Chapter II: Germany and Austria-Hungary (2)

No matter how long the campaign and the sacrifices it may entail,
we know that the true and lasting interests of the toilers and
wage-earners in Germany can only be served by the victory of the
Allied Armies. The Kaiser, having ruined innocent and deceived
Belgium, is now despoiling and drenching France with the blood
of his victims. It must, therefore, be plain to all honest men,
without distinction of race, or creed, or party, that there can
be no settlement of the existing disruptions, no lasting peace or
security for the rights of man, no protection of democracy from
brigandage and death until the Imperial domination of Prussia
within Germany is crushed, disarmed, and swept away for ever. Then,
and then only, will Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, and Hanover be
rescued, and Poland liberated from the grip of a monarch who, by
his conduct, has forfeited the allegiance of his subjects; and, by
his boasted defiance of all international treaties and conventions,
has embarked upon a career of crime unparalleled in ancient or
modern history.

On August 19 the Emperor issued an Army order to his troops urging them to use all their skill and valour "to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little army," and on December 3, in reply to a deputation from the Army in Poland, he said: "We shall continue to fight successfully as hitherto, for Heaven is on our side. With God's help we shall win a long peace, for our nerves are stronger than those of the enemy."

In both the Prussian and German Parliaments all parties united in declaring that the war should be pursued to a successful end. In the German Parliament on December 2 the Imperial Chancellor, dressed in the grey service uniform of a general, declared that the German nation was fighting "a defensive war for right and freedom," and that "though the apparent responsibility for the war fell on Russia, the real responsibility fell on the British Government," as the latter "would have made the war impossible if it had without ambiguity declared at Petrograd that Great Britain would not allow a Continental war to develop from the Austro-Serbian conflict; such a declaration would have obliged France to take energetic measures to restrain Russia from undertaking warlike operations," and the German "action as mediators between Petrograd and Vienna would have been successful." "But Great Britain did not act thus. Great Britain was aware of the bellicose machinations of the partly irresponsible but powerful group around the Tsar. She saw how the ball was rolling, but placed no obstacle in its path. In spite of all its assurances of peace, London informed Petrograd that Great Britain was on the side of France, and consequently on the side of Russia. The Cabinet of London allowed this monstrous world-wide war to come about, hoping, with the help of the _Entente_, to destroy the vitality of England's greatest European competitor on the markets of the world. Therefore, England and Russia have before God and men the responsibility for the catastrophe which has fallen upon Europe. Belgian neutrality, which England pretended to defend, was nothing but a disguise. On the evening of August 2 we informed Brussels that we were obliged in the interests of self-defence and in consequence of the war plans of France, which were known to us, to march through Belgium, but already on the afternoon of the same day, August 2, before anything of our _démarche_ in Brussels could have been known in London, the British Government promised France unconditional assistance in case the German fleet should attack the French coast. Nothing was said about Belgian neutrality. How can England maintain that she drew the sword because we violated Belgian neutrality? How could the British statesman, whose past is well known, speak at all of Belgian neutrality? When on August 4 I spoke of the wrong which we were committing with our march into Belgium, it was not yet established whether the Belgian Government at the last hour would not desire to spare the country and retire under protest to Antwerp."

In September, in reply to an informal inquiry made of the Imperial Chancellor by the American Ambassador at Berlin as to whether the German Emperor would be willing to discuss terms of peace, the Chancellor replied that as the Allies had formed a compact under which none of them would cease hostilities except by common agreement, the inquiry should be addressed to them, but that there were three pre-requisites to Germany's consideration of peace negotiations: first, that England should forego her demands for a war to a finish and the complete crushing of Germany; second, that while negotiations might be considered with regard to the German Colonies the German Empire in Europe must remain intact; and third, that Germany should be secured against interference by the other Powers around her in future. These conditions were considerably enlarged in a statement made at New York by Herr Dernburg, the Emperor's financial agent in America, in December. He said that Germany "would not consider it wise" to take any European territory, but would make "minor corrections of frontiers" by occupying such frontier territory as has proved a weak spot in the German armour. Belgium, which belonged geographically to the German Empire, would be incorporated in the German Customs Union like Luxemburg; but her neutrality, "having been proved an impossibility," would be abolished, and her harbours secured for all time against British or French invasion. Great Britain having "bottled up" the North Sea, a _mare liberum_ must be established, and the Channel coasts of England, Holland, Belgium and France must be neutralised even in time of war, and the doctrine that private property should enjoy the same freedom of seizure on the high seas as it does on land must be guaranteed by all nations. All cables must be neutralised, and all Germany's Colonies returned, and in view of Germany's growing population she must take Morocco "if it is really fit for the purpose." There must be a recognised sphere of German influence for commercial and industrial purposes from the Persian Gulf to the Dardanelles, and no further development of Japanese influence in Manchuria. Finally, all small nations, such as Finland, Poland, and the Boers of South Africa, must have the right to frame their own destinies, while Egypt is to be returned, if she desires it, to Turkey.

On December 10 the British Government proposed to Germany through the American Government that arrangements should be made for the exchange of British and German officers and men, prisoners of war, who were physically incapacitated for further military service, and this offer was accepted by the German Government on December 31.

The Government was authorised by the German Parliament at the beginning of the war to borrow 200,000,000_l._, and a War Loan was accordingly started in. September bearing interest at 5 per cent., the issue price being 97-1/2. Extraordinary efforts were made to insure the success of the loan, and the Government sought to raise a minimum sum of 50,000,000_l._ by offering Treasury bills to that amount. The total subscribed amounted to 223,000,000_l._, but only 188,000,000_l._ of this sum was paid up at the end of November. The enormous increase of the expenditure in armaments was shown by the announcement of the firm of Krupp that its share capital would be increased from 9,000,000_l._ to 12,000,000_l._ and that of the new amount 1,750,000_l._ would be paid up at the end of the year. All the deposits of Russia, France, Belgium, and England in the German financial institutions were declared at the beginning of the year to be confiscated, and any repayment of such deposits was to be punished as an act of high treason.

In December General von Moltke, who had not displayed any of the military qualities which had made his uncle famous, was dismissed from the post of Chief of the General Staff, and succeeded by Lieutenant-General von Falkenhayn, Minister of War. His dismissal was ascribed to a difference of opinion between the Kaiser and himself. General Moltke desired a plan of campaign which would concentrate the German efforts on breaking through the Allies' line at Verdun and forcing the British Army to retire in a northerly direction. The Kaiser, however, preferred the plan of breaking through to Calais, and his favourite, General von Falkenhayn, worked out the plan, with the well-known results at Dixmude and Ypres and on the Yser (pp. 222, 369).

II. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

The result of the second Balkan War was so far favourable to Austria-Hungary that it broke up the Balkan League, but it left as the predominant State in the peninsula Serbia, which aspired to be the Piedmont of the Southern Slavs, and had long pursued a pan-Serbian agitation in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Dalmatia, which had become very formidable with the prestige gained by the Serbian victories. The danger to the very existence of the Empire, seeing that Serbia was secretly encouraged and supported by Russia, was patent, and there was a general feeling in Austria-Hungary that the only way to avert it was to compel Serbia by force of arms, if necessary, to cease her agitation in the Austrian provinces on her border. The Austrian and German Emperors had combined in the previous year to prevent what might have become a European war (A.R., 1913, p. 34), but the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne by a Serbian, with arms furnished by a Serbian officer, precipitated a crisis which was bound to come sooner or later. One of the outcomes of the pan-Serbian agitation was the attempt on May 20 on the life of Baron Sterletz, Ban of Croatia, by two Serbian students, who were sentenced on October 8 to five and eight years' penal servitude respectively.

The trial of the persons accused of promoting an agitation among the Ruthenians of Eastern Galicia and Hungary with the object of their conversion to the Russian Church as a first step towards the annexation of their country by Russia, which had been begun in the previous year (A.R., 1913, p. 329), was concluded on March 3, and thirty-two of the accused were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment, combined with fines, varying from six months to four and a half years. A similar trial began at Lemberg on March 9. The accused, who were all Ruthenians, were a journalist, two "Orthodox" priests, and a law student, and they were also charged with espionage in favour of Russia. The jury before whom they were tried was composed entirely of Poles, who acquitted them because, it was said, they wished to avoid interference with the internal affairs of the Ruthenians.

The racial struggle in Bohemia (A.R., 1913, p. 328) continued to make the assembling of the Diet impossible, and the Czech members of the Reichsrath retaliated by obstruction in the Reichsrath, which was consequently adjourned _sine die_ early in March. It was not summoned again even after the outbreak of the war.

The Austro-Hungarian Delegations were opened by the heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, on April 29, after a meeting, described as "very cordial," between Count Berchtold and the Marquis of San Giuliano, accompanied by their diplomatic staffs, at Abbazia. The estimates for the financial year from July 1, 1914, showed that the naval expenditure for the year would amount to 7,386,083_l._, of which 2,000,000_l._ was set down as a first instalment of a new naval programme to be completed in five years at a total estimated cost of 17,781,830_l._ An explanatory note attached to the Estimates stated that the object of this programme was "to make provision against the marked shifting of naval power in the Mediterranean which recent changes in the Near East may be expected to bring about." Four battleships, each of 24,500 tons displacement, were to be substituted for the three old vessels of the _Monarch_ class and the _Hapsburg_, and were to form the second Dreadnought division of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, besides which three fast cruisers were to be built of 4,800 tons each, to take the place of the three cruisers of the _Zenta_ class built in 1897, and six torpedo gun-boats of 800 tons each and two new gun-boats for service on the Danube. Provision was also made for the extension of the arsenal at Pola and the naval base at Sebenico, about half-way down the Dalmatian coast, which has a good natural harbour, is the headquarters of a rear-admiral with a command extending from Zara to Cattaro, and possesses a torpedo station, though it is not, like Pola, a naval base in which the ordinary necessaries for a modern fleet are to be found, and it was proposed to make it such a base in order to provide for a partial decentralisation of the Fleet, the necessity for which was alleged to have been shown by the recent crisis in the Balkans. Baron Engel, the Assistant Finance Minister, succeeded the late Minister, Count Zaleski, on October 21.

Among the prosecutions for espionage, which were frequent this year in Austria-Hungary, as in other countries, were those of three former officers of the Austrian Army on February 24 and March 6 and 10, who were sentenced to three, nineteen, and seventeen and a half years' penal servitude respectively for espionage in favour of Russia.

An important statement as to the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was made by Count Berchtold to the Delegations after the President of the Austrian Delegation had expressed the hope that "while preserving the non-aggressive policy of the monarchy, steps might be taken to put a decisive check upon the anti-Austrian propaganda carried on in the frontier districts." Count Berchtold, speaking of the mutual relations of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, noted "a certain slackening of the tension" between them, which he attributed to the policy of Great Britain. "In the attitude adopted by England at the decisive moments of the Balkan crisis," he said, "and more recently, we can perceive efforts to prevent in the future dangers to European peace similar to those threatened in the events of the most recent past. Such a policy is capable of removing misunderstandings which may arise between the two groups of Powers, and thereby to compensate in some measure for the defects which attach to the practical translation into activity of a rigid system of equilibrium"--a hint that such a system is only too likely to produce a European war. The Count also spoke in friendly terms of the relations between the Dual Monarchy and Russia, which he hoped would develop still further in the direction of mutual confidence. Turning to the Balkan States, he referred especially to the desire for closer commercial relations between the monarchy and Bulgaria, the negotiations as to the section of the Orient railways in the new Serbian territories (A. R., 1913, p. 359), the visit to Vienna of the Greek Premier, M. Venizelos, "which showed that the friendly feeling of Austria-Hungary towards Greece was reciprocated at Athens," and to the political and economic interests of the monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, which "could be best served by the continued development of friendly relations with the Porte." As to Roumania, he said that "no serious Roumanian politician could think of risking the loss of the great advantages which the hitherto close and friendly relations with the monarchy had brought to the country."

Francis Kossuth, the head of the Hungarian Independence party, died on May 25. Brought up as an engineer, he had none of the qualities of a great political leader, and he owed his position mainly to his name; he did not inherit even the oratorical gifts of his celebrated father.

The murder of the heir to the Austrian throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, which was the immediate cause of the war, took place at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, on June 28. The Archduke, who was Inspector-General of the Army, was on a tour of inspection, and as his car was driving to the town hall a bomb was thrown at him, but without effect. Half an hour later, as the Archduke was returning from the town hall, another bomb was thrown which did not explode, and the man who threw it, a Serbian student of the high school, then fired three shots with a pistol, two of which hit the Archduke and the third his wife. Both expired shortly after. It was stated that this was not the act of isolated assassins, but of a Serbian conspiracy, as widespread as that which had brought about the murder of King Alexander of Serbia and his Queen (A.R., 1902, pp. 322-3), and an outburst of horror and indignation followed all over the Empire. At Sarajevo the Croats, who, though of the same race as the Serbians, are Roman Catholics while the Serbians are "Orthodox" Greeks, and are consequently separated by deep religious as well as political differences, marched through the streets together with a large contingent of Moslems who are Serbian by race but Mohammedan by religion, and broke the windows of houses belonged to "Orthodox" Serbians; and at Agram, the capital of Croatia, large crowds of Croats marched in procession crying, "Down with the Serbian murderers." The general belief was that the conspiracy had its source in Belgrade, and the chief of the police at Sarajevo was said to have arrived at the same conclusion from the examination of the men who had taken part in the murder. According to the evidence taken at the trial of these men, which took place in October, they were the paid agents of a conspiracy whose leaders were Ministers and other functionaries of the Serbian Government, officers of the Serbian Army, and even, as was suggested by one of the witnesses, possibly the Crown Prince of Serbia himself, whose father was alleged to have been in correspondence with the assassins of King Alexander and Queen Draga, and had loaded them with honours on his accession to the throne. Five of the accused, said to have been furnished with arms and bombs by the Serbian Government for the express purpose of the murder, were condemned to death, one to imprisonment for life, and ten others to various periods of imprisonment, from three to twenty years. A dramatic incident in this connexion was the sudden death of M. Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, while on a visit to Baron Giers, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, for the purpose, it was said, of defending himself against the charge which was freely made at the time, of his having been an accomplice in the murder. The funeral of the late Archduke took place on July 8, and on the same day the aged Emperor issued a patriotic message to his people, expressing his profound affliction at a crime which "had taken from him a dear relative and faithful helper and robbed his children, still of tender age and still in need of protection, of all that was dear to them on earth," and declaring that as through sixty-five years he had shared joy and sorrow with his people, remembering even in the hours of deepest gloom his high duties and responsibility for their destinies, he was only strengthened by this fresh painful trial in the resolve to follow to his last breath the way he knew to be right for their welfare.

The new heir-presumptive, the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, was the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand's nephew, a young man twenty-seven years of age, very popular, especially with the Poles and Ruthenians, among whom he served for some years with his cavalry regiment, but more through his pleasant manners and those of his wife, the Archduchess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, than by any special qualities of character or ability, while his uncle was impetuous and quick-tempered, with very strong opinions, chiefly in an Ultramontane direction; and an enthusiastic champion of the idea of a politico-religious conquest of the Western Balkans by Hapsburg influence, if not by Hapsburg arms, and by the propagation of Roman Catholicism among the Southern Slavs--an idea which was of course abhorrent to the Pan-Serbians, and was probably the cause of the conspiracy to which he fell a victim. The murder of the heir-presumptive of a great European State by the members of a conspiracy in a neighbouring country called for immediate and vigorous action. Accordingly, on July 23, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade presented a peremptory note to the Serbian Government, demanding a reply before 6 o'clock on July 25. The Note began by recalling the statement made by the Serbian Government on March 31, 1909, and drawn up by Great Britain (A.R., 1909, p. 346), to the effect that it would alter its policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and live in future on good neighbourly terms with her. So far from fulfilling the engagement thus contracted, the Note proceeded, "the history of recent years has shown the existence in Serbia of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy--a movement which had its birth under the eyes of the Serbian Government, and was carried out by a series of acts of terrorism, outrages, and murders." The Serbian Government had "done nothing to repress this movement"; it had permitted "the criminal machinations of various societies and associations," had "tolerated apologies for the perpetrators of outrages and the participation of Serbian officers and civil officials in the movement," and had "permitted all the manifestations which have incited the Serbian people to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its institutions." Passing to the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Note stated that the depositions and confessions of perpetrators of the outrage had shown that it was "hatched in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which they were provided had been given to them by Serbian officers and civil officials belonging to the society _Narodna Oprava_, and that their passage into Bosnia was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Serbian frontier service." It was therefore impossible for the Austro-Hungarian Government "to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it had maintained for years in face of the machinations started in Belgrade and thence propagated to the territories of the monarchy"; and in order to put an end to these machinations, "which form a perpetual menace to its tranquillity, it demands from the Serbian Government a declaration, to be published on the front page of the _Official Journal_ for July 26, and communicated to the Serbian Army as an Order of the Day by the King, stating that it condemns the movement whose final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it," that it "regrets that Serbian officers and civil functionaries have participated in the movement and thereby compromised the neighbourly relations to which Serbia was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31, 1909," and that "henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress." The Note also made the following demands of the Serbian Government: 1. The suppression of all publications inciting to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy or whose tendency is directed against its territorial integrity. 2. Immediate dissolution of the _Narodna Obrana_ and confiscation of all its means of propaganda, also of all other societies with the same objects. 3. Elimination from public instruction in Serbia of everything serving to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 4. Removal from the service of all officers and civil functionaries guilty of such propaganda whose names and acts shall be communicated by the Austro-Hungarian Government to that of Serbia. 5. Representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government to be accepted by Serbia for the purpose of collaborating in the suppression of the above propaganda. 6. Judicial proceedings to be taken against accessories to the plot of June 28 who are on Serbian territory, and delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government to take part in the investigation relating thereto. 7. The immediate arrest of Major Jankasitch and the Serbian State functionary, Ciganovitch, who were found to be implicated in the plot at the official inquiry at Sarajevo. 8. The prevention by effective measures of the co-operation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, and the dismissal and severe punishment of the officials of the frontier service who had facilitated the passage of the frontier for the perpetrators of the outrage of June 28. 9. Explanation of the utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who notwithstanding their official position did not hesitate after the crime of June 28 to express themselves in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government. 10. Notification to the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The general feeling at Vienna was that notwithstanding the hard and uncompromising tone of the above Note, Serbia would yield as she did in 1909 and 1913. Everything depended, now as then, on Russia, and the Tsar was known to be strongly opposed to a European war. The Serbian reply, however, which was delivered by M. Pashitch, the Premier, to the Austro-Hungarian Minister within the time stipulated, after a busy exchange of telegrams between Belgrade and St. Petersburg, though it accepted "in principle," but with reservations, nearly all the Austrian demands, protested against the claim that Austro-Hungarian officials shall take part in the judicial inquiry into the complicity of persons on Serbian territory in the murder and in the suppression of the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and suggested that the matter should be settled by arbitration. At Vienna the Serbian reply was regarded as merely a device to gain time for Russian and Serbian mobilisation, and a request on the part of Russia that the period in which the reply was to be given might be extended was similarly interpreted. Diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were at once broken off, orders were given for a mobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian Army, part of the Landsturm was called up for service, and all ordinary traffic on the railways was stopped. In reply to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for the mediation of the four Powers, the Austro-Hungarian Government, while expressing entire agreement with him as to the desirability of localising the war, stated that "things had proceeded much too far" to allow anything to be done for the suspension of military operations; both Russia and Serbia had been mobilising for some time, and Austria-Hungary could not risk being behindhand, especially if the outcome should be a European war.

On July 28 war was declared against Serbia, and the Emperor Francis Joseph addressed a manifesto to his people, stating that it had been his fervent wish to consecrate the years still remaining to him to the works of peace, and to protect them from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. "The intrigues of a màlevolent opponent," however, had compelled him, in the defence of the honour and dignity of the monarchy, of its position as a Power, and of the security of its possessions to grasp the sword after long years of peace. When, "after three decades of fruitful work for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," the Emperor extended his sovereign rights to those lands, Serbia, whose rights were in no wise injured, had assumed an attitude of "bitterest hate" to the monarchy, notwithstanding which it had only required her to reduce her Army to a peace footing and to promise that in future "she would tread the path of peace and friendship." Again, when Serbia was embroiled two years ago in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, it was to Austria-Hungary, which had "restricted its action to the defence of the vital interests of the monarchy," that Serbia "primarily owed the attainment of the objects of the war." But "the hope that Serbia would appreciate the patience and love of peace of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and would keep its word," had not been fulfilled. "The flame of its hatred" for the Emperor and his House had "blazed always higher," and the design to tear from it by force inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary "had been made manifest." "A criminal propaganda extended over the frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of State order," of making the people "waver in their loyalty to the ruling House and the Fatherland," and of inciting their youth "to mischievous deeds of madness and high treason." A series of murderous attacks, an organised, carefully prepared, and well carried out conspiracy, "whose process had wounded him and his people to the heart," had marked with its bloody track the secret machinations which were operated and directed in Serbia with this object. In vain did his Government make a last attempt to preserve the honour, dignity and interests of the monarchy from these criminal shocks, "and to induce Serbia, by means of a serious warning, to desist." Serbia had rejected "the just and moderate demands" of his Government; he must, therefore, proceed by force of arms to secure "those indispensable pledges which alone can ensure tranquillity to the monarchy at home and lasting peace abroad." Finally, the Emperor declared that "in this solemn hour he was fully conscious of the whole significance of his resolve and his responsibility before the Almighty"; that he had "examined and weighed everything," and with a serene conscience would "set out on the path to which duty points," trusting in his people "who throughout every storm always rallied in unity and loyalty round the throne, and were always prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honour, the prestige, and the might of the Fatherland," in his "brave and devoted forces," and "in the Almighty to give the victory to his arms."

The ultimatum to Serbia was, as Sir Edward Grey described it, unprecedented in the harshness of its demands of an independent State, and its style was so different from that of Count Berchtold that it was believed at Vienna to have been drafted at the Emperor Francis Joseph's request by Baron Burian, the Hungarian Minister _a latere_ of the Emperor, an expert in South Slavonic affairs and himself of Slovak origin. The German Chancellor and his Secretary of State professed a total ignorance of the text of the ultimatum, but there seems to be no doubt that it was sent to the German Emperor in Norway and met with his complete approval, as it was more in accordance with the policy of "the mailed fist" than the polished and conciliatory despatches of Count Berchtold. The latter repeatedly asked the Emperor Francis Joseph to be relieved of his post, and only remained to carry out a policy distasteful to him out of loyalty to his Imperial master. He strove up to the last for a pacific issue, and he announced in London and Paris on July 31 that he would consent to submit to mediation the points in the Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence,[19] but the matter had by that time passed into the hands of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian military leaders and could not be pursued diplomatically any further. The policy initiated by the late Count Aehrenthal in 1908, the disastrous consequences of which Count Berchtold had done his best to minimise, was now again predominant at the Hofburg, and threatened to lead Austria-Hungary to her ruin.

War was declared against Russia, France, and England, on August 6, and the Austrian troops marched across the Russian frontier, which had been left unguarded, on August 7. The Austro-Hungarian Army was well organised and equipped, and though composed of men of several different nationalities, showed a unity of action and a rigid discipline not surpassed by that of its German ally. The Polish legion, numbering 20,000 men, many from Russian Poland, and equipped out of a fund raised by private subscription among the Poles of Galicia, greatly distinguished itself by its headlong valour and the high military qualities of its officers. Austria-Hungary was a most efficient ally for Germany, but the task assigned to her of invading Serbia, defending her own territories against the overwhelming forces of Russia, and at the same time assisting the Germans in their defence of East Prussia, was beyond her strength. This was the cause of her failures in Serbia; she crossed the frontier at Shabatz on August 13, after having bombarded Belgrade, but the necessity of massing her troops in Galicia to resist the Russian invasion prevented her from sending sufficient reinforcements to the army of 15,000 men with which she had occupied Shabatz, and she announced on August 23 that as she was "obliged to gather all her forces for the principal struggle in the north-east," her attack upon Serbia was to be regarded "as a punitive expedition and not as a definite war." The campaign which followed (p. 360) was disastrous to the Austro-Hungarian arms; three attempts were made to invade Serbian territory, and in the third, further troops having been brought up from Hungary, they succeeded in capturing Belgrade, but a fortnight after the Serbians recaptured their capital and drove the Austro-Hungarians in disorder from the country (p. 361). Montenegro having joined Serbia in declaring war upon Austria her coasts were blockaded on August 12 by the Austro-Hungarian Fleet and the Montenegrin fortress of Lowczen, opposite Cattaro, was bombarded with little effect. The Montenegrins and Serbians repeatedly attempted to invade Bosnia, but did not succeed in reaching Sarajevo, the capital, being on each occasion beaten back by the Austrians.

The capture of Lemberg by the Russians and the Austro-Hungarian disasters in Serbia were a great blow to Austrian prestige, and much discontent was expressed at Vienna because Germany had apparently neglected the interests of her ally in her anxiety to protect Prussian territory against Russia. Repeated negotiations took place on the subject between the two Governments, and Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, was sent on a mission to the German headquarters, the result of which was that numerous German troops were sent to assist in a fresh expedition against Serbia.

War was declared against Belgium on August 27, and a treaty of arbitration with Switzerland was concluded on September 2.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] The French Ambassador at Berlin stated on July 24 that great weight must be attached to the Emperor's feeling that monarchies must stand together, and that his impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a Prince whose guest he had been a few days previously (French White Book, No. 30).

[7] British Blue Book, No. 17.

[8] _Ibid._, Nos. 18, 32.

[9] _Ibid._, No. 46.

[10] _Ibid._, No. 46.

[11] _Ibid._, No. 71.

[12] _Ibid._, No. 98.

[13] _Ibid._, Nos. 112, 113.

[14] British Blue Book, No. 123.

[15] _Ibid._, No. 129.

[16] Nos. 157, 158 Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 20 and 22 Austrian Red Book.

[17] The campaigns in Belgium, France, and Russian Poland are described in the chapters relating to those countries.

[18] The naval operations of the war are dealt with in English History, Chapter V.

[19] Blue Book, No. 161.