Chapter III (3)

[Footnote 72: Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy, ii. 8, 11. "That is said to be at rest which, during any time, is in one place; and that to be moved, or to have been moved, which whether it be now at rest or moved, was formerly in another place from that which it is now in. From which definition it may be inferred, first, that whatsoever is moved _has been_ moved: for if it still be in the same place in which it was formerly, it is at rest: but if it be in another place, it _has been_ moved, by the definition of moved. Secondly, that what _is_ moved, _will yet_ be moved: for that which is moved, leaveth the place where it is, and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that whatsoever is moved, is not in one place during any time, how little soever that may be: for by the definition of rest, that which is in one place during any time, is at rest. . . . From what is above demonstrated--namely, that whatsoever _is_ moved, _has also been_ moved, and _will be_ moved: this also may be collected, That there can be no conception of motion without conceiving past and future time."]

[Footnote 73: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 91-97-112-116.]

[Footnote 74: See this point touched by Plato in Philêbus, p. 43 B.]

[Footnote 75: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. 113. [Greek: ki/nêsis kat' ei)likri/neian . . . ki/nêsis kat' e)pikra/teian]. Compare Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griech. ii. p. 191, ed. 2nd.]

[Footnote 76: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 346-348.]

[Side-note: Stilpon of Megara--His great celebrity.]

That Diodorus was a person seriously anxious to solve logical difficulties, as well as to propose them, would be incontestably proved if we could believe the story recounted of him--that he hanged himself because he could not solve a problem proposed by Stilpon in the presence of Ptolemy Soter.[77] But this story probably grew out of the fact, that Stilpon succeeded Diodorus at Megara, and eclipsed him in reputation. The celebrity of Stilpon, both at Megara and at Athens (between 320-300 B.C., but his exact date can hardly be settled), was equal, if not superior, to that of any contemporary philosopher. He was visited by listeners from all parts of Greece, and he drew away pupils from the most renowned teachers of the day; from Theophrastus as well as the others.[78] He was no less remarkable for fertility of invention than for neatness of expression. Two persons, who came for the purpose of refuting him, are said to have remained with him as admirers and scholars. All Greece seemed as it were looking towards him, and inclining towards the Megaric doctrines.[79] He was much esteemed both by Ptolemy Soter and by Demetrius Poliorkêtes, though he refused the presents and invitations of both: and there is reason to believe that his reputation in his own day must have equalled that of either Plato or Aristotle in theirs. He was formidable in disputation; but the nine dialogues which he composed and published are characterised by Diogenes as cold.[80]

[Footnote 77: Diog. L. ii. 112.]

[Footnote 78: This is asserted by Diogenes upon the authority of [Greek: Phi/lippos o( Megriko/s], whom he cites [Greek: kata\ le/xin]. We do not know anything about Philippus.

Menedêmus, who spoke with contempt of the other philosophers, even of Plato and Xenokrates, admired Stilpon (Diog. L. ii. 134).]

[Footnote 79: The phrase of Diogenes is here singular, and must probably have been borrowed from a partisan--[Greek: ô(/ste mikrou= deê=sai pa=san tê\n E(lla/da a)phorô=san ei)s au)to\n megari/sai]. Stilpon [Greek: eu(resilogi/a| kai\ sophistei/a| proê=ge tou\s a)/llous--kompso/tatos] (Diog. L. ii. 113-115).]

[Footnote 80: Diog. L. ii. 119-120. [Greek: psuchroi/].]

[Side-note: Menedêmus and the Eretriacs.]

Contemporary with Stilpon (or perhaps somewhat later) was Menedêmus of Eretria, whose philosophic parentage is traced to Phædon. The name of Phædon has been immortalised, not by his own works, but by the splendid dialogue of which Plato has made him the reciter. He is said (though I doubt the fact) to have been a native of Elis. He was of good parentage, a youthful companion of Sokrates in the last years of his life.[81] After the death of Sokrates, Phædon went to Elis, composed some dialogues, and established a succession or sect of philosophers--Pleistanus, Anchipylus, Moschus. Of this sect Menedêmus,[82] contemporary and hearer of Stilpon, became the most eminent representative, and from him it was denominated Eretriac instead of Eleian. The Eretriacs, as well as the Megarics, took up the negative arm of philosophy, and were eminent as puzzlers and controversialists.

[Footnote 81: The story given by Diogenes L. (ii. 31 and 106; compare Aulus Gellius, ii. 18) about Phædon's adventures antecedent to his friendship with Sokrates, is unintelligible to me. "Phædon was made captive along with his country (Elis), sold at Athens, and employed in a degrading capacity; until Sokrates induced Alkibiades or Kriton to pay his ransom." Now, no such event as the capture of Elis, and the sale of its Eupatrids as slaves, happened at that time: the war between Sparta and Elis (described by Xenophon, Hell. iii. 2, 21 seq.) led to no such result, and was finished, moreover, after the death of Sokrates. Alkibiades had been long in exile. If, in the text of Diogenes, where we now read [Greek: Phai/dôn, _Ê(/leios_, tô=n eu)patridô=n]--we were allowed to substitute [Greek: Phai/dôn, _Mê/lios_, tô=n eu)patridô=n]--the narrative would be rendered consistent with known historical facts. The Athenians captured the island of Melos in 415 B.C., put to death the Melians of military age, and sold into slavery the younger males as well as the females (Thucyd. v. 116). If Phædon had been a Melian youth of good family, he would have been sold at Athens, and might have undergone the adventures narrated by Diogenes. We know that Alkibiades purchased a female Melian as slave (Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad.).]

[Footnote 82: Diog. L. ii. 105, 126 seq. There was a statue of Menedêmus in the ancient stadium of Eretria: Diogenes speaks as if it existed in his time, and as if he himself had seen it (ii. 132).]

[Side-note: Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus.]

But though this was the common character of the two, in a logical point of view, yet in Stilpon, as well as Menedêmus, other elements became blended with the logical. These persons combined, in part at least, the free censorial speech of Antisthenes with the subtlety of Eukleides. What we hear of Menedêmus is chiefly his bitter, stinging sarcasms, and clever repartees. He did not, like the Cynic Diogenes, live in contented poverty, but occupied a prominent place (seemingly under the patronage of Antigonus and Demetrius) in the government of his native city Eretria. Nevertheless he is hardly less celebrated than Diogenes for open speaking of his mind, and carelessness of giving offence to others.[83]

[Footnote 83: Diog. L. ii. 129-142.]

* * * * *

ANTISTHENES.

[Side-note: Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative Logic intermingled.]

Antisthenes, the originator of the Cynic succession of philosophers, was one of those who took up principally the ethical element of the Sokratic discoursing, which the Megarics left out or passed lightly over. He did not indeed altogether leave out the logical element: all his doctrines respecting it, as far as we hear of them, appear to have been on the negative side. But respecting ethics, he laid down affirmative propositions,[84] and delivered peremptory precepts. His aversion to pleasure, by which he chiefly meant sexual pleasure, was declared in the most emphatic language. He had therefore, in the negative logic, a point of community with Eukleides and the Megarics: so that the coalescence of the two successions, in Stilpon and Menedêmus, is a fact not difficult to explain.

[Footnote 84: Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. 20, p. 485, Potter. [Greek: e)gô\ d' a)pode/chomai to\n A)phrodi/tên le/gonta ka)\|n katatoxeu/saimi, ei) la/boimi], &c.

[Greek: Manei/ên ma=llon ê)\ ê)sthei/ên], Diog. L. vi. 3.]

The life of Sokrates being passed in conversing with a great variety of persons and characters, his discourses were of course multifarious, and his ethical influence operated in different ways. His mode of life, too, exercised a certain influence of its own.

[Side-note: He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and rigour.]

Antisthenes, and his disciple Diogenes, were in many respects closer approximations to Sokrates than either Plato or any other of the Sokratic companions. The extraordinary colloquial and cross-examining force was indeed a peculiar gift, which Sokrates bequeathed to none of them: but Antisthenes took up the Sokratic purpose of inculcating practical ethics not merely by word of mouth, but also by manner of life. He was not inferior to his master in contentment under poverty, in strength of will and endurance,[85] in acquired insensibility both to pain and pleasure, in disregard of opinion around him, and in fearless exercise of a self-imposed censorial mission. He learnt from Sokrates indifference to conventional restraints and social superiority, together with the duty of reducing wants to a minimum, and stifling all such as were above the lowest term of necessity. To this last point, Sokrates gave a religious colour, proclaiming that the Gods had no wants, and that those who had least came nearest to the Gods.[86] By Antisthenes, these qualities were exhibited in eminent measure; and by his disciple Diogenes they were still farther exaggerated. Epiktetus, a warm admirer of both, considers them as following up the mission from Zeus which Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) sets forth as his authority, to make men independent of the evils of life by purifying and disciplining the appreciation of good and evil in the mind of each individual.[87]

[Footnote 85: Cicero, de Orator. iii. 17, 62; Diog. L. vi. 2. [Greek: par' ou)=] (Sokrates) [Greek: kai\ to\ karteriko\n labô\n kai\ to\ a)pathe\s zêlô/sas katê=rxe prô=tos tou= kunismou=]: also vi. 15. The appellation of Cynics is said to have arisen from the practice of Antisthenes to frequent the gymnasium called [Greek: Kuno/sarges] (D. L. vi. 13), though other causes are also assigned for the denomination (Winckelmann, Antisth. Frag. pp. 8-10).]

[Footnote 86: Sokrates had said, [Greek: to\ mêdeno\s de/esthai, thei=on ei)=nai; to\ d' ô(s e)lachi/stôn, e)gguta/tô tou= thei/ou] (Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 10. Compare Apuleius, Apol. p. 25). Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 E. The same dictum is ascribed to Diogenes (Diog. L. vi. 105).]

[Footnote 87: Epiktetus, Dissert. iii. 1, 19-22, iii. 21-19, iii. 24-40-60-69. The whole of the twenty-second Dissertation, [Greek: Peri\ Kunismou=], is remarkable. He couples Sokrates with Diogenes more closely than with any one else.]

[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. He despised music, literature, and physics.]

Antisthenes declared virtue to be the End for men to aim at--and to be sufficient _per se_ for conferring happiness; but he also declared that virtue must be manifested in acts and character, not by words. Neither much discourse nor much learning was required for virtue; nothing else need be postulated except bodily strength like that of Sokrates.[88] He undervalued theory even in regard to Ethics: much more in regard to Nature (Physics) and to Logic: he also despised literary, geometrical, musical teaching, as distracting men's attention from the regulation of their own appreciative sentiment, and the adaptation of their own conduct to it. He maintained strenuously (what several Platonic dialogues call in question) that virtue both could be taught and must be taught: when once learnt, it was permanent, and could not be eradicated. He prescribed the simplest mode of life, the reduction of wants to a minimum, with perfect indifference to enjoyment, wealth, or power. The reward was, exemption from fear, anxiety, disappointments, and wants: together with the pride of approximation to the Gods.[89] Though Antisthenes thus despised both literature and theory, yet he had obtained a rhetorical education, and had even heard the rhetor Gorgias. He composed a large number of dialogues and other treatises, of which only the titles (very multifarious) are preserved to us.[90] One dialogue, entitled Sathon, was a coarse attack on Plato: several treated of Homer and of other poets, whose verses he seems to have allegorised. Some of his dialogues are also declared by Athenæus to contain slanderous abuse of Alkibiades and other leading Athenians. On the other hand, the dialogues are much commended by competent judges; and Theopompus even affirmed that much in the Platonic dialogues had been borrowed from those of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson.[91]

[Footnote 88: Diog. L. vi. 11.]

[Footnote 89: Diog. L. vi. 102-104.]

[Footnote 90: Diog. L. vi. 1, 15-18. The two remaining fragments--[Greek: Ai)/as, O)/dusseu\s] (Winckelmann, Antisth. Fragm. pp. 38-42)--cannot well be genuine, though Winckelmann seems to think them so.]

[Footnote 91: Athenæus, v. 220, xi. 508; Diog. L. iii. 24-35; Phrynichus ap. Photium, cod. 158; Epiktêtus, ii. 16-35. Antisthenes is placed in the same line with Kritias and Xenophon, as a Sokratic writer, by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Thucyd. Jud. p. 941. That there was standing reciprocal hostility between Antisthenes and Plato we can easily believe. Plato never names Antisthenes: and if the latter attacked Plato, it was under the name of Sathon. How far Plato in his dialogues intends to attack Antisthenes without naming him--is difficult to determine. Probably he does intend to designate Antisthenes as [Greek: ge/rôn o)psimathê/s], in Sophist. 251. Schleiermacher and other commentators think that he intends to attack Antisthenes in Philêbus, Theætêtus, Euthydêmus, &c. But this seems to me not certain. In Philêbus, p. 44, he can hardly include Antisthenes among the [Greek: ma/la deinoi\ peri\ phu/sin]. Antisthenes neglected the study of [Greek: phu/sis].]

[Side-note: Constant friendship of Antisthenes with Sokrates--Xenophontic Symposion.]

Antisthenes was among the most constant friends and followers of Sokrates, both in his serious and in his playful colloquies.[92] The Symposion of Xenophon describes both of them, in their hours of joviality. The picture drawn by an author, himself a friend and companion, exhibits Antisthenes (so far as we can interpret caricature and jocular inversion) as poor, self-denying, austere, repulsive, and disputatious--yet bold and free-spoken, careless of giving offence, and forcible in colloquial repartee.[93]

[Footnote 92: Xenophon, Memor. iii. 11, 17.]

[Footnote 93: Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 11, 17; Symposion, ii. 10, iv. 2-3-44. Plutarch (Quæst. Symp. ii. 1, 6, p. 632) and Diogenes Laertius (vi. 1, 15) appear to understand the description of Xenophon as ascribing to Antisthenes a winning and conciliatory manner. To me it conveys the opposite impression. We must recollect that the pleasantry of the Xenophontic Symposion (not very successful as pleasantry) is founded on the assumption, by each person, of qualities and pretensions the direct reverse of that which he has in reality--and on his professing to be proud of that which is a notorious disadvantage. Thus Sokrates pretends to possess great personal beauty, and even puts himself in competition with the handsome youth Kritobulus; he also prides himself on the accomplishments of a good [Greek: mastropo/s]. Antisthenes, quite indigent, boasts of his wealth; the neglected Hermogenes boasts of being powerfully friended. The passage, iv. 57, 61, which talks of the winning manners of Antisthenes, and his power of imparting popular accomplishments, is to be understood in this ironical and inverted sense.]

[Side-note: Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes--His Cynical perfection--striking effect which he produced.]

In all these qualities, however, Antisthenes was surpassed by his pupil and successor Diogenes of Sinôpê; whose ostentatious austerity of life, eccentric and fearless character, indifference to what was considered as decency, great acuteness and still greater power of expression, freedom of speech towards all and against all--constituted him the perfect type of the Cynical sect. Being the son of a money-agent at Sinôpê, he was banished with his father for fraudulently counterfeiting the coin of the city. On coming to Athens as an exile, he was captivated with the character of Antisthenes, who was at first unwilling to admit him, and was only induced to do so by his invincible importunity. Diogenes welcomed his banishment, with all its poverty and destitution, as having been the means of bringing him to Antisthenes,[94] and to a life of philosophy. It was Antisthenes (he said) who emancipated him from slavery, and made him a freeman. He was clothed in one coarse garment with double fold: he adopted the wallet (afterwards the symbol of cynicism) for his provisions, and is said to have been without any roof or lodging--dwelling sometimes in a tub near the Metroon, sometimes in one of the public porticoes or temples: he is also said to have satisfied all his wants in the open day. He here indulged unreservedly in that unbounded freedom of speech, which he looked upon as the greatest blessing of life. No man ever turned that blessing to greater account: the string of repartees, sarcasms, and stinging reproofs, which are attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius, is very long, but forms only a small proportion of those which that author had found recounted.[95] Plato described Diogenes as Sokrates running mad:[96] and when Diogenes, meeting some Sicilian guests at his house and treading upon his best carpet, exclaimed "I am treading on Plato's empty vanity and conceit," Plato rejoined "Yes, with a different vanity of your own ". The impression produced by Diogenes in conversation with others, was very powerfully felt both by young and old. Phokion, as well as Stilpon, were among his hearers.[97] In crossing the sea to Ægina, Diogenes was captured by pirates, taken to Krete, and there put up to auction as a slave: the herald asked him what sort of work he was fit for: whereupon Diogenes replied--To command men. At his own instance, a rich Corinthian named Xeniades bought him and transported him to Corinth. Diogenes is said to have assumed towards Xeniades the air of a master: Xeniades placed him at the head of his household, and made him preceptor of his sons. In both capacities Diogenes discharged his duty well.[98] As a slave well treated by his master, and allowed to enjoy great freedom of speech, he lived in greater comfort than he had ever enjoyed as a freeman: and we are not surprised that he declined the offers of friends to purchase his liberation. He died at Corinth in very old age: it is said, at ninety years old, and on the very same day on which Alexander the Great died at Babylon (B.C. 323). He was buried at the gate of Corinth leading to the Isthmus: a monument being erected to his honour, with a column of Parian marble crowned by the statue of a dog.[99]

[Footnote 94: Diog. L. vi. 2, 21-49; Plutarch Quæst. Sympos. ii. 1, 7; Epiktetus, iii. 22, 67, iv. 1, 114; Dion Chrysostom. Orat. viii.-ix.-x.

Plutarch quotes two lines from Diogenes respecting Antisthenes:--

[Greek: O(/s me r(a/kê t' ê)/mpische ka\xêna/gkase Ptôcho\n gene/sthai kai\ do/môn a)na/staton-- ou) ga\r a)\n o(moi/ôs pithano\s ê)=n le/gôn--O(/s me sopho\n kai\ au)ta/rkê kai\ maka/rion e)poi/êse].

The interpretation given of the passage by Plutarch is curious, but quite in the probable meaning of the author. However, it is not easy to reconcile with the fact of this extreme poverty another fact mentioned about Diogenes, that he asked fees from listeners, in one case as much as a mina (Diog. L. vi. 2, 67).]

[Footnote 95: Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 2, 69. [Greek: e)rôtêthei\s ti/ ka/lliston e)n a)nthrô/pois e)/phê--par)r(êsi/a]. Among the numerous lost works of Theophrastus (enumerated by Diogen. Laert. v. 43) one is [Greek: Tô=n Dioge/nous Sunagôgê\, a/], a remarkable evidence of the impression made by the sayings and proceedings of Diogenes upon his contemporaries. Compare Dion Chrysostom. Or. ix. (vol. i. 288 seq. Reiske) for the description of the conduct of Diogenes at the Isthmian festival, and the effect produced by it on spectators.

These smart sayings, of which so many are ascribed to Diogenes, and which he is said to have practised beforehand, and to have made occasions for--[Greek: o(/ti chrei/an ei)/ê memeletêkô/s] (Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 91, vii. 26)--were called by the later rhetors [Greek: Chrei=ai]. See Hermogenes and Theon, apud Walz, Rhetor. Græc. i. pp. 19-201; Quintilian, i. 9, 4.

Such collections of _Ana_ were ascribed to all the philosophers in greater or less number. Photius, in giving the list of books from which the Sophist Sopater collected extracts, indicates one as [Greek: Ta\ Dioge/nous tou= Kunikou= A)pophthe/gmata] (Codex 161).]

[Footnote 96: Diog. L. vi. 54: [Greek: Sôkra/tês maino/ menos]. vi. 26: [Greek: Oi( de\ phasi to\n Dioge/nên ei)pei=n, Patô= to\n Pla/tônos tu=phon; to\n de\ pha/nai, E(te/rô| ge tu/phô|, Dio/genes]. The term [Greek: tu=phos] ("vanity, self-conceit, assumption of knowing better than others, being puffed up by the praise of vulgar minds") seems to have been mach interchanged among the ancient philosophers, each of them charging it upon his opponents; while the opponents of philosophy generally imputed it to all philosophers alike. Pyrrho the Sceptic took credit for being the only [Greek: a)/tuphos]: and he is complimented as such by his panegyrist Timon in the Silli. Aristokles affirmed that Pyrrho had just as much [Greek: tu=phon] as the rest. Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 18.]

[Footnote 97: Diog. L. vi. 2, 75-76.]

[Footnote 98: Diog. L. vi. 2, 74. Xeniades was mentioned by Democritus: he is said to have been a sceptic (Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-53), at least he did not recognise any [Greek: kritê/rion].]

[Footnote 99: Diog. L. vi. 2, 77-78.

Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under the title of [Greek: o( Ku/ôn]. Aristotle cites from him a witty comparison under that designation, Rhetoric. iii. 10, 1410, a. 24. [Greek: kai\ o( Ku/ôn (e)ka/lei) ta\ kapêlei=a, ta\ A)ttika\ phidi/tia.]]

[Side-note: Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes--Contempt of pleasure--training and labour required--indifference to literature and geometry.]

In politics, ethics, and rules for human conduct, Diogenes adopted views of his own, and spoke them out freely. He was a freethinker (like Antisthenes) as to the popular religion: and he disapproved of marriage laws, considering that the intercourse of the sexes ought to be left to individual taste and preference.[100] Though he respected the city and conformed to its laws, yet he had no reverence for existing superstitions, or for the received usages as to person, sex, or family. He declared himself to be a citizen of the Kosmos and of Nature.[101] His sole exigency was, independence of life, and freedom of speech: having these, he was satisfied, fully sufficient to himself for happiness, and proud of his own superiority to human weakness. The main benefit which he derived from philosophy (he said) was, that he was prepared for any fortune that might befall him. To be ready to accept death easily, was the sure guarantee of a free and independent life.[102] He insisted emphatically upon the necessity of exercise or training ([Greek: a)/skêsis]) both as to the body and as to the mind. Without this, nothing could be done: by means of it everything might be achieved. But he required that the labours imposed should be directed to the acquisition of habits really useful; instead of being wasted, as they commonly were, upon objects frivolous and showy. The truly wise man ought to set before him as a model the laborious life of Hêraklês: and he would find, after proper practice and training, that the contempt of pleasures would afford him more enjoyment than the pleasures themselves.[103]

[Footnote 100: Diog. L. vi. 2, 72. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 13.]

[Footnote 101: Diog. L. vi. 2, 63-71. The like declaration is ascribed to Sokrates. Epiktêtus, i. 9, 1.]

[Footnote 102: Diog. L. vi. 2, 63, 72. [Greek: mêde\n e)leutheri/as prokri/nôn]. Epiktêtus, iv. 1, 30. [Greek: Ou(/tô kai\ Dioge/nês le/gei, mi/an ei)=nai mêchanê\n pro\s e)leutheri/an--to\ eu)ko/lôs a)pothnê/skein]. Compare iv. 7-28, i. 24, 6.]

[Footnote 103: Diog. L. vi. 2, 70-71. [Greek: kai\ ga\r au)tê\ tê=s ê(donê=s ê( kataphro/nêsis ê(duta/tê promeletêthei=sa, kai\ ô(/sper oi( sunethisthe/ntes ê(de/ôs zê=|n, a)êdô=s e)pi\ tou)nanti/on meti/asin, ou(/tô oi( tou)nanti/on a)skêthe/ntes ê(/dion au)tô=n tô=n ê(donô=n kataphronou=si]. See Lucian, Vitar. Auct. c. 9, about the hard life and the happiness of Diogenes. Compare s. 26 about the [Greek: tu=phos] of Diogenes treading down the different [Greek: tu=phos] of Plato, and Epiktêtus iii. 22, 57. Antisthenes, in his dialogue or discourse called [Greek: Ê(raklê=s], appears to have enforced the like appeal to that hero as an example to others. See Winckelmann, Fragm. Antisthen. pp. 15-18.]

[Side-note: Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency in acting out his own ethical creed.]

Diogenes declared that education was sobriety to the young, consolation to the old, wealth to the poor, ornament to the rich. But he despised much of what was commonly imparted as education--music, geometry, astronomy, &c.: and he treated with equal scorn Plato and Eukleides.[104] He is said however to have conducted the education of the sons of his master Xeniades[105] without material departure from the received usage. He caused them to undergo moderate exercise (not with a view to athletic success) in the palæstra, and afterwards to practise riding, shooting with the bow, hurling the javelin, slinging and hunting: he cultivated their memories assiduously, by recitations from poets and prose authors, and even from his own compositions: he kept them on bread and water, without tunic or shoes, with clothing only such as was strictly necessary, with hair closely cut, habitually silent, and fixing their eyes on the ground when they walked abroad. These latter features approximate to the training at Sparta (as described by Xenophon) which Diogenes declared to contrast with Athens as the apartments of the men with those of the women. Diogenes is said to have composed several dialogues and even some tragedies.[106] But his most impressive display (like that of Sokrates) was by way of colloquy--prompt and incisive interchange of remarks. He was one of the few philosophers who copied Sokrates in living constantly before the public--in talking with every one indiscriminately and fearlessly, in putting home questions like a physician to his patient.[107] Epiktêtus,--speaking of Diogenes as equal, if not superior, to Sokrates--draws a distinction pertinent and accurate. "To Sokrates" (says he) "Zeus assigned the elenchtic or cross-examining function: to Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising function: to Zeno (the Stoic) the didactic and dogmatical." While thus describing Diogenes justly enough, Epiktetus nevertheless insists upon his agreeable person and his extreme gentleness and good-nature:[108] qualities for which probably Diogenes neither took credit himself, nor received credit from his contemporaries. Diogenes seems to have really possessed--that which his teacher Antisthenes postulated as indispensable--the Sokratic physical strength and vigour. His ethical creed, obtained from Antisthenes, was adopted by many successors, and (in the main) by Zeno and the Stoics in the ensuing century. But the remarkable feature in Diogenes which attracts to him the admiration of Epiktêtus, is--that he set the example of acting out his creed, consistently and resolutely, in his manner of life:[109] an example followed by some of his immediate successors, but not by the Stoics, who confined themselves to writing and preaching. Contemporary both with Plato and Aristotle, Diogenes stands to both of them in much the same relation as Phokion to Demosthenes in politics and oratory: he exhibits strength of will, insensibility to applause as well as to reproach, and self-acting independence--in antithesis to their higher gifts and cultivation of intellect. He was undoubtedly, next to Sokrates, the most original and unparalleled manifestation of Hellenic philosophy.

[Footnote 104: Diog. L. vi. 2, 68-73-24-27.]

[Footnote 105: Diog. L. vi. 2, 30-31.]

[Footnote 106: Diog. L. vi. 2, 80. Diogenes Laertius himself cites a fact from one of the dialogues--Pordalus (vi. 2, 20): and Epiktêtus alludes to the treatise on Ethics by Diogenes--[Greek: e)n tê=| Ê)thikê=|]--ii. 20, 14. It appears however that the works ascribed to Diogenes were not admitted by all authors as genuine (Diog. L. c.).]

[Footnote 107: Dion Chrysost. Or. x.; De Servis, p. 295 E. Or. ix.; Isthmicus, p. 289 R. [Greek: ô(/sper i)atroi\ a)nakri/nousi tou\s a)sthenou=ntas, ou(/tôs Dioge/nês a)ne/krine to\n a)/nthrôpon], &c.]

[Footnote 108: Epiktêtus, iii. 21, 19. [Greek: ô(s Sôkra/tei sunebou/leue tê\n e)legktikê\n chô/ran e)/chein, ô(s Dioge/nei tê\n basilikê\n kai\ e)piplêktikê/n, ô(s Zê/nôni tê\n didaskalikê\n kai\ dogmatikê/n].

About [Greek: to\ ê(/meron kai\ phila/nthrôpon] of Diogenes, see Epiktêtus, iii. 24, 64; who also tells us (iv. 11, 19), professing to follow the statements of contemporaries, that the bodies both of Sokrates and Diogenes were by nature so sweet and agreeable ([Greek: e)pi/chari kai\ ê(du/]) as to dispense with the necessity of washing.

"Ego certé" (says Seneca, Epist. 108, 13-14, about the lectures of the eloquent Stoic Attalus) "cum Attalum audirem, in vitia, in errores, in mala vitæ perorantem, sæpé misertus sum generis humani, et illum sublimem altioremque humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse dicebat: sed plus quam regnare mihi videbatur, cui liceret censuram agere regnantium." See also his treatises De Beneficiis, v. 4-6, and De Tranquillitate Animi (c. 8), where, after lofty encomium on Diogenes, he exclaims--"Si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de Deorum immortalium statu, an parum beaté degant," &c.]

[Footnote 109: Cicero, in his Oration in defence of Murena (30-61-62) compliments Cato (the accuser) as one of the few persons who adopted the Stoic tenets with a view of acting them out, and who did really act them out--"Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato, autoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit: neque disputandi causa, ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi". Tacitus (Histor. iv. 5) pays the like compliment to Helvidius Priscus.

M. Gaston Boissier (Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de Varron, pp. 113-114, Paris, 1861) expresses an amount of surprise which I should not have expected, on the fact that persons adopted a philosophical creed for the purpose only of debating it and defending it, and not of acting it out. But he recognises the fact, in regard to Varro and his contemporaries, in terms not less applicable to the Athenian world: amidst such general practice, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, &c., stood out as memorable exceptions. "Il ne faut pas non plus oublier de quelle manière, et dans quel esprit, les Romains lettrés étudiaient la philosophie Grecque. Ils venaient écouter les plus habiles maîtres, connaître les sectes les plus célèbres: mais ils les étudiaient plutôt en curieux, qu'ils ne s'y attachaient en adeptes. On ne les voit guères approfondir un système et s'y tenir, adopter un ensemble de croyances, et y conformer leur conduite. On étudiait le plus souvent la philosophie pour discuter. C'était seulement une matière à des conversations savantes, un exercice et un aliment pour les esprits curieux. Voilà pourquoi la secte Académique étoit alors mieux accueillie que les autres," &c.]

[Side-note: Admiration excited by the asceticism of the Cynics--Asceticism extreme in the East--Comparison of the Indian Gymnosophists with Diogenes.]

Respecting Diogenes and the Cynic philosophers generally, we have to regard not merely their doctrines, but the effect produced by their severity of life. In this point Diogenes surpassed his master Antisthenes, whose life he criticised as not fully realising the lofty spirit of his doctrine. The spectacle of man not merely abstaining from enjoyment, but enduring with indifference hunger, thirst, heat, cold, poverty, privation, bodily torture, death, &c., exercises a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind. It calls forth strong feelings of reverence and admiration in the beholders: while in the sufferer himself also, self-reverence and self-admiration, the sense of power and exaltation above the measure of humanity, is largely developed. The extent to which self-inflicted hardships and pains have prevailed in various regions of the earth, the long-protracted and invincible resolution with which they have been endured, and the veneration which such practices have procured for the ascetics who submitted to them are among the most remarkable chapters in history.[110] The East, especially India, has always been, and still is, the country in which these voluntary endurances have reached their extreme pitch of severity; even surpassing those of the Christian monks in Egypt and Syria, during the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era.[111] When Alexander the Great first opened India to the observation of Greeks, one of the novelties which most surprised him and his followers was, the sight of the Gymnosophists or naked philosophers. These men were found lying on the ground, either totally uncovered or with nothing but a cloth round the loins; abstaining from all enjoyment, nourishing themselves upon a minimum of coarse vegetables or fruits, careless of the extreme heat of the plain, and the extreme cold of the mountain; and often superadding pain, fatigue, or prolonged and distressing uniformity of posture. They passed their time either in silent meditation or in discourse on religion and philosophy: they were venerated as well as consulted by every one, censuring even the most powerful persons in the land. Their fixed idea was to stand as examples to all, of endurance, insensibility, submission only to the indispensable necessities of nature, and freedom from all other fear or authority. They acted out the doctrine, which Plato so eloquently preaches under the name of Sokrates in the Phædon--That the whole life of the philosopher is a preparation for death: that life is worthless, and death an escape from it into a better state.[112] It is an interesting fact to learn that when Onesikritus (one of Alexander's officers, who had known and frequented the society of Diogenes in Greece), being despatched during the Macedonian march through India for the purpose of communicating with these Gymnosophists, saw their manner of life and conversed with them he immediately compared them with Diogenes, whom he had himself visited--as well as with Sokrates and Pythagoras, whom he knew by reputation. Onesikritus described to the Gymnosophists the manner of life of Diogenes: but Diogenes wore a threadbare mantle, and this appeared to them a mark of infirmity and imperfection. They remarked that Diogenes was right to a considerable extent; but wrong for obeying convention in preference to nature, and for being ashamed of going naked, as they did.[113]

[Footnote 110: Dion Chrysostom, viii. p. 275, Reiske.]

[Footnote 111: See the striking description in Gibbon, Decl. and Fall, ch. xxxvii. pp. 253-265.]

[Footnote 112: Strabo, xv. 713 A (probably from Onesikritus, see Geier, Fragment. Alexandr. Magn. Histor. p. 379). [Greek: Plei/stous d' au)toi=s ei)=nai lo/gous peri\ tou= thana/tou; nomi/zein ga\r dê\ to\n me\n e)ntha/de bi/on ô(s a)\n a)kmê\n kuome/nôn ei)=nai, to\n de\ tha/naton ge/nesin ei)s to\n o)/ntôs bi/on kai\ to\n eu)dai/mona toi=s philosophê/sasi; dio\ tê=| a)skê/sei plei/stê| chrê=sthai pro\s to\ e)toimotha/naton; a)gatho\n de\ ê)\ kako\n mêde\n ei)=nai tô=n sumbaino/ntôn a)nthrô/pois], &c.

This is an application of the doctrines laid down by the Platonic Sokrates in the Phædon, p. 64 A: [Greek: Kinduneu/ousi ga\r o(/soi tugcha/nousin o)rthô=s a)pto/menoi philosophi/as lelêthe/nai tou\s a)/llous, o(/ti ou)de\n a)/llo au)toi\ e)pitêdeu/ousin ê)\ a)pothnê/skein te kai\ tethna/nai]. Compare p. 67 D.; Cicero. Tusc. D. i. 30. Compare Epiktêtus, iv. i. 30 (cited in a former note) about Diogenes the Cynic. Also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 27; Valerius Maximus, iii. 3, 6; Diogen. L. Prooem. s. 6; Pliny, H. N. vii. 2.

Bohlen observes (Das Alte Indien, ch. ii. pp. 279-289), "It is a remarkable fact that Indian writings of the highest antiquity depict as already existing the same ascetic exercises as we see existing at present: they were even then known to the ancients, who were especially astonished at such fanaticism.]

[Footnote 113: Strabo gives a condensed summary of this report, made by Onesikritus respecting his conversation with the Indian Gymnosophist Mandanis, or Dandamis (Strabo, xv. p. 716 B):--[Greek: Tau=t' ei)po/nta e)xere/sthai] (Dandamis asked Onesikritus), [Greek: ei) kai\ e)n toi=s E(/llêsi lo/goi toiou=toi le/gointo. Ei)po/ntos d' (O)nêsikri/tou), o(/ti kai\ Puthago/ras toiau=ta le/goi, keleu/oi te e)mpsu/chôn a)pe/chesthai, kai\ Sôkra/tês, kai\ Dioge/nês, _ou(= kai\ au)to\s_] (Onesikritus) [Greek: _a)kroa/saito_, a)pokri/nasthai] (Dandamis), [Greek: o(/ti ta)/lla me\n nomi/zoi phroni/môs au)toi=s dokei=n, e(\n d' a(marta/nein--no/mon pro\ tê=s phu/seôs titheme/nous; ou) ga\r a)\n ai)schu/nesthai gumnou/s, ô(/sper au)to/n, dia/gein, a)po\ litô=n zô=ntas; kai\ ga\r oi)ki/an a)ri/stên ei)=nai, ê)/tis a)\n e)piskeuê=s e)lachi/stês de/êtai].

About Onesikritus, Diog. Laert. vi. 75-84; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 65; Plutarch, De Fortuna Alexandri, p. 331.

The work of August Gladitsch (Einleitung in das Verständniss der Weltgeschichte, Posen, 1841) contains an instructive comparison between the Gymnosophists and the Cynics, as well as between the Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophers--between the Eleatic sect and the Hindoo philosophers. The points of analogy, both in doctrine and practice, are very numerous and strikingly brought out, pp. 356-377. I cannot, however, agree in his conclusion, that the doctrines and practice of Antisthenes were borrowed, not from Sokrates with exaggeration, but from the Parmenidean theory, and the Vedanta theory of the Ens Unum, leading to negation and contempt of the phenomenal world.]

[Side-note: The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were carried into fullest execution by the Cynics.]

These observations of the Indian Gymnosophist are a reproduction and an application in practice[114] of the memorable declaration of principle enunciated by Sokrates--"That the Gods had no wants: and that the man who had fewest wants, approximated most nearly to the Gods". This principle is first introduced into Grecian ethics by Sokrates: ascribed to him both by Xenophon and Plato, and seemingly approved by both. In his life, too, Sokrates carried the principle into effect, up to a certain point. Both admirers and opponents attest his poverty, hard fare, coarse clothing, endurance of cold and privation:[115] but he was a family man, with a wife and children to maintain, and he partook occasionally, of indulgences which made him fall short of his own ascetic principle. Plato and Xenophon--both of them well-born Athenians, in circumstances affluent, or at least easy, the latter being a knight, and even highly skilled in horses and horsemanship--contented themselves with preaching on the text, whenever they had to deal with an opponent more self-indulgent than themselves; but made no attempt to carry it into practice.[116] Zeno the Stoic laid down broad principles of self-denial and apathy: but in practice he was unable to conquer the sense of shame, as the Cynics did, and still more the Gymnosophists. Antisthenes, on the other hand, took to heart, both in word and act, the principle of Sokrates: yet even he, as we know from the Xenophontic Symposion, was not altogether constant in rigorous austerity. His successors Diogenes and Krates attained the maximum of perfection ever displayed by the Cynics of free Greece. They stood forth as examples of endurance, abnegation--insensibility to shame and fear--free-spoken censure of others. Even they however were not so recognised by the Indian Gymnosophists; who, having reduced their wants, their fears, and their sensibilities, yet lower, had thus come nearer to that which they called the perfection of Nature, and which Sokrates called the close approach to divinity.[117] When Alexander the Great (in the first year of his reign and prior to any of his Asiatic conquests) visited Diogenes at Corinth, found him lying in the sun, and asked if there was anything which he wanted--Diogenes made the memorable reply--"Only that you and your guards should stand out of my sunshine". This reply doubtless manifests the self-satisfied independence of the philosopher. Yet it is far less impressive than the fearless reproof which the Indian Gymnosophists administered to Alexander, when they saw him in the Punjab at the head of his victorious army, after exploits, dangers, and fatigues almost superhuman, as conqueror of Persia and acknowledged son of Zeus.[118]

[Footnote 114: Onesikritus observes, respecting the Indian Gymnosophists, that "they were more striking in act than in discourse" ([Greek: e)n e)/rgois ga\r au)tou\s krei/ttous ê)\ lo/gois ei)=nai], Strabo, xv. 713 B); and this is true about the Cynic succession of philosophers, in Greece as well as in Rome. Diogenes Laertius (compare his prooem, s. 19, 20, and vi. 103) ranks the Cynic philosophy as a distinct [Greek: ai(/resis]: but he tells us that other writers (especially Hippobotus) would not reckon it as an [Greek: ai(/resis], but only as an [Greek: e)/nstasis bi/ou]--practice without theory.]

[Footnote 115: Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 2-5; Plato, Sympos. 219, 220.

The language of contemporary comic writers, Ameipsias, Eupolis, Aristophanes, &c., about Sokrates--is very much the same as that of Menander a century afterwards about Kratês. Sokrates is depicted as a Cynic in mode of life (Diogen. L. ii. 28; Aristophan. Nubes, 104-362-415).]

[Footnote 116: Zeno, though he received instructions from Kratês, was [Greek: a)/llôs me\n eu)/tonos pro\s tê\n philosophi/an, ai)dê/môn de\ ô(s pro\s tê\n kunikê\n a)naischunti/an] (Diog. L. vii. 3).

"Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicure quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere," &c. This is the distinction which Seneca draws between Stoic and Cynic (De Brevitat. Vitæ, 14, 5). His admiration for the "seminudus" Cynic Demetrius, his contemporary and companion, was extreme (Epist. 62, 2, and Epist. 20, 18).]

[Footnote 117: Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 10 (the passage is cited in a previous note). The Emperor Julian (Orat. vi. p. 192 Spanh.) says about the Cynics--[Greek: a)pa/theian ga\r poiou=ntai to\ te/los, tou=to de\ i)/son e)sti\ tô=| theo\n gene/sthai]. Dion Chrysostom (Or. vi. p. 208) says also about Diogenes the Cynic--[Greek: kai\ ma/lista e)mimei=to tô=n theô=n to\n bi/on.]]

[Footnote 118: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 32, 92, and the Anabasis of Arrian, vii. 1-2-3, where both the reply of Diogenes and that of the Indian Gymnosophists are reported. Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. p. 145 seq. Reiske) gives a prolix dialogue between Alexander and Diogenes. His picture of the effect produced by Diogenes upon the different spectators at the Isthmian festival, is striking and probable.

Kalanus, one of the Indian Gymnosophists, was persuaded, by the instances of Alexander, to abandon his Indian mode of life and to come away with the Macedonian army--very much to the disgust of his brethren, who scornfully denounced him as infirm and even as the slave of appetite ([Greek: a)ko/laston], Strabo, xv. 718). He was treated with the greatest consideration and respect by Alexander and his officers; yet when the army came into Persis, he became sick of body and tired of life. He obtained the reluctant consent of Alexander to allow him to die. A funeral pile was erected, upon which he voluntarily burnt himself in presence of the whole army; who witnessed the scene with every demonstration of military honour. See the remarkable description in Arrian, Anab. vii. 3. Cicero calls him "Indus indoctus ac barbarus" (Tusc. Disp. ii. 22, 52); but the impression which he made on Alexander himself, Onesikritus, Lysimachus, and generally upon all who saw him, was that of respectful admiration (Strabo, xv. 715; Arrian, l. c.). One of these Indian sages, who had come into Syria along with the Indian envoys sent by an Indian king to the Roman Emperor Augustus, burnt himself publicly at Athens, with an exulting laugh when he leaped upon the funeral pile (Strabo, xv. 720 A)--[Greek: kata\ ta\ pa/tria tô=n I)ndô=n e)/thê].

The like act of self-immolation was performed by the Grecian Cynic Peregrinus Proteus, at the Olympic festival in the reign of Marcus Antoninus, 165 A.D. (See Clinton, Fasti Romani.) Lucian, who was present and saw the proceeding, has left an animated description of it, but ridicules it as a piece of silly vanity. Theagenes, the admiring disciple of Peregrinus, and other Cynics, who were present in considerable numbers--and also Lucian himself compare this act to that of the Indian Gymnosophists--[Greek: ou(=tos de\ ti/nos ai)ti/as e(/neken e)mba/llei phe/rôn e(auto\n ei)s to\ pu=r? nê\ Di/', o(/pôs tê\n karteri/an e)pidei/xêtai, katha/per oi( Brachma=nes] (Lucian, De Morte Peregrini, 25-39, &c.).]

[Side-note: Antithesis between Nature--and Law or Convention--insisted on by the Indian Gymnosophists.]

Another point, in the reply made by the Indian Gymnosophist to Onesikritus, deserves notice: I mean the antithesis between law (or convention) and nature ([Greek: no/mos--phu/sis])--the supremacy which he asserts for Nature over law--and the way in which he understands Nature and her supposed ordinances. This antithesis was often put forward and argued in the ancient Ethics: and it is commonly said, without any sufficient proof, that the Sophists (speaking of them collectively) recognised only the authority of law--while Sokrates and Plato had the merit of vindicating against them the superior authority of Nature. The Indian Gymnosophist agrees with the Athenian speaker in the Platonic treatise De Legibus, and with the Platonic Kallikles in the Gorgias, thus far--that he upholds the paramount authority of Nature. But of these three interpreters, each hears and reports the oracles of Nature differently from the other two: and there are many other dissenting interpreters besides.[119] Which of them are we to follow? And if, adopting any one of them, we reject the others, upon what grounds are we to justify our preference? When the Gymnosophist points out, that nakedness is the natural condition of man; when he farther infers, that because natural it is therefore right and that the wearing of clothes, being a departure from nature, is also a departure from right--how are we to prove to him that his interpretation of nature is the wrong one? These questions have received no answer in any of the Platonic dialogues: though we have seen that Plato is very bitter against those who dwell upon the antithesis between Law and Nature, and who undertake to decide between the two.

[Footnote 119: Though Seneca (De Brevitate Vit. 14) talks of the Stoics as "conquering Nature, and the Cynics as exceeding Nature," yet the Stoic Epiktêtus considers his morality as the only scheme conformable to Nature (Epiktêt. Diss. iv. 1, 121-128); while the Epikurean Lucretius claims the same conformity for the precepts of Epikurus.]

[Side-note: The Greek Cynics--an order of ascetic or mendicant friars.]

Reverting to the Cynics, we must declare them to be in one respect the most peculiar outgrowth of Grecian philosophy: because they are not merely a doctrinal sect, with phrases, theories, reasonings, and teachings, of their own--but still more prominently a body of practical ascetics, a mendicant order[120] in philosophy, working up the bystanders by exhibiting themselves as models of endurance and apathy. These peculiarities seem to have originated partly with Pythagoras, partly with Sokrates--for there is no known prior example of it in Grecian history, except that of the anomalous priests of Zeus at Dodona, called Selli, who lay on the ground with unwashed feet. The discipline of Lykurgus at Sparta included severe endurance; but then it was intended to form, and actually did form, good soldiers. The Cynics had no view to military action. They exaggerated the peculiarities of Sokrates, and we should call their mode of life the Sokratic life, if we followed the example of those who gave names to the Pythagorean or Orphic life, as a set of observances derived from the type of Pythagoras or Orpheus.[121]

[Footnote 120: Respecting the historical connexion between the Grecian Cynics and the ascetic Christian monks, see Zeller, Philos. der Griech. ii. p. 241, ed. 2nd.

Homer, Iliad xvi. 233-5:--

[Greek: Zeu= a)/na, Dôdônai=e, Pelasgike/, têlo/thi nai/ôn, Dôdô/nês mede/ôn duscheime/rou, a)mphi\ de\ Se/lloi Soi\ nai/ous' u(pophê=tai a)nipto/podes, chamaieu=nai].

There is no analogy in Grecian history to illustrate this very curious passage: the Excursus of Heyne furnishes no information (see his edition of the Iliad, vol. vii. p. 289) except the general remark:--"Selli--vitæ genus et institutum affectarunt abhorrens à communi usu, vitæ monachorum mendicantium haud absimile, cum sine vitæ cultu viverent, nec corpus abluerent, et humi cubarent. Ita inter barbaros non modo, sed inter ipsas feras gentes intellectum est, eos qui auctoritatem apud multitudinem consequi vellent, externâ specie, vitæ cultu austeriore, abstinentiâ et continentiâ, oculos hominum in se convertere et mirationem facere debere."]

[Footnote 121: Plato, Republic, x. 600 B; Legib. vi. 782 C; Eurip. Hippol. 955; Fragm. [Greek: Krê=tes].

See also the citations in Athenæus (iv. pp. 161-163) from the writers of the Attic middle comedy, respecting the asceticism of the Pythagoreans, analogous to that of the Cynics.]

[Side-note: Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes--they opposed the Platonic Ideas.]

Though Antisthenes and Diogenes laid chief stress upon ethical topics, yet they also delivered opinions on logic and evidence.[122] Antisthenes especially was engaged in controversy, and seemingly in acrimonious controversy, with Plato; whose opinions he impugned in an express dialogue entitled Sathon. Plato on his side attacked the opinions of Antisthenes, and spoke contemptuously of his intelligence, yet without formally naming him. At least there are some criticisms in the Platonic dialogues (especially in the Sophistês, p. 251) which the commentators pronounce, on strong grounds, to be aimed at Antisthenes: who is also unfavourably criticised by Aristotle. We know but little of the points which Antisthenes took up against Plato and still less of the reasons which he urged in support of them. Both he and Diogenes, however, are said to have declared express war against the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas. The functions of general Concepts and general propositions, together with the importance of defining general terms, had been forcibly insisted on in the colloquies of Sokrates; and his disciple Plato built upon this foundation the memorable hypothesis of an aggregate of eternal, substantive realities, called Ideas or Forms, existing separate from the objects of sense, yet affording a certain participation in themselves to those objects: not discernible by sense, but only by the Reason or understanding. These bold creations of the Platonic fancy were repudiated by Antisthenes and Diogenes: who are both said to have declared "We see Man, and we see Horse; but Manness and Horseness we do not see". Whereunto Plato replied "You possess that eye by which Horse is seen: but you have not yet acquired that eye by which Horseness is seen".[123]

[Footnote 122: Among the titles of the works of Antisthenes, preserved by Diogenes Laertius (vi. 15), several relate to dialectic or logic. [Greek: A)lê/theia. Peri\ tou= diale/gesthai, a)ntilogiko/s. Sa/thôn, peri\ tou= a)ntile/gein, a, b, g. Peri\ Diale/kton. Peri\ Paidei/as ê)\ o)noma/tôn, a, b, g, d, e. Peri\ o)noma/tôn chrêseôs, ê)\ e)ristiko/s. Peri\ e)rôtê/seôs kai\ a)pokri/seôs], &c., &c.

Diogenes Laertius refers to _ten_ [Greek: to/moi] of these treatises.]

[Footnote 123: Simplikius, ad Aristot. Categ. p. 66, b. 47, 67, b. 18, 68, b. 25, Schol. Brand.; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vii. 606.

[Greek: tô=n de\ palaiô=n oi( me\n a)nê/|roun ta\s poio/têtas tele/ôs, to\ poio\n sugchôrou=ntos ei)=nai; ô(/sper A)ntisthe/nês, o(/s pote Pla/tôni diamphisbêtô=n--ô(= Pla/tôn, e)/phê, i(/ppon me\n o(rô=, i(ppo/têta d' ou)ch o(rô=; kai\ o(\s ei)=pen, e)/cheis me\n ô(=| i(/ppos o(ra=tai to/de to\ o)/mma, ô(=| de\ i(ppo/tês theôrei=tai, ou)de/pô ke/ktêsai. kai\ a)/lloi de/ tines ê)=san tau/tês tê=s do/xês. oi( de\ tina\s men a)nê/|roun poio/têtas, tina\s de\ kateli/mpanon].

[Greek: Anthrôpo/tês] occurs p. 58, a. 31. Compare p. 20, a. 2.

The same conversation is reported as having taken place between Diogenes and Plato, except that instead of [Greek: i(ppo/tês] and [Greek: a)nthrôpo/tês], we have [Greek: trapezo/tês] and [Greek: kuatho/tês] (Diog. L. vi, 53).

We have [Greek: zôo/tês--A)thênaio/tês]--in Galen's argument against the Stoics (vol. xix. p. 481, Kühn).]

[Side-note: First protest of Nominalism against Realism.]

This debate between Antisthenes and Plato marks an interesting point in the history of philosophy. It is the first protest of Nominalism against the doctrine of an extreme Realism. The Ideas or Forms of Plato (according to many of his phrases, for he is not always consistent with himself) are not only real existences distinct from particulars, but absorb to themselves all the reality of particulars. The real universe in the Platonic theory was composed of Ideas or Forms such as Manness or Horseness[124] (called by Plato the [Greek: Au)to\-A)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: Au)to\-I(/ppos]), of which particular men and horses were only disfigured, transitory, and ever-varying photographs. Antisthenes denied what Plato affirmed, and as Plato affirmed it. Aristotle denied it also; maintaining that genera, species, and attributes, though distinguishable as separate predicates of, or inherencies in, individuals--yet had no existence apart from individuals. Aristotle was no less wanting than Antisthenes, in the intellectual eye required for discerning the Platonic Ideas. Antisthenes is said to have declared these Ideas to be mere thoughts or conceptions ([Greek: psila\s e)nnoi/as]): _i.e._, merely subjective or within the mind, without any object corresponding to them. This is one of the various modes of presenting the theory of Ideas, resorted to even in the Platonic Parmenidês, not by one who opposes that theory, but by one seeking to defend it--_viz._, by Sokrates, when he is hard pressed by the objections of the Eleate against the more extreme and literal version of the theory.[125] It is remarkable, that the objections ascribed to Parmenides against that version which exhibits the Ideas as mere Concepts of and in the mind, are decidedly less forcible than those which he urges against the other versions.

[Footnote 124: We know from Plato himself (Theætêtus, p. 182 A) that even the word [Greek: poio/tês], if not actually first introduced by himself, was at any rate so recent as to be still repulsive, and to require an Apology, If [Greek: poio/tês] was strange, [Greek: a)nthrôpo/tês] and [Greek: i(ppo/tês] would be still more strange. Antisthenes probably invented them, to present the doctrine which he impugned in a dress of greater seeming absurdity.]

[Footnote 125: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 132 B. See, afterwards, chapter xxvii., Parmenides.]

[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes about predication--he admits no other predication but identical.]