Chapter III (6)

[Footnote 223: See below, vol. iii. ch. xxviii. Compare Aristokles ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii. 190-197, vi. 53. Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles--at least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it many absurd consequences--in my judgment without foundation. It is probable that by the term [Greek: pa/thos] the Kyrenaics meant simply sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the memory of past sensations--and the expectation of future sensations, in successions or conjunctions more or less similar--associating in the mind with the sensation present and actual, to form what is called a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner.

But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates against them the hypothesis of the ultra phenomenal, absolute, transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation, present, past, or future--and from any sentient Subject. Besides that, he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their favour. "If these philosophers," says Aristokles (Eus. xiv. 19, 1), "know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know something beyond the sensation itself. If I say [Greek: e)gô\ kai/omai], 'I am being burned,' this is a proposition, not a sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential--the sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels it ([Greek: a)na/gkê ge tri/a tau=ta sunuphi/stasthai--to/ te pa/thos au)to\ kai\ to\ poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon])." In trying to make good his conclusion--That you cannot know the sensation without the Object of sense--Aristokles at the same time asserts that the Object cannot be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject. He asserts that the three are by necessity _co-essential--i.e._ implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically ([Greek: lo/gô| chôrista\]), admitting of being looked at in different points of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is trying to refute. Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very forcible part of Sextus's reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272, where he shows that a logical Subject _per se_ is undefinable and inconceivable--that those who attempt to define Man (_e.g._) do so by specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man--and that if you suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with them.]