Chapter 16: (p. 397) (1)

Integration in the Air Force and the Navy

The racial reforms instituted by the four services between 1949 and 1954 demonstrated that integration was to a great extent concerned with effective utilization of military manpower. In the case of the Army and the Marine Corps the reforms would be delayed and would occur, finally, on the field of battle. The Navy and the Air Force, however, accepted the connection between military efficiency and integration even before the Fahy Committee began to preach the point. Despite their very dissimilar postwar racial practices, the Air Force and the Navy were facing the same problem. In a period of reduced manpower allocations and increased demand for technically trained men, these services came to realize that racial distinctions were imposing unacceptable administrative burdens and reducing fighting efficiency. Their response to the Fahy Committee was merely to expedite or revise integration policies already decided upon.

_The Air Force, 1949-1951_

The Air Force's integration plan had gone to the Secretary of Defense on 6 January 1949, committing that service to a major reorganization of its manpower. In a period of severe budget and manpower retrenchment, the Air Force was proposing to open all jobs in all fields to Negroes, subject only to the individual qualifications of the men and the needs of the service.[16-1] To ascertain these needs and qualifications the Director of Personnel Planning was prepared to screen the service's 20,146 Negroes (269 officers and 19,877 airmen), approximately 5 percent of its strength, for the purpose of reassigning those eligible to former all-white units and training schools and dropping the unfit from the service.[16-2] As Secretary of the Air Force Symington made clear, his integration plan would be limited in scope. Some black service units would be retained; the rest would be eliminated, "thereby relieving the Air Force of the critical problems involved in manning these units with qualified personnel."[16-3]

[Footnote 16-1: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 25 Mar 49,
sub: Salient Factors of Air Force Policy Regarding
Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-2: Negro strength figures as of 5 April
1949. Ltr, ASecAF to Robert Harper, Chief Clerk,
House Armed Services Cmte, 5 Apr 49, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-3: Memo, Symington for Forrestal, 6 Jan
49, SecAF files.]

In the end the integration process was not a drawn-out one; much of Symington's effort in 1949 was devoted instead to winning approval for the plan. Submitted to Forrestal on 6 January 1949, it was (p. 398) slightly revised after lengthy discussions in both the Fahy Committee and the Personnel Policy Board and in keeping with the Defense Secretary's equal treatment and opportunity directive of 6 April 1949. Some further delay resulted from the Personnel Policy Board's abortive attempt to achieve an equal opportunity program common to all the services. The Air Force plan was not finally approved by the Secretary of Defense until 11 May. Some in the Air Force were worried about the long delay in approval. As early as 12 January the Chief of Staff warned Symington that budget programming for the new 48-wing force required an early decision on the plan, especially in regard to the inactivation of the all-black wing at Lockbourne. Further delay, he predicted, would cause confusion in reassignment of some 4,000 troops.[16-4] In conversation with the Secretary of Defense, Symington mentioned a deadline of 31 March, but Assistant Secretary Zuckert was later able to assure Symington that the planners could tolerate a delay in the decision over integration until May.[16-5]

[Footnote 16-4: Memo, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, CofS, USAF,
for SecAF, 12 Jan 49, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-5: Memo, SecAF for Forrestal, 17 Feb 49;
Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 24 Mar 49, sub:
Lockbourne AFB; both in SecAF files.]

By then the long official silence had produced serious consequences, for despite the lack of any public announcement, parts of the plan had leaked to the press and caused some debate in Congress and considerable dissatisfaction among black servicemen. Congressional interest in the internal affairs of the armed forces was always of more than passing concern to the services. When a discussion of the new integration plan appearing in the Washington _Post_ on 29 March caused a flurry of comment on Capitol Hill, Zuckert's assistant, Clarence H. Osthagen, met with the clerk of the House Armed Services Committee to "explain and clarify" for the Air Force. The clerk, Robert Harper, warned Osthagen that the impression in the House was that a "complete intermingling of Negro and white personnel was to take place" and that Congressman Winstead of Mississippi had been tempted to make a speech on the subject. Still, Harper predicted that there would be no adverse criticism of the plan in the House "at this time," adding that since that body had already passed the Air Force appropriation Chairman Carl Vinson was generally unconcerned about the Air Force racial program. Reporting on Senate reaction, Harper noted that while many members of the upper house would have liked to see the plan deferred, they recognized that the President's order made change mandatory. At any rate, Harper reassured Osthagen, the announcement of an integration plan would not jeopardize pending Air Force legislation.[16-6]

[Footnote 16-6: Memo for Files, Osthagen, Asst to
ASecAF, 13 Apr 49, SecAF files.]

Unfortunately, the Air Force's black personnel were not so easily reassured, and the service had a morale problem on its hands during the spring of 1949. As later reported by the Fahy Committee staff, black troops generally supported the inactivation of the all-black 332d Fighter Wing at Lockbourne as a necessary step toward integration, but news reports frequently linked the disbandment of that unit to the belt tightening imposed on the Air Force by the 1950 budget. Some Negroes in the 332d concluded that the move was not (p. 399) directed at integration but at saving money for the Air Force.[16-7] They were concerned lest they find themselves relegated to unskilled labor units despite their training and experience. This fear was not so farfetched, considering Zuckert's private prediction that the redistribution of Lockbourne men had to be executed exactly according to the proposed program or "we would find experienced Air Force Negro technical specialists pushing wheelbarrows or driving trucks in Negro service units."[16-8]

[Footnote 16-7: Ltr, Joseph H. Evans, Assoc Exec Secy,
Fahy Cmte, to Fahy Cmte, 23 Jun 49, FC file. See
also "U.S. Armed Forces: 1950," _Our World 5_ (June
1950):11-35.]

[Footnote 16-8: Draft Memo, Zuckert for Symington, 15
Feb 49, sub: Air Force Policies on Negro Personnel
(not sent), SecAF files.]

The truth was that, while most Negroes in the Air Force favored integration, some were disturbed by the prospect of competition with whites of equivalent rank that would naturally follow. Many of the black officers were overage in grade, their proficiency geared to the F-51, a wartime piston plane, and they were the logical victims of any reduction in force that might occur in this period of reduced military budgets.[16-9] Some men doubted that the new program, as they imperfectly understood it, would truly integrate the service. They could, for example, see no way for the Air Force to break through what the press called the "community patterns" around southern bases, and they were generally suspicious of the motives of senior department officials. The Pittsburgh _Courier_ summarized this attitude by quoting one black officer who expressed doubt "that a fair program will be enforced from the top echelon."[16-10]

[Footnote 16-9: Washington _Post_, April 4, 1949; USAF
Oral History Program, Interview with Lt Col Spann
Watson (USAF, Ret.), 3 Apr 73.]

[Footnote 16-10: Pittsburgh _Courier_, January 22,
1949.]

But such suspicions were unfounded, for the Air Force's senior officials were determined to enforce the new program both fairly and expeditiously. General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff, reported to the War Council on 11 January that the Air Force would "effect full and complete implementation" of its integration plan not only by issuing the required directives and orders, but also by assigning responsibility for monitoring the worldwide implementation of the program to his deputy for personnel. The Chief of Staff also planned to call a meeting of his senior commanders to discuss and solve problems rising from the plan and impress on them the personal attention they must give to carrying it out in the field.[16-11]

[Footnote 16-11: Memo, Vandenberg, CofS, USAF, for
SecAF, 12 Jan 49, SecAF files.]

The Air Force Commanders' Conference, assembled on 12 April 1949, heard Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, explain the genesis of the integration plan and outline its major provisions. He mentioned two major steps to be taken in the first phase of the program. First, the 332d Fighter Wing would be inactivated on or before 30 June, and all blacks would be removed from Lockbourne. The commander of the Continental Air Command would create a board of Lockbourne officers to screen those assigned to the all-black base, dividing them into three groups. The skilled and qualified officers and airmen would be reassigned worldwide to white units "just like any other officers or airmen of similar skills (p. 400) and qualifications." General Edwards assumed that the number of men in this category would not be large. Some 200 officers and 1,500 airmen, he estimated, would be found sufficiently qualified and proficient for such reassignment. He added parenthetically that Colonel Davis understood the "implications" of the new policy and intended to recommend only an individual "of such temperament, judgment, and common sense that he can get along smoothly as an individual in a white unit, and second, that his ability is such as to warrant respect of the personnel of the unit to which he is transferred."

The technically unqualified but still "usable" men would be reassigned to black service units. The staff recognized, General Edwards added, that some Negroes were unsuited for assignment to white units for "various reasons" and had specifically authorized the retention of "this type of Negro" in black units. Finally, those who were found neither qualified nor useful would be discharged under current regulations.

The second major action would be taken at the same time as the first. All commands would similarly screen their black troops with the object of reassigning the skilled and qualified to white units and eliminating the chronically unqualified. At the same time racial quotas for recruitment and school attendance would be abolished. Henceforth, blacks would enter the Air Force under the same standards as whites and would be classified, assigned, promoted, or eliminated in accordance with rules that would apply equally to all. "In other words," Edwards commented, "no one is either helped or hindered because of the color of his skin; how far or how fast each one goes depends upon his own ability." To assure equal treatment and opportunity, he would closely monitor the problem. Edwards admitted that the subject of integrated living quarters had caused discussion in the staff, but based on the Navy's years of good experience with integrated quarters and bolstered by the probability that the number of Negroes in any white unit would rarely exceed 1 percent, the staff saw no need for separate sleeping accommodations.

General Edwards reminded the assembled commanders that, while integration was new to the Air Force, the Navy had been following a similar policy for years, encountering no trouble, even in the Deep South where black troops as well as the nearby civilian communities understood that when men left the base they must conform to the laws and customs of the community. And as a parting shot he made the commanders aware of where the command responsibility lay:

There will be frictions and incidents. However, they will be
minimized if commanders give the implementation of this policy
their personal attention and exercise positive command control.
Unless our young commanders are guided and counselled by the
senior commanders in unbiased implementation, we may encounter
serious troubles which the Navy has very ably avoided. It must
have your _personal attention and personal control_.[16-12]

[Footnote 16-12: Lt Gen I. H. Edwards, "Remarks on
Major Personnel Problems Presented to USAF
Commanders' Conference Headquarters, USAF," 12 Apr
49, SecAF files. Italics in the original.]

Compelling reasons for reform notwithstanding, the effectiveness of an integration program would in the end depend on the attitude and initiative of the local commander. In the Air Force's case the (p. 401) ultimate effectiveness owed much to the fact that the determination of its senior officials was fully explained and widely circulated throughout the service. As Lt. Gen. Daniel (Chappie) James, Jr., later recalled, those who thought to frustrate the process were well aware that they risked serious trouble if their opposition was discovered by the senior commanders. None of the obvious excuses for preserving the racial _status quo_ remained acceptable after Vandenberg and Edwards made their positions clear.[16-13]

[Footnote 16-13: USAF Oral History Program, Interview
with Lt Gen Daniel James, Jr., 2 Oct 73. James was
to become the first four-star black officer in the
armed forces.]

The fact that the control of the new plan was specifically made a personal responsibility of the senior commanders spoke well for its speedy and efficient execution. This was the kind of talk commanders understood, and as the order filtered down to the lower echelons its terms became even more explicit.[16-14] "Direct attention to this changed condition is required throughout the Command," Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter notified his subordinate commanders at the Military Air Transport Service. "Judgment, leadership, and ingenuity are demanded. Commanders who cannot cope with the integration of Negroes into formerly white units or activities will have no place in the Air Force structure."[16-15]

[Footnote 16-14: Ltr, Marr to author, 19 Jun 70.]

[Footnote 16-15: MATS Hq Ltr No. 9, 1 May 49, SecAF
files.]

The order itself, as approved by the Secretary of Defense on 11 May 1949 and published on the same day as Air Force Letter 35-3, was unmistakable in intent and clearly spelled out a new bill of rights for Negroes in the Air Force.[16-16] The published directive differed in some respects from the version drafted by the Chief of Staff in January. Despite General Edwards's comments at the commanders' conference in April, the provision for allowing commanders to segregate barracks "if considered necessary" was removed even before the plan was first forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. This deletion was made in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, probably by Zuckert.[16-17] Later Zuckert commented, "I wouldn't want to give the commanders that kind of sweeping power. I would be afraid of how it might be exercised."[16-18] From the beginning, black airmen were billeted routinely in the living quarters of the units to which they were assigned.

[Footnote 16-16: AF Ltr 35-3, 11 May 49. Effective
until 11 May 1950, the order was superseded by a
new but similar letter, AF Ltr 35-78, on 14
September 1950.]

[Footnote 16-17: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 12 Jan
49, AF Negro Affairs 49, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-18: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Zuckert.]

The final version of the directive also deleted reference to a 10 percent limitation on black strength in formerly white units. Zuckert had assured the Fahy Committee this limitation was designed to facilitate, not frustrate, the absorption of Negroes into white units, and Edwards even agreed that given the determination of Air Force officials to make a success of their program, the measure was probably unnecessary.[16-19] In the end Zuckert decided to drop any reference to such limitations "because of the confusion that seemed to arise from this statement."[16-20]

[Footnote 16-19: Testimony of Zuckert and Edwards,
USAF, Before the Fahy Committee, 28 Mar 49,
afternoon session, pp. 7-8.]

[Footnote 16-20: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 29 Apr
49, sub: Department of the Air Force Implementation
of the Department of Defense Policy on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,
SecAF files.]

Zuckert also deleted several clauses in the supplementary letter (p. 402) to Air Force commanders that was to accompany and explain the order. These clauses had listed possible exemptions from the new order: one made it possible to retain a man in a black unit if he was one of the "key personnel" considered necessary for the successful functioning of a black unit, and the other allowed the local commander to keep those Negroes he deemed "best suited" for continued assignment to black units. The free reassignment of all eligible Negroes, particularly the well-qualified, was essential to the eventual dissolution of the all-black units. The Fahy Committee had objected to these provisions and considered it important for the Air Force to delete them,[16-21] but the matter was not raised during the committee hearings. There is evidence that the deletions were actually requested by the Secretary of Defense's Personnel Policy Board, whose influence in the integration of the Air Force is often overlooked.[16-22]

[Footnote 16-21: _Freedom to Serve_, pp. 37-38.]

[Footnote 16-22: Memo, SecAF for Chmn, PPB, 30 Apr 49,
copy in FC file. McCoy and Ruetten, _Quest and
Response_, p. 223, call the deletion a victory for
the committee.]

The screening of officers and men at Lockbourne got under way on 17 May. A board of officers under the presidency of Col. Davis, the commander of Lockbourne, and composed of representatives of Air Force headquarters, the Continental Air Command, and the Air Training Command, and important officers of Lockbourne, interviewed every officer in the wing. After considering each man's technical training, his performance, and his career field preference, the board recommended him for reassignment in a specific duty field. Although Edwards had promised that the screening boards would also judge each man's "adaptability" to integrated service, this requirement was quickly dropped by Davis and his fellow board members.[16-23] In fact, the whole idea of having screening boards was resented by some black officers. Zuckert later admitted that the screening may have been a mistake, but at the time it had been considered the best mechanism for ascertaining the proper assignment for the men.[16-24]

[Footnote 16-23: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Davis.]

[Footnote 16-24: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Zuckert.]

At the same time, a screening team in the Air Training Command gave a written examination to Lockbourne's more than 1,100 airmen and WAF's to determine if they were in appropriate military occupational specialties. A team of personnel counselors interviewed all (p. 403) airmen, weighed test scores, past performances, qualifications outside of assigned specialty, and choices of a career field, and then placed them in one of three categories. First, they could be earmarked for general reassignment in a specific military occupational specialty different from the one they were now in; second, they could be scheduled for additional or more advanced technical training; or third, they could be trained in their current specialties. The screeners referred marginal or extraordinary cases to Colonel Davis's board for decision.[16-25]

[Footnote 16-25: NME Fact Sheet No. 105-49, 27 Jul
49.]

Concurrently with the Lockbourne processing, individual commanders established similar screening procedures wherever black airmen were then assigned. All these teams uncovered a substantial number of men and women considered eligible for further training or reassignment. (_Table 4_)

Table 4--Disposition of Black Personnel at Eight Air Force Bases, 1949

Percentages
Total Asgmt to Asgmt to Asgmt to Recom for
Base Tested Instr Tech Present Board
Duty School MOS Action

Lockbourne
Male 970 .32 12.08 64.64 22.98
Female 58 0.00 25.86 55.17 18.97
Lackland 247 1.62 20.65 67.61 10.12
Barksdale 158 0.00 20.25 65.82 13.93
Randolph 252 2.38 26.19 57.14 14.29
Waco 146 2.06 30.14 57.53 10.27
Mather 126 .79 27.78 40.48 30.95
Williams 144 8.33 21.53 39.58 30.56
Goodfellow 122 .82 36.89 40.89 21.31

Total 2,223 1.35 19.61 59.20 19.84

_Source_: President's Cmte on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, "A First Report on the Racial Integration Program of the Air Force," 6 Feb 50, FC file.

The process of screening Lockbourne's troops was quickly completed, but the process of reassigning them was considerably more drawn-out. The reassignments were somewhat delayed in the first place by indecision, caused by budgetary uncertainties, on the future of Lockbourne itself. By 25 July, a full two months after the screening began, the Lockbourne board had recommended only 181 officers and 700 airmen to Air Force headquarters for new assignment. A short time later, however, Lockbourne was placed on inactive status and its remaining men and women, with the exception of a small caretaker detachment, were quickly reassigned throughout the Air Force.

The staff had predicted that the speed with which the integration order was carried out would follow a geographical pattern, with southern bases the last to integrate, but in fact no special pattern prevailed. For the many Negroes assigned to all-black base squadrons for administrative purposes but serving on a day-to-day basis in integrated units, the change was relatively simple. These men had already demonstrated their ability to perform their duties competently under integration, and in conformity with the new order most (p. 404) commanders immediately assigned them to the units in which they were already working. Except for their own squadron overhead, some base service squadrons literally disappeared when these reassignments were effected. After the screening process, most commanders also quickly reassigned troops serving in the other all-black units, such as Squadron F's, air ammunition, motor transport, vehicle repair, signal heavy construction, and aviation engineer squadrons.[16-26]

[Footnote 16-26: "Report on the First Year of
Implementation of Current Policies Regarding Negro
Personnel," Incl to Memo, Maj Gen Richard E. Nugent
for ASecAF, 14 Jul 50, sub: Distribution of Negro
Personnel, PPB 291.2 (9 Jul 50) (hereafter referred
to as Marr Report). See also USAF Oral Hist Interv
with Marr.]

There were of course a few exceptions. Some commanders, noticeably more cautious than the majority, began the integration process with considerably less ease and speed.[16-27] As late as January 1950, for example, the Fahy Committee's executive secretary found that, with the exception of a small number of Negroes assigned to white units, the black airmen at Maxwell Air Force Base were still assigned to the all-black 3817th Base Service Squadron, the only such unit he found, incidentally, in a tour of seven installations.[16-28] But as the months went by even the most cautious commander, learning of the success of the new policy in other commands, began to reassign his black airmen according to the recommendations of the screening board. Despite the announcement that some black units would be retained, practically all units were integrated by the end of the first year of the new program. Even using the Air staff's very restricted definition of a "Negro unit," that is, one whose strength was over 50 percent black, statistics show how radical was the change in just one year. (_Table 5_)

[Footnote 16-27: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Davis.]

[Footnote 16-28: President's Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, "A
First Report on the Racial Integration Program of
the Air Force," 6 Feb 50, FC file (hereafter cited
as Kenworthy Report).]

Table 5--Racial Composition of Air Force Units

Negroes Assigned Negroes Assigned
Month Black Integrated to Black to Integrated
Units Units Units Units[1]

1949
June 106 167 Not available Not available
July 89 350 14,609 7,369
August 86 711 11,921 11,977
September 91 863 11,521 13,290
October 88 1,031 9,522 15,980
November 75 1,158 8,038 17,643
December 67 1,253 7,402 18,489

1950
January 59 1,301 6,773 18,929
February 36 1,399 5,511 20,654
March 26 1,476 5,023 20,938
April 24 1,515 4,728 20,793
May 24 1,506 4,675 21,033

[Tablenote 1: Figures extracted from the Marr
Report; see also monthly reports on AF integration,
for example Memo, Dir, Pers Plng, for Osthagen
(SecAF office), 10 Mar 50, sub: Distribution of
Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]

Despite the predictions of some analysts, the effect of (p. 405) integration on black recruitment proved to be negligible. In a service whose total strength remained about 415,000 men during the first year of integration, Negroes numbered as follows (_Table 6_):

Table 6--Black Strength in the Air Force

Percentage
Officer Enlisted of Air Force
Date Strength[1] Strength[1] Strength

December 1948 Not available Not available 6.5
June 1949 319 (47) 21,782 (2,196) 6.0
August 1949 330 (32) 23,568 (2,275) 6.5
December 1949 368 (18) 25,523 (3,072) 7.2
May 1950 341 (8) 25,367 (2,611) 7.1

[Tablenote 1: Includes in parentheses the Special
Category Army Personnel with Air Force (SCARWAF),
those soldiers assigned for duty in the Air Force
but still administratively under the segregated
Army, leftovers from the Department of Defense
reorganization of 1947. Figures extracted from Marr
Report.]

The Air staff explained that the slight surge in black recruits in the early months of integration was related less to the new policy than to the abnormal recruiting conditions of the period. In addition to the backlog of Negroes who for some time had been trying to enlist only to find the Air Force quota filled, there were many black volunteers who had turned to the quota-free Air Force when the Army, its quota of Negroes filled for some time, stopped recruiting Negroes.

With Negroes serving in over 1,500 separate units there was no need to invoke the 10 percent racial quota in individual units as Vandenberg had ordered. One notable exception during the first months of the program was the Air Training Command, where the rapid and unexpected reassignment of many black airmen caused some bases, James Connally in Texas, for example, to acquire a great many Negroes while others received few or none. To prevent a recurrence of the Connally experience and "to effect a smooth operation and proper adjustment of social importance," the commander of the Air Training Command imposed an 8 to 10 percent black quota on his units and established a procedure for staggering the assignment of black airmen in small groups over a period of thirty to sixty days instead of assigning them to any particular base in one large increment. These quotas were not applied to the basic training flights, which were completely integrated. It was not uncommon to find black enlistees in charge of racially mixed training flights.[16-29] Of all Air Force organizations, the Training Command received the greatest number of black airmen as a result of the screening and reassignment. (_Table 7_)

[Footnote 16-29: ATC, "History of ATC, July-December
1949," I:29-31; New York _Times_, September 18,
1949.]

Table 7--Racial Composition of the Training Command, December 1949 (p. 406)

A. Flight Training
_Percent_
_White_ _Black_ _Black_
Officers 1,345 11 .8
Enlisted 2,063 22 1.0
Total 3,408 33 .9
B. Technical Training
Officers 1,897 37 1.9
Enlisted 25,838 1,819 6.5
Total 27,735 1,856 6.0
C. Indoctrination (Basic) Training
White 7,649
Black 1,007
Total 8,656
Percent black 11.6[a]
D. Officers Candidate Training
(candidates graduating from
28 November through 26
December 1949)
White 225
Black 7
Total 232
Percent black 3.0
E. Course Representation

_Base_ _No. of Courses_[b] _No. of Courses
with Blacks_
Chanute 31 21
Warren 11 10
Keesler 16 7
Lowry 23 13
Scott 6 4
Sheppard 4 1

[Tablenote a: In January 1950, probably as a result
of a decline in backlog and the raising of
enlistment standard to GCT 100, this percentage
dropped to 8.8.]

[Tablenote b: Negroes in 61 percent of the courses
offered as of 26 Dec 1949.]

_Source_: Kenworthy Report.

At the end of the first year under the new program, the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, General Nugent, informed Zuckert that integration had progressed "rapidly, smoothly and virtually without incident."[16-30] In view of this fact and at Nugent's recommendation, the Air Force canceled the monthly headquarters check on the program.

[Footnote 16-30: Memo, Actg DCSPER for Zuckert, 14 Jul
50, USAF file No. 3370, SecAF files.]

To some extent the Air Force's integration program ran away with itself. Whatever their personal convictions regarding discrimination, senior Air Force officials had agreed that integration would be limited. They were most concerned with managerial problems associated with continued segregation of the black flying unit and the black specialists scattered worldwide. Other black units were not considered an immediate problem. Assistant Secretary Zuckert admitted as much in March 1949 when he reported that black service units would be retained since they performed a "necessary Air Force function."[16-31] As originally conceived, the Air Force plan was frankly imitative of the Navy's postwar program, stressing merit and ability as the limiting factors of change. The Air Force promised to discharge all its substandard men, but those black airmen either ineligible for discharge or for reassignment to specialist duty would remain in segregated units.

[Footnote 16-31: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 25 Mar
49, sub: Salient Factors of Air Force Policy
Regarding Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]

Yet once begun, the integration process quickly became universal. By the end of 1950, for example, the Air Force had reduced the number of black units to nine with 95 percent of its black airmen serving in integrated units. The number of black officers rose to 411, an (p. 407) increase of 10 percent over the previous year, and black airmen to 25,523, an increase of 15 percent, although the proportion of blacks to whites continued to remain between 6 and 7 percent.[16-32] Some eighteen months later only one segregated unit was left, a 98-man outfit, itself more than 26 percent white. Negroes were then serving in 3,466 integrated units.[16-33]

[Footnote 16-32: _Air Force Times_, 10 February 1951.
These figures do not take into account the SCARWAF
(Army personnel) who continued to serve in
segregated units within the Air Force.]

[Footnote 16-33: Memo, DepSecAF for Manpower and
Organizations for ASD/M, 5 Sep 52, SecAF files.]

There were several reasons for the universal application of what was conceived as a limited program. First, the Air Force was in a sense the captive of its own publicity. While Secretary Symington had carefully delineated the limits of his departmental plan for the Personnel Policy Board in January 1949, he was carried considerably beyond these limits when he addressed President Truman in the open forum of the Fahy Committee's first formal meeting:

As long as you mentioned the Air Force, sir, I just want to
report to you that our plan is to completely eliminate
segregation in the Air Force. For example, we have a fine group
of colored boys. Our plan is to take those boys, break up that
fine group, and put them with the other units themselves and go
right down the line all through these subdivisions one hundred
percent.[16-34]

[Footnote 16-34: Transcript of the Meeting of the
President and the Four Service Secretaries With the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services, 12 Jan 49, FC
file, which reports the President's response as
being "That's all right."]

Later, Symington told the Fahy Committee that while the new program would probably temporarily reduce Air Force efficiency "we are ready, willing, and anxious to embark on this idea. We want to eliminate the fundamental aspect of class in this picture."[16-35] Clearly, the retention of large black units was incompatible with the elimination of class distinctions.

[Footnote 16-35: Testimony of the Secretary of the Air
Force Before the Fahy Committee, 28 Mar 49,
afternoon session, p. 33.]

The more favorable the publicity garnered by the plan in succeeding months, the weaker the distinction became between the limited integration of black specialists and total integration. Reinforcing the favorable publicity were the monthly field reports that registered a steady drop in the number of black units and a corresponding rise in the number of integrated black airmen. This well-publicized progress provided another, almost irresistible reason for completing the task.

More to the point, the success of the program provided its own impetus to total integration. The prediction that a significant number of black officers and men would be ineligible for reassignment or further training proved ill-founded. The Air Force, it turned out, had few untrainable men, and after the screening process and transfer of those eligible was completed, many black units were so severely reduced in strength that their inactivation became inevitable. The fear of white opposition that had inhibited the staff planners and local commanders also proved groundless. According to a Fahy Committee staff report in March 1950, integration had been readily accepted at all levels and the process had been devoid of friction. "The men," E. W. (p. 408) Kenworthy reported, "apparently were more ready for equality of treatment and opportunity than the officer corps had realized."[16-36] At the same time, Kenworthy noted the effect of successful integration on the local commanders. Freed from the charges of discrimination that had plagued them at every turn, most of the commanders he interviewed remarked on the increased military efficiency of their units and the improved utilization of their manpower that had come with integration. They liked the idea of a strictly competitive climate of equal standards rigidly applied, and some expected that the Air Force example would have an effect, eventually, on civilian attitudes.[16-37]

[Footnote 16-36: Kenworthy Report, as quoted and
commented on in Memo, Worthington Thompson
(Personnel Policy Board staff) for Leva, 9 Mar 50,
sub: Some Highlights of Fahy Committee Report on
Air Force Racial Integration Program, SD 291.2.]

[Footnote 16-37: Ltr, Kenworthy to Zuckert, 5 Jan 50,
SecAF files.]

For the Air Force, it seemed, the problem of segregation was all over but for the celebrating. And there was plenty of that, thanks to the Fahy Committee and the press. In a well-publicized tour of a cross section of Air Force installations in early 1950, Kenworthy surveyed the integration program for the committee. His favorable report won the Air Force laudatory headlines in the national press and formed the core of the Air Force section of the Fahy Committee's final report, _Freedom to Serve_.[16-38] For its part, the black press covered the program in great detail and gave its almost unanimous approval. As early as July 1949, for example, Dowdal H. Davis, president of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, reported on the highly encouraging reaction to the breakup of the 332d, and the headlines reflected this attitude: "The Air Force Leads the Way," the Chicago _Defender_ headlined; "Salute to the Air Force," the Minneapolis _Spokesman_ editorialized; and "the swiftest and most amazing upset of racial policy in the history of the U.S. Military," _Ebony_ concluded. Pointing to the Air Force program as the best, the Pittsburgh _Courier_ called the progress toward total integration "better than most dared hope."[16-39]

[Footnote 16-38: See, for example, the Washington
_Post_, March 27, 1950.]

[Footnote 16-39: Press reaction summarized in Memo,
James C. Evans for PPB, 19 Jan 50, PPB 291.2. See
also, Ltr, Dowdal Davis, Gen Manager of the Kansas
City _Call_, to Evans, 9 Jul 49, SD 291.2; Memo,
Evans for SecAF, 5 Jul 49; and Memo, Zuckert for
SecAF, 2 Aug 49, both in SecAF files; Chicago
_Defender_, June 18, 1949; Minneapolis _Spokesman_,
January 13, 1950; _Ebony_ Magazine, 4 (September
1949):15; Pittsburgh _Courier_, July 25, 1952;
Detroit _Free Press_, May 14, 1953.]

General Vandenberg and his staff were well aware of the rapid and (p. 409) profound change in the Air Force wrought by the integration order. From the start his personnel chief carefully monitored the program and reviewed the reports from the commands, ready to investigate any racial incidents or differences attributable to the new policy. The staff had expected a certain amount of testing of the new policy by both white and black troops, and with few exceptions the incidents reported turned out to be little more than that. Some arose from attempts by Negroes to win social acceptance at certain Air Force installations, but the majority of cases involved attempts by white airmen to introduce their black comrades into segregated off-base restaurants and theaters. Two examples might stand for all. The first involved a transient black corporal who stopped off at the Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., to get a haircut in a post exchange barbershop. He was refused service and in the absence of the post exchange officer he returned to the shop to trade words and eventually blows with the barber. The corporal was subsequently court-martialed, but the sentence was set aside by a superior court.[16-40] Another case involved a small group of white airmen who ordered refreshments at a segregated lunch counter in San Antonio, Texas, for themselves "and a friend who would join them later." The friend, of course, was a black airman. The Inspector General reported this incident to be just one of a number of attempts by groups of white and black airmen to integrate lunch counters and restaurants. In each case the commanders concerned cautioned their men against such action, and there were few reoccurrences.[16-41]

[Footnote 16-40: Memo, IG, USAF, for ASecAF, 25 Jul
49, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-41: Idem for DCSPER, 7 Sep 49, copy in
SecAF files; see also ACofS, G-2, Fourth Army, Ft.
Sam Houston, Summary of Information, 7 Sep 49, copy
in SA 291.2.]

The commanders' warnings were understandable because, as any official from Secretary Symington on down would quickly explain, the Air Force did not regard itself as being in the business of forcing changes in American society; it was simply trying to make the best use of its manpower to build military efficiency in keeping with its national defense mission.[16-42] But in the end the integration order proved effective on both counts. Racial feelings, racial incidents, charges of discrimination, and the problems of procurement, training, and assignment always associated with racially designated units had been reduced by an appreciable degree or eliminated entirely. The problems anticipated from the mingling of blacks and whites in social situations had proved to be largely imaginary. The Air Force adopted a standard formula for dealing with these problems during the next decade. Incidents involving black airmen were treated as individual incidents and dealt with on a personal basis like any ordinary disciplinary case. Only when there was no alternative was an incident labeled "racial" and then the commander was expected to deal speedily and firmly with the troublemakers.[16-43] This sensible procedure freed the Air Force for a decade from the charges of on-base discrimination that had plagued it in the past.

[Footnote 16-42: See, for example, Memo, SecAF for
SecDef, 17 Feb 49; Ltr, SecAF to Sen. Burnet R.
Maybank, 21 Jul 49; both in SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-43: Memo, Evans, OSD, for Worthington
Thompson, 18 May 53, sub: Summary of Topics
Reviewed in Thompson's office 15 May 53, SD 291.2.]

Without a doubt the new policy improved the Air Force's manpower (p. 410) efficiency, as the experience of the 3202d Installation Group illustrates. A segregated unit serving at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the 3202d was composed of an all-black heavy maintenance and construction squadron, a black maintenance repair and utilities squadron, and an all-white headquarters and headquarters squadron. This rigid segregation had caused considerable trouble for the unit's personnel section, which was forced to assign men on the basis of color rather than military occupational specialty. For example, a white airman with MOS 345, a truck driver, although assigned to the unit, could not be assigned to the heavy maintenance and construction squadron where his specialty was authorized but had to be assigned to the white headquarters squadron where his specialty was not authorized. Clearly operating in an inefficient manner, the unit was charged with misassignment of personnel by the Air Inspector; in July 1950 it was swiftly and peaceably, if somewhat belatedly, integrated, and its three squadrons were converted to racially mixed units, allowing an airman to be assigned according to his training and not his color.[16-44]

[Footnote 16-44: History Officer, 3202d Installations
Groups, "History of the 3202d Installations Group,
1 July-31 October 1950," Eglin AFB, Fla., pp. 8-9.]

The preoccupation of high officials with the effects of integration on a soldier's social life seemed at times out of keeping with the issues of national defense and military efficiency. At one of the Fahy Committee hearings, for instance, an exasperated Charles Fahy asked Omar Bradley, "General, are you running an Army or a dance?"[16-45] Yet social life on military bases at swimming pools, dances, bridge parties, and service clubs formed so great a part of the fabric of military life that the Air Force staff could hardly ignore the possibility of racial troubles in the countless social exchanges that characterized the day-to-day life in any large American institution. The social situation had been seriously considered before the new racial policy was approved. At that time the staff had predicted that problems developing out of integration would not prove insurmountable, and indeed on the basis of a year's experience a member of the Air staff declared that (p. 411)

at the point where the Negro and the white person are actually in
contact the problem has virtually disappeared. Since all races of
Air Force personnel work together under identical environmental
conditions on the base, it is not unnatural that they participate
together, to the extent that they desire, in certain social
activities which are considered a normal part of service life.
This type of integration has been entirely voluntary, without
incident, and considerably more complete and more rapid than was
anticipated.[16-46]

[Footnote 16-45: This off-the-record comment occurred
during the committee hearings in the Pentagon and
was related to the author by E. W. Kenworthy in
interview on 17 October 1971. See also Memo,
Kenworthy to Brig Gen James L. Collins, Jr., 13 Oct
76, copy in CMH.]

[Footnote 16-46: Marr Report.]

The Air staff had imposed only two rules on interracial social activities: with due regard for sex and rank all Air Force facilities were available for the unrestricted use of all its members; troublemakers would get into trouble. Under these inflexible rules, the Fahy Committee later reported, there was a steady movement in the direction of shared facilities. "Here again, mutual respect engendered on the job or in the school seemed to translate itself into friendly association."[16-47] Whether it liked it or not, the Air Force was in the business of social change.

[Footnote 16-47: _Freedom to Serve_, p. 41.]

Typical of most unit reports was one from the commander of the 1701st Air Transport Wing, Great Falls Air Force Base, Montana, who wrote Secretary Symington that the unit's eighty-three Negroes, serving in ten different organizations, lived and worked with white airmen "on an apparently equal and friendly basis."[16-48] The commander had been unable to persuade local community leaders, however, to promote equality of treatment outside the base, and beyond its movie theaters Great Falls had very few places that allowed black airmen. The commander was touching upon a problem that would eventually trouble all the services: airmen, he reported to Secretary Symington, although they have good food and entertainment on the base, sooner or later want to go to town, sit at a table, and order what they want. The Air Force was now coming into conflict with local custom which it could see no way to control. As the _Air Force Times_ put it, "The Air Force, like the other services, feels circumspect policy in this regard is the only advisable one on the grounds that off-base segregation is a matter for civilian rather than military decision."[16-49]

[Footnote 16-48: Ltr, Col Paul H. Prentiss, Cmdr,
1701st AT Wing, to SecAF, 27 Dec 49, SecAF files.]

[Footnote 16-49: _Air Force Times_, 10 February 1951.]

But this problem could not detract from what had been accomplished on the bases. Judged by the standards it set for itself before the Fahy Committee, the Air Force had achieved its goals. Further, they (p. 412) were achieved in the period between 1949 and 1956 when the percentage of blacks in the service doubled, an increase resulting from the Defense Department's qualitative distribution of manpower rather than the removal of the racial quota.[16-50] During these years the number of black airmen rose from 5.1 to 10.4 percent of the enlisted strength and the black officers from 0.6 to 1.1 percent. Reviewing the situation in 1960, _Ebony_ noted that the program begun in 1949 was working well and that white men were accepting without question progressive racial practices forbidden in their home communities. Minor racial flare-ups still occurred, but integration was no longer a major problem in the Air Force; it was a fact of life.[16-51]

[Footnote 16-50: Memo for Rcd, ADS(M), 12 Sep 56, sub:
Integration Percentages, ADS(M) 291.2. For further
discussion of the qualitative distribution program,
see Navy section, below.]

[Footnote 16-51: "Integration in the Air Force
Abroad," _Ebony_ 15 (March 1960):27.]

_The Navy and Executive Order 9981_

The changing government attitude toward integration in the late 1940's had less dramatic effect on the Navy than upon the other services because the Navy was already the conspicuous possessor of a racial policy guaranteeing equal treatment and opportunity for all its members. But as the Fahy Committee and many other critics insisted, the Navy's 1946 equality guarantee was largely theoretical; its major racial problem was not one of policy but of practice as statistics demonstrated. It was true, for example, that the Navy had abolished racial quotas in recruitment, yet the small number of black sailors--17,000 during 1949, averaging 4.5 percent of the total strength--made the absence of a quota academic.[16-52] It was true that Negroes served side by side with white sailors in almost every occupation and training program in the Navy, but it was also a fact that 62 percent of all Negroes in the Navy in 1949 were still assigned to the nonwhite Steward's Branch. This figure shows that as late as December 1949 fewer than 7,000 black sailors were serving in racially integrated assignments.[16-53] Again, with only 19 black officers, including 2 nurses, in a 1949 average officer strength of 45,464, it meant little to say that the Navy had an integrated officer corps. A shadow had fallen, then, between the promise of the Navy's policy and its fulfillment, partly because of indifferent execution.

[Footnote 16-52: Unless otherwise noted all statistics
are from information supplied by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel. The exact percentage on 1 July
1949 was 4.7; see Memo for Rcd, ASD(M), 12 Sep 56,
sub: Integration Percentages, ASD(M) 291.2.]

[Footnote 16-53: Memo, Chief, NavPers, for Under
SecNav, 5 Dec 49, sub: Proposed Report to Chairman
Personnel Policy Board Regarding the Implementation
of Executive Order 9981, Pers 21, GenRecsNav.]

Submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Defense, the new Navy plan announced on 7 June 1949 called for a specific series of measures to bring departmental practices into line with policy.[16-54] Once he had gained Johnson's approval, Secretary of the Navy Matthews did not tarry. On 23 June he issued an explicit statement to all ships and stations, abjuring racial distinctions in the Navy and Marine (p. 413) Corps and ordering that all personnel be enlisted or appointed, trained, advanced or promoted, assigned and administered without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.[16-55] Admirable and comprehensive, Matthew's statement scarcely differed in intent from his predecessor's general declaration of equal treatment and opportunity of 12 December 1945 and the more explicit directive of the Chief of Naval Operations on the same subject on 27 February 1946. Yet despite the close similarity, a reiteration was clearly necessary. As even the most ardent apologist for the navy's postwar racial policy would admit, these groundbreaking statements had not done the job, and, to satisfy the demands of the Fahy Committee and the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Matthews had to convince his subordinates that the demand for equal treatment and opportunity was serious and had to be dealt with immediately. His specific mention of the Marine Corps and the problems of enlistment, assignment, and promotion, subjects ignored in the earlier directives, represented a start toward the reform of his department's racial practices currently out of step with its expressed policy.

[Footnote 16-54: Memo, SecNav for SecDef, 23 May 49,
sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, copy in FC file.]

[Footnote 16-55: ALNAV 447-49, which remained in force
until 23 March 1953 when SecNav Instruction 1000.2
superseded it without substantial change.]

Yet a restatement of policy, no matter how specific, was not enough. As Under Secretary Dan A. Kimball admitted, the Navy had the formidable task of convincing its own people of the sincerity of its policy and of erasing the distrust that had developed in the black community "resulting from past discriminating practices."[16-56] Those who were well aware of the Navy's earlier failure to achieve integration by fiat were bound to greet Secretary Matthews's directive with skepticism unless it was accompanied by specific reforms. Matthews, aware of the necessity, immediately inaugurated a campaign to recruit more black sailors, commission more black officers, and remove the stigma attached to service in the Steward's Branch.

[Footnote 16-56: Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22
Dec 49, sub: Implementation of Executive Order
9981, PPB 291.2.]

It was logical enough to start a reform of the Navy's integration program by attacking the perennial problem of too few Negroes in the general service. In his annual report to the Secretary of Defense, Matthews outlined some of the practical steps the Navy was taking to attract more qualified young blacks. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, he explained, planned to assign black sailors and officers to its recruiting service. As a first step it assigned eight Negroes to Recruitment Procurement School and subsequently to recruit duty in eight major cities with further such assignments planned when current manpower ceilings were lifted.[16-57]

[Footnote 16-57: SecNav, Annual Report to SecDef, FY
1949, p. 230; Memo, Under SecNav Chmn, PPB, 22 Dec
49, sub: Implementation of Executive Order 9981,
PPB 291.2.]

The Bureau of Naval Personnel had also polled black reservists on the possibility of returning to active duty on recruiting assignments, and from this group had chosen five officers for active duty in the New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Detroit, and Chicago recruiting offices. At the same time black officers and petty officers were sent to extol the advantages of a naval career before black student (p. 414) bodies and citizen groups.[16-58] Their performances were exceedingly well received. The executive secretary of the Dayton, Ohio, Urban League, for example, thanked Secretary Matthews for the appearances of Lieutenant Nelson before groups of students, reporters, and community leaders in the city. The lieutenant, he added, not only "clearly and effectively interpreted the opportunities open to Negro youth in the United States Navy" but also "greatly accelerated" the community's understanding of the Navy's integration program.[16-59] Nelson, himself, had been a leading advocate of an accelerated public relations program to advertise the opportunities for Negroes in the Navy.[16-60] The personnel bureau had adopted his suggestion that all recruitment literature, including photographs testifying to the fact that Negroes were serving in the general service, be widely distributed in predominantly black institutions. Manpower ceilings, however, had forced the bureau to postpone action on Nelson's suggestion that posters, films, pamphlets, and the like be used.[16-61]

[Footnote 16-58: Memo, Dir, Recruiting Div, BuPers,
for Admin Aide to SecNav, 22 Dec 50, sub: Negro
Officer in Recruiting on the West Coast; Ltr,
SecNav to Actg Exec Dir, Urban League, Los Angeles,
22 Dec 50; both in Pers B6, GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 16-59: Ltr, Charles W. Washington, Exec
Secy, Dayton, Ohio, Urban League, to SecNav, 19 Oct
50, copy in Pers 1376, GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 16-60: Memo, Nelson for Charles Durham, Fahy
Committee, sub: Implementation of Proposed Navy
Racial Policy, 17 Jun 49, FC file.]

[Footnote 16-61: Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22
Dec 49, sub: Implementation of Executive Order
9981, PPB 291.2.]

An obvious concomitant to the increase in the number of black sailors was an increase in the number of black officers. The personnel bureau was well aware of this connection; Comdr. Luther C. Heinz, officer in charge of naval reserve officer training, called the shortage of Negroes in his program a particularly important problem. He promised, "in accord with the desires of the President," as he put it, to increase black participation in the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and his superior, the Chief of Naval Personnel, started a program in the bureau for that purpose.[16-62] With the help of the National Urban League, Heinz arranged a series of lectures by black officers at forty-nine black schools and other institutions to interest Negroes in the Navy's reserve officers program. In August 1949, for example, Ens. Wesley Brown, the first Negro to be graduated from Annapolis, addressed gatherings in Chicago on the opportunities for Negroes as naval officers.[16-63]

[Footnote 16-62: Memo, Off in Charge, NROTC Tng, for
Chief, Plans & Policy Div, BuPers, 14 Jul 49, sub:
NROTC Personnel Problems, Pers 424, BuPersRecs.]

[Footnote 16-63: Ltr, Granger to Chief, NavPers, 3 Aug
49, Pers 42, BuPersRecs.]