Chapter VIII: Platonic Compositions Generally (4)

"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Sokratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the common-places of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed: in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school-disputations of the middle ages had a similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it--and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premisses appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the 'Socratici viri'. But the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. . . It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic--that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents."]

[Side-note: Result called _Knowledge_, which Plato aspires to. Power of going through a Sokratic cross examination; not attainable except through the Platonic process and method.]

Another matter must here be noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of Search. We must understand how Plato conceived the goal towards which they tend: that is the state of mind which he calls _knowledge_ or _cognition_. Knowledge (in his view) is not attained until the mind is brought into clear view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate communion with them: but the test (as I have already observed) for determining whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to ascertain whether he can give to others a full account of all that he professes to know, and can extract from them a full account of all that they profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner exhaustive as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of asking and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.[94] Such being the way in which Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct, demonstrative, didactic communication: by simply announcing to the hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and analogies: he must have had before him objections with their refutation, and the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the theorem, but do not really prove it:[95] he must be introduced to the principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal terms and sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining an opponent. All these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude and flexibility, before he will be competent to perform those two difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is, that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this continued practice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).[96] The Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with the Platonic result, as described and pursued.

[Footnote 94: See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about [Greek: paidei/a], as developing [Greek: tê\n e)nou=san e(ka/stou du/namin e0n tê=| psuchê=|]: and 534, about [Greek: e)pistê/mê], with its test, [Greek: to\ dou=nai kai\ de/xasthai lo/gon]. Compare also Republic, v. 477, 478, with Theætêt. 175, C, D; Phædon, 76, B, Phædrus, 276; and Sympos. 202 A. [Greek: to\ o)rtha\ doxa/zein kai\ a)/neu tou= e)/chein lo/gon dou=nai, ou)k oi)=sth' o(/ti ou)/te e)pi/stasthai e)stin? a)/logon ga\r pra=gma pô=s a)\n ei)/ê e)pistê/mê?]

[Footnote 95: On this point the scholastic manner of handling in the Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the Platonic dialectic. I borrow a passage from the treatise of M Hauréau, De la Phil. Scolastique, vol. ii. p. 190.

"Saint Thomas pouvait s'en tenir là: nous le comprenons, nous avons tout son système sur l'origine des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu'il n'a plus rien à nous apprendre à ce sujet: mais en scolastique, il ne suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois arguments, réputés invincibles, ce que l'on suppose être la vérité, il faut, en outre, répondre aux objections première, seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de divers interlocuteurs, souvent imaginaires; il faut établir la parfaite concordance de la conclusion enoncée et des conclusions precédents ou subséquentes; il faut réproduire, à l'occasion de tout problème controversé, l'ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s'est déclaré."]

[Footnote 96: Longinus De Sublim. s. 6. [Greek: kai/toi to\ pra=gma du/slêpton; ê( ga\r tô=n lo/gôn kri/sis pollê=s e)sti pei/ras teleutai=on e)pige/nnêma]. Compare what is said in a succeeding chapter about the Hippias Minor. And see also Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. 35, p. 224.]

[Side-note: Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics--man and society.]

Moreover, not merely method and result are in harmony, but also the topics discussed. These topics were ethical, social, and political: matters especially human[97] (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) familiar to every man,--handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dramatists in the theatre. Now it is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most interesting, varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operating and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of view, each of which has a certain range of application, and each of which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary circumstances; they are liable to exception, if those circumstances undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as apparent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dialectic was adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and comparisons, bringing into notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by objections available against each, included a large and instructive survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings.

[Footnote 97: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-15. I transcribe the following passage from an article in the Edinburgh Review (April, 1866, pp. 325-326), on the first edition of the present work: an article not merely profound and striking as to thought, but indicating the most comprehensive study and appreciation of the Platonic writings:--

"The enemy against whom Plato really fought, and the warfare against whom was the incessant occupation of his life and writings, was--not Sophistry, either in the ancient or modern sense of the term, but--_Commonplace_. It was the acceptance of traditional opinions and current sentiments as an ultimate fact; and bandying of the abstract terms which express approbation and disapprobation, desire and aversion, admiration and disgust, as if they had a meaning thoroughly understood and universally assented to. The men of his day (like those of ours) thought that they knew what Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honourable and Shameful, were--because they could use the words glibly, and affirm them of this or that, in agreement with existing custom. But what the property was, which these several instances possessed in common, justifying the application of the term, nobody had considered; neither the Sophists, nor the rhetoricians, nor the statesmen, nor any of those who set themselves up, or were set up by others, as wise. Yet whoever could not answer this question was wandering in darkness--had no standard by which his judgments were regulated, and which kept them consistent with one another--no rule which he knew and could stand by for the guidance of his life. Not knowing what Justice and Virtue are, it was impossible to be just and virtuous: not knowing what Good is, we not only fail to reach it, but are certain to embrace evil instead. Such a condition, to any one capable of thought, made life not worth having. The grand business of human intellect ought to consist in subjecting these terms to the most rigorous scrutiny, and bringing to light the ideas that lie at the bottom of them. Even if this cannot be done and real knowledge attained, it is already no small benefit to expel the false opinion of knowledge: to make men conscious of the things most needful to be known, fill them with shame and uneasiness at their own state, and rouse a pungent internal stimulus, summoning up all their energies to attack those greatest of all problems, and never rest until, as far as possible, the true solutions are reached. This is Plato's notion of the condition of the human mind in his time, and of what philosophy could do to help it: and any one who does not think the description applicable, with slight modifications, to the majority of educated minds in our own time and in all times known to us, certainly has not brought either the teachers or the practical men of any time to the Platonic test."

The Reviewer farther illustrates this impressive description by a valuable citation from Max Müller to the same purpose (Lectures on the Science of Language, Second Series, pp. 520-527). "Such terms as Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, &c., are tossed about in the war of words as if every body knew what they meant, and as if every body used them exactly in the same sense; whereas most people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest conceptions, adding to them from time to time--perhaps correcting likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors--but never taking stock, never either enquiring into the history of the terms which they handle so freely, or realising the fulness of their meaning according to the strict rules of logical definition."]

[Side-note: Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations _à priori_ of some impressive sentiment.]

The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in the Platonic dialogues, that no historian of philosophy can omit to notice it. But many of them (like Xenophon in describing Sokrates) assign to it only a subordinate place and a qualified application: while some (and Schleiermacher especially) represent all the doubts and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to call forth the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the last half I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises to his readers; but he has nowhere provided a key to the solution of them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each other. Where the affirmative is especially present (as in Timæus), the negative altogether disappears. Timæus is made to proclaim the most sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination: but the Platonic Sokrates hears them with respectful silence, and commends afterwards. The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a teacher--that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them--this declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally true.[98] The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up all difficulties--not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas are altogether _à priori_: they enunciate preconceptions or hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep and solemn sentiment of some kind or other--religious, ethical, æsthetical, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or exactness, &c. The dogmas are enunciations of some grand sentiment of the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,[99] which Plato follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself; and while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is therefore a mistake to suppose[100] that Plato ties knots in one dialogue only with a view to untie them in another; and that the doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind, only that he defers the announcement of the solution until the embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself.

[Footnote 98: See the conversation between Menippus and Sokrates. (Lucian, Dialog. Mortuor. xx.)]

[Footnote 99: Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics upon which Plato renounces the character of a searcher, and passes into that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above human investigation and evidence--the transcendental: [Greek: kai\ ga\r e)kei=nos] (Plato) [Greek: ta\ do/gmata ou)k au)to\s a)pophai/netai, ei)=ta peri\ au)tô=n diagôni/zetai; a)ll' e)n mesô| tê\n zê/têsin poiou/menos pro\s tou\s dialegome/nous, eu(ri/skôn ma=llon to\ de/on do/gma, ê)\ philoneikô=n u(pe\r au)tou= phai/netai; plê\n o(/sa peri\ tô=n kreitto/nôn, ê)\ kath' ê(ma=s, le/getai] (Dion. Hal. Ars Rhet. c. 10, p. 376, Reiske.)

M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style of theorising in the physical sciences, very analogous to that of Plato, generally:--

Arago, Biographies, vol. i. p. 149, Vie de Fresnel. "De ces deux explications des phénomènes de la lumière, l'une s'appelle la théorie de l'émission; l'autre est connue sous le nom de système des ondes. On trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits d'Empédocle. Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer parmi ses adhérents Képler, Newton, Laplace. Le système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans moins illustres: Aristote, Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Euler, l'avaient adopté . .

"Au reste, si l'on s'étonnait de voir d'aussi grands génies ainsi divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la question on litige ne pouvait être résolue; que les expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu'alors les divers systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non _des déductions logiques des faits_, mais, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de _simples vérités de sentiment_, qu'enfin, le don de l'infaillibilité n'est pas accordé même aux plus habiles, des qu'en sortant du domaine des observations, et se jetant dans celui des conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche sévère et assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours avec raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables progrès."]

[Footnote 100: Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and Munk treats the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. "Plato (he observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of pædagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question, he proposes, in propædeutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has not yet solved them himself; and all this for the praiseworthy (_ironically said_) purpose of correcting in their minds the false persuasion of knowledge." (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon Schrift. p. 515.)

That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it as ridiculous, but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing himself as nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest.

So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the Parmenidês, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion, altogether conjectural; for there is no solution of them given in any of Plato's writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as given by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato.

Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, p. 103-104); that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. "The special talent and dexterity (Virtuosität) which Sokrates displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain conviction on the question discussed."

This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as inconsistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere (Platonische Welt-seele, p. 69-70)--That the Platonic Ideenlehre was altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, if he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often repeated, of Sokrates; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them.

For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of his most expository compositions) see a remarkable passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. [Greek: a)pistou=nta de\ kai\ zêtou=nta a)/ma tou\s lo/gous poiei=sthai, o(\ dê\ e)gô\ drô=], &c.]

[Side-note: Hypothesis--that Plato had solved all his own difficulties for himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few select auditors in oral lectures--Untenable.]

Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have produced a full breadth of positive philosophy to countervail his own negative fertility, yet not finding enough of it in the written dialogues look for it elsewhere. Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is partly shared by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest principles of Plato's philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures: that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system (der Kern) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally written so as to convey only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these great principles, together with refutation of various errors opposed to them: that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.[101] I have already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and unprepared audience: while among the written dialogues, there are some which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, are highly perplexing and abstruse. The Timæus does not confine itself to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the super-sensible world: though they are of a mystical cast, as we know that the oral lectures De Bono were also.

[Footnote 101: Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 205-220. Hermann, Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, pp. 290-294.

Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to be unworthy of Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras and other Sophists, on the authority of a passage in the Theætêtus (152 C), which does not at all sustain his allegation.

Hermann considers "die akroamatischen Lehren als Fortsetzung und Schlussstein der schriftlichen, die dort erst zur vollen Klarheit principieller Auffassung erhoben wurden, ohne jedoch über den nämlichen Gegenstand, soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste, etwas wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren" (p. 293).]]

[Side-note: Characteristic of the oral lectures--that they were delivered in Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed from the dialogues, we cannot say.]

Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of difference between them and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in his own name; whereas he never published any written composition in his own name. But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way this difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, delivered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held special communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils. Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either in these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to controvert what was said in the last page--that Plato's affirmative philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle tells us[102]) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of philosophy was an ascending one toward the _principia_ ([Greek: a)rcha\s]), or a descending one down from the _principia_. A good philosophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately: in Plato's philosophy, there is no road explicable either upwards or downwards, between the two: no justifiable mode of participation ([Greek: me/thexis]) between the two disparate worlds--intellect and sense. The _principia_ of Plato take an impressive hold on the imagination: but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties; and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear against them.

[Footnote 102: Aristot. Eth. Nik. i. 4, 5. [Greek: eu)= ga\r kai\ Pla/tôn ê)po/rei tou=to kai\ e)zê/tei po/teron a)po\ tô=n archô=n ê)\ e)pi\ ta\s a)rcha/s e)stin ê( o(do/s.]]

[Side-note: Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search and debate _per se_. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation.]

With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue--of threads which are taken up only to be broken off, devious turns and "passages which lead to nothing"--of much talk "about it and about it," without any peremptory decision from an authorised judge--with such complainants Plato has no sympathy. He feels a strong interest in the process of enquiry, in the debate _per se_: and he presumes a like interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.[103] On the contrary, he claims it as the privilege of philosophical research, that persons engaged in such discussions are noway tied to time; they are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock to measure the length of each speech, are under slavish dependence on the feelings of the Dikasts, and are therefore obliged to keep strictly to the point.[104] Whoever desires accurate training of mind must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit.[105] Plato regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other: he also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the result.[106] Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue, not merely as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship, whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him what the tragedy was to Sophokles, and the rhetorical discourse to Isokrates. He went on "combing and curling it" (to use the phrase of Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition of the Panegyrical Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to show what it involves as well as what it excludes in the way of consequence. We shall not find the ethical point of view always the same: there are material inconsistencies and differences in this respect between one dialogue and another.

[Footnote 103: As an illustration of that class of minds which take delight in the search for truth in different directions, I copy the following passage respecting Dr. Priestley, from an excellent modern scientific biography. "Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not venerable--and had been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in science--that he unavoidably and unconsciously over-estimated the value of what was novel, and held himself free to change his opinions to an extent not easily sympathised with by minds of a different order. Some men love to _rest_ in truth, or at least in settled opinions, and are uneasy till they find repose. They alter their beliefs with great reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency, even in reference to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other hand, was a _follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and was all his life long pursuing, not resting in it_.

On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled up as he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done, disavowed any attempt to reconcile his changing views with each other, or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. . . I think it must be acknowledged by all who have studied his writings, that in his scientific researches at least he carried this feeling too far, and that often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should have rested, his dread of anything like a too hasty stereotyping of a supposed discovery, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify him in renewing the _pursuit_ of truth, and thus led him completely astray. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop."

(Dr. Geo Wilson--Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications of the Cavendish Society, 1851, p. 110-111.)]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Theætêt. p. 172.]

[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. [Greek: me/tron de/ g', e)/phê, ô)= Sô/krates, o( Glau/kôn, toiou/tôn lo/gôn a)kou/ein, o(/los o( bi/os nou=n e)/chousin]. vi. 504 D. [Greek: Tê\n makrote/ran peri+ite/on tô=| toiou/tô|, kai\ ou)ch ê(=tton mantha/nonti ponête/on ê)\ gumnazome/nô|]. Also Phædrus, 274 A, Parmenid. p. 135 D, 136 D, [Greek: a)mê/chanon pragmatei/an--a)doleschi/as], &c. Compare Politikus, 286, in respect to the charge of prolixity against him.

In the Hermotimus of Lucian, the assailant of philosophy draws one of his strongest arguments from the number of years required to examine the doctrines of all the philosophical sects--the whole of life would be insufficient (Lucian, Hermot. c. 47-48). The passages above cited, especially the first of them, show that Sokrates and Plato would not have been discouraged by this protracted work.]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iii. 394 D. [Greek: Manteu/omai] (says Glaukon) [Greek: skopei=sthai se, ei)/te paradexo/metha tragô|di/an te kai\ kômô|di/an ei)s tê\n po/lin, ei)/te kai\ ou)/. I)/sôs] (says Sokrates) [Greek: kai\ plei/ô e)/ti tou/tôn; _ou) ga\r dê\ e)/gôge pô oi)=da, a)ll' o(/pê| a)\n o( lo/gos ô(/sper pneu=ma phe/rê|, tau/tê| i)teon_. Kai\ kalô=s g', e)/phê, le/geis].

The Republic, from the second book to the close, is one of those Platonic compositions in which Sokrates is most expository.

We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very self-working philosopher expresses his conviction that the longer he continued enquiring, the more his own mind would become armed for the better appreciation of truth--and in which he strongly protests against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry.

"Et encore qu'il y en ait peut-être d'aussi bien sensés parmi les Perses ou les Chinois que parmi nous, il me sembloit que le plus utile étoit, de me régler selon ceux avec lesquels j'aurois à vivre; et que, pour savoir quelles étoient véritablement leurs opinions, je devois plutôt prendre garde à ce qu'ils pratiquaient qu'à ce qu'ils disaient; non seulement à cause qu'en la corruption de nos moeurs, _il y a peu de gens qui veuillent dire tout ce qu'ils croient--mais aussi à cause que plusieurs l'ignorent eux mêmes; car l'action de la pensée, par laquelle on croit une chose étant différente de celle par laquelle on connoit qu'on la croit, elles sont souvent l'une sans l'autre._ Et entre plusieurs opinions également reçues, je ne choisissois que les plus modérées; tant à cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes pour la pratique, et vraisemblablement les meilleures--tous excès ayans coutume d'être mauvais--comme aussi afin de me détourner moins du vrai chemin, en cas que je faillisse, que si, ayant choisi l'un des deux extrêmes, c'eût été l'autre qu'il eut fallu suivre.

"Et particulièrement, je _mettois entre les excès toutes les promesses par lesquelles on retranche quelque chose de sa liberté_; non que je désapprouvasse les lois, qui pour remédier à l'inconstance des esprits foibles, permettent, lorsqu'on a quelque bon dessein (ou même, pour la sureté du commerce, quelque dessein qui n'est qu'indifférent), qu'on fasse des voeux ou des contrats qui obligent à y persévérer: mais à cause que je ne voyois au monde aucune chose qui demeurât toujours en même état, et _que comme pour mon particulier, je me promettois de perfectionner de plus en plus en mes jugemens, et non point de les rendre pires, j'eusse pensé commettre une grande faute contre le bon sens, si, parceque j'approuvois alors quelque chose, je me fusse obligé de la prendre pour bonne encore après, lorsqu'elle auroit peut-être cessé de l'être, ou que j'aurois cessé de l'estimer telle_." Discours de la Méthode, part iii. p. 147-148, Cousin edit.; p. 16, Simon edit.]

[Side-note: Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of enquiry interesting to others, as it was to himself.]

But amidst all these differences--and partly indeed by reason of these differences--Plato succeeds in inspiring his readers with much of the same interest in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evidently felt in his own bosom. The charm, with which he invests the process of philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings from the terrible ship-wreck which has overtaken so much of the abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his principle titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so far as we can judge from the preserved portion of the Aristotelian writings: whether for the other _viri Socratici_ his contemporaries, or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato's works charmed and instructed all; so that they were read not merely by disciples and admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.[107] The process of philosophising is one not naturally attractive except to a few minds: the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and suggestive influence exercised by Plato--the variety of new roads pointed out to the free enquiring mind--are in themselves sufficiently valuable: whatever we may think of the positive results in which he himself acquiesced.[108]

[Footnote 107: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3, 8.

Cicero farther commends the Stoic Panætius for having relinquished the "tristitiam atque asperitatem" of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno, Chrysippus, &c., and for endeavouring to reproduce the style and graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom he was always commending to his students (De Fin. iv. 28, 79).]

[Footnote 108: The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is applicable to the Platonic writings also. "Philosophiam multis locis _inchoasti_, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum" (Academ. Poster. i. 3, 9).

I shall say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitophon; an unfinished dialogue, which takes up the point of view here indicated by Cicero.]

I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange. Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an enquiry without any result--a story without an end. Respecting the Dialogues of Exposition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood. Whether the exposition be clear or obscure--orderly or confused--true or false--we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character: as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and Leges) or of Pythagoras (in Timæus).[109]

[Footnote 109: See the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of this chapter.]

[Side-note: Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search--general terms and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis.]

A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice, directly or indirectly. The relation of the universal to its particulars, the contrast of the constant and essential with the variable and accidental, are turned and returned in a thousand different ways. The principles of classification, with the breaking down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic dialogues, and are often partially applied in the rest. To see the One in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and particular cases--is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention and analysis, and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, unfamiliar even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental hypothesis: but the important fact is, that it was constantly present to his own mind and is impressed upon the notice of his readers.

[Side-note: The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable inter-dependence.]

After these various remarks, having a common bearing upon all, or nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I shall proceed to give some account of each dialogue separately. It is doubtless both practicable and useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes in the way of analogy, sometimes in that of contrast. But I shall not affect to handle them as contributories to one positive doctrinal system--nor as occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfolding of one preconceived scheme--nor as successive manifestations of change, knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they exist as distinct imaginary conversations, composed by the same author at unknown times and under unknown specialities of circumstance. Of course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be admitted; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible.

[Side-note: Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis last.]

The order which I shall adopt for considering the dialogues coincides to a certain extent with that which some other expositors have adopted. It begins with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and which confine themselves to the subjects and points of view belonging to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon. First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing the explicit negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before his death, when Plato was 28 years of age.

Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato's most advanced age--Timæus, Kritias, and Leges, with the sequel, Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of Sokrates: Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the affirmative pole of philosophy.

[Side-note: Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order.]

Between the Apology and the dialogues named as last--I shall examine the intermediate dialogues according as they seem to approximate or recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, however, the reasons for preference are noway satisfactory. Of the many dissentient schemes, professing to determine the real order in which the Platonic dialogues were composed, I find a certain plausibility in some, but no conclusive reason in any. Of course the reasons in favour of each one scheme, count against all the rest. I believe (as I have already said) that none of Plato's dialogues were composed until after the death of Sokrates: but at what dates, or in what order, after that event, they were composed, it is impossible to determine. The Republic and Philêbus rank among the constructive dialogues, and may suitably be taken immediately before Timæus: though the Republic belongs to the highest point of Plato's genius, and includes a large measure of his negative acuteness combined with his most elaborate positive combinations. In the Sophistês and Politikus, Sokrates appears only in the character of a listener: in the Parmenidês also, the part assigned to him, instead of being aggressive and victorious, is subordinate to that of Parmenidês and confined to an unsuccessful defence. These dialogues, then, occupy a place late in the series. On the other hand, Kriton and Euthyphron have an immediate bearing upon the trial of Sokrates and the feelings connected with it. I shall take them in immediate sequel to the Apology.

For the intermediate dialogues, the order is less marked and justifiable. In so far as a reason can be given, for preference as to former and later, I shall give it when the case arises.