitted that a black serviceman might well charge discrimination to mask his failure to compete successfully for a job or grade, but to accept such failures as a universal explanation for the disproportionate number of Negroes in the lower ranks and undesirable occupations was to accept as true the canard that Negroes as a group were deficient. Diggs's conclusion, which he pressed upon the department with some notice in the press, was that some black servicemen were being subtly but deliberately and arbitrarily restricted to inferior positions because their military superiors exercised judgments based on racial considerations. These judgments, he charged, were inconsistent with the spirit of the Truman order.[20-78]

[Footnote 20-78: Ltr, Diggs to SecAF, 7 Jul 60; see
also Memo, Dir, AF Legis Liaison, for Spec Asst for
Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces, USAF, 14
Jul 60, with attached Summary of Findings and
Highlights of the Diggs Report Concerning Alleged
Discriminatory Practices in the Armed Forces; both
in SecAF files.]

At first glance the 1963 study of racial discrimination by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights seemed to contradict Diggs's charges. The commission concluded that taken as a whole the status of black servicemen had improved considerably since the Truman order. It noted that black representation had remained relatively constant since the early days of integration, 8.2 percent of the total, 9.2 percent of the enlisted strength, and approached national population averages. The percentage of black officers, 1.6 percent of all officers, while admittedly low, had been rising steadily and compared favorably with the number of black executives in the civilian economy. The occupational status of the black enlisted man had also undergone steady improvement since the early days of integration, especially when one compared the number and variety of military occupation specialties held by black servicemen with opportunities in the rest of the civil service and the business community.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the commission found that in their daily operations, military installations were "generally free from the taint of racial discrimination."[20-79] It confirmed the general assessments of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the American Veterans Committee among others, pointing out that black and white servicemen not only worked side by side, but also mingled in off-duty hours.[20-80] In sum, the study demonstrated general satisfaction with the racial situation on military bases. Its major concern, and indeed the major concern of Diggs and most black servicemen, remained the widespread discrimination prevailing against black servicemen in the local community.

[Footnote 20-79: U.S. Commission on _Civil Rights_,
Civil Rights '63, pp. 173-85. The quotation is from
page 185.]

[Footnote 20-80: See, for example, Morton Puner, "The
Armed Forces: An Integration Success Story,"
_Anti-Defamation League Bulletin_, Nov 62, pp. 3,
7; and American Veterans Committee, "Audit of Negro
Veterans and Servicemen," 1960.]

These important generalizations aside, the commission nevertheless offered impressive statistical support for some of Diggs's charges when it investigated the diverse and conflicting enlistment and assignment patterns of the different services. The Navy and Marine Corps came in for special criticism. Even when the complexities of mental aptitude requirements and use of draftees versus enlistees (p. 522) were discounted, the commission found that these two services consistently employed a significantly smaller percentage of Negroes than the Army and Air Force. A similar disparity existed in assignment procedures. The commission found that both services failed to match the record of the civilian economy in the use of Negroes in technical, mechanical, administrative, clerical, and craft fields. It suspected that the services' recruiting and testing methods intensified these differences and wondered whether they might not operate to exclude Negroes in some instances.

Despite general approval of conditions on the bases, the commission found what it called "vestiges of discrimination on some bases." It reported some segregated noncommissioned officer clubs, some segregated transportation of servicemen to the local community, and some discriminatory employment patterns in the hiring of civilians for post jobs. Partly the legacy of the old segregated services, this discrimination, the commission concluded, was to a greater extent the result of the intrusion of local civilian attitudes. The commission's attention to outside influences on attitudes at the base suggested that it found the villain of the Diggs investigation, the prejudiced military official, far too simplistic an explanation for what was in reality institutional racism, a complex mixture of sociological forces and military traditions acting on the services. The Department of Defense's manpower experts dwelt on these forces and traditions when they analyzed recruitment, promotion, and assignment trends for McNamara in 1963.[20-81]

[Footnote 20-81: Memo, DepASD (Special Studies and
Requirements) for ASD (M), 16 Jul 63, with
attachment, Utilization of Negroes in the Armed
Forces, July 1963, copy in CMH. All the tables
accompanying this discussion are from the preceding
source, with the exception of Table 16, which is
from the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Policy
Planning and Research, _The Negro Family: The Case
for National Action_, Mar 64, p. 75, where it is
reproduced from DOD sources.]

They found a general increase in black strength ratios between 1949 and 1962 (_Table 13_). They blamed the "selective" recruiting practices in vogue before the Truman order for the low enlistment ratios in 1949, just as they attributed the modest increases since that time to the effects of the services' equal treatment and opportunity programs. In the judgment of these analysts, racial differences in representation since the Truman order, and indeed most of the other discrepancies between black and white servicemen, could usually be explained by the sometimes sharp difference in aptitude test results (_Table 14_). A heritage of the Negro's limited, often segregated and inferior education and his economic and related (p. 523) environmental handicaps, low aptitude scores certainly explained the contrast in disqualification rates (_Tables 15 and 16_). By 1962 fully half of all Negroes--as compared to 8 percent of all whites--failed to qualify for service under minimum mental test standards. In some southern states, the draftee rejection rate for Negroes exceeded 80 percent.

Table 13--Black Strength in the Armed Forces for Selected Years (In Percentage)

Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force
Enlisted Enlisted Enlisted Enlisted
Year Men Officers Men Officers Men Officers Men Officers

1949 12.4 1.8 4.7 0.0 2.1 0.0 5.1 0.6
1954 13.7 3.0 3.6 0.1 6.5 0.1 8.6 1.1
1962 12.2 3.2 5.2 0.2 7.6 0.2 9.2 1.2

Table 14--Estimated Percentage Distribution of Draft-Age Males in U.S. Population by AFQT Groups (Based on Preinduction Examination, 1959-1962)

Group White Nonwhite
I 11.8 0.3
II 31.3 2.6
III 31.9 15.0
IV 19.0 40.1
V 6.0 42.0

Table 15--Rate of Men Disqualified for Service in 1962 (In Percentage)

Cause White Nonwhite
Medical and other 21.8 10.1
Mental test failure 8.4 50.6
Total 30.2 60.7

Table 16--Rejection Rates for Failure to Pass
Armed Forces Mental Test, 1962

Failed Mental Test
Number
Area Examined Number Percent
Grand total, Continental United States 286,152 64,536 22.6
Total, white 235,678 36,204 15.4
Total, black 50,474 28,332 56.1

First Army: Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, Vermont

White 49,171 12,989 26.4
Black 7,937 3,976 50.1

Second Army: Delaware, Washington,
D.C., Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia,
West Virginia

White 48,641 5,888 12.1
Black 9,563 4,255 44.5

Third Army: Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee

White 30,242 5,786 19.1
Black 20,343 13,772 67.7

Fourth Army: Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas

White 15,048 2,039 13.5
Black 4,796 2,988 62.3

Fifth Army: Colorado, Illinois, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wisconsin, Wyoming

White 51,117 4,495 8.9
Black 5,723 2,684 46.9

Sixth Army: Arizona, California, Idaho, 1 1 1
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,
Washington

White 41,459 5,007 12.1
Black 2,112 657 31.1

This problem became critical for black enlistments in the mid-1950's when the services, with less need for new servicemen, raised the mental standards for enlistees, denying Group IV men the right to enlist. (An exception to this pattern was the Navy's decision to accept Group IV enlistments in 1956 and 1957 to replace post-Korean enlistment losses.) In terms of total black representation, however, the new mental standards made a lesser difference (_Table 17_). Denying Group IV men enlistment during the 1950's only increased their number in the draft pool, and when the Army stepped up draft inductions in the early 1960's the number of Group IV men in uniform, including Negroes, rapidly increased.

Table 17--Nonwhite Inductions and First Enlistments, Fiscal Years 1953-1962[1]

Fiscal | Total | Percent Nonwhite
Year |Accessions| DOD| Army |Navy|Marine| Air
| (000)[1] | |Inductees[2]|Enlistees| |Corps |Force

1953 886.1 12.8 14.7 13.4 4.3 8.0 11.1
1954 576.3 10.0 9.9 13.0 4.0 7.8 11.9
1955 622.6 10.6 8.8 12.7 9.0 5.4 13.5
1956 481.9 11.2 10.3 15.1 9.5 10.6 12.2
1957 456.7 9.1 10.8 9.3 3.6 9.5 9.7
1958 367.1 7.9 13.2 6.4 2.8 5.1 7.1
1959 392.0 7.1 10.4 8.1 2.4 5.0 6.5
1960 389.4 8.1 12.3 8.4 3.0 7.9 8.4
1961 394.7 8.2 14.4 8.2 2.9 5.9 9.5
1962 518.6 9.7 15.3 9.0 4.1 6.5 8.6
Total 5,085.4 9.9 12.3 10.3 4.9 7.4 10.4

[Tablenote 1: Includes inductions and male
"non-prior service" enlistments into the Regular
components.]

[Tablenote 2: The Army was the only service
drafting men during this decade.]

While the Army's dependence on the draft, and thus Group IV men, explained part of the continuing high percentage of Negroes in that service, the Defense Department manpower group was at a loss to explain the notable variation in black enlistments among the services. All employed similar enlistment standards, yet during the period 1958--1960, for example, black enlistment in the Army and Air Force averaged 7 percent, the Marine Corps 6 percent, and the Navy 2.7 percent. Nor could the analysts isolate the factors contributing to the low officer ratios in all four services. Almost all military officers during the period under analysis were college graduates, Negroes comprised about 4 percent of all male college graduates, yet only the Army maintained a black officer ratio approaching that figure. (_See Table 13._)

The inability of many black servicemen to score highly in the tests might also explain why training in some technical occupations continued more restricted for them (_Tables 18 and 19_). In (p. 524) contrast to ground combat and service occupations, which required little formal school training, some occupation groups--electronics, for example--had high selection standards. The Defense Department group admitted that occupations for blacks in the armed forces had also been influenced by historical patterns of segregated assignments to food service and other support occupations. Among men with twenty or more years in uniform, 40 percent of the blacks and 12 percent (p. 525) of the whites were assigned to service occupations. But this pattern was changing, the analysts pointed out. The reduction in the differential between whites and blacks in service occupations among more recent recruits clearly reflected the impact of policies designed to equalize opportunities (_Table 20_). These policies had brought (p. 526) about an increasing proportion of Negroes in white collar skills as well as in ground combat skills.

Table 18--Distribution of Enlisted Personnel in Each Major Occupation, 1956

Percentage Distribution by AFQT Groups
Occupation I&II III IV

Electronics 60.3 31.4 8.3
Other technical 57.9 30.7 11.4
Admin. & clerical 51.5 37.4 11.1
Mechanics & repairmen 37.6 43.8 18.6
Crafts 30.0 44.1 25.9
Services 21.5 43.3 35.2
Ground combat 24.5 37.1 38.4

Table 19--Occupational Group Distribution by Race. All DOD, 1962

Total Percent
Occupational Group Percentage Distribution of Negroes in
Negroes White Each Group
Ground combat 23.7 15.0 14.3
Electronics 7.0 14.9 4.7
Other technical 6.8 7.7 8.5
Admin. & clerical 21.5 19.2 10.6
Mechanics & repairmen 15.1 26.0 5.8
Crafts 5.6 6.6 8.4
Services 20.3 10.7 16.6
Total 100.0 100.0 9.2

Table 20--Occupational Group Distribution of Enlisted Personnel By Length of Service and Race

12-20 Over
Occupational 0-4 Years 4-8 Years 8-12 Years Years 20 Years
Group
White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black

Ground
combat 20.3 32.7 9.8 17.7 9.6 17.8 9.8 14.5 8.4 12.5
Electronics 14.1 5.6 19.7 10.3 15.6 8.1 14.2 6.7 10.5 3.6
Other
technical 7.5 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.8 6.8 8.6 6.1 7.3 5.0
Admin. &
clerical 18.3 22.3 17.5 22.6 19.6 22.0 22.0 18.5 24.5 18.7
Mechanics 23.9 12.8 29.6 20.5 28.9 16.2 24.2 15.1 29.1 13.6
Crafts 5.3 4.0 6.9 7.4 7.7 6.8 8.8 7.2 8.6 6.1
Services 10.6 15.5 9.2 15.1 10.8 22.3 12.3 31.9 11.7 40.4

This change was dramatically highlighted by the occupational distribution of naval personnel in 1962 (_Table 21_). Among General Qualification Test Groups I and II, the percentage of Negroes assigned to service occupations, mainly stewards, commissarymen, and the (p. 527) like, declined from 22 percent of those with more than twelve years' service to 2 percent of those with less than twelve years' service, with sharp increases in the "other technical" group, mainly medical and dental specialists, and smaller increases in other technical skills. A similar trend also appeared in the lower mental categories. One persisting occupational difference was the tendency to assign a relatively large percentage of Negroes with high aptitudes to "other technical" skills and those of low aptitude to service occupations. The group admitted that these differences required further analysis.

Table 21--Percentage Distribution of Navy Enlisted Personnel by Race, AFQT Groups and Occupational Areas, and Length of Service, 1962

AFQT Group and 0-12 Years 12 Years & Over
Occupational Area[1] White Negro White Negro

Groups I and II
Electronics 35.7 29.5 25.6 21.1
Other technical 11.4 25.9 10.4 10.5
Admin. & clerical 8.5 10.9 14.6 14.0
Mechanics & repairmen 37.5 26.1 33.1 22.5
Crafts 6.4 5.4 12.9 10.3
Services .6 2.2 3.5 21.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Group III
Electronics 10.3 9.1 8.8 4.2
Other technical 7.1 12.3 6.2 3.0
Admin. & clerical 9.7 12.9 12.4 8.2
Mechanics & repairmen 56.7 42.2 36.7 16.5
Crafts 13.2 11.1 25.2 16.9
Services 3.0 12.4 10.8 51.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Group IV
Electronics 5.3 1.4 2.9 .5
Other technical 3.7 1.7 2.9 .4
Admin. & clerical 6.9 8.1 7.0 2.5
Mechanics & repairmen 60.8 44.2 35.8 7.3
Crafts 16.4 13.5 32.5 9.5
Services 6.9 31.1 19.4 79.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

[Tablenote 1: Excludes personnel not classified by
occupation, such as recruits and general duty
seamen.]

Reporting on promotions, the Defense Department group found that the relatively limited advancement of black officers was caused chiefly by their disadvantage in point of time in service and grade, branch of service, and educational background (_Table 22_). Although the difference in grade distribution among black and white enlisted men was much smaller, it too seemed related to disadvantages in education and service occupation. Again, for Negroes entering the services since 1950, the grade distribution had become similar to that of whites. The Navy's experience illustrated this point. In the case of those entering the Navy since the Korean War, the grade distribution of whites and nonwhites within the first three mental categories was nearly identical (_Table 23_). The divergences were much wider among the more senior men in the service groups, but this was probably due at least in part to the concentration of senior black servicemen in relatively overmanned specialties, such as food service, where promotional opportunities were limited. With this exception little evidence exists that whites enjoyed an advantage over blacks in the matter of promotions in the enlisted ranks.

Table 22--Percentage Distribution of Blacks and Whites by Pay Grade, All DOD, 1962

Grade Black White

Officers
O-1 to O-2 35.9 34.5
O-3 47.7 30.2
O-4 12.1 18.0
O-5 4.0 12.0
O-6 to O-10 .3 5.3
Total 100.0 100.0

Enlisted Men
E-1 to E-3 45.5 46.9
E-4 23.1 19.6
E-5 20.1 16.1
E-6 8.2 10.0
E-7 to E-9 3.0 7.5
Total 100.0 100.0

Table 23--Percentage Distribution of Navy Enlisted Personnel by Race, AFQT Groups, Pay Grade, and Length of Service, 1962

0-12 Years Over 12 Years
Pay Grade White Negro White Negro

AFQT Groups I & II
E-1 to E-3 50.0 50.4 0.1 0.5
E-4 22.5 21.8 1.0 5.3
E-5 17.8 18.6 6.6 16.8
E-6 8.3 8.5 30.8 33.9
E-7 to E-9 1.4 .7 61.5 43.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

AFQT Group III
E-1 to E-3 60.6 60.5 0.5 3.5
E-4 20.7 20.4 4.4 14.7
E-5 13.1 14.2 19.3 28.8
E-6 5.1 4.6 40.1 33.7
E-7 to E-9 .5 .3 35.7 19.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

AFQT Group IV
E-1 to E-3 77.1 61.2 2.2 12.2
E-4 13.0 23.3 14.9 32.6
E-5 7.9 13.0 34.0 29.9
E-6 1.9 2.4 32.4 19.3
E-7 to E-9 .1 [a] 16.5 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

[Tablenote a: Less than .05 percent.]

All these figures could be conjured up when the services had to answer complaints of discrimination, but more often than not the services contented themselves with a vague defense of the _status quo_[20-82] Such answers were clearly unacceptable to civil rights leaders (p. 528) and their allies in the administration, and it is not surprising that the complaints persisted. To the argument that higher enlistment standards were a matter of military economy during a period of partial mobilizations, those concerned about civil rights responded that, since marginal manpower was a necessary ingredient of full mobilization, the services should learn to deal in peacetime with what would be a wartime problem.[20-83] To pleas of helplessness against off-base discrimination, the activists argued that these practices had demonstrably adverse effects on the morale of more than 9 percent of the armed forces and were, therefore, a clear threat to the accomplishment of the services' military mission.[20-84]

[Footnote 20-82: See, for example, the following
Memos: Dep Under SA (Manpower) for ASD (M), 30 Mar
62, sub: Servicemen's Complaints of Discrimination
in the U.S. Military; AF Dep for Manpower, Pers,
and Organization for ASD (M), 29 Mar 62, sub:
Alleged Racial Discrimination Within the Air Force;
Under SecNav for ASD (M), 16 Mar 62, sub:
Discrimination in the U.S. Military Services. All
in ASD (M) 291.2 (12 Feb 62).]

[Footnote 20-83: Ginzberg, _The Negro Potential_, p.
90.]

[Footnote 20-84: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
_Civil Rights '63_, pp. 210-11.]

Integration of black servicemen and general political and economic gains of the black population had combined in the last decade to create a ground swell for reform that resulted in ever more frequent and pressing attacks on the community policies of the Department (p. 529) of Defense. Some members of the administration rode with the reform movement. Although he was speaking particularly of increased black enrollment at the military academies, Special White House Assistant Wofford betrayed the reformer's attitude toward the whole problem of equal opportunity when he told James Evans "I am sure that much work has been done, but there is, of course, still a long way to go."[20-85] But by 1962 the services had just about exhausted the traditional reform methods available to them. To go further, as Wofford and the civil rights advocates demanded, meant a fundamental change in the department's commitment to equal treatment and opportunity. The decision to make such a change was clearly up to Secretary McNamara and the Kennedy administration.

[Footnote 20-85: Memo, Wofford for Evans, 2 Feb 62,
Wofford Collection, J. F. Kennedy Library.]