Chapter 17: (p. 428) (2)

The second problem, integration of units throughout the command, proved more difficult and time-consuming. Ridgway considered the need most urgent in the infantry units and wanted their integration to take precedence. The 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry was reorganized first, many of its black members scattered throughout other infantry units in the 2d Division. But then things got out of phase. To speed the process the Army staff dropped its plan for inactivating all segregated units and decided simply to remove the designation "segregated" and assign white soldiers to formerly all-black units. Before this form of integration could take place in the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, the last major black infantry unit, the 64th Tank Battalion and the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion began the process of shifting their black troops to nearby white units. The 77th Engineer Combat Company was the last combat unit to lose the asterisk, the Army's way of designating a unit black.[17-57] The command was originally committed to an Army contingency plan that would transfer black combat troops found superfluous to the newly integrated units to service units, but this proved unnecessary. All segregated combat troops were eventually assigned to integrated combat units.[17-58]

[Footnote 17-57: Msg, DA 81846, 19 Sep 51; Eighth Army
GO 774, 16 Oct 51.]

[Footnote 17-58: FECOM Mil Hist Section, "History of
the Korean War," III (pt. 2):153-57.]

To soften the emotional aspects of the change, troop transfers were scheduled as part of the individual soldier's normal rotation. By the end of October 1951 the Eighth Army had integrated some 75 percent of its infantry units. The process was scheduled for completion by December, but integration of the rest of its combat units and the great number of service units dragged on for another half year. It was not until May 1952 that the last divisional and nondivisional organizations were integrated.[17-59]

[Footnote 17-59: Memo, ASA (M&RF) for ASD (M&P), 22
Aug 52, sub: Integration of Negro Manpower, SD
291.2.]

The third and greatest problem in the integration of the Far East Command was how to achieve a proportionate distribution of black troops throughout the command. Ridgway was under orders to maintain black strength at a maximum 12 percent except in combat infantry units, where the maximum was 10 percent. The temporary restriction on integrating the 40th and 45th Divisions and the lack of specially trained Negroes eligible for assignment to the Japan Logistical Command added to the difficulty of achieving this goal, but the basic cause of delay was the continued shipment of black troops to the (p. 446) Far East in excess of the prescribed percentage. During the integration period the percentage of black replacements averaged between 12.6 and 15 percent and occasionally rose above 15 percent.[17-60] Ridgway finally got permission from Washington to raise the ratio of black soldiers in his combat infantry units to 12 percent, and further relief could be expected in the coming months when the two National Guard divisions began integrating.[17-61] Still, in October 1951 the proportion of Negroes in the Eighth Army had risen to 17.6 percent, and the flow of black troops to the Far East continued unabated, threatening the success of the integration program. Ridgway repeatedly appealed for relief, having been warned by his G-1 that future black replacements must not exceed 10 percent if the integration program was to continue successfully.[17-62]

[Footnote 17-60: Ibid.; Stillwaugh, "Personnel
Problems in the Korean Conflict," pp. 33-35.]

[Footnote 17-61: Msg, CSA to CINCFE, DA 96489, 18 Jul
51.]

[Footnote 17-62: Journal Files, G-1, FEC, Oct 51,
Annex 2.]

Ridgway was particularly concerned with the strain on his program caused by the excessive number of black combat replacements swelling the percentage of Negroes in his combat units. By September black combat strength reached 14.2 percent, far above the limits set by the Army staff. Ridgway wanted combat replacements limited to 12 (p. 447) percent. He also proposed that his command be allowed to request replacements by race and occupational specialty in order to provide Army headquarters with a sound basis for allotting black enlisted men to the Far East. While the Army staff promised to try to limit the number of black combat troops, it rejected the requisition scheme. Selection for occupational specialist training was not made by race, the G-1 explained, and the Army could not control the racial proportions of any particular specialty. Since the Army staff had no control over the number of Negroes in the Army, their specialties or the replacement needs of the command, no purpose would be served by granting such a request.[17-63]

[Footnote 17-63: Rad, CINCFE for DA, DA IN 182547, 11
Sep 52, sub: Negro Personnel; Msg, DA to CINCFE, 23
Sep 52, G-1 291.2.]

Yet Ridgway's advice could not be ignored, because by year's end the whole Army had developed a vested interest in the success of integration in the Far East. The service was enjoying the praise of civil rights congressmen, much of the metropolitan press, and even some veterans' groups, such as the Amvets.[17-64] Secretary Pace was moved to call the integration of the Eighth Army a notable advance in the field of human relations.[17-65] But most of all, the Army began to experience the fruits of racial harmony. Much of the conflict and confusion among troops that characterized the first year of the war disappeared as integration spread, and senior officials commented publicly on the superior military efficiency of an integrated Army in Korea.[17-66] As for the men themselves, their attitudes were in sharp contrast to those predicted by the Army traditionalists. The conclusion of some white enlisted men, wounded and returned from Korea, were typical:

Far as I'm concerned it [integration] worked pretty good.... When
it comes to life or death, race does not mean any difference....
It's like one big family.... Got a colored guy on our machine gun
crew--after a while I wouldn't do without him.... Concerning
combat, what I've seen, an American is an American. When we have
to do something we're all the same.... Each guy is like your own
brother--we treated all the same.... Had a colored platoon
leader. They are as good as any people.... We [an integrated
squad] had something great in common, sleeping, guarding each
other--sometimes body against body as we slept in bunkers....
Takes all kinds to fight a war.[17-67]

[Footnote 17-64: See, for example, Press Release by
Senator Herbert H. Lehman, 27 July 1951, which
expressed the praise of nine U.S. senators;
Editorial in the Baltimore Sun, December 21, 1951;
Ltr, National Cmdr, Amvets, to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51,
copies in CMH.]

[Footnote 17-65: _Semiannual Report of the Secretary
of Defense, July 1-December 31, 1951_ (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 13.]

[Footnote 17-66: See, for example, Interv, Nichols
with Bradley; Ltr, Ridgway to author, 3 Dec 73;
Mark S. Watson, "Most Combat GI's are
Unsegregated," datelined 15 Dec 51 (probably
prepared for the Baltimore _Sun_). All in CMH
files. See also James C. Evans and David Lane,
"Integration in the Armed Services," _Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences_
304 (March 1956):78.]

[Footnote 17-67: Extracted from a series of interviews
conducted by Lee Nichols with a group of wounded
soldiers at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 12
November 1952, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

Integration was an established fact in Korea, but the question remained: could an attitude forged in the heat of battle be sustained on the more tranquil maneuver grounds of central Europe and the American south?

_Integration of the European and Continental Commands_ (p. 448)

Since the Army was just 12 percent Negro in September 1951, it should have been possible to solve Ridgway's problem of black overstrength simply by distributing black soldiers evenly throughout the Army. But this solution was frustrated by the segregation still in force in other commands. Organized black units in the United States were small and few in number, and black recruits who could not be used in them were shipped as replacements to the overseas commands, principally in the Far East and Europe.[17-68] Consequently, Ridgway's problem was not an isolated one; his European counterpart was operating a largely segregated command almost 13 percent black. The Army could not prevent black overstrengths so long as Negroes were ordered into the quota-free service by color-blind draft boards, but it could equalize the overstrength by integrating its forces all over the world.

[Footnote 17-68: In 1951 the European Command was the
major Army headquarters in the European theater. It
was, at the same time, a combined command with some
20,000 members of the Air Force and Navy serving
along with 234,000 Army troops. In August 1952 a
separate Army command (U.S. Army, Europe) was
created within the European Command. Discussion of
the European Command and its commander in the
following paragraphs applies only to Army troops.]

This course, along with the knowledge that integration was working in the Far East and the training camps, was leading senior Army officials toward full integration. But they wanted certain reassurances. Believing that integration of the continental commands would create, in the words of the G-1, "obstacles and difficulties vastly greater than those in FECOM," the Army staff wanted these problems (p. 449) thoroughly analyzed before taking additional moves, "experimental or otherwise," to broaden integration.[17-69] General Collins, although personally committed to integration, voiced another widespread concern over extending integration beyond the Far East units. Unlike the Navy and the Air Force, which were able to secure more highly qualified men on a volunteer basis, the Army had long been forced to accept anyone meeting the draft's minimum standards. This circumstance was very likely to result, he feared, in an army composed to an unprecedented degree of poorly educated black soldiers, possibly as much as 30 percent in the near future.[17-70]

[Footnote 17-69: Memo, G-1 for DCofS, Admin, 18 Jul
51, G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-70: Ltr, Eli Ginzberg to Lt Col Edward J.
Barta, Hist Div, USAREUR, attached to Ltr, Ginzberg
to Carter Burgess, ASD (M&P), 11 Nov 55, SD 291.2
(11 Nov 55).]

The Army's leaders received the necessary reassurances in the coming months. The Secretary of Defense laid to rest their fear that the draft-dependent Army would become a dumping ground for the ignorant and untrainable when, in April 1951, he directed that troops must be distributed among the services on a qualitative basis. Assistant Secretary of the Army Johnson asked Professor Eli Ginzberg, a social scientist and consultant to the Army, to explain to the Army Policy Council the need for aggressive action to end segregation.[17-71] And once again, but this time with considerable scientific detail to support its recommendations, the Project CLEAR final report told Army leaders that the service should be integrated worldwide. Again the researchers found that the Army's problem was not primarily racial, but a question of how best to use underqualified men. Refining their earlier figures, they decided that black soldiers were best used in integrated units at a ratio of 15 to 85. Integration on the job was conducive to social integration, they discovered, and social integration, dependent on several variables, was particularly amenable to firm policy guidance and local control. Finally, the report found that integration on military posts was accepted by local civilians as a military policy unlikely to affect their community.[17-72]

[Footnote 17-71: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 11 Nov 55.]

[Footnote 17-72: ORO-R-11, Rpt, Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the Army, Project CLEAR, vol. 1; G-1
Summary Sheet for CofSA, 5 Jan 52, sub: Evaluation
of ORO-R-11 on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
Army, CS 291.2 Negroes (5 Jan 52).]

The Chief of Staff approved the Project CLEAR final report, although his staff had tried to distinguish between the report's view of on-the-job integration and social integration, accepting the former with little reservation, but considering the latter to be "weak in supporting evidence." The personnel staff continued to stress the need to reimpose a racial quota quickly without waiting for black enrollment to reach 15 percent as the Project CLEAR report suggested. It also believed that integration should be limited to the active federal service, exempting National Guard units under state control. General McAuliffe agreed to drop racial statistics but warned that investigation of discrimination charges depended on such statistics. He also agreed that blacks could be mixed with whites at 10 to 20 percent of the strength of any white unit, but to assign whites in similar percentages to black units "would undoubtedly present difficulties and place undue burdens on the assigned white personnel." Finally, McAuliffe stressed that commanders would have flexibility (p. 450) in working out the nonoperational aspects of integration so long as their methods and procedures were consistent with Army policy.[17-73]

[Footnote 17-73: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofSA, 5 Jan
52.]

These reservations aside, McAuliffe concluded that integration was working in enough varied circumstances to justify its extension to the entire Army. General Collins agreed, and on 29 December 1951 he ordered all major commanders to prepare integration programs for their commands. Integration was the Army's immediate goal, and, he added, it was to be progressive, in orderly stages, and without publicity.[17-74]

[Footnote 17-74: Ibid., 29 Dec 51, sub: Integration of
Negro Enlisted Personnel, G-1 291.2 Negroes.]

The Chief of Staff's decision was especially timely for the European Command where General Thomas T. Handy faced manpower problems similar to if not so critical as those in the Far East. During 1951 Army strength in Europe had also risen sharply--from 86,000 to 234,000 men. Black strength had increased even more dramatically, from 8,876 (or 11 percent) to 27,267 (or 13 percent). The majority of black soldiers in Europe served in segregated units, the number of which more than doubled because of the Korean War. From sixty-six units in June 1950, the figure rose to 139 in March 1952. Most of these units were not in divisions but in service organizations; 113 were service units, of which fifty-three were transportation units.

Again as in the Far East, some integration in Europe occurred in response to the influx of new soldiers as well as to Army directives. Handy integrated his Noncommissioned Officers' Academy in 1950 in an operation involving thousands of enlisted men. After he closed the segregated Kitzingen Training Center in February 1951, black troops were absorbed into other training and replacement centers on an integrated basis. For some time Army commanders in Europe had also been assigning certain black soldiers with specialist training to white units, a practice dramatically accelerated in 1950 when the command began receiving many Negroes with occupation specialties unneeded in black units. In March 1951 Handy directed that, while the assignment of Negroes to black units remained the first priority, Negroes possessing qualifications unusable or in excess of the needs of black units would be assigned where they could be used most effectively.[17-75] Consequently, by the end of 1951 some 7 percent of all black enlisted men, 17 percent of the black officers, and all black soldiers of the Women's Army Corps in the command were serving in integrated units.

[Footnote 17-75: Ltr, EUCOM to Sub Cmds, 16 Mar 51,
sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel, USAREUR SGS
291.2. See also EUCOM Hist Div, "Integration of
Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army, Europe,
1952-1954," p. 4, in CMH. This monograph, prepared
by Ronald Sher, will be cited hereafter as Sher
Monograph.]

In sharp contrast to the Far East Command, there was little support among senior Army officials in Europe for full integration. Sent by Assistant Secretary Johnson to brief European commanders on the Army's decision, Eli Ginzberg met with almost universal skepticism. Most commanders were unaware of the Army's success with integration in the Far East and in the training divisions at home; when so informed they were quick to declare such a move impractical for Europe. They warned of the social problems that would arise with the all-white civilian population and predicted that the Army would be forced to abandon (p. 451) the program in midstream.[17-76]

[Footnote 17-76: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 11 Nov 55,
CMH files.]

There were exceptions. Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, the commander of the Seventh Army, described the serious operational problems caused by segregation in his command. Most of his black units were unsatisfactory, and without minimizing the difficulties he concluded in 1951 that integration was desirable not only for the sake of his own mission but for the Army's efficiency and the nation's world leadership. Officers at Headquarters, Supreme Allied Powers, Europe, also recited personnel and training problems caused in their command by segregation, but here, Ginzberg noted, the attitude was one of cautious silence, an attitude that made little difference because General Eisenhower's command was an international organization having nothing to do with the Army's race policies. It would, however, be of some interest during the 1952 political campaign when some commentators made the false claim that Eisenhower had integrated American units in Europe.[17-77]

[Footnote 17-77: See, for example, _Pathfinder_
Magazine 58 (May 7, 1952):11. See also Ltr, Philleo
Nash to Donald Dawson, 27 May 52, Nash Collection,
Truman Library; Ltr, Brig Gen Charles T. Lanham to
Evans, 7 Aug 51, CMH files; CINFO Summary Sheet, 12
Jun 52, sub: Query Washington Bureau, NAACP, CSA
291.2.]

Obviously it was going to take more than a visit from Ginzberg to move the European Command's staff, and later in the year Collins took the matter up personally with Handy. This consultation, and a series of exchanges between McAuliffe and command officials, led Collins to ask Handy to submit an integration plan as quickly as possible.[17-78] Handy complied with a proposal that failed on the whole to conform to the Army's current plans for worldwide integration and was quickly amended in Washington. The European Command would not, Collins decreed, conduct a special screening of its black officers and noncoms for fitness for combat duty. The command would not retain segregated service units, although the Army would allow an extension of the program's timetable to accomplish the integration of these units. Finally, the command would stage no publicity campaign but would instead proceed quietly and routinely. The program was to begin in April 1952.[17-79]

[Footnote 17-78: Msg, CofSA to CINCEUR, 4 Dec 51, DA
88688.]

[Footnote 17-79: Ltr, AG, EUCOM, to CofSA, 14 Dec 51,
sub: Racial Integration in Combat Units; G-1
Summary Sheet, 24 Jan 52, same sub; Ltr, CofSA to
Handy, 15 Feb 52; Msg, CINCEUR to CofSA, 22 Mar 52,
DA IN 119235; Msg, CofSA to CINCEUR, DA 904459, 24
Mar 52. All in CS 291.2.]

Integration of the European Command proceeded without incident, but the administrative task was complicated and frequently delayed by the problem of black overstrength. Handy directed that Negroes be assigned as individuals in a 1 to 10 ratio in all units although he would tolerate a higher ratio in service and temporary duty units during the early stages of the program.[17-80] This figure was adjusted upward the following year to a maximum of 12 percent black for armor and infantry units, 15 percent for combat engineers and artillery, and 17.5 percent for all other units. During the process of integrating the units, a 25 percent black strength was authorized.[17-81]

[Footnote 17-80: Memo, CINCEUCOM for Commanding
Generals et al., 1 Apr 52, sub: Racial Integration
of EUCOM Army Units, copy in CS 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-81: Sher Monograph, p. 27.]

The ratios were raised because the percentage of Negroes in the (p. 452) command continued to exceed the 1 to 10 ratio and was still increasing. In September 1953 the new commander, General Alfred M. Gruenther, tried to slow the rate of increase.[17-82] He got Washington to halt the shipment of black units, and he himself instituted stricter reenlistment standards in Europe. Finally, he warned that with fewer segregated units to which black troops might be assigned, the racial imbalance was becoming more critical, and he asked for a deferment of the program's completion.[17-83] The Army staff promised to try to alleviate the racial disproportions in the replacement stream, but asked Gruenther to proceed as quickly as possible with integration.[17-84]

[Footnote 17-82: As of 1 August 1952 the major joint
American command in Europe was designated U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM). The U.S. Army element
in this command was designated U.S. Army, Europe
(USAREUR). Gruenther was the commander in chief of
the European Command from July 1953 to November
1956. At the same time he occupied the senior
position in the NATO Command under the title
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).]

[Footnote 17-83: Memo, USCINCEUR for TAG, 30 Sep 53,
sub: Racial Integration of USAREUR Units, AG 291.2
(30 Sep 53); see also Sher Monograph, pp. 24-27.]

[Footnote 17-84: Memos, G-1 for TAG, 30 Oct 53, sub:
Negro Overstrength in USAREUR, and TAG for
USCINCEUR, 2 Nov 53, same sub; both in AG 291.2 (30
Oct 53).]

There was little the Army staff could do. The continental commands had the same overstrength problem, and the staff considered the European Command an inappropriate place to raise black percentages. By mid-1953 Negroes accounted for some 16 percent of Army personnel in Europe and, more important to the command, the number of Negroes with combat occupation specialties continued to increase at the same rate. As an alternative to the untenable practice of reclassifying combat-trained men for noncombat assignments purely on account of race, Gruenther again raised the acceptable ratio of blacks in combat units. At the same time he directed the Seventh Army commander to treat ratios in the future merely as guidelines, to be adhered to as circumstances permitted.[17-85] The percentage of Negroes in the command leveled off at this time, but not before the black proportion of the command's transportation units reached 48.8 percent. Summing up his command's policy on integration, Gruenther concluded: "I cannot permit the assignment of large numbers of unqualified personnel, regardless of race, to prejudice the operation readiness of our units in an effort to attain 100 percent racial integration, however desirable that goal may be."[17-86] A heavy influx of white replacements with transportation specialties allowed the European Command to finish integrating the elements of the Seventh Army in July 1954.[17-87] The last black unit in the command, the 94th Engineer Battalion, was inactivated in November.

[Footnote 17-85: Ltr, USCINCEUR to CG, Seventh Army, 8
Jul 53, sub: Racial Integration of USAREUR Units,
USAREUR AG 291.2 (1953).]

[Footnote 17-86: Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR, 10 Apr
53, USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1953), quoted in Sher
Monograph, p. 28.]

[Footnote 17-87: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical
Report, 1 January 1953-30 June 1954," p. 60, in
CMH.]

Integration of black troops in Europe proved successful on several counts, with the Army, in Assistant Secretary Fred Korth's words, "achieving benefits therefrom substantially greater than we had anticipated at its inception."[17-88] The command's combat (p. 453) readiness increased, he claimed, while its racial incidents and disciplinary problems declined. The reaction of the soldiers was, again in Korth's words, "generally good" with incidents stemming from integration "fewer and much farther between." Moreover, the program had been a definite advantage in counteracting Communist propaganda, with no evidence of problems with civilians arising from social integration. More eloquent testimony to the program's success appeared in the enthusiasm of the European Command's senior officials.[17-89] Their fears and uncertainties eased, they abruptly reversed their attitudes and some even moved from outright opposition to praise for the program as one of their principal achievements.

[Footnote 17-88: Memo, ASA (M&RF) for J. C. Evans,
OASD (M), 26 Nov 52, sub: Negro Integration in
Europe, SD 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-89: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 15 Nov 55,
CMH files; Ernest Leiser, "For Negroes, It's a New
Army Now," _Saturday Evening Post_ 225 (December
13, 1952):26-27, 108-12.]

The smaller overseas commands also submitted plans to Army headquarters for the breakup of their segregated units in 1951, and integration of the Alaskan Command and the rest proceeded during 1952 without incident.[17-90] At the same time the continental Army commands, faced with similar manpower problems, began making exceptions, albeit considerably more timidly than the great overseas commands, to the assignment of Negroes to black units. As early as September 1951 the Army G-1 discovered instances of unauthorized integration in every Army area,[17-91] the result of either unrectified administrative errors or the need to find suitable assignments for black replacements. "The concern shown by you over the press reaction to integrating these men into white units," the Sixth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, reported to the Army staff, "causes me to guess that your people may not realize the extent to which integration has already progressed--at least in the Sixth Army."[17-92] Swing concluded that gradual integration had to be the solution to the Army's race problems everywhere. McAuliffe agreed with Swing that the continental commands should be gradually integrated, but, as he put it, "the difficulty is that my superiors are not prepared to admit that we are already launched on a progressive integration program" in the United States. The whole problem was a very touchy one, McAuliffe added.[17-93]

[Footnote 17-90: On the integration of these commands,
see, for example, G-1 Summary Sheet, 4 Sep 52, sub:
Utilization of Negro Personnel; Ltr, CG, USARAL, to
DA, 15 Sep 51; Ltr, G-1 to Maj Gen Julian
Cunningham, 22 Oct 51. All in G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-91: Memo, Chief, Manpower Control Div,
G-1, for Gen Taylor, 6 Sep 51, sub: Negro
Integration, G-1 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-92: Ltr, CG, Sixth Army, to ACofS, G-1,
10 Sep 51, G-1 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 17-93: Ltr, G-1 to CG, Sixth Army, 17 Sep
51, G-1 291.2.]

The Army staff had agreed to halt the further integration of units in the United States until the results of the overseas changes had been carefully analyzed. Nevertheless, even while the integration of the Far East forces was proceeding, General McAuliffe's office prepared a comprehensive two-phase plan for the integration of the continental armies. It would consolidate all temporary units then separated into racial elements, redistributing all Negroes among the organized white units; then, Negroes assigned to black components of larger white units would be absorbed into similar white units through normal attrition or by concentrated levies on the black units. McAuliffe (p. 454) estimated that the whole process would take two years.[17-94]

[Footnote 17-94: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 21 Sep
51, sub: G-1 Attitude Toward Integration of Negroes
Into CONUS Units, CS 291.2 Negroes (21 Sep 51). The
staff's decision to halt further integration was
announced in Memo, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18
Jul 51, G-1 291.2.]

McAuliffe's plan was put into effect when General Collins ordered worldwide integration in December 1952. The breakdown of the "10 percent Army" proceeded uneventfully, and the old black units disappeared. The 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, now converted into the 509th and 510th Tank Battalions (Negro), received white replacements and dropped the racial designation. The 25th Infantry, now broken down into smaller units, was integrated in September 1952. On 12 October 1953 Assistant Secretary of Defense John Hannah announced that 95 percent of the Army's Negroes were serving in integrated units with the rest to be so assigned not later than June 1954.[17-95] His estimate was off by several months. The European (p. 455) Command's 94th Engineer Battalion, the last major all-black unit, was inactivated in November 1954, several weeks after the Secretary of Defense had announced the end of all segregated units.[17-96]

[Footnote 17-95: _U.S. News and World Report_ 35
(October 16, 1953):99-100.]

[Footnote 17-96: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical
Report, 1 July 1954-30 June 1955," p. 83.]

Like a man who discovers that his profitable deeds are also virtuous, the Army discussed its new racial policy with considerable pride. From company commander to general officer the report was that the Army worked better; integration was desirable, and despite all predictions to the contrary, it was a success. Military commentators in and out of uniform stoutly defended the new system against its few critics.[17-97] Most pointed to Korea as the proving ground for the new policy. Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah generalized about the change to integration: "Official analyses and reports indicate a definite increase in combat effectiveness in the overseas areas.... From experience in Korea and elsewhere, Army commanders have (p. 456) determined, also, that more economical and effective results accrue from the policies which remove duplicate facilities and operations based upon race."[17-98] The Army, it would seem, had made a complete about-face in its argument from efficiency.

[Footnote 17-97: See, for example, _Semiannual Report
of the Secretary of Defense, January 1-June 30,
1933_, p. 24; ibid., January 1-June 30, 1954, pp.
21-22; and annual reports of the Secretary of the
Army for same period, as well as CINCUSAREUR's
response to criticisms by General Mark Clark, _Army
Times_, May 19, 1956, and S. L. A. Marshall's
devastating rejoinder to General Almond in the
Detroit _News_, May 13, 1956. Clark's views are
reported in _U.S. News and World Report_ 40 (May
11, 1956). See also Ltr, Lt Col Gordon Hill, CINFO,
to Joan Rosen, WCBS, 17 Apr 64, CMH files; New York
_Herald Tribune_, May 14, 1956; New York _Times_
May 6, 1956.]

[Footnote 17-98: Ltr, Hannah, ASD (M), to Sen. Lyndon
B. Johnson, 27 Feb 53, ASD (M) 291.2.]

But integration did more than demonstrate a new form of military efficiency. It also stilled several genuine fears long entertained by military leaders. Many thoughtful officials had feared that the social mingling that would inevitably accompany integration in the continental United States might lead to racial incidents and a breakdown in discipline. The new policy seemed to prove this fear groundless.[17-99] A 1953 Army-sponsored survey reported that, with the single major exception of racially separate dances for enlisted men at post-operated service clubs on southern bases, segregation involving uniformed men and women now stopped at the gates of the military reservation.[17-100] Army headquarters, carefully monitoring the progress of social integration, found it without incident.[17-101] At the same time the survey revealed that some noncommissioned officers' clubs and enlisted men's clubs tended to segregate themselves, but no official notice was taken of this tendency, and not one such instance was a source of racial complaint in 1953. The survey also discovered that racial attitudes in adjacent communities had surprisingly little influence on the relations between white and black soldiers on post. Nor was there evidence of any appreciable resentment toward integration on the part of white civilian employees, even when they worked with or under black officers and enlisted men.

[Footnote 17-99: One exception was the strong
objection in some states to racially mixed
marriages contracted by soldiers. Twenty-seven
states had some form of miscegenation law. The Army
therefore did not assign to stations in those
states soldiers who by reason of their mixed
marriages might be subject to criminal penalties.
See Memo, Chief, Classification and Standards
Branch, DCSPER, for Planning Office, 28 Feb 50,
sub: Assignment of Personnel; DF, DCSPER to TAG, 4
Jun 54; both in DCSPER 291.2. For further
discussion of the matter, see TAGO, Policy Paper,
July 1954; New York _Post_, November 13, 1957.]

[Footnote 17-100: HUMRRO, Integration of Social
Activities on Nine Army Posts, Aug 53. See also
Interv, Nichols with Davis. A DCSPER action
officer, Davis was intimately involved with the
Army's integration program during this period.]

[Footnote 17-101: Interv, author with Evans, 4 Dec 73,
CMH files.]

The on-post dance, a valuable morale builder, was usually restricted to one race because commanders were afraid of arousing antagonism in nearby communities. But even here restrictions were not uniform. Mutual use of dance floors by white and black couples was frequent though not commonplace and was accepted in officers' clubs, many noncommissioned officers' clubs, and at special unit affairs. The rules for social integration were flexible, and many adjustments could be made to the sentiments of the community if the commander had the will and the tact. Some commanders, unaware of what was being accomplished by progressive colleagues, were afraid to establish a precedent, and often avoided practices that were common elsewhere. Social scientists reviewing the situation suggested that the Army should acquaint the commanders with the existing wide range of social possibilities.

Fear of congressional disapproval, another reason often given for deferring integration, was exaggerated, as a meeting between Senator Richard B. Russell and James Evans in early 1952 demonstrated. (p. 457) At the request of the manpower secretary, Evans went to Capitol Hill to inform the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that for reasons of military efficiency the Army was going to integrate. Senator Russell observed that he had been unable to do some things he wanted to do "because your people [black voters] weren't strong enough politically to support me." Tell the secretary, Russell added, "that I won't help him integrate, but I won't hinder him either--and neither will anyone else."[17-102] The senator was true to his word. News of the Army's integration program passed quietly through the halls of Congress without public or private protest.

[Footnote 17-102: Ibid.]

Much opposition to integration was based on the fear that low-scoring black soldiers, handicapped by deficiencies in schooling and training, would weaken integrated units as they had the all-black units. But integration proved to be the best solution. As one combat commander put it, "Mix 'um up and you get a strong line all the way; segregate 'um and you have a point of weakness in your line. The enemy hits you there, and it's bug out."[17-103] Korea taught the Army that an integrated unit was not as weak as its weakest men, but as strong as its leadership and training. Integration not only diluted the impact of the less qualified by distributing them more widely, but also brought about measurable improvement in the performance and standards of a large number of black soldiers.

[Footnote 17-103: Quoted in John B. Spore and Robert
F. Cocklin, "Our Negro Soldiers," _Reporter_ 6
(January 22, 1952):6-9.]

Closely related to the concern over the large number of ill-qualified soldiers was the fear of the impact of integration on a quota-free Army. The Project CLEAR team concluded that a maximum of 15 to 20 percent black strength "seems to be an effective interim working level."[17-104] General McAuliffe pointed out in November 1952 that he was trying to maintain a balanced distribution of black troops, not only geographically but also according to combat and service specialties (_see Tables 9 and 10_). Collins decided to retain the ceiling on black combat troops--no more than 12 percent in any combat unit--but he agreed that a substantially higher percentage was acceptable in all other units.[17-105]

[Footnote 17-104: Ltr, Dir, ORO, to ACofS, G-3, 20 Nov
52, G-3 291.2.]

[Footnote 17-105: Memo for Rcd, G-1, 6 Nov 52, ref:
ACofS, G-1, Memo for CofS, sub: Distribution of
Negro Personnel, 14 Oct 52, G-1 291.2.]

Table 9--Worldwide Distribution of Enlisted Personnel by Race, October 1952

(In Thousands)

European Far East Other Overseas Continental
Category Command Command Commands United Total
States

White 212.1 293.1 96.0 649.2 1,250.5
Black 35.6 41.5 5.8[a] 110.6 193.4
Total 247.7 334.6 101.8 759.8 1,445.9
Percent black 14.4 12.4 5.7 14.6 13.4

[Tablenote a: Restrictions remained in effect on
the assignment of Negroes to certain stations in
USARPAC, TRUST, and USARCARIB.]

_Source_: Memo, Chief, Per and Dist Br, G-1, for ACofS, G-1, 8 Oct 52, sub: Distribution of Negro Enlisted Personnel, G-1, 291.2.

Table 10--Distribution of Black Enlisted Personnel by Branch and Rank, 31 October 1952

AUS Regular
Branch Total Percent[b] Total Percent[b]

Armor 7,738 13.7 3,565 13.8
Artillery 33,684 16.9 14,854 19.9
Infantry 37,220 14.1 15,713 14.9
Adjutant General's Corps 1,074 8.8 663 10.8
Chemical Corps 1,504 15.5 633 20.1
Corps of Engineers 18,987 16.4 8,315 17.9
Military Police Corps 3,012 8.1 1,751 9.8
Finance Corps 68 2.4 51 5.3
Army Medical Service 9,896 12.2 4,439 12.9
Ordnance Corps 5,683 10.2 2,598 12.0
Quartermaster Corps 9,690 20.8 4,187 20.6
Signal Corps 6,923 8.2 3,192 8.7
Transportation Corps 16,380 31.2 8,765 38.2
Women's Army Corps 1,310 13.1 1,283 13.3
No Branch assignment[a] 42,643 11.4 17,779 11.7
Total 195,812[c] 87,788

[Tablenote a: In training.]

[Tablenote b: Figures show black percentage of
total Army enlistments.]

[Tablenote c: Discrepancy with Table 9, which is
based on September figures.]

_Source_: STM-30, 31 Oct 52.

These percentages were part of a larger concern over the number of Negroes in the Army as a whole. Based on the evidence of draft-swollen enlistment statistics, it seemed likely that the 15 to 20 percent figure would be reached or surpassed in 1953 or 1954, and there was some discussion in the staff about restoring the quota. But such talk quickly faded as the Korean War wound down and the percentage declined. Negroes constituted 14.4 percent of enlisted strength in December 1952 and leveled off by the summer of 1955 at 11.9 percent. Statistics for the European Command illustrated the trend. In June 1955, Negroes accounted for 3.6 percent of the command's officer strength and 11.4 percent of its enlisted strength. The enlisted figure represents a drop from a high of 16.1 percent in June 1953. The percentage of black troops was down to 11.2 percent of the (p. 458) command's total strength--officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men--by June 1956. The reduction is explained in part by a policy adopted by all commands in February 1955 of refusing, with certain exceptions, to reenlist three-year veterans who scored less than ninety in the classification tests. In Europe alone some 5,300 enlisted men were not permitted to reenlist in 1955. Slightly more than 25 percent were black.[17-106]

[Footnote 17-106: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical
Report, 1 July 1954-30 June 1955," pp. 76-80, 92;
ibid., 1 July 1955-30 June 1956, pp. 65-67.]

The racial quota, in the guise of an "acceptable" percentage of Negroes in individual units, continued to operate long after the Army agreed to abandon it. No one, black or white, appears to have voiced in the early 1950's the logical observation that the establishment of a racial quota in individual Army units--whatever the percentage and the grounds for that percentage--was in itself a residual form of discrimination. Nor did anyone ask how establishing a race quota, clearly distinct from restricting men according to mental, moral, or professional standards, could achieve the "effective working (p. 459) level" posited by the Army's scientific advisers.

These questions would still be pertinent years later because the alternative to the racial quota--the enlistment and assignment of men without regard for color--would continue to be unacceptable to many. They would argue that to abandon the quota, as the services did in the 1960's, was to violate the concept of racial balance, which is yet another hallmark of an egalitarian society. For example, during the Vietnam War some black Americans complained that too many Negroes were serving in the more dangerous combat arms. Since men were assigned without regard to race, these critics were in effect asking for the quota again, reminding the service that the population of the United States was only some 11 percent black. And during discussions of the all-volunteer Army a decade later, critics would be asking how the white majority would react to an army 30 or even 50 percent black.

These considerations were clearly beyond the ken of the men who integrated the Army in the early 1950's. They concentrated instead on the perplexities of enlisting and assigning vast numbers of segregated black soldiers during wartime and closely watched the combat performance of black units in Korea. Integration provided the Army with a way to fill its depleted combat units quickly. The shortage of white troops forced local commanders to turn to the growing surplus of black soldiers awaiting assignment to a limited number of black units. Manpower restrictions did not permit the formation of new black units merely to accommodate the excess, and in any case experience with the 24th Infantry had strengthened the Army staff's conviction that black combat units did not perform well. However commanders may have felt about the social implications of integration, and whatever they thought of the fighting ability of black units, the only choice left to them was integration. When the Chief of Staff ordered the integration of the Far East Command in 1951, what had begun as a battlefield expedient became official policy.

Segregation became unworkable when the Army lost its power to limit the number of black soldiers. Abandonment of the quota on enlistments, pressed on the Army by the Fahy Committee, proved compatible with segregated units only so long as the need for fighting men was not acute. In Korea the need became acute. Ironically, the Gillem Board, whose work became anathema to the integrationists, accurately predicted the demise of segregation in its final report, which declared that in the event of another major war the Army would use its manpower "without regard to antecedents or race."