Chapter VII: Africa (with Malta) (1)

I. SOUTH AFRICA.

A Boer rebellion instigated by Germany is the outstanding fact of the year in the South African Union. It was, however, confined to a section of the rural population, and, thanks to the loyalty and energy of General Botha and his supporters, was suppressed by the end of December. Authority for the statement that the origin of the revolt is to be sought in German intrigue is to be found in the proclamation of martial law throughout the Union, though this was not issued until October 12. The first overt act of treachery was known on the 8th, when Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Maritz, commanding the force in the North-West of the Cape Province, being suspected by the Government, was relieved of his command and ordered by his successor, Colonel Conraad Britz, to come in and report to him. He replied, according to Lord Buxton's despatch to the Secretary of State, that "all he wanted was his discharge and Colonel Britz must come himself and take over his command." Colonel Britz sent Major Ben Bouwer to take charge. Maritz made him and his companions prisoners, but then sent him back alone with an ultimatum to the effect that unless the Union Government "guaranteed to him that before 11 o'clock on Sunday morning, October 11, they would allow Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller to meet him where he was, in order that he might receive instructions from them, he would forthwith make an attack on Colonel Britz's forces and proceed further to invade the Union." Major Bouwer reported that Maritz had German guns and a German force with his command, that he held the rank of General commanding the enemy troops, and that he had sent as prisoners into German South-West Africa all of the Union officers and men who had refused to betray their oath. Major Bouwer had also seen an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South-West Africa "guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfisch Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz." He had also been shown German telegrams and helio messages dating from the beginning of September, and Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, ammunition and money from the Germans and that he would over-run South Africa. On these facts, and presumably on others not disclosed by the Government, the proclamation justified the imposition of martial law under three heads: (1) "a widespread secret propaganda" by Germany "to seduce citizens of the Union and the officers and members of the Defence forces of the Union, from their allegiance and to cause rebellion and civil war"; (2) that Maritz and a portion of his forces "had shamefully and traitorously gone over to the enemy" and with the enemy forces "had invaded the northern portions of Cape Province"; and (3) there was "grave reason to think that the Government of German South-West Africa had, through its numerous spies and agents, communicated with and corrupted also other citizens of the Union under the false and treacherous pretext of favouring the establishment of a Republic in South Africa." Therefore it was "necessary to take effective measures to protect and defend the interests of the Union and its loyal and law-abiding citizens against these insidious and treacherous attacks from within and without and to that end to declare martial law."

That being the evidence of a German plot to seduce the Boers from their allegiance, the optimistic news from South Africa between August 4 and October 12 was discounted by events. Scanty as the news was it gave the impression, at least until mid-September, that though the Hertzogite party in Parliament opposed military attack upon the German territory, Dutch patriotism was sound. The line taken by General Hertzog was that the Union should commit no act of aggression; and there were some supporters of General Botha who had to be won over by their leader to the view that a neutral attitude was impossible. The Government had at once made up their minds to act with the Imperial authorities. In reply to the King's Message to the Dominions they declared that "the Message had been received with great enthusiasm and deep loyalty in all parts of the Union" and that His Majesty's subjects there were "firmly resolved to fulfil their sacred duty of assisting with all resources at their disposal to bring the terrible war which has been forced on His Majesty to a speedy and successful conclusion." But this resolve was not universal in Parliament or in the country. The sacred duty was disputed by the Hertzogites, and General Botha's lead was apparently accepted with reluctance by some of those who were opposed on other grounds to General Hertzog. It seems to have been assumed that as the Germans had not then attacked, non-intervention was the preferable course. This issue was, however, brought to a head on September 12 by a declaration by General Botha in the Senate that South Africa, being part of the Empire, could not remain neutral, and that the Government had therefore decided to accede to the request of the Imperial authorities to occupy for strategic reasons certain parts of German West Africa. "The Government had come to this decision (according to _The Times_ report) because they wished to preserve the name and reputation of South Africa for uprightness. They were under the British flag and had all the freedom they could have.... Let them assume their responsibilities in the fullest sense of the word. It had been stated that the reports of the German invasion of the Union were baseless, but he declared with authority that the Union had been invaded. Their English-speaking friends must not expect quite the same enthusiasm amongst the Dutch-speaking section about the war as among themselves. There was not, however, the slightest disloyalty, and even among those who perhaps were least enthusiastic, there was no idea of preferring to live under the German flag." In saying that "there was not the slightest disloyalty" General Botha was probably affecting to ignore reports to the contrary and refraining from attaching any sinister significance to the parliamentary action of the Hertzogites, or to those among his own supporters who deemed it impolitic and unnecessary to take the offensive against the Germans. On September 15 General Beyers, Commandant General of the Union Defence Forces, resigned his post. In a letter to General Smuts, the Minister of Defence, he complained that Parliament should by resolutions have confirmed the decision of the Government "to conquer German South-West Africa without any provocation towards the Union," and asserted that the majority of the Dutch-speaking people decidedly disapproved of crossing that frontier. He cited the resignations of three English Ministers (p. 173) as evidence that there was a minority in England not convinced of the righteousness of the war with Germany: "It was said that war was being waged against the barbarity of the Germans. He had forgiven, but not forgotten, all the barbarities perpetrated during the South African War.... At this critical moment it was made known in Parliament that their Government was granted a loan of 7,000,000_l._ by the British Government. This was very significant."

In accepting his resignation General Smuts pointed out that the plan of operations decided upon had been recommended by General Beyers, and the officers who were to carry it out were appointed on his advice. It was well understood between them that he (General Beyers) was to take chief command in German South-West Africa. Yet he (General Smuts) never received the impression that resignation was intended, though he knew General Beyers entertained objections against the war. He rebuked General Beyers for his "bitter attack" on Great Britain, and for having first communicated his resignation in a letter of political argument to the Press. "The attack was not only entirely baseless but the more unjustifiable coming as it does in the midst of a great war from the Commandant General of one of the British Dominions. Your reference to barbarous acts during the South African War ... can only be calculated to sow hatred and division among the people of South Africa." After further castigation of General Beyers, General Smuts characterised the insinuation about the loan of 7,000,000_l._ to the Union Government "as of such a despicable nature" that it needed no comment. "It only shows to what extent your mind has been obscured by political bias." General Smuts could not conceive anything more fatal and humiliating for the Dutch-speaking people than a policy of lip-loyalty in fair weather and of neutrality and pro-German sentiment in days of storm and stress. He was convinced that the people would support the Government in carrying out the mandate of Parliament, and would fulfil their duty to South Africa and to the Empire.

By that time, September 15, a strong German force had advanced on Raman's Drift (on the Orange River) and had garrisoned a blockhouse commanding the drift. Thus the report of an invasion early in August was confirmed. A force of South African Mounted Rifles under Colonel Dawson crossed the waterless region and captured the blockhouse. On the next day the Germans, who were in force in the Uppington Kopjes within the British side, attacked the Union frontier post at Nakob and overpowered the small garrison. Swakopmund, on Walfisch Bay, had been seized, without resistance, by Union forces coming by steamer, and on the 19th Lüderitzbucht, midway between Walfisch Bay and Capetown, had also been surrendered to the Union, after the enemy had destroyed the wireless station there. The Union successes on the coast were counterbalanced by German captures of frontier posts. General Botha decided to take the field himself against the enemy and made a call for volunteers. The response was reported to be all that could be desired, particularly in the district where General Beyers had influence; but, in the language of Lord Buxton to the Secretary of State, "ever since the resignation" of General Beyers "there have been indications that something was wrong with the forces on the north-west of Cape Province" under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz. What was wrong has been told in the opening paragraph; whether General Beyers was a party to the conduct of Maritz at this time may be judged by the use of his name by Maritz and by the circumstances of his resignation. Of Maritz it was reported that, after serving in the South African War, he had taken service with the Germans, and had fought for them against the Herreros. Returning to the Union he was said to have made himself conspicuous by ostentatious dislike of the Germans. On the outbreak of war he was given a commando of irregulars on the strength of his knowledge of the frontier. He was believed to have 500 men with him near Uppington. One effect of the rebellion was to rally opinion to the support of General Botha and to demonstrate that the bulk of the Dutch population had little sympathy with Maritz. Recruiting was vigorously stimulated. On the other hand there was evidence of a seditious propaganda among the backveld Boers, notwithstanding very drastic regulations under the proclamation of martial law, which included in the definition of sedition opposition to the policy of hostilities against the enemy. The rebellion appeared to have profoundly stirred the people. On the native population it had no discernible and immediate effects. As Minister for Native Affairs General Botha sent a message urging on them prompt obedience and cheerful submission to the restrictions of martial law.

According to a correspondent of the _Cape Times_, who had been travelling in German West Africa just before the war, the Germans had a force of 10,000 mounted infantry and artillery, many machine guns and sixty-six gun batteries. They had also a Camel Corps of 500 for use in the desert region. The correspondent saw 192 guns at Keetmanshoop and described the country as being dotted with police posts, with two guns in each and manned by artillerymen. Railways and roads had been made to facilitate the invasion of the Union and this account of the enemy suggested long and costly preparation for war.

Obviously the military situation was difficult enough for General Botha without the complication of internal rebellion. Thus far it seemed, on such news as the censorship permitted to come through, that Maritz stood alone. On October 26 it was announced that he had been completely defeated at Kakamas, was wounded, and had fled into German territory. Colonel Britz sent to Pretoria an agreement which Maritz had asked him to sign. It was a pact between the Governor of German South-West Africa, as representing the Emperor, and traitors prepared to declare the independence of South Africa. The German Emperor undertook to take all possible measures to get the independence of any State or States of the Union recognised under the terms of peace. On the other side, the middle of the Orange River was to be the boundary between German South-West Africa and the Cape Province. Maritz had himself entered into this agreement. It was reported that before the engagement of the 26th, Maritz, being hard pressed, had offered to surrender on condition of a free pardon for himself and his followers, the Germans with him to be sent across the border. No reply was made. On the 27th many of Maritz's followers surrendered.

At the moment of the collapse of his commando rebellion broke out in the Northern Orange Free State and in the Western Transvaal. On October 28 the Union Government announced "with deep regret" that "at the instigation of certain prominent individuals," burghers in these districts had been "misguided enough to defy the authority of the Government and to make preparations for armed resistance and rebellion." Armed rebellious commandoes, under the authority of General Christian de Wet in the Orange Free State, and of General Beyers in the Western Transvaal, were in existence. The town of Heilbron had been seized and the Government officials imprisoned. A train had been stopped at Reitz and armed citizens of the Defence force seized and disarmed. "The very great majority of the citizens in every province are thoroughly loyal," said the Government statement, "and detest the very idea of rebellion." The Government had been aware of the rebel preparations and had "spared no efforts to preserve the peace without bloodshed." They called upon all loyal citizens to be on the alert and give the Government every assistance. "Citizens who have been, for some reason or other, guilty of disobedience under the Defence Act"--continued the announcement--"need not fear any action against them on that ground on the part of the Government so long as they remain quietly at home and abstain from acts of violence or hostility against the authority of the Government of the Union." The former Commandant-General of the Union forces had thus taken the field, in concert with General Christian de Wet, the Commander-in-Chief of the Orange Free State forces during the three years' war. De Wet was one of the signatories to the peace of Vereeniging, and had since held Ministerial office. Action had preceded the issue of the Government statement, for there was published on the 29th a telegram from Lord Buxton to the effect that General Botha had on the 27th searched out Beyers' commando and "driven them in headlong pursuit the whole of the day, capturing eighty of them fully armed." The engagement took place near Rustenburg and was a flight, not a battle. "General" Kemp--one of the names mentioned by Maritz--escaped into the Lichtenburg district, where there appear to have been many rebels under a Boer named Claussen; but the gathering here was put to flight by a force under Colonel Alberts. In the Calvinia district also there were bodies of rebels, who, however, made no serious fight against Colonel van der Venter's forces. General Botha followed the rebel commandoes to Zoutspansdrift and they were there again scattered. Early in November the Minister of Defence stated that the Maritz rebellion was over and in the Transvaal the movement was then quite insignificant. Only in the northern district of the Free State had the rebellion "assumed certain dimensions." On October 29 De Wet had entered Vrede with a body of rebels and addressed the townspeople in front of the Dutch Church. He spoke of "the miserable, pestilential English" and described the attack on German South-West Africa as a dastardly act of robbery. "Some of my friends," he was reported to have said, "have advised me to wait a little longer until England received a bigger knock, but it is beneath me and my people to kick a dead dog." He ordered the commandeering of supplies and threatened obstructives with the sjambok. At another place he was reported as saying: "I am going through to Maritz, where we will receive arms and ammunition, and from there we are going through to Pretoria to pull down the British flag and proclaim a free South African Republic." On November 12 it was announced that General Botha had got into touch with De Wet's forces and soundly defeated them. The rebels numbered 2,000. There were losses on both sides, but the rebels did not make a serious stand. They lost 255 prisoners here, among them Commandant Muller--also named in Maritz's message--and most of their transport.

The Government issued a proclamation calling upon all rebels to surrender voluntarily, and saying that all persons who did so would not be criminally prosecuted but allowed to return to their homes on condition that they took no further part in rebellion, and gave no information or assistance to rebels, and did and said nothing likely to disturb the peace. But the amnesty would not apply to those who had violated the rules of civilised warfare. All rebels who did not surrender forthwith would be liable to be dealt with according to the rigour of the law. The notification was signed by General Botha and was an appeal to good sense rather than a menace. On November 8 a rebel commando believed to be under the leadership of an ex-Major on the Union Defence Staff, was heavily defeated some thirty miles west of Warmbaths, the rebels losing 120 killed and wounded. At Winburg (Nov. 9) De Wet is alleged to have behaved with brutality towards the Mayor. He had lost his son in a fight a few days earlier and seemed to be out of control. The rebels looted the chief store. His commando numbered about 2,000, and were frequently harried by the Union forces. Meanwhile Beyers was severely handled to the south of the Vaal River, east of Bloemhof, and in an engagement on December 7 lost 364 prisoners, besides killed and wounded. It is impossible to keep count of the commandoes; the cables during November are too scanty and confusing. The rebel forces were daily suffering attrition by captures and surrenders and minor fighting. On December 2 Colonel Britz reported that he had captured De Wet at a farm at Wartenburg, 100 miles east of Mafeking. De Wet had crossed the Vaal as a fugitive on November 21, but had got together a small commando. Though pursued by motor cars, he managed to escape hither and thither for several days, until his commando was broken up and he was run to earth by Colonel Britz. There were four others in the farm where he took refuge. Finding themselves surrounded they surrendered. De Wet was taken to Pretoria. With his capture the Free State rebellion collapsed. The operations directed by General Botha had brought in over 800 prisoners.

In the Transvaal Beyers was caught and his force driven towards the Vaal at Greyling (Dec. 7). Beyers and others tried to cross the Vaal, and were fired on. Beyers was seen to fall from his horse, but managed to grasp another by the tail. He was next seen drifting down stream, shouting for help. His body was recovered. Lord Buxton reported that the rebellion was everywhere practically at an end. A few small bodies might continue to give a little trouble. De Wet, Muller, Wessel Wessels, as well as other leaders (including three members of the Union Parliament and members of the Provincial Councils) had been captured or had surrendered. Beyers was dead and Maritz and Kemp--the latter erroneously reported captured--had joined the Germans. About 7,000 rebels had been captured or had surrendered--an official figure which for the first time gave a clue to the extent of the rebel movement. General Botha issued a statement on December 9. He said that "the speedy and successful termination of what promised at one time to be a formidable and widespread rebellion, led by some of the best known South Africans," was due to the energy and ceaseless efforts of the forces in the fields. He then thanked them on behalf of the Government and people of South Africa. "Our sacrifices in blood, treasure and losses of population have been considerable, but I believe they are not out of proportion to the great results already achieved or which will accrue to South Africa in coming years. For this and much more let us be reverently thankful to Providence, which has once more guided our country through the gravest perils, and let that spirit of gratitude drive from our minds all bitterness caused by the wrongs suffered and the loss and anguish which has been caused by this senseless rebellion." He spoke of the rebellion as "a quarrel in our own South African household," and urged the cultivation of a spirit of tolerance and "merciful oblivion of the errors and misdeeds of those misguided people, many of whom took up arms against the State without any criminal intention and without any clear perception of the consequences of their action. While just and fair punishment should be meted out, let us also remember that now more than ever it is for the people of South Africa to practise the wise policy of forgive and forget." Their next duty was to deal with the German danger and make it impossible for German South-West Africa to be again used as a base from which to threaten the peace and liberties of the Union. "I hope and trust the people will deal with this danger as energetically as they have done with the internal rebellion."

During the rebellion little information had been forthcoming about the situation on the frontier. Presumably the Union forces had been sufficiently engaged in suppressing the rebellion, the extent and gravity of which are measurable by General Botha's language when the peril had been surmounted. What activity the Germans displayed, if any, in co-operation with the rebels was not disclosed by the authorities. The position of affairs as it presented itself to General Botha was thus described by him in an interview given on December 17: "In suppressing the rebellion the Government have had the most hearty co-operation of both races. Let us have the same co-operation in German South-West Africa. The undertaking before us is difficult, but if we all do our duty it will be carried to a successful conclusion. Now that German territory has become a refuge for Maritz and the other rebels it is more than ever necessary that we should persist in our operations there. We cannot tolerate the existence of a nest of outlaws on our frontier, a menace to the peace of the Union." In that interview General Botha paid a warm tribute to General Smuts, whose "brilliant intellect, calm judgment, amazing energy and undaunted courage had been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial." His own services to the Union and to the Empire cannot fitly be appraised until events have fallen into perspective; but the language applied to General Smuts, generous and eloquent as it is, would be inadequate as an expression of gratitude for the labours of General Botha. To review the events of the rebellion is to wonder whether South Africa would not temporarily have ceased to be a British Dominion in 1914 had not General Botha given a strong lead in loyalty and policy, and had the frustration of the German plot fallen to a man less influential than himself with the Dutch-speaking people or to one less skilful in military generalship.

The total casualties in the Union Defence Forces up to December 23 were 755--334 during the fighting with rebels and 369 from the fighting with the Germans. The killed in the rebel campaign numbered seventy-eight and in the German engagements sixteen. The rebels killed in action numbered 170. The rounding up of rebel parties was still going on. On December 30, however, it was reported that Maritz, with Kemp second in command, had successfully attacked a Union force, 480 strong, near Schuit Drift on the 22nd, and had compelled it, with its reinforcements, to retire with the loss of ninety prisoners, a maxim, 80,000 rounds of ammunition, an ambulance and twenty-six empty waggons. As Maritz's force was described as 800 rebels, with four field guns and four maxims, and as the Union force lost only one man killed and one wounded, though it offered "a vigorous resistance," the despatch was clearly incomplete. On December 31 the Government put in force the provisions of the Defence Act, empowering them to commandeer men for military service, and it was officially admitted that dependence on voluntary service was inadequate in view of the German menace.

The war and the rebellion have reduced other events of the South African Union to relative insignificance. But there are matters of permanent interest which cannot here be left aside; and first in importance is the renewal of the strife between white Labour and Capital, a strife which shook Johannesburg to its foundations in the summer of 1913 (A.R., 1913, p. 416 _sq._). The superficial cause of the renewal in January was the dismissal of sixty men from the Government railways, men paid by the day and subject to twenty-four hours' notice of dismissal. The real question, however, was whether the Trades Federation should control such dismissals and the administration of the railways. The dismissals were due to a policy of retrenchment. Mr. Poutsma, the secretary of the Railwaymen's Union, failing to get satisfaction at the hands of Mr. Burton, the Minister for Railways, threatened a strike. The Railway Union resolved to strike and the Executive of the Federation of Trades called upon all unionists and non-unionists to support them. Much anxiety was felt in view of the previous riots, when Imperial troops had to be brought into Johannesburg and there was serious rioting and loss of life; but by this time the Union Defence Forces had been organised and when the plans of the strikers were put into operation on January 9 the Government were prepared for emergencies. Simultaneously with the stoppage of the railways they called up the Citizen Defence Force in certain areas and let it be known they would call out the entire force if needs be. They also arrested a number of labour leaders, including Mr. Poutsma, on charges of having used seditious language, and lodged them in jail. By the following day there were 60,000 burghers under arms. The Trades Federation threatened a general strike of all trades and ordered a ballot to be taken. The Government, through the Railway Minister, reiterated their refusal to reinstate the men and drop the policy of retrenchment. They attempted to run a partial service, with which the strikers interfered where it was possible. The trouble spread throughout the Union and was complicated by an outbreak of Basutos at Jagersfontein Mine, the cause being the death of a Basuto, the result, it was alleged, of a kick by a white man employed by the management. The dismissal of the man was demanded and refused. The Basutos broke out of the compound, which they wrecked, and caused a panic in the town. Troops were brought on the scene and in the fighting eleven Basutos were killed and thirty-six wounded. A Committee of Public Safety was set up in Johannesburg, and the Government took a very serious view of the situation. There was a two-thirds majority of the Federated Trades for a general strike, which was proclaimed on the 13th. The miners were to come out the following day. The Government at once proclaimed martial law and mobilised 20,000 men on the Rand. Trouble was apprehended in the native compounds. The town was full of troops. Ministers went about with armed guards. Business was suspended. The president and secretary of the Federation of Trades, with some 200 of their supporters, barricaded themselves in the Trades Hall and successfully resisted arrest. There was an affray outside the hall in which the police used bayonets. The Trades Hall was besieged by a force of burghers with machine guns, and means were taken to impress the besieged with the Government's determination to effect the arrest of the leaders. On a field gun being placed in position the secretary of the Federation appeared at a window and after protesting against the display of force offered an unconditional surrender. With the arrests thus accomplished the situation became less alarming and in a few days the strike collapsed. Normal industrial conditions were quickly resumed and the citizen force demobilised. On the 21st the general strike was formally declared "off." By this time there was scarcely a Labour leader anywhere in the Union who was not under arrest. Among those arrested was Mr. Cresswell, a member of Parliament, who was sentenced to a month's imprisonment and a fine of 20_l._ for publishing a pamphlet; but this sentence was remitted on the ground that the Government did not desire to deprive the Labour party of its spokesmen in Parliament in the coming discussions. On the 27th it was announced that the Government had decided to deport ten of the principal labour leaders, Mr. Watson, president of the federation, Mr. Poutsma, secretary of the Railway Men's Society, Messrs. Bain, Mason, Crawford, Waterson, Kendall, McKerrell, Livingstone and Morgan. The men were secretly conveyed to Natal and put on board a steamer--the _Umgeni_--which sailed forthwith for England (pp. 12, 24, 35). Application on behalf of the men was made to the courts but without result. The deportation had taken place and the restraining power of the courts forestalled. The illegality caused profound resentment in South Africa.

The South African Parliament was opened by Lord Gladstone on January 30. The Governor-General's inaugural speech dealt with the strike in cautious but yet definite language. The extension of the trouble to all trades "finally convinced my Ministers that the safety and well-being of the whole Union made the declaration of martial law imperative.... The measures taken and the effective display of force by the citizens of the Union happily succeeded in preventing any serious disturbance and in restoring order without bloodshed. Certain measures will be submitted to you in connexion with the action taken by my Ministers during the exceptional conditions to which I have referred." Nothing, however, was said of the deportations. On February 2 a Bill was introduced by General Smuts indemnifying the Government and its servants for all acts done under martial law and prohibiting the return of the deported persons. Sir Thomas Smartt, the leader of the Opposition, who had supported the Administration during the trouble, asked for an explanation of the Government's acts. Mr. Cresswell, the leader of the Labour party, condemned the deportations and accused the Government of a conspiracy with the capitalists to run the country in their own interests. A Ministerial statement was made on the second reading, which was moved by General Smuts. It occupied several hours in delivery. As to the first part it was an elaborate and rhetorical survey of the industrial troubles of the country and an indictment of the Labour party as "Syndicalists." General Smuts suggested that the natives on the Rand had been drawn into the movement. On one mine 1,500 assegais had been found. He made no attempt to dispute the illegality of the deportations. There had been three revolutionary attempts within six months, and after anxious consideration Ministers resolved to strike down by deportation ringleaders whose acts and speeches and associations showed they had committed themselves to a conspiracy against constituted order. Why not a trial? His reply to that was that the situation was novel and not less treasonable and perilous because the acts had not come within the law of treason. Having regard to the supreme interests of the State the Government "could not run the ordinary risks of the law courts." He acquitted Lord Gladstone of any responsibility for the deportations; the decision to deport was that of the Cabinet alone. At a later stage General Smuts issued a return of thirty-eight outrages during the January disturbances, in several instances dynamite and other explosives being used. The leader of the Opposition, while criticising the Government, declined the responsibility, seeing that deportation was accomplished, of giving a vote which would enable the deportees to return to the country. The debates were continued until February 24, when, after an all-night sitting, the second reading was carried by 95 votes to 11. Meanwhile the deportees had landed in England (p. 35). After a hard fight in Committee the Indemnity Bill was passed.

Among other legislation passed were a Riotous Assemblies Act, an Act for the Protection of Workmen's Weekly Wages and an Industrial Dispute Act, setting up a system of conciliation. During the Session the Report was issued of the Commission on labour, wages and economic conditions in the Union. This document showed that the cost of living on the Rand was 40 per cent. higher than in the United States and 80 per cent. higher than anywhere in Europe; wages were put at 40 per cent. higher, than in the United States and 225 per cent. higher than in any European country. The Commission recommended the establishment of an Advisory Council to deal with native questions, and an Industrial Commission to administer labour legislation, the extension of which was advised. The Commission found that competition of skilled white workers with natives and Indians is negligible, and advised that barriers should not be placed in the way of non-white labour by the State. They concluded that the Government ought not to lay down a minimum subsistence wage and that employers should "recognise" trade unions. They advised legal protection for non-unionists and declared that strikes among the white workers had caused unrest among the natives. One effect of the deportations and the debates on the Indemnity Bill was to be seen in the stimulation of political activity among the Labour men, who gained a majority of one in the elections for the Transvaal Provincial Council.

At a Party Congress in January General Hertzog, who seceded with his followers from the National party, decided to form a new party. This was done. A general election is due in 1915. General Hertzog's position as a party leader was unassailable in the Orange Free State until the time of the war.

The Budget of the Union showed that the expenditure for 1913-14 was 16,481,000_l._ and the revenue 15,794,000_l._, a deficit of 687,000_l._ The Finance Minister said the funded debt on March 31, 1914, amounted to 117,671,000_l._, and the floating debt to 7,308,000_l._, against 105,856,000_l._ and 11,972,000_l._ respectively. On March 31, 1913, the total debt was 124,980,000_l._, as compared with 116,502,000_l._ at the time of the Union. He estimated the expenditure for 1914-15 at 16,668,000_l._, an increase of 187,000_l._ as compared with 1913-14, for which the service of the public debt and the provincial administrations were largely responsible. He estimated the revenue at 15,707,000_l._, excluding the Bewaarplaatsen, leaving a deficit of 961,000_l._ Half of the Bewaarplaatsen, however, would be available to meet this, and the actual deficit would be 711,000_l._ These estimates were made in April--before the war, when the finances of the Union were strengthened by a loan of 7,000,000_l._ from the Imperial Government. The Government policy of economy and retrenchment was checked by the January industrial troubles and later in the year by war and rebellion.

_The Times_ Capetown correspondent reported on December 26 that Treasury figures indicated that the deficit at the end of the financial year 1915 would be between 2,500,000_l._ and 3,000,000_l._, apart from war expenditure. The deficit was mainly due to the stoppage of the diamond industry and the heavy fall in customs and other revenue. The cost of the war and the rebellion in November was over 1,000,000_l._, and the 2,000,000_l._ voted in September for operations against German South-West Africa had been exhausted by the end of that month.

The Indian grievances, which assumed dangerous proportions towards the end of 1913 and continued to be an embarrassment during the early months of 1914, were composed by the passing of a relief measure through the Union Parliament before the Prorogation in July. The Bill was founded on the recommendations of the Commission appointed in consequence of the strike disorders in Natal and the passive resistance movement under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi. At the outset the Commission met with Indian hostility, Mr. Gandhi taking the view that some of its members were partisans; but he modified this attitude when Lord Hardinge welcomed the appointment of the Commission and sent an Anglo-Indian of distinction, Sir Benjamin Robertson, to follow the proceedings in the interests of India. The Report advised the abolition of the 3_l._ licence and made recommendations on the marriage question and administrative matters. It created a favourable impression in India as well as in South Africa and the Act founded upon it was regarded by Mr. Gandhi as the Magna Carta of Indian liberty in South Africa. On leaving Africa in July he told the Indians that their difficulties were not over, but spoke of the settlement as "generous." He appealed to Europeans to take a humanitarian view of the Indian question and told the Indians that their future under the settlement depended on themselves. There was no further news, the war obliterating the subject.

In _Rhodesia_ the elections to the Legislative Council in March resulted in the return of pro-Charter candidates. As the six non-elected members are appointed by the British South Africa Company the Council was thus pledged to the maintenance of the existing form of Government, subject to the action of the Imperial authorities, who had the right to review, on October 29, 1914, the administrative powers of the Company. The anti-Charterists were composed of groups in favour of responsible Government, or of Crown Colony Government as a step to that, or of inclusion in the South Africa Union, though this last expedient had few advocates. The groups combined on a "common platform," the chief feature of which was "to make an immediate and definite move in favour of responsible Government by urging the Imperial Government as an initial step to assume provisional control of the Executive, preliminary to arranging with the British South Africa Company the price to be paid for such public works and buildings as would be required, and granting a Constitution, in accordance with the wishes of the people." The pro-Charter candidates received 3,324 votes and their opponents 1,733. The elections were a complete victory for the Company and were held to demonstrate the unripeness of the country for a responsible system. On October 8 the Secretary of State for the Colonies issued a document saying that the question of the future administration of the territories had been under the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government. The Charter, dated October 29, 1889, reserved to the Crown the power at the end of twenty-five years, and at the end of every successive period of ten years, to add to or repeal any of the provisions, but only in relation to so much of the Charter as related to administrative and public matters. Failing the exercise of this power the Charter was automatically extended for another ten years. His Majesty's Government were advised that there was no power in the Charter or elsewhere to shorten or vary the periods. The Directors of the Company had, however, informed the Secretary of State that they would not regard the non-exercise of the right to review by His Majesty's Government as any bar to the establishment of responsible Government should the time appear to be ripe for such a step within the ten years ensuing, and that if, during those ten years, the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia should find that they were, financially and in other respects, strong enough to assume, with the concurrence of the Imperial Government, the burden of administration, they, the directors, "would be most willing that effect be given to that desire." In view of that statement and the desire of the newly elected Legislative Council for a continuance of the Company's administration, His Majesty's Government had decided not to advise His Majesty to exercise the powers reserved under Article 33 of the Charter, and its provisions would not accordingly be modified. His Majesty would, however, in due course be advised to issue a Supplemental Charter giving effect to the arrangement to which the Directors had agreed and to render possible the establishment of responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia, should the Legislative Council desire it and the Imperial Government concur within the ten years. This announcement closed the controversy, with what satisfaction to Rhodesians is not yet known. The settlers have since had more important matters in hand. Some returned to this country to join the forces of the Crown and many were formed into contingents for the prosecution with the Union of the war in South Africa.

The vexed question of the Chartered Company's claim to the ownership of all land not already transferred to other proprietors, and the contrary claim that the Company holds such land only as trustee for administrative purposes, was put in the way of judicial settlement. The Imperial Government had declined to pronounce on the matter, holding that it was one of the laws determinable only by the courts. In March, however, Mr. Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, proposed to the Company that the claim should be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The newly elected Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia therefore passed a resolution on April 17 contesting the Company's claim to all unalienated land. It appointed a Committee of three to collect evidence and voted 5,000_l._ for Counsel's fees and other expenses. On July 16 the Order of Reference to the Judicial Committee was published. It recited that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had that day communicated the resolution passed by the Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia on April 17, 1914, claiming on behalf of the inhabitants and people: (1) that the ownership of the unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia was not vested in and had never been acquired by the British South Africa Company as their commercial or private property, and that any powers of dealing with land that were possessed by it belonged to it solely as the governing body of the territory; (2) that any ownership of the said land that the Company might have acquired was vested in them as an administrative and public asset only; and (3) that on the Company ceasing to be the Government of the territory, all unalienated lands should become the property of the Government, taking the place of the Company as public domain.

According to the Parliamentary White Paper [Cd. 7,325] the administrative accounts of the Company for the year ending March 31, 1913, showed that the Customs receipts and native tax for Southern Rhodesia amounted to 769,978_l._ and the expenditure 889_l._ in excess of that sum. The revenue of Northern Rhodesia was 126,336_l._, and expenditure 178,044_l._ The total deficit was therefore 52,597_l._ The annual meeting of the Company was deferred pending the decision of the Government as to the Charter and was held on December 17. The report referred with satisfaction to the action of the Government and the prospect of a decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as to the ownership of the unalienated lands. The accounts for the year ending March 31, 1914, showed a credit balance of 102,271_l._ as compared with 85,882_l._ the previous year. The Southern Rhodesia administrative account showed a surplus revenue of 17,125_l._ The administrative accounts for Northern Rhodesia showed a deficit of 48,177_l._ The Directors were of opinion that steady progress was being made in building up a stable and growing revenue. The total receipts from land from all sources were 134,700_l._, "likely to be largely increased in future years." The mineral estate yielded 63,041_l._, and the total gross income, exclusive of administrative revenue but inclusive of net receipts from land, amounted to 422,532_l._ While it was impossible to predict what the effects of the war might be the Directors thought that the disturbance of the Company's operations in certain directions and the shrinkage of the capital value of its investments were not likely to do more than "retard the fulfilment of their hopes."

The total gold production of Rhodesia in 1914 was of the value of 3,580,207_l._, as against 2,903,267_l._ in 1913.

II. EGYPT AND THE SUDAN.

At the outbreak of the war the Khedive Abbas Hilmi was at Constantinople, the guest of the Sultan, and Lord Kitchener was home on leave in England. Up to that time the affairs of Egypt had followed a normal course. The Khedive did not return to Cairo. Such information as was permitted to reach England indicated that agents of enemy Powers were engaged in intrigue against us in Egypt, and that emissaries of Turkey were also actively hostile. No news was forthcoming of military changes. There was an ominous silence, broken by occasional messages of reassurance as to the friendly attitude of the Egyptian people. With the advent of Turkey among the combatant Powers at the end of October a new situation arose which had swift and dramatic results. Martial law was proclaimed at Cairo and wholesale arrests of Turkish agents were made. It appeared that Germans and Austrians had been interned and the crews of enemy vessels at Alexandria deported to Malta. Egyptians of dangerous tendencies had also been restrained. On November 2 Lieut.-General Sir John Maxwell assembled at the British Agency a number of Bedouin Sheikhs and informed them that Germany had been successful in inducing the men in power at Constantinople to quarrel with the Allies. "The Government," he is reported to have added, "has therefore convoked the Arab notables, enjoining them that their duty is to remain calm and enjoy the peace and tranquillity on Egyptian soil which the British forces ensure. If the Government finds it necessary to appeal to their devotion to serve the country the Government is fully confident of their reply to its appeal." The notables assured Sir John of their loyalty. By this time it had become known that British Territorial regiments and Indian and Australian troops were in the country, and were being reinforced, and it also appeared that a Turkish Army had entered Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula. British patrols were in touch with advance parties of the enemy thirty miles east of the Suez Canal in December, and nothing further was reported by the close of the year. On December 2 the censorship permitted an official statement that Australian and New Zealand contingents "had disembarked in Egypt to assist in the defence of that country and to complete their training there. When their training is completed they will go direct to the front to fight with other British troops in Europe." These arrivals increased the forces in Egypt by about 20,000, but how many troops we had in the country was not discovered.

A period of official silence and strict censorship of news was broken by a Foreign Office announcement in London, through the censorship, that in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey "Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a Protectorate. The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and the protection of its inhabitants and interests." Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arthur Henry McMahon was appointed High Commissioner. Next day there was a further announcement that, in view of the action of Abbas Hilmi, "lately Khedive of Egypt," who had adhered to the King's enemies, His Majesty's Government had seen fit to depose him from the Khediviate and had offered that high dignity, with the title of Sultan of Egypt, to his Highness Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest living Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali. The Foreign Office also announced that the French Republic having recognised the British Protectorate over Egypt, His Majesty's Government gave notice of adherence to the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of March 30, 1912. The Foreign Office published simultaneously a letter addressed to the new Sultan by the Acting High Commissioner, dated Cairo, December 19. It was a review of the circumstances preceding the outbreak of war with Turkey, and the consequent changes in the status of Egypt. The letter drew Prince Hussein's attention to the fact that there were two parties in the Turkish Cabinet--a moderate and reforming party who welcomed the assurances of His Majesty and his Allies that neither in Egypt nor elsewhere would the war in Europe be used as a pretext for any action injurious to Ottoman interests, and "a band of unscrupulous military adventurers" who looked to find in a war of aggression waged in concert with His Majesty's enemies, "means of retrieving the disasters, military, financial, and economic into which they had already plunged their country." His Majesty and his Allies, in spite of repeated violation of their rights, had abstained from retaliatory action until the crossing of the Egyptian frontier and the unprovoked attack on Russian ports by Turkish naval forces under German officers. His Majesty's Government possessed ample evidence that since the outbreak of the war with Germany Abbas Hilmi Pasha, the late Khedive, had definitely thrown in his lot with His Majesty's enemies. The rights of the Sultan and the Khedive over the Egyptian Executive were therefore forfeited to His Majesty, whose Government, through the General Officer commanding the Forces, "accepted exclusive responsibility for the defence of Egypt during the present war. It remains to lay down the form of the future Government of the country, freed from all rights of Suzerainty or other rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman Government." For thirty years His Majesty's Government had regarded themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt, and they now decided that Great Britain could best fulfil the responsibilities incurred by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate and by the government of the country under such a Protectorate by a Prince of the Khedivial family. "By reason of your age and experience," the letter proceeded, "you have been chosen as the Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali most worthy to occupy the Khedivial position with the title and style of the Sultan of Egypt.... With Ottoman Suzerainty there will disappear the restrictions heretofore placed by Ottoman _firmans_ upon the numbers and organisation of Your Highness's Army.... As regards foreign relations His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between Your Highness's Government and the Representatives of Foreign Powers should be henceforth conducted through His Majesty's representative at Cairo." With regard to the system of treaties known as the Capitulations, "revision may most conveniently be postponed until the end of the present war." It was the intention of His Majesty's Government to remain faithful, in internal administration, to the policy of reform and economic progress and to associate the governed in the task of government in such measure as the enlightenment of public opinion permitted. They were convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country would accelerate progress towards self-government. Religious convictions would be scrupulously respected; "nor need I affirm," added Sir Arthur McMahon, "that in declaring Egypt free from any duty of obedience to those who have usurped political power at Constantinople, His Majesty's Government are animated by no hostility towards the Khalifate. The past history of Egypt shows indeed that the loyalty of Egyptian Mohammedans towards the Khalifate is independent of any political bonds between Egypt and Constantinople." His Majesty's Government relied with confidence upon the loyalty, good sense, and self-restraint of Egyptian subjects to facilitate the task of the General Officer commanding the forces, who is "entrusted with the maintenance of internal order and with the prevention of the rendering of aid to the enemy."

His Majesty appointed Prince Hussein honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath and also of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, and sent to him the following message:--

On the occasion when your Highness enters upon your high office
I desire to convey to your Highness the expression of my most
sincere friendship and the assurance of my unfailing support in
safeguarding the integrity of Egypt and in securing her future
well-being and prosperity.

Your Highness has been called upon to undertake the
responsibilities of your high office at a grave crisis in the
national life of Egypt, and I feel convinced that you will be able,
with the co-operation of your Ministers and the Protectorate of
Great Britain, successfully to overcome all the influences which
are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt and the wealth,
liberty, and happiness of its people.

GEORGE R. AND I.

The Sultan replied as follows:--

To His Majesty the King, London.