Chapter II: The Session Until Easter (3)

This speech and Sir Edward Carson's departure damped whatever hopes of settlement had been based on certain passages in the Vote of Censure debate. Meanwhile rumours had reached London that officers in Ireland had resigned to avoid serving against Ulster; and many Unionists believed that British troops were to be ordered to shoot down the Ulster Volunteers at once. The chief sources for the history are the Prime Minister's statements to the Press and in the Commons (March 22, 23); the White Paper (March 25); the _Morning Post_ account (March 26), based on information from the officers concerned; the First Lord of the Admiralty's speech (March 30), and Colonel Seely's speech (April 9); the Ulster version issued in April, and the consequent debates in the Unionist motion for an inquiry (_post_, Chap. III.). In December, 1913, the War Minister had warned the Generals commanding in chief, that while soldiers were justified in contemplating disobedience to outrageous orders, _e.g._ massacring a demonstration of Orangemen who were not dangerous, they might have to assist in supporting the Civil Power, and that they could not pick and choose between lawful and reasonable orders. Any officer resigning was to be asked for reasons, and, if he indicated that he desired to choose between orders, the War Minister would at once submit to the King that his name should be removed. On March 14 it was determined to protect certain military stores in Ireland from possible raids by Ulster Volunteers. General Sir Arthur Paget, commanding in Ireland, was ordered to take the necessary steps. Cavalry and horse artillery were to support the infantry, and, as the Great Northern Railway of Ireland was expected to refuse to convey the troops, preparations were made to send them by sea, and one company was actually sent by sea to Carrickfergus; but the railway authorities accepted the troops. As was afterwards revealed, naval support was provided for the operations (p. 60). On March 20 Sir A. Paget arrived in Dublin and conferred, first, with General Gough, commanding the Third Cavalry Brigade, who apparently refused to serve against Ulster, preferring to be dismissed the service; next, with the other generals, and, according to the _Morning Post_ (April 7), his instructions were as follows: The Third Cavalry Brigade was to move forward to seize the bridges across the Boyne and to wait there till relieved by the infantry; a fleet was to anchor in Belfast Lough and co-operate with the Army, 25,000 troops were to be employed, and a division of infantry got from England. The force was made large apparently in order to deter the Volunteers from attacking it, but the Unionists insisted that it was provocative. It appears to have been intimated also to the officers that the Ulster Unionist leaders were to be arrested, and possibly--though as to this there is a conflict of evidence--that the orders were in accordance with the wishes of the King. It seemed that Sir A. Paget might unintentionally have misinterpreted the intentions of the Government. However, he telegraphed to the War Office that evening that the Brigadier and fifty-seven officers, Third Cavalry Brigade (out of a total of seventy), preferred to accept dismissal if ordered North; and General Gough sent him a Minute, saying that, while these officers were prepared to maintain order and preserve property, they had rather be dismissed than initiate active military operations against Ulster. (These officers comprised all those of the Sixteenth Lancers, nearly all those of the Fourth Hussars and Fifth Lancers, and six out of thirteen of the Third Brigade Royal Horse Artillery.) Next day, March 21, Sir A. Paget attempted to remove their fears. He assured them that the measure contemplated was merely a measure of precaution, but he spoke of "massacres," of "battles," of a possible disarmament of regiments which refused to move, which would be the "Indian Mutiny over again," and finally said that "there were worse things than a Court Martial," which was interpreted to refer to the possibility of a capital sentence for disobeying orders. For these explanations the authority is the _Morning Post_ account, based apparently on statements from the officers concerned. The situation was not bettered by them, or by the wild rumours which were published in London (March 21 and 22) of mutinies of infantry regiments in Ireland. On Sunday, March 22, therefore, the Prime Minister authorised _The Times_ to state: (1) That the recent movements of troops in Ireland were purely precautionary and intended only to safeguard the depots of arms, while the naval movements merely consisted in sending troops to Carrickfergus by two small cruisers without the necessity of marching them through Belfast; (2) that no warrants were issued for the arrest of the Ulster leaders, and no such step was contemplated; (3) it was untrue that the Government contemplated instituting a general inquiry into the intentions of officers if asked to take up arms against Ulster; it was hoped that this contingency might never arise.

It was under these circumstances that both Houses met on Monday, March 23. In the Commons the War Minister stated that on the evening of March 20 General Sir A. Paget had notified the War Office that some officers might be unable to carry out his instructions; the Army Council telegraphed asking him to state the circumstances, and ordering the senior officers concerned to report themselves at the War Office. An inquiry held by the Army Council showed that the incident was due to a misunderstanding of questions put them by Sir A. Paget, and, with his approval, they had been ordered to rejoin their units. The movements of troops ordered on the night of March 19 from information received were: One company of infantry was instructed to move to Enniskillen, Omagh, Armagh, and Carrickfergus respectively; one battalion of infantry was ordered, half to Dundalk and half to Newry, and one from Victoria Barracks, inside Belfast, to Holywood Barracks, just outside. The reason was the necessity for protecting Government arms, ammunition, stores, and other property. All these movements had been completed in accordance with instructions from the General commanding in Ireland, and all orders had been punctually and implicitly obeyed.

To make a discussion possible, the Prime Minister moved the adjournment, at Mr. Bonar Law's request. The latter said that a new danger had arisen--that the Army should be destroyed before their eyes. The resignations were not confined to the Cavalry Brigade; an officer in an infantry regiment at the Curragh had written stating that on Thursday, March 20, the following proposal had been put before the officers: "Any officer whose home is in Ulster can be given leave; officers who object to fighting against Ulster can say so and will be at once dismissed from service;" and they were given half an hour to decide. Nine or ten objected to go on any conditions. He read a letter from an officer who had heard Sir A. Paget's address at the Curragh, stating that he had said that "active operations" were to be taken against Ulster, and that he expected the country "to be in a blaze" by March 21. Officers domiciled in Ulster were to be "allowed to disappear," and would subsequently be reinstated, but must give their word not to fight for Ulster; others who would not fight against Ulster would be dismissed. This meant more than merely protective operations, and in his belief certain Ministers, probably without the Prime Minister's knowledge, had made the movement either to provoke or to intimidate the people of Ulster. Neither officers nor men should be compelled to take part in civil war against their will. (Labour members interjected inquiries whether the Army was also entitled to refuse to act in suppressing the railway strike.)

The Prime Minister replied. It was the duty of the Army to protect military property and stores, and to aid the civil power in the maintenance of order. Any officer or private who refused to assist in doing these duties was guilty of a breach of duty and was liable to be dismissed. In December, 1913, instructions were issued to General Sir A. Paget, and the rule as to excusing officers domiciled in an area of disturbance would apply anywhere as far as practicable. Long before the First Lord's speech the danger of a seizure of the guns and stores had been pointed out, and the operation was purely protective, and was over. The Cavalry Brigade had not been ordered to move. Sir A. Paget had had no instructions beyond those of December, except to make these particular movements. Brigadier-General Gough and his officers had misinterpreted his speech, and he denied using anything like the language given. General Gough and the officers concerned, had returned to their posts and expressed their willingness to carry out the duties required. (These explanations were greatly interrupted by the Opposition.) Finally, if officers and soldiers were to discriminate between the validity of different laws, the fabric of society would crumble. Suppose acute labour troubles and a stoppage of food, transport, and fuel, were the troops to follow their sympathies?

Mr. Balfour (U.) ridiculed the Prime Minister's explanation, and contended that the Government had intended to coerce Ulster, and had shrunk from doing so. Ulster might be wrong, but her conviction was rooted, and Ministers had aroused forces which could only be pacified by a broad and statesmanlike treatment which they had given no indications of being able to adopt.

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab.) said that the Syndicalists who had failed to poison the Labour party with their doctrines had apparently succeeded with the Tories; and Mr. John Ward (Lab., _Stoke-on-Trent_) declared that the officers had thrown over their allegiance to the King. The motion for adjournment was withdrawn; and a debate in the House of Lords added no further information.

The course of the debate and of events pleased only the Labour party, who foresaw that, since the option given to officers must logically be extended to men, the Army could not now be used in labour troubles. The Unionists believed that the Government had meant to coerce Ulster and had climbed down. Many Liberals held that it had gone too far in concession to the officers, and a Liberal member was said to have described the situation as "our Zabern." The _Manchester Guardian_ said that the Prime Minister had gone very far towards recognising the right of officers to lay down the conditions of service, and cited Hearson _v._ Churchill (a naval case, 1892) and Clode's "Military Forces of the Crown," to show that officers had no right to resign without leave. In the country the Labour members' deductions made a great impression; on the other hand, an Ulster Defence Fund, started in the City by Mr. H. H. Gibbs, soon reached 100,000_l._

The Labour view of the position was emphasised (March 23) in a debate in the Commons, started by Mr. Amery (U., _Birmingham, S._), on the Report of the Army Vote. Mr. J. Ward (Lab.) read a Syndicalist manifesto "to the men of the British Army" published that day, urging them to remember that officers had exercised an option as to obeying orders, and asking them to resolve that they would never fire a shot against their own class. He added that when this once began it was not officers alone who would have consciences; the question was whether the people, through their representatives in Parliament, were to make the law without interference from King or Army. Later, Mr. J. H. Thomas. (Lab., _Derby_) remarked that the Railway Servants' Union had refused to assist one of their own members who had distributed pamphlets asking soldiers not to shoot down their fellow-workmen. He himself agreed with the action of the Prime Minister in August, 1911, in using troops to secure the food supplies of the nation in the railway strike; and he warned the House that his union had given notice to the railway companies in the name of 400,000 railwaymen which would expire on November 1. He would do his best to effect an amicable settlement, but, if the Opposition doctrine held good, his duty would be to tell the railwaymen to organise their forces and to spend the union's half-million of capital in providing arms and ammunition.

These speeches greatly pleased the Liberals, and Mr. Ward was enthusiastically cheered ("for saying what we all think") when he was introduced by a member into the smoking-room of the National Liberal Club. It was stated, also, that they roused much sympathy in the Army among the rank and file. The Liberals were further startled by the White Paper published next day (March 25). Following the correspondence already quoted, it contained a letter in which General Gough asked the Adjutant-General to make clear whether, if the Home Rule Bill became law, the officers "could be called upon to enforce it in Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order;" and a minute was written in reply, and signed by the War Minister, General Sir John French, and General Sir J. S. Ewart, which ran as follows:--

You are authorised by the Army Council to inform the Officers of
the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, that the Army Council are satisfied that
the incident which has arisen in regard to their resignations has
been due to a misunderstanding.

It is the duty of all soldiers to obey lawful commands given to
them through the proper channel by the Army Council, either for the
protection of public property and the support of the civil power in
the event of disturbances or for the protection of the lives and
property of the inhabitants.

This is the only point it was intended to be put to the officers
in the questions of the General Officer Commanding, and the Army
Council have been glad to learn from you that there never has been
and never will be in the Brigade any question of disobeying such
lawful orders.

His Majesty's Government must retain their right to use all the
forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, to maintain law and
order and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution of
its duty.

But they have no intention whatever of taking advantage of this
right to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of
the Home Rule Bill.

J. S.
J. F.
J. S. E.

23 March, 1914

General Gough, it was rumoured, had at once shown this document and talked freely to reporters, and had received an ovation on his return to the Curragh.

The whole White Paper, and especially the letter above quoted, filled the Liberals with anger and dismay. The _Westminster Gazette_ described it as "incredible," and declared editorially that it would prefer the defeat of the Government to an abject surrender to the Army.

On March 25 the position was further elucidated on the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill. Before this, however, there was another sensation and a scene. Questioned by Lord Charles Beresford as to the movements of the Third Battle Squadron, alleged to be meant to intimidate Ulster, the First Lord of the Admiralty said that a fortnight earlier the Cabinet had decided to station a battle squadron at Lamlash (Arran) as a convenient place to exercise from, and near Ireland if there should be serious disorder. On March 22, the precautionary movements of troops having been carried out without opposition, it was decided to delay the movement till after the Easter period of leave. The field-guns were asked for by the Admiral to exercise the men ashore at Lamlash if the weather was bad (a statement scoffed at by the Opposition). The insinuation made by a Unionist member that the precautionary movements were provocative he repudiated as "hellish." Subsequently Colonel Seely, the War Minister, stated in detail the facts relating to the correspondence published and to the statement quoted above. Having seen General Gough, he went to the Cabinet meeting and said he would ask the Adjutant-General to draft a document for him. He then had to go to the King, and (he said parenthetically) the suggestion made outside Parliament that His Majesty had taken any initiative in the matter was "absolutely without foundation." When he returned, the Cabinet had separated, having discussed the draft prepared by the Adjutant-General (Sir J. S. Ewart). He added the two concluding paragraphs to conform to the statement he had made. On receiving this document General Gough asked Sir John French if it meant that he would not be called on to order his brigade to assist in coercing Ulster to submit to Home Rule, and Sir John French wrote across it "I should read it so." Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart did not know that it was a Cabinet document, and no blame rested on them or on Sir A. Paget; but blame rested on himself for altering it, and, having been absent from the Cabinet meeting, he did not apprehend that his colleagues had seriously considered the document and regarded it in the form in which it had left their hands as a matter of vital concern. Having unintentionally misled his colleagues, he had tendered his resignation. It appeared, however, that this had not been accepted; and Mr. Balfour, after scouting the Ministerial explanation of the naval and military movements and defending Ulster's right to resist, asked how the Government explained the two "peccant paragraphs" which were binding on Colonel Seely and the Army Council, and which "the whole Army would take as its charter." They made it impossible to coerce Ulster.

The Prime Minister, after declaring that the King had throughout observed every rule comporting with the dignity of a constitutional Sovereign, pointed out that in fact the Government had offered the Ulster counties exclusion till after two consultations of the electorate against an offer by the Opposition of one such consultation at once. Was it really believed that there was a plot to provoke Ulster? The movements were purely protective, and were ordered on March 14. Sir Edward Carson and his friends might equip a force said to number 100,000, but, if the Government consulted their general, it was an intrigue and an outrage. General Paget acted like any prudent general in the circumstances. The officers were uneasy, as to the possible initiation of active operations against Ulster, and sent in their resignations. When they came to the War Office, every one realised that there had been a misconception. On the 23rd, after the interviews, the Cabinet received the draft of the proposed letter from the Army Council to General Gough. They did not know of his previous letter nor did the War Secretary. They authorised the three first paragraphs of the letter from the Army Council, which gave no assurance of any sort and stated plainly the duties of the officers. As soon as he received the copy of the whole letter, he sent for the War Secretary, who explained how the two last paragraphs had been added, and said that it was too late to alter them, for General Gough had had the letter. Mr. Asquith pointed out to the House that General Gough's letter shifted the question to a remote and hypothetical contingency It was not right to ask an officer what he would do in such a contingency, still less could it be right for an officer to ask a Government to give him any assurance. Such a claim, once admitted, would put the Government and the House at the mercy of the Military and the Navy. (This was received with prolonged Liberal and Labour cheers and waving of handkerchiefs and papers.) Were that issue once raised, he had little doubt as to the verdict of the country. The War Secretary, under great stress, had committed an error of judgment, but to accept his resignation would be ungenerous and unjust.

Mr. Bonar Law declared that the Government had decided on a great military and naval demonstration to impress the people of Ulster, and Sir A. Paget's statement was inconsistent with their explanation. He read a letter from an infantry officer, stating that Sir Charles Fergusson had told his officers that "steps had been taken so that any aggression must come from the Ulsterites." He insisted that the position amounted to civil war, and, with reference to the Labour attacks on the Ulster people and the Army, he declared that the Ulster Volunteers were thoroughly democratic, and the feeling among the rank and file of the Army was as strong as among the officers. If he were an officer he would resign, and (he hoped) would face a court martial rather than be sent against Ulster. The Government's duty was to find some means of saving the nation from an impossible position.

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab.) declared that Mr. Bonar Law's statement was an encouragement to mutiny. The sentence quoted from Sir Charles Fergusson meant that the offensive must not be taken against Ulster. The officers were acting as party politicians, and had communicated with the Press. Had the position revealed in the White Paper been that of the Government, the Government could not have lived for twenty-four hours.

Later, the Foreign Minister said that the Government repudiated the two paragraphs because they appeared as an answer to General Gough's letter making conditions, and General Gough had returned unconditionally. His question was not one that an officer should put. No question must be raised by the Army as to the orders given them.

After a stormy scene, caused by a remark of Mr. Holt (L., _Northumberland, Hexham_), Mr. Austen Chamberlain (U.), in a long speech, said that the Government's account was incompatible with the permission to officers domiciled in Ulster to disappear, and with the movements of the Fleet, of which the Prime Minister apparently did not know when he communicated with the Press on March 22. He also stated that the draft had been prepared by Colonel Seely in conjunction with Lord Morley of Blackburn, that it contained the guarantee embodied in the paragraphs in question, and that Lord Morley was present at the Cabinet meeting at which the draft was amended. The Cabinet would not throw over a colleague for doing what it had assented to in fact. The First Lord replied that Lord Morley's only connexion with the full document was that the War Minister had shown it to him after the meeting of the Cabinet when he asked what he was to say in the House of Lords on behalf of the Government. He said also that two great issues had emerged, Parliament _versus_ the Army, and the Army _versus_ the People, and that the Opposition had laid down the principle that it was always right for the soldier to shoot down a Radical and a Labour man. The debate ended in uproar, but the second reading was passed and the Government sustained by 314 to 222.

In the House of Lords, meanwhile, Lord Morley of Blackburn described the idea of a plot as "a sinister hallucination," and mentioned incidentally that the peccant paragraphs had been drafted with his aid. The Marquess of Lansdowne thought the Government had contemplated a _coup d'état_ by paralysing the loyalists.

Next day the crisis was dealt with in Parliament only by angry questioning in the Commons; but it was announced in the Press that Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart had tendered their resignations and persisted in them. A statement was promised, but not made, on the adjournment of the Commons; and on Friday, March 27, it was officially promised at 5 P.M., as the Cabinet was still sitting; a suggestion by Mr. Bonar Law that the House should adjourn was rendered nugatory by the ruling of the Speaker that only a Minister could move the adjournment on a Friday, and after a somewhat stormy conversation, the House passed to other business. Just before 5 P.M. the Prime Minister entered; and in reply to Sir R. Pole-Carew (U.) he stated that the officers in question had tendered their resignations, as they had initialled the memorandum to General Gough; but the Cabinet, as there was no difference of policy, had asked them not to persist in their request, as their resignations would be a serious misfortune to the Army and the State. To avoid future misconceptions, a new Army order had been issued, as follows. It was headed "Discipline."

1. No officer or soldier should in future be questioned by his
superior officer as to the attitude he will adopt or as to his
action in the event of his being required to obey orders dependent
on future or hypothetical contingencies.

2. An officer or soldier is forbidden in future to ask for
assurances as to orders which he may be required to obey.

3. In particular it is the duty of every officer and soldier to
obey all lawful commands given to them through the proper channel,
either for the safeguarding of public property, or the support of
the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty, or for the
protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants in the case
of disturbance of the peace.

He repeated that no operations had been contemplated imposing any duty on the Army not covered by the terms of this Order, and the Government adhered to all the declarations they had made.

Mr. Bonar Law insisted, first, that the trouble in the Army had arisen because of the inquisition to which the officers had been subjected, which was condemned in the Order; next, that the disclosures of the movements of troops and battleships were totally inconsistent with the Prime Minister's statement in _The Times_ of March 23. Captain Morrison-Bell (U., _Honiton, Devon_) denounced the Order as a gross insult to the Army; there never would be any doubt as to the obedience to orders. Had the officers not been asked their views the question would never have arisen.

Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart persisted in their resignations; and on Monday, March 30, there was a new and dramatic development. Near the end of question-time in the Commons, Colonel Seely entered, but did not take his place on the Ministerial Bench. A moment later, in reply to a question from the Opposition leader, the Prime Minister regretfully confirmed the news as to the resignations. The two officers retired, not because of any difference with the Government as to the conditions of service in the Army, but because having initialled the memorandum given to General Gough they felt bound to do so. The Secretary of State for War, to his infinite regret, had informed him that he thought it right to take the same course. He himself had, therefore, after much consideration and with no little reluctance, felt it his duty to become Secretary of State for War. (After a momentary pause of astonishment the mass of the Liberals above the gangway, with some other Liberals and Nationalists, rose and cheered wildly.) He must, therefore, offer himself for re-election. Colonel Seely followed, explaining that his resignation was the consequence of that of his two military colleagues. He added that great issues were raised; the whole Army system might have to be recast; but apart from these issues, the Army had served the country loyally and well. He would continue to support the Prime Minister, and would have the knowledge that he had tried to serve faithfully with his colleagues, and to see that fair play was given to the Army in a difficult time.

Mr. Bonar Law protested that the second reading of the Home Rule Bill must be postponed, and the Prime Minister intimated that he had vacated his seat by the advice of the Law Officers, in spite of the adverse precedent set by Mr. Gladstone in 1873. He then left the House amid a great display of Liberal and Nationalist enthusiasm.

The motion for the third reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill, which at once followed, provided another opportunity for reviewing the crisis. Mr. F. E. Smith (U.) endeavoured to establish the existence of the alleged plot, and asked how Lord Morley could remain in the Government if Colonel Seely had left it. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in a long speech defending the Government, said that the letter from the Army Council did not arrive in time to be read to the Cabinet, but that the Prime Minister, who knew the mind of the Cabinet, cut it down to the first three paragraphs. Lord Morley copied the two appended paragraphs merely for his coming statement in the House of Lords. Reviewing the controversy, Mr. Churchill argued that after the Prime Minister's offer of March 9 the question was not of the coercion of Ulster, but of Ulster's barring the way to the rest of Ireland. In January the War Secretary had asked for naval protection for Carrickfergus Castle, but he refused it till after the offer of March 9 had been made. The military advisers of the Government had counselled withdrawing the stores and troops to Dublin; the Cabinet decided to reinforce the depots so that they could only be captured by a serious military attack. Sir A. Paget thought that the movement would be provocative, the Chief Secretary that it would not, though interference with the drill of the Volunteers or arrest of their leaders might be so. Sir A. Paget received no orders for any movement of troops beyond these precautionary movements, but he had full discretionary power in case of resistance. The Secretary of War gave him oral instructions, but he was not asked to put, nor did he put, a hypothetical question, and he was determined to take every conceivable precaution to prevent a collision. A deliberate and unprovoked attack by the Ulster forces on British troops would have made all the contingent measures absolutely necessary, but he and the Government had not expected it, and were right. Suppose a Nationalist Army taking the same course as the Ulster Volunteers, would not the Government be compelled to take similar steps? As to the political issues, he withdrew the word that he spoke at Bradford. What of the provocation from the other side? He charged the Opposition leaders in both Houses with attempting to seduce the Army, quoting a number of speeches, a letter from Earl Roberts, and a circular sent out on House of Commons notepaper by Mr. Hunt (U., _Shropshire, Ludlow_). They had been trying to force an election by creating a rebellion and paralysing the use of the Army to deal with it, and their followers were boasting that the Army had killed the Home Rule Bill.

Among subsequent speakers, Mr. Brace (Lab., _Glamorgan, S._) said that if the King had interfered the Labour party must have made his action an issue at the next elections. If the two paragraphs had been maintained, that party would have overthrown the Government. Mr. Bonar Law contested the charge made against the Opposition leaders by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and, reading out Lord Morley's explanation, declared that every member of the Cabinet was in the same position as the War Minister. Eventually the third reading was carried by 329 to 251.

In the House of Lords, also, the resignations and Lord Morley's position were discussed, but without much fresh enlightenment. Lord Morley stated that when the War Minister showed him the two paragraphs, he did not perceive, nor did he yet perceive, that they differed in spirit or substance from the preceding paragraphs. Further explanations were promised for next day, and, incidentally, Earl Roberts appealed to Peers and people to end the mischievous and dangerous assertions that the Army was being made the tool of a party. No man alive, he said, could seduce the Army in that way. Next day, in reply to a vehement attack on the Government by Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Morley explained that Colonel Seely had resigned the second time in order that it might not appear that any Minister had made a bargain, and he himself had had no share in sending the letter as a reply to General Gough's request, of which he was unaware. Sir Edward Grey and the Prime Minister had taken the same view of the paragraphs, when taken with the rest of the letter, as himself. Notable speeches were made by Lord Methuen--to the effect that the Army would do its duty in any case--and by Earl Loreburn, who appealed to all parties to facilitate a settlement. The Marquess of Lansdowne thought the new Army order would not make matters clearer, and the Marquess of Crewe mentioned that the Royal Irish Constabulary, and Afridis in Indian frontier wars, were never asked to serve against men of their own country or race respectively.

Amid all these shocks it was a comparatively trifling matter that the Arms proclamation was invalidated for a time by the result of Hunter _v._ Coleman, an action brought by a firm of Belfast gunsmiths at the Belfast Assizes against the Collector of Customs of the port for detaining arms consigned to the plaintiffs at Hamburg on December 18, 1913. The sympathies of the jury were obviously with the plaintiffs, and the Attorney-General described the trial as a "political farce."

The crisis cut short the Royal visit to Lancashire and Cheshire, which had been arranged for March 24-28. Their Majesties, who were the guests of the Earl of Derby at Knowsley, decided to give up the Aintree race meeting and return to London on March 26; but on March 26 they opened a new infirmary at Chester, visited Messrs. Lever's famous model town of Port Sunlight, and Messrs. Cammell, Laird and Co.'s great engineering works at Birkenhead, opened--by pressing a button--a new park in that town, and subsequently, by similar means, laid the foundation stone of Wallasey Town Hall. Everywhere they were received with the utmost enthusiasm.

The Ulster crisis, which had abridged this visit, took much of the interest out of the resumed debate on the Home Rule Bill (March 31, April 1, 2, 6). Many people continued to believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the First Lord of the Admiralty had tried to provoke Ulster into a rising in order to crush her, with Colonel Seely as their tool. But the debate, nevertheless, showed signs of conciliation. Mr. Long (U.) said that the Opposition would consider an offer of an appeal to the people conditional on such an amendment of the Parliament Act as would not sacrifice its advantages to the Government. The Foreign Secretary, who spoke second, was most conciliatory. Various suggestions, he said, had been made and had found no success; but on none of them was the door absolutely shut by the Government. They were not prepared to go beyond the six years' exclusion, but unless a federal solution were reached Parliament and the country would go under through the failure of Parliament to conduct its business, and it might be the subject within the six years of private conversations between the leaders. The Government could not accept a referendum or agree to any settlement that did not mean passing the Home Rule Bill. An election without the plural vote before the Bill came into operation might be considered. Force must be used if there were outbreaks in Ulster, or if the Provisional Government defied the Imperial Government. But it could not be used to coerce Ulster to accept Home Rule till after an election. The new Army order might be taken as giving a fair start after the misunderstanding, but otherwise the next election must be on issues so grave as to change the Constitution.

It was thought that this speech had opened a fresh prospect of settlement, and this was confirmed by the opening of next day's debate. Mr. Dillon (N.) welcomed the tendency to conciliation, but declared that for the Unionists exclusion was simply a political weapon, while the Nationalist acceptance of the Government's proposal was inspired solely by a desire for peace. A referendum would not produce a poll of 50 per cent. in Great Britain. Federalism he disliked as implying a written constitution, but it was not barred by the Bill. If there was an agreement, the Bill might be amended either by the Lords inserting the agreed amendments, or by the Home Rule Bill. The Nationalists would do all they could to secure peace, but must not be asked to do what they could not do and what their people would not permit. Sir R. Finlay (U.), however, pressed for a general election; the Solicitor-General effectively put the Liberal and Nationalist case, and Mr. O'Brien (N.) strongly deprecated exclusion and urged a Conference. The debate was cut short by the Labour motion on the rights of British citizens within the Empire (p. 73), and was resumed on April 2 by Mr. Balfour, who said that the discussion had shifted from the Home Rule Bill to the avoidance of civil war. The conciliatory tone of the debate meant that the House was frightened. Under a voluntary system they could not prevent the Army having its own views; it had to obey orders, but questions arose beyond the day-to-day code, and the Army ought not to have them put to it. After again demanding a referendum or a general election, he said that, though he had never been a believer in Federalism, if some moderate form of devolution met with general acceptance, and would avert civil war, he would not oppose it, but Ulster must be treated separately meanwhile. The President of the Local Government Board declared that Mr. Balfour's doctrine would make the mess-room a debating society. He had rather the Liberal party was beaten on other issues than that it won on this. He said most emphatically that there was no secret obligation of any sort between the Government and the Nationalists; that an election was not wanted, and would settle nothing, and that the election held after the passing of the Bill, and adverse to the Liberals, would mean that they would consent not to the repeal of the whole Bill, but to the exclusion of Ulster. It was only after the Bill passed that Federalism could be discussed. Later Mr. Agar-Robartes (L., _Cornwall, St. Austell_) attacked the Ministry and advocated giving Ulster a second option at the end of six years; and Mr. Cave (U.) inclined to devolution.

Before the debate was resumed two events affecting it took place outside (April 4)--the Prime Minister's speech to his constituents at Ladybank, and a great Hyde Park demonstration to protest against the coercion of Ulster. At the latter there were fourteen platforms, and the demonstrators reached the Park in twenty-two different processions; there was a large Stock Exchange and middle class contingent, and the speakers included Mr. Balfour (his first appearance at a Hyde Park demonstration), Sir E. Carson, Viscount Milner, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, and other Unionist leaders. The militant suffragists attempted a counter-demonstration, but the police prevented it and arrested Mrs. Drummond; and a Labour demonstration was meanwhile held in Trafalgar Square to protest against the different treatment by the Government of politicians and officers on the one hand and of anti-militarist strike-leaders and militant suffragettes on the other. The resolution carried here approved the conduct of the officers, and urged the rank and file to refuse to take up arms against their own class in industrial disputes.

Speaking to a select audience representative of his constituency at Ladybank (April 4), the Prime Minister began by ridiculing the Unionist rumours in circulation--the story of the plot, the story that he had accepted his new office to escape for a fortnight from meeting the Unionist leaders in the House, the statement that his open journey to his constituency was provocative; and he ridiculed also the hesitation of the Unionists in opposing him. He had taken his new office in view of the grave situation that had arisen regarding the discipline of the Army and its relations to the civil power. As chairman of the Imperial Defence Committee, he knew the zeal, devotion, and settled traditions of discipline and honour pervading the military and naval forces of the Crown. The Army was not, and he prayed that it might never become, a political instrument; as an Army--and here he cited the elder William Pitt--it had no voice in the framing of policy and laws. "The Army will hear nothing of politics from me, and in return I expect to hear nothing of politics from the Army." The responsibility for the preservation of domestic order lay with the magistrates and police. In special emergencies the Army was called in to assist; in these it was the duty of the soldier, as of the civilians, to comply with the lawful demands of the civil power. The doctrines recently promulgated by some of the Tory leaders struck at the roots not only of Army discipline but of democratic government. As to the Home Rule Bill, he had brought the question into prominence at St. Andrews on December 7, 1910, and there was a complete justification for the application of the Parliament Act to it; but the Government were anxious to work out an agreed settlement, and hence the proposed optional exclusion of Ulster for a term of years. He should have preferred other solutions, but this one satisfied the conditions in his speech of October, 1913 (A.R., 1913, p. 219). The proposal had led to an unprecedented expression from both sides of the House of a desire to find some road to settlement, but any settlement must involve the placing of the Home Rule Bill on the Statute-book. Finally, Mr. Asquith referred to the other great Liberal measures pending, and deprecated division among the forces of progress.

The last day of the Home Rule Bill debate exhibited a continuance of the apparent movement towards a solution by consent, Mr. John Redmond (N.), after reviewing the various proposals for settlement, said that the only proposal from the side of Ulster was the total exclusion of Ulster, which was not a compromise, and was not put forward as the price of peace; the exclusion of Ulster by counties he regarded as dead; the Federal solution had been suggested in 1832, favoured by O'Connell and Parnell, and was the basis of Isaac Butt's movement. If Federalism meant that Ireland was to have priority, that her powers under the Bill were not to be watered down, and that the six years' limit was to stand, the Nationalists raised no objection. But the Opposition received that proposal with scoffing, and the only course was to proceed with the Bill as it stood. But even yet he did not despair of a settlement.

Sir Edward Carson (U.) said that Mr. Redmond's speech showed that there had been no real advance towards peace and conciliation. He had killed even the offer of the temporary exclusion of Ulster. If the Bill was passed, Federalism would be impracticable, for there would be no power over the Irish Parliament. Did Sir Edward Grey's speech mean that the Bill would be suspended till after a new Parliament had decided whether it was to be enforced? There was only one policy possible: "Leave Ulster out until you have won her consent to come in". Coercion would mean ruin to Ulster and to Ireland, and possibly to Great Britain also. This apprehension in Ulster was what the Nationalists had to overcome. Turning to them he said: "It is worth while your trying. Will you?"

The Attorney-General interpreted this speech as a great and significant advance towards conciliation. He added that the Prime Minister's offer of temporary exclusion was not withdrawn, and would remain open to the latest possible moment. If the exclusion would be till Parliament otherwise ordered, the House of Lords, at any rate as at present constituted, might frustrate the decision of the country. As to the Federal solution, Ireland came first because its case was urgent, and English opinion on Federalism was less advanced than Scottish, Irish, or Welsh. The immediate duty of the House was to go on with the Bill as it stood, but the Government hoped the efforts towards a settlement would still continue.

Mr. T. Healy (I.N.) in a brilliantly scornful speech, denounced Ministers for proposing the exclusion of Ulster and the Nationalist leaders for accepting it, and for making no effort at a settlement by other means. Exclusion was a device of Sir Edward Carson for killing the Bill. Later, Mr. Bonar Law (U.), who commented severely on the absence of the Prime Minister "from causes which might have been prevented or delayed," and of the Foreign Secretary, said he desired to convince the House and the country that the Unionists were prepared to make every possible sacrifice for peace. He had Lord Lansdowne's authority to say that, if the new proposals were embodied in a Bill and endorsed by the House and the country, the House of Lords would let it become law without delay. The Government might justify their denial of a "bargain" with the Nationalists by some quibble, but Mr. Redmond had not done so; the "Kilmainham treaty" afforded a parallel to the denial of the "bargain." The other way of escape was by the exclusion of Ulster, and the Unionists would welcome that proposal in a form in which it could be discussed, because the time-limit could not stand discussion. He described the Foreign Secretary's intimation as to the Government action towards Ulster as a cold-blooded indication of a policy securing bloodshed there. It was the duty of the Government to maintain order, but it was equally their duty to avert a situation requiring the use of force. The Foreign Secretary would not coerce the Epirotes, and the British conscience would not permit the coercion of Ulster.

After a conciliatory speech from the Chief Secretary for Ireland, who thought considerable progress had been made towards a settlement, the debate was closured and the rejection of the Bill defeated by 356 to 276. Sir Clifford Cory (L.) and Mr. Agar-Robartes (L.) voted in the minority; Mr. Pirie (L.) and the eight Independent Nationalists abstained. The majority for the Bill, putting aside the votes of all members from Ireland, was five.

Next day the East Fife Unionists decided not to oppose the Prime Minister, and he was returned on April 8 without a contest.

The militant suffragists, like the Labour members, had used the action of the Ulstermen and the officers as an argument for their own militancy; but their acts, while far exceeding anything yet attempted on the part of Ulster, were vexatious, but hardly formidable. Still, the perpetrators frequently escaped discovery; punishment was no deterrent; and imprisonment was speedily ended by hunger and thirst strikes, entailing temporary discharge under the "Cat and Mouse" Act. Miss Sylvia Pankhurst and her mother, thus released, were rearrested on their way respectively to demonstrations in Trafalgar Square (March 8) and St. Andrew's Hall, Glasgow (March 9); rioting followed and both were released after fresh hunger-strikes on March 15. Meanwhile Miss Mary Richardson had damaged with a chopper the Rokeby Velasquez in the National Gallery (bought by subscription in 1906), in order, as she explained, to protest against the treatment of the most beautiful character in modern history--Mrs. Pankhurst--by destroying the picture of the most beautiful woman in mythology; but her sentence of six months' imprisonment was soon suspended by a hunger-strike. A month later (April 9) a woman smashed a case in the British Museum containing porcelain, but did little damage. A charity performance attended by the King and Queen at the Palladium was interrupted (March 17); an attempt to carry Miss Sylvia Pankhurst into Westminster Abbey (March 22) was unsuccessful, but a clergyman conducted a suffragist service outside. A woman clumsily disguised as a man awaited the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary in the Commons lobby with a riding whip, but was detected and sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment (March 16, 17); and a discussion in the Poplar Borough Council whether its halls should be let to suffragists (March 26) was broken up by militants in the Council and the audience. A graver outrage was a bomb explosion at St. John the Evangelist's Church, Westminster (March 1), after evening service; a stained glass window was shattered. Damage was done a week later in Birmingham Cathedral; the interior was daubed with white paint, suffragist mottoes were displayed, and a stained glass, window injured. Attempts were made to fire churches at Clevedon (March 21) and Glasgow (March 28), and an unoccupied house at Stewarton, Ayrshire (March 12), in revenge for Mrs. Pankhurst's rearrest; and, when Sir Edward Carson, after some days' picketing of his house, had refused to press women's enfranchisement under his Provisional Government, a house belonging to General McCalmont at Abbeylands, near Belfast, was burnt likewise. Though all this estranged the general public, militancy found ardent and devoted support among both sexes, and the receipts of the Women's Social and Political Union, for the year ending with February, 1914, amounted to nearly 37,000_l._, apart from some thousands raised independently by local branches. Mrs. Pankhurst's American tour in 1913 had produced 4,500_l._

Besides the suffragist troubles, there had been a host of fresh manifestations of the general Labour unrest. In the London building trade (p. 3) further proposals for a settlement, made by the National Conciliation Board, were rejected by the men on a ballot in April by 23,481 to 2,021. A coal strike in South Yorkshire in March and April on the question whether certain additional payments to the men were to continue to be paid in spite of an increase of the minimum wage, though brief, proved costly, and was ended on April 15 by the acceptance of the terms offered on a ballot by 27,259 votes to 15,866. Other strikes occurred in the furniture trade at High Wycombe (settled by a conference under Sir George Askwith on February 23, when an elaborate code of rules and rates was devised to prevent the recurrence of disputes) and among agricultural labourers in various places, notably at Helions Bumpstead in Essex at the end of February, and on Lord Lilford's estate in Northamptonshire in April, where the men pressed for increased wages, a Saturday half-holiday, and recognition of the union.

These Labour troubles seemed beyond the reach of legislation; indeed, the South Yorkshire coal strike was the direct outcome of the Minimum Wage Act; but Liberals hoped that the increased cost of living, or at any rate the housing difficulty, which was a factor in it, might be mitigated by the achievement of the Ministerial programme of land reform. Further material for this was provided by the Report containing the urban land proposals of the Liberal Land Enquiry Committee, issued as a shilling volume of some 700 pages on April 1. Broadly, they substantiated the forecasts given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Holloway (A.R., 1913, p. 247), but only the briefest indication of them can be given here. Skilled observers, armed with a set of questions to be answered, had investigated the conditions in London and 100 other towns, and in sixteen London boroughs, and supplementary inquiries had subsequently been made in these towns and in 148 others. The inquiry fell into four divisions: (1) Housing; (2) Acquisition of land by public or _quasi_-public bodies and private persons; (3) systems of tenure, especially leasehold; (4) the rating and taxation of land. Wages and labour conditions had been dealt with in view of their bearing on housing, and the recommendations included the fixing of a minimum wage, the consideration of remedies for casual employment, statutory obligation on all local authorities to provide adequate housing for their working-class population, supplementing it, if necessary, by schemes of transit; the appointment of district Government officials to stimulate these efforts; Government power to order the leasing of undeveloped land and the sale of mining and prospecting rights, and of land required for churches, chapels, village institutes, co-operative or trade union halls; copyhold reform under a pending Bill which was to be made more comprehensive; the prohibition of future leases for lives, and the conferring of wide powers on the Land Commissioners to vary and regulate the conditions of existing and future leases; a rate on site values to meet all future increases in local expenditure chargeable to the rates; further Imperial relief to local taxation, possibly amounting to 5,000,000_l._ annually, and statutory revaluation at least every five years, but annually if practicable.