Chapter V: Great Britain at War (3)

The Prime Minister had not waited for the prorogation to leave for Edinburgh, where he spoke at a meeting of 3,500 persons, primarily consisting of those eligible for the new Army, on September 18. Great crowds were unable to enter, and were addressed either by him at an overflow meeting or by speakers outside. Lord Provost Inches, who presided, mentioned that Edinburgh had enlisted 11,000 men in the new Army. Mr. Asquith began by referring to the origin of the war, and to Sir Maurice de Bunsen's despatch (p. 215), as showing that, largely through Sir Edward Grey's efforts, a peaceful settlement was already in sight when, on July 31, Germany deliberately made war a certainty. The only attempt to controvert the facts was by circulating such wanton falsehoods as that France was beginning to violate Belgian territory. England was at war (1) to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obligations and the public law of Europe; (2) to assert the independence of small States; (3) to withstand in the interest of civilisation the claim of a single Power to dominate Europe. Rebutting the German charge that England had never cared for treaties save in her own interest, he quoted Pitt's speech in 1793 on the French annulment of the treaties guaranteeing to Holland the navigation of the Scheldt, and cited Mr. Gladstone's action regarding Belgium in 1870 and his vindication of it at Edinburgh in 1880. The Germans practically did not contest the British statement that their aim was to dominate Europe. They avowedly believed that the supremacy of German culture was best for the world. Mankind owed much to Germany, but her specific share in the movement of the past thirty years had been intellectually the development of the doctrine of the prerogative of material forces, and, practically, primacy in the fabrication and multiplication of means of destruction. To those accepting this gospel treaties were merely pieces of parchment, and talk about the rights of the weak and the obligations of the strong merely threadbare and nauseating cant. Their creed had proved a purblind philosophy; they had miscalculated the strength of the British Empire, the feelings of the Colonies and India, the state of Great Britain. The fruits of this culture were seen in their action in Belgium and France--Louvain, Malines, Termonde, their proclamation at Reims. The British task might take months or years, but the economic, monetary, and military and naval position was encouraging; but more men were needed, and he eloquently appealed for them, reminding them of their hardships and dangers, and of their noble opportunity.

Next day the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke for a similar purpose at a meeting of Welshmen at the Queen's Hall, London. He said that no man detested war more than himself, but it could not have been avoided without national dishonour. France had respected Belgian neutrality at Sedan at the cost of her own ruin; Prussia's interest was to break the treaty, and she had done it. The German Chancellor called treaties "scraps of paper." Then let them burn their bank-notes; they were only scraps of paper. "What are they made of? Rags. What are they worth? The whole credit of the British Empire." The machinery of the world's commerce had stopped; it was moved by bills of exchange--wretched little scraps of paper, which yet moved great ships with precious cargoes across the world. What was the motive power behind them? The honour of commercial men. Treaties were the currency of international statesmanship. German merchants were as honourable as any, but if the currency of German commerce was to be debased to that of her statesmanship no trader would ever look at a German signature again. The German doctrine was the straight road to barbarism. It was as if one removed the magnetic pole whenever it was in the way of a German cruiser. The tales about conspiracy of France and Belgium had been vamped up afterwards. He dwelt on the outrages in Belgium, and on the Austrian treatment of Servia; and he remarked that, the greatest art, the most enduring literature, even the salvation of mankind had come through little nations. He contrasted the Russian action to free Bulgaria with Bismarck's saying that "Bulgaria was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." German civilisation was hard and material; the Emperor claimed to be God's Viceregent; "there has been nothing like it since the days of Mahomet." He did not mean all his speeches, but the men around him did. They meant to destroy Christianity; the new diet of the world they held was to be blood and iron. Britain was not fighting the German people, who were under the heel of the military caste. The Prussian Junker was "the road hog of Europe." If the old British spirit was alive, that bully would be torn from his seat. It would not be easy to beat them, but in the end we should march through terror to triumph. It was a great opportunity, and a greater blessing was emerging--a new patriotism, richer, nobler, more exalted than the old. We had been living in a sheltered valley; the stern hand of fate had scourged us to an elevation whence they could see the great peaks of honour--Duty, Patriotism, Sacrifice. We should descend again, but this generation would carry in their hearts "the image of those great mountain peaks whose foundations are not shaken, though Europe rock and sway in the convulsions of a great war."

Speaking at a recruiting meeting at Nottingham (Sept. 21) the Marquess of Lansdowne attributed to Germany a design to establish a great military despotism from the North Sea to the Adriatic, and described the action of the Dominions and India as unparalleled in history. The response to Lord Kitchener's appeal was magnificent, but two men in training were needed for every one in the field. The First Lord of the Admiralty on the same evening at Liverpool said that circumstances had so far been unexpectedly favourable to the Allied cause; if the British Empire had the time--and the Navy would give it--he thought, if its resolution did not fail, it could finally settle the fight as it chose. Without a battle, Great Britain was enjoying the advantages of a battle in which the German Navy had been destroyed. If the German ships did not come out, "they would be dug out like rats in a hole." Mr. F. E. Smith and Mr. T. P. O'Connor spoke also, and it was announced that the former was leaving for the front.

Mr. Churchill's speech, unfortunately, was promptly followed by the sinking of three British cruisers in the North Sea, with a heavy loss of officers and men; but encouragement was given by the news of the daring British air raid on Cologne and Düsseldorf, by the indignation roused throughout the civilised world by the German bombardment of Reims Cathedral (_post_, Chron., Sept. 20, 22), and still more by the announcement that, on the eleventh day of the Battle of the Aisne, the Allies were gaining ground. No full account, however, was given of the doings of the British Army in France till Sir John French's despatch was published, October 19; and we may here continue the story (p. 199) by summarising his account of the movement from the Marne to the Aisne.

The battle on September 6, he said, began on a front running from Ermenonville through Lizy, Mauperthuis, Cortecon, Esternay, Charleville, to a point north of Verdun. About noon a German retreat began, and a series of battles followed till, on the evening of September 10, the enemy, driven back to a line running from Compiègne to Soissons, were preparing to dispute the passage of the Aisne. He specially mentioned the forcing of the passage of the Petit Morin River (Sept. 8) by the First British Corps, and of the Marne by the First and Second Corps, and of the battle on September 10, when these Corps, assisted by the Cavalry division on the right and the Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northwards, capturing thirteen guns, seven machine guns, some 2,000 prisoners, and much transport.

A further despatch, dated October 8, but published with the first, practically completed the history of the fighting on the Aisne. On September 12, Sir John French stated, the enemy made a stand, and prepared to dispute the passage of the river (somewhat to the east of Soissons). The river valley, he explained, ran east and west; the bottom was flat, the hills bordering it were about 400 feet high, with numerous spurs and re-entrants; they were backed on the north by a high plateau with patches of wood, admirably adapted for concealing troops. The enemy held a very strong position on the north of the Aisne (a winding stream, 170 feet wide, and unfordable), commanding all the bridges, and with great facilities for concealment. On September 13 the British forces were ordered to advance and make good the Aisne. Portions of them that day crossed at various points a distance of about twelve miles from Bourg to Venizel (the latter some three miles east of Soissons), with comparative ease on their right, with great difficulty on their left, the Fifth Infantry Brigade, in particular, crossing in single file under heavy fire on the broken and only remaining girder of a bridge. The crossing was not completed till the evening of the 13th, when the enemy (though still holding some points on the Aisne) effected a general retirement and entrenched on the high ground two miles north of the river, leaving, however, detachments of infantry supported by powerful artillery, in commanding points on the slopes of the spurs of the high ground. The river was further bridged, under heavy artillery fire, by the Royal Engineers, and on the 15th there was a general advance, to ascertain whether the enemy intended to hold his position or was only halting. This cannot here be described in detail; a few points must suffice. The First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, gained positions on that day by "skilful, bold, and decisive" action which alone enabled the British forces to maintain their foothold on the north bank during three weeks' severe fighting; the most difficult part of this work was achieved, round Vendresse and Troyon, by the Loyal North Lancashires, the Royal Sussex, the King's Royal Rifles, and the Northamptons, reinforced by the Coldstream Guards. The enemy was found to be making a determined stand against the Allies in a strongly entrenched position along the whole line from Compiègne to Reims, supported by heavy artillery set free by the fall of Maubeuge. The British troops, therefore, had to entrench thoroughly, and eventually to establish a regular system of relief in the trenches, the cavalry men taking their turn, and also to obtain heavy howitzer batteries from England, which were first used September 24. On the 16th the Army was reinforced by the 6th Division. On the 17th, 18th, 19th, the Germans heavily bombarded the trenches and the First Corps was heavily engaged; on the 17th the Northamptons crept in mist to within 100 yards of the enemy's trenches, and then cleared them with the bayonet; on the night of the 18th the Gloucesters advanced near Chivy, filled in the German trenches and took two Maxim guns. From the 23rd to the 26th the enemy was less active; but on the 26th, and especially on the night of the 27th-28th, there were renewed German attacks, which were beaten off, and were the last great German effort in the battle. Sir John French eulogised the conduct alike of officers and men; the total casualties in four weeks were 561 officers and 12,980 men, and the heavy rain and cold during most of the battle imposed a severe tax on the endurance of the troops. The German losses, it must be noted, were far heavier; and after the end of September the German resistance died down and permitted the removal of the British troops to Ypres.

All this was as yet only known vaguely; but a possible danger to London had been impressed afresh on the public by the issue through the police authorities of an Admiralty statement of the measures taken to protect the capital against an air raid. More searchlights had been mounted, as well as special guns; at Hendon aerodrome men and machines of the Naval Air Service were held ready to pursue the raiders. Naval airships were to pay surprise visits, to test the effectiveness of the diminution of lighting; and for many months the darkness of the London streets, the consequent reduction in evening performances at the theatres, and (after the middle of November) the regulation that suburban trains must have their blinds drawn after nightfall, served as a reminder of the newest peril of modern war.

Besides all this, the conviction that Germany was essentially responsible for the war had been, if that were possible, intensified; first, by Sir Edward Grey's effective reply to a bungling attack on the sincerity of Great Britain made through the Danish Press by the German Chancellor (Sept. 15, 16), and next by the issue of two important diplomatic publications: (1) Sir Maurice de Bunsen's lengthy despatch (Sept. 16) which showed that the Austro-Hungarian Government had pressed on the war against Serbia in harmony with the wishes of the population of Vienna and other leading cities, and that Germany had by her intervention destroyed the last hopes of a peaceful solution; (2) the Russian Orange Book (Sept. 21; see _post_, For. Hist., Chap. II., III.).

It was amid these impressions that the Prime Minister addressed a great meeting at the Round Room of the Dublin Mansion House on September 25, the Lord Mayor in the chair. A small section of the National Volunteers had issued an anti-recruiting manifesto in the morning, and police and National Volunteers were ready to avert a disturbance, but these precautions were not needed. Mr. Asquith, who had an enthusiastic reception, said that he could base his title to speak on such service as he had tried throughout his political life to render Ireland. The Empire, as a family of nations, was united in defending principles vital to it and to civilisation and the progress of mankind. The proofs that Germany was responsible for the war were patent, manifold, and overwhelming; Germany had been preparing for a generation past, and had seized the opportunity of the Austro-Serbian dispute. But she made two profound miscalculations; as to the resistance of Belgium--to which he paid an eloquent tribute--and as to the attitude of England. She believed England to be paralysed by domestic disaffection and without interest in the conflict. But England had at stake her plighted word and the maintenance of the whole system of international goodwill. In 1870 Mr. Gladstone had said that "the greatest triumph of our time would be the enthronement of public right as the governing idea of European politics." That meant that the small nations must have as good a title as the large ones to a place in the sun, and finally the establishment of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. The victory of the Allies would bring this within the range of European statesmanship. The cause of the small nations specially appealed to Ireland. Let her take her share in the war. The British Empire had always been proud of its Irish regiments and their leaders; and he specially appealed to the National Volunteers (after a brief reference to the contests which had become unthinkable) to form an Irish Brigade, or, better still, an Irish Army Corps. Local associations would be maintained as far as possible, and officers of the Volunteers might receive commissions. He was certain that the Volunteers would become an integral part of the defensive forces of the Crown. Old animosities were dead; what was needed was the free-will offering of a free people.

The Earl of Meath, the Unionist Lord-Lieutenant of co. Dublin, also spoke; and Mr. John Redmond said that Ireland would feel bound in honour to take her place beside the other autonomous portions of the King's Dominions. She had been profoundly moved by the sufferings of Belgium, and he had promised Cardinal Mercier that Irishmen would avenge Louvain. Ireland's highest material interests were at stake in the war. After referring to the high proportion of Irishmen in the Army from the Peninsular War onwards he said that Ireland wanted an Irish Army Corps, and at the same time the Irish National Volunteers would be kept intact, and would be an inexhaustible source of strength to the new Army Corps and Army. Speaking for an overwhelming majority of the Nationalists, he said to the Prime Minister and Great Britain: "You have kept faith with Ireland; Ireland will keep faith with you." The Lord-Lieutenant, the Chief Secretary, Mr. Dillon, and Mr. Devlin spoke also, and the meeting closed with the singing of "God Save the King," "God Save Ireland," and "A Nation Once Again."

A day earlier the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in an impromptu speech at Criccieth, had mentioned that France and England had agreed that each should lend Belgium 10,000,000_l._ without interest, and that the Bank of England had been ready to let him have 40,000,000_l._ or more; and he urged Wales to be forward in recruiting for this eminently righteous war. He repeated this appeal at a great meeting in Cardiff (Sept. 29) called to promote the raising of a separate Welsh Army Corps. Wales, he said, would have under compulsory service to raise 250,000 men; it ought to provide 40,000 to 50,000 volunteers for the new Army. The war must be national, and conviction was essential to confidence. It was no picnic; but their war memories would compensate them. The Welsh were not a martial race; but neither were the men who composed Cromwell's Ironsides. If they failed through timidity, ignorance or indolence Welshmen would be unable to live down their evil repute for generations. In two months 36,000 men had joined the Army from Wales. If Welshmen came out manfully, the sons of Wales would have laid up for their native land treasures of honour and glory.

On the previous day, September 28, Belfast had celebrated the second anniversary of Ulster Day, which had not been dropped owing to the alleged breach by the Government of the "truce" (p. 204). But the proceedings were very largely a demonstration of a broader patriotism. Sir Edward Carson, indeed, announced that after the war he proposed to summon the Provisional Government, which would repeal the Home Rule Act as affecting Ulster and enact simultaneously that the Volunteers should carry out this decision; meanwhile, let them throw themselves whole-heartedly into the patriotic action demanded by the time. And Mr. Bonar Law, at a great demonstration that evening, after giving a formal pledge that the whole Unionist party would support Ulster unconditionally; repeated that Ulstermen had no ill-will to their Catholic fellow-countrymen, and went on to deal with the war. The meeting was called to stimulate Ulstermen to join the Army; such hesitation as there had been at first was due to the suddenness of the war, and it had not lasted long. The pressure put on individuals to join seemed to him detestable, and was utterly unnecessary. The Germans had been shown that we were not a decadent nation. We had reason to be proud of the Army, the Volunteers, and the spirit shown throughout the Empire. After urging the need of better allowances for dependants of soldiers, Mr. Bonar Law described the war as one of the greatest of crimes, due to one nation and largely to one man. The Germans had pulled down their spiritual altars and erected a temple to naked Force. It was Napoleonism without Napoleon. Apart from their Army they had made every possible mistake--with Italy, with Belgium, in neutral countries, as regarded the Dominions and India. The British people had no desire to humiliate the German people, but they were determined that the dread spectre that had haunted them should not do so again, and that the law of right, not of might, should govern the world.

Meanwhile the moral strength of the British case was emphasised by the elaborate reply of British theologians (Sept. 30) to an appeal issued by German theologians to Evangelical Christians abroad. This appeal described Germany as "confronted in other lands by a systematic network of lies." It attributed the war to the interference of Russia in the Servian dispute, complained that Russia had been joined by those who "by blood and history and faith are our brothers," and said that against a world in arms, Germans had to defend their existence, individuality, culture, and honour. "Unnameable horrors" had been committed against Germans living peaceably abroad, women and children, wounded and physicians; heathen Japan had been called in under pretext of an alliance; the mission fields indicated as most important by the World Missionary Conference, mid-Africa and Eastern Asia, were now the scenes of bitter rivalry between the peoples specially responsible for their Christianisation; the signatories, for the sake, not of Germany, but of the world-task of the Christian peoples in the decisive hour of the world-mission, addressed themselves to Evangelical Christians abroad, and repudiated German responsibility for the war and its consequences to the development of God's kingdom on earth. The British reply, signed by the two English Archbishops, the Primates of Ireland and Scotland, the Bishops of London, Winchester, and Ossory, the Chairman of the World Missionary Conference, and a host of other Anglican and Free Church divines and University dignitaries, began by a calm review of the origin of the war, and the violation of Belgian neutrality. It went on to note the absence of reference to the teachings of Treitschke and Bernhardi, questioned the allegation of atrocities, deplored the signatories' severance from German Christians and the effects of the war in the mission field, and declared that, dear to them as was the cause of peace, the principles of truth and honour were yet more dear. They took their stand for international good faith, the safeguarding of smaller nationalities, and the upholding of the essential conditions of brotherhood among the nations of the world.

But, though the British people supported the war with practical unanimity, it was found necessary to stimulate recruiting by a platform campaign. A more effective method would doubtless have been to give news from the front; but few details were given of the great battle on the Aisne, and the feats of particular corps were not mentioned for fear that the enemy should find out what troops it had to face. War correspondents, again, were not allowed at the front, and arrangements to permit them were vetoed, after long waiting, by the War Office. An official account, by an "eye-witness," was supplied to the Press; but it contained little that was definite. Popular feeling was encouraged by the surrender of Duala and the investment of Tsingtau, and exasperated by the _Emden's_ raid on Madras; but recruiting was encouraged only by advertisement and by speech-making, following the Ministerial lead.

The Prime Minister concluded his part in this campaign at Cardiff, where he addressed a thoroughly representative meeting of 9,000 persons (Oct. 2). He began by laying stress on the unparalleled unity of the British Empire in the war, which was due neither to ambition nor to ill-will. In regard to Germany in particular, British policy had aimed at establishing a firm basis for cordial relations; Ministers had repeatedly said that friendships with certain Powers did not imply coldness or hostility to others; but, as the Foreign Secretary had said (Nov. 27, 1911), "One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones." Mr. Asquith then made an important disclosure. In 1912 the Cabinet had formally notified the German Government that Britain would "neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack on Germany." "Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." But the German Government asked Britain for an absolute pledge of neutrality if Germany were engaged in war, and this at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive forces, especially at sea. Only one answer was possible, but the British Government had continued, especially during the Balkan crisis, to work for peace. Both from a domestic and an international point of view the war could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes for Britain, but not the worst. In the four weeks since his Guildhall speech (p. 197) every day had increased the sombre and repulsive features of the German invasion--"worthy of the blackest annals in the history of barbarism." Had not Great Britain shown herself ready to strike with all her forces at the common enemy of civilisation and freedom she could only have gone down dishonoured to her grave. The world was as ready as ever to respond to moral issues. The new school of German ethics had taught for a generation that force alone was the test of right. But in the British Empire they still believed in the sanctity of treaties, the rights of small nationalities, and the worth of freedom; and they looked forward at the end of the war to a Europe in which those simple and venerable truths would be guarded for ever against the recrudescence of the era of blood and iron. Britain was confronted by the greatest emergency in her history. There was no ground for apprehension that the new Army would interfere with the Territorials, who were fit, according to the considered opinion of one of the most eminent generals, for any part either in home defence, in garrison, or in the battle lines at the front. He asked Welshmen to fill up the ranks of the Welsh Army Corps. Let them remember their past and leave to their children the richest of all inheritances--the memory of fathers who in a great cause put self-sacrifice before ease, and honour before life itself.

The recruiting campaign was now energetically carried on throughout the country; and in Ireland the Nationalist leaders took a prominent part in it. Mr. Redmond at Wexford (Oct. 4) did his best to secure the aid of the Irish National Volunteers, and to promote a general reconciliation on Home Rule; and he intimated that the Prime Minister had promised that there should be an Irish Brigade. Mr. Dillon the same day at Ballaghadareen, Mayo, condemned the efforts to check recruiting made by Sinn Fein and the Gaelic League; but these, unfortunately, were not ineffective. Complaints were made of the inadequate accommodation at the camps (which was mitigated by billeting, or even by allowing the recruits to live at home while under instruction), of the drunkenness caused by indiscreet treating by civilian sympathisers, and, in some cases, of immorality (Chron., Oct. 13), but voluntary effort did much to counteract these evils and to provide recreation for the men.

But the character of the war was being brought home to England by other means than the recruiting campaign. On the day the Premier spoke at Cardiff the Admiralty announced that the German mine-laying and submarine activities had constrained Great Britain to establish a minefield in the North Sea south of the German field (which extended to lat. 52°), and that it was now dangerous for ships to cross the area between lat. 51° 15' and 51° 40' and long. 1° 35' and 3°, but that navigation must not be supposed safe in any part of the south of that sea. This new minefield extended the danger area a line drawn from the mouth of the Eastern Scheldt to the Thames. On the other hand, it was encouraging that the Germans were failing to make any impression on the Allies on the Aisne, and that the German destroyer S 167 had been sunk off Schiermonnikoog by the British submarine E9 (Oct. 6) which had recently sunk the _Hela_ (Chron., Sept. 3); still more that Canada had decided to double her contribution in men and material; that British airmen had damaged a Zeppelin shed, and perhaps a Zeppelin, at Düsseldorf (Chron., Oct. 9); that the Home Office had taken effective measures against espionage (p. 185), though here the reassurance was only temporarily effective; and that alien enemy residents had been prohibited from changing their names, or continuing to use names changed since the outbreak of the war (Oct. 5).

But British confidence was shaken by the unexpected fall of Antwerp, where the Royal Naval Division, formed in September and consisting of two Naval Brigades and a Marine Brigade, in all 8,000 men, had reinforced the Belgian troops. The Marine Brigade of 2,200 men had arrived on the night of October 3-4, and relieved the Belgians in the trenches near Lierre, with an advanced post on the Nethe. Through the exhaustion of the Belgians--coupled with the superior numbers of the enemy, and the defenders' lack of heavy guns--they were driven back by several stages on the second line of defence, the Germans on the 5th forcing the passage of the Nethe, which was not under fire from the trenches. The two Naval Brigades reached Antwerp on the night of October 5-6; the first assisted in the withdrawal of the Marine Brigade (under a violent bombardment) on the following night from a position temporarily occupied to the second main line of defence, and the Naval Division occupied the intervals between the forts on this second line. The German heavy guns bombarded the town, forts, and trenches from midnight on October 7-8, the inability of the Belgians to hold the forts became evident during the 8th, and a retirement of the Division was decided on at 5:30 P.M., chivalrously facilitated by the Belgian commander, and carried out that evening under very difficult conditions. A large German force was in the rear, the roads were blocked by refugees, vehicles, and cattle, and for these and other reasons, partly fatigue, many of the First Naval Brigade were taken prisoners or crossed the border into Holland, where they were interned. The remainder entrained after an all-night march at St. Gillies-Waes, and completed their retreat; but the rearguard, a battalion of the Marine Brigade, entraining later with many refugees, found its journey interrupted by the enemy at Morbeke, and fought its way through with great difficulty, losing half its numbers; it then marched ten miles more to Selzaate and entrained there. The casualties altogether exceeded 2,500.

The full account was given in a report from Major-General Paris, published Dec, 4, and a covering despatch from Sir John French stated that General Paris had handled the force with great skill and boldness; its action had considerably delayed the enemy and enabled the Belgian Army to be withdrawn and regain its value as a fighting force, and had also facilitated the destruction of war material which would have been of great value to the enemy; moreover, the moral effect of this "necessarily desperate attempt" to succour the Belgian Army had greatly conduced to their efficiency as a fighting force.

This latter despatch was virtually a reply to Press strictures on a step regarded as essentially the enterprise of the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had, in fact, visited the city during the British occupation; and the _Morning Post_ of October 13 described it as "a costly blunder, for which Mr. Winston Churchill was primarily responsible"; the relief had come too late, and kept the Belgian Army there too long. In other quarters, however, it was pointed out that the despatch of the force must have been the act of the whole Cabinet, and that it had a moral value as a demonstration of sympathy with Belgium. Meanwhile, the Germans occupied Bruges and Thielt, bombarded Arras, and were evidently making a desperate effort to reach the coast at Dunkirk and Calais, hoping to interfere at least with British shipping in the Channel.

The capture of Antwerp, too, seemed to increase their means of interference. The defenders had destroyed the stores of petrol, and sunk or disabled the steamers in the port; and to have used it as a naval base even for submarines would have involved the violation of the neutrality of Holland. But it increased the danger of a Zeppelin raid on London; the Mayor of Gravesend issued a warning against hostile aircraft; and it opened the way for a German advance to the more suitable bases, at Zeebrugge and Ostend, for a naval or aerial attack.

The fall was accompanied by a fresh influx into England of Belgian refugees; in four days (Oct. 7-10) some 10,000 landed in Folkestone from Ostend; on Sunday, October 11, 4,250 landed there from Ostend and 900 from Flushing; by October 17 the total number in England was 100,000. Crowds reached other ports, notably Lowestoft, in sailing craft, amid great suffering. Belief was promptly given by committees at London and Folkestone, and shelter and hospitality was offered throughout Great Britain; while numbers of Belgian wounded were also provided for in improvised hospitals, private houses being frequently lent and fitted up by their owners with other voluntary aid. Many German spies were said to be among the refugees; and for this reason they were withdrawn from Dover and Grimsby.

The fate of Belgium was a powerful factor in the issue of a Labour manifesto (Oct. 15), signed by twenty-five Labour members of Parliament and thirty-five leading trade union officials, declaring that in view of Germany's conduct there must be no peace till she was beaten, and that during the war combatants and non-combatants must be supported to the utmost, though after the war the party favoured arbitration. With the rarest exceptions, the whole British people was equally convinced that the war must be fought out; and there was no dismay at the news of the Maritz rebellion or the loss of the _Hawke_, against which indeed might be set the arrival of the first Canadian contingent and the sinking of German destroyers off the Dutch coast (Chron., Oct. 17). Such disquiet as there was showed itself in a revival of the fear of espionage, which was met by the internment of a number of Germans and Austrians (Oct. 21, 22), and in the destruction of German shops in South London (Oct. 17); and complaint was also made of an order (shortly afterwards rescinded) that enemy passengers were not to be taken out of neutral ships and of the permission of transactions with branches of German and Austrian firms outside Germany and Austria. Recruiting, however, was proceeding rapidly; within the British Isles there were already 1,200,000 men "in organised form," and 100,000 troops were available as "a first instalment" from the outer Empire.

Meanwhile a daring attempt, not fully revealed till six weeks later, had been made by Sir John French to outflank the German forces in Northern France. Details must be sought in his lengthy despatch (published Nov. 30); but the general idea was to effect a turning movement north of Lille, and then, with the aid of the cavalry under Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had been covering the Belgian retreat from Antwerp, to advance on Bruges and Ghent. The position on the Aisne (p. 214) permitted the transfer from that region of the British troops; and this delicate operation was carried out (Oct. 3-19) with the full concurrence of General Joffre and the cordial co-operation of the French General Staff. Broadly, the plan arranged with General Foch, in charge of the French operations north of Noyon, was that the Second, Third, and First British Army Corps should successively take up positions on the French right, beginning at a point on the Lille-Bethune road, on a line running thence through Armentières towards, and beyond, Ypres, the British right being directed on Lille, while Sir Henry Rawlinson's cavalry was to co-operate, and the First Corps was to make for Bruges. The great battle of Ypres-Armentières, the result of this attempt, began October 11, and was unfinished at the end of the year. Its first stage closed about October 31. The Second Corps, under Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, reached the line Aire-Bethune on October 11; its cavalry that day came in contact with the enemy, and the corps moved eastward to the line Laventie-Lorges, advancing with difficulty over ground cut up by mines and factory buildings, and endeavoured to wheel to the right to take the Germans in flank at the rear of their position at La Bassée, which defied capture throughout. From the 13th to the 17th this corps fought its way on, the Dorset Regiment and the Artillery being specially commended, and at dark on the 17th the Lincolns and Royal Fusiliers took Herlies (three or four miles beyond the line) at the point of the bayonet. From the 19th to the 31st October they defended themselves against vigorous counter-attacks from much more numerous German forces, with the help, from the 24th, of Indian troops, but were forced back on to a line crossing their old one, and terminating slightly west of La Bassée. Meanwhile the Third Corps, under General Pulteney, coming through St. Omer and Hazebrouck, had moved forward towards the line Armentières-Wytschaete, and, fighting their way slowly forward amid rain and fog, occupied Bailleul (some six miles behind this line), secured the line of the River Lys from Armentières south-west to Sailly, and, till the 19th, attempted vainly to force the passage of the river, in order to be able to drive the enemy eastwards to Lille. Sir H. Rawlinson's force had already reached a line six miles east of Ypres, running from Zandvoorde to Zonnenboke, and an effort was made (Oct. 18) to capture Ménin (some twelve miles north of Lille), but this proved impracticable. The First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, had now arrived at a position between St. Omer and Hazebrouck; but it had to be sent to the north of Ypres to meet a German outflanking movement towards the Channel, which the exhausted Belgian Army could not have stopped without assistance. Sir Douglas Haig was therefore instructed (Oct. 19) to advance through Ypres north-eastwards to Thorout, on the Ypres-Bruges railway, with Bruges and Ghent as its eventual objective, but with the option, after passing Ypres, of attacking either the Germans on the north or those advancing from the east, French cavalry co-operating on his left and General Byng's Third Cavalry Division on his right. The British Army, Sir John French remarked, had a task arduous beyond precedent. "That success has been attained, and all the enemy's desperate attempts to break through our line frustrated, is due entirely to the marvellous fighting power and the indomitable courage and tenacity of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men." Never in all their splendid history had they answered so magnificently the desperate calls which of necessity were made on them.

The First Corps, however, was compelled to turn eastwards from Ypres, and was unable to advance beyond the line Zonnenbeke-St. Julien-Langemarck-Bixschoete, and had to remain on the defensive pending a French movement on its north (Oct. 21). A series of severe engagements took place in this neighbourhood on October 22-31, special mention being made of a recapture of trenches (Oct. 23) by the Queens, Northamptons, and King's Royal Rifles, and of the fighting round Gheluvelt (some six miles east-south-east of Ypres) against vastly superior numbers (Oct. 29-31), the village being retaken, on the 31st by a bayonet charge of the 2nd Worcesters, during the most critical portion of the whole great battle. It was discovered that three German Army Corps had been charged with the task of breaking the line near Ypres, and that the Emperor regarded the issue of the attack as vital to German success in the war. The Fourth Corps, which had been formed partly out of the troops from Antwerp and had been co-operating with the First, was broken up at the end of October and incorporated in the latter, the Commander proceeding to England to supervise the mobilisation of his 8th division; and the British Army had meanwhile been considerably reinforced, while French troops had been supporting it.

Meanwhile the Third Corps, in the Centre, had been severely pressed, holding as it did an extended front crossing the Lys, with several weak points, while adequate reserves could not be provided. High praise was given to the skill of its commander and the courage, tenacity, endurance and unparalleled cheerfulness of the men; and special mention was made of the frequent repulse of attacks (Oct. 22-24), a German attack on Le Gheir (29th) and its recapture by the Middlesex Regiment, with the aid of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; of trenches temporarily lost; of a counter-attack by the Somerset Light Infantry, and of much fighting by the Cavalry Corps. In the Third Corps the East Lancashire, Hampshire, and Somersetshire Light Infantry Regiments were specially commended, and the Indian troops were said to have displayed much initiative and resource.

It transpired on December 16 that Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops, the Seventh Infantry and Third Cavalry Divisions, which were landed in Belgium about October 6, to support the British forces at Antwerp, had been compelled to retreat, fighting almost continuously, by Thielt and Roulers to Ypres, and there to keep several German Corps at bay till Sir John French's Army had come up from the Aisne. When they were released, the infantry had only 44 officers left out of 400, and only 2,336 men out of 12,000.

Episodes in Sir John French's movement were revealed soon after it, _inter alia_ the entry of the Indian troops into battle, the gallantry of the London Scottish (Territorials), of the Loyal North Lancashires, and other regiments. But attention at home was directed mainly to the struggle of the Belgians on the Yser, assisted by a British squadron, including the river monitors _Severn_, _Mersey_, and _Humber_, taken over at the beginning of the war from Brazil; their light draught and howitzer batteries enabled them to render effective aid. They left Dover on October 17, began to bombard the German forces at daybreak on the 19th, and landed detachments with machine guns; and the bombardment continued, with slight intermissions, for over a fortnight, H.M.S. _Attentive_, _Wildfire_, _Brilliant_, _Rinaldo_, the destroyer _Falcon_, the battleship _Venerable_, and other vessels (some almost obsolete), taking part, and inflicting heavy losses on the German troops. The Germans strove to protect themselves by removing the Wielingen and Wandelaar lightships, and by placing mines along the coast.

German methods of warfare had meanwhile been illustrated by the attempt to sink the French steamer _Amiral Ganteaume_, crowded with refugees from Calais, in the English Channel (Oct. 26), and indirectly by the terrible wreck of the British hospital ship _Rohilla_ off Whitby (Oct. 30), caused mainly by her keeping close inshore to avoid mines in an easterly gale, though she was believed to have struck one before stranding. On November 2 the Admiralty issued a warning that the Germans, through the agency of some merchant vessel under a neutral flag, had scattered mines indiscriminately on the route between America and Liverpool _via_ the north of Ireland; the White Star liner _Olympic_ had escaped them only by pure good luck; and, in view of the German practice, the whole of the North Sea must now be declared a military area; after November 5 any ship passing a line drawn from the north point of the Hebrides through the Faroes to Iceland must do so at its peril. Within the North Sea arrangements were made to prescribe safe routes for vessels trading with neutral countries, but even a slight deviation would be dangerous.

It was afterwards stated that the _Olympic's_ escape was caused by her response to a call on October 27 from one of the newest British battleships, which had struck a mine off Ireland while on patrol duty, and whose crew she had been able to save, though not the ship. The _Olympic_ was detained for some days in Lough Swilly, no one being allowed to land, and was then taken to Belfast. Particulars reached the American papers by mail and were published there with photographs and in neutral papers also, and rumours of the disaster had circulated in England for some time. But the Admiralty gave the story no official confirmation, and the name of the ship in question remained in the Navy List.

Apart from this, however, the naval war was sensibly drawing nearer to Great Britain. On October 27 the Admiralty closed all but one of the approaches to the Thames, and ordered vessels in a specified area of the estuary to anchor during the night and show no lights; H.M.S. _Hermes_ was torpedoed in the Downs, only two miles off Deal, on October 31; and on the morning of November 3 a German squadron fired on H.M.S. _Halcyon_ off Yarmouth, wounding one man, but were driven off by the approach of other British ships, and pursued by light cruisers, which failed to engage them. In retiring the Germans threw out mines promiscuously and the British submarine D 5 and two steam drifters were sunk. Rumour connected this advance with a German attempt at a raid.

But Germany had prepared also to attack in other quarters. The Porte entered the war on October 30, doubtless under German influence, by bombarding various Russian towns on the Black Sea; and on November 1 the Foreign Office issued a statement of the British position. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had assured the Porte that, if Turkey remained neutral, her independence and integrity would be respected during the war and in the terms of peace; ever since, the British Government had shown great patience and forbearance; but German officers had been sent in considerable numbers to Constantinople, the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ had entered the Dardanelles, the Turks had attacked undefended towns, and had prepared to invade Egypt and excite a Holy War in Syria, and probably in India: and telegraphic communication had been interrupted without notice on October 30 with the British Embassy at Constantinople. The British Government, therefore, must take such action as was necessary to protect British interests, British territory, and Egypt. This statement was followed by the news that a British and French squadron had bombarded the Dardanelles, and that H.M.S. _Minerva_ had driven a Turkish force out of Akabah, thus checking a possible invasion of Egypt by sea, by a British declaration of war with Turkey, and by the annexation of Cyprus by Order in Council (Nov. 5)--a step which got rid of the anomalous tenure devised in 1878, which had been one of the objections most strongly felt by British Liberals to Lord Beaconsfield's acquisition of the island.

At home, meanwhile, the campaign against alien enemies had culminated in an attack in the _Globe_ on Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, who had been popularly (but absurdly) reported for some time to be confined in the Tower on a charge of treason. On October 30 a letter from him was published tendering his resignation on the ground that his birth and parentage in some respects impaired his usefulness; and Mr. Churchill, in accepting his resignation, cordially testified to his great services, notably to his having taken the first step securing the concentration of the Fleet at the outbreak of the war. The attack, it need scarcely be said, was baseless; the Battenberg Princes had every reason to detest the Prussian Court, and Prince Louis had been an Englishman from boyhood, and had strenuously exerted himself to gain naval knowledge and apply it for the advancement of the British Navy. But he was regarded in some quarters as too compliant to the First Lord's demands, and he had not been forgiven for his disavowal of his alleged speech (p. 35). Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, however, proved an entirely satisfactory successor.

The new First Sea Lord was soon confronted with the task of avenging a grave British naval defeat. On November 6 it was announced that on Sunday, November 1, five German warships, the _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, _Leipzig_, _Dresden_, and _Nürnberg_, had concentrated off Santa Maria Island, near Coronel, Chile, and engaged a British squadron under Rear-Admiral Cradock, consisting of the cruisers _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_, the light cruiser _Glasgow_, and the armed merchant cruiser _Otranto_, and that the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ had been sunk and the _Glasgow_ seriously damaged. The details remained obscure for some time, even to the Admiralty; but it was eventually learnt that the British ships had been met near sunset by the German squadron, that the Admiral had determined to engage notwithstanding his inferiority in speed and gun-power, and had warned off the battleship _Canopus_, which was coming up from the Straits of Magellan, as her speed was insufficient to cope with the Germans, and had ordered the _Otranto_ to keep out of danger; that the Germans forced the British ships into a position where the setting sun interfered with their aim, that the British guns were outranged and that the _Monmouth_ was sunk, and the _Good Hope_ blown up while making for the shore, the _Glasgow_ escaping. The loss of men was heavy; so was the blow to British prestige.

It was tolerably clear, moreover, that the German ships, coming as they did from the Chinese coast, could not have obtained coal or provisions without some violation of neutrality; and it was found that they had been supplied by Kosmos liners from Chilean ports, by an American collier at Juan Fernandez, and by other ships at the Galapagos Islands, belonging to Ecuador. The Chilean Government had not been involved; but Ecuador and Colombia were suspected of breaches of neutrality. And in other quarters there were new dangers. The collapse of Maritz's rebellion at the Cape had been followed by a more serious rising led by Generals de Wet and Beyers; and the British forces had suffered a serious reverse on November 2 in German East Africa.

It was amid these impressions that the Lord Mayor's banquet was held at the Guildhall (Nov. 10). The first toast after the loyal toasts was that of "Our Allies," proposed by Mr. Balfour. He described the capture of Tsingtau as a most dramatic answer to one of the most insulting messages ever sent from one Sovereign to another [in 1897] and as a good omen for those still fighting the arch-enemy in Europe. Russia had shown not only dogged and boundless courage, but unexpected powers of organisation; the war had brought out the military genius not only of a nation, but of a man (the Grand Duke Nicholas). As for the gallant French, never would the time grow dim in which they and the British fought side by side against the common foe of civilisation. Serbia, to preserve the peace of the world, had been prepared to give up everything short of her national existence, but she had gallantly defended it, and there was no chance now that Austria would wrest it from her. The case of Belgium was even more tragic. Cynicism could go no farther than the Germans had carried it, and the memory of the accumulated infamy of their transaction would be remembered after the crime, great as it was, had been adequately expiated. The Allies were fighting for civilisation and the cause of small States, and whether the war was short or long, they would triumph. They had behind them all the finest moral influences of the civilised world.

M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, in reply, said that Europe had suffered invasions of barbarians in the past, but had never yet seen barbarism raised to dogma and reinforced by science. But its professors had not foreseen that they would come into conflict with the conscience of the civilised world.

The First Lord of the Admiralty, responding to the toast of "The Imperial Forces of the Crown," said that it was thanks to the Navy that they were there. In a recent conversation with Sir John Jellicoe and his chief Admiral they had remarked that Cornwallis was three years off Brest and Nelson more than two off Toulon; they themselves were only just beginning, and their turn would come. The multiplied duties of the Navy arising from the curious and novel conditions of naval warfare forced them to expose a target to the enemy incomparably larger than any target exposed to our own daring and vigilant sailors. The Navy was making good the motto "Business as usual"; the economic stringency resulting from a blockade required time to reach its full effectiveness; but in the sixth, ninth, or twelfth month they would see results gradually and silently achieved which would spell the doom of Germany. The Navy, too, gave Britain and the British Empire the time to realise their vast military power. At the end of a hundred days of war the Navy was actually and relatively stronger than when war was declared, particularly in the branches most influential in the struggle.