Chapter VIII: Platonic Compositions Generally (3)

This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical, religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true or false, probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, decent or indecent, obligatory to do or obligatory to avoid, respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society, respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation--this is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any special season of teaching, or special persons to teach. It becomes a part of each person's nature--a standing habit of mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which, particular experience is interpreted and particular persons appreciated.[67] It is not set forth in systematic proclamation, nor impugned, nor defended: it is enforced by a sanction of its own, the same real sanction or force in all countries, by fear of displeasure from the Gods, and by certainty of evil from neighbours and fellow-citizens. The community hate, despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent from their social creed, or even openly calls it in question. Their hatred manifests itself in different ways at different times and occasions, sometimes by burning or excommunication, sometimes by banishment or interdiction[68] from fire and water; at the very least, by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, good-will, and estimation, without which the life of an individual becomes insupportable: for society, though its power to make an individual happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognise in any individual citizen a right to scrutinise their creed, and to reject it if not approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of authority and contagion--as they have adopted it themselves: as they have adopted also the current language, weights, measures, divisions of time, &c. If he dissents, he is guilty of an offence described in the terms of the indictment preferred against Sokrates--"Sokrates commits crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods, in whom the city believes, but introduces new religious beliefs," &c.[69] "Nomos (Law and Custom), King of All" (to borrow the phrase which Herodotus cites from Pindar[70]), exercises plenary power, spiritual as well as temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as well as the intellect according to the local type--determining the sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new matters tendered for belief, of every one--fashioning thought, speech, and points of view, no less than action--and reigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies. Plato, when he assumes the function of Constructor, establishes special officers for enforcing in detail the authority of King Nomos in his Platonic variety. But even where no such special officers exist, we find Plato himself describing forcibly (in the speech assigned to Protagoras)[71] the working of that spontaneous ever-present police by whom the authority of King Nomos is enforced in detail--a police not the less omnipotent because they wear no uniform, and carry no recognised title.

[Footnote 67: This general fact is powerfully set forth by Cicero, in the beginning of the third Tusculan Disputation. Chrysippus the Stoic, "ut est in omni historiâ curiosus," had collected striking examples of these consecrated practices, cherished in one territory, abhorrent elsewhere. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 45, 108.)]

[Footnote 68: See the description of the treatment of Aristodêmus, one of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylæ, after his return home, Herodot. vii. 231, ix. 71. The interdiction from communion of fire, water, eating, sacrifice, &c., is the strongest manifestation of repugnance: so insupportable to the person excommunicated, that it counted for a sentence of exile in the Roman law. (Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, s. 9. Heineccius, Ant. Rom. i. 16, 9, 10.)]

[Footnote 69: Xenophon. Memor. i. 1, 1. [Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês, ou(\s me\n ê( po/lis nomi/zei theou\s ou) nomi/zôn, e(/tera de\ kaina\ daimo/nia ei)sphe/rôn], &c. Plato (Leges, x. 909, 910) and Cicero (Legib. ii. 19-25) forbid [Greek: kaina\ daimo/nia], "separatim nemo habessit Deos," &c.]

[Footnote 70: [Greek: No/mos pa/ntôn basileu/s] (Herodot. iii. 38). It will be seen from Herodotus, as well as elsewhere, that the idea really intended to be expressed by the word [Greek: No/mos] is much larger than what is now commonly understood by _Law_. It is equivalent to that which Epiktêtus calls [Greek: to\ do/gma--pantachou= a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma] (Epiktet. iii. 16). It includes what is meant by [Greek: to\ no/mimon] (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 13-24), [Greek: ta\ no/mima, ta\ nomizo/mena, ta pa/tria, ta\ no/maia], including both positive morality, and social æsthetical precepts, as well as civil or political, and even personal habits, such as that of abstinence from spitting or wiping the nose (Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 8, 8-10). The case which Herodotus quotes to illustrate his general thesis is the different treatment which, among different nations, is considered dutiful and respectful towards senior relatives and the corpses of deceased relatives; which matters come under [Greek: ta)/grapta ka)sphalê= Theô=n No/mima] (Soph. Antig. 440)--of immemorial antiquity;--

[Greek: Ou) ga/r ti nu=n ge ka)chthe\s a)ll' a)ei/ pote Zê=| tau=ta, kou)dei\s oi)=den e)x' o(/tou' pha/nê].

[Greek: No/mos] and [Greek: e)pitê/deuma] run together in Plato's mind, dictating every hour's proceeding of the citizen through life (Leges, vii. 807-808-823).

We find Plato, in the Leges, which represents the altered tone and compressive orthodoxy of his old age, extolling the simple goodness ([Greek: eu)ê/theia]) of our early forefathers, who believed implicitly all that was told them, and were not clever enough to raise doubts, [Greek: ô(/sper tanu=n] (Legg. iii. 679, 680). Plato dwells much upon the danger of permitting any innovation on the fixed modes of song and dance (Legg. v. 727, vii. 797-800), and forbids it under heavy penalties. He says that the lawgiver both _can_ consecrate common talk, and ought to consecrate it--[Greek: kathierô=sai tê\n phê/mên] (Legg. 838), the dicta of [Greek: No/mos Basileu/s].

Pascal describes, in forcible terms, the wide-spread authority of [Greek: No/mos Basileu/s]:--"Il ne faut pas se méconnaître, nous sommes automates autant qu'esprit: et delà vient que l'instrument, par lequel la persuasion se fait, n'est pas la seule démonstration. Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus crues: _elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il y pense_. Qui a démontré qu'il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons--et qu'y a-t-il de plus cru? C'est donc la coutume qui nous en persuade, c'est elle qui fait tant de Chrétiens, c'est elle qui fait les Turcs les Paiens, les métiers, les soldats, &c. Enfin, il faut avoir recours à elle quand une fois l'esprit a vu où est la vérité, afin de nous abreuver et nous teindre de cette créance, qui nous échappe à toute heure; car d'en avoir toujours les preuves présentes, c'est trop d'affaire. Il faut acquérir une créance plus facile, qui est celle de l'habitude, qui, sans violence, sans art, sans argument, nous fait croire les choses, et incline toutes nos puissances à cette croyance, en sorte que notre âme y tombe naturellement. Quand on ne croit que par la force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez." (Pascal, Pensées, ch. xi. p. 237, ed. Louandre, Paris, 1854.)

Herein Pascal coincides with Montaigne, of whom he often speaks harshly enough: "Comme de vray nous n'avons aultre mire de la vérité et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs où nous sommes: là est tousiours la parfaicte religion, la parfaicte police, parfaict et accomply usage de toutes choses." (Essais de Montaigne, liv. i. ch. 30.) Compare the same train of thought in Descartes (Discours sur la Méthode, pp. 132-139, ed. Cousin).]

[Footnote 71: Plat. Protag. 320-328. The large sense of the word [Greek: No/mos], as conceived by Pindar and Herodotus, must be kept in mind, comprising positive morality, religious ritual, consecrated habits, the local turns of sympathy and antipathy, &c. M. Salvador observes, respecting the Mosaic Law: "Qu'on écrive tous les rapports publics et privés qui unissent les membres d'un peuple quelconque, et tous les principes sur lesquels ces rapports sont fondés--il en résultera un ensemble complet, un véritable système plus ou moins raisonnable, qui sera l'expression exacte de la manière d'exister de ce peuple. Or, cet ensemble ou ce système est ce que les Hébreux appellent la _tora_, la loi ou la constitution publique--en prenant ce mot dans le sens le plus étendu." (Salvador, Histoire des Institutions de Moise, liv. i. ch. ii. p. 96.)

Compare also about the sense of the word _Lex_, as conceived by the Arabs, M. Renan, Averroès, p. 286, and Mr. Mill's chapter respecting the all-comprehensive character of the Hindoo law (Hist. of India, ch. iv., beginning): "In the law books of the Hindus, the details of jurisprudence and judicature occupy comparatively a very moderate space. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and practice of education; the institutions, duties, and customs of domestic life; the maxims of private morality, and even of domestic economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation; all form essential parts of the Hindu code of law, and are treated in the same style, and laid down with the same authority, as the rules for the distribution of justice."

Mr. Maine, in his admirable work on Ancient Law, notes both the all-comprehensive and the irresistible ascendancy of what is called _Law_ in early societies. He remarks emphatically that "the stationary condition of the human race is the rule--the progressive condition the exception--a rare exception in the history of the world". (Chap. i. pp. 16-18-19; chap. ii. pp. 22-24.)

Again, Mr. Maine observes:--"The other liability, to which the infancy of society is exposed, has prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of ancient law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their institutions were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity: and grafts from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies. But it is still true that over the larger part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the ground-plan supposed to have been marked out by the legislator. _If intellect has in such cases been exercised upon jurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from their literal tenor._" (Maine, Ancient Law, ch. iv. pp. 77-78.)]

[Side-note: Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not yield to the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own judgment.]

There are, however, generally a few exceptional minds to whom this omnipotent authority of King Nomos is repugnant, and who claim a right to investigate and judge for themselves on many points already settled and foreclosed by the prevalent orthodoxy. In childhood and youth these minds must have gone through the ordinary influences,[72] but without the permanent stamp which such influences commonly leave behind. Either the internal intellectual force of the individual is greater, or he contracts a reverence for some new authority, or (as in the case of Sokrates) he believes himself to have received a special mission from the Gods--in one way or other the imperative character of the orthodoxy around him is so far enfeebled, that he feels at liberty to scrutinise for himself the assemblage of beliefs and sentiments around him. If he continues to adhere to them, this is because they approve themselves to his individual reason: unless this last condition be fulfilled, he becomes a dissenter, proclaiming his dissent more or less openly, according to circumstances. Such disengagement from authority traditionally consecrated ([Greek: e)xallagê\ tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn]),[73] and assertion of the right of self-judgment, on the part of a small minority of [Greek: i)diognô/mones],[74] is the first condition of existence for philosophy or "reasoned truth".

[Footnote 72: Cicero, Tusc. D. iii. 2; Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 10, 1179, b. 23. [Greek: o( de\ lo/gos kai\ ê( didachê\ mê/ pot' ou)k e)n a(/pasin i)schu/ê|, a)lla\ de/ê| prodieirga/sthai toi=s e)/thesi tê\n tou= a)kroatou= psuchê\n pro\s to\ kalô=s chai/rein kai\ misei=n, ô(/sper gê=n tê\n thre/psousan to\ spe/rma]. To the same purpose Plato, Republ. iii. 402 A, Legg. ii. 653 B, 659 E, Plato and Aristotle (and even Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 3), aiming at the formation of a body of citizens, and a community very different from anything which they saw around them--require to have the means of shaping the early sentiments, love, hatred, &c., of children, in a manner favourable to their own ultimate views. This is exactly what [Greek: No/mos Basileu\s] does effectively in existing societies, without need of special provision for the purpose. See Plato, Protagor. 325, 326.]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, 265 A. See Sir Will. Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. 29, pp. 88-90. In the Timæus (p. 40 E) Plato interrupts the thread of his own speculations on cosmogony, to take in all the current theogony on the authority of King Nomos. [Greek: a)du/naton ou)=n theô=n paisi\n a)pistei=n, kai/per a)/neu te ei)ko/tôn kai\ a)nagkai/ôn a)podei/xeôn le/gousin, a)ll' ô(s oi)kei=a pha/skousin a)pagge/llein e(pome/nous tô=| no/mô| pisteute/on].

Hegel adverts to this severance of the individual consciousness from the common consciousness of the community, as the point of departure for philosophical theory:--"On one hand we are now called upon to find some specific matter for the general form of Good; such closer determination of The Good is the criterion required. On the other hand, the exigencies of the individual subject come prominently forward: this is the consequence of the revolution which Sokrates operated in the Greek mind. So long as the religion, the laws, the political constitution, of any people, are in full force--so long as each individual citizen is in complete harmony with them all--no one raises the question, What has the Individual to do for himself? In a moralised and religious social harmony, each individual finds his destination prescribed by the established routine; while this positive morality, religion, laws, form also the routine of _his own_ mind. On the contrary, if the Individual no longer stands on the custom of his nation, nor feels himself in full agreement with the religion and laws--he then no longer finds what he desires, nor obtains satisfaction in the medium around him. When once such discord has become confirmed, the Individual must fall back on his own reflections, and seek his destination there. This is what gives rise to the question--What is the essential scheme for the Individual? To what ought he to conform--what shall he aim at? An _ideal_ is thus set up for the Individual. This is, the Wise Man, or the Ideal of the Wise Man, which is, in truth, the separate working of individual self-consciousness, conceived as an universal or typical character." (Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, Part ii. pp. 132, 133.)]

[Footnote 74: This is an expression of the learned Huet, Bishop of Avranches:--"Si quelqu'un me demande maintenant, ce que nous sommes, puisque nous ne voulons être ni Académiciens, ni Sceptiques, ni Eclectiques, ni d'aucune autre Secte, je répondrai que _nous sommes nôtres_--c'est à dire libres: ne voulans soumettre notre esprit à aucune autorité, et n'approuvans que ce qui nous paroit s'approcher plus près de la vérité. Que si quelqu'un, par mocquerie ou par flatterie, nous appelle [Greek: i)diognô/monas]--c'est à dire, attachés à nos propres sentimens, nous n'y répugnerons pas." (Huet, Traité Philosophique de la Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain, liv. ii. ch. xi. p. 224, ed. 1741.)]

[Side-note: Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or free-thinkers in Greece.]

Amidst the epic and lyric poets of Greece, with their varied productive impulse--as well as amidst the Gnomic philosophers, the best of whom were also poets--there are not a few manifestations of such freely judging individuality. Xenophanes the philosopher, who wrote in poetry, censured severely several of the current narratives about the Gods and Pindar, though in more respectful terms, does the like. So too, the theories about the Kosmos, propounded by various philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, &c., were each of them the free offspring of an individual mind. But these were counter-affirmations: novel theories, departing from the common belief, yet accompanied by little or no debate, or attack, or defence: indeed the proverbial obscurity of Herakleitus, and the recluse mysticism of the Pythagoreans, almost excluded discussion. These philosophers (to use the phrase of Aristotle[75]) had no concern with Dialectic: which last commenced in the fifth century B.C., with the Athenian drama and dikastery, and was enlisted in the service of philosophy by Zeno the Eleate and Sokrates.

[Footnote 75: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. Eusebius, having set forth the dissentient and discordant opinions of the various Hellenic philosophers, triumphantly contrasts with them the steady adherence of Jews and Christians to one body of truth, handed down by an uniform tradition from father to son, from the first generation of man--[Greek: a)po\ prô/tês a)nthrôpogoni/as]. (Præp. Ev. xiv. 3.)

Cicero, in the treatise (not preserved) entitled _Hortensius_--set forth, at some length, an attack and a defence of philosophy; the former he assigned to Hortensius, the latter he undertook in his own name. One of the arguments urged by Hortensius against philosophy, to prove that it was not "vera sapientia," was, that it was both a human invention and a recent novelty, not handed down by tradition _a principio_, therefore not natural to man. "Quæ si secundum hominis naturam est, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est; si vero non est, nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Ubi apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" (Lactantius, Inst. Divin. iii. 16.) The loss of this Ciceronian pleading (Philosophy _versus_ Consecrated Tradition) is much to be deplored. Lactantius and Augustin seem to have used it largely.

The Hermotimus of Lucian, manifesting all his lively Sokratic acuteness, is a dialogue intended to expose the worthlessness of all speculative philosophy. The respondent Hermotimus happens to be a Stoic, but the assailant expressly declares (c. 85) that the arguments would be equally valid against Platonists or Aristotelians. Hermotimus is advised to desist from philosophy, to renounce inquiry, to employ himself in some of the necessary affairs of life, and to acquiesce in the common received opinions, which would carry him smoothly along the remainder of his life ([Greek: a)xiô= pra/ttein ti tô=n a)nagkai/ôn, kai\ o(/ se parape/mpsei e)s to\ loipo\n tou= bi/ou, ta\ koina\ tau=ta phronou=nta], c. 72). Among the worthless philosophical speculations Lucian ranks geometry: the geometrical definitions (point and line) he declares to be nonsensical and inadmissible (c. 74).]

[Side-note: Rise of Dialectic--Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery.]

Both the drama and the dikastery recognise two or more different ways of looking at a question, and require that no conclusion shall be pronounced until opposing disputants have been heard and compared. The Eumenides plead against Apollo, Prometheus against the mandates and dispositions of Zeus, in spite of the superior dignity as well as power with which Zeus is invested: every Athenian citizen, in his character of dikast, took an oath to hear both the litigant parties alike, and to decide upon the pleadings and evidence according to law. Zeno, in his debates with the anti-Parmenidean philosophers, did not trouble himself to parry their thrusts. He assumed the aggressive, impugned the theories of his opponents, and exposed the contradictions in which they involved themselves. The dialectic process, in which there are (at the least) two opposite points of view both represented--the negative and the affirmative--became both prevalent and interesting.

[Side-note: Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by Sokrates.]

I have in a former chapter explained the dialectic of Zeno, as it bore upon the theories of the anti-Parmenidean philosophers. Still more important was the proceeding of Sokrates, when he applied the like scrutiny to ethical, social, political, religious topics. He did not come forward with any counter-theories: he declared expressly that he had none to propose, and that he was ignorant. He put questions to those who on their side professed to know, and he invited answers from them. His mission, as he himself described it, was, to scrutinise and expose false pretensions to knowledge. Without such scrutiny, he declares life itself to be not worth having. He impugned the common and traditional creed, not in the name of any competing doctrine, but by putting questions on the familiar terms in which it was confidently enunciated, and by making its defenders contradict themselves and feel the shame of their own contradictions. The persons who held it were shown to be incapable of defending it, when tested by an acute cross-examiner; and their supposed knowledge, gathered up insensibly from the tradition around them, deserved the language which Bacon applies to the science of his day, conducting indirectly to the necessity of that remedial course which Bacon recommends. "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi proposuerit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia rursus applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus quas primo hausimus notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries."[76]

[Footnote 76: Bacon, Nov. Org. Aph. 97. I have already cited this passage in a note on the 68th chapter of my 'History of Greece,' pp. 612-613; in which note I have also alluded to other striking passages of Bacon, indicating the confusion, inconsistencies, and misapprehensions of the "_intellectus sibi permissus_". In that note, and in the text of the chapter, I have endeavoured to illustrate the same view of the Sokratic procedure as that which is here taken.]

[Side-note: Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of satisfaction for his own individual reason.]

Never before (so far as we know) had the authority of King Nomos been exposed to such an enemy as this dialectic or cross-examination by Sokrates: the prescriptive creed and unconsciously imbibed sentiment ("ratio ex fide, casu, et puerilibus notionibus") being thrown upon their defence against negative scrutiny brought to bear upon them by the inquisitive reason of an individual citizen. In the Apology, Sokrates clothes his own strong intellectual _oestrus_ in the belief (doubtless sincerely entertained) of a divine mission. In the Gorgias, the Platonic Sokrates asserts it in naked and simple, yet not less emphatic, language. "You, Polus, bring against me the authority of the multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do _not_ agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent, to agree with _me_."[77] The autonomy or independence of individual reason against established authority, and the title of negative reason as one of the litigants in the process of philosophising, are first brought distinctly to view in the career of Sokrates.

[Footnote 77: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 A. [Greek: kai\ nu=n, peri\ ô(=n su\ le/geis, o)li/gou soi\ pa/ntes sumphê/sousi tau)ta A)thênai=oi kai\ oi( xe/noi, e)a\n bou/lê kat' e)mou= ma/rturas parasche/sthai ô(s ou)k a)lêthê= le/gô; marturê/sousi/ soi, e)a\n me\n bou/lê|, Niki/as o( Nikêra/tou kai\ oi( a)delphoi\ met' au)tou=--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|, A)ristokra/tês o( Skelli/ou--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|, ê( Perikle/ous o(/lê oi)ki/a ê)\ a)/llê sugge/neia, ê(/ntina a)\n bou/lê| tô=n e)/nthade e)kle/xasthai. _A)ll' e)gô/ soi ei)=s ô(\n ou)ch o(mologô=_; ou) ga/r me su\ a)nagka/zeis], &c.]

[Side-note: Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici.]

With such a career, we need not wonder that Sokrates, though esteemed and admired by a select band of adherents, incurred a large amount of general unpopularity. The public (as I have before observed) do not admit the claim of independent exercise for individual reason. In the natural process of growth in the human mind, belief does not follow proof, but springs up apart from and independent of it: an immature intelligence believes first, and proves (if indeed it ever seeks proof) afterwards.[78] This mental tendency is farther confirmed by the pressure and authority of King Nomos; who is peremptory in exacting belief, but neither furnishes nor requires proof. The community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with calmness the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or reconcile those opinions.[79] They disapprove especially that dialectic debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to the negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing worthy of being called _reasoned truth_ can exist, without full and equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative.

[Footnote 78: See Professor Bain's Chapter on Belief; one of the most original and instructive chapters in his volume on the Emotions and the Will, pp. 578-584. [Third Ed., pp. 505-538.]]

[Footnote 79: This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion--between the speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks for himself, and the established traditional convictions of the public--is nowhere more strikingly enforced than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic; together with the corrupting influence exercised by King Nomos, at the head of his vehement and unanimous public, over those few gifted natures which are competent to philosophical speculation. See Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493.

The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts to analyse morality (especially when quite novel, as such attempts were in the time of Sokrates) are received in a community--are noticed by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-39:--

"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question: which though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in _regard to all standards_. It arises in fact whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being _in itself_ obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe that this morality _derives_ its obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem: the superstructure seems to stand better without than with what is represented as its foundation. . . . The difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse morality, and reduce it to principles: which, unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity."

Epiktêtus observes that the refined doctrines acquired by the self-reasoning philosopher, often failed to attain that intense hold on his conviction, which the "rotten doctrines" inculcated from childhood possessed over the conviction of ordinary men. [Greek: Dia\ ti/ ou)=n e)kei=noi (oi( polloi\, oi( i)diô=tai) u(mô=n (tôn philoso/phôn) i)schuro/teroi? O(/ti e)kei=noi me\n ta\ sapra\ tau=ta a)po\ dogma/tôn lalou=sin? u(mei=s de\ ta\ kompsa\ a)po\ tô=n cheilô=n . . . . . Ou(/tôs u(ma=s oi( i)diô=tai nikô=si; Pantachou= ga\r i)schuro\n to\ do/gma; a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma]. (Epiktêtus, iii. 16.)]

[Side-note: The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox public.]

These historians usually speak in very harsh terms of the Sophists, as well as of Eukleides and the Megaric sect; who are taken as the great apostles of negation. But the truth is, that the Megarics inherited it from Sokrates, and shared it with Plato. Eukleides cannot have laid down a larger programme of negation than that which we read in the Apology of Sokrates,--nor composed a dialogue more ultra-negative than the Platonic Parmenidês: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in principle as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato in his Republic. The charges which historians of philosophy urge against the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the Sophists--such as corruption of youth--perversion of truth and morality, by making the worse appear the better reason--subversion of established beliefs--innovation as well as deception--all these were urged against Sokrates himself by his contemporaries,[80] and indeed against all the philosophers indiscriminately, as we learn from Sokrates himself in the Apology.[81] They are outbursts of feeling natural to the practical, orthodox citizen, who represents the common sense of the time and place; declaring his antipathy to these speculative, freethinking innovations of theory, which challenges the prescriptive maxims of traditional custom and tests them by a standard approved by herself. The orthodox citizen does not feel himself in need of philosophers to tell him what is truth or what is virtue, nor what is the difference between real and fancied knowledge. On these matters he holds already settled persuasions, acquired from his fathers and his ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic authorities, spiritual and temporal;[82] who are to him exponents of the creed guaranteed by tradition:--

"Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo
Esse quod Arcesilas ærumnosique Solones."

[Footnote 80: Themistius, in defending himself against contemporary opponents, whom he represents to have calumniated him, consoles himself by saying, among other observations, that these arrows have been aimed at all the philosophers successively--Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus. [Greek: O( ga\r sophistê\s kai\ a)lazô\n kai\ kaino/tomos prô=ton me\n Sôkra/tous o)nei/dê ê)=n, e)/peita Pla/tônos e)phexê=s, ei)=th' u(/steron A)ristote/lous kai\ Theophra/stou]. (Orat. xxiii. p. 346, Dindorf.)

We read in Zeller's account of the Platonic philosophy (Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd):

"Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen Philosophie besteht im Allgemeinen darin, dass der unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und die Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit nachgewiesen wird. Im Besondern können wir drey Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein. Indem die _Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein Erstes und Festes gegolten hatten, dialektisch zersetzt werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das negative Resultat der Sophistik_. Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist, kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt werden."

Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias and others) who first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness; breaking up, by their dialectic scrutiny, those hypotheses which had before exercised authority therein, as first principles not to be disputed.

I dissent from this position. I conceive that the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did _not_ do what Zeller affirms, and that Sokrates (and Plato after him) _did_ do it. The negative analysis was the weapon of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, &c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that false persuasion of knowledge was at once universal and ruinous, and who devoted his life to the task of exposing it by cross-examination. The conversation of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydêmus (Memor. iv. 2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive analysis, brought to bear on the common consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the Sophists: the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-examines upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety, Virtue, &c., are of the like character; and we know from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates passed much time in such examinations with pre-eminent success.

I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is peculiar to him (for most of the modern historians of philosophy affirm the same; and his history, which is the best that I know, merely repeats the ordinary view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which I take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the unmeaning abstract "_Sophistik_," given by Zeller and others, we ought properly to insert the word "_Sokratik_," if we are to have any abstract term at all.

Again--The negative analysis, which these authors call "Sophistik," they usually censure as discreditable and corrupting. To me it appears, on the contrary, both original and valuable, as one essential condition for bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of philosophy or "reasoned truth".

Professor Charles Thurot (in his Études sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, p. 119) takes a juster view than Zeller of the difference between Plato and the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). "Les Sophistes, comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur des questions de philosophie, et en particulier sur la morale et la politique, s'appuyaient sur l'autorité et le témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers des poètes célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des oracles de sagesse: ils invoquaient l'opinion du commun des hommes. Platon récusait absolument ces deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni le commun des hommes ne savent ce qu'ils disent, puisqu'ils ne peuvent en rendre raison. . . . . . Aux yeux de Platon, il n'y a d'autre méthode, pour arriver au vrai et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui est à la fois l'art d'interroger et de répondre, et l'art de définir et de diviser."

M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly) that the Sophists appealed to the established ethical authorities, and dwelt upon or adorned the received common-places--that Plato denied these authorities, and brought his battery of negative cross-examination to bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M. Thurot thus gives a totally different version of the procedure of the Sophists from that which is given by Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with Zeller, and with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp. 91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class who made money by deceiving and perverting the minds of hearers (p. 120).]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23 D. [Greek: i(/na de\ mê\ dokô=sin a)porei=n, _ta\ kata\ pa/ntôn tô=n philosophou/ntôn pro/cheira tau=ta le/gousin_, o(/ti ta\ mete/ôra kai\ ta\ u(po\ gê=s _kai\ theou\s mê\ nomi/zein kai\ to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô poiei=n_], &c.

Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. [Greek: to\ koinê=| toi=s philoso/phois u(po\ tô=n pollô=n epitimô/menon]. The rich families in Athens severely reproached their relatives who frequented the society of Sokrates. Xenophon, Sympos. iv. 32.]

[Footnote 82: See this point strikingly set forth by Plato, Politikus, 299: also Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 13, 756 A.

This is the "auctoritas majorum," put forward by Cotta in his official character of _Pontifex_, as conclusive _per se_: when reasons are produced to sustain it, the reasons fail. (Cic. Nat. Deor. iii. 3, 5, 6, 9.)

The "auctoritas maiorum," proclaimed by the Pontifex Cotta, may be illustrated by what we read in Father Paul's History of the Council of Trent, respecting the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of Scripture:--"Lorsqu'on fut à opiner sur le quatrième Article, presque tous se rendirent à l'avis du Cardinal Pachèco, qui représenta: Que l'Écriture ayant été expliquée par tant de gens éminens en piété et en doctrine, l'on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de meilleur: Que les nouvelles Hérésies etant toutes nées des nouveaux sens qu'on avoit donnés à l'Écriture, il étoit nécessaire d'arrêter la licence des esprits modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par les Anciens et par l'Église: Et que si quelqu'un naissoit avec un esprit singulier, on devoit le forcer à le renfermer au dedans de lui-même, et à ne pas troubler le monde en publiant tout ce qu'il pensoit." (Fra Paolo, Histoire du Concile de Trente, traduction Françoise, par Le Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate of Paul III.)

P. 289. "Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en substance, de tenir l'Edition Vulgate pour authentique dans les leçons publiques, les disputes, les prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d'expliquer la Saint Écriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui donne la Sainte Église notre Mère, et au consentement unanime des Pères, quand bien même on auroit intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on ordonnoit que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette défense fussent punis par les Ordinaires."]

* * * * *

He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these consecrated traditions; he does not approve the tribe of fools who despise what they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable novelties:[83] he cannot tolerate the nice discoursers, ingenious hair-splitters, priests of subtleties and trifles--dissenters from the established opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to be wise above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and mothers,[84] and to cheat their creditors--mischievous instructors, whose appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and who ought to be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.[85] Such feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative philosophy and dialectic--against the _libertas philosophandi_--counts as a branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens, rich or poor, oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or modern. It is an antipathy common to men in other respects very different, to Nikias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as well as to Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the Roman Cato (the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a dangerous and violent citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the institutions and customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of his fellow-citizens with opinions hostile to the laws.[86] How much courage is required in any individual citizen, to proclaim conscientious dissent in the face of wide-spread and established convictions, is recognised by Plato himself, and that too in the most orthodox and intolerant of all his compositions.[87] He (and Aristotle after him), far from recognising the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough[88] to try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new [Greek: No/mos] of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of Politics--a notion which would not have been understood by Themistokles or Aristeides.

[Footnote 83: Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21.

[Greek: E)/sti de\ phu=lon e)n a)nthrô/poisi mataiotaton, O(/stis ai)schu/nôn e)pichô/ria paptai/nei ta\ po/rsô, Metamô/nia thêreu/ôn a)kra/ntois e)lpi/sin.]]

[Footnote 84: [Greek: Ou)de\n sophizo/mestha toi=si dai/mosi; Patri/ous paradocha\s, a(\s th' o(mê/likas chro/nô| Kektê/meth', ou)dei\s au)ta\ katabalei= lo/gos, Ou)/d' ei) di' a)/krôn to\ sopho\n êu(/rêtai phrenô=n]. (Euripides, Bacchæ, 200.)

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forté rearis Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque Endogredi sceleris. (Lucretius, i. 85.)

Compare Valckenaer, Diatrib. Eurip. pp. 38, 39, cap. 5.

About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading the youth to contract doubts and to slight the authority of their fathers, see Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 52; Plato, Gorgias, 522 B, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 1, 89, where the father of Tigranes puts to death the [Greek: sophistê\s] who had taught his son, because that son had contracted a greater attachment to the [Greek: sophistê\s] than to his own father.

Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 9; i. 2, 49. Apolog. So. s. 20; compare the speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato, Politikus, p. 299 E.

Timon in the Silli bestows on Sokrates and his successors the title of [Greek: a)kribo/logoi]. Diog. Laert. ii. 19. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 8. Aristophan. Nubes, 130, where Strepsiades says--

[Greek: pôs ou)=n gerô\n ô)=n ka)pilê/smôn kai\ bradu\s lo/gôn a)kribô=n schindala/mous mathê/somai?]

Compare 320-359 of the same comedy--[Greek: su/ te leptota/tôn lê/rôn i(ereu=]--also Ranæ, 149, b.

When Euripides ([Greek: o( skêniko\s philo/sophos]) went down to Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving clever exhibitions among the malefactors there, with great success and applause. Ranæ, 771--

[Greek: O(/te dê\ katê=lth' Eu)ripi/dês, e)pedei/knuto toi=s lôpodu/tais kai\ toi=s balantiêto/mois . . . o(/per e)/st' e)n A(/|dou plê=thos; oi( d' a)kroô/menoi tô=n a)ntilogiô=n kai\ lugismô=n kai strophô=n u(perema/nêsan, ka)no/misan sophô/taton].

These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are attributed by Aristophanes, and the other comic writers, to his frequent conversations with Sokrates. Ranæ, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhet. p. 301-355. Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from the palæstra (Nubes, 180); and Eupolis also introduces him as having stolen a wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc. Eupolis, Fragm. Incert. ix. ed. Meineke). The fragment of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, [Greek: A)doleschei=n au)to\n e)kdi/daxon, ô)= sophista/]) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic writers on Sokrates, see Lucian, Piscat. c. 25.

The rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], pp. 406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking on the very vague and general manner in which the title [Greek: Sophistê\s] was applied among the Greeks (Herodotus having so designated both Solon and Pythagoras), mentions that Androtion not only spoke of the seven wise men as [Greek: tou\s e(/pta sophista/s], but also called Sokrates [Greek: sophistê\n tou=ton to\n pa/nu]: that Lysias called Plato [Greek: sophistê\n], and called Æschines (the Sokratic) by the same title; that Isokrates represented himself, and rhetors and politicians like himself, as [Greek: philoso/phous], while he termed the dialecticians and critics [Greek: sophista/s]. Nothing could be more indeterminate than these names, [Greek: sophistê\s] and [Greek: philo/sophos]. It was Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name [Greek: sophistê\s (o( ma/lista e)panasta\s tô=| o)no/mati)] but others had tried to discredit [Greek: philo/sophos] and [Greek: to\ philosophei=n] in like manner. It deserves notice that in the restrictive or censorial law (proposed by Sophokles, and enacted by the Athenians in B.C. 307, but repealed in the following year) against the philosophers and their schools, the philosophers generally are designated as [Greek: sophistai/]. Pollux, Onomast. ix. 42 [Greek: e)/sti de\ kai\ no/mos A)ttiko\s kata\ tô=n philosophou/ntôn graphei/s, o(\n Sophoklê=s A)mphiklei/dou Sounieu\s ei)=pen, e)n ô(=| tina kata\ au)tô=n proeipô\n, e)pê/gage, mê\ e)xei=nai mêdeni\ _tô=n sophistô=n_ diatribê\n kataskeua/sasthai.]]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois ga\r ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)\n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\ me/ntoi didaskaliko\n tê=s au(tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\ a)/llous oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)=t' ou)=n phtho/nô|, ô(s su le/geis, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]]

[Footnote 86: Plato, Menon, pp. 90-92. The antipathy manifested here by Anytus against the Sophists, is the same feeling which led him to indict Sokrates, and which induced also Cato the Censor to hate the character of Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato, 23: [Greek: o(/lôs philosophi/a| proskekroukô\s, kai\ pa=san E(llênikê\n mou=san kai\ paidei/an u(po\ philotimi/as propêlaki/zôn; o(\s ge kai\ Sôkra/tê phêsi\ la/lon kai\ bi/aion geno/menon e)picheirei=n, ô(=| tro/pô| dunato\n ê)=n, turannei=n tê=s patri/dos, katalu/onta ta\ e)/thê, kai\ pro\s e)nanti/as toi=s no/mois do/xas e(/lkonta kai\ methi/stanta tou\s poli/tas]. Comp. Cato, Epist. ap. Plin. H. N. xxix. 7.]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. [Greek: nu=n de a)nthrô/pou tolmêrou= kinduneu/ei dei=sthai/ tinos, o(\s par)r(êsi/an diaphero/ntôs timô=n e)rei= ta\ dokou=nta a)/rist' ei)=nai po/lei kai\ poli/tais, e)n psuchai=s diephtharme/nais to\ pre/pon kai\ e(po/menon pa/sê| tê=| politei/a| ta/ttôn, e)nanti/a le/gôn tai=s megi/staisin e)pithumi/ais kai\ ou)k e)/chôn boêtho\n a)nthrô/pôn ou)de/na, lo/gô| e(po/menos mo/nô| mo/nos].

Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of with respect: compare the contrary feeling, Leges, ix. 881 A, and in the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic, referred to in a previous note (vi. 492) Plato declares the lessons taught by the multitude--the contagion of established custom and tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers--to be of overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid.]

[Footnote 88: In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had asserted before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the [Greek: Basileu\s Techniko\s] (representing political science, art, or theory) to rule mankind--the illusory nature of all other titles to rule and the mischievous working of all existing governments. The same view is developed in the Republic and the Leges. Compare also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b. 27 ad fin.

In a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 637 D, 638 C), Plato observes, in touching upon the discrepancy between different local institutions at Sparta, Krete, Keos. Tarentum, &c.:--"If natives of different cities argue with each other about their respective institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is the custom _with us; with you perhaps it is different_. But we, who are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private citizen; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to determine whether his laws are good or bad." [Greek: ê(mi=n d' e)sti\n ou) peri\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn tô=n a)/llôn o( lo/gos, a)lla\ peri\ tô=n nomothetô=n au)tô=n kaki/as te kai\ a)retê=s]. King Nomos was not at all pleased to be thus put upon his trial.]

[Side-note: Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato's Dialogues of Search.]

The dislike so constantly felt by communities having established opinions, towards free speculation and dialectic, was aggravated in its application to Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel, but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.[89] The name of Sokrates, after his death, was employed not merely by Plato, but by all the Sokratic companions, to cover their own ethical speculations: moreover, all of them either composed works or gave lectures. But in either case, readers or hearers were comparatively few in number, and were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest: while Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to interrogate every one, and sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon reluctant hearers.[90] That he could have been allowed to persist in this course of life for thirty years, when we read his own account (in the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked--and when we recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under an interdict--is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of Athenian practice.

[Footnote 89: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. "Est enim philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa," &c.

The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive conversation of Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by Themistius (Orat. xxvi. p. 384, [Greek: U(pe\r tou= le/gein]) as aggravating the displeasure of the public against him.]

[Footnote 90: Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40.]

However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates enunciates to the Dikasts. "False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal: the Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispensable: the dialectic search for truth between two active, self-working minds, both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue." The modern reader must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if he would fairly appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,[91] even though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the steps which he makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions, several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even without full certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.[92] But Plato presumes that the search will be renewed, either by the same interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the youthful subject; he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise itself to farther pursuit--men who, having listened to the working out of different points of view, will meditate on these points for themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled and put to shame by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never presented themselves again--were despised by Sokrates as lazy and stupid.[93] For him, as well as for Plato, the search after truth counted as the main business of life.

[Footnote 91: Aristotel. Topica, i. p. 101, a. 29, with the Scholion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the habit of colloquial debate had been very frequent in the days of Aristotle, and afterwards; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, haying been exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol. Brandis, also Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136, and the Commentary of Proklus thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.]

[Footnote 92: A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias, addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and free antithesis of opposite opinions were accounted as essential to the process [Greek: tou= philosophei=n--kai\ e)gô\ me\n ô)/|mên philosophou=ntas au)tou\s peri\ tou= pra/gmatos a)ntile/gein to\n e)nanti/on lo/gon; oi( d' a)/ra ou)k ante/legon, a)ll' a)nte/pratton]. (Lysias, Or. viii. [Greek: Kakologiô=n] s. 11,** p. 273; compare Plat. Apolog. p. 28 E.)

Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in terms which illustrate the Platonic [Greek: dia/logoi zêtêtikoi/],--the character of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as contrasted with that of the confident affirmer and expositor:--"Me ipsum autem ad veritatis contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabrefactum deprehendi, ut qui mentem et ad rerum similitudinem (quod maximum est) agnoscendum satis mobilem, et ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam et intentam haberem--qui et _quærendi desiderium_, et _dubitandi patientiam_, et _meditandi voluptatem_, et _asserendi cunctationem_, et _resipiscendi facilitatem_, et disponendi sollicitudinem tenerem--quique nec novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et omnem imposturam odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veritate quandam familiaritatem et cognationem habere judicavi." (Impetus Philosophici, De Interpretatione Naturæ Prooemium.)

[Greek: Sôkratikô=s ei)s e(ka/teron] is the phrase of Cicero, ad Atticum ii. 3.]

[Footnote 93: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, has the following remarks, illustrating Plato's Dialogues of Search. I should have been glad if I could have transcribed here many other pages of that admirable Essay: which stands almost alone as an unreserved vindication of the rights of the searching individual intelligence, against the compression and repression of King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):--

"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefits of its universal recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it: some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion.