Chapter I (4)

Besides these doctrines respecting the great cosmical bodies, Anaxagoras gave explanations of many among the striking phenomena in geology and meteorology--the sea, rivers, earthquakes, hurricanes, hail, snow, &c.[174] He treated also of animals and plants--their primary origin, and the manner of their propagation.[175] He thought that animals were originally produced by the hot and moist earth; but that being once produced, the breeds were continued by propagation. The seeds of plants he supposed to have been originally contained in the air, from whence they fell down to the warm and moist earth, where they took root and sprung up.[176] He believed that all plants, as well as all animals, had a certain measure of intelligence and sentiment, differing not in kind but only in degree from the intelligence and sentiment of men; whose superiority of intelligence was determined, to a great extent, by their possession of hands.[177] He explained sensation by the action of unlike upon unlike (contrary to Empedokles, who referred it to the action of like upon like),[178] applying this doctrine to the explanation of the five senses separately. But he pronounced the senses to be sadly obscure and insufficient as means of knowledge. Apparently, however, he did not discard their testimony, nor assume any other means of knowledge independent of it, but supposed a concomitant and controlling effect of intelligence as indispensable to compare and judge between the facts of sense when they appeared contradictory.[179] On this point, however, it is difficult to make out his opinions.

[Footnote 174: See Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 174-181. Among the points to which Anaxagoras addressed himself was the annual inundation of the Nile, which he ascribed to the melting of the snows in Æthiopia, in the higher regions of the river's course.--Diodor. i. 38. Herodotus notices this opinion (ii. 22), calling it plausible, but false, yet without naming any one as its author. Compare Euripides, Helen. 3.]

[Footnote 175: Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 6, iv. 1.]

[Footnote 176: Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iii. 2; Diogen. Laert. ii. 9; Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2.]

[Footnote 177: Aristot. De Plantis, i. 1; Aristot. Part. Animal. iv. 10.]

[Footnote 178: Theophrastus, De Sensu, sect. 1--sect. 27-30.

This difference followed naturally from the opinions of the two philosophers on the nature of the soul or mind. Anaxagoras supposed it peculiar in itself, and dissimilar to the Homoeomeries without. Empedokles conceived it as a compound of the four elements, analogous to all that was without: hence man knew each exterior element by its like within himself--earth by earth, water by water, &c.]

[Footnote 179: Anaxag. Fr. 19, Schaub.; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 91-140; Cicero, Academ. i. 12.

Anaxagoras remarked that the contrast between black and white might be made imperceptible to sense by a succession of numerous intermediate colours very finely graduated. He is said to have affirmed that snow was really black, notwithstanding that it appeared white to our senses: since water was black, and snow was only frozen water (Cicero, Academ. iv. 31; Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 33). "Anaxagoras non modo id ita esse (_sc._ albam nivem esse) negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse _ne videri quidem_." Whether Anaxagoras ever affirmed that snow did not _appear to him_ white, may reasonably be doubted: his real affirmation probably was, that snow, though it appeared white, was not really white. And this affirmation depended upon the line which he drew between the fact of sense, the phenomenal, the relative, on one side--and the substratum, the real, the absolute, on the other. Most philosophers recognise a distinction between the two; but the line between the two has been drawn in very different directions. Anaxagoras assumed as his substratum, real, or absolute, the Homoeomeries--numerous primordial varieties of matter, each with its inherent qualities. Among these varieties he reckoned _water_, but he did not reckon _snow_. He also considered that water was really and absolutely black or dark (the Homeric [Greek: me/lan u(/dôr])--that blackness was among its primary qualities. Water, when consolidated into snow, was so disguised as to produce upon the spectator the appearance of whiteness; but it did not really lose, nor could it lose, its inherent colour. A negro covered with white paint, and therefore looking white, is still really black: a wheel painted with the seven prismatic colours, and made to revolve rapidly, will look white, but it is still really septi-coloured: _i.e._ the state of rapid revolution would be considered as an exceptional state, not natural to it. Compare Plato, Lysis, c. 32, p. 217 D.]

[Side-note: The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious.]

Anaxagoras, residing at Athens and intimately connected with Perikles, incurred not only unpopularity, but even legal prosecution, by the tenor of his philosophical opinions, especially those on astronomy. To Greeks who believed in Helios and Selênê as not merely living beings but Deities, his declaration that the Sun was a luminous and fiery stone, and the Moon an earthy mass, appeared alike absurd and impious. Such was the judgment of Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon, as well as of Aristophanes and the general Athenian public.[180] Anaxagoras was threatened with indictment for blasphemy, so that Perikles was compelled to send him away from Athens.

[Footnote 180: Plato, Apol. So. c. 14; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7.]

That physical enquiries into the nature of things, and attempts to substitute scientific theories in place of the personal agency of the Gods, were repugnant to the religious feelings of the Greeks, has been already remarked.[181] Yet most of the other contemporary philosophers must have been open to this reproach, not less than Anaxagoras; and we learn that the Apolloniate Diogenes left Athens from the same cause. If others escaped the like prosecution which fell upon Anaxagoras, we may probably ascribe this fact to the state of political party at Athens, and to the intimacy of the latter with Perikles. The numerous political enemies of that great man might fairly hope to discredit him in the public mind--at the very least to vex and embarrass him--by procuring the trial and condemnation of Anaxagoras. Against other philosophers, even when propounding doctrines not less obnoxious respecting the celestial bodies, there was not the same collateral motive to stimulate the aggressive hostility of individuals.

[Footnote 181: Plutarch, Nikias, 23.]

[Side-note: Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element.]

Contemporary with Anaxagoras--yet somewhat younger, as far as we can judge, upon doubtful evidence--lived the philosopher Diogenes, a native of Apollonia in Krete. Of his life we know nothing except that he taught during some time at Athens, which city he was forced to quit on the same ground as Anaxagoras. Accusations of impiety were either brought or threatened against him:[182] physical philosophy being offensive generally to the received religious sentiment, which was specially awakened and appealed to by the political opponents of Perikles.

[Footnote 182: Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for foreign visitors--when the visits of philosophers to the city had been multiplied by the countenance of Perikles--and when the political rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is, that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C. 440-410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen. Apoll. c. 12-18 (Leipsic, 1830).

Simplikius (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having been [Greek: schedo\n neô/tatos] in the series of physical theorists.]

Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There was but one primordial element--and that element was air. He laid it down as indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same nature, but very changeable and diversified.[183]

[Footnote 183: Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29 Panzerb.; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 39.

[Greek: ei) ga\r ta\ e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta nu=n gê= kai\ u(/dôr kai\ ta)/lla, o(/sa phainetai e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta, ei) toute/ôn ti ê)=n to\ e(/teron tou= e(te/rou e(/teron e)o\n tê=| i)di/ê| phu/sei, kai\ mê\ to\ au)to\ e)o\n mete/pipte pollachô=s kai\ ê(teroiou=to; ou)damê= ou)/te mi/sgesthai a)llê/lois ê)du/nato ou)/te ô)phe/lêsis tô=| e(te/rô| ou)/te bla/bê], &c.

Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion that there must be one common Something out of which all things came--[Greek: e)x e(no\s a(/panta] (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7, p. 322, a. 14), inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.]

[Side-note: Air was the primordial, universal element.]

Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of intelligence and knowledge. This latter property Diogenes proved by the succession of climatic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to respire.[184]

[Footnote 184: Diog. Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz.--[Greek: Ou) ga\r a)\n ou(/tô de/dasthai oi(=o/n te ê)=n a)/neu noê/sios, ô(/ste pa/ntôn me/tra e)/chein, cheimô=no/s te kai\ the/reos kai nukto\s kai\ ê(me/rês kai\ u(etô=n kai\ a)ne/môn kai\ eu)diô=n. kai\ ta\ a)/lla ei)/ tis bou/letai e)nnoe/esthai, eu(/riskoi a)\n ou(/tô diakei/mena, ô(s a)nusto\n ka/llista. E)/ti de pro\s tou/tois kai\ ta/de mega/la sêmei=a; a)/nthrôpos ga\r kai\ ta\ a)/lla zô=a a)napne/onta zô/ei tô=| a)e/ri. Kai\ tou=to au)toi=s kai\ psuchê/ e)sti kai\ no/êsis----

--Kai\ moi\ doke/ei to\ tê\n no/êsin e)/chon ei)=nai o( a)ê\r kaleo/menos u(po\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn], &c.

Schleiermacher has an instructive commentary upon these fragments of the Apolloniate Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162; Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).]

[Side-note: Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was eminently modifiable.]

Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in nature partook of it in a different manner.[185] For it was distinguished by great diversity of properties and by many gradations of intelligence. It was hotter or colder--moister or drier--denser or rarer--more or less active and movable--exhibiting differences of colour and taste. All these diversities were found in objects, though all at the bottom were air. Reason and intelligence resided in the warm air. So also to all animals as well as to men, the common source of vitality, whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air; hotter than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that near the sun.[186] Nevertheless, in spite of this common characteristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely modifiable, that animals were of all degrees of diversity, in form, habits, and intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among themselves: yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished with the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things, animate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning from air and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and indestructible.[187]

[Footnote 185: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ e)sti mêde\ e(\n o(/, ti mê\ mete/chei tou/tou] (air). [Greek: Mete/chei de\ ou)de\ e(\n o(moi/ôs to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|; a)lla\ polloi\ tro/poi\ kai\ au)tou\ tou= a)e/ros kai\ tê=s noê/sio/s ei)sin.]

Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 21. [Greek: Dioge/nês d', ô(/sper kai\ e(teroi/ tines, a)e/ra [u(pe/labe tê\n psuchê/n]], &c.]

[Footnote 186: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ pa/ntôn zô/ôn dê\ ê( psuchê\ to\ au)to/ e)stin, a)ê\r thermo/teros me\n tou= e)/xô e)n ô(=| e)sme/n, tou= me/ntoi para\ tô=| ê(eli/ô| pollo\n psuchro/teros.]]

[Footnote 187: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.]

[Side-note: Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in the human body.]

The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in character and degree, was imbibed by respiration, the inspired air passing by means of the veins and along the blood into all parts of the body. Of the veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its minuteness of detail, in an age when philosophers dwelt almost exclusively in loose general analogies.[188] He conceived the principal seat of intelligence in man to be in the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle of the heart, where a quantity of air was accumulated ready for distribution.[189] The warm and dry air concentrated round the brain, and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted, thereby causing vision:[190] while pulsations and vibrations of the air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the eye with the brain were inflamed, no visual sensation could take place;[191] moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the real seat of sensation.[192] Thought and intelligence, as well as sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us, depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less intelligence than men: because they had more moisture in their bodies, so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to all parts: they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood was torpid and thick.[193]

[Footnote 188: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz. The description of the veins given by Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel. Hist. Animal, iii. 2: yet seemingly only in a defective abstract, for Theophrastus alludes to various opinions of Diogenes on the veins, which are not contained in Aristotle. See Philippson, [Greek: U(/lê a)nthrôpi/nê], p. 203.]

[Footnote 189: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. [Greek: E)n tê=| a)rtêriakê=| koili/a| tê=s kardi/as, ê(/tis e)sti\ kai\ pneumatikê/]. See Panzerbieter's commentary upon these words, which are not very clear (c. 50), nor easy to reconcile with the description given by Diogenes himself of the veins.]

[Footnote 190: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 18. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 39-41-43. [Greek: Kritikô/taton de\ ê(donê=s tê\n glô=ttan; a(palô/taton ga\r ei)=nai kai\ mano\n kai\ ta\s phle/bas a(pa/sas a)nê/kein ei)s au)tê/n.]]

[Footnote 191: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 16; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 40.]

[Footnote 192: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 42. [Greek: O(/ti de\ o( e)nto\s a)ê\r ai)stha/netai, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion tou= theou=, sêmei=on ei)=nai, o(/ti polla/kis pro\s a)/lla to\n nou=n e)/chontes ou)/th' o(rô=men ou)/t' a)kou/omen]. The same opinion--that sensation, like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions--is ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by Porphyry, De Abstinentiâ, iii. 21. [Greek: Stra/tônos tou= phusikou= lo/gos e)sti\n a)podeiknu/ôn, ô(s ou)de\ ai)stha/nesthai to para/pan a)/neu tou= noei=n u(pa/rchei. kai\ ga\r gra/mmata polla/kis e)piporeuome/nous tê=| o)/psei kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes tê=| a)koê=| dialantha/nousin ê(ma=s kai\ diapheu/gousi pro\s e(te/rous to\n nou=n e)/chontas--ê(=| kai\ le/lektai, nou=s o(rê= kai\ nou=s a)kou/ei, ta)/lla kôpha\ kai\ tuphla/.]

The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus--[Greek: o( e)nto\s a)ê\r, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion _tou= theou=_]--is so printed by Philippson; but the word [Greek: theou=] seems not well avouched as to the text, and Schneider prints [Greek: thumou=]. It is not impossible that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his physical theory; but this requires proof.]

[Footnote 193: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 43-46; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry soul is the best and most intelligent--is cited among the doctrines of Herakleitus, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony. [Greek: Au)/ê psuchê\ sophôta/tê kai\ a)ri/stê.] See Schleiermach. Herakleitos, sect. 59-64.]

[Side-note: Kosmology and meteorology.]

The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense, and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as earth and water: while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a rapid rotatory movement round the earth, and shaping itself into sun, moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone. The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the infinite mass without.[194] Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum; and the rotation of the heavens as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he supposed to have been the original arrangement; but after a certain time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south--the northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed--so that the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation of the heavens became apparently oblique.[195] He thought, moreover, that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.[196] Respecting animal generation--and to some extent respecting meteorological phenomena[197]--Diogenes also propounded several opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have resembled those of Anaxagoras.

[Footnote 194: Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8; Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Diogen. Laert. ix. 53. [Greek: Dioge/nês kissêroeidê= ta\ a)/stra, diapnoi/as de\ au)ta\ nomi/zei tou= ko/smou, ei)=nai de\ dia/pura; sumperiphe/resthai de\ toi=s phaneroi=s a)/strois a)phanei=s li/thous kai\ par' au)to\ tou=t' a)nônu/mous; pi/ptonta de\ polla/kis e)pi\ tê=s gê=s sbe/nnusthai; katha/per to\n e)n Ai)go\s potamoi=s purôdô=s katenechthe/nta _a)ste/ra_ pe/trinon.] This remarkable anticipation of modern astronomy--the recognition of aerolithes as a class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth's attraction, becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there being extinguished--is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his Kosmos, vol. i. p. 98-104, Eng. trans. He says--"The opinion of Diogenes of Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day," p. 110. The charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical subjects.]

[Footnote 195: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Panzerbieter ad Diog. Ap. c. 76-78; Schaubach ad Anaxagor. Fr. p. 175.]

[Footnote 196: Plut. Ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.]

[Footnote 197: Preller, Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief attention "in animantium naturâ ex aeris principio repetendâ"; and that he was less full "in cognitione [Greek: tô=n meteô/rôn]". But the fragments scarcely justify this.]

[Side-note: Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory.]

Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those already noticed--usually known under the name of the atomic theory. This Atomic theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdera, its expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger than Anaxagoras.[198] The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras.

[Footnote 198: Diogen. Laert. ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus discussed in Mullach, Frag. Dem. p. 12-25; and in Zeller, Phil. der Griech., vol. i. p. 576-681, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared himself to be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.]

[Side-note: Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions of Demokritus.]

Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little--yet enough to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics, but even of inherited patrimony.[199] His attention was chiefly turned towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical relations of lines.[200] He spent several years in visiting Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy, and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read, even from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in range and diversity of subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.[201]

[Footnote 199: Dionys. ix. 36-39.]

[Footnote 200: Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 238, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p. 41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 35; Strabo, xv. p. 703.

Pliny, Hist. Natur. "Democritus--vitam inter experimenta consumpsit," &c.]

[Footnote 201: Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos, o( tê=| Dio\s phô/nê| pareikazo/menos], &c.

Diogenes (ix. 46-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of philosophy, the difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have had a positive antipathy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus, while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked praise.]

[Side-note: Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides.]

The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out the Eleatic theory.[202] Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one side--from the phenomenal and relative on the other--conceived the former in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, continuous, unchangeable, immovable: the conception of Ens included these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parmenides _did_ affirm it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised each in a sphere of its own.

[Footnote 202: Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. [Greek: Leu/kippos . . . . koinônê/sas Parmeni/dê| tê=s philosophi/as, ou) tê\n au)tê\n e)ba/dise Parmeni/dê| kai\ Xenopha/nei peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn do/xan, a)ll', ô(s dokei=, tê\n e)nanti/an]. Aristotel. De Gener. et Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31. Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.]

[Side-note: Demokritean theory--Atoms--Plena and Vacua--Ens and Non-Ens.]

This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that Ens could not really change--that there could be no real generation, or destruction--no transformation of qualities--no transition of many into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the extended, which Parmenides had treated as an _Unum continuum_, into extension with body, and extension without body: into _plenum_ and _vacuum_, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the _vacuum_; not less self-existent than that which he called Something. They established their point by showing that Ens, thus interpreted, would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even appear to be a fact, without supposing _vacuum_ as well as body to be real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the existence of a _vacuum_ by appeal to direct physical observation, which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, essentially many and discontinuous: _plena_ and _vacua_, spaces full and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.[203] There existed atoms innumerable, each one in itself essentially a plenum, admitting no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be visible: yet all atoms were not equally small; there were fundamental differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible properties.[204]

[Footnote 203: It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise De Gener. et Corr. (i. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus as having grown out of that of the Eleates. [Greek: Leu/kippos d' e)/chein ô)|ê/thê lo/gous, oi(/tines pro\s tê\n ai)/sthêsin o(mologou/mena le/gontes ou)k a)nairê/sousin ou)/te ge/nesin ou)/te phthora\n ou)/te ki/nêsin kai\ to\ plê=thos tô=n o)/ntôn], &c.

Compare also Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 4, p. 303, a. 6; Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 5; Physic. iv. 6: [Greek: le/gousi de\] (Demokritus, &c., in proving a vacuum) [Greek: e(\n me\n o(/ti ê( ki/nêsis ê( kata\ to/pon ou)k a)\n ei)/ê, _ou) ga\r a)\n dokei=n_ ei)=nai ki/nêsin ei) mê\ ei)/ê keno/n; to\ ga\r plê=res a)du/naton ei)=nai de/xasthai/ ti], &c.

Plutarch adv. Kolot. p. 1108. [Greek: Oi(=s ou)d' o)/nar e)ntuchô\n o( Kolô/tês, e)spha/lê peri\ le/xin tou= a)ndro\s] (Demokritus) [Greek: e)n ê)=| diori/zetai, mê\ ma=llon to\ de\n, ê)\ to\ mêde\n ei)=nai; de\n me\n o)noma/zôn to\ sô=ma mêde\n de\ to\ keno/n, ô(s kai\ tou/tou phu/sin tina\ kai\ u(po/stasin i)di/an e)/chontos.]

The affirmation of Demokritus--That Nothing existed, just as much as Something--appears a paradox which we must probably understand as implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language of the Eleates, his opponents. They called the vacuum _Nothing_, but Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum _Nothing_, then I say that Nothing exists as well as Something.

The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a vacuum were--1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins. 3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b.)

Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact, ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum existed. Melissus, the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real motion. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6.)

Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his hypothesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (Gen. et Corr. i. 2; De Animâ, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was discoverable by man. See Mullach, Demokritus (pp. 414, 415). Compare Philippson--[Greek: U(=lê a)nthrôpi/nê]--Berlin, 1831.]

[Footnote 204: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 25, [Greek: ta\ prô=ta mege/thê ta\ a)diai/reta sterea/]. Diogen. Laert. ix. 44; Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1110 seq.

Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristotel. Metaphys. Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, [Greek: a)du/naton ei)=nai/ phêsi Dêmo/kritos e)k du/o e(\n ê)\| e)x e(no\s du/o gene/sthai; ta\ ga\r mege/thê ta\ a)/toma ta\s ou)si/as poiei=.]]

[Side-note: Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements and combinations generated qualities.]

The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established. For the real world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely from the sameness and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypothesis, accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world. In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as phenomenal aggregates.[205] But in respect to quantity or magnitude as well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover, besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental differences--partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination--arose all the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no "nature of their own," or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but phenomenal and relative--_i.e._ they were powers of acting upon correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of such organs.[206] Such were the colour, sonorousness, taste, smell, heat, cold, &c., of the bodies around us: they were relative, implying correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but perpetually fluctuating; since the compounds were frequently changing either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our organs.[207]

[Footnote 205: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where agent and patient were alike. [Greek: Phêsi\ ga\r to\ au)to\ kai\ o(/moion ei)=nai to/ te poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon; ou) ga\r e)gchôrei=n ta\ e(/tera kai\ diaphe/ronta pa/schein u(p' a)llê/lôn; a)lla\ ka)\n e(/tera o)/nta poiê=| ti ei)s a)/llêla, ou)ch ê(=| e(/tera, a)ll' ê(=| tau)to/n ti u(pa/rchei, tau/tê| tou=to sumbai/nein au)toi=s]. Many contemporary philosophers affirmed distinctly the opposite. [Greek: To\ o(/moion u(po\ tou= o(moi/ou pa=n a)pathe/s], &c. Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with Demokritus; see above, p. 61, note 1 [*Footnote 185*]. The facility with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly observable.]

[Footnote 206: Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 63, 64. [Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n bare/os kai\ kou/phou kai\ sklêrou= kai\ malakou= e)n tou/tois a)phori/zei; tô=n de\ a)/llôn ai)sthêtô=n ou)deno\s ei)=nai phu/sin, a)lla\ pa/nta pa/thê tê=s ai)sthê/seôs a)lloioume/nês, e)x ê(=s gi/nesthai tê\n phantasi/an], &c.

Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 16. [Greek: Phu/sin me\n mêde\n ei)=nai chrô=ma, ta\ me\n ga\r stoichei=a a)/poia, ta/ te mesta\ kai\ to\ keno/n; ta\ d' e)x au)tô=n sugkri/mata ke/chrô=sthai diatagê=| te kai\ r(uthmô=| kai\ protropê=|], &c.

Demokritus restricted the term [Greek: Phu/sis]--Nature--to the primordial atoms and vacua (Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. p. 310 A.).]

[Footnote 207: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 2, p. 315, b. 10. [Greek: Ô(/ste tai=s metabolai=s tou= sugkeime/nou to\ au)to\ e)nanti/on dokei=n a)/llô| kai\ a)/llô|, kai\ metakinei=sthai mikrou= e)mmignume/nou, _kai\ o(/lôs e(/teron phai/nesthai e(no\s metakinêthe/ntos_.]]

[Side-note: Combinations of atoms--generating different qualities in the compounds.]

Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and hardness--primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste, and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal. In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.[208] The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus, comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the iron: hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout; it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk, equally close to and coherent with each other on every side, but not more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the lead.[209]

[Footnote 208: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 61. [Greek: Baru\ me\n ou)=n kai\ kou=phon tô=| mege/thei diairei= Dêmo/kritos], &c.

Aristotel. De Coelo, iv. 2, 7, p. 309, a. 10; Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 9. [Greek: Kai/toi baru/teron ge kata\ tê\n u(perochê/n phêsin ei)=nai Dêmo/kritos e(/kaston tô=n a)diaire/tôn], &c.]

[Footnote 209: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 62.]

[Side-note: All atoms essentially separate from each other.]

We thus see that Demokritus, though he supposed single atoms to be all of the same specific gravity, yet recognised a different specific gravity in the various compounds of atoms or material masses. It is to be remembered that, when we speak of contact or combination of atoms, this is not to be understood literally and absolutely, but only in a phenomenal and relative sense; as an approximation, more or less close, but always sufficiently close to form an atomic combination which our senses apprehended as one object. Still every atom was essentially separate from every other, and surrounded by a margin of vacant space: no two atoms could merge into one, any more than one atom could be divided into two.

[Side-note: All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the real and absolute.]

Pursuant to this theory, Demokritus proclaimed that all the properties of objects, except weight, hardness, and softness, were not inherent in the objects themselves, but simply phenomenal and relative to the observer--"modifications of our sensibility". Colour, taste, smell, sweet and bitter, hot and cold, &c., were of this description. In respect to all of them, man differed from other animals, one man from another, and even the same man from himself at different times and ages. There was no sameness of impression, no unanimity or constancy of judgment, because there was no real or objective "nature" corresponding to the impression. From none of these senses could we at all learn what the external thing was in itself. "Sweet and bitter, hot and cold (he said) are by law or convention (_i.e._ these names designate the impressions of most men on most occasions, taking no account of dissentients): what really exists is, atoms and vacuum. The sensible objects which we suppose and believe to exist do not exist in truth; there exist only atoms and vacuum. We know nothing really and truly about an object, either what it is or what it is not: our opinions depend upon influences from without, upon the position of our body, upon the contact and resistances of external objects. There are two phases of knowledge, the obscure and the genuine. To the obscure belong all our senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The genuine is distinct from these. When the obscure phase fails, when we can no longer see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch--from minuteness and subtlety of particles--then the genuine phase, or reason and intelligence, comes into operation."[210]

[Footnote 210: Demokritus, Fr. p. 205, Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 135; Diogen. Laert. ix. 72.]

[Side-note: Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was attainable.]

True knowledge (in the opinion of Demokritus) was hardly at all attainable; but in so far as it could be attained, we must seek it, not merely through the obscure and insufficient avenues of sense, but by reason or intelligence penetrating to the ultimatum of corpuscular structure, farther than sense could go. His atoms were not pure Abstracta (like Plato's Ideas and geometrical plane figures, and Aristotle's materia prima), but concrete bodies, each with its own[211] magnitude, figure, and movement; too small to be seen or felt by us, yet not too small to be seen or felt by beings endowed with finer sensitive power. They were abstractions mainly in so far as all other qualities were supposed absent. Demokritus professed to show how the movements, approximations, and collisions of these atoms, brought them into such combinations as to form the existing Kosmos; and not that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist.

[Footnote 211: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 29. [Greek: A)/peira to\ plê=thos kai\ a)o/rata dia\ smikro/têta tô=n o)/gkôn], &c.

Marbach observes justly that the Demokritean atoms, though not really objects of sense in consequence of their smallness (of their disproportion to our visual power), are yet spoken of as objects of sense: they are as it were microscopic objects, and the [Greek: gnêsi/ê gnô/mê], or intelligence, is conceived as supplying something of a microscopic power. (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, sect. 58, vol. i. p. 94.)]

[Side-note: No separate force required to set the atoms in motion--they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos.]

How this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set the atoms in motion--such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles--the Nous or Intelligence of Anaxagoras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms moved by an inherent force of their own: that this motion was as much without beginning as the atoms themselves:[212] that eternal motion was no less natural, no more required any special cause to account for it, than eternal rest. "Such is the course of nature--such is and always has been the fact," was his ultimatum.[213] He farther maintained that all the motions of the atoms were necessary--that is, that they followed each other in a determinate order, each depending upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he could not explain.[214] Fixed laws, known or unknown, he recognised always. Fortune or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover their own want of knowledge and foresight.[215] Demokritus seems to have supposed that like atoms had a spontaneous tendency towards like; that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with unequal force, owing to their different size, and weight proportional to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory motion, gradually extending itself, and comprehending a larger and larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior membrane or shell was formed around them.[216] This rotatory motion was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained the severance of its central and peripheral masses--Earth and Water in the centre--Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, near the circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Empedokles, imagined different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation; but all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to deduce the formation of the various cosmical bodies and their known manifestations.[217] In respect to these bodies--Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c.--Demokritus seems to have held several opinions like those of Anaxagoras. Both of them conceived the Sun as a redhot mass, and the Earth as a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a drum, stationary in the centre of the revolving celestial bodies, and supported by the resistance of air beneath.[218]

[Footnote 212: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. [Greek: Leuki/ppô| kai\ Dê/mokritô|, toi=s le/gousin a)ei\ kinei=sthai, ta\ prô=ta sô/mata], &c. (Physic. viii. 3, 3, p. 253, b. 12, viii. 9, p. 265, b. 23; Cicero, De Finib. i. 6, 17.)]

[Footnote 213: Aristot. Generat. Animal. ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20; Physic. viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32.

Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation, Sur la Philosophie Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), shows that this is exactly the ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. "Un phénomène se passait-il, si on lui en demandait la raison, il (Demokritus) répondait, 'La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ'elle s'est toujours passée ainsi.' C'est, en d'autres termes, la seule réponse que font encore aujourd'hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand elle n'est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur. Qu'est-ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait plusieurs fois observé, qu'une pierre tombe quand elle n'est pas soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu'implique l'explication des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c'est que la nature demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite--'Tel phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de cette même façon'--est la première forme qu' ait revêtue le principe de la stabilité des lois naturelles."]

[Footnote 214: Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place [Greek: a)po\ tou= au)toma/tou]. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly remarks--"Casu ([Greek: a)po\ tau)toma/tou]) videntur fieri, quæ naturali quâdam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus evenire dicuntur. Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem, vitato [Greek: a)na/gkês] vocabulo, quod alii aliter usurpabant, casum et fortunam vocaret--ipse tamen Democritus, abhorrens ab iis omnibus quæ destinatam causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus concessit."

Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 600, 2nd.** ed.).

Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical _quoad hoc_ with the Demokritean) philosophy.

"I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz--'that the _blind chance_ of the Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without a cause'. This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition. The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the universe does not imply the existence of _intelligent_ causes, but may be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the atoms of matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced, exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words _blind chance_ to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place: but only to intimate that I do not here act as a _designing_ cause, in consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the main object of the Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace) to inculcate." (Stewart--First Dissertation, part ii. p. 139, note.)]

[Footnote 215: Demokrit. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 27. [Greek: a)/nthrôpoi tu/chês ei)/dôlon e)pla/santo pro/phasin i)di/ês a)bouli/ês.]]

[Footnote 216: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit. Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.]

[Footnote 217: Demokrit. Fragm. p. 208, Mullach. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos e)n oi(=s phêsi di/nê a)po\ panto\s a)pokri/nesthai pantoi/ôn ei)de/ôn], &c.

Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.]

[Footnote 218: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 612, ed. 2nd.]

[Side-note: Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation.]

Among the researches of Demokritus there were some relating to animal generation, and zoology; but we cannot find that his opinions on these subjects were in peculiar connection with his atomic theory.[219] Nor do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special cases that he thus connected determinate atoms with compounds of determinate quality; for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small and globular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all; those constituting air, water, and earth, were an assemblage of all varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude--the atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest.[220]

[Footnote 219: Mullach, Demokr. Fragm. p. 395 seqq.]

[Footnote 220: Aristotle, Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 5; De Coelo, iii. 8, p. 306, b. 35; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.]

[Side-note: His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles intermingled throughout all the frame with corporeal particles.]

In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with heat or fire, conceiving it to consist in the same very small, globular, rapidly movable atoms, penetrating everywhere: which he illustrated by comparison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when shining through a doorway. That these were the constituent atoms of mind, he proved by the fact, that its first and most essential property was to move the body, and to be itself moved.[221] Mind, soul, the vital principle, fire, heat, &c., were, in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially identical--not confined to man or even to animals, but diffused, in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and alternating with the corporeal particles.[222] It was the essential condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained in proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed or thrust out at all apertures by the pressure of air on all the external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly distributed throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or compensated the loss, of those which were tending outwards. When breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the vital particles in the interior were speedily forced out, and death ensued.[223]

[Footnote 221: Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, 2-3, p. 403, b. 28; i. 3, p. 406, b. 20; Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. i. 11; Diogen. Laert. ix. 44.]

[Footnote 222: Aristotel. De Respirat. (c. 4, p. 472, a. 5), [Greek: le/gei] (Demokritus) [Greek: ô(s ê( psuchê\ kai\ to\ thermo\n tau)to\n, ta\ prô=ta schê/mata tô=n sphairoeidô=n].

Lucretius, iii. 370.

Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis, Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit; Corporis atque animi primordia singula privis Adposita alternis variare ac nectere membra.]

[Footnote 223: Aristotel. De Respiratione, c. 4, p. 472, a. 10; De Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, a. 12.]

[Side-note: Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body.]

Though Demokritus conceived those mental particles as distributed all over the body, yet he recognised different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body. Besides the special organs of sense, he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, passion to the heart, and appetite to the liver:[224] the same tripartite division afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or thought. Sensation and thought were, in his opinion, alike material, and alike mental. Both were affections of the same peculiar particles, vital or mental, within us: both were changes operated in these particles by effluvia or images from without; nevertheless the one change was different from the other.[225]

[Footnote 224: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 618, ed. 2nd.

Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iv. 4), ascribes a bipartite division of the soul to Demokritus: [Greek: to\ logiko\n], in the thorax: [Greek: to\ a)/logon], distributed over all the body. But in the next section (iv. 6), he departs from this statement, affirming that both Demokritus and Plato supposed [Greek: to\ ê(gemoniko\n] of the soul to be in the head.]

[Footnote 225: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 8. Demokritus and Leukippus affirm [Greek: tê\n ai)/sthêsin kai\ tê\n no/êsin gi/nesthai, ei)dô/lôn e)/xôthen prosio/ntôn; mêdeni\ ga\r e)piba/llein mêdete/ran chôri\s tou= prospi/ptontos ei)dô/lou].

Cicero, De Finibus, i. 6, 21, "imagines, quæ idola nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus," &c.]

In regard to sensations, Demokritus said little about those of touch, smell, and hearing; but he entered at some length into those of sight and taste.[226]

[Footnote 226: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.]

[Side-note: Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. Colours.]