Chapter III (4)

There is another singular doctrine, which Aristotle ascribes to Antisthenes, and which Plato notices and confutes; alluding to its author contemptuously, but not mentioning his name. Every name (Antisthenes argued) has its own special reason or meaning ([Greek: oi)kei=os[126] lo/gos]), declaring the essence of the thing named, and differing from every other word: you cannot therefore truly predicate any one word of any other, because the reason or meaning of the two is different: there can be no true propositions except identical propositions, in which the predicate is the same with the subject--"man is man, good is good". "Man is good" was an inadmissible proposition: affirming different things to be the same, or one thing to be many.[127] Accordingly, it was impossible for two speakers really to contradict each other. There can be no contradiction between them if both declare the essence of the same thing--nor if neither of them declare the essence of it--nor if one speaker declares the essence of one thing, and another speaker that of another. But one of these three cases must happen: therefore there can be no contradiction.[128]

[Footnote 126: Diogen. L. vi. 3. [Greek: Prôto/s te ô(ri/sato] (Antisthenes) [Greek: lo/gon, ei)pô/n, lo/gos e)sti\n o( to\ ti/ ê)=n ê)/ e)sti dêlô=n.]]

[Footnote 127: Aristotle, Metaphy. [Greek: D]. 1024, b. 32, attributes this doctrine to Antisthenes by name; which tends to prove that Plato meant Antisthenes, though not naming him, in Sophist, p. 251 B, where he notices the same doctrine. Compare Philêbus, p. 14 D.

It is to be observed that a doctrine exactly the same as that which Plato here censures in Antisthenes, will be found maintained by the Platonic Sokrates himself, in Plato, Hippias Major, p. 304 A. See chap, xiii. vol. ii. of the present work.]

[Footnote 128: Aristot. Topic. i. p. 104, b. 20. [Greek: the/sis de/ e)stin u(po/lêpsis para/doxos tô=n gnôri/môn tino\s kata\ philosophi/an; oi(=on o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)ntile/gein, katha/per e)/phê A)ntisthe/nês].

Plato puts this [Greek: the/sis] into the mouth of Dionysodorus, in the Euthydêmus--p. 286 B; but he says (or makes Sokrates say) that it was maintained by many persons, and that it had been maintained by Protagoras, and even by others yet more ancient.

Antisthenes had discussed it specially in a treatise of three sections polemical against Plato--[Greek: Sa/thôn, ê)\ peri\ tou= a)ntile/gein, a, b, g] (Diog. L. vi. 16).]

[Side-note: The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle.]

The works of Antisthenes being lost, we do not know how he himself stated his own doctrine, nor what he said on behalf of it, declaring contradiction to be impossible. Plato sets aside the doctrine as absurd and silly; Aristotle--since he cites it as a paradox, apt for dialectical debate, where the opinion of a philosopher stood opposed to what was generally received--seems to imply that there were plausible arguments to be urged in its favour.[129] And that the doctrine actually continued to be held and advocated, in the generation not only after Antisthenes but after Aristotle--we may see by the case of Stilpon: who maintained (as Antisthenes had done) that none but identical propositions, wherein the predicate was a repetition of the subject, were admissible: from whence it followed (as Aristotle observed) that there could be no propositions either false or contradictory. Plutarch,[130] in reciting this doctrine of Stilpon (which had been vehemently impugned by the Epikurean Kolôtês), declares it to have been intended only in jest. There is no ground for believing that it was so intended: the analogy of Antisthenes goes to prove the contrary.

[Footnote 129: Aristotle (Met. [Greek: D]. 1024) represents the doctrine of Antisthenes, That contradictory and false propositions are impossible--as a consequence deduced from the position laid down--That no propositions except identical propositions were admissible. If you grant this last proposition, the consequences will be undeniable. Possibly Antisthenes may have reasoned in this way:"There are many contradictory and false propositions now afloat; but this arises from the way in which predication is conducted. So long as the predicate is different from the subject, there is nothing _in the form of a proposition_ to distinguish falsehood from truth (to distinguish _Theætêtus sedet_, from _Theætêtus volat_--to take the instance in the Platonic Sophistês--p. 263). There ought to be no propositions except identical propositions: the form itself will then guarantee you against both falsehood and contradiction: you will be sure always to give [Greek: to\n oi)kei=on lo/gon tou= pra/gmatos]." There would be nothing inconsistent in such a precept: but Aristotle might call it silly [Greek: eu)êthô=s]), because, while shutting out falsehood and contradiction, it would also shut out the great body of useful truth, and would divest language of its usefulness as a means of communication.

Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes--"Nur Eins bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges--die Wesenheit als einfachen Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften"(this is rather too Aristotelian)--"zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der Erscheinungen". Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We read in the Kratylus, that there were persons who maintained the rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only an unmeaning sound (Plato, Krat. pp. 429-430).]

[Footnote 130: Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1119 C-D.]

[Side-note: Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication.]

Stilpon, however, while rejecting (as Antisthenes had done) the universal Ideas[131] or Forms, took a larger ground of objection. He pronounced them to be inadmissible both as subject and as predicate. If you speak of Man in general (he said), what, or whom, do you mean? You do not mean A or B, or C or D, &c.: that is, you do not mean any one of these more than any other. You have no determinate meaning at all: and beyond this indefinite multitude of individuals, there is nothing that the term can mean. Again, as to predicates--when you say, _The man runs_, or _The man is good_, what do you mean by the predicate _runs_, or is _good_? You do not mean any thing specially belonging to man: for you apply the same predicates to many other subjects: you say _runs_, about a horse, a dog, or a cat--you say _good_ in reference to food, medicine, and other things besides. Your predicate, therefore, being applied to many and diverse subjects, belongs not to one of them more than to another: in other words, it belongs to neither: the predication is not admissible.[132]

[Footnote 131: Hegel (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 123) and Marbach (Geschichte der Philos. s. 91) disallow the assertion of Diogenes, that Stilpon [Greek: a)nê/rei ta\ ei)/dê]. They maintain that Stilpon rejected the particular affirmations, and allowed only general or universal affirmations. This construction appears to me erroneous.]

[Footnote 132: Diog. L. ii. 113; Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, 1119-1120. [Greek: ei) peri\ i(/ppou to\ tre/chein katêgorou=men, ou)/ phêsi] (Stilpon) [Greek: tau)to\n ei)=nai tô=| peri\ ou)= katêgorei=tai to\ katêgorou/menon--e)kate/rou ga\r a)paitou/menoi to\n lo/gon, ou) to\n au)to\n a)podi/domen u(pe\r a)mphoi=n. O(/then a(marta/nein tou\s e(/teron e(te/rou katêgorou=ntas. Ei) me\n ga\r tau)ton e)sti tô=| a)nthrô/pô| to\ a)gatho/n, kai\ tô=| i(/ppô| to\ tre/chein, pô=s kai\ siti/ou kai\ pharma/kou to\ a)gatho/n? kai\ nê\ Di/a pa/lin le/ontos kai\ kuno\s to\ tre/chein, katêgorou=men? ei) d' e(/teron, ou)k o)rthô=s _a)/nthrôpon a)gatho\n kai\ i(/ppon tre/chein_ le/gomen].

Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. p. 269-282) gives a different vein of reasoning respecting predication,--yet a view which illustrates this doctrine of Antisthenes. Sextus does not require that all predication shall be restricted to identical predication: but he maintains that you cannot define any general word. To define, he says, is to enunciate the essence of that which is defined. But when you define Man--"a mortal, rational animal, capable of reason and knowledge"--you give only certain attributes of Man, which go along with the essence--you do not give the essence itself. If you enumerate even all the accompaniments ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]), you will still fail to tell me what the essence of Man is: which is what I desire to know, and what you profess to do by your definition. It is useless to enumerate accompaniments, until you explain to me what the essence is which they accompany.

These are ingenious objections, which seem to me quite valid, if you assume the logical subject to be a real, absolute essence, apart from all or any of its predicates. And this is a frequent illusion, favoured even by many logicians. We enunciate the subject first, then the predicate; and because the subject can be conceived after abstraction of this, that, _or_ the other predicates--we are apt to imagine that it may be conceived without _all or any_ of the predicates. But this is an illusion. If you suppress all predicates, the subject or supposed substratum vanishes along with them: just as the Genus vanishes, if you suppress all the different species of it.

"Scais-tu au moins ce que c'est que la matière? Très-bien. . . Par exemple, cette pierre est grise, est d'une telle forme, a ses trois dimensions; elle est pésante et divisible. Eh bien (dit le Sirien), cette chose qui te paroît être divisible, pésante, et grise, me dirois tu bien ce que c'est? Tu vois quelques attributs: mais le fond de la chose, le connois tu? Non, dit l'autre. Tu ne scais donc point ce que c'est que la matière." (Voltaire, Micromégas, c. 7.)

"Le fond de la chose"--the Ding an sich--is nothing but the name itself, divested of every fraction of meaning: it is _titulus sine re_. But the name being familiar, and having been always used with a meaning, still appears invested with much of the old emotional associations, even though it has been stripped of all its meaning by successive acts of abstraction. If you subtract from four, 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, there will remain zero. But by abstracting, from the subject _man_, all its predicates, real and possible, you cannot reduce it to zero. The _name_ man always remains, and appears by old association to carry with it some meaning--though the meaning can no longer be defined.

This illusion is well pointed out in a valuable passage of Cabanis (Du Degré de Certitude de la Médecine, p. 61):--

"Je pourrois d'ailleurs demander ce qu'on entend par la nature et les causes premières des maladies. Nous connoissons de leur nature, ce que les faits en manifestent. Nous savons, par exemple, que la fièvre produit tels et tels changements: ou plutôt, c'est par ces changements qu'elle se montre à nos yeux: c'est _par eux seuls qu'elle existe pour nous_. Quand un homme tousse, crache du sang, respire avec peine, ressent une douleur de côté, a le pouls plus vite et plus dur, la peau plus chaude que dans l'état naturel--l'on dit qu'il est attaqué d'une pleurésie. Mais qu'est ce donc _qu'une pleurésie_? On vous répliquera que c'est une maladie, dans laquelle tous, ou presque tous, ces accidents se trouvent combinés. S'il en manque un ou plusieurs, ce n'est point la pleurésie, du moins la vraie pleurésie essentielle des écoles. _C'est donc le concours de ces accidents qui la constitue._ Le mot _pleurésie ne fait que les retracer d'une manière plus courte. Ce mot n'est pas un être par lui-même_: il exprime une abstraction de l'esprit, et réveille par un seul trait toutes les images d'un assez grand tableau.

"Ainsi lorsque, non content de connoître une maladie par ce qu'elle offre à nos sens, par ce qui seul la constitue, et sans quoi elle n'existeroit pas, _vous demandez encore quelle est sa nature en elle-même, quelle est son essence--c'est comme si vous demandiez quelle est la nature ou l'essence d'un mot, d'une pure abstraction._ Il n'y a donc pas beaucoup de justesse à dire, d'un air de triomphe, que les médecins ignorent même la nature de la fièvre, et que sans cesse ils agissent dans des circonstances, ou manient des instruments, dont l'essence leur est inconnue."]

[Side-note: Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to more than one subject.]

Stilpon (like Antisthenes, as I have remarked above) seems to have had in his mind a type of predication, similar to the type of reasoning which Aristotle laid down the syllogism: such that the form of the proposition should be itself a guarantee for the truth of what was affirmed. Throughout the ancient philosophy, especially in the more methodised debates between the Academics and Sceptics on one side, and the Stoics on the other--what the one party affirmed and the other party denied, was, the existence of a Criterion of Truth: some distinguishable mark, such as falsehood could not possibly carry. To find this infallible mark in propositions, Stilpon admitted none except identical. While agreeing with Antisthenes, that no predicate could belong to a subject different from itself, he added a new argument, by pointing out that predicates applied to one subject were also applied to many other subjects. Now if the predicates belonged to one, they could not (in his view) belong to the others: and therefore they did not really belong to any. He considered that predication involved either identity or special and exclusive implication of the predicate with the subject.

[Side-note: Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenidês.]

Stilpon was not the first who had difficulty in explaining to himself how one and the same predicate could be applied to many different subjects. The difficulty had already been set forth in the Platonic Parmenidês.[133] How can the Form (Man, White, Good, &c.) be present at one and the same time in many distinct individuals? It cannot be present as a whole in each: nor can it be divided, and thus present partly in one, partly in another. How therefore can it be present at all in any of them? In other words, how can the One be Many, and how can the Many be One? Of this difficulty (as of many others) Plato presents no solution, either in the Parmenidês or anywhere else.[134] Aristotle alludes to several contemporaries or predecessors who felt it. Stilpon reproduces it in his own way. It is a very real difficulty, requiring to be dealt with by those who lay down a theory of predication; and calling upon them to explain the functions of general propositions, and the meaning of general terms.

[Footnote 133: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 131. Compare also Philêbus, p. 15, and Stallbaum's Proleg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 46-47. The long commentary of Proklus (v. 100-110. pp. 670-682 of the edition of Stallbaum) amply attests the [Greek: duskoli/an] of the problem.

The argument of Parmenidês (in the dialogue called Parmenidês) is applied to the Platonic [Greek: ei)/dê] and to [Greek: ta\ mete/chonta]. But the argument is just as much applicable to attributes, genera, species: to all general predicates.]

[Footnote 134: Aristot. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 26-36.

Lykophron and some others anterior to Aristotle proposed to elude the difficulty, by ceasing to use the substantive verb as copula in predication: instead of saying [Greek: Sôkra/tês e)sti\ leuko/s], they said either [Greek: Sôkra/tês leuko/s], simply, or [Greek: Sôkra/tês leleu/kôtai].

This is a remarkable evidence of the difficulty arising, even in these early days of logic, about the logical function of the copula.]

[Side-note: Menedêmus disallowed all negative predication.]

Menedêmus the Eretrian, one among the hearers and admirers of Stilpon, combined even more than Stilpon the attributes of the Cynic with those of the Megaric. He was fearless in character, and uncontrouled in speech, delivering harsh criticisms without regard to offence given: he was also a great master of ingenious dialectic and puzzling controversy.[135] His robust frame, grave deportment, and simplicity of life, inspired great respect; especially as he occupied a conspicuous position, and enjoyed political influence at Eretria. He is said to have thought meanly both of Plato and Xenokrates. We are told that Menedêmus, like Antisthenes and Stilpon, had doctrines of his own on the subject of predication. He disallowed all negative propositions, admitting none but affirmative: moreover even of the affirmative propositions, he disallowed all the hypothetical, approving only the simple and categorical.[136]

[Footnote 135: Diog. L. ii. 127-134. [Greek: ê)=n ga\r kai\ e)piko/ptês kai\ par)r(êsiastê/s.]]

[Footnote 136: Diog. L. ii. 134.]

It is impossible to pronounce confidently respecting these doctrines, without knowing the reasons upon which they were grounded. Unfortunately these last have not been transmitted to us. But we may be very sure that there were reasons, sufficient or insufficient: and the knowledge of those reasons would have enabled us to appreciate more fully the state of the Greek mind, in respect to logical theory, in and before the year 300 B.C.

[Side-note: Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex objects. Simple objects undefinable.]

Another doctrine, respecting knowledge and definition, is ascribed by Aristotle to "the disciples of Antisthenes and other such uninstructed persons": it is also canvassed by Plato in the Theætêtus,[137] without specifying its author, yet probably having Antisthenes in view. As far as we can make out a doctrine which both these authors recite as opponents, briefly and their own way, it is as follows:--"Objects must be distinguished into--1. Simple or primary; and 2. Compound or secondary combinations of these simple elements. This last class, the compounds, may be explained or defined, because you can enumerate the component elements. By such analysis, and by the definition founded thereupon, you really come to _know_ them--describe them--predicate about them. But the first class, the simple or primary objects, can only be perceived by sense and named: they cannot be analysed, defined, or known. You can only predicate about them that they are like such and such other things: _e.g., silver_, you cannot say what it is in itself, but only that it is like tin, or like something else. There may thus be a _ratio_ and a definition of any compound object, whether it be an object of perception or of conception: because one of the component elements will serve as Matter or Subject of the proposition, and the other as Form or Predicate. But there can be no definition of any one of the component elements separately taken: because there is neither Matter nor Form to become the Subject and Predicate of a defining proposition."

[Footnote 137: Plato, Theætêt, pp. 201-202. Aristotel. Metaph. [Greek: Ê]. 1043, b. 22.]

This opinion, ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes, is not in harmony with the opinion ascribed by Aristotle to Antisthenes himself (_viz._, That no propositions, except identical propositions, were admissible): and we are led to suspect that the first opinion must have been understood or qualified by its author in some manner not now determinable. But the second opinion, drawing a marked logical distinction between simple and complex Objects, has some interest from the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle: both of whom select, for the example illustrating the opinion, the syllable as the compound made up of two or more letters which are its simple constituent elements.

[Remarks of Plato on this doctrine.]

Plato refutes the doctrine,[138] but in a manner not so much to prove its untruth, as to present it for a verbal incongruity. How can you properly say (he argues) that you _know_ the compound AB, when you know neither A nor B separately? Now it may be incongruous to restrict in this manner the use of the words _know--knowledge_: but the distinction between the two cases is not denied by Plato. Antisthenes said--"I feel a simple sensation (A or B) and can name it, but I do not _know_ it: I can affirm nothing about it in itself, or about its real essence. But the compound AB I do know, for I know its essence: I can affirm about it that _it is_ compounded of A and B, and this is its essence." Here is a real distinction: and Plato's argument amounts only to affirming that it is an incorrect use of words to call the compound _known_, when the component elements are not known. Unfortunately the refutation of Plato is not connected with any declaration of his own counter-doctrine, for Theætêtus ends in a result purely negative.

[Footnote 138: Plato, Theætêt. ut suprâ.]

[Side-note: Remarks of Aristotle upon the same.]

Aristotle, in his comment on the opinion of Antisthenes, makes us understand better what it really is:--"Respecting simple essences (A or B), I cannot tell what they really are: but I can tell what they are like or unlike, _i.e._, I can compare them with other essences, simple or compound. But respecting the compound AB, I can tell what it really is: its essence is, to be compounded of A and B. And this I call _knowing_ or _knowledge_."[139] The distinction here taken by Antisthenes (or by his followers) is both real and useful: Plato does not contest it: while Aristotle distinctly acknowledges it, only that among the simple items he ranks both Percepta and Concepta.

[Footnote 139: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. 1043, b. 24-32, with the Scholia, p. 774, b. Br.

Mr. J. S. Mill observes, Syst. of Logic, i. 5, 6, p. 116, ed. 9:--"There is still another exceptional case, in which, though the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but resemblance: the class being founded not on resemblance in any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say, they are alike in this, not alike in that but because we feel them to be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When therefore I say--The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation I feel is one of tightness--in both cases the attribute I affirm of the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance: simple likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had that name bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other concrete general names, are connotative: but they connote a mere resemblance. When predicated of any individual feelings, the information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings which we have been accustomed to call by the same name."]

[Side-note: Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia.]

Monimus a Syracusan, and Krates a Theban, with his wife Hipparchia,[140] were successors of Diogenes in the Cynic vein of philosophy: together with several others of less note. Both Monimus and Krates are said to have been persons of wealthy condition,[141] yet their minds were so powerfully affected by what they saw of Diogenes, that they followed his example, renounced their wealth, and threw themselves upon a life of poverty; with nothing beyond the wallet and the threadbare cloak, but with fearless independence of character, free censure of every one, and indifference to opinion. "I choose as my country" (said Krates) "poverty and low esteem, which fortune cannot assail: I am the fellow-citizen of Diogenes, whom the snares of envy cannot reach."[142] Krates is said to have admonished every one, whether they invited it or not: and to have gone unbidden from house to house for the purpose of exhortation. His persistence in this practice became so obtrusive that he obtained the title of "the Door-Opener".[143] This feature, common to several other Cynics, exhibits an approximation to the missionary character of Sokrates, as described by himself in the Platonic Apology: a feature not found in any of the other eminent heads of philosophy--neither in Plato nor in Aristotle, Zeno, or Epikurus.

[Footnote 140: Hipparchia was a native of Maroneia in Thrace; born in a considerable station, and belonging to an opulent family. She came to Athens with her brother Mêtroklês, and heard both Theophrastus and Kratês. Both she and her brother became impressed with the strongest admiration for Kratês: for his mode of life, as well as for his discourses and doctrine. Rejecting various wealthy suitors, she insisted upon becoming his wife, both against his will and against the will of her parents. Her resolute enthusiasm overcame the reluctance of both. She adopted fully his hard life, poor fare, and threadbare cloak. She passed her days in the same discourses and controversies, indifferent to the taunts which were addressed to her for having relinquished the feminine occupations of spinning and weaving. Diogenes Laertius found many striking dicta or replies ascribed to her ([Greek: a)/lla muri/a tê=s philoso/phou] vi. 96-98). He gives an allusion made to her by the contemporary comic poet Menander, who (as I before observed) handled the Cynics of his time as Aristophanes, Eupolis, &c., had handled Sokrates--

[Greek: Sumperipatê/seis ga\r tri/bôn' e)/chous e)moi\, ô(/sper Kra/têti tô=| Kunikô=| poth' ê( gunê\. Kai\ thugate/r' e)xe/dôk' e)kei=nos, ô(s e)/phê au)to\s, e)pi\ peira=| dou\s tria/konth' ê(me/ras]. (vi. 93.)]

[Footnote 141: Diog, L. vi. 82-88. [Greek: Mo/nimos o( Ku/ôn], Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-88.

About Krates, Plutarch, De Vit. Aere Alieno, 7, p. 831 F.]

[Footnote 142: Diog. L. vi. 93. [Greek: e)/chein de\ patri/da a)doxi/an te kai\ peni/an, a)na/lôta tê=| tu/chê|: kai\--Dioge/nous ei)=nai poli/tês a)nepibouleu/tou phtho/nô|]. The parody or verses of Krates, about his city of Pera (the Wallet), vi. 85, are very spirited--

[Greek: Pê/rê tis po/lis e)sti\ me/sô| e)ni\ oi)/nopi tu/phô|], &c.

Krates composed a collection of philosophical Epistles, which Diogenes pronounces to be excellent, and even to resemble greatly the style of Plato (vi. 98).]

[Footnote 143: Diog. L. vi. 86, [Greek: e)kalei=to de\ _thurepanoi/ktês_, dia\ to\ ei)s pa=san ei)sie/nai oi)ki/an kai\ nouthetei=n]. Compare Seneca, Epist. 29.]

[Side-note: Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus.]

Among other hearers of Krates, who carried on, and at the same time modified, the Cynic discipline, we have to mention Zeno, of Kitium in Cyprus, who became celebrated as the founder of the Stoic sect. In him the Cynic, Megaric, and Herakleitean tendencies may be said to have partially converged, though with considerable modifications:[144] the ascetic doctrines (without the ascetic practices or obtrusive forwardness) of the Cynics--and the logical subtleties of the others. He blended them, however, with much of new positive theory, both physical and cosmological. His compositions were voluminous; and those of the Stoic Chrysippus, after him, were still more numerous. The negative and oppugning function, which in the fourth century B.C. had been directed by the Megarics against Aristotle, was in the third century B.C. transferred to the Platonists, or Academy represented by Arkesilaus: whose formidable dialectic was brought to bear upon the Stoic and Epikurean schools--both of them positive, though greatly opposed to each other.

[Footnote 144: Numenius ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 5.]

* * * * *

ARISTIPPUS.

Along with Antisthenes, among the hearers and companions of Sokrates, stood another Greek of very opposite dispositions, yet equally marked and original--Aristippus of Kyrênê. The stimulus of the Sokratic method, and the novelty of the topics on which it was brought to bear, operated forcibly upon both, prompting each of them to theorise in his own way on the best plan of life.

[Side-note: Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine.]

Aristippus, a Kyrenean of easy circumstances, having heard of the powerful ascendancy exercised by Sokrates over youth, came to Athens for the express purpose of seeing him, and took warm interest in his conversation.[145] He set great value upon mental cultivation and accomplishments; but his habits of life were inactive, easy, and luxurious. Upon this last count, one of the most interesting chapters in the Xenophontic Memorabilia reports an interrogative lecture addressed to him by Sokrates, in the form of dialogue.[146]

[Footnote 145: Plutarch (De Curiositate, p. 516 A) says that Aristippus informed himself, at the Olympic games, from Ischomachus respecting the influence of Sokrates.]

[Footnote 146: See the first chapter of the Second Book of the Memorabilia.

I give an abstract of the principal points in the dialogue, not a literal translation.]

[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus.]

Sokrates points out to Aristippus that mankind may be distributed into two classes: 1. Those who have trained themselves to habits of courage, energy, bodily strength, and command over their desires and appetites, together with practice in the actual work of life:--these are the men who become qualified to rule, and who do actually rule. 2. The rest of mankind, inferior in these points, who have no choice but to obey, and who do obey.[147]--Men of the first or ruling class possess all the advantages of life: they perform great exploits, and enjoy a full measure of delight and happiness, so far as human circumstances admit. Men of the second class are no better than slaves, always liable to suffer, and often actually suffering, ill-treatment and spoliation of the worst kind. To which of these classes (Sokrates asks Aristippus) do you calculate on belonging--and for which do you seek to qualify yourself?--To neither of them (replies Aristippus). I do not wish to share the lot of the subordinate multitude: but I have no relish for a life of command, with all the fatigues, hardships, perils, &c., which are inseparable from it. I prefer a middle course: I wish neither to rule, nor to be ruled, but to be a freeman: and I consider freedom as the best guarantee for happiness.[148] I desire only to pass through life as easily and pleasantly as possible.[149]--Which of the two do you consider to live most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? asks Sokrates.--I do not rank myself with either (says Aristippus): nor do I enter into active duties of citizenship anywhere: I pass from one city to another, but everywhere as a stranger or non-citizen.--Your scheme is impracticable (says Sokrates). You cannot obtain security in the way that you propose. You will find yourself suffering wrong and distress along with the subordinates[150]--and even worse than the subordinates: for a stranger, wherever he goes, is less befriended and more exposed to injury than the native citizens. You will be sold into slavery, though you are fit for no sort of work: and your master will chastise you until you become fit for work.--But (replies Aristippus) this very art of ruling, which you consider to be happiness,[151] is itself a hard life, a toilsome slavery, not only stripped of enjoyment, but full of privation and suffering. A man must be a fool to embrace such discomforts of his own accord.--It is that very circumstance (says Sokrates), that he does embrace them of his own accord--which renders them endurable, and associates them with feelings of pride and dignity. They are the price paid beforehand, for a rich reward to come. He who goes through labour and self-denial, for the purpose of gaining good friends or subduing enemies, and for the purpose of acquiring both mental and bodily power, so that he may manage his own concerns well and may benefit both his friends and his country--such a man will be sure to find his course of labour pleasurable. He will pass his life in cheerful[152] satisfaction, not only enjoying his own esteem and admiration, but also extolled and envied by others. On the contrary, whoever passes his earlier years in immediate pleasures and indolent ease, will acquire no lasting benefit either in mind or body. He will have a soft lot at first, but his future will be hard and dreary.[153]

[Footnote 147: Xen. Memor. ii. 1, 1 seq. [Greek: to\n me\n o(/pôs i(kano\s e)/stai a)/rchein, to\n de\ o(/pôs mê/d' a)ntipoiê/setai a)rchê=s--tou\s a)rchikou/s.]]

[Footnote 148: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 11. [Greek: a)ll' ei)=nai ti/s moi dokei= me/sê tou/tôn o(do/s, ê)\n peirô=mai badi/zein, ou)/te di' a)rchê=s, ou)/te dia\ doulei/as, a)lla\ di' e)leutheri/as, ê)/per ma/lista pro\s eu)daimoni/an a)/gei.]]

[Footnote 149: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9. [Greek: e)mauton toi/nun ta/ttô ei)s tou\s boulome/nous ê)=| r(a=|sta kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]]

[Footnote 150: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 12. [Greek: ei) me/ntoi e)n a)nthrô/pois ô)\n mê/te a)/rchein a)xiô/seis mê/te a)/rchesthai, mê/te tou\s a)/rchontas e(kô\n therapeu/seis, oi)=mai/ se o(ra=|n ô(s e)pi/stantai oi( krei/ttones tou\s ê(/ttonas kai\ koinê=| kai\ i)di/a| klai/ontas kathi/santes, ô(s dou/lois chrê=sthai].

What follows is yet more emphatic, about the unjust oppression of rulers, and the suffering on the part of subjects.]

[Footnote 151: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 17. [Greek: A)lla\ ga\r, ô)= Sô/krates, oi( ei)s tê\n basilikê\n te/chnên paideuo/menoi, ê)\n dokei=s moi su\ nomi/zein eu)daimoni/an ei)=nai].

Compare Memor. ii. 3, 4.]

[Footnote 152: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 19. [Greek: pô=s ou)k oi)/esthai chrê\ tou/tous kai\ ponei=n ê(de/ôs ei)s ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ zê=n eu)phronome/nous, a)game/nous me\n e(autou\s, e)painoume/nous de\ kai\ zêloume/nous u(po\ tô=n a)/llôn?]

[Footnote 153: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 20, cited from Epicharmus:--

[Greek: mê\ ta\ malaka\ mô/eo, mê\ ta\ sklê/r' e)/chê|s.]]

[Side-note: Choice of Hêraklês.]

Sokrates enforces his lecture by reciting to Aristippus the memorable lecture or apologue, which the Sophist Prodikus was then delivering in lofty diction to numerous auditors[154]--the fable still known as the Choice of Hêraklês. Virtue and Pleasure (the latter of the two being here identified with Evil or Vice) are introduced as competing for the direction of the youthful Hêraklês. Each sets forth her case, in dramatic antithesis. Pleasure is introduced as representing altogether the gratification of the corporeal appetites and the love of repose: while Virtue replies by saying, that if youth be employed altogether in pursuing such delights, at the time when the appetites are most vigorous--the result will be nothing but fatal disappointment, accompanied with entire loss of the different and superior pleasures available in mature years and in old age. Youth is the season of labour: the physical appetites must be indulged sparingly, and only at the call of actual want: accomplishments of body and mind must be acquired in that season, which will enable the mature man to perform in after life great and glorious exploits. He will thus realise the highest of all human delights--the love of his friends and the admiration of his countrymen--the sound of his own praises and the reflexion upon his own deserts. At the price of a youth passed in labour and self-denial, he will secure the fullest measure of mature and attainable happiness.

[Footnote 154: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21-34. [Greek: e)n tô=| suggra/mmati tô=| peri\ Ê(rakle/ous, o(/per dê\ kai\ plei/stois e)pidei/knutai--megaleiote/rois r(ê/masin.]]

"It is worth your while, Aristippus" (says Sokrates, in concluding this lecture), "to bestow some reflexion on what is to happen in the latter portions of your life."

[Side-note: Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting Good and Evil.]

This dialogue (one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and probably reported by Xenophon from actual hearing) is valuable in reference not only to Aristippus, but also to Sokrates himself. Many recent historians of philosophy describe Sokrates and Plato as setting up an idea of Virtue or Good Absolute (_i.e._ having no essential reference to the happiness or security of the agent or of any one else) which they enforce--and an idea of Vice or Evil Absolute (_i.e._ having no essential reference to suffering or peril, or disappointment, either of the agent or of any one else) which they denounce and discommend and as thereby refuting the Sophists, who are said to have enforced Virtue and denounced Vice only relatively--_i.e._ in consequence of the bearing of one and the other upon the security and happiness of the agent or of others. Whether there be any one doctrine or style of preaching which can be fairly ascribed to the Sophists as a class, I will not again discuss here: but I believe that the most eminent among them, Protagoras and Prodikus, held the language here ascribed to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that upon this point Sokrates was their opponent. The Xenophontic Sokrates (a portrait more resembling reality than the Platonic) always holds this same language: the Platonic Sokrates not always, yet often. In the dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, as well as in the apologue of Prodikus, we see that the devotion of the season of youth to indulgence and inactive gratification of appetite, is blamed as productive of ruinous consequences--as entailing loss of future pleasures, together with a state of weakness which leaves no protection against future suffering; while great care is taken to show, that though laborious exercise is demanded during youth, such labour will be fully requited by the increased pleasures and happiness of after life. The pleasure of being praised, and the pleasure of seeing good deeds performed by one's self, are especially insisted on. On this point both Sokrates and Prodikus concur.[155]

[Footnote 155: Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, 31. [Greek: tou= de\ pa/ntôn ê(di/stou a)kou/smatos, e)pai/nou seautê=s, a)nê/koos ei)=, kai\ tou= pa/ntôn ê(distou thea/matos a)the/atos; ou)de\n ga\r pô/pote seautê=s e)/rgon kalo\n tethe/asai. . . .

ta\ me\n ê(de/a e)n tê=| veo/têti diadramo/ntes, ta\ de\ chalepa\ e)s to\ gê=ras a)pothe/menoi.]]

[Side-note: Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates.]

If again we compare the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates, we shall find that the lecture of the former to Aristippus coincides sufficiently with the theory laid down by the latter in the dialogue Protagoras; to which theory the Sophist Protagoras is represented as yielding a reluctant adhesion. But we shall find also that it differs materially from the doctrine maintained by Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias. Nay, if we follow the argument addressed by the Xenophontic Sokrates to Aristippus, we perceive that it is in substance similar to that which the Platonic dialogue Gorgias puts in the mouth of the rhetor Pôlus and the politician Kalliklês. The Xenophontic Sokrates distributes men into two classes--the rulers and the ruled: the former strong, well-armed, and well-trained, who enjoy life at the expense of the submission and suffering of the latter: the former committing injustice, the latter enduring injustice. He impresses upon Aristippus the misery of being confounded with the suffering many, and exhorts him to qualify himself by a laborious apprenticeship for enrolment among the ruling few. If we read the Platonic Gorgias, we shall see that this is the same strain in which Pôlus and Kalliklês address Sokrates, when they invite him to exchange philosophy for rhetoric, and to qualify himself for active political life. "Unless you acquire these accomplishments, you will be helpless and defenceless against injury and insult from others: while, if you acquire them, you will raise yourself to political influence, and will exercise power over others, thus obtaining the fullest measure of enjoyment which life affords: see the splendid position to which the Macedonian usurper Archelaus has recently exalted himself.[156] Philosophy is useful, when studied in youth for a short time as preface to professional and political apprenticeship: but if a man perseveres in it and makes it the occupation of life, he will not only be useless to others, but unable to protect himself; he will be exposed to suffer any injustice which the well-trained and powerful men may put upon him." To these exhortations of Pôlus and Kalliklês Sokrates replies by admitting their case as true matter of fact. "I know that I am exposed to such insults and injuries: but my life is just and innocent. If I suffer, I shall suffer wrong: and those who do the wrong will thereby inflict upon themselves a greater mischief than they inflict upon me. Doing wrong is worse for the agent than suffering wrong."[157]

[Footnote 156: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 466-470-486.]

[Footnote 157: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 508-509-521-527 C. [Greek: kai\ e)/aso/n tina sou= kataphronê=sai ô(s a)noê/tou, kai\ propêlaki/sai e)a\n bou/lêtai, kai\ nai\ ma\ Di/a su/ ge thar)r(ô=n pata/xai tê\n a)/timon tau/tên plêgê/n; ou)de\n ga\r deino\n pei/sei, e)a\n tô=| o)/nti ê(=|s kalo\s ka)gatho/s, a)skô=n a)retê/n.]]

[Side-note: Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kallikes in Platonic Gorgias.]

There is indeed this difference between the Xenophontic Sokrates in his address to Aristippus, and the Platonic Kalliklês in his exhortation to Sokrates: That whereas Kalliklês proclaims and even vindicates it as natural justice and right, that the strong should gratify their desires by oppressing and despoiling the weak--the Xenophontic Sokrates merely asserts such oppression as an actual fact, notorious and undeniable,[158] without either approving or blaming it. Plato, constructing an imaginary conversation with the purpose that Sokrates shall be victorious, contrives intentionally and with dramatic consistency that the argument of Kalliklês shall be advanced in terms so invidious and revolting that no one else would be bold enough to speak it out:[159] which contrivance was the more necessary, as Sokrates is made not only to disparage the poets, rhetors, and most illustrious statesmen of historical Athens, but to sustain a thesis in which he admits himself to stand alone, opposed to aristocrats as well as democrats.[160] Yet though there is this material difference in the manner of handling, the plan of life which the Xenophontic Sokrates urges upon Aristippus, and the grounds upon which he enforces it, are really the same as those which Kalliklês in the Platonic Gorgias urges upon Sokrates. "Labour to qualify yourself for active political power"--is the lesson addressed in the one case to a wealthy man who passed his life in ease and indulgence, in the other case to a poor man who devoted himself to speculative debate on general questions, and to cross-examination of every one who would listen and answer. The man of indulgence, and the man of speculation,[161] were both of them equally destitute of those active energies which were necessary to confer power over others, or even security against oppression by others.

[Footnote 158: If we read the conversation alleged by Thucydides (v. 94-105-112) to have taken place between the Athenian generals and the executive council of Melos, just before the siege of that island by the Athenians, we shall see that this same language is held by the Athenians. "You, the Melians, being much weaker, must submit to us who are much stronger; this is the universal law and necessity of nature, which we are not the first to introduce, but only follow out, as others have done before us, and will do after us. Submit--or it will be worse for you. No middle course, or neutrality, is open to you."]

[Footnote 159: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-487-492.]

[Footnote 160: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 472-521.]

[Footnote 161: If we read the treatise of Plutarch, [Greek: Peri\ Stôi/kôn e)nantiôma/tôn] (c. 2-3, p. 1033 C-D), we shall see that the Stoic writers, Zeno, Kleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, all of them earnestly recommended a life of active citizenship and laborious political duty, as incumbent upon philosophers not less than upon others; and that they treated with contempt a life of literary leisure and speculation. Chrysippus explicitly declared [Greek: ou)de\n diaphe/rein to\n scholastiko\n bi/on tou= ê(donikou=] _i. e._ that the speculative philosopher who kept aloof from political activity, was in substance a follower of Epikurus. Tacitus holds much the same language (Hist. iv. 5) when he says about Helvidius Priscus:--"ingenium illustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit: non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret," &c.

The contradiction which Plutarch notes is, that these very Stoic philosophers (Chrysippus and the others) who affected to despise all modes of life except active civic duty--were themselves, all, men of literary leisure, spending their lives away from their native cities, in writing and talking philosophy. The same might have been said about Sokrates and Plato (except as to leaving their native cities), both of whom incurred the same reproach for inactivity as Sokrates here addresses to Aristippus.]

[Side-note: Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life.]

In the Xenophontic dialogue, Aristippus replies to Sokrates that the apprenticeship enjoined upon him is too laborious, and that the exercise of power, itself laborious, has no charm for him. He desires a middle course, neither to oppress nor to be oppressed: neither to command, nor to be commanded--like Otanes among the seven Persian conspirators.[162] He keeps clear of political obligation, and seeks to follow, as much as he can, his own individual judgment. Though Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue, is made to declare this middle course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias aspires to:--moreover the same as what the real Sokrates at Athens both pursued as far as he could, and declared to be the only course consistent with his security.[163] The Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias declares emphatically that no man can hope to take active part in the government of a country, unless he be heartily identified in spirit with the ethical and political system of the country: unless he not merely professes, but actually and sincerely shares, the creed, doctrines, tastes, and modes of appreciation prevalent among the citizens.[164] Whoever is deficient in this indispensable condition, must be content "to mind his own business and to abstain from active meddling with public affairs". This is the course which the Platonic Sokrates claims both for himself and for the philosopher generally:[165] it is also the course which Aristippus chooses for himself, under the different title of a middle way between the extortion of the ruler and the suffering of the subordinate. And the argument of Sokrates that no middle way is possible--far from refuting Aristippus (as Xenophon says that it did)[166] is founded upon an incorrect assumption: had it been correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed.

[Footnote 162: Herodot. iii. 80-83.]

[Footnote 163: Plato, Apol. So. p. 32 A. [Greek: i)diôteu/ein, a)lla\ mê\ dêmosieu/ein].]

[Footnote 164: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 510-513. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n pot' e)sti\ te/chnê tê=s paraskeuê=s tou= mêde\n a)dikei=sthai ê)\ ô(s o)li/gista? ske/psai ei)/ soi dokei= ê(=|per e)moi/. e)moi\ me\n ga\r dokei= ê(/de; ê)\ au)to\n a)/rchein dei=n e)n tê=| po/lei ê)\ kai\ turannei=n, ê)\ tê=s u(parchou/sês politei/as e(tai=ron ei)=nai]. (This is exactly the language which Sokrates holds to Aristippus, Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1, 12.)

[Greek: o(\s a)\n o(moê/thês ô)\n, tau)ta pse/gôn kai\ e)painô=n, e)the/lê| a)/rchesthai kai\ u(pokei=sthai tô=| a)/rchonti--eu)thu\s e)k ne/ou e)thi/zein au(to\n toi=s au)toi=s chai/rein kai\ a)/chthesthai tô=| despo/tê|] (510 D). [Greek: ou) ga\r mimêtê\n dei= ei)=nai a)ll' au)tophuô=s o(/moion tou/tois] (513 B).]

[Footnote 165: Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C-D. (Compare Republic, vi. p. 496 D.) [Greek: a)ndro\s i)diô/tou ê)\ a)/llou tino/s, ma/lista me/n, e)/gôge/ phêmi, ô)= Kalli/kleis, philoso/phou ta\ au(tou= pra/xantos kai\ ou) polupragmonê/santos e)n tô=| bi/ô|--kai\ dê\ kai\ se\ a)ntiparakalô=] (Sokrates to Kalliklês) [Greek: e)pi\ tou=ton to\n bi/on]. Upon these words Routh remarks: "Respicitur inter hæc verba ad Calliclis orationem, quâ rerum civilium tractatio et [Greek: polupragmosu/nê] Socrati persuadentur,"--which is the same invitation as the Xenophontic Sokrates addresses to Aristippus. Again, in Plat. Republ. viii. pp. 549 C, 550 A, we read, that corruption of the virtuous character begins by invitations to the shy youth to depart from the quiet plan of life followed by a virtuous father (who is [Greek: ta\ e(autou= pra/ttei]) and to enter on a career of active political ambition. The youth is induced, by instigation of his mother and relatives without, to pass from [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê] to [Greek: philopragmosu/nê], which is described as a change for the worse. Even in Xenophon (Memor. iii. 11, 16) Sokrates recognises and jests upon his own [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê].]

[Footnote 166: Xen. Mem. iii. 8, 1. Diogenes L. says (and it is probable enough, from radical difference of character) that Xenophon was adversely disposed to Aristippus. In respect to other persons also, Xenophon puts invidious constructions (for which at any rate no ground is shown) upon their purposes in questioning Sokrates: thus, in the dialogue (i. 6) with the Sophist Antiphon, he says that Antiphon questioned Sokrates in order to seduce him away from his companions (Mem. i. 6, 1).]

[Side-note: Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the character of the hearer.]

The real Sokrates, since he talked incessantly and with every one, must of course have known how to diversify his conversation and adapt it to each listener. Xenophon not only attests this generally,[167] but has preserved the proofs of it in his Memorabilia--real conversations, reported though doubtless dressed up by himself. The conversations which he has preserved relate chiefly to piety and to the duties and proceedings of active life: and to the necessity of controuling the appetites: these he selected partly because they suited his proclaimed purpose of replying to the topics of indictment, partly because they were in harmony with his own _idéal_. Xenophon was a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus--warriors, horsemen, hunters, husbandmen, always engaged in active competition for power, glory, or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue, or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence, even though accompanied by mental and speculative activity--"homines ignavâ operâ et philosophiâ sententiâ"--he had no respect. It was on this side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be, and probably really was, the most defective. Sokrates employed the arguments the most likely to call forth within him habits of action--to render him [Greek: praktikô/teron].[168] In talking with the presumptuous youth Glaukon, and with the diffident Charmides,[169] Sokrates used language adapted to correct the respective infirmities of each. In addressing Kritias and Alkibiades, he would consider it necessary not only to inculcate self-denial as to appetite, but to repress an exorbitance of ambition.[170] But in dealing with Aristippus, while insisting upon command of appetite and acquirement of active energy, he at the same time endeavours to kindle ambition, and the love of command: he even goes so far as to deny the possibility of a middle course, and to maintain (what Kritias and Alkibiades[171] would have cordially approved) that there was no alternative open, except between the position of the oppressive governors and that of the suffering subjects. Addressed to Aristippus, these topics were likely to thrust forcibly upon his attention the danger of continued indulgences during the earlier years of life, and the necessity, in view to his own future security, for training in habits of vigour, courage, self-command, endurance.

[Footnote 167: Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2-3.]

[Footnote 168: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 1. [Greek: ô(s de\ kai\ praktikôte/rous e)poi/ei tou\s suno/ntas au)tô=|, nu=n au)= tou=to le/xô.]]

[Footnote 169: Xenoph. Mem. iii. capp. 6 and 7.]

[Footnote 170: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 15-18-24. Respecting the different tone and arguments employed by Sokrates, in his conversations with different persons, see a good passage in the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n tetta/rôn], p. 161, Dindorf.]

[Footnote 171: We see from the first two chapters of the Memorabilia of Xenophon (as well as from the subsequent intimation of Æschines, in the oration against Timarchus, p. 173) how much stress was laid by the accusers of Sokrates on the fact that he had educated Kritias and Alkibiades; and how the accusers alleged that his teaching tended to encourage the like exorbitant aspirations in others, dangerous to established authority, traditional, legal, parental, divine. I do not doubt (what Xenophon affirms) that Sokrates, when he conversed with Kritias and Alkibiades, held a very opposite language. But it was otherwise when he talked with men of ease and indulgence without ambition, such as Aristippus. If Melêtus and Anytus could have put in evidence the conversation of Sokrates with Aristippus, many points of it would have strengthened their case against Sokrates before the Dikasts. We read in Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 58) how the point was made to tell, that Sokrates often cited and commented on the passage of the Iliad (ii. 188) in which the Grecian chiefs, retiring from the agora to their ships, are described as being respectfully addressed by Odysseus--while the common soldiers are scolded and beaten by him, for the very same conduct: the relation which Sokrates here dwells on as subsisting between [Greek: oi( a)rchikoi\] and [Greek: oi( a)rcho/menoi], would favour the like colouring.]

[Side-note: Conversations between Sokrates and Aristippus about the Good and Beautiful.]

Xenophon notices briefly two other colloquies between Sokrates and Aristippus. The latter asked Sokrates, "Do you know anything good?" in order (says Xenophon) that if Sokrates answered in the affirmative and gave as examples, health, wealth, strength, courage, bread, &c., he (Aristippus) might show circumstances in which this same particular was evil; and might thus catch Sokrates in a contradiction, as Sokrates had caught him before.[172] But Sokrates (says Xenophon) far from seeking to fence with the question, retorted it in such a way as to baffle the questioner, and at the same time to improve and instruct the by-standers.[173] "Do you ask me if I know anything good for a fever?--No. Or for ophthalmic distemper?-No. Or for hunger?--No. Oh! then, if you mean to ask me, whether I know anything good, which is good for nothing--I reply that I neither know any such thing, nor care to know it."

[Footnote 172: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by Aristippus--'captiosas Aristippi quæstiunculas". Such a criticism is preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually examining and questioning others in the same manner. See in particular his cross-examination of Euthydêmus, reported by Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2; and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.]

[Footnote 173: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. [Greek: boulo/menos tou\s suno/ntas ô(phelei=n.]]