Chapter 13: (p. 315) (1)

Service Interests Versus Presidential Intent

Several months elapsed between the appointment of the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services and its first meeting, a formal session with the President at the White House on 12 January 1949. Actually, certain advantages accrued from the delay, for postponing the meetings until after the President's reelection enabled the committee to face the services with assurance of continued support from the administration. Renewed presidential backing was probably necessary, considering the services' deliberations on race policy during this half-year hiatus. Their reactions to the order, logical outgrowths of postwar policies and practices, demonstrated how their perceived self-interests might subvert the President's intentions. The events of this six-month period also began to show the relative importance of the order and the parochial interests of the services as factors in the integration of the armed forces.

_Public Reaction to Executive Order 9981_

Considering the substantial changes it promised, the President's order provoked surprisingly little public opposition. Its publication coincided with the convening of the special session of a Congress smarting under Truman's "do-nothing" label. In this charged political atmosphere, the anti-administration majority in Congress quietly sidestepped the President's 27 July call for civil rights legislation. To do otherwise would only have added to the political profits already garnered by Truman in some important voting areas. For the same reason congressional opponents avoided all mention of Executive Order 9981, although the widely expected defeat of Truman and the consequent end to this executive sally into civil rights might have contributed to the silence. Besides, segregationists could do little in an immediate legislative way to counteract the presidential command. Congress had already passed the Selective Service Act and Defense Appropriations Act, the most suitable vehicles for amendments aimed at modifying the impact of the integration order. National elections and the advent of a new Congress precluded any other significant moves in this direction until later in the next year.

Yet if it was ignored in Congress, the order was nevertheless a clear signal to the friends of integration and brought with it a tremendous surge of hope to the black community. Publishing the order made Harry Truman the "darling of the Negroes," Roy Wilkins said later. Nor did the coincidence of its publication to the election, he added, bother a group that was becoming increasingly pragmatic about the reasons (p. 316) for social reform.[13-1] Both the declaredly Democratic Chicago _Defender_ and Republican-oriented Pittsburgh _Courier_ were aware of the implications of the order. The _Defender_ ran an editorial on 7 August under the heading "Mr. Truman Makes History." The "National Grapevine" column of Charlie Cherokee in the same issue promised its readers a blow-by-blow description of the events surrounding the President's action. An interview in the same issue with Col. Richard L. Jones, black commander of the 178th Regimental Combat Team (Illinois), emphasized the beneficial effects of the proposed integration, and in the next issue, 14 August, the editor broadened the discussion with an editorial entitled "What About Prejudice?"[13-2] The _Courier_, for its part, questioned the President's sincerity because he had not explicitly called for an end to segregation. At the same time it contrasted the futility of civil disobedience with the efficiency of such an order on the services, and while maintaining its support for the candidacy of Governor Dewey the paper revealed a strong enthusiasm for President Truman's civil rights program.[13-3]

[Footnote 13-1: Columbia University Oral Hist Interv
with Wilkins.]

[Footnote 13-2: Chicago _Defender_, August 7 and
August 14, 1948.]

[Footnote 13-3: Pittsburgh _Courier_, August 7, August
28, and September 25, 1948.]

These affirmations of support for Executive Order 9981 in the major black newspapers fitted in neatly with the administration's political strategy. Nor was the Democratic National Committee averse to using the order to win black votes. For example it ran a half-page advertisement in the _Defender_ under the heading "By His Deeds Shall Ye Know Him."[13-4] At the same time, not wishing to antagonize the opponents of integration further, the administration made no special effort to publicize the order in the metropolitan press. Consequently, when the order was mentioned at all, it was usually carried without comment, and the few columnists who treated the subject did so with some caution. Arthur Krock's "Reform Attempts Aid Southern Extremists" in the New York _Times_, for example, lauded the President's civil rights initiatives but warned that any attempt to force social integration would only strengthen demagogues at the expense of moderate politicians.[13-5]

[Footnote 13-4: Chicago _Defender_, August 21, 1948.]

[Footnote 13-5: New York _Times_, September 12, 1948.]

If the President's wooing of the black voter was good election politics, his executive order was also a successful practical response to the threat of civil disobedience and the failure of the Secretary of Defense to strive actively for racial equality throughout the services. Declaring the President's action a substantial gain, A. Philip Randolph canceled the call for a boycott of the draft, leaving only a small number of diehards to continue the now insignificant effort. The black leaders who had participated in Secretary Forrestal's National Defense Conference gave the President their full support, and Donald S. Dawson, administrative assistant to the President, was able to assure Truman that the black press, now completely behind the committee on equal treatment and opportunity, had abandoned its vigorous campaign against the Army's racial policy.[13-6]

[Footnote 13-6: Memo, Donald Dawson for President, 9
Sep 48, Nash Collection, Truman Library; Memo,
SecDef for [Clark] Clifford, 2 Aug 48, and Ltr,
Bayard Rustin of the Campaign to Resist Military
Segregation to James V. Forrestal, 20 Aug 48; both
in D54-1-14, SecDef files. It should be noted that
Dawson's claim that the black press universally
supported the executive order has not been accepted
by all commentators; see McCoy and Ruetten, _Quest
and Response_, p. 130.]

Ironically, the most celebrated pronouncement on segregation at (p. 317) the moment of the Truman order came not from publicists or politicians but from the Army's new Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley.[13-7] Speaking to a group of instructors at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and unaware of the President's order and the presence of the press, Bradley declared that the Army would have to retain segregation as long as it was the national pattern.[13-8] This statement prompted questions at the President's next news conference, letters to the editor, and debate in the press.[13-9] Bradley later explained that he had supported the Army's segregation policy because he was against making the Army an instrument of social change in areas of the country which still rejected integration.[13-10] His comment, as amplified and broadcast by military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin, summarized the Army's position at the time of the Truman order. "It is extremely dangerous nonsense," Baldwin declared, "to try to make the Army other than one thing--a fighting machine." By emphasizing that the Army could not afford to differ greatly in customs, traditions, and prejudices from the general population, Baldwin explained, Bradley was only underscoring a major characteristic of any large organization of conscripts. Most import, Baldwin pointed out, the Chief of Staff considered an inflexible order for the immediate integration of all troops one of the surest ways to break down the morale of the Army and destroy its efficiency.[13-11]

[Footnote 13-7: Bradley succeeded Eisenhower as Chief
of Staff on 7 February 1948.]

[Footnote 13-8: Washington _Post_, July 28, 1948;
Atlanta _Constitution_, July 28, 1948.]

[Footnote 13-9: News Conference, 29 Jul 48, _Public
Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948_,
p. 165; New York _Times_, July 30, 1948; Chicago
_Defender_, August 7, 1948; Pittsburgh _Courier_,
August 21, 1948; Washington _Post_, August 23,
1948.]

[Footnote 13-10: Interv, Nichols with Bradley.]

[Footnote 13-11: Hanson Baldwin, "Segregation in the
Army," New York _Times_, August 8, 1948.]

But such arguments were under attack by the very civil rights groups the President was trying to court. "Are we to understand that the President's promise to end discrimination," one critic asked,

was made for some other purpose than to end discrimination in its
worst form--segregation? General Bradley's statement, subsequent
to the President's orders, would seem to indicate that the
President either did not mean what he said or his orders were not
being obeyed. We should like to point out that General Bradley's
reported observation ... was decidedly wide of the mark.
Segregation is the legal pattern of only a few of our most
backward states.... In view of the trends in law and social
practice, it is high time that the Defense forces were not used
as brakes on progress toward genuine democracy.[13-12]

[Footnote 13-12: Ltr, A. A. Heist, Dir, American Civil
Liberties Union, South California Branch, to
Forrestal, 7 Sep 48, D54-1-4, SecDef files.]

General Bradley apologized to the President for any confusion caused by his statement, and Truman publicly sloughed off the affair, but not before he stated to the press that his order specifically directed the integration of the armed forces.[13-13] It was obvious that the situation had developed into a standoff. Some of the President's most (p. 318) outspoken supporters would not let him forget his integration order, and the Army, as represented by its Chief of Staff, failed to realize that events were rapidly moving beyond the point where segregation could be considered a workable policy for an agency of the United States government.

[Footnote 13-13: Ltrs, Bradley to President Truman, 30
Jul 48, and Truman to Bradley, 4 Aug 48, CSUSA
291.2 (4 Aug 48). See also Ltr, SA to President, 29
Jul 48, OSA 291.2 (Negroes) (7-29-48).]

_The Army: Segregation on the Defensive_

The President's order heralded a series of attacks on the Army's race policy. As further evidence of the powerful pressures for change, several state governors now challenged segregation in the National Guard. Generally the race policy of the reserve components echoed that of the Regular Army, in part because it seemed logical that state units, subject to federal service, conform to federal standards of performance and organization. Accordingly, in the wake of the publication of the Gillem Board Report, the Army's Director of Personnel and Administration recommended to the Committee on National Guard Policy[13-14] that it amend its regulation on the employment of black troops to conform more closely with the new policy. Specifically, General Paul asked the committee to spell out the prohibition against integration of white and black troops below battalion level, warning that federal recognition would be denied any state unit organized in violation of this order.[13-15]

[Footnote 13-14: As provided in various laws since
1920, most notably in Section V of the amendments
to the National Defense Act, members of the General
Staff's Committee on National Guard Policy and
Committee on Reserve Policy were the principal
advisers to the Secretary of War on reserve
component matters. All questions regarding these
organizations were referred to the committees,
which usually met in combined session as the
Committee on National Guard and Reserve Policy. The
combined committee was composed of twenty-one
officers, seven each from the Regular Army, the
guard, and the reserves. When the business under
consideration was restricted exclusively to one of
the reserve components, the representatives of the
other would absent themselves, the remaining
members, along with the Regular Army members,
reconstituting themselves as the Committee on
National Guard Policy or the Committee on Reserve
Policy. These groups, familiarly known as the
"Section V Committees," wielded considerable power
in the development of the postwar program for the
reserves.]

[Footnote 13-15: Memo, Chief, Classification and
Personnel Actions Br, P&A, for Brig Gen Ira Swift,
Chief, Liaison, Planning and Policy Coordination
Gp, P&A, 8 Apr 47, sub: Resolution Regarding
Employment of Negro Troops in the National Guard;
Memo, Dir, P&A, for Dir, Intel, 9 Apr 47, same sub;
both in WDGPA 291.2 (3 Apr 47).]

Agreeing to comply with General Paul's request, the National Guard Committee went a step further and recommended that individual states be permitted to make their own decisions on the wisdom and utility of organizing separate black units.[13-16] The Army staff rejected this proposal, however, on the grounds that it gave too much discretionary power to the state guard authorities.[13-17] Interestingly enough in view of later developments, neither the committee nor the staff disputed the War Department's right to withhold federal recognition in racial matters, and both displayed little concern for the principle of (p. 319) states' rights. Their attitude was important, for while the prohibition against integration sat well in some circles, it drew severe criticism in others. Unlike the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Army Reserve were composed of units deeply rooted in the local community, each reflecting the parochial attitudes of its members and its section. This truth was forcefully pointed out to the Army staff in 1946 when it tried to reactivate the 313th Infantry and designate it as a black unit in the 79th Division (Pennsylvania). Former members of the old white 313th, now prominent citizens, expressed their "very strong sentiments" on the matter, and the Army had to beat a hasty retreat. In the future, the staff decided, either black reserve units would be given the name and history of inactive black units or new units would be constituted.[13-18]

[Footnote 13-16: DF, WDGS Cmte on National Guard
Policy, to Chief, NGB, 20 May 47, sub: Integration
of Negro Troops; idem to Dir, P&A, and Dir, O&T,
same date and sub. See also Ltr, Maj Gen Kenneth F.
Cramer, CG, 43d Inf Div (Conn. NG) to Col Russell
Y. Moore, OCofS, 17 Mar 47. All in Office file,
Army Reserve Forces Policy Cmte.]

[Footnote 13-17: Memo, Dir, O&T, for WDGS Cmte on
National Guard Policy, 23 Jun 47, sub: Integration
of Negro Troops, WDGOT 291.2.]

[Footnote 13-18: Memo, Exec for Reserve and ROTC
Affairs, O&T, for Dir, O&T, 22 Jul 46; O&T Memo for
Rcd, 12 Aug 46; both in WDGOT 291.2.]

On the other hand, in 1947 citizen groups sprang up in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and California to agitate among their state adjutants general for liberalization of the National Guard's racial policy. As early as February 1947 Governor James L. McConnaughy had publicly deplored segregation of Negroes in his own Connecticut National Guard. Adopting the states' rights stance more commonly associated with defenders of racial discrimination, Governor McConnaughy argued that by requiring segregation the War Department ran contrary to the wishes of individual states. Marcus Ray, the secretary's adviser on race, predicted that integration in the reserve components would continue to be a "point of increasing pressure." As he pointed out to Assistant Secretary Petersen, the Army had always supported segregation in its southern installations on the grounds that it had to conform with local mores. How then could it refuse to conform with the local statutes and customs of some northern states without appearing inconsistent? He recommended the Army amend its race policy to permit reserve components in states which wished it to integrate at a level consistent with "local community attitudes."[13-19]

[Footnote 13-19: Memo, Ray for Petersen, 2 Apr 47,
sub: Integration of Negro Personnel in the Reserve
Components, ASW 291.2.]

The Army staff would have nothing to do with Ray's suggestion. Instead, both the Director of Personnel and Administration and the Director of Organization and Training supported a new resolution by the National Guard Policy Committee that left the number of black units and the question of their integration with white units above the company level up to the states involved. Integration at the company level was prohibited, and such integrated companies would be denied federal recognition. The committee's resolution was adopted by the Secretary of War in May 1947.[13-20]

[Footnote 13-20: Memo, D/O&T for ASW, 17 Apr 47, sub:
Integration of Negro Personnel in the Reserve
Components, WDGOT 291.2; Memo, D/P&A thru D/O&T for
ASW, 10 Apr 47, same sub, WDGPA 291.2; DF, D/P&A to
CofS, 20 May 47, sub: Integration of Negro Troops,
CSUSA 291.2 Negroes.]

But the fight was not over yet. In 1947 New Jersey adopted a new constitution that specifically prohibited segregation in the state militia. By extension no New Jersey National Guard unit could receive federal recognition. In February 1948 Governor McConnaughy brought (p. 320) Connecticut back into the fray, this time taking the matter up with the White House. A month later Governor Luther W. Youngdahl appealed to the Secretary of Defense on behalf of Negroes in the Minnesota National Guard. Secretary of the Army Royall quickly reappraised the situation and excepted New Jersey from the Army's segregation rule. Secretary Symington followed suit by excepting the New Jersey Air National Guard.[13-21] Royall also let the governors of Connecticut and Minnesota know that he would be inclined to make similar concessions to any state which, by legislative action, prohibited its governor from conforming to the federal requirements. At that time Connecticut and Minnesota had no such legislation, but Royall nevertheless agreed to refer their requests to his Committee on National Guard Policy.[13-22]

[Footnote 13-21: Ltr, Kenneth Royall to Alfred
Driscoll, 7 Feb 48; Ltr, W. Stuart Symington to
Driscoll, 17 Mar 48; copies of both in CMH.]

[Footnote 13-22: Ltrs, SA to Luther Youngdahl and
James C. Shannon, 20 May 48, both in OSA 291.2
Negroes (5-28-48); Memos, CofSA for Dir, O&T, 2 Jan
and 9 Mar 48, sub: Utilization of Negroes in the
National Guard, CSUSA 291.2. Shannon succeeded
McConnaughy as governor of Connecticut in March
1948.]

Here the secretary did no more than comply with the National Defense Act, which required that all National Guard policy matters be formulated in the committee. Privately, Royall admitted that he did not feel bound to accept a committee recommendation and would be inclined to recognize any state prohibition against segregation. But he made a careful distinction between constitutional or legislative action and executive action in the states. A governor's decision to integrate, he pointed out, would not be recognized by the Army because such an action was subject to speedy reversal by the governor's successor and could cause serious confusion in the guard.[13-23] (p. 321) The majority of the National Guard Committee, supported by the Director of Organization and Training, recommended that the secretary make no exceptions to the segregation policy. The Director of Personnel and Administration, on the other hand, joined with the committee's minority in recommending that Royall's action in the New Jersey case be used as a precedent.[13-24] Commenting independently, General Bradley warned Royall that integrating individual Negroes in the National Guard would, from a military point of view, "create problems which may have serious consequences in case of national mobilization of those units."[13-25]

[Footnote 13-23: Remarks by Kenneth Royall in the
Committee of Four, 9 Mar 48, OSD Historical Office
files.]

[Footnote 13-24: P&A Summary Sheet, 7 Jul 48, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the National
Guard, WDGPA 291.2; O&T Summary Sheet, 8 Apr 48,
same sub. See also Memo, Col William Abendroth,
Exec, Cmte on NG and Reserve Policy, for CofSA, 30
Jun 48, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
National Guard of the United States, Office file,
Army Reserve Forces Policy Cmte. Thirteen of the
seventeen committee members concurred with the
staff study without reservation; the remaining four
concurred with the proviso that states prohibiting
segregation be granted the right to integrate.]

[Footnote 13-25: Memo, CofSA for SA, 7 Jul 48, CSUSA
291.2 Negroes (1 Jul 48).]

Here the matter would stand for some time, the Army's segregation policy intact, but an informal allowance made for excepting individual states from prohibitions against integration below the company level. Yet the publicity and criticism attendant upon these decisions might well have given the traditionalists pause. While Secretary Royall, and on occasion his superior, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, reiterated the Army's willingness to accommodate certain states,[13-26] civil rights groups were gaining allies for another proposition. The American Veterans Committee had advanced the idea that to forbid integration at the platoon level was a retreat from World War II practice, and to accept the excuse that segregation was in the interest of national defense was to tolerate a "travesty on words."[13-27] Hearings were conducted in Congress in 1949 and 1951 on bills H.R. 1403 and H.R. 1389 to prohibit segregation in the National Guard. Royall's interpretation of the National Defense Act did not satisfy advocates of a thoroughly integrated guard, for it was clear that not many states were likely to petition for permission to integrate. At the same time the exceptions to the segregation rule promised an incompatible situation between the segregated active forces and the incompletely integrated reserve organization.

[Footnote 13-26: See Ltrs, James Forrestal to A. A.
Heist, Dir, American Civil Liberties Union, 13 Sep
48, and Augustus F. Hawkins, 22 Sep 48; both in
D54-1-2, SecDef files; DF, Dir, P&A, to CofSA, 2
Nov 49, sub: Executive Order to Permit Integration
of Negroes Into Minnesota National Guard, CSUSA
291.2 Negroes (2 Nov 49).]

[Footnote 13-27: Ltr, J. Steward McClendon, Secy,
Minneapolis Chapter, Am Vets Cmte, to SecDef
[_sic_] Royall, 28 May 48, CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (28
May 48).]

Royall's ruling, while perhaps a short-term gain for traditionalists, was significant because it established a precedent that would be used by integrationists in later years. The price for defending the Army's segregation policy, guard officials discovered, was the surrender of their long-cherished claim of state autonomy. The committee's recommendation on the matter of applying the Gillem Board policy to the guard was inflexible, leaving no room for separate decisions by officials of the several states. Maj. Gen. Jim Dan Hill of the Wisconsin National Guard recognized this danger. Along with a minority of his colleagues he maintained that the decision on segregation "will have to be solved at the state level."[13-28] The committee (p. 322) majority argued the contrary, agreeing with Brig. Gen. Alexander G. Paxton of Mississippi that the National Defense Act of 1945 prohibited the sort of exception made in the New Jersey case. General Paxton called for a uniform policy for all guard units:

National Security is an obligation of all the states, and its
necessity in time of emergency transcends all local issues.
Federal recognition of the National Guard units of the several
States is extended for the purpose of affording these units a
Federal status under the National Defense Act. The issue in
question is purely one of compliance with Federal Law.[13-29]

[Footnote 13-28: Ltr, Maj Gen Jim Dan Hill, Wisconsin
National Guard, to Secy, WD Advisory Cmte, 24 Jun
48; see also Ltr, Brig Gen Harry Evans, Maryland
National Guard, to Col William Abendroth, Exec,
Cmte on NG and Reserve Policy, 22 Jun 48, Office
file, Army Reserve Forces Policy Cmte.]

[Footnote 13-29: Ltr, Brig Gen A. G. Paxton,
Mississippi National Guard, to Col William
Abendroth, 13 May 1948, Office file, Army Reserve
Forces Policy Cmte.]

Here was tacit recognition of federal supremacy over the National Guard. In supporting the right of the Secretary of the Army to dictate racial policy to state guards in 1948, the National Guard Committee adopted a position that would haunt it when the question of integrating the guard came up again in the early 1960's.

Despite the publicity given to General Bradley's comments at Fort Knox, it was the Secretary of the Army, not the Chief of Staff, who led the fight against change in the Army's racial practices. As the debate over these practices warmed in the administration and the national press, Kenneth C. Royall emerged as the principal spokesman against further integration and the principal target of the civil rights forces. Royall's sincere interest in the welfare of black soldiers, albeit highly paternalistic, was not in question. His trouble with civil rights officials stemmed from the fact that he alone in the Truman administration still clung publicly to the belief that segregation was not in itself discrimination, a belief shared by many of his fellow citizens. Royall was convinced that the separate but equal provisions of the Army's Gillem Board policy were right in as much as they did provide equal treatment and opportunity for the black minority. His opinion was reinforced by the continual assurances of his military subordinates that in open competition with white soldiers few Negroes would ever achieve a proportionate share of promotions and better occupations. And when his subordinates added to this sentiment the notion that integration would disrupt the Army and endanger its efficiency, they quickly persuaded the already sympathetic Royall that segregation was not only correct but imperative.[13-30] The secretary might easily have agreed with General Paul, who told an assembly of Army commanders that aside from some needed improvement in the employment of black specialists "there isn't a single complaint anyone can make in our use of the Negro."[13-31]

[Footnote 13-30: Ltr, Marx Leva to author, 24 May 70,
CMH files; see also Testimony of Royall at National
Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr 48,
copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 13-31: General Paul's Remarks at Army
Commanders Conference, 30 Mar-2 Apr 48, p. 30,
CSUSA 337.]

Secure in his belief that segregation was right and necessary, Royall confidently awaited the judgment of the recently appointed President's committee. He was convinced that any fair judge could draw but one conclusion: under the provisions of Circular 124, Negroes had (p. 323) already achieved equal treatment and opportunity in the Army. His job, therefore, was relatively simple. He had to defend Army policy against outside attack and make sure it was applied uniformly throughout the service. His stand marked one of the last attempts by a major federal official to support a racially separate but equal system before the principle was finally struck down by the Supreme Court in _Brown_ v. _Board of Education_.

Royall readily conceded that it was proper and necessary for Negroes to insist on integration, but, echoing a long-cherished Army belief, he adamantly opposed using the Army to support or oppose any social cause. The Army, he contended, must follow the nation, not lead it, in social matters. The Army must not experiment. When, "without prejudice to the National Defense," the Army could reduce segregation to the platoon level it would do so, but all such steps should be taken one at a time. And 1948, he told the conference of black leaders in April of that year, was not the time.[13-32]

[Footnote 13-32: See Testimony of Royall at National
Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr 48, pp.
24-26.]

Convinced of the rightness of the Army's policy, Secretary Royall was understandably agitated by the unfavorable publicity directed at him and his department. The publicity, he was convinced, resulted from discrimination on the part of "the Negro and liberal press" (p. 324) against the Army's policy in favor of the Navy and Air Force. He was particularly incensed at the way the junior services had escaped the "rap"--his word--on racial matters. He ascribed it in large part, he told the Secretary of Defense in September 1948, to the "unfortunate" National Defense Conference, the gathering of black spokesmen held under Forrestal's auspices the previous spring.[13-33] The specific object of Royall's indignation was Lester Granger's final report on the work of the National Defense Conference. That report emphasized the conferees' rebuttal to Royall's defense of segregation on the grounds of military expediency and past experience with black soldiers. The Army has assumed a position, Granger claimed, that was unjustified by its own experience. Overlooking evidence to the contrary, Granger added that the Army position was at variance with the experience of the other services. His parting shot was aimed at the heart of the Army's argument: "It is as unwise as it is unsound to cite the resistance of military leadership against basic changes in policy as sufficient cause for delaying immediate and effective action."[13-34]

[Footnote 13-33: Memo, SA for SecDef, 22 Sep 48, copy
in CD30-1-2, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 13-34: Ltr, Granger and Conferees to
Forrestal, 26 Aug 48, D54-1-3, SecDef files.]

Adding to Royall's discomfort, Forrestal released the report on 8 September, and his letter of appreciation to Granger and the conferees assured them he would send their report to the President's committee. The New York _Times_ promptly picked up Granger's reference to opposition among military leaders.[13-35] Royall tried to counter this attack. Since neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense had disapproved the Army's racial policy nor suggested any modifications, Royall told Forrestal he wanted him to go on record as approving the Army position. This course would doubtless be more palatable to Forrestal, Royall suggested, than having Royall announce that Forrestal had given tacit approval to the Army's policy.[13-36]

[Footnote 13-35: NME Press Release, 8 Sep 48; New York
_Times_, September 9, 1948; Memo, Leva for
Forrestal, 30 Aug 48; Ltr, Forrestal to Granger, 30
Aug 48. Last two in D54-1-3, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 13-36: Memo, SA for SecDef, 22 Sep 48, copy
in CD30-1-2, SecDef files.]

Forrestal quickly scotched this maneuver. It was true, he told Royall, that the Army's policy had not been disapproved. But neither had the Army's policy or that of the Navy or Air Force yet been reviewed by the Secretary of Defense. The President's committee would probably make such a review an early order of business. Meanwhile, the Army's race policy would continue in effect until it was altered either by Forrestal's office or by action from some other source.[13-37]

[Footnote 13-37: Memo (unsigned), Forrestal for
Royall, 22 Sep 48. The answer was prepared by Leva
and used by Forrestal as the basis for his
conversation with Royall. See Memos, Leva for
Forrestal, undated, and 30 Sep 48, both in
CD30-1-2, SecDef files.]

Even as Secretary Royall tried to defend the Army from the attacks of the press, the service's policy was challenged from another quarter. The blunt fact was that with the reinstitution of selective service in 1948 the Army was receiving more black recruits--especially those in the lower mental categories--than a segregated system could easily absorb. The high percentage of black soldiers so proudly publicized by Royall at the National Defense Conference was in fact a source of anxiety for Army planners. The staff particularly resented the different standards adopted by the other services to determine (p. 325) the acceptability of selectees. The Navy and Air Force, pleading their need for skilled workers and dependence on volunteer enlistments, imposed a higher minimum achievement score for admission than the Army, which, largely dependent upon the draft for its manpower, was required to accept men with lower scores. Thousands of Negroes, less skilled and with little education, were therefore eligible for service in the Army although they were excluded from the Navy and Air Force. Given such circumstances, it was probably inevitable that differences in racial policies would precipitate an interservice conflict. The Army claimed the difference in enlistment standards was discriminatory and contrary to the provisions of the draft law which required the Secretary of Defense to set enlistment standards. In April 1948 Secretary Royall demanded that Forrestal impose the same mental standards on all the services. He wanted inductees allocated to the services according to their physical and mental abilities and Negroes apportioned among them.

The other services countered that there were not enough well-educated people of draft age to justify raising the Army's mental standards to the Navy and Air Force levels, but neither service wanted to lower its own entrance standards to match the level necessity had imposed on the Army. The Air Force eventually agreed to enlist Negroes at a 10 percent ratio to whites, but the Navy held out for higher standards and no allocation by race. It contended that setting the same standards for all services would improve the quality of the Army's black enlistees only imperceptibly while it would do great damage to the Navy. The Navy admitted that the other services should help the Army, but not "up to the point of _unnecessarily_ reducing their own effectiveness.... The modern Navy cannot operate its ships and aircraft with personnel of G.C.T. 70."[13-38] General Bradley cut to the point: if the Navy carried the day it would receive substantially fewer Negroes than the other two services and a larger portion of the best qualified.[13-39] Secretary Forrestal first referred the interservice controversy to the Munitions Board in May 1948 and later that summer to a special interservice committee. After both groups failed to reach an agreement,[13-40] Forrestal decided not to force a parity in mental standards upon the services. On 12 October he explained to the secretaries that parity could be imposed only during time of full mobilization, and since conditions in the period between October 1948 and June 1949 could not be considered comparable to those of full mobilization, parity was impossible. He promised, however, to study the qualitative needs of each service. Meanwhile, he had found no evidence that any service was discriminating in the selection of enlistees and settled for a warning that any serious (p. 326) discrimination by any two of the services would place "an intolerable burden" on the third.[13-41]

[Footnote 13-38: Memo, SecNav for SecDef, 27 May 48,
sub: Liaison With the Selective Service System and
Determination of Parity Standards, P14-6; Memo,
Actg SecNav for SecDef, 17 Aug 48; sub: Items in
Disagreement Between the Services as Listed in
SecDef's Memo of 15 Jul 48, P 14-4; both in
GenRecsNav. The quotation is from an inclosure to
the latter memo.]

[Footnote 13-39: CofSA, Rpt of War Council Min, 3 Aug
48, copy in OSD Historical Office files.]

[Footnote 13-40: For a detailed analysis of the
various service arguments and positions, see Office
of the Secretary of Defense, "Proposed Findings and
Decisions on Questions of Parity of Mental
Standards, Allocation of Inductees According to
Physical and Mental Capabilities and Allocation of
Negroes" (Noble Report), 29 Oct 48, copy in SecDef
files.]

[Footnote 13-41: Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 12 Oct
48, with attached Summary of Supplement, copy in
CMH.]

Convinced that Forrestal had made the wrong decision, the Army staff was nevertheless obliged to concern itself with the percentage of Negroes it would have to accept under the new selective service law. Although by November 1948 the Army's black strength had dropped to 9.83 percent of the total, its proportion of Negroes was still large when compared with the Navy's 4.3 percent, the Marine Corps' 1.79 percent, and the Air Force's 6 percent. Projecting these figures against the possible mobilization of five million men (assuming each service increased in proportion to its current strength and absorbed the same percentage of a black population remaining at 12 percent of the whole), the Army calculated that its low entrance requirements would give it a black strength of 21 percent. In the event of a mobilization equaling or surpassing that of World War II, the minimum test score of seventy would probably be lowered, and thus the Army would shoulder an even greater burden of poorly educated men, a burden that in the Army's view should be shared by all the services.[13-42]

[Footnote 13-42: DF, Dir, P&A, to CofS, 24 Jan 49,
sub: Experimental Unit, GSPGA 291.2 (24 Jan 49).]

_A Different Approach_

No matter how the Army tried to justify segregation or argue against the position of the Navy and Air Force, the integrationists continued to gain ground. Royall, in opposition, adopted a new tactic in the wake of the Truman order. He would have the Army experiment with integration, perhaps proving that it would not work on a large scale, certainly buying time for Circular 124 and frustrating the rising demand for change. He had expressed willingness to experiment with an integrated Army unit when Lester Granger made the suggestion through Forrestal in February 1948, but nothing came of it.[13-43] In September he returned to the idea, asking the Army staff to plan for the formation of an integrated unit about the size of a regimental combat team, along with an engineer battalion and the station complement of a post large enough to accommodate these troops. Black enlisted men were to form 10 percent of the troop basis and be used in all types of positions. Black officers, used in the same ratio as black officers in the whole Army, were to command mixed troops. General Bradley reported the staff had studied the idea and concluded that such units "did not prove anything on the subject." Royall, however, dismissed the staff's objection and reiterated his order to plan an experiment at a large installation and in a permanent unit.[13-44]

[Footnote 13-43: Memo, SecDef for President, 29 Feb
48, Secretary's File (PSF), Truman Library.]

[Footnote 13-44: Memo, CofS for Dir, O&T, 11 Oct 48,
CSUSA 291.2 Negroes (11 Oct 48).]

Despite the staff's obvious reluctance, Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, the new Director of Organization and Training, made an intensive study of the alternatives. He produced a plan that was in turn further refined by a group of senior officers including the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration and the Chief of Information.[13-45] These officers (p. 327) decided that "if the Secretary of the Army so orders," the Army could activate an experimental unit in the 3d Infantry Division at Camp Campbell, Kentucky. The troops, 10 percent of them black, would be drawn from all parts of the country and include ten black officers, none above the rank of major. The unit would be carefully monitored by the Army staff, and its commander would report on problems encountered after a year's trial.

[Footnote 13-45: Lt Col D. M. Oden, Asst Secy, CS,
Memo for Rcd, 4 Nov 48, sub: Organization of an
Experimental Unit, CSUSA 291.2 (Negroes) (11 Oct
48).]

It was obvious that Forrestal wanted to avoid publicizing the project. He had his assistants, Marx Leva and John Ohly, discuss the proposal with the Secretary of the Array to impress on him the need for secrecy until all arrangements were completed. More important, he hoped to turn Royall's experiment back on the Army itself, using it to gain a foothold for integration in the largest service. Leva and Ohly suggested to Royall that instead of activating a special unit he select a Regular Army regiment--Leva recommended one from the 82d Airborne Division to which a number of black combat units were already attached--as the nucleus of the experiment. With an eye to the forthcoming White House investigation, Leva added that, while the details would be left to the Army, integration of the unit, to be put into effect "as soon as possible," should be total.[13-46]

[Footnote 13-46: Memo, Marx Leva for SA, 22 Nov 48;
see also idem for Ohly, 16 Nov 48; both in CD
30-1-2, SecDef files.]

The plan for a large-scale integrated unit progressed little (p. 328) beyond this point, but it was significant if only because it marked the first time since the Revolution that the Army had seriously considered using a large number of black soldiers in a totally integrated unit. The situation was not without its note of irony, for the purpose of the plan was not to abolish the racial discrimination that critics were constantly laying at the Army's doorstep. In fact, Army leaders, seriously dedicated to the separate but equal principle, were convinced the Gillem Board policy had already eliminated discrimination. Nor was the plan designed to carry out the President's order or prompted by the Secretary of Defense. Rather, it was pushed by Secretary Royall as a means of defending the Army against the anticipated demands of the President's committee.

The plan died because, while the Army staff studied organizations and counted bodies, Royall expanded his proposal for an integrated unit to include elements of the whole national defense establishment. Several motives have been suggested for his move. By ensnaring the Navy and Air Force in the experiment, he might impress on all concerned the problems he considered certain to arise if any service attempted the integration of a large number of Negroes. An experiment involving the whole department might also divert the White House from trying to integrate the Army immediately. Besides, the scheme had an escape clause. If the Navy and Air Force refused to cooperate, and Royall thought it likely they would, given the shortage of skilled black recruits, the Army could then legitimately cancel its offer to experiment with integration and let the whole problem dissipate in a lengthy interservice argument.[13-47]

[Footnote 13-47: Interv, author with James C. Evans, 1
Jul 70; Ltr, E. W. Kenworthy, Exec Secy,
Presidential Committee, to Lee Nichols, 28 Jul 53;
both in CMH files.]

Royall formally proposed a defense-wide experiment in integration to Forrestal on 2 December. He was not oblivious to the impression his vacillation on the subject had produced and went to some lengths to explain why he had opposed such experiments in the past. Although he had been thinking about such an experiment for some time, he told Forrestal, he had publicly rejected the idea at the National Defense Conference and during the Senate hearings on the draft law because of the tense international situation and the small size of the Army at that time. His interest in the experiment revived as the size of the Army increased and similar suggestions were made by both black leaders and southern politicians, but again he had hesitated, this time because of the national elections. He was now prepared to go ahead, but only if similar action were taken by the other services.

The experimental units, he advised Forrestal, should contain both combat and service elements of considerable size, and he went on to specify their composition in some detail. The Navy and Marine Corps should include at least one shore station "where the social problems for individuals and their families will approximate those confronting the Army." To insure the experiment's usefulness, he wanted Negroes employed in all positions, including supervisory ones, for which they qualified, and he urged that attention be paid to "the problem of social relations in off-duty hours." He was candid about the plan's weaknesses. The right to transfer out of the experimental unit might confine the experiment to white and black troops who wanted it to (p. 329) succeed; hence any conclusions drawn might be challenged as invalid since men could not be given the right to exercise similar options in time of war. Therefore, if the experiment succeeded, it would have to be followed by another in which no voluntary options were granted. The experiment might also bring pressure from groups outside the Army, and if it failed "for any reason" the armed services would be accused of sabotage, no matter how sincere their effort. Curiously, he admitted that the plan was not favored by his military advisers. The Army staff, he noted in what must have surprised anyone familiar with the staff's consistent defense of segregation, thought the best way to eliminate segregation was to reduce gradually the size of segregated units and extend integration in schools, hospitals, and special units. Nevertheless, Royall recommended that the National Military Establishment as a whole, not the Army separately, go forward with the experiment and that it start early in 1949.[13-48]

[Footnote 13-48: Memo, SA for SecDef, 2 Dec 48, CD
30-1-2, SecDef files.]

The other services had no intention of going forward with such an experiment. The Air Force objected, as Secretary Symington explained, because the experiment would be inconclusive; too many artificial features were involved, especially having units composed of volunteers. Arbitrary quotas violated the principle of equal opportunity, he charged, and the experiment would be unfair to Negroes because the proportion of Negroes able to compete with whites was less than 1 to 10. Symington also warned against the public relations aspect of the scheme, which was of "minimal military significance but of major significance in the current public controversy on purely racial issues." The Air Force could conduct the experiment without difficulty, he conceded, for there were enough trained black technicians to man 10 percent of the positions and give a creditable performance, but these men were representative neither of the general black population of the Air Force nor of Negroes coming into the service during wartime.

Symington predicted that Negroes would suffer no matter how the experiment came out--success would be attributed to the special conditions involved; failure would reflect unjustly on the Negro's capabilities. The Air Force, therefore, preferred to refrain from participation in the experiment. Symington added that he was considering a study prepared by the Air staff over the past six months that would insure equality of treatment and increased opportunities for Negroes in the Air Force, and he expected to offer proposals to Forrestal in the immediate future.[13-49]

[Footnote 13-49: Memo, SecAF for SecDef, 22 Dec 48, CD
30-1-2, SecDef files.]

The Navy also wanted no part of the Royall experiment. Its acting secretary, John Nicholas Brown, believed that the gradual indoctrination of the naval establishment was producing the desired nondiscriminatory practices "on a sound and permanent basis without concomitant problems of morale and discipline." To adopt Royall's proposal, on the other hand, would "unnecessarily risk losing all that has been accomplished in the solution of the efficient utilization of Negro personnel to the limit of their ability."[13-50] Brown did not spell out the risk, but a Navy spokesman on Forrestal's staff was (p. 330) not so reticent. "Mutiny cannot be dismissed from consideration," Capt. Herbert D. Riley warned, if the Navy were forced to integrate its officers' wardrooms, staterooms, and clubs. Such integration ran considerably in advance of the Navy's current and carefully controlled integration of the enlisted general service and would, like the proposal to place Negroes in command of white officers and men, Captain Riley predicted, have such dire results as wholesale resignations and retirements.[13-51]

[Footnote 13-50: Memo, Actg SecNav for SecDef, 28 Dec
48, CD 30-1-2, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 13-51: Memo, Capt H. D. Riley, USN, OSD, for
SecDef, 6 Dec 48, sub: Comment on the Secretary of
the Army's Proposal Concerning Experimental
Non-Segregated Units in the Armed Forces, CD
30-1-2, SecDef files.]

The decisive opposition of the Navy and Air Force convinced Forrestal that interservice integration was unworkable. In short, the Navy and Air Force had progressed in their own estimation to the point where, despite shortcomings in their racial policies rivaling the Army's, they had little to fear from the coming White House investigation. The Army could show no similar forward motion. Despite Royall's claim that he and the Army staff favored eventual integration of black soldiers through progressive reduction in the size of the Army's segregated black units, the facts indicated otherwise. For example, while Secretary of Defense Forrestal was touring Germany in late 1948 he noted in his diary of Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, now the commander of Europe: "Huebner's experience with colored troops is excellent.... He is ready to proceed with the implementation of the President's directive about nonsegregation down to the platoon level, and proposes to initiate this in the three cavalry regiments and the AA battalion up north, but does not want to do it if it is premature."[13-52]

[Footnote 13-52: Millis, _Forrestal Diaries_, p. 528.]

Huebner's concern with prematurity was understandable, for the possibility of using black soldiers in the constabulary had been a lively topic in the Army for some time. Marcus Ray had proposed it in his December 1946 report to the Secretary of War, but it was quickly rejected by the Army staff. The staff had approved Huebner's decision in July 1948 to attach a black engineer construction battalion and a transportation truck company, a total of 925 men, to the constabulary. The Director of Organization and Training, however, continued to make a careful distinction between attached units and "organic (p. 331) assignment," adding that "the Department of the Army does not favor the organic assignment of Negro units to the Constabulary at this time."[13-53]

[Footnote 13-53: DF, Dir, O&T, to DCofS, 14 Jul 48,
sub: Report of Visit by Negro Publishers and
Editors to the European Theater, CSGOT 291.2 (14
May 48); Memo for Rcd, attached to Memo, Dir, P&A,
for DCofS, 21 Jul 48, same sub, CSGPA 291.2 (14 May
48). See also Geis Monograph, pp. 88-89.]

But by November 1948 Huebner wished to go considerably further. As he later put it, he had no need for a black infantry regiment, but since the constabulary, composed for the most part of cavalry units, lacked foot soldiers, he wanted to integrate a black infantry battalion, in platoon-size units, in each cavalry regiment.[13-54] The staff turned down his request. Arguing that the inclusion of organic black units in the constabulary "might be detrimental to the proper execution of its mission," and quoting the provision of Circular 124 limiting integration to the company level, the staff's organization experts concluded that the use of black units in the European theater below company size "would undoubtedly prove embarrassing to the Department of the Army ... in the Zone of the Interior in view of the announced Department of the Army policy." General Bull, Director of Organization and Training, informed Huebner he might use black units in composite groupings only at the company level, including his constabulary forces, "if such is desired by you," but it was "not presently contemplated that integration of Negro units on the platoon level will be approved as Department of the Army policy."[13-55] Huebner later recalled that the constabulary was his outfit, to be run his way, and "Bradley and Collins always let me do what I had to."[13-56] Still, when black infantrymen joined the constabulary in late 1948, they came in three battalion-size units "attached" for training and tactical control.[13-57]

[Footnote 13-54: Interv, author with Huebner.]

[Footnote 13-55: Ltr, Dir, O&T, to CG, EUCOM, 13 Dec
48, sub: Integration of Negro Units on the Platoon
Level Within the Constabulary EUCOM, CSGOT 291.21
(24 Nov 48); DF, Dir, O&T, to CofS, 9 Dec 48, same
sub, CSUSA 291.2 (24 Nov 48).]

[Footnote 13-56: Interv, author with Huebner.]

[Footnote 13-57: Geis Monograph, p. 90. For the
reaction of a constabulary brigade commander to the
attachment of black infantrymen, see Bruce C.
Clarke, "Early Integration," _Armor_ (Nov-Dec
1978):29.]

The Truman order had no immediate effect on the Army's racial policy. The concession to state governors regarding integration of their National Guard units was beside the point, and Royall's limited offer to set up an experimental integrated unit in the Regular Army was more image than substance. Accurately summarizing the situation in March 1949, The Adjutant General informed Army commanders that although it was "strategically unwise" to republish War Department Circular 124 while the President's committee was meeting, the policies contained in that document, which was about to expire, would continue in effect until further notice.[13-58]

[Footnote 13-58: Ltr, TAG to Distribution, 23 Mar 49,
sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, AGAO 291.2.]

_The Navy: Business as Usual_

The Navy Department also saw no reason to alter its postwar racial policy because of the Truman order. As Acting Secretary of Navy Brown explained to the Secretary of Defense in December 1948, whites in (p. 332) his service had come to accept the fact that blacks must take their rightful place in the Navy and Marine Corps. This acceptance, in turn, had led to "very satisfactory progress" in the integration of the department's black personnel without producing problems of morale and discipline or a lowering of _esprit de corps_.[13-59]

[Footnote 13-59: Memo, Actg SecNav for SecDef et al.,
28 Dec 48, sub: The Secretary of the Army's
Confidential Memorandum of 2 December..., copy in
SecAF files.]

Brown had ample statistics at hand to demonstrate that at least in the Navy this nondiscrimination policy was progressive. Whereas at the end of the World War II demobilization only 6 percent of the Navy's Negroes served in the general service, some two years later 38 percent were so assigned. These men and women generally worked and lived under total integration, and the men served on many of the Navy's combat ships. The Bureau of Naval Personnel predicted in early 1949 that before the end of the year at least half of all black sailors would be assigned to the general service.[13-60] In contrast to the Army's policy of separate but equal service for its black troops, the Navy's postwar racial policy was technically correct and essentially in compliance with the President's order. Yet progress was very limited and in fact in the two years under its postwar nondiscrimination policy, the Navy's performance was only marginally different from that of the other services. The number of Negroes in the Navy in December 1948, the same month Brown was extolling its nondiscrimination policy, totaled some 17,000 men, 4.5 percent of its strength and about half the Army's proportion. This percentage had remained fairly constant since World War II and masked a dramatic drop in the number of black men in uniform as the Navy demobilized. Thus while the _percentage_ of the Navy's black sailors assigned to the integrated general service rose from 6 to 38, the _number_ of Negroes in the general service dropped from 9,900 in 1946 to some 6,000 in 1948. Looked at another way, the 38 percent figure of blacks in the general service meant that 62 percent of all Negroes in the Navy, 10,871 men in December 1948, still served in the separate Steward's Branch.[13-61] In contrast to the Army and Air Force, the Navy's Negroes were, with only the rarest exception, enlisted men. The number of black officers in December 1948 was four; the WAVES could count only six black women in its 2,130 (p. 333) total. Clearly, the oft repeated rationale for these statistics--Negroes favored the Army because they were not a seafaring people--could not explain them away.[13-62]