Chapter XI: The Philosophers (3)

[50\11: The withdrawal of the soul from the ~ku/klos ana/gkês~ and its return to an emancipated existence as a bodiless spirit was never so clearly held in view for the "Pure" by the older Pythagorean tradition as it was among the Orphics (and Empedokles). It is, however, hardly thinkable that a system which regarded every incarnation of the soul as a punishment and the body as its prison or its tomb should never have held out to the true ~ba/kchoi~ of its mysteries the prospect of a full and permanent liberation of the soul, at last, from corporeality and the earthly life. Only so could the long chain of deaths and rebirths reach a final and satisfactory conclusion. Eternally detained in the cycle of births the soul would be eternally punished (this is e.g. the idea of Empedokles: 455 f., _fr._ 145 D.); and this cannot have been the real conclusion of the Pythagorean doctrine of salvation. Claud. Mamertus, _de An._ 2, 7 [_Vors._ 320, 12], gives it as a doctrine of Philolaos [_fr._ 22] that the (pure soul after its separation from the body leads a "bodiless" life in the "Universe" (the ~ko/smos~ situated above the ~ourano/s~): see Böckh, _Philol._ 177. Apart from this the only evidence for the withdrawal of the soul is late: _Carm. Aur._ 70 f. (making use of the Empedok. verses, _fr._ 112, 4 f. = 400 Mull.), Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31 (~a/gesthai ta\s kathara\s [psucha\s] epi\ to\n hu/psiston~ "in altissimum locum" Cobet: but an ellipse of ~to/pon~ is hardly admissible. ~ho hu/psistos~ = the highest God would be a Hebraic form of expression, nor can it be a possible one here for Alex. Polyh.--we should also, with this meaning of ~hu/psistos~, expect ~pro\s t. hu/.~ ad superiores circulos bene viventium animae, secundum philosophorum altam scientiam, Serv., _A._ vi, 127--should we then supply ~epi\ to\n hu/psiston <ku/klon>~? Or perh. ~epi\ to\ hu/psiston~?)--An escape of the souls after the expiry of their ~peri/odoi~ must have been known as a Pythagorean belief to Luc., _VH._ ii, 21. (Vergil, too, is speaking in a Pythagorean sense, _A._ vi, 744, pauci laeta arva [Elysii] tenemus.--i.e. for ever without renewed ~ensôma/tôsis~--see Serv., _A._ vi, 404, 426, 713. It is true the line is out of its right place, but there can be no doubt that it reproduces the words and the--in this section Pythagorean--opinion of Vergil.) The idea that the cycle of births is never to be broken cannot be regarded as Pythagorean nor even as Neopythagorean. (A few isolated later accounts of Pythag. doctrine; e.g. D.L. viii, 14 (from Favorinus), Porph., _VP._ 19, and also the cursory description in Ov., _M._ xv--with a good deal of foreign matter added--speak of the Pyth. doctrine of soul-transmigration without also referring to the possibility of ~ku/klou lê=xai~; but they are not meant to deny that {399} possibility but merely leave it unmentioned as unnecessary in the context.) There seems to be no example of a Greek doctrine of transmigration that did not also include a promise to the ~ho/sioi~ or the ~philo/sophoi~ that they would be able to escape from the cycle of births (at least for a world-period: as Syrian. took it, though probably not Porph.). Such a promise, as the consummation of the promises of salvation therein made, could only be dispensed with in the case of a doctrine of transmigration in which being born again was itself regarded as a _reward_ for the pious (as in the teaching which Jos., _BJ._ 2, 8, 14, attributes to the Pharisees). By Greek partisans of the doctrine of Metempsychosis rebirth upon earth is always regarded as a punishment or at any rate a burden, not as a desirable goal for the life of the soul. We must therefore presume that the promise of escape from the cycle of rebirth was made also by the oldest Pythagorean teaching as the final benefit of its message of salvation. Without this completing touch Pythagoreanism would be like Buddhism without the promise of a final attainment of Nirvâna.]

[51\11: Pythagoras is called the pupil of Pherekydes as early as Andron of Ephesos (before Theopompos): D.L. i, 119; _Vors._ ii, 199, 18. Pherekydes was regarded as "the first" who taught the immortality of the soul (Cic., _TD._ i, 38) or more correctly metempsychosis (Suid. ~Pherek.~); cf. Preller, _Rh. Mus._ (N.F.), iv, 388 f. A hint of such teaching must have been found in his mystical treatise (cf. Porph., _Antr._ 31; _Vors._ ii, 204, 12--Gomperz is rather too sceptical, _Gk. Thinkers_, i, 542). This teaching seems to have been the chief reason which tempted later writers to make the old _theologos_ into the teacher of Pythagoras, the chief spokesman of the doctrine of the soul's transmigrations.--It is, however, an untenable theory that Pherek. illustrated his doctrine of transmigration by the example of Aithalides. What the Sch. on A.R. i, 645 [_Vors._ ii, 204, 24], quotes from "Pherekydes" about the alternate sojourn of the ~psuchê/~ of Aithalides in Hades and on earth, does not come from Pherekydes the _theologos_ (as Göttling, _Opusc._ 210, and Kern, _de Orph. Epim. Pherec._, pp. 89, 106, think) but without the slightest doubt from the genealogist and historian; this is the only Pherekydes who is used by the Sch. of Ap. Rh., and he is used frequently. Besides this, the way in which the different statements of the various authorities used in this Scholion are distinguished, shows quite clearly that Pherekydes had only spoken of Aithalides' alternate dwelling above and below the earth, but _as still being_ Aithalides, and not as metamorphosed by the series of births into other personalities living upon earth. Pherekydes was obviously reproducing a Phthiotic local-legend in which Aithalides as the son of (the chthonic?) Hermes alternately lived on and below the earth, as an ~heterê/meros~--like the Dioscuri in Lacedaimonian legend (~l~ 301 ff.: in that passage and generally in the older view--as held by Alkman, Pindar, etc.--_both_ the Dioscuri change their place of abode together: it is not till later that the variant arose acc. to which they alternate with each other: see Hemst. _Luc._ ii, p. 344 Bip.). It was Herakleides Pont. who first turned the alternate sojourning of Aithalides into death and resurrection (he also made Aithalides one of the previous incarnations of Pythagoras; see Appendix x); but as a _different_ person, so that A. thus became an example of metempsychosis. It is not hard to see why Aithalides was chosen as one of the previous incarnations of P., nor how the old miracle-story, preserved to literature by Pherekydes, was thus transformed to suit its new purpose. Plainly Pherekydes did _not_ say that Hermes {400} also gave Aithalides the power of memory after his death (otherwise the statement to this effect in Sch. A.R. would have stood under the name of Pherek.); and the privilege was rather meaningless until after Herakleides' narrative. Perhaps it was Her. who first added this touch to the story. Ap. Rh. follows him in this point (i, 643 ff.), but not--or not plainly, at least: 646 ff.--in what Herakleides had invented about the metempsychosis of Aithalides.]

[52\11: Macr., _Som. Scip._ 1, 14, 19, attributes this view to Pythagoras and Philolaos, being certainly correct in the case of the latter; since the opinion that the soul is a ~kra=sis~ and ~harmoni/a~ of the warm and the cold, the dry and the wet, which go to make up the body, is given by Simmias in Pl., _Phd._ 86 B, as a tradition that he has received and not an invention of his own. But what else can this mean than a tradition handed down in Thebes by his teacher Philolaos (_Phd._ 61 D)? (Hence ~Harmoni/as tê=s Thêbaïkê=s~, 95 A.) It is true that Claud. Mam. _de An._ ii, 7, only attributes to Philolaos the doctrine that the soul is _bound up_ with the body "in eternal and incorporeal harmony" (_convenientiam_): which would imply an independent substance of the soul side by side with that of the body. But this must have been a misunderstanding of the real meaning of Philolaos. Aristoxenos, too, can only have got his doctrine of the soul as a harmony from his Pythagorean friends. Perhaps, too, this was the influence which suggested to Dikaiarchos his view that the "soul" is a ~harmoni/a tô=n tessa/rôn stoichei/ôn~ (_Dox._, p. 387), and indeed ~tô=n en tô=| sô/mati thermô=n kai\ psuchrô=n kai\ hugrô=n kai\ xêrô=n~, as Nemes., _Nat. Hom._, p. 69 Matth., tells us--thus exactly resembling Simmias in Plato (unless indeed the passage in Nemes. is a mere reminiscence of Plato strayed here by accident). See also chap. x, n. 27.]

[53\11: See Pl., _Phd._ 86 CD. Pre-existence of the soul impossible if it is only an ~harmoni/a~ of the body: 92 AB.]

[54\11: It was in itself almost unavoidable that a community founded like the Pythagorean mainly on a mystical doctrine but not ill-disposed to scientific studies, should, as it was extended (and still followed practical aims) split up into two parties: an inner circle of qualified teachers and scholars, and one or more groups, outside and attached to them, of lay members for whom a special teaching suited for popular comprehension would be provided. Thus the inner circle of Buddhism, the Bikshu, was surrounded by the common herd of "worshippers"; and the same can be seen in Christian monastic organisations. A division, then, of the followers of Pythagoras into Akousmatikoi and Mathematikoi--Pythagoreioi and Pythagoristai--etc., is not in itself at all incredible.]

[55\11: The division of the soul, or the ~duna/meis~ of the soul, into the ~logiko/n~ and the ~a/logon~ was made, before Plato, by Pythagoras--so we might have learnt, ~autou= tou= Puthago/rou suggra/mmatos oudeno\s eis hêma=s sôzome/nou~, from the writings of his followers, acc. to Poseidonios ap. Galen, _de Plac. Hipp. et Pl._ 5, p. 459 Müll. = v, 478 K.; cf. also 425 K. (_Vors._ 34, 23). From Poseidonios evidently comes the same opinion in Cic., _TD._ iv, 10. And, in fact, a fragment of Philolaos ~p. phu/seôs~, _fr._ 13 Diels (_Theol. Ar._, p. 20, 35 A.), gives a division of the ~archai\ tou= zô/|ou tou= logikou=~, which depends upon the idea that the highest living organism contains within itself and makes use of all the lower organisms as well (~nou=s~ in the head, ~anthrô/pou archa/--psucha\ kai\ ai/sthêsis~ in the heart, ~zô/|ou archa\--rhi/zôsis kai\ ana/phusis~ in the navel, ~phutou= archa\--spe/rmatos metabola/~ and ~ge/nnêsis~ in the ~aidoi=on, xunapa/ntôn archa/~). Then in the psychical region we have a division between the ~logiko/n~ {401} and the ~a/logon~ according to their nature and "seat" in man (~logiko/n~ being made up of reasoning power, ~nou=s~, specific to man, and sense-perception, ~ai/sthêsis~, which also belongs to the other ~zô=|a~, while the ~a/logon = rhi/zôsis kai\ ana/phusis~ and resembles the ~ai/tion tou= tre/phesthai kai\ au/xesthai~, or the ~phutiko/n~, a part of the ~a/logon tê=s psuchê=s~ in Arist., _EN._ 1, 13, p. 1102a, 32 ff.). This evidently represents an attempt at a division of the soul into ~logiko/n~ and ~a/logon~, such as Poseidonios must have found carried out by other Pythagoreans. A clear distinction between ~phronei=n (xunie/nai~ and ~aistha/nesthai~ was made by the Pythag. physician Alkmaion, whose division was at least different from and more profound than that of Empedokles (with whom he is contrasted by Thphr., _Sens._ 25; _Vors._ 132, 20). Empedokles did indeed distinguish between thinking and perceiving, but thinking (~noei=n~) was only a ~sômatiko/n ti hô/sper to\ aistha/nesthai~ and to this extent ~tauto/n~ with it (Arist., _An._ 3, 3, p. 427a, 21). Alkmaion cannot, therefore, have made ~xunie/nai sômatiko/n~. These Pythagoreans were on the way to separating from the soul as a whole a separate, thinking soul that required no sense-perception for its thought, the ~nou=s~. To this latter alone would divinity and immortality be ascribed, as in later philosophy (and thus _Dox._ 393a, 10, though unhistorically and prematurely, gives ~to\ logiko\n [tê=s psuchê=s] a/phtharton~ as a doctrine of "Pythagoras").--It is certainly difficult to see how Philolaos' doctrine of the distinction between the ~anthrô/pou archa/~, the ~nou=s~--an element of the soul belonging exclusively to men--and the ~zô/|ou archa/~ (confined to ~ai/sthêsis~ and ~psucha/~, power of life) could possibly be reconciled with the older Pythagorean doctrine of the soul's transmigration. Acc. to that belief the soul wanders through the bodies of animals as well as men, and the idea implies the view that the _same_ soul could inhabit animals as well as men; that, in fact, ~pa/nta ta\ geno/mena e/mpsucha~ are ~homogenê=~ (Porph., _VP._ 19; cf. S.E., _M._ ix, 127). Philolaos, on the contrary, holds that the soul of man is differently constituted from the souls of animals--the latter lack ~nou=s~ (it is not merely that its efficacy is hindered in animals by the ~duskrasi/a tou= sô/matos~ as is said wrongly to be the opinion of Pythag. by _Dox._ 432a, 15 ff.). The same difficulty arises again in the case of Plato's doctrine of transmigration.--Alkmaion who ascribes ~xunie/nai~ to man alone seems not to have held the transmigration doctrine.]

[56\11: 401 ff. Mull.; _fr._ 112, 5 Diels.]

[57\11: 462 ff. _fr._ 111.]

[58\11: Satyros ap. D.L. viii, 59; _Vors._ 195, 26.--Especially famous was his feat of driving away adverse winds from Akragas (cf. _fr._ 111, 3); see also Welcker, _Kl. Schr._ iii, 60-1.--The asses' skins with which Emped. kept the north winds away from Akragas were at any rate intended as _apotropaic_ materials--magic means of driving away spirits. In the same way protection against hail and lightning is obtained by hanging up the skin of a hyena, a seal, etc. (see _Geop._ i, 14, 3-5; i, 16, and Niclas' notes there). These skins ~e/chousi du/namin antipathê=~: Plu., _Smp._ 4, 2, 1, p. 664 C.--Other magic charms against hail--the ~chalazophu/lakes~, Plu., _Smp._ 7, 2, 2, p. 700 F; Sen., _NQ._ 4b, 6.]

[59\11: ~. . . egô\ d' humi=n theo\s a/mbrotos, ouke/ti thnêto/s, pôleu=mai meta\ pa=si tetime/nos ktl.~ 400 f. (_fr._ 112, 4 f.).]

[60\11: A late echo is to be found in the inspired lines of Lucretius in praise of Empedokles, i, 717 ff.]

[61\11: The well-known story of Empedokles' leap into the crater of Mt. Aetna--intended by his complete disappearance to call forth the belief that he had not died (Luc., _DM._ xx, 4), but had been _translated_ {402} alive--is a parody of a serious translation legend and presupposes the existence of one. The parodists' version was contradicted early by Empedokles' follower, the physician Pausanias: D.L. viii, 69 (this does not come from the fabulously conceived narrative of Herakleides Pont. It does not follow, from the epigram quoted by D.L. viii, 61, _fr._ 156; _AP._ vii, 508, that Paus. died before Emped.; the authorship of that ep. is uncertain and in any case it is not very worthy of credit). The seriously intended legend must then have arisen soon after the disappearance of Empedokles: it was founded upon the fact that no one did know where Emp. had died (~tha/natos a/dêlos~, Timaeus ap. D.L. viii, 71), or could point to the grave which covered his remains. (This is expressly stated by Timaeus, who, in other respects, contradicts the translation-fable as well as the story of the leap into Mt. Aetna: D.L. viii, 72. In the face of this no importance need be attached to what some one--Neanthes apparently--states ap. D.L. viii, 73; that there was a grave of Emped. at Megara.) Free elaboration was given to the translation story by Herakleides Pont. ~p. no/sôn~: D.L. viii, 67-8 (in return, his philosophic rivals contemptuously applied a malicious story of feigned translation to Herakleides himself, who in this way wished to legitimize his own claim to be god or Hero: D.L. v, 89 ff. From other sources comes Suid. ~Hêrakl. Euthu/phronos~; cf. Marx, _Griech. Märchen v. dankb. Thieren_, p. 97 ff.). All kinds of stupid variations of the story of Empedokles' end ap. D.L. viii, 74.]

[62\11: See above, chap. ii, and p. 129.]

[63\11: Cf. 113 ff.; _fr._ 9.]

[64\11: ~sarkô=n chitô/n~, 414, _fr._ 126.]

[65\11: His treatment of the woman who seemed to be dead (~a/pnous~, D.L. viii, 60) has quite the appearance of a psychophysical _experiment_; one, however, that was intended to prove the correctness of precisely the irrational side of his doctrine of the soul.]

[66\11: ~gui/ôn pi/stis~ is distinguished from ~noei=n~ in v, 57 (_fr._ 4, 13), and ~no/ô| de/rkesthai~ from ~de/rkesthai o/mmasin~ in 82 (_fr._ 17, 21); cf. ~ou/t' epi/derkta ta/d' a/ndrasin ou/t' epakousta/, ou/te no/ô| peri/lêpta~, 42 f. (_fr._ 2, 7).--Elsewhere it is true that Emped. (who throughout avoids prosaic exactitude in the use of technical terms) uses ~noê=sai~ as simply = sense-perception following epic idiom: e.g. 56 (_fr._ 4, 12; but it is not quite correct to say that Emped. ~to\ phronei=n kai\ to\ aistha/nesthai tauto/ phêsi~, as Arist. declares: _An._ 427a, 22).]

[67\11: 378 ff.; _fr._ 109: ~gai/ê| me\n ga\r gai=an opô/pamen~, etc. (~hora=n~ is here used in its widest sense, ~ei=dos anti\ ge/nous~, and = ~aistha/nesthai~. Thus, ~no/ô| de/rkesthai~ in 82 [17, 21] = ~aistha/nesthai~, and very commonly words denoting one of the modes of perception are used instead of those of another ~ei=dos~, or for the whole ~ge/nos~ of ~ai/sthêsis~. Lob., _Rhemat._ 334 ff.).]

[68\11: 372 ff. Mull.; _fr._ 105: ~hai/matos en pela/gessi . . . tê=| te no/êma ma/lista kukli/sketai anthrô/poisin; hai=ma ga\r anthrô/pois perika/rdio/n esti no/êma~.--The blood is the seat of ~to\ phronei=n; en tou/tô| ga\r ma/lista kekra=sthai ta\ stoichei=a~, Thphr., _Sens._ 10, 23 f.]

[69\11: A kind of ~suggumnasi/a tô=n aisthê/seôn~ as the physician Asklepiades defines the idea of the ~psuchê/~ (_Dox._ 378a, 7).--It resembles what Arist. calls the ~prô=ton aisthêtê/rion~.--This function which Emped. calls ~phronei=n~ would probably be the ~henopoiou=n~ of the perceptions which Aristot. found wanting in Emp. (_An._ 409b, 30 ff.; 410a, 1-10; b, 10).]

[70\11: ~to\ noei=n~ is ~sômatiko\n hô/sper to\ aistha/nesthai~, Arist., _An._ 427a, 26.]

[71\11: Arist., _Metaph._ 1009b, 17 ff.]

[72\11: 298 Mull.; _fr._ 110, 10: ~pa/nta ga\r i/sthi phro/nêsin e/chein kai\ nô/matos hai=san~. The ~pa/nta~ must be understood quite literally; for it is the {403} elements in which the powers of perception inhere (~he/kaston tô=n stoichei/ôn psuchê\n ei=nai~ is the opinion attributed to Emped. by Arist., _An._ 404b, 12). But elements are present in the mixture of all things, and thus stones, etc., have ~phro/nêsis~ and a "portion of mind" in them (though the statement that it is ~hai/ma~ that first produces ~phro/nêsis~ will not square with this: Thphr., _Sens._ 23). Emped. attributed complete sensation and perception to plants, and even gave them ~nou=s~ and ~gnô=sis~ (without blood?): [Arist.] _Plant._ 815a, 16 ff.; b, 16 f. That is why they, too, are capable of harbouring fallen daimones.]

[73\11: Emped. himself does not use the word ~psuchê/~ at all in the fragments that have been preserved to us; and it is hardly probable that he himself would have used the term of the psychical faculties of the body even if he regarded these as gathered together to a substantive unity. Later authorities, on the other hand, in their accounts of the doctrine of Emped. give the name of ~psuchê/~ precisely to these "somatic" intellectual faculties; thus Arist., _An._ 404b, 9 ff.; 409b, 23 ff.: ~hai=ma phêsin ei=nai tê\n psuchê/n~, Gal., _Hipp. et Pla._ 2 = v, 283 K.; cf. Cic., _TD._ i, 19; Tert., _An._ 5.]

[74\11: 113-19 Mull.; _frr._ 11, 15, do not (as Plu., _adv. Col._ 12, p. 1113 D, understood them) teach the pre-existence and persistence after death of the psychic powers within the world of the elements, but merely speak of the indestructibility of the elements that are the component parts of the human body, even when the latter has suffered dissolution.]

[75\11: ~a/tês leimô/n~, _fr._ 121, 4 (21 Mull.; cf. 16) is the name given by Empedokles to the earth; and not to Hades (as has been supposed), of which--as an intermediate place of purgation between two births--there is nowhere any mention in his verses. That the ~aterpê\s chô=ros~ (_fr._ 121, 1) to which Emped. is cast down, the realm of ~Pho/nos ktl.~ (_fr._ 121) and the ~A/tês leimô/n~, all refer to the _earth_, ~ho e/ggeios to/pos, ta\ peri\ gê=n~, is expressly stated by Themistios, _Or._ 13, and Hierocl. _in C. Aur._ 24 (_fr._ 121), p. 470 Mull. [_FPG._ i]; Synes. also implies it (_Ep._ 147, p. 283 C; _Prov._ i, 89 D); the same is distinctly implied for _fr._ 121, 4, and by Jul., _Or._ vii, 226 B; Philo, ii, p. 638 M.--Procl., _in _Crat.__, p. 103 Boiss., connects _fr._ 121, 3, ~auchmêrai/ te no/soi kai\ sê/psies e/rga te rheusta/~ immediately with _fr._ 121, 2, and both lines acc. to him apply to ~ta\ hupo\ tê\n selê/nên~; i.e. not to any kind of underworld but to the region of the earth (cf. Emp. ap. Hippol., _RH._ i, 4; _Vors._ 210, 27; _Dox._ 559). The idea that Hades is being spoken of in these lines is a view peculiar to moderns who have misunderstood the poet and set aside the clear testimony of Themistios and the rest. Maass, _Orpheus_, 113, speaks as though the interpretation in favour of Hades rested upon a tradition which I "contradicted". On the contrary, that interpretation is itself contradicted by definite tradition and by common sense (for Emp. falls from Heaven to earth and not, please God, to Hades!). The view is quite baseless (though Maass himself finds in the ~e/rga rheusta/~ of _fr._ 121 [20 M.]--the inconstant, transitory works of men upon earth--a support for his Hades-view: these "fluid works" or things are, he thinks, nothing else but the stream of filth, the ~skô\r aei/nôn~, in Hades of which pious invention rumoured: certainly an ingenious interpretation). Emp. is, in fact, the first to regard this earthly sojourning as the real Hell--the ~asunê/thês, aterpê\s chô=ros~ (_fr._ 118, 121, 1, the latter a parodying reminiscence of ~l~ 94)-- an ~a/ntron hupo/stegon~ (_fr._ 120) filled with all the plagues and terrors of the original Hades (121). Stoics and Epicureans (see below) took up the idea after him and elaborated it in detail. The daimones that are shut up in this life here below--a ~zôê\ a/bios~ (_fr._ 2, 3)--are as if dead: {404} _frr._ 125 (?), 35, 14. The Orphic idea of the ~sô=ma--sê=ma~ (see above, p. 345) was thus thoroughly and energetically carried out. (Macr., _in S. Scip._ 1, 10, 9 ff., attributed the idea that the _inferi_ are nothing else but the material world of earth to the old _theologi_ (§ 17) who, he says, lived _before_ the development of a philosophic science of nature.)]

[76\11: 3 Mull.; _fr._ 115, 3: ~eu=te/ tis (tô=n daimo/nôn) amplaki/ê|si _pho/nô|_ phi/la gui=a miênê|~. He means ~brô=sis sarkô=n kai\ allêlophagi/a~ as Plu. paraphrases it, _Es. Carn._ 1, p. 996 B (for this must always imply acc. to Emp. the "murder" of a spirit of the same race: _fr._ 136). Even for God it is a crime to taste of a meat ("blood")-offering and, in fact, there were only bloodless offerings made in the Golden Age (which was described by Emp. not in the ~Phusika/~--the principle of which work denied that there had ever been such a period--but in some other poem in which he left his philosophic doctrine out of account; perhaps the ~Katharmoi/~): 420 ff. M; _fr._ 128, 3 ff.]

[77\11: _fr._ 115, 4. The earth then becomes the place of their banishment and punishment for gods that have broken their oath. This is a version of the impressive picture in Hes., _Th._ 793 ff. _Dei peierantes_ were punished for nine years (cf. Hes., _Th._ 801) in Tartaros: Orpheus (not Lucan in his "Orpheus") ap. Serv., _A._ vi, 565. (To this also alludes the poet from whose elegiac verses came the frag. ap. Serv., _A._ vi, 324: ~tou=~ [sc. ~Stugo\s hu/datos] stugno\n pô=ma kai\ athana/tô|~: this is probably how the words should be read.) So that instead of the "underworld" or Tartaros, the world is for Emp. the worst place of sorrows. From Emp. is derived the conception that the realm of the _inferi_ is our world, that inhabited by men, and that there is no other, nor any need of another ~ha/|dês~--a conception often alluded to and improved upon by Stoic and other semi-philosophers (esp. clear in Serv., _A._ vi, 127, often only in allegorical sense: Lucr. iii, 978 ff. [See also Bevan, _Stoics and Sceptics_, p. 107.]).]

[78\11: 30,000 ~hô=rai~: which means probably "years" (hardly "seasons" as Dieterich, _Nekyia_, 119, takes it). The figure 30,000 has no special meaning (e.g. 300 periods of a life-time each): it is merely a concrete phrase for "innumerable" (and is frequent: Hirzel, _Ber. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss._ 1885, p. 64 ff.). This enormous period of time is the divine counter-part, as measured by divine standards of time, of the ~me/gas eniauto/s~, the _ennaëteris_ during which the earthly murderer had to fly from the land of his violent deed. The fiction of Emp. clearly shows the influence of this expiation of murder by ~apeniautismo/s~.]

[79\11: _fr._ 121 (22 ff.).]

[80\11: ~argale/as bioi/toio keleu/thous . . . ~ _fr._ 115, 8 (8).]

[81\11: Emp. does not even use the word ~psuchê/~ of these ~dai/mones~ confined within corporeality. They are so named, however, regularly and without qualification by the later authors who quote verses from the _Prooimion_ of the ~Phusika/~, Plutarch, Plotinos, Hippolytos, etc.]

[82\11: Peculiar to Emp. is the attempt to give actual details of the crimes for which the spirits are condemned to ~ensôma/tôsis~; and also the extension of metempsychosis to plants (which is occasionally attributed, but by late authorities only, to the Pythagoreans as well).]

[83\11: The entirely unpurified seem not to have been condemned to everlasting punishment in Hades, of which in general he shows no knowledge, by Emp. (as by the Pythagoreans sometimes). He merely, it seems, threatens them with ever-renewed rebirth upon earth and the impossibility of ~to\ ku/klou lê=xai~ (until the complete ascendency of ~phili/a~). This appears to be the meaning of _fr._ 145 (455 f.) from the way in which Cl. Al., _Protr._ ii, 27, p. 23 P., cites the lines.] {405}

[84\11: As we may paraphrase--though indeed here, too, only with reservations--the ~kako/tês~ and ~kako/têtes~ of Emp. _fr._ 145 (454 f.).]

[85\11: _frr._ 136-7, 128, 9 f. (424, 440). Very remarkable in a thinker of such an early period is what is said (_fr._ 135) about the ~pa/ntôn no/mimon~ which forbids ~ktei/nein to\ e/mpsuchon~.--Apart from this we have other vestiges of _kathartic_ rules: purification with water drawn from five springs: _fr._ 143 (see Append. v); abstention from the eating of beans (_fr._ 141) and of laurel leaves (_fr._ 140). The laurel is sacred as a magic plant, together with the ~ski/lla~ (see App. v) and ~rha/mnos~ (see above, chap. v, n. 95). Cf. _Gp._ 11, 2, etc. Its special sacredness gives the laurel its importance in the cult of Apollo. Emp. (like Pythagoras) seems to have paid special honour to Apollo: it appears from something that is said ap. D.L. viii, 57, that he wrote a ~prooi/mion eis Apo/llôna~: the exalted conception of a divinity that is pure ~phrê\n hierê/~ in abstraction from all sense-perception, elaborated by Emp. in _frr._ 133-4, was regarded by him as applying particularly ~peri\ Apo/llônos~ (Amm. in Arist., _Interpr._ 249, 1 ed. Brand. 135a, 23).]

[86\11: In fanciful ways: _fr._ 127 (lion, laurel), 448 Mull.]

[87\11: _fr._ 146 (457) ~pro/moi~ being used probably with intention as a vague term: regal power would hardly have seemed to possess special merit to the democratically minded Emp. He hardly knew it in any form but the tyrannis and to this he showed himself an energetic opponent (even though the violent language of Timaeus, the enemy of tyrants, is not to be taken quite literally). He himself was offered royal power, but he refused it with contempt as one who was ~pa/sês archê=s allo/trios~: Xanthos and Arist. ap. D.L. viii, 63; _Vors._ 196, 10. He might all the same (and rightly) regard himself in political matters, too, as one of the ~pro/moi~; it is plain that in the enumeration of those who were ~eis te/los~ born as ~ma/nteis te kai\ humnopo/loi kai\ iêtroi/, kai\ pro/moi anthrô/poisin epichthoni/oisi pe/lontai~, and were never to be born again, he includes himself especially, and, in fact, takes himself as the model of this last and highest stage upon earth. He himself was all these things simultaneously.]

[88\11: _frr._ 146-7 (459 ff.) ~e/nthen anablastou=si theoi\ timê=|si phe/ristoi, athana/tois a/lloisin home/stioi, e/n te trape/zais~ (read ~_e/n te tra/pezoi_~--a tmesis, = ~entra/pezoi/ te); eu/nies andrei/ôn ache/ôn, apo/kêroi, ateirei=s~.]

[89\11: Emped. perhaps described himself as "god" also in _fr._ 23, 11 (144) ~alla\ torô=s tou=t' i/sthi~ (he is speaking to Pausanias), ~_theou= pa/ra_ mu=thon akou/sas~. See Bidez, _Biogr. d'Emp._, p. 166 (1894)--unless these words would be better taken as an abbreviated comparison (with omission of ~hôs~): "as certainly as if you had received these words from a god."]

[90\11: As Plu. is inclined to do: _Exil._ xvii, p. 607 D.]

[91\11: As several modern critics have attempted to do.]

[92\11: _fr._ 17, 30 (92).]

[93\11: See above, chap. i, pp. 4 ff.]

[94\11: As late again as Plotinos, who speaks of the ~ditto\n en hêmi=n~: the ~sô=ma~ which is a ~thêri/on zô|ôthe/n~ and the ~alêthê\s a/nthrôpos~ distinct from it, etc. (1, 1, 10; 6, 7, 5).]

[95\11: At any rate Emp. spoke of the ekstasis, the _furor_ which is an _animi purgatio_ and to be entirely distinguished from that which is produced by _alienatio mentis_ (~phronei=n alloi=a~, _fr._ 108): Cael. Aur., _Morb. Chron._ i, 5, p. 25 Sich. = _Vors._ 223. A special ~enthousiastiko/n~ in the soul as its ~theio/taton~ (part): Stoics (and Plato) acc. to _Dox._ 639, 25. A special organ of the soul which effects the union with the divine, being the ~a/nthos tê=s ousi/as hêmô=n~, is mentioned in Proclus (Zeller, _Phil. d. Griech._^2 iii, 2, 738).] {406}

[96\11: ~to\ ho/lon~, the whole reality of Being and Becoming in the world, cannot be comprehended by man through his senses nor even with ~nou=s~: _fr._ 2 (36-43). But Empedokles has in his own persuasion grasped it; he is situated ~sophi/ês ep' a/kroisi~ (_fr._ 4, 8), ~autê\n epagge/lletai dô/sein tê\n alê/theian~ (Procl., _in Ti._ 106 E. Proclus declares that the words ~sophi/ês ep' a/kroisi~--and this is a further point--are meant to apply to Emped. himself. (I do not quite understand Bidez' doubts about what is said here, and in what follows: see _Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Phil._ ix, 203, 42.) Whence, then, did the poet obtain this knowledge of the truth since it is revealed neither to the senses nor to the ~nou=s~? At any rate, the ~psuchopompoi\ duna/meis~ (Porph., _Antr._ 8), who conducted his soul-daimon out of the region of the gods, say to the soul (_fr._ 2, 8): ~su\ d' ou=n epei\ hô=d' elia/sthês~ (i.e. "since you have been cast up here--on the earth"--not "since you have so desired it", as Bergk, _Opusc._ ii, 23, explains: which would be a distorted idea expressed in distorted language)--~peu/seai ou ple/on êe\ brotei/ê mê=tis ho/pôpen~ (thus with Panzerbieter, for ~o/rôre~). According to this we must suppose that his more profound knowledge (insight into the ~mi=xi/s te dia/llaxi/s te mige/ntôn~ of the elements, together with knowledge of the destiny and purpose of the soul-daimones, etc.), which he cannot have got on earth or in his earthly body must have been brought with him out of his divine past-life. This knowledge is then peculiar to the daimon (or ~psuchê/~ in the older sense) that is buried in the body; and Emp. presumably owes it to an _~ana/mnêsis~_ of his earlier life (a faculty that is only rarely active). From what other source could he have got his knowledge of his previous ~ensômatô/seis~ (_fr._ 117)? He has even farther and more profound knowledge than he dares communicate--_fr._ 4 (45-51), and says quite plainly that he is keeping back in piety a last remnant of wisdom that is unsuited for human ears (to this extent the authorities--~a/lloi d' ê=san hoi le/gontes~--of S.E., _M._ vii, 122--have rightly understood him).--The belief in a miraculous power of _~ana/mnêsis~_ that goes beyond the present life of the individual may have been derived by Emp. from Pythagorean doctrine or mythology. Emp. himself follows the legend of the Pyth. school and attributes such a power of recollection to Pythagoras: ~ho/ppote ga\r pa/sê|si . . .~ _fr._ 129 [430 ff.]. See Append. x. The eager development--indeed, the cult--of the ~mnê/mê~ in Pythagorean circles is well known. The invention of the myths describing the fountain of Mnemosyne in Hades may also be Pythagorean (see below). Throughout the various ~ensômatô/seis~ of the soul it is the undying ~mnê/mê~ that alone preserves the unity of personality which (as the ~psuchê/~) lives through all these transformations and is bound together in this way. It is evident how important this idea was for the doctrine of transmigration (it occurs also in the teaching of Buddha). Plato, like Empedokles, seems to have got the idea of an _~ana/mnêsis~_ reaching beyond the limits of the present life from the Pythagoreans: he, then, it is true, developed the idea in connexion with his own philosophy to unexpected conclusions (cf. further, Dieterich, _Nekyia_, 122).]

[97\11: ~phili/a~ is for him (not indeed in his words but in his intention as Arist. understood him): ~aiti/a tô=n agathô=n, to\ de\ nei=kos tô=n kakô=n~, _Metaph._ 985a, 4 ff.; 1075b, 1-7. Hence the ~êpio/phrôn Philo/têtos amemphe/os a/mbrotos hormê/~ (_fr._ 35) is contrasted with ~Nei=kos maino/menon~ (115, 14), ~oulo/menon~ (17, 19), ~lugro/n~ (109). The ~sphai=ros~ in which only ~phili/a~ prevails while ~nei=kos~ is completely vanquished, is called ~moni/ê| periê/rgeï gai/ôn~, _fr._ 27, 28.] {407}

[98\11: ~theoi\ dolichai/ônes~ (_frr._ 20, 12, 23, 8). Exactly the same is said of the ~_dai/mones_ hoi/te bi/oio lelo/gchasi makrai/ônos~ (115, 5). In the face of these expressions, so definitely setting a period to the lifetime of the gods, we must suppose that the epithets which Emp. applies to himself--he is to be in the future ~theo\s a/mbrotos ouk e/ti thnêto/s~, 112, 4--are merely intended to assert that he shall not die any more in his incarnation as a man (the same thing must be meant when those who are delivered from the circle of rebirth are called ~apo/kêroi, a/teirei=s~ (147); the gods are only called ~a/thanatoi~ by traditional convention). Plutarch also, _Def. Or._ 16, p. 418 E, distinctly states that the ~dai/mones~ of Emp. eventually die. That the gods (but not ~to\ thei=on~ itself) were liable to extinction had already been the opinion of Anaximander and Anaximenes. Acc. to Emp. the individual ~dai/mones~ would be reabsorbed into the universal divinity, the ~sphai=ros~ (just as the individual deities of the Stoics are reabsorbed at the world-conflagration into Zeus who is alone indestructible). [= ll. 131, 141, 461, 460 M.]]

[99\11: Emp., _frr._ 133, 134 (389-96), speaks of a supersensual divinity that is entirely ~phrê\n hierê/~: he gives to this divinity the name of Apollo, but the description is said to apply ~peri\ panto\s tou= thei/ou~. Hipp., _RH._ vii, 29, p. 386 D.-S., refers the description to the ~sphai=ros~. The ~sphai=ros~, in which no ~nei=kos~ is left was called by Emp. ~ho theo/s, ho eudaimone/statos theo/s~ (Arist., _An._ i, 5, 410b, 5-6; _Metaph._ ii, 4, 1000b, 3). It is, however, certain that Emp. would not have **regarded the ~sphai=ros~ as pure ~phrê\n hierê/~. It appears, in fact, that in the ~sphai=ros~, in which everything is together and united, even the divine power thought of as supersensual is brought to a close. In the world-state of multiplicity caused by ~nei=kos~ divinity seems to be regarded as separate from the elements and the forces. "Furious conflict" (115, 14) then attacks even the divinity and divides it against itself; hence the origin of individual ~dai/mones~ as a self-caused division of the divine, a desertion from the One ~thei=on~--the individual ~dai/mones~ are ~phuga/des, theo/then~ (115, 13). These individual ~dai/mones~ are entangled in the world from its origin until at last, having become purified, they rise again to the heights of divinity; and when all individuality is again fused into one by ~phili/a~ they return once more into the universal divinity in order with it to enter into the ~sphai=ros~.--Thus we may perhaps reconstruct the Empedoklean fantasy. His lines do not supply sufficient evidence for the complete reconstruction of his picture of the perpetually recurring process. We should naturally expect a certain obscurity to cling to this attempt to fuse together physiology and theology.]

[100\11: Lucr. iii, 370-3.]

[101\11: All that is essential on the subject of Demokritos' doctrine of the soul is to be found in Arist., _An._ i, 2, p. 403b, 31-404a, 16; 405a., 7-13; i, 3, p. 406b, 15-22; _Resp._ iv, p. 471b, 30-472a, 17.--The air is full of the particles which Demokritos calls ~nou=s~ and ~psuchê/~: _Resp._ 472a, 6-8 [_Vors._ ii, 36]. The atoms hovering in the air become visible as "motes in the sunbeam"; of these some are the soul-atoms (this must be the meaning of _An._ 404A, 3 ff.; Iamb. ap. Stob., _Ecl._ i, p. 384, 15 W., is only drawing upon Arist.). This is a modification of the opinion held by the Pythagoreans (mentioned also by Arist. 404a, 16 ff.) that the motes in the sunbeam are "souls" (see above, chap. x, n. 34). Inhalation of the world-stuff as a condition of life in the individual is imitated from Herakleitos (see S.E., _M._ vii, 129).]

[102\11: The soul acc. to Dem. ~ekbai/nei me\n tou= sô/matos, en de\ tô=| ekbai/nein diaphorei=tai kai\ diaskeda/nnutai~, Iamb. ap. Stob., _Ecl._ i, p. 384, 16 f. W.] {408}

[103\11: Dem. ~phthartê\n (ei=nai tê\n psuchê\n) tô=| sô/mati sundiaphtheirome/nên~, _Dox._ 393a, 8 [_Vors._ A 109]. Since the disruption of the soul-atoms is not effected at a single blow death may, in consequence, sometimes be only apparent; i.e. when many but not all the soul-particles have escaped. For this reason also, with the possible re-assemblage of the soul-atoms, ~anabiô/seis~ of the apparently dead may occur. Cases of this kind seem to have been treated in the work ~peri\ tô=n en Ha/idou~: see Procl., _in _Rp.__ ii, 113, 6 Kr.; D.L. ix, 46; it is counted among the most famous, or at least the most popular of Dem.'s writings in the anecdote ap. Ath. 168 B; cf. [Hp.] _Ep._ 10, 3, p. 291 Hch. [ix, 322 Lit.]; _Vors._ 55 C, 2. This view of the retention of vitality, of course, only applies to the period immediately following the (apparent) death (it is fairly correctly represented by [Plu.] _Plac. Ph._ 4, 4, 4 [_Dox._ 390], it was probably attributed to Dem. on account of a similar observation made by Parmenides; see above, p. 373). Nevertheless, out of it grew up the assertion, which was then attributed to Dem., that in fact ~ta\ nekra\ tô=n sôma/tôn aistha/netai~: e.g. Alex. Aph. in Arist., _Top._ 21, 21; [_Vors._ ii, 38, 8]; Stob., _Ecl._ i, p. 477, 18 W. In the case, at least, of those that are really "dead", i.e. of bodies that have been deserted by all the soul-atoms, Dem. certainly never taught the presence of ~ai/sthêsis~: against the vulgarization of his opinions that would attribute such a view as this to him (as Epicurus himself did) the _Democritici_ spoken of by Cic. (_TD._ i, 82) made their protest.--The work ~peri\ tô=n en Ha/idou~ can certainly not have confined itself to considerations of a purely physical nature; otherwise Thrasyllos (D.L. ix, 46) could not have classified it among the ~_êthika\_ bibli/a~ of Dem. [_Vors._ ii, 19]. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine what from Dem.'s point of view there could have been to say about "the things in the Underworld". It is hardly possible to suppose (as Mullach, _Dem. fr._, pp. 117-18, and Heyne do) that Dem. would think himself obliged either to answer or to parody the fabulous inventions of the poets about the realm of shadows. It is difficult to be certain that Dem. was really the author of the work: the forgery of later times was particularly fond of turning the most clear-headed of materialists into a mage and a jack-of-all-trades. (Dem.'s observations of the possibility of ~anabiou=n~ is in part at least the origin of the writing ~p. t. en ha/|dou~; it is also responsible for the anecdote that makes him promise to the Persian king that he will restore his dead wife to life again, etc.--a variation of an ingenious story widely spread both in the East and the West. See my Lecture on Greek Novel-writing: _Verh. der Philologenvers. zu Rostock_, 1875, p. 68 f.)--The "fragmenta moralia" of Dem. are with rare exceptions (e.g. Mull. _frr._ 7, 23, 48, 49, etc. = 146, 159, 147, 127 D.) wholesale fabrications of the feeblest kind. One of them, however (119 Mull., 297 D.), agrees at least with what Dem. may very well have said about the punishments in Hell (though in rather different words--he was incapable of quite such a monstrosity as ~muthoplaste/ontes~, which sounds very late Greek. Vain efforts have been made to justify this ~muthoplaste/ô~ by reference to the older ~muthopla/stês~. But ~muthopoio/s, odophu/lax, arguroko/pos~, etc., are also old, and it is no secret that verbs derived by further extension from such composite verbal nouns are mostly late formations: thus ~muthopoie/ô, odophulake/ô, argurokope/ô~, and again ~petrobole/ô, hierophante/ô, teknoktone/ô~, etc.). In another of these _falsa_ no echo even of Dem.'s thought is to be found: _fr. moral._ 1 Mull. [171 D.] ~psuchê\ oikêtê/rion dai/monos~.]

[104\11: Dem., whose inquiries set out from the study of inorganic nature, {409} was led to predicate a mechanical obedience to law in organic nature as well. Anaxagoras starting from the study of organic nature and in particular of man, its highest development, derived from that study the concept of purpose--purpose consciously undertaken and carried out--and this idea affected his outlook upon the whole of nature, including inorganic nature. This teleological system, regarded as of universal application, is made by him to depend on a Being modelled upon the human mind, the only source, in fact, from which he could have derived his experience of action carried out in accordance with pre-arranged purpose.]

[105\11: Cf. here and on what follows, Heinze, _Ber. d. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss._ 1890, pp. 1 ff.]

[106\11: ~nou=s~ must be omniscient if it ~gnô/mên peri\ panto\s i/schei~ (_fr._ 6 M. = 12 D.). It has organized (~dieko/smêse~) not only what was and is but also what is to be: _frr._ 6, 12 [12, 14 D.].]

[107\11: Arist., _Ph._ 256b. 24 ff.]

[108\11: ~ho ga\r nou=s~ (of Anaxag.) ~hei=s~: Arist., _Metaph._ 1069b, 31. On the other hand, ~chrê/mata a/peira plê=thos~: Anaxag. _fr._ 1.]

[109\11: ~Anaxago/ras phêsi to\n nou=n koino\n outhe\n outheni\ tô=n a/llôn e/chein~. Arist., _An._ i, 2, p. 405b, 19 ff.; cf. iii, 4, p. 429b, 23 f.]

[110\11: Anaxag. _fr._ 6 [12]: ~ta\ me\n a/lla <pa/nta> panto\s moi=ran mete/chei, no/os de/ esti a/peiron kai\ autokrate\s kai\ me/miktai oudeni\ chrê/mati, alla\ mou=nos auto\s eph, heôutou= esti. (a/peiron~ does not seem to supply the required opposition to what proceeds: ? ~haplo/on~. Anaxag. used the word of ~nou=s~ acc. to Arist., _An._ 405a, 16; 429b, 23. Zeller also suggests ~haplo/on~, _Archiv f. G. d. Philos._ v, 441.)]

[111\11: ~ho/sa psuchê\n e/chei, kai\ ta\ me/zô kai\ ta\ ela/ssô, pa/ntôn no/os _krate/ei_; kai\ tê=s perichôrê/sios tê=s sumpa/sês no/os ekra/têse, ô/ste perichôrê=sai tê\n archê/n~, _fr._ 6 [12]. This ~kratei=n~ at the beginning of the ~perichô/rêsis~ cannot at any rate take place by the inter-mixture of ~nou=s~ in the ~spe/rmata~ or by the entry of ~nou=s~ into these. Because ~nou=s~ is both ~apathê/s~ and ~amigê/s~s, it ~kratoi/ê a\n _amigê\s_ ô/n~, Arist., _Ph._ 256b, 27; cf. 429a, 18. Does this also apply to ~nou=s~ when it ~tô=n psuchê\n echo/ntôn krate/ei~? And yet in this case it appears to be divided, as ~mei/zôn~ or ~ela/ttôn~ in each case, in the ~zô=|a~.--No one can help being reminded here of the insoluble _aporiai_ raised in Aristotle's own doctrine of the active ~nou=s~ which, in this case too, is ~apathê/s, amigê/s, chôristo/s~ from the body; is also deprived of all attributes of individuality (which reside entirely in the lower psychical powers) and thus appears as a common divine spirit. And yet it is said to be a ~mo/rion tê=s psuchê=s~, present ~en tê=| psuchê=|~, dwelling inside the body yet having nothing in common with it, and in any case is thought of as an individual mind. In the case of Anaxagoras the same _aporiai_ apply also to the nourishing, feeling, desiring, and moving soul (as it is called by Arist.); for all the "parts" of the soul are included almost indistinguishably by him under the conception of ~nou=s~.--The difficulty of reconciling the unity and inward continuity of the spiritual (immaterial, that cannot be thought of as divided)--with its individuation and distribution into the multiplicity of souls, is one which repeatedly occurs in Greek philosophy.]

[112\11: ~dia\ pa/ntôn io/nta~, Pl., _Crat._ 413 C.]

[113\11: ~en panti\ panto\s moi=ra e/nesti plê\n no/ou; e/sti hoi=si de\ kai\ no/os e/ni~, _fr._ 5 [11].]

[114\11: ~no/os de\ pa=s ho/moio/s esti kai\ ho me/zôn kai\ ho ela/ssôn~, _fr._ 6 [12].]

[115\11: Arist., _An._ i, 2, p. 404b, 1-7: Anaxag. often gives ~to\n nou=n~ as ~to\ ai/tion tou= kalô=s kai\ orthô=s; hete/rôthi de\~ (he says) ~_tou=ton ei=nai tê\n psuchê/n_; en ha/pasi ga\r hupa/rchein auto\n toi=s zô/|ois, kai\ mega/lois kai\ mikroi=s {410} kai\ timi/ois kai\ atimote/rois~ (in which case the ~nou=s~ that dwells within all the ~zô=|a~ cannot be any longer regarded as ~ho kata\ phro/nêsin lego/menos nou=s~). Anaxag. had expressed himself indistinctly: ~hê=tton diasaphei= peri\ autôn~ (i.e, the relation between ~nou=s~ and ~psuchê/~). Cf. 405a, 13 f. In the sense of the words as used by Anaxagoras ~nou=s~ and ~psuchê/~ were simply identified by Plato: _Crat._ 400 A.]

[116\11: D.L. ii, 8 [_Vors._ 375]. Acc. to Anaxag. the moon has ~_oikê/seis_ (alla\ kai\ lo/phous kai\ pha/raggas~). _Fr._ 10 [4] probably refers to the men and other ~zô=|a~ in the moon (to whom yet another moon gives light). Anaxag. ~tê\n selê/nên gê=n phêsi\n ei=nai~ (i.e. an inhabitable heavenly body like the earth), Pl., _Ap._ 26 D; cf. Hippol., _R.H._ i, 8, 10, p. 22, 40 D.-S.--We are reminded of the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasies about life on the moon (see above, chap. x, n. 76).]

[117\11: Anaxag. counted the plants as ~zô=|a~ and ascribed emotions to them: ~hê/desthai kai\ lupei=sthai~ [Arist.] _Plant._ 815a, 18. Like Plato and Demokritos Anaxag. also regarded plants as ~zô=|a e/ggeia~: Plu., _QN._ 1, 911 D.]

[118\11: In spite of its entry into ~chrê/mata, nou=s~ is yet said to remain "unmixed" and unaffected by them: ~autokra/tora ga\r auto\n o/nta kai\ oudeni\ memigme/non pa/nta phêsi\n auto\n kosmei=n ta\ pra/gmata dia\ pa/ntôn io/nta~, Pl., _Crat._ 413 C. We thus have at the same time ~dia\ pa/ntôn io/nta~ and denial of mixture which is reiterated in stronger and stronger language. Thus ~nou=s~ even so remains still ~eph' heôutou= (ei mê\ ga\r eph' heôutou ê=n, _a/llô|_ te/ô| eme/mikto a/n; metei=che de\ a\n hapa/ntôn chrêma/tôn ei eme/mikto/ teô|; en panti\ ga\r panto\s moi=ra he/nesti ktl.~ So perhaps we should read _fr._ 6 [12] restoring a completed syllogism. In the traditional text the clause ~ei eme/mikto/ teô|~ is superfluous and in the way). It takes no particle of the others into itself.]

[119\11: [Plu.] _Plac. Phil._ 5, 25, 2 (Aët., _Dox._ 437; _Vors._ 397, 18), in the chap. ~pote/rou esti\n hu/pnos kai\ tha/natos psuchê=s ê\ sô/matos~; Anaxag. taught: ~ei=nai de\ kai\ psuchê=s tha/naton to\n diachôrismo/n~. Nothing else can be meant by the words--the theme of the chapter alone shows it--than: the death of the soul (as well as of the body) occurs with its separation (from the body). ~to\n diachôrismo/n~ is subject and ~ei=nai tê=s psuchê=s tha/naton~ predicate of the sentence (not the other way round as Siebeck seems to think: _Ges. d. Psychol._ i, 285). The violent alteration proposed by Wyttenbach (_de immort. animi_, **_Opusc._ ii, 597 f.) has not the smallest justification: ~ei=nai de\ kai\ to\n tha/naton psuchê=s diachôrismo\n kai\ sô/matos~. There could have been no reason at all in appealing specially to Anaxagoras for a confirmation of the popular conception of death (it would be nothing more). Further, in this particular connexion such a definition of death is quite out of place; since the theme of the chap. is only to ask the question whether death also affects the soul, not what it is. ~psuchê/~ here must mean the individual soul, not the ~nou=s~ which is the basis of the individual souls. Anaxag. made the individual soul perish at death--so much is certain. It must be admitted that we cannot say for certain whether the Placita are referring to an actual utterance of Anaxag. or are only drawing conclusions from his teaching.]

[120\11: _fr._ 17 [17].]

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