Chapter III (1)

[Footnote *: As stated in the prefatory note to this edition, the present and the following chapter have been, for convenience, transferred from the place given to them by the author, to their present position.]

OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

Having dwelt at some length on the life and compositions of Plato, I now proceed to place in comparison with him some other members of the Sokratic philosophical family: less eminent, indeed, than the illustrious author of the Republic, yet still men of marked character, ability, and influence.[1] Respecting one of the brethren, Xenophon, who stands next to Plato in celebrity, I shall say a few words separately in my next and concluding chapter.

[Footnote 1: Dionysius of Halikarnassus contrasts Plato with [Greek: to\ Sôkra/tous didaskalei=on pa=n] (De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosthen. p. 956.) Compare also Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 762, where he contrasts the style and phraseology of Plato with that of the [Greek: Sôkratikoi\ dia/logoi] generally.]

[Side-note: Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions.]

The ascendancy of Sokrates over his contemporaries was powerfully exercised in more than one way. He brought into vogue new subjects both of indefinite amplitude, and familiar as well as interesting to every one. On these subjects, moreover, he introduced, or at least popularised, a new method of communication, whereby the relation of teacher and learner, implying a direct transfer of ready-made knowledge from the one to the other, was put aside. He substituted an interrogatory process, at once destructive and suggestive, in which the teacher began by unteaching and the learner by unlearning what was supposed to be already known, for the purpose of provoking in the learner's mind a self-operative energy of thought, and an internal generation of new notions. Lastly, Sokrates worked forcibly upon the minds of several friends, who were in the habit of attending him when he talked in the market-place or the palæstra. Some tried to copy his wonderful knack of colloquial cross-examination: how far they did so with success or reputation we do not know: but Xenophon says that several of them would only discourse with those who paid them a fee, and that they thus sold for considerable sums what were only small fragments obtained gratuitously from the rich table of their master.[2] There were moreover several who copied the general style of his colloquies by composing written dialogues. And thus it happened that the great master,--he who passed his life in the oral application of his Elenchus, without writing anything,--though he left no worthy representative in his own special career, became the father of numerous written dialogues and of a rich philosophical literature.[3]

[Footnote 2: Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 60. [Greek: ô(=n tine\s mikra\ me/rê par' e)kei/nou proi=ka labo/ntes pollou= toi=s a)/llois e)pô/loun, kai\ ou)k ê)=san ô(/sper e)kei=nos dêmotikoi/; toi=s ga\r mê\ e)/chousi chrê/mata dido/nai ou)k ê)/thelon diale/gesthai.]]

[Footnote 3: We find a remarkable proof how long the name and conception of Sokrates lasted in the memory of the Athenian public, as having been the great progenitor of the philosophy and philosophers of the fourth century B.C. in Athens. It was about 306 B.C., almost a century after the death of Sokrates, that Democharês (the nephew of the orator Demosthenes) delivered an oration before the Athenian judicature for the purpose of upholding the law proposed by Sophokles, forbidding philosophers or Sophists to lecture without a license obtained from the government; which law, passed a year before, had determined the secession of all the philosophers from Athens until the law was repealed. In this oration Democharês expatiated on the demerits of many philosophers, their servility, profligate ambition, rapacity, want of patriotism, &c., from which Athenæus makes several extracts. [Greek: Toiou=toi ei)sin oi( a)po\ philosophi/as stratêgoi/; peri\ ô(=n Dêmocha/rês e)/legen,--Ô(/sper e)k thu/mbras ou)dei\s a)\n du/naito kataskeua/sai lo/gchên, ou)/d' e)k _Sôkra/tous stratiô/tên a)/mempton_].

Demetrius Phalereus also, in or near that same time, composed a [Greek: Sôkra/tous a)pologi/an] (Diog. La. ix. 37-57). This shows how long the interest in the personal fate and character of Sokrates endured at Athens.]

[Side-note: Names of those companions.]

Besides Plato and Xenophon, whose works are known to us, we hear of Alexamenus, Antisthenes, Æschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Eukleides, Phædon, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, &c., as having composed dialogues of this sort. All of them were companions of Sokrates; several among them either set down what they could partially recollect of his conversations, or employed his name as a dramatic speaker of their own thoughts. Seven of these dialogues were ascribed to Æschines, twenty-five to Aristippus, seventeen to Kriton, twenty-three to Simmias, three to Kebês, six to Eukleides, four to Phædon. The compositions of Antisthenes were far more numerous: ten volumes of them, under a variety of distinct titles (some of them probably not in the form of dialogues) being recorded by Diogenes.[4] Aristippus was the first of the line of philosophers called Kyrenaic or Hedonic, afterwards (with various modifications) Epikurean: Antisthenes, of the Cynics and Stoics: Eukleides, of the Megaric school. It seems that Aristippus, Antisthenes, Eukleides, and Bryson, all enjoyed considerable reputation, as contemporaries and rival authors of Plato: Æschines, Antisthenes (who was very poor), and Aristippus, are said to have received money for their lectures; Aristippus being named as the first who thus departed from the Sokratic canon.[5]

[Footnote 4: Diogenes Laert. 1. 47-61-83, vi. 15; Athenæ. xi. p. 505 C.

Bryson is mentioned by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 508 D. Theopompus, the contemporary of Aristotle and pupil of Isokrates, had composed an express treatise or discourse against Plato's dialogues, in which discourse he affirmed that most of them were not Plato's own, but borrowed in large proportion from the dialogues of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson. Ephippus also, the comic writer (of the fourth century B.C., contemporary with Theopompus, perhaps even earlier), spoke of Bryson as contemporary with Plato (Athenæ. xi. 509 C). This is good proof to authenticate Bryson as a composer of "Sokratic dialogues" belonging to the Platonic age, along with Antisthenes and Aristippus: whether Theopompus is correct when he asserts that Plato borrowed _much_, from the three, is very doubtful.

Many dialogues were published by various writers, and ascribed falsely to one or other of the _viri Sokratici_: Diogenes (ii. 64) reports the judgment delivered by Panætius, which among them were genuine and which not so. Panætius considered that the dialogues ascribed to Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines, were genuine; that those assigned to Phædon and Eukleides were doubtful; and that the rest were all spurious. He thus regarded as spurious those of Alexamenus, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, Simon, Bryson, &c., or he did not know them all. It is possible that Panætius may not have known the dialogues of Bryson; if he did know them and believed them to be spurious, I should not accept his assertion, because I think that it is outweighed by the contrary testimony of Theopompus. Moreover, though Panætius was a very able man, confidence in his critical estimate is much shaken when we learn that he declared the Platonic Phædon to be spurious.]

[Footnote 5: Diogen. Laert. i. 62-65; Athenæus, xi. p. 507 C.

Dion Chrysostom (Orat. lv. De Homero et Socrate, vol. ii. p. 289, Reiske) must have had in his view some of these other Sokratic dialogues, not those composed by Plato or Xenophon, when he alludes to conversations of Sokrates with Lysikles, Glykon, and Anytus; what he says about Anytus can hardly refer to the Platonic Menon.]

[Side-note: Æschines--oration of Lysias against him.]

Æschines the companion of Sokrates did not become (like Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus) the founder of a succession or sect of philosophers. The few fragments remaining of his dialogues do not enable us to appreciate their merit. He seems to have employed the name of Aspasia largely as a conversing personage, and to have esteemed her highly. He also spoke with great admiration of Themistokles. But in regard to present or recent characters, he stands charged with much bitterness and ill-nature: especially we learn that he denounced the Sophists Prodikus and Anaxaras, the first on the ground of having taught Theramenes, the second as the teacher of two worthless persons--Ariphrades and Arignôtus. This accusation deserves greater notice, because it illustrates the odium raised by Melêtus against Sokrates as having instructed Kritias and Alkibiades.[6] Moreover, we have Æschines presented to us in another character, very unexpected in a _vir Socraticus_. An action for recovery of money alleged to be owing was brought in the Athenian Dikastery against Æschines, by a plaintiff, who set forth his case in a speech composed by the rhetor Lysias. In this speech it is alleged that Æschines, having engaged in trade as a preparer and seller of unguents, borrowed a sum of money at interest from the plaintiff; who affirms that he counted with assurance upon honest dealing from a disciple of Sokrates, continually engaged in talking about justice and virtue.[7] But so far was this expectation from being realized, that Æschines had behaved most dishonestly. He repaid neither principal nor interest; though a judgment of the Dikastery had been obtained against him, and a branded slave belonging to him had been seized under it. Moreover, Æschines had been guilty of dishonesty equally scandalous in his dealings with many other creditors also. Furthermore, he had made love to a rich woman seventy years old, and had got possession of her property; cheating and impoverishing her family. His character as a profligate and cheat was well known and could be proved by many witnesses. Such are the allegations against Æschines, contained in the fragment of a lost speech of Lysias, and made in open court by a real plaintiff. How much of them could be fairly proved, we cannot say: but it seems plain at least that Æschines must have been a trader as well as a philosopher. All these writers on philosophy must have had their root and dealings in real life, of which we know scarce anything.

[Footnote 6: Plutarch, Perikles, c. 24-32; Cicero, De Invent. i. 31; Athenæus, v. 220. Some other citations will be found in Fischer's collection of the few fragments of Æschines Sokraticus (Leipsic, 1788, p. 68 seq.), though some of the allusions which he produces seem rather to belong to the orator Æschines. The statements of Athenæus, from the dialogue of Æschines called Telaugês, are the most curious. The dialogue contained, among other things, [Greek: tê\n Prodi/kou kai\ A)naxago/rous _tô=n sophistô=n_ diamô/kêsin], where we see Anaxagoras denominated a Sophist (see also Diodor. xii. 39) as well as Prodikus. Fischer considers the three Pseudo-Platonic dialogues--[Greek: Peri\ A)retê=s, Peri\ Plou/tou, Peri\ Thana/tou]--as the works of Æschines. But this is noway established.]

[Footnote 7: Athenæus, xiii. pp. 611-612. [Greek: Peisthei\s d' u(p' au)tou= toiau=ta le/gontos, kai\ a(/ma oi)o/menos tou=ton Ai)schi/nên Sôkra/tous gegone/nai mathêtê/n, kai\ peri\ dikaiosu/nês kai\ a)retê=s pollou\s kai\ semnou\s le/gonta lo/gous, ou)k a)/n pote e)picheirê=sai ou)de\ tolmê=sai a(/per oi( ponêro/tatoi kai\ a)dikô/tatoi a)/nthrôpoi e)picheirou=si pra/ttein].

We read also about another oration of Lysias against Æschines--[Greek: peri\ sukophanti/as] (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63), unless indeed it be the same oration differently described.]

[Side-note: Written Sokratic Dialogues--their general character.]

The dialogues known by the title of Sokratic dialogues,[8] were composed by all the principal companions of Sokrates, and by many who were not companions. Yet though thus composed by many different authors, they formed a recognised class of literature, noticed by the rhetorical critics as distinguished for plain, colloquial, unstudied, dramatic execution, suiting the parts to the various speakers: from which general character Plato alone departed--and he too not in all of his dialogues. By the Sokratic authors generally Sokrates appears to have been presented under the same main features: his proclaimed confession of ignorance was seldom wanting: and the humiliation which his cross-questioning inflicted even upon insolent men like Alkibiades, was as keenly set forth by Æschines as by Plato: moreover the Sokratic disciples generally were fond of extolling the Dæmon or divining prophecy of their master.[9] Some dialogues circulating under the name of some one among the companions of Sokrates, were spurious, and the authorship was a point not easy to determine. Simon, a currier at Athens, in whose shop Sokrates often conversed, is said to have kept memoranda of the conversations which he heard, and to have afterwards published them: Æschines also, and some other of the Sokratic companions, were suspected of having preserved or procured reports of the conversations of the master himself, and of having made much money after his death by delivering them before select audiences.[10] Aristotle speaks of the followers of Antisthenes as unschooled, vulgar men: but Cicero appears to have read with satisfaction the dialogues of Antisthenes, whom he designates as acute though not well-instructed.[11] Other accounts describe his dialogues as composed in a rhetorical style, which is ascribed to the fact of his having received lessons from Gorgias:[12] and Theopompus must have held in considerable estimation the dialogues of that same author, as well as those of Aristippus and Bryson, when he accused Plato of having borrowed from them largely.[13]

[Footnote 8: Aristotel. ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 505 C; Rhetoric. iii. 16.

Dionys. Halikarnass. ad Cn. Pomp. de Platone, p. 762, Reiske. [Greek: Traphei\s] (Plato) [Greek: e)n toi=s Sôkratikoi=s dialo/gois i)schnota/tois ou)=si kai\ a)kribesta/tois, ou) mei/nas d' e)n au)toi=s, a)lla\ tê=s Gorgi/ou kai\ Thoukudi/dou kataskeuê=s e)rasthei/s]: also, De Admir. Vi Dicend. in Demosthene, p. 968. Again in the same treatise De Adm. V. D. Demosth. p. 956. [Greek: ê( de\ e(te/ra le/xis, ê( litê\ kai\ a)phelê\s kai\ dokou=sa kataskeuê/n te kai\ i)schu\n tê\n pro\s i)diô/tên e)/chein lo/gon kai\ o(moio/têta, pollou\s me\n e)/sche kai\ a)gathou\s a)/ndras prosta/tas--kai\ oi( tô=n ê)thikô=n dialo/gôn poiêtai/, ô(=n ê)=n to\ Sôkratiko\n didaskalei=on pa=n, e)/xô Pla/tônos], &c.

Dionysius calls this style [Greek: o( Sôkratiko\s charaktê\r] p. 1025. I presume it is the same to which the satirist Timon applies the words:--

[Greek: A)sthenikê/ te lo/gôn duas ê)\ tria\s ê)\ e)/ti po/rsô, Oi)=os Xeinopho/ôn, ê)/t' Ai)schi/nou ou)k e)pipeithê\s gra/psai--] Diogen. La. ii. 55.

Lucian, Hermogenes, Phrynichus, Longinus, and some later rhetorical critics of Greece judged more favourably than Timon about the style of Æschines as well as of Xenophon. See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. ii. p. 171, sec. ed. And Demetrius Phalereus (or the author of the treatise which bears his name), as well as the rhetor Aristeides, considered Æschines and Plato as the best representatives of the [Greek: Sôkratiko\s charaktê/r], Demetr. Phaler. De Interpretat. 310; Aristeides, Orat. Platon. i. p. 35; Photius, Cods. 61 and 158; Longinus, ap. Walz. ix. p. 559, c. 2. Lucian says (De Parasito, 33) that Æschines passed some time with the elder Dionysius at Syracuse, to whom he read aloud his dialogue, entitled Miltiades, with great success.

An inedited discourse of Michæl Psellus, printed by Mr. Cox in his very careful and valuable catalogue of the MSS. in the Bodleian Library, recites the same high estimate as having been formed of Æschines by the chief ancient rhetorical critics: they reckoned him among and alongside of the foremost Hellenic classical writers, as having his own peculiar merits of style--[Greek: para\ me\n Pla/tôni, tê\n dialogikê\n phra/sin, para\ de\ tou= Sôkratikou= Ai)schi/nou, tê\n e)mmelê= sunthê/kên tô=n le/xeôn, para\ de\ Thoukudi/dou], &c. See Mr. Cox's Catalogue, pp. 743-745. Cicero speaks of the Sokratic philosophers generally, as writing with an elegant playfulness of style (De Officiis, i. 29, 104): which is in harmony with Lucian's phrase--[Greek: Ai)schi/nês o( tou\s dialo/gous makrou\s kai\ a)stei/ous gra/psas], &c.]

[Footnote 9: Cicero, Brutus, 85, s. 292; De Divinatione, i. 54-122; Aristeides, Orat. xlv. [Greek: peri\ R(êtorikê=s] Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], vol. ii. pp. 295-369, ed. Dindorf. It appears by this that some of the dialogues composed by Æschines were mistaken by various persons for actual conversations held by Sokrates. It was argued, that because Æschines was inferior to Plato in ability, he was more likely to have repeated accurately what he had heard Sokrates say.]

[Footnote 10: Diog. L. ii. 122. He mentions a collection of thirty-three dialogues in one volume, purporting to be reports of real colloquies of Sokrates, published by Simon. But they can hardly be regarded as genuine.

The charge here mentioned is advanced by Xenophon (see a preceding note, Memorab. i. 2, 60), against some persons ([Greek: tine\s]), but without specifying names. About Æschines, see Athenæus, xiii. p. 611 C; Diogen. Laert. ii. 62.]

[Footnote 11: Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, xii. 38:--"viri acuti magis quam eruditi," is the judgment of Cicero upon Antisthenes. I presume that these words indicate the same defect as that which is intended by Aristotle when he says--[Greek: oi( A)nthisthe/neioi kai\ oi( ou(/tôs _a)pai/deutoi_], Metaphysic. [Greek: Ê]. 3, p. 1043, b. 24. It is plain, too, that Lucian considered the compositions of Antisthenes as not unworthy companions to those of Plato (Lucian, adv. Indoctum, c. 27).]

[Footnote 12: Diogen. Laert. vi. 1. If it be true that Antisthenes received lessons from Gorgias, this proves that Gorgias must sometimes have given lessons _gratis_; for the poverty of Antisthenes is well known. See the Symposion of Xenophon.]

[Footnote 13: Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 508. See K. F. Hermann, Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, p. 300. An extract of some length, of a dialogue composed by Æschines between Sokrates and Alkibiades, is given by Aristeides, Or. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], vol. ii. pp. 292-294, ed. Dindorf.]

[Side-note: Relations between the companions of Sokrates--Their proceedings after the death of Sokrates.]

Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, were all companions and admirers of Sokrates, as was Plato. But none of them were his disciples, in the strict sense of the word: none of them continued or enforced his doctrines, though each used his name as a spokesman. During his lifetime the common attachment to his person formed a bond of union, which ceased at his death. There is indeed some ground for believing that Plato then put himself forward in the character of leader, with a view to keep the body united.[14] We must recollect that Plato though then no more than twenty-eight years of age, was the only one among them who combined the advantages of a noble Athenian descent, opulent circumstances, an excellent education, and great native genius. Eukleides and Aristippus were neither of them Athenians: Antisthenes was very poor: Xenophon was absent on service in the Cyreian army. Plato's proposition, however, found no favour with the others and was even indignantly repudiated by Apollodorus: a man ardently attached to Sokrates, but violent and overboiling in all his feelings.[15] The companions of Sokrates, finding themselves unfavourably looked upon at Athens after his death, left the city for a season and followed Eukleides to Megara. How long they stayed there we do not know. Plato is said, though I think on no sufficient authority, to have remained absent from Athens for several years continuously. It seems certain (from an anecdote recounted by Aristotle)[16] that he talked with something like arrogance among the companions of Sokrates: and that Aristippus gently rebuked him by reminding him how very different had been the language of Sokrates himself. Complaints too were made by contemporaries, about Plato's jealous, censorious, spiteful, temper. The critical and disparaging tone of his dialogues, notwithstanding the admiration which they inspire, accounts for the existence of these complaints: and anecdotes are recounted, though not verified by any sufficient evidence, of ill-natured dealing on his part towards other philosophers who were poorer than himself.[17] Dissension or controversy on philosophical topics is rarely carried on without some invidious or hostile feeling. Athens, and the _viri Sokratici_, Plato included, form no exception to this ordinary malady of human nature.

[Footnote 14: Athenæus, xi. p. 507 A-B. from the [Greek: u(pomnê/mata] of the Delphian Hegesander. Who Hegesander was, I do not know: but there is nothing improbable in the anecdote which he recounts.]

[Footnote 15: Plato, Phædon. pp. 59 A. 117 D. Eukleides, however, though his school was probably at Megara, seems to have possessed property in Attica: for there existed, among the orations of Isæus, a pleading composed by that rhetor for some client--[Greek: Pro\s Eu)klei/dên to\n Sôkratiko\n a)mphisbê/têsis u(pe\r tê=s tou= chôri/ou lu/seôs] (Dion. Hal., Isæ., c. 14, p. 612 Reiske) Harpokr.--[Greek: O(/ti ta\ e)pikêrutto/mena]: also under some other words by Harpokration and by Pollux, viii. 48.]

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, p. 1398, b. 30. [Greek: ê)\ ô(s A)ri/stippos, pro\s Pla/tôna e)paggeltikô/tero/n ti ei)po/nta, ô(s ô(/|eto--a)lla\ mê\n o( g' e(tai=ros ê(mô=n, e)/phê, ou)the\n toiou=ton--le/gôn to\n Sôkra/tên].

This anecdote, mentioned by Aristotle, who had good means of knowing, appears quite worthy of belief. The jealousy and love of supremacy inherent in Plato's temper ([Greek: to\ philo/timon]), were noticed by Dionysius Hal. (Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 756).]

[Footnote 17: Athenæus, xi. pp. 505-508. Diog. Laert. ii. 60-65, iii. 36.

The statement made by Plato in the Phædon--That Aristippus and Kleombrotus were not present at the death of Sokrates, but were said to be in Ægina--is cited as an example of Plato's ill-will and censorious temper (Demetr. Phaler. s. 306). But this is unfair. The statement ought not to be so considered, if it were true: and if not true, it deserves a more severe epithet. We read in Athenæus various other criticisms, citing or alluding to passages of Plato, which are alleged to indicate ill-nature; but many of the passages cited do not deserve the remark.]

[Side-note: No Sokratic school--each of the companions took a line of his own.]

It is common for historians of philosophy to speak of a Sokratic school: but this phrase, if admissible at all, is only admissible in the largest and vaguest sense. The effect produced by Sokrates upon his companions was, not to teach doctrine, but to stimulate self-working enquiry, upon ethical and social subjects. Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus, each took a line of his own, not less decidedly than Plato. But unfortunately we have no compositions remaining from either of the three. We possess only brief reports respecting some leading points of their doctrine, emanating altogether from those who disagreed with it: we have besides aphorisms, dicta, repartees, bons-mots, &c., which they are said to have uttered. Of these many are evident inventions; some proceeding from opponents and probably coloured or exaggerated, others hardly authenticated at all. But if they were ever so well authenticated, they would form very insufficient evidence on which to judge a philosopher--much less to condemn him with asperity.[18] Philosophy (as I have already observed) aspires to deliver not merely truth, but reasoned truth. We ought to know not only what doctrines a philosopher maintained, but how he maintained them:--what objections others made against him, and how he replied:--what objections he made against dissentient doctrines, and what replies were made to him. Respecting Plato and Aristotle, we possess such information to a considerable extent:--respecting Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, we are without it. All their compositions (very numerous, in the case of Antisthenes) have perished.

[Footnote 18: Respecting these ancient philosophers, whose works are lost, I transcribe a striking passage from Descartes, who complains, in his own case, of the injustice of being judged from the statements of others, and not from his own writings:--"Quod adeo in hâc materiâ verum est, ut quamvis sæpe _aliquas ex meis opinionibus explicaverim viris acutissimis_, et qui _me loquente videbantur eas valdé distincté intelligere: attamen cum eas retulerunt, observavi_ ipsos fere _semper illas ita mutavisse, ut pro meis agnoscere amplius non possem._ Quâ occasione posteros hic oratos volo, ut nunquam credant, quidquam à me esse profectum, quod ipse in lucem non edidero. _Et nullo modo miror absurda illa dogmata, quæ veteribus illis philosophis tribuuntur, quorum scripta non habemus_: nec propterea judico ipsorum cogitationes valdé à ratione fuisse alienas, cum habuerint præstantissima suorum sæculorum ingenia; sed tantum nobis perperam esse relatas." (Descartes, Diss. De Methodo, p. 43.)]

* * * * *

EUKLEIDES.

[Side-note: Eukleides of Megara--he blended Parmenides with Sokrates.]

Eukleides was a Parmenidean, who blended the ethical point of view of Sokrates with the ontology of Parmenides, and followed out that negative Dialectic which was common to Sokrates with Zeno. Parmenides (I have with already said)[19] and Zeno after him, recognised no absolute reality except Ens Unum, continuous, indivisible: they denied all real plurality: they said that the plural was Non-Ens or Nothing, _i.e._ nothing real or absolute, but only apparent, perpetually transient and changing, relative, different as appreciated by one man and by another. Now Sokrates laid it down that wisdom or knowledge of Good, was the sum total of ethical perfection, including within it all the different virtues: he spoke also about the divine wisdom inherent in, or pervading the entire Kosmos or universe.[20] Eukleides blended together the Ens of Parmenides with the Good of Sokrates, saying that the two names designated one and the same thing: sometimes called Good, Wisdom, Intelligence, God, &c., and by other names also, but always one and the same object named and meant. He farther maintained that the opposite of Ens, and the opposite of Bonum (Non-Ens, Non-Bonum, or Malum) were things non-existent, unmeaning names, Nothing,[21] &c.: _i.e._ that they were nothing really, absolutely, permanently, but ever varying and dependent upon our ever varying conceptions. The One--the All--the Good--was absolute, immoveable, invariable, indivisible. But the opposite thereof was a non-entity or nothing: there was no one constant meaning corresponding to Non-Ens--but a variable meaning, different with every man who used it.

[Footnote 19: See ch. i. pp. 19-22.]

[Footnote 20: Xenophon. Memor. i. 4, 17. [Greek: tê\n e)n tô=| panti\ phro/nêsin]. Compare Plato, Philêbus, pp. 29-30; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 6, iii. 11.]

[Footnote 21: Diog. L. ii. 106. [Greek: Ou)=tos e)\n to\ a)gatho\n a)pephê/|nato polloi=s o)no/masi kalou/menon; o(/te me\n ga\r phro/nêsin, o(/te de\ theo/n, kai\ a)/llote nou=n kai\ ta\ loipa/. Ta\ de\ a)ntikei/mena tô=| a)gathô=| a)nê/|rei, mê\ ei)=nai pha/skôn]. Compare also vii. 2, 161, where the Megarici are represented as recognising only [Greek: mi/an a)retê\n polloi=s o)no/masi kaloume/nên]. Cicero, Academ. ii. 42.]

[Side-note: Doctrine of Eukleides about _Bonum_.]

It was in this manner that Eukleides solved the problem which Sokrates had brought into vogue--What is the Bonum--or (as afterwards phrased) the Summum Bonum? Eukleides pronounced the Bonum to be coincident with the Ens Unum of Parmenides. The Parmenidean thesis, originally belonging to Transcendental Physics or Ontology, became thus implicated with Transcendental Ethics.[22]

[Footnote 22: However, in the verse of Xenophanes, the predecessor of Parmenides--[Greek: Ou(=los o(ra=|, ou(=los de\ noei=, ou(=los de/ t' a)kou/ei]--the Universe is described as a thinking, seeing, hearing God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pa=n]. Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. ix. 144; Xenophan. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Karsten.]

[Side-note: The doctrine compared to that of Plato--changes in Plato.]

Plato departs from Sokrates on the same point. He agrees with Eukleides in recognising a Transcendental Bonum. But it appears that his doctrines on this head underwent some change. He held for some time what is called the doctrine of Ideas: transcendental Forms, Entia, Essences: he considered the Transcendental to be essentially multiple, or to be an aggregate--whereas Eukleides had regarded it as essentially One. This is the doctrine which we find in some of the Platonic dialogues. In the Republic, the Idea of Good appears as one of these, though it is declared to be the foremost in rank and the most ascendant in efficacy.[23] But in the later part of his life, and in his lectures (as we learn from Aristotle), Plato came to adopt a different view. He resolved the Ideas into numbers. He regarded them as made up by the combination of two distinct factors:--1. The One--the Essentially One. 2. The Essentially Plural: The Indeterminate Dyad: the Great and Little.--Of these two elements he considered the Ideas to be compounded. And he identified the Idea of Good with the essentially One--[Greek: to\ a)gatho\n] with [Greek: to\ e(/n]: the principle of Good with the principle of Unity: also the principle of Evil with the Indeterminate. But though Unity and Good were thus identical, he considered Unity as logically antecedent, or the subject--Good as logically consequent, or the predicate.[24]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E, vii. p. 517 A.]

[Footnote 24: The account given by Aristotle of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, as held by Plato in his later years, appears in various passages of the Metaphysica, and in the curious account repeated by Aristoxenus (who had often heard it from Aristotle--[Greek: A)ristote/lês a)ei\ diêgei=to]) of the [Greek: a)kro/asis] or lecture delivered by Plato, De Bono. See Aristoxen. Harmon. ii. p. 30, Meibom. Compare the eighth chapter in this work,--Platonic Compositions Generally. Metaphys. N. 1091, b. 13.[Greek: tô=n de\ ta\s a)kinê/tous ou)si/as ei)=nai lego/ntôn] (sc. Platonici) [Greek: oi( me/n phasin au)to\ to\ e(\n to\ a)gatho\n au)to\ ei)=nai; ou)si/an me/ntoi to\ e(\n au)tou= ô)/|onto ei)=nai ma/lista], which words are very clearly explained by Bonitz in the note to his Commentary, p. 586: also Metaphys. 987, b. 20, and Scholia, p. 551, b. 20, p. 567, b. 34, where the work of Aristotle, [Greek: Peri\ Ta\gathou=], is referred to: probably the memoranda taken down by Aristotle from Plato's lecture on that subject, accompanied by notes of his own.

In Schol. p. 573, a. 18, it is stated that the astronomer Eudoxus was a hearer both of Plato and of Eukleides.

The account given by Zeller (Phil. der Griech. ii. p. 453, 2nd ed.) of this latter phase of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, applies exactly to that which we hear about the main doctrine of Eukleides. Zeller describes the Platonic doctrine as being "Eine Vermischung des ethischen Begriffes vom höchsten Gut, mit dem Metaphysischen des Absoluten: Der Begriff des Guten ist zunächst aus dem menschlichen Leben abstrahirt; er bezeichnet das, was dem Menschen zuträglich ist. So noch bei Sokrates. Plato verallgemeinert ihn nun zum Begriff des Absoluten; dabei spielt aber seine ursprüngliche Bedeutung noch fortwährend herein, und so entsteht die Unklarheit, dass weder der ethische noch der metaphysische Begriff des Guten rein gefasst wird."

This remark is not less applicable to Eukleides than to Plato, both of them agreeing in the doctrine here criticised. Zeller says truly, that the attempt to identify Unum and Bonum produces perpetual confusion. The two notions are thoroughly distinct and independent. It ought not to be called (as he phrases it) "a generalization of Bonum". There is no common property on which to found a generalization. It is a forced conjunction between two disparates.]

[Side-note: Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as that of Eukleides.]

This last doctrine of Plato in his later years (which does not appear in the dialogues, but seems, as far as we can make out, to have been delivered substantially in his oral lectures, and is ascribed to him by Aristotle) was nearly coincident with that of Eukleides. Both held the identity of [Greek: to\ e(/n] with [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n]. This one doctrine is all that we know about Eukleides: what consequences he derived from it, or whether any, we do not know. But Plato combined, with this transcendental Unum = Bonum, a transcendental indeterminate plurality: from which combination he considered his Ideas or Ideal Numbers to be derivatives.

[Side-note: Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eritrean succession.]

Eukleides is said to have composed six dialogues, the titles of which alone remain. The scanty information which we possess respecting him relates altogether to his negative logical procedure. Whether he deduced any consequences from his positive doctrine of the Transcendental Ens, Unum, Bonum, we do not know: but he, as Zeno had been before him,[25] was acute in exposing contradictions and difficulties in the positive doctrines of opponents. He was a citizen of Megara, where he is said to have harboured Plato and the other companions of Sokrates, when they retired for a time from Athens after the death of Sokrates. Living there as a teacher or debater on philosophy, he founded a school or succession of philosophers who were denominated _Megarici_. The title is as old as Aristotle, who both names them and criticises their doctrines.[26] None of their compositions are preserved. The earliest who becomes known to us is Eubulides, the contemporary and opponent of Aristotle; next Ichthyas, Apollonius, Diodôrus Kronus, Stilpon, Alexinus, between 340-260 B.C.

[Footnote 25: Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 C, where Zeno represents himself as taking for his premisses the conclusions of opponents, to show that they led to absurd consequences. This seems what is meant, when Diogenes says about Eukleides--[Greek: tai=s a)podei/xesin e)ni/stato ou) kata\ lê/mmata, a)lla\ kat' e)piphora/n] (ii. 107); Deycks, De Megaricorum Doctrinâ, p. 34.]

[Footnote 26: Aristot. Metaph. iv. p. 1046, b. 29.

The sarcasm ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic implies that Eukleides was really known as the founder of a _school_--[Greek: kai\ tê\n me\n Eu)klei/dou scholê\n e)/lege cholê/n] (Diog. L. vi. 24)--the earliest mention (I apprehend) of the word [Greek: scholê\] in that sense.]

With the Megaric philosophers there soon become confounded another succession, called Eleian or Eretrian, who trace their origin to another Sokratic man--Phædon. The chief Eretrians made known to us are Pleistanus, Menedêmus, Asklepiades. The second of the three acquired some reputation.

[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus--Ethical, not transcendental.]

The Megarics and Eretrians, as far as we know them, turned their speculative activity altogether in the logical or intellectual direction, paying little attention to the ethical and emotional field. Both Antisthenes and Aristippus, on the contrary, pursued the ethical path. To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum? Eukleides had answered by a transcendental definition: Antisthenes and Aristippus each gave to it an ethical answer, having reference to human wants and emotions, and to the different views which they respectively took thereof. Antisthenes declared it to consist in virtue, by which he meant an independent and self-sufficing character, confining all wants within the narrowest limits: Aristippus placed it in the moderate and easy pleasures, in avoiding ambitious struggles, and in making the best of every different situation, yet always under the guidance of a wise calculation and self-command. Both of them kept clear of the transcendental: they neither accepted it as Unum et Omne (the view of Eukleides), nor as Plura (the Eternal Ideas or Forms, the Platonic view). Their speculations had reference altogether to human life and feelings, though the one took a measure of this wide subject very different from the other: and in thus confining the range of their speculations, they followed Sokrates more closely than either Eukleides or Plato followed him. They not only abstained from transcendental speculation, but put themselves in declared opposition to it. And since the intellectual or logical philosophy, as treated by Plato, became intimately blended with transcendental hypothesis--Antisthenes and Aristippus are both found on the negative side against its pretensions. Aristippus declared the mathematical sciences to be useless, as conducing in no way to happiness, and taking no account of what was better or what was worse.[27] He declared that we could know nothing except in so far as we were affected by it, and as it was or might be in correlation with ourselves: that as to causes not relative to ourselves, or to our own capacities and affections, we could know nothing about them.[28]

[Footnote 27: Aristotel. Metaph. B. 906, a. 32. [Greek: ô(/ste dia\ tau=ta tô=n _sophistô=n tines_ oi(=on A)ri/stippos proepêla/kizon au)ta\s (ta\s mathêmatika\s te/chnas);--e)n me\n ga\r tai=s a)/llais te/chnais, kai\ tai=s banau/sois, oi(=on e)n tektonikê=| kai\ skutikê=|, dio/ti be/ltion ê)\ chei=ron le/gesthai pa/nta, ta\s de\ mathêmatika\s ou)the/na poiei=sthai lo/gon peri\ a)gathô=n kai\ kakô=n.]

Aristotle here ranks Aristippus among the [Greek: sophistai/].

Aristippus, in discountenancing [Greek: phusiologi/an], cited the favourite saying of Sokrates that the proper study of mankind was [Greek: o(/tti toi e)n mega/roisi kako/n t' a)gatho/n te te/tuktai].

Plutarch, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.]

[Footnote 28: Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 191; Diog. L. ii. 92.]

[Side-note: Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age.]

Such were the leading writers and talkers contemporary with Plato, in the dialectical age immediately following on the death of Sokrates. The negative vein greatly preponderates in them, as it does on the whole even in Plato--and as it was pretty sure to do, so long as the form of dialogue was employed. Affirmative exposition and proof is indeed found in some of the later Platonic works, carried on by colloquy between two speakers. But the colloquial form manifests itself evidently as unsuitable for the purpose: and we must remember that Plato was a lecturer as well as a writer, so that his doctrines made their way, at least in part, through continuous exposition. But it is Aristotle with whom the form of affirmative continuous exposition first becomes predominant, in matters of philosophy. Though he composed dialogues (which are now lost), and though he appreciates dialectic as a valuable exercise, yet he considers it only as a discursive preparation; antecedent, though essential, to the more close and concentrated demonstrations of philosophy.

[Side-note: Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative vein.]

Most historians deal hardly with this negative vein. They depreciate the Sophists, the Megarics and Eretrians, the Academics and Sceptics of the subsequent ages--under the title of Eristics, or lovers of contention for itself--as captious and perverse enemies of truth.

[Side-note: Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of the affirmative.]

I have already said that my view of the importance and value of the negative vein of philosophy is altogether different. It appears to me quite as essential as the affirmative. It is required as an antecedent, a test, and a corrective. Aristotle deserves all honour for his attempts to construct and defend various affirmative theories: but the value of these theories depends upon their being defensible against all objectors. Affirmative philosophy, as a body not only of truth but of reasoned truth, holds the champion's belt, subject to the challenge not only of competing affirmants, but of all deniers and doubters. And this is the more indispensable, because of the vast problems which these affirmative philosophers undertake to solve: problems especially vast during the age of Plato and Aristotle. The question has to be determined, not only which of two proposed solutions is the best, but whether either of them is tenable, and even whether any solution at all is attainable by the human faculties: whether there exist positive evidence adequate to sustain any conclusion, accompanied with adequate replies to the objections against it. The burthen of proof lies upon the affirmant: and the proof produced must be open to the scrutiny of every dissentient.

[Side-note: Sokrates--the most persevering and acute Eristic of his age.]

Among these dissentients or negative dialecticians, Sokrates himself, during his life, stood prominent. In his footsteps followed Eukleides and the Megarics: who, though they acquired the unenviable surname of Eristics or Controversialists, cannot possibly have surpassed Sokrates, and probably did not equal him, in the refutative Elenchus. Of no one among the Megarics, probably, did critics ever affirm, what the admiring Xenophon says about Sokrates--"that he dealt with every one in colloquial debate just as he chose," _i.e._, that he baffled and puzzled his opponents whenever he chose. No one of these Megarics probably ever enunciated so sweeping a negative programme, or declared so emphatically his own inability to communicate positive instruction, as Sokrates in the Platonic Apology. A person more thoroughly Eristic than Sokrates never lived. And we see perfectly, from the Memorabilia of Xenophon (who nevertheless strives to bring out the opposite side of his character), that he was so esteemed among his contemporaries. Plato, as well as Eukleides, took up this vein in the Sokratic character, and worked it with unrivalled power in many of his dialogues. The Platonic Sokrates is compared, and compares himself, to Antæus, who compelled every new-comer, willing or unwilling, to wrestle with him.[29]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Theætet. p. 169 A. _Theodorus_. [Greek: Ou) r(a/|dion, ô)= Sô/krates, soi\ parakathê/menon mê\ dido/nai lo/gon, a)ll' e)gô\ a)/rti parelê/rêsa pha/skôn se e)pitre/psein moi mê\ a)podu/esthai, kai\ ou)chi\ a)nagka/sein katha/per Lakedaimo/nioi; su\ de/ moi dokei=s pro\s to\n Ski/r)r(ôna ma=llon tei/nein. Lakedaimo/nioi me\n ga\r a)pie/nai ê(\ a)podu/esthai keleu/ousi, su\ de\ kat' A)ntai=o/n ti/ moi ma=llon dokei=s to\ dra=ma dra=|n; to\n ga\r proseltho/nta ou)k a)ni/ês pri\n a)nagka/sê|s a)podu/sas e)n toi=s lo/gois prospalai=sai.]

_Sokrates_. [Greek: _A)=rista ge_, ô)= Theo/dôre, _tê\n no/son mou a)pei/kasas_; i)schurikô/teros me/ntoi e)gô\ e)kei/nôn; muri/oi ga\r ê)/dê moi Ê(rakle/es te kai\ Thêse/es e)ntucho/ntes karteroi\ pro\s to\ le/gein ma/l' eu)= xugkeko/phasin, a)ll' e)gô\ ou)de/n ti ma=llon a)phi/stamai. ou(/tô _tis e)rô\s deino\s e)nde/duke tê=s peri\ tau=ta gumnasi/as_; mê\ ou)=n mêde\ su\ phthonê/sê|s prosanatripsa/menos sauto/n te a(/ma kai\ e)me\ o)nê=sai].

How could the eristic appetite be manifested in stronger language either by Eukleides, or Eubulides, or Diodôrus Kronus, or any of those Sophists upon whom the Platonic commentators heap so many harsh epithets?

Among the compositions ascribed to Protagoras by Diogenes Laertius (ix. 55), one is entitled [Greek: Te/chnê E)ristikô=n]. But if we look at the last chapter of the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, we shall find Aristotle asserting explicitly that there existed no [Greek: Te/chnê E)ristikô=n] anterior to his own work the Topica.]

[Side-note: Platonic Parmenides--its extreme negative character.]

Of the six dialogues composed by Eukleides, we cannot speak positively, because they are not preserved. But they cannot have been more refutative, and less affirmative, than most of the Platonic dialogues; and we can hardly be wrong in asserting that they were very inferior both in energy and attraction. The Theætêtus and the Parmenides, two of the most negative among the Platonic dialogues, seem to connect themselves, by the _personnel_ of the drama, with the Megaric philosophers: the former dialogue is ushered in by Eukleides, and is, as it were, dedicated to him: the latter dialogue exhibits, as its _protagonistes_, the veteran Parmenides himself, who forms the one factor of the Megaric philosophy, while Sokrates forms the other. Parmenides (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is made to enforce the negative method in general terms, as a philosophical duty co-ordinate with the affirmative; and to illustrate it by a most elaborate argumentation, directed partly against the Platonic Ideas (here advocated by the youthful Sokrates), partly against his own (the Parmenidean) dogma of Ens Unum. Parmenides adduces unanswerable objections against the dogma of Transcendental Forms or Ideas; yet says at the same time that there can be no philosophy unless you admit it. He reproves the youthful Sokrates for precipitancy in affirming the dogma, and contends that you are not justified in affirming any dogma until you have gone through a bilateral scrutiny of it--that is, first assuming the doctrine to be true, next assuming it to be false, and following out the deductions arising from the one assumption as well as from the other.[30] Parmenides then gives a string of successive deductions (at great length, occupying the last half of the dialogue)--four pairs of counter-demonstrations or Antinomies--in which contradictory conclusions appear each to be alike proved. He enunciates the final result as follows:--"Whether Unum exists, or does not exist, Unum itself and Cætera, both exist and do not exist, both appear and do not appear, all things and in all ways--both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other".[31]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Parmen. p. 136.]

[Footnote 31: Plato, Parmen. p. 166. [Greek: e(\n ei)/t' e)/stin, ei)/te mê\ e)/stin, au)to/ te kai\ ta)/lla kai\ pro\s au)ta\ kai\ pro\s a)/llêla pa/nta pa/ntôs e)sti/ te kai\ ou)k e)/sti, kai\ phai/netai/ te kai\ ou) phai/netai.--A)lêthe/stata].

See below, vol. iii. chap. xxvii. Parmenides.]

If this memorable dialogue, with its concluding string of elaborate antinomies, had come down to us under the name of Eukleides, historians would probably have denounced it as a perverse exhibition of ingenuity, worthy of "that litigious person, who first infused into the Megarians the fury of disputation "[32] But since it is of Platonic origin, we must recognise Plato not only as having divided with the Megaric philosophers the impulse of negative speculation which they had inherited from Sokrates, but as having carried that impulse to an extreme point of invention, combination, and dramatic handling, much beyond their powers. Undoubtedly, if we pass from the Parmenidês to other dialogues, we find Plato very different. He has various other intellectual impulses, an abundant flow of ideality and of constructive fancy, in many distinct channels. But negative philosophy is at least one of the indisputable and prominent items of the Platonic aggregate.

[Footnote 32: This is the phrase of the satirical sillographer Timon, who spoke with scorn of all the philosophers except Pyrrhon:--

[Greek: A)ll' ou)/ moi tou/tôn phledo/nôn me/lei, ou)de\ me\n a)/llou Ou)deno/s, ou) Phai/dônos, o(/tis ge me\n--ou)/d' e)rida/nteô Eu)klei/dou, Megareu=sin o(\s e)/mbale lu/ssan e)rismou=.]]

[Side-note: The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and Plato.]

While then we admit that the Megaric succession of philosophers exhibited negative subtlety and vehement love of contentious debate, we must recollect that these qualities were inherited from Sokrates and shared with Plato. The philosophy of Sokrates, who taught nothing and cross-examined every one, was essentially more negative and controversial, both in him and his successors, than any which had preceded it. In an age when dialectic colloquy was considered as appropriate for philosophical subjects, and when long continuous exposition was left to the rhetor--Eukleides established a succession or school[33] which was more distinguished for impugning dogmas of others than for defending dogmas of its own. Schleiermacher and others suppose that Plato in his dialogue Euthydêmus intends to expose the sophistical fallacies of the Megaric school:[34] and that in the dialogue Sophistês, he refutes the same philosophers (under the vague designation of "the friends of Forms") in their speculations about Ens and Non-Ens. The first of these two opinions is probably true to some extent, though we cannot tell how far: the second of the two is supported by some able critics--yet it appears to me untenable.[35]

[Footnote 33: If we may trust a sarcastic bon-mot ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic, the contemporary of the _viri Sokratici_ and the follower of Antisthenes, the term [Greek: scholê\] was applied to the visitors of Eukleides rather than to those of Plato--[Greek: kai\ tê\n me\n Eu)klei/dou scholê\n e)/lege _cholê/n_, tê\n de\ Pla/tônos diatribê/n, _katatribê/n_]. Diog. L. vi. 24.]

[Footnote 34: Schleierm. Einleitung to Plat. Euthyd. p. 403 seq.]

[Footnote 35: Schleierm. Introduction to the Sophistês, pp. 134-135.

See Deycks, Megaricorum Doctrina, p. 41 seq. Zeller, Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 180 seq., with his instructive note. Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. p. 37, and others cited by Zeller.--Ritter dissents from this view, and I concur in his dissent. To affirm that Eukleides admitted a plurality of Ideas or Forms, is to contradict the only one deposition, certain and unequivocal, which we have about his philosophy. His doctrine is that of the Transcendental Unum, Ens, Bonum; while the doctrine of the Transcendental Plura (Ideas or Forms) belongs to Plato and others. Both Deycks and Zeller (p. 185) recognise this as a difficulty. But to me it seems fatal to their hypothesis; which, after all, is only an hypothesis--first originated by Schleiermacher. If it be true that the Megarici are intended by Plato under the appellation [Greek: oi( tô=n ei)dô=n phi/loi], we must suppose that the school had been completely transformed before the time of Stilpon, who is presented as the great opponent of [Greek: ta\ ei)/dê].]

Of Eukleides himself, though he is characterised as strongly controversial, no distinct points of controversy have been preserved: but his successor Eubulides is celebrated for various sophisms. He was the contemporary and rival of Aristotle: who, without however expressly naming him, probably intends to speak of him when alluding to the Megaric philosophers generally.[36] Another of the same school, Alexinus (rather later than Eubulides) is also said to have written against Aristotle.

[Footnote 36: Aristokles, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2. Eubulides is said not merely to have controverted the philosophical theories of Aristotle, but also to have attacked his personal character with bitterness and slander: a practice not less common in ancient controversy than in modern. About Alexinus, Diog. L. ii. 109.

Among those who took lessons in rhetoric and pronunciation from Eubulides, we read the name of the orator Demosthenes, who is said to have improved his pronunciation thereby. Diog. Laert. ii. p. 108. Plutarch, x. Orat. 21, p. 845 C.]

[Side-note: Eubulides--his logical problems or puzzles--difficulty of solving them--many solutions attempted.]

Six sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides. 1.--[Greek: O( pseudo/menos]--Mentiens. 2.--[Greek: O( dialantha/nôn], or [Greek: e)gkekalumme/nos]--the person hidden under a veil. 3.--[Greek: Ê)le/ktra]. 4.--[Greek: Sôrei/tês]--Sorites. 5.--[Greek: Kerati/nês]--Cornutus. 6.--[Greek: Pha/lakros]--Calvus. Of these the second is substantially the same with the third; and the fourth the same with the sixth, only inverted.[37]

[Footnote 37: Diog. L. ii. pp. 108-109; vii. 82. Lucian vit. Auct. 22.

1. Cicero, Academ. ii. pp. 30-96. "Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris. Dicis autem te mentiri, verumque dicis: mentiris igitur." 2, 3. [Greek: O( e)gkekalumme/nos]. You know your father: you are placed before a person covered and concealed by a thick veil: you do not know him. But this person is your father. Therefore you both know your father and do not know him. 5. [Greek: Kerati/nês]. That which you have not lost, you have: but you have not lost horns; therefore you _have_ horns. 4, 6. [Greek: Sôrei/tês--Pha/lakros]. What number of grains make a heap--or are many? what number are few? Are three grains few, and four _many_?--or, where will you draw the line between Few and Many? The like question about the hairs on a man's head--How many must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?]

These sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides, and belonged probably to the Megaric school both before and after him. But it is plain both from the Euthydêmus of Plato, and from the Topica of Aristotle, that there were many others of similar character; frequently employed in the abundant dialectic colloquies which prevailed at Athens during the fourth and third centuries B.C. Plato and Aristotle handle such questions and their authors contemptuously, under the name of Eristic: but it was more easy to put a bad name upon them, as well as upon the Eleate Zeno, than to elucidate the logical difficulties which they brought to view. Neither Aristotle nor Plato provided a sufficient answer to them: as is proved by the fact, that several subsequent philosophers wrote treatises expressly in reference to them--even philosophers of reputation, like Theophrastus and Chrysippus.[38] How these two latter philosophers performed their task, we cannot say. But the fact that they attempted the task, exhibits a commendable anxiety to make their logical theory complete, and to fortify it against objections.

[Footnote 38: Diog. L. v. p. 49; vii. pp. 192-198. Seneca, Epistol. p. 45. Plutarch (De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1087) has some curious extracts and remarks from Chrysippus; who (he says) spoke in the harshest terms against the [Greek: Megarika\ e)rôtê/mata], as having puzzled and unsettled men's convictions without ground--while he (Chrysippus) had himself proposed puzzles and difficulties still more formidable, in his treatise [Greek: kata\ Sunêthei/as].]

[Side-note: Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to deceive but to guard against deception.]

It is in this point of view--in reference to logical theory--that the Megaric philosophers have not been fairly appreciated. They, or persons reasoning in their manner, formed one essential encouragement and condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory. They administered, to minds capable and constructive, that painful sense of contradiction, and shock of perplexity, which Sokrates relied upon as the stimulus to mental parturition--and which Plato extols as a lever for raising the student to general conceptions.[39] Their sophisms were not intended to impose upon any one, but on the contrary, to guard against imposition.[40] Whoever states a fallacy clearly and nakedly, applying it to a particular case in which it conducts to a conclusion known upon other evidence not to be true--contributes to divest it of its misleading effect. The persons most liable to be deceived by the fallacy are those who are not forewarned:--in cases where the premisses are stated not nakedly, but in an artful form of words--and where the conclusion, though false, is not known beforehand to be false by the hearer. To use Mr. John Stuart Mill's phrase,[41] the fallacy is a case of apparent evidence mistaken for real evidence: you expose it to be evidence only apparent and not real, by giving a type of the fallacy, in which the conclusion obtained is obviously false: and the more obviously false it is, the better suited for its tutelary purpose. Aristotle recognises, as indispensable in philosophical enquiry, the preliminary wrestling into which he conducts his reader, by means of a long string of unsolved difficulties or puzzles--([Greek: a)po/riai]). He declares distinctly and forcibly, that whoever attempts to lay out a positive theory, without having before his mind a full list of the difficulties with which he is to grapple, is like one who searches without knowing what he is looking for; without being competent to decide whether what he hits upon as a solution be really a solution or not.[42] Now that enumeration of puzzles which Aristotle here postulates (and in part undertakes, in reference to Philosophia Prima) is exactly what the Megarics, and various other dialecticians (called by Plato and Aristotle Sophists) contributed to furnish for the use of those who theorised on Logic.

[Footnote 39: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523 A, 524. [Greek: ta\ me\n e)n tai=s ai)sthê/sesin ou) parakalou=nta tê\n no/êsin ei)s e)pi/skepsin, ô(s i(kanô=s u(po\ tê=s ai)sthê/seôs krino/mena--ta\ de\ panta/pasi diakeleuo/mena e)kei/nên e)piske/psasthai, ô(s tê=s ai)sthê/seôs ou)de\n u(gie\s poiou/sês . . . Ta\ me\n ou) parakalou=nta, o(/sa mê\ e)kbai/nei ei)s e)nanti/an ai)/sthêsin a(/ma; ta\ d' e)kbai/nonta, ô(s parakalou=nta ti/thêmi, e)peida\n ê( ai)/sthêsis mêde\n ma=llon tou=to ê)\ to\ e)nanti/on dêloi=]. Compare p. 524 E: the whole passage is very interesting.]