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Chapter II: The Session Until Easter (2)

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The debate was continued next day, when there was a stormy scene over a reduction proposed by Lord R. Cecil (U.) in order to call attention to the housing of the Admiralty labourers at Rosyth. The Chairman was charged with unduly favouring the Government, and an attempt at a snap division was defeated by Mr. Leif Jones, who spoke amid continual disorder. Eventually the reduction was defeated by 272 to 132, and later the First Lord, in a general reply, denied that there had been any acceleration of the shipbuilding programme, and said that there was no prospect of "breaking the armaments ring" by getting armour from competing firms abroad. He would do so if he could (a statement which roused protests) or would start a State factory, but this latter would involve a heavy capital charge. The Vote was agreed to.

Another basis for an attack on Ministers was still found in the Insurance Act. Mr. Bonar Law declared that it was insolvent (March 2); and three days later in Supply it was assailed by Mr. Worthington Evans (U.) and other members, who contended that some of the societies would be unable to pay the minimum benefits, that the drug fund was overspent, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was concealing the facts and using the powers of the Commissioners to influence bye-elections. The Chancellor of the Exchequer made a spirited defence, adding that the State was not bound to make up the deficiencies of badly managed societies. Married women's sickness was a difficulty, and in certain trades, _e.g._ mining, even slight illness stopped work and produced a sickness claim. After a vigorous reply by Mr. Bonar Law, and other criticisms and counter-criticisms, the Government was supported by 242 to 174. A more interesting debate had been set up by a Labour resolution, moved by Mr. A. Henderson (March 3), asking for an extension of the Act to certain other trades and an inquiry into the provision disqualifying for unemployment benefit workmen unemployed through a Labour dispute. The new President of the Board of Trade promised an extension during the current year, and, while regarding the provision in question as vital, held that means might be taken to settle more definitely when disqualification began. The resolution was adopted.

The confidence of the Government in its programme was shown by the cordial acceptance (March 4) of a motion proposed by Mr. E. Jones (L., _Merthyr Tydvil_)for a Select Committee on the redistribution of seats, with an amendment moved by Major Morrison-Bell (U., _Devon, Honiton_) inserting "immediate" before redistribution. The President of the Local Government Board pointed out that Home Rule would remove the great obstacle--the provision of the Act of Union that Ireland should have 100 members "for ever,"--and proportional representation, as was asked by a Unionist member, would be included. It would probably take the form of giving additional members to the larger constituencies, and electing them on a transferable vote. Mr. Long (U.) gave a somewhat qualified assent, and the motion was agreed to.

This skirmishing was followed (March 9) by a new stage in Home Rule problem. Amid intense interest, the Prime Minister announced the projected concessions to Ulster in moving the second reading of the Home Rule Bill. Repeating that the Government adhered firmly to this measure, he said that they were specially anxious that the new regime should start with the best chance of success. Whether Home Rule as embodied in the Bill were carried or rejected, the outlook was very grave. A settlement must involve the acceptance of a Legislature and Executive at Dublin, and of some form of special treatment for the Ulster minority. Dismissing as impracticable Lord Loreburn's suggestion of a round table conference without any preliminary basis of agreement, he referred to the conditions he had laid down at Ladybank (A.R., 1913, p. 219) and to the unsuccessful conversations, which would remain absolutely confidential, between himself, Mr. Bonar Law, and Sir Edward Carson. These at any rate brought out the difficulties, and he and his colleagues had devised three ways of attempting a solution. (1) "Home Rule within Home Rule," exemption of a part, provisionally undefined, of Ulster from the administration of a Dublin Executive, with a veto, for that part, subject to an appeal, however, to the Imperial Parliament, on the application to it of legislation pressed by the Legislature in Dublin. But this none of those concerned would accept. (2) Sir Horace Plunkett's plan, which the "conversations" had anticipated,--an option for the Ulster counties to separate themselves from Home Rule Ireland after a time. (3) Exclusion of Ulster, to which there were grave objections in any form. A middle course, the Government held, might be found in provisional exclusion; and they proposed that any county in Ulster, including the county boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry, might vote themselves out on the requisition of, say, one-tenth of the Parliamentary electors, for a term of six years from the first meeting of the Irish Legislature in Dublin. This, he showed at length, would give time to test the working of the Irish Parliament, and within the six years there would be two general elections in Great Britain, in 1915 and 1920. The counties excluded would come into the Home Rule scheme automatically at the end of six years, unless the Imperial Parliament determined otherwise. Their representation in that Parliament, and as far as possible their administration, would continue unchanged meanwhile. Financial and administrative adjustments would be necessary, and would be set forth in a White Paper to be published the next day, but he hoped to work out the details with something like general co-operation. The proposals were put forward as the price of peace. He appealed for their dispassionate consideration, referring to the traditions of "give and take" in the British nation which had made it the pioneer of popular government.

Mr. Bonar Law (U.) said that if, as he feared, these proposals represented the last word of the Government, the position seemed to him very grave. The Government might conciliate Ulster by submitting the Bill to the judgment of the electors. He must leave Sir Edward Carson to speak for Ulster; but the Ulstermen were asked to destroy their fortress, and to come in when they were weak. Remove the Ulster question, and the general election would be fought on entirely different lines; even if the Unionists won the first election and changed the law, the next might reverse their decision. He feared that the concessions were being made unwillingly and too late; that the offer was being made to be refused. Let the Government put their proposals in a Bill and submit it to the people by a referendum.

Mr. Redmond (N., _Waterford_) regarded the proposals as the extreme limit of concession. If they were accepted, they would elicit the real opinion of Ulster, which would surprise many people both there and in Great Britain; and, long before the period of exclusion had expired, the fears of Ulster would have been disarmed by the moderate and tolerant government exhibited in Dublin. The Nationalists could only acquiesce in the proposals if they were frankly accepted by their Ulster opponents. Otherwise it was the duty of the majority in the House to proceed forthwith with the Bill, to pass it without delay, and to face firmly and with all their resources any movement to overawe Parliament or subvert the law by the menace of force.

Mr. W. O'Brien (I.N., _Cork City_) said that the Ministry seemed to have picked out the one concession intolerable to any Nationalist. He protested against "chopping an ancient nation into a thing of shreds and patches," and urged the Government to try to get a better settlement through a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons.

Sir E. Carson (U., _Dublin University_) who, being ill, spoke under great difficulties, declined to accept Mr. Redmond's promises, and declared that nothing had happened since the introduction of the Bill to abate the loathing with which it was regarded by every Irish Unionist. They would never agree, whatever benefits were offered to Ulster, to the sacrifice of the people of the South and West. Something was gained towards a peaceable solution by the admission of the principle of exclusion; but Ulster wanted the question settled at once and for ever, "We don't want sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years." The whole Ulster organisation would have to be kept up, and all the old questions would remain, while the attention of the British electorate would be diverted to other matters. Would the Government agree that Ulster should stay out until Parliament otherwise ordered? If not, they did not really mean exclusion as a safeguard. The period of six years was fantastic; a whole new system of government would have to be set up for it; but, if the time limit were removed, he would feel it his duty to go to Ulster and call a Convention. Did the country mean to allow the Forces of the Crown to be used to coerce men who asked only that they might remain with it?

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab.) said that the Labour party would accept the proposed compromise as the price of peace in spite of the great difficulties it entailed in factory inspection and other matters; and Mr. T. Healy said that he preferred to have no Bill rather than the Government proposal, which he regarded as _Finis Hiberniæ_. Exclusion would be permanent, the severance complete, there would be reprisals and boycotting, and the American Congress would be urged to put a tariff on Belfast goods. Mr. A. Ward (U., _Herts, Watford_), as a back-bench Unionist, welcomed the proposals as a great concession and urged their consideration in good faith.

The debate was adjourned _sine die_ to give time to finish the necessary financial business; and public interest centred on the reception of the Bill outside. The White Paper (issued March 10) added little to Mr. Asquith's outline of his proposals; and the Irish Unionists both in Ulster and Dublin, as well as in Parliament, were very unfavourable. The Dublin Nationalists also were against the time limit, which, it may be remarked, was believed to have been extended at the last moment to six years, having previously been fixed at three. In the City, however, and among independent observers, opinion was decidedly hopeful. That Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan would decline exclusion was certain, and that Fermanagh and Tyrone would do so was highly probable; but the areas of Protestant and Catholic population by no means coincided with those of the counties, nor did the religious division, especially among the Protestants, with that between Unionism and Home Rule.

While these proposals were under consideration in the country the House dealt with the Army Estimates, published March 5. Their total amount was 28,845,000_l._; a net increase as compared with 1913-14 of 625,000_l._, which was almost accounted for by (1) the new schemes of pay for regimental officers and of promotion from the ranks (140,000_l._), and (2) the development of the Air Service (480,000_l._). As the Secretary of State's memorandum pointed out, when allowance was made for the automatic growth of pension charges and for the 1,000,000_l._ provided for aviation, the effective cost of the Army was actually less than in 1907-8, when there was a reduction of 2,000,000_l._ in the Estimates, and only 250,000_l._ more than in 1909-10, when it was at its lowest since the South African War. Since 1905-6 the expenditure from loans had come to an end, but the general level of prices had risen by some 20 per cent. The total regular establishment, the memorandum continued, showed an increase of 800 men, half due to the growth of the Military Wing of the Flying Corps, half to additions to the Garrison Artillery for home defence. After giving details as to cavalry and horses, and promising a new war organisation of this arm, the memorandum mentioned that there would be a shortage (of some 8,000 men at that time) in the Infantry owing to the abnormal number passing into the Reserve. As employment and emigration were also brisk and the Navy was competing for men, the gaps had not been readily filled, but better results were being obtained by modern methods of recruiting. The question was bound up with that of employment for ex-soldiers, into which a Commission was inquiring, with Sir Matthew Nathan as its chairman. The health of the Army, including that in India and the Colonies, was shown by figures to be very satisfactory. The new rates of pay for regimental officers took effect from January 1. An inquiry would be held into the conditions of the supply of cadets, which was disappointing. As to aviation, the _personnel_ of the 5th and 6th squadrons would be complete by the end of March, and that of the 7th and 8th, as well as its equipment in aeroplanes, in the coming year. The lighter-than-air service being concentrated under the Admiralty, the Army airships had been handed over to the Navy on January 1. Satisfactory accounts were given of the progress in _matériel_ of the air service. The strength of the Territorial Force on January 1, 1914, was 9,366 officers and 239,819 of other ranks, showing a decrease of 14,220, due to the retirement of time-expired men, whose number was large owing to the abnormal recruiting of 1909. The recruiting of 1913, however, showed a satisfactory advance, and more men had attended camp. Attendance was to be encouraged by an increased bounty. The National Reserve had increased by January 1, 1914, to 217,000. Particulars were also given as to the supply of horses, improvement of weapons and building works.

The table on the opposite page shows the net estimate of the several votes and the difference between the amounts for 1914-15 and those for 1913-14.

Table Legend:

Column B: Votes.
Column C: Net Estimates. 1914-15.
Column D: Increase on Net Estimates.
Column E: Decrease on Net Estimates.

---+--------------------------------------+----------+--------+--------+
| | | | |
B | | C | D | E |
| | | | |
---+--------------------------------------+----------+--------+--------+
| | | | |
| I.--Numbers. | Numbers. |Numbers.|Numbers.|
A |Number of men on the Home and Colonial| | | |
| Establishments of the Army, | | | |
| exclusive of those serving in India.| 186,400 | 800 | --- |
| +----------+--------+--------+
| II.--Effective Services. | £ | £ | £ |
1 |Pay, etc., of the Army | 8,705,000| 82,000| --- |
2 |Medical Establishment: Pay, etc. | 437,000| --- | 3,000 |
3 |Special Reserve | 724,000| 9,000| --- |
4 |Territorial Forces | 3,086,000| 271,000| --- |
5 |Establishments for Military Education | 156,000| 10,000| --- |
6 |Quartering, Transport, and Remounts | 1,732,000| 38,000| --- |
7 |Supplies and Clothing | 4,388,000| --- |119,000 |
8 |Ordnance Department Establishments | | | |
| and General Stores | 621,000| --- | 99,000 |
9 |Armaments, Engineer Stores, and | | | |
| Aviation | 1,732,000| 55,000| --- |
10 |Works and Buildings | 2,791,000| 356,000| --- |
11 |Miscellaneous Effective Services | 59,000| --- | 7,000 |
12 |War Office | 457,000| 14,000| --- |
| | | | |
|Total Effective Services |24,888,000| 835,000|228,000 |
| | | | |
| III.--Non-Effective Services. | | | |
13 |Half-pay, retired pay, and other non- | | | |
| effective charges for Officers, etc.| 1,846,000| --- | 3,000 |
14 |Pensions and other non-effective | | | |
| charges for Men, etc. | 1,977,000| 27,000| --- |
15 |Civil Superannuation, Compensation, | | | |
| and Gratuities | 134,000| --- | 6,000 |
| +----------+--------+--------+
|Total Non-Effective Services | 3,957,000| 27,000| 9,000 |
| +----------+--------+--------+
|Total Effective and Non-effective |28,845,000|862,000 237,000 |
| Services | | \ / |
| | | \ / |
| Net Increase | | £625,000 |
---+--------------------------------------+----------+-----------------+

The Army Estimates were introduced by the War Minister on March 10. The cost of living and the air service, he said, would increase the cost of all armies per man; the number of men was less, the cost was more. The Regular Army showed a deficiency of 8,000, the Reserve a surplus of 13,000, so that on the whole number on mobilisation the surplus would be 5,000. At home there were 121,000 Regulars, abroad 117,000 (white troops recruited in the United Kingdom); and there was an Army Reserve of 146,000. On the declaration of war an Expeditionary Force of 162,000 could be mobilised very soon. To deal with a sudden emergency from oversea 50,000 men could be assembled in a few hours. Coming to the officers and men, he remarked that it was the first year of the new scheme of officers' pay, which would involve considerable promotion from the ranks--as there had been in the Peninsular War, and, according to Lord Wolseley, the principle was accepted in the British Army. By 1915 a scheme of education for such officers would have been devised. Recruiting gave some anxiety, but by advertising the advantages of the Army an increased number had been attained. But the Cardwell system, while good for the State, was bad for the men after their discharge, and of 24,000 men, of good character, who left the Army in 1913 employment had been found for only 16,000. A Committee, with Sir Matthew Nathan as Chairman, was studying the problem. In the Special Reserve, in spite of a reduction of the establishment owing to the extension of mechanical transport, there was a shortage of 13,000, which would continue; but the force was valuable as a half-way house for the Army. The Territorial Force was short of its establishment by 56,000, but 1913 had been its best year for recruiting. This, however, might be due to the rejoining of time-expired men, and further efforts were needed. The National Reserve numbered 217,000, of whom 13,000 had undertaken to serve in any part of the world in the event of a national emergency, and 45,000 within the British Isles, these latter being a set-off to the Territorial shortage of 56,000. Of horses the number needed on going to war was 102,000, the number available 375,000; the surplus extended to every class of horse, and was largest in the heavier type. Aviation was very costly, but might be made safer by the provision of money. One of the leading combatants in the Balkan War had said to him: "Had we had a single aeroplane, the whole history of Europe would have been altered." That army had, indeed, aeroplanes and men, but had not the organisation to ensure that an aeroplane and a man should be where they were needed. Great Britain, he showed, was not behindhand, and he appealed to farmers to provide landing-places. He also gave encouraging information as to the field-gun and the new rifle.

There was little time for criticisms that evening, and the most important were those of Mr. A. Lee (U., _Hants_, _Fareham_). He was dissatisfied with the arrangements for promotion from the ranks, and with the means of defence in the absence of the Expeditionary Force. The Report of the Defence Committee, too, should have been debated before the Army Estimates. Next day Mr. Baird (U., _Warwickshire_, _Rugby_) moved a resolution regretting the serious shortage in the Military Forces of the Crown, and inviting the Government to state forthwith its concrete proposals to deal with the situation. He insisted on the youth of a large proportion of the troops, and Sir B. Pole-Carew (U., _Cornwall_, _Bodmin_) added that naval experts now held that the Navy was unable to defend the British Isles. [His attack on the First Sea Lord's disclaimer (p. 35) led to a scene.] The War Minister, in his reply, declared that the British Army was much better trained and was much more formidable as a fighting machine than any Continental Army, and the Expeditionary Force was absolutely ready to go on an expedition. Great Britain was more ready for war than ever before. Eventually the motion was negatived, and next day in Committee the Under-Secretary for War gave an encouraging account of the arrangements contemplated for raising the numbers of the Special Reserve. A reduction was moved by Mr. Worthington Evans (U., _Colchester_), to call attention to the hardships suffered by men marrying "off the strength," in which case their wives and families received no allowances. The War Secretary announced that recommendations recently made after an inquiry conducted by Mrs. Tennant would be adopted, entailing an annual addition to the Estimates of some 60,000_l._ The reduction was negatived by 249 to 212.

The question of the ability of the Navy to protect the British Isles from invasion had been raised by the Earl of Portsmouth in the Upper House on March 10. He called attention to the First Sea Lord's Statement (A.R., 1913, p. 94) that the Fleet alone was not sufficient, and to the Prime Minister's explanation that the statement had been misconstrued (p. 35). What, he asked, did the First Sea Lord now mean? Lord Wimborne replied, on behalf of the Government, that the First Sea Lord had never used the word "invasion." Before his speech he had consulted the First Lord, and both he and the Prime Minister represented the views of the Admiralty and were in harmony with those of Mr. Balfour (A.R., 1905, p. 157 _seq._). Neither arm was separately responsible for protection against invasion. The Army had to provide that no invasion could be undertaken with less than a considerable body of men; the Navy had to intercept such an enemy; these functions both arms, now as always, were competent to perform. After other speeches, the Lord Chancellor closed the debate, saying that the interpretation put on the First Sea Lord's speech had represented him as deserting the basic principles of naval strategy. What he had said fully accorded with the accepted principles of home defence.

Meanwhile a well-meant attempt at strengthening home defence had been made by Lord Willoughby de Broke's Territorial Forces Amendment Bill, of which the second reading was moved in the House of Lords on March 13. It proposed to form a new Imperial Force (supported by a 3_d._ income tax), composed of British subjects or domiciled aliens, whose service would be compulsory between the ages of sixteen and forty-five. It was confined to public school and university men, members of the higher professions, and men whose income from all sources was 400_l._ a year. Boys at school were to serve in cadet corps; between the ages of twenty-one and thirty there were to be annual periods of training; and at thirty the members would be liable to serve in great national emergencies. He believed the example set would induce extensive working-class enlistment in the Territorials. The impracticability of the Bill was exposed by Lord Newton (who moved an amendment in favour of universal service), and by the Lord Chancellor, who pointed out that a measure of taxation originating in the Upper House was not worth discussing, and that German experience showed that a large home army and a large overseas army were incompatible. Still, the Bill obtained considerable support on that and the two following days, less for its own sake than as a basis of discussion. Several speakers advocated compulsory cadet training; the Earl of Cromer pleaded for a non-party settlement, instancing Germany and France; and Earl Roberts and the Marquess of Lansdowne, while objecting to the class distinctions of the Bill, were eminently dissatisfied with the existing conditions of defence. In replying for the Government, Viscount Morley of Blackburn intimated that Mr. Asquith's Defence Committee of 1913-14 had come to the same conclusions as that of 1908 and Mr. Balfour's in 1905. The Bill was rejected by 53 to 34.

The debates on the Army Estimates had been interrupted by an attack on the Chancellor of the Exchequer (March 10) in the shape of a resolution moved by Sir John Randles (U., _Manchester, N.W._), and seconded by Mr. Cassell (U., _St. Pancras, W._), regretting his "repeated inaccuracies," and his "gross and unfounded personal attacks." The cases cited can only be briefly indicated. They were (1) the attack on the Duke of Montrose (p. 14); (2) the Duke of Sutherland's offer (A.R., 1913, p. 262), the executors' valuation having only been a rough estimate, less the amount of the mortgages; (3) the inaccurate attacks on ancestors of the Duke; (4) the Gorringe case (A.R., 1909, p. 181), where the "fine" was paid partly for the grant of a fresh and very valuable lease of other premises; (5) the statements (A.R., 1913, p; 248) as to St. Pancras, where there were 1,550 freeholders (instead of "about ten"), many of the largest being trustees. The Chancellor of the Exchequer made a spirited defence. Mr. Gorringe was paying for the value he had created, and his company were paying rates on it. In the Cathcart case, the Opposition had reduced the number of years' purchase from 920 to 750. In the Loch Arklet case, Glasgow had had to pay for 383 acres, not 19,000_l._ but 21,000_l._, more than thirty years' purchase of the whole 11,000 acres. In the Sutherland case, he read a poignant description of the clearances, written, as he told a Unionist inquirer, by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain; and claimed that the mortgages would not reduce the valuation to anywhere near 200,000_l._ Though his illustrations were questioned his case had never been challenged, and Mr. Long (p. 8) had accepted it. After a vigorous reply from Mr. F. E. Smith (U.), who incidentally mentioned that Mr. Lloyd George had suppressed the passage in his speech telling of the destruction of mangolds by pheasants (A.R., 1913, p. 212), the motion was rejected by 304 to 140, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was enthusiastically cheered by his supporters.

In the following week, in an interval of the new phase of the Ulster crisis, the House began to deal with the Navy Estimates, issued March 12. They were the largest on record, amounting, according to the First Lord's introductory memorandum, to 51,550,000_l._, an increase on the total (including Supplementary) Estimates of 1913-14 of 2,740,700_l._ Of this increase 450,000_l._ represented increased pay and victualling for the larger _personnel_; 30,000_l._ automatic increase of the non-effective votes, 40,000_l._ was for fuel and fuel service, owing to the increased horse-power of the Fleet, and the continued building up of the oil fuel reserves; 300,000_l._ for development of air service; 750,000_l._ for increased earnings by contractors on Vote 8; 800,000_l._ for guns, torpedoes, and ammunition, of which 300,000_l._ was due to the acceleration of the three 1913-14 battleships. The new programme was composed of four battleships, four light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and a number of submarines and subsidiary craft. On April 1, 1914, there would be under construction thirteen battleships, one battle cruiser, sixteen light cruisers, thirty torpedo-boat destroyers, twenty-four submarines, and various oil-fuel and Fleet service vessels. Particulars were given _inter alia_ of the New Zealand Division--where two light cruisers would be kept, and manned from the New Zealand Naval Force--and of the progress of the naval air service. A chain of seaplane bases was being established round the coast; five were already complete. Good progress had been made with the design of the seaplane, and certain standard types for war service were rapidly being developed. The practical utility of aircraft for war was increasingly evident, and experiments in connexion with bomb dropping, wireless telegraphy, and gunnery had been continuous. Action had been taken as to aircraft armament, and guns for action against aircraft were being mounted aboard ship.

The following is the abstract of the net Estimates for the different Votes, with the increases and decreases indicated in each case:--

+--+---------------------------------------+----------+-------------------+
|V | | Net | Differences on |
|o | |Estimates.| Net Estimates. |
|t | | 1914-15. +---------+---------+
|e | | |Increase.|Decrease.|
|s | | | | |
|. | | | | |
+--+---------------------------------------+----------+---------+---------+
| | | Total | | |
| | I.--Numbers. | Numbers. | Numbers.| Numbers.|
| A|Total Number of Officers, Seamen, Boys,| | | |
| |Coast Guard, and Royal Marines | 151,000 | 5,000 | -- |
| | +----------+---------+---------+
| | II.--Effective Services. | £ | £ | £ |
| 1|Wages, etc., of Officers, Seamen, and | | | |
| | Boys, Coast Guard, and Royal Marines | 8,800,000| 437,800| -- |
| 2|Victualling and Clothing for the Navy | 3,092,000| 74,000| -- |
| 3|Medical Establishments and Services | 292,100| 19,900| -- |
| 4|Civilians employed on Fleet Services | 115,300| 15,800| -- |
| 5|Educational Services | 175,000| 15,300| -- |
| 6|Scientific Services | 64,700| -- | 1,500|
| 7|Royal Naval Reserves | 489,000| 13,900| -- |
| 8|Shipbuilding, Repairs, | | | |
| | Maintenance, etc.: | | | |
| | I.--_Personnel_ | 3,989,800| -- | 161,300|
| | II.--_Matériel_ | 7,087,400| 502,800| -- |
| | III.--Contract Work |14,287,800| 936,500| -- |
| 9|Naval Armaments | 5,544,300| 828,300| -- |
|10|Works, Buildings, and Repairs at Home | | | |
| | and Abroad | 3,595,500| 87,500| -- |
|11|Miscellaneous Effective Services | 523,700| -- | 93,900|
|12|Admiralty Office | 483,500| 33,500| -- |
| | +----------+---------+---------+
| |Total Effective Services |48,541,000|2,965,300| 256,700|
| | +----------+---------+---------+
| | III.--Non-Effective Services. | | | |
|13|Half-Pay and Retired Pay | 1,003,700| -- | 2,100|
|14|Naval and Marine Pensions, Gratuities, | | | |
| | and Compassionate Allowances | 1,605,900| 43,800| -- |
|15|Civil Superannuation, Compensation | | | |
| | Allowances, and Gratuities | 399,400| -- | 9,600|
| | +----------+---------+---------+
| |Total Non-Effective Services | 3,009,000| 43,800| 11,700|
| | +----------+---------+---------+
| | Grand Total |51,550,000|3,009,100| 268,400|
| | | \________|________/|
| | Net Increase | £2,740,700 |
+--+---------------------------------------+------------------------------+

Prefixed to the First Lord's memorandum was the following statement of twelve years' actual and two years' estimated naval expenditure:--

+-------+-----------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-----------+
| | | Annuity | Total | | | |
| | | in |Expenditure| | | |
| | Total |Repayment| exclusive | | | |
| |Expenditure| of Loans|of Annuity |Expenditure| Total of |Expenditure|
| | from Navy |under the|[Column(2) |from Loans |Columns(3)| on New |
| Year. | Votes | Naval | deducted |under Naval| and (4). | Construct-|
| | (Net). | Works | from |Works Acts.| | ion |
| | | Acts. |Column(1)].| | | (Vote 8). |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
+-------+-----------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-----------+
| | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ |
|1901-2 | 30,981,315| 122,255| 30,859,060| 2,745,176 |33,604,236| 8,865,080|
|1902-3 | 31,003,977| 297,895| 30,706,082| 3,198,017 |33,904,099| 8,534,917|
|1903-4 | 35,709,477| 502,010| 35,207,467| 3,261,083 |38,468,550| 11,115,733|
|1904-5 | 36,859,681| 634,238| 36,225,443| 3,402,575 |39,628,018| 11,263,019|
|1905-6 | 33,151,841|1,015,812| 32,136,029| 3,313,604 |35,449,633| 9,688,044|
|1906-7 | 31,472,087|1,094,309| 30,377,778| 2,431,201 |32,808,979| 8,861,897|
|1907-8 | 31,251,156|1,214,403| 30,036,753| 1,083,663 |31,120,416| 7,832,589|
|1908-9 | 32,181,309|1,264,033| 30,917,276| 948,262 |31,865,538| 7,406,930|
|1909-10| 35,734,015|1,325,809| 34,408,206| -- |34,408,206| 9,597,551|
|1910-11| 40,419,336|1,322,752| 39,096,584| -- |39,096,584| 13,077,689|
|1911-12| 42,414,257|1,322,752| 41,091,505| -- |41,091,505| 12,526,171|
|1912-13| 44,933,169|1,322,752| 43,610,417| -- |43,610,417| 13,401,358|
|1913-14| | | | | | |
|(est.) | 48,809,300|1,311,558| 47,497,742| -- |47,497,742| 14,513,500|
|1914-15| | | | | | |
|(est.) | 51,550,000|1,311,558| 50,238,442| -- |50,238,442| 15,282,950|
+-------+-----------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-----------+

The First Lord's speech in introducing the Navy Estimates (March 17) came at an acute stage of the Ulster question and was in great part an elaborate defence, addressed to his own party, of the increase during his term of office, and he compared the figures elaborately with those of 1911-12, his predecessor's last year. The increased cost of maintenance--6,250,000_l._--was accounted for, he said, mainly by increased pay, wages, and victuals (2,140,000_l._), oil reserve (1,500,000_l._), and air service (900,000_l._). Apart from these two last items, the whole increase was either automatic or proportioned to the increased size and strength of the Fleet, which again was proportionate to that of other Powers. Great Britain was aiming at completing eight battleship squadrons to Germany's five, with the proper proportion of cruisers and flotillas. Again, against sixteen _Dreadnoughts_ in full commission in 1911-12, there were now thirty-three, many of them much larger and more costly, including nine battle cruisers against Germany's five. As to new construction, about 2,500,000_l._ of the 17,566,000_l._ appropriated in 1911-12 went over into the succeeding years; but for this, the vote of 1914-15 would be less; but he expected great progress to be made, and more money earned by the contractors, in the new year. In 1915-16 the Estimates would probably be substantially lower. Oil fuel, as he showed from a statement of the Chairman of the Royal Commission on fuel and engines, increased the radius of action, saved labour and stowage, rendered it possible to get fresh supplies at sea, and so to escape submarine attacks when going to oiling stations; and the oil tanks were a capital charge. Oil would be used as the sole fuel for small craft and light cruisers of the _Arethusa_ type, and for capital ships of exceptional speed. The air service had increased enormously during his term of office--the number of aeroplanes had increased from 9 to 103, the _personnel_ by the end of the year might be 180 officers and 1,500 men. The seaplane had a great future, especially in scouting and watching the coast. For the security of the east coast from raids the Admiralty relied largely on patrol flotillas of aircraft grouped and held in strong force at strategic points, and able to be directed to any point of attempted landing. Fifteen airships were built, building, or ordered, of which ten had a speed exceeding forty-five miles an hour. Three officers only had been killed, and 131,000 miles flown. As to _personnel_, there were 146,000 men against less than 134,000 in 1911, and he asked for 5,000 more. The whole fleet could be fully manned on mobilisation, but the increase in _personnel_ was required to train the men for the fleet of 1916-17. In 1920 Germany would have 108,000, and was reaching that figure by increments of 6,000 annually. After noticing the questions of pay and insurance, and mentioning that instead of grand manoeuvres there would be a general mobilisation of the Third Fleet, he dealt _inter alia_ with the supply of officers, and the new rank of Lieut.-Commander (lieutenants of eight years' standing) and then came to _matériel_. The programme was wholly normal. One of the four battleships would burn oil only. He extolled the 15-inch gun, in which Great Britain was ahead of all other Powers. Naval battles were now like "two eggshells striking each other with hammers"; hence the "awful importance" of good gunnery. After touching on the submarine service--the number to be built being secret--and its dangers, the destroyer flotillas, and the armed merchantmen--seventy by the end of 1914-15, armed with two guns solely for self-defence--he said that the Cabinet had again considered the capture of private property at sea and refused to change the practice, but had decided on the abolition of prize-money. Coming to the question of standards of naval superiority, he interpreted the 60 per cent. standard of superiority (A.R., 1912, p. 45) in _Dreadnoughts_ for the six years following 1912-13 as follows:--

Great Britain 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4
As compared with Germany 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 2.

For the provision to cover the period of delay of the Canadian ships, however, there was a special reason--_viz._, that, in July, 1912, the Cabinet had decided that a British battle squadron should be maintained in the Mediterranean, that Great Britain might be the guardian of her own interests there, and by the end of 1915 a battle squadron of eight battleships, based on Malta, would replace the four battle cruisers now stationed there. The force there would then consist of eight battleships, four large armed cruisers, four light cruisers of the "Town" type and sixteen destroyers of the _Beagle_ type. Hence the acceleration of three ships of the 1913-14 programme and two of the 1914-15 programme; these latter would be ready in the third quarter of 1916. Turning to the Pacific, the situation there was regulated by the British naval strength in European waters, which protected New Zealand and Australia from European Powers, and from any present danger from Japan, and Japan from European attack by sea. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, renewed up to 1921 and likely to continue, was the true protection of Australia and New Zealand, and depended entirely on the maintenance of British naval supremacy. He extolled the policy of New Zealand in giving a splendid ship to strengthen the British Navy at a decisive point; and, though the natural desire of the Dominions to have their ships in their own waters was hard to reconcile with naval strategy, the combination of the two was aimed at by the design of the Imperial squadron, a fleet of large ships supported in each Dominion by local repairing establishments, light cruisers, and small craft, and bringing sufficient aid wherever needed in war. Finally, the First Lord dealt with the supreme importance of a strong Navy to Great Britain, pointing out that while other Powers built navies in order to play a part in the world's affairs, Great Britain's Navy was to her a question of life or death. By sober conduct and skilful diplomacy she could disarm or divide the elements of potential danger; but her diplomacy depended largely on her naval strength, and, in the face of the unprecedented armament increase of Continental Powers, the Government could not feel that they were doing their duty to their country unless its naval strength were solidly, amply, and unswervingly maintained.

Mr. Lee (U., _Hants, Fareham_) maintained that on the 60 per cent. standard of superiority Great Britain was five ships short (28 against the Germans 21, when there should be 33) and that three ships to replace the Canadian ships should be begun at once; we must keep faith with the Dominions.

The debate, however, was suspended to allow Mr. Butcher (U., _York_) a resolution declaring that the House was not satisfied that the provision for defence against invasion was adequate, and demanding the publication forthwith of the conclusions of the Defence Committee. After several speeches, the First Lord, after dealing with special points raised, replied that of the new factors in the problem, submarines told against the invader; aircraft and wireless telegraphy in favour of the strongest fleet; on the other hand, the changes in the strategic front told against Great Britain. The Invasion Committee had dealt with all these matters, and the naval manoeuvres had yielded important lessons, but he deprecated the popular interpretation of them (A.R., 1913, p. 179). If the Expeditionary Force was at home no invading force could be large enough, if it had left, the Fleet would have been fully mobilised. He vindicated Prince Louis of Battenberg's action and promised a day later in the session for a debate on the Report of the Imperial Defence Committee; and, incidentally, he made an attack on Sir R. Pole-Carew (U., _Bodmin_) which caused a scene. The motion was rejected by 290 to 190.

Next day the debate was continued by a vigorous and comprehensive attack on Admiralty policy from Lord Charles Beresford (U., _Portsmouth_). The number of ships, he said, was inadequate, the men were overworked and underpaid, the deficiency of officers was dangerous, and the Admiralty was trusting to oil, which they could not guard, nor could Great Britain produce it. More significant, however, was an attack on the "armaments ring" by Mr. Snowden (Lab., _Blackburn_) which was applauded (even, contrary to rule, from the Strangers' Gallery). The shareholders in armament companies, he pointed out, included Bishops, the President of the Free Church Council, the Colonial Secretary, and the Postmaster-General; with British co-operation, battleships were being constructed by members of the "ring" for Italy, and Whitehead torpedoes for Austria. The debate was again suspended for a resolution moved by Mr. Aubrey Herbert (U., _Somerset, S._), declaring that the protection of the route to India and other services of the Empire demanded the provision of an adequate naval force in the Mediterranean. This discussion extended also to Near Eastern problems. The Foreign Secretary, in the course of a long reply, held that the understandings between the Powers of the Triple Entente had made for peace. As Great Britain could not maintain in the Mediterranean a fleet superior to the combined fleets of all the other nations represented there, her policy should be to keep there a fleet equal to any combination she was likely to have to meet. Foreign policy depended on naval strength rather than conversely, for policy must be so shaped that the country would not have to face a combination that the Navy could not meet. In the Near East British policy was to use diplomatic influence to preserve the integrity of Turkey. There was nothing to offend Mohammedan feeling in the proposed Turco-Greek settlement, and it should be considered as a whole. After a speech from Mr. Lee (U.) on the naval position in the Mediterranean, the motion was withdrawn.

The debate next week (March 23) on the Navy Estimates was almost crowded out by the Ulster and Army crises, but the Votes for wages, victualling and clothing, and works and buildings, were agreed to on March 23, after debate and two divisions. An additional day for the discussion of naval policy was promised after Easter.

But meanwhile the Home Rule controversy had passed into a phase of unprecedented gravity. The "British Covenant" had been supplemented by a "Women's Covenant," and both documents had been numerously and influentially signed, about 3 or 4 per cent. of the signatories, it was said, being Liberals. On the other hand, the First Lord of the Admiralty had spoken at Bradford (March 14), apparently as the messenger of the Cabinet. The Chief Liberal Whip, who presided, declared that the Government's position was impregnable, and that there would be no general election till the three Bills under the Parliament Act had become law. Mr. Churchill, on his part, referred to his own past admissions of Ulster's claim to special treatment; the Prime Minister had made a fair and reasonable offer, with the assent of the Nationalist leaders, and it seemed to him final. It represented the hardest sacrifice ever asked of Irish Nationalism. But the Unionists were not satisfied. The sole return offered was that there would be no civil war. The Ulstermen still showed the old spirit of ascendency. They seemed to think a settlement could only be achieved by threats; but, in the event of violence, the larger issue would be dominant, whether Parliamentary government was to be broken down before the menace of armed force. That had been fought out at Marston Moor. Apparently some sections of the propertied classes desired to subvert Parliamentary government. Against such a mood, when manifested in action, there was no lawful measure from which the Government should or would shrink. He had had to send soldiers out during the railway strike (A.R., 1911, p. 209), and there was no Unionist condemnation then. They knew how the Unionists would treat the Nationalists, and how they applauded martial law in South Africa. The Government met the menace with patience, but with firmness. They were responsible for the peace of the British Empire; who would dare to break it up? There must be one law for all; Great Britain was not to be reduced to the condition of Mexico. If Ulster sought peace and fair play, she knew where to find it; if she were to be made a tool in Parliamentary calculations, if the British civil and Parliamentary systems were to be brought to the challenge of force, he could only say, "Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof."

The finality of the Prime Minister's offer was further emphasised on that day and the next in speeches by Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin; the adverse feeling of the Independent Nationalists by an "All-for-Ireland" Conference (March 14) at Cork; and on March 16 the Prime Minister made a further statement in the Commons, in the form of a collective reply to twenty-six questions, of which notice had been given. Prefacing this reply by a general survey of the situation, he said that the Government had put forward its proposals for the separate treatment of Ulster not as the best way of dealing with Home Rule, but as a basis of settlement; if they were accepted in principle, the Bill would have to be supplemented by a number of adjustments, financial and administrative, which were being worked out, but to discuss them would interfere with a discussion on the main issue. He then began curtly to dispose of the questions; the Unionists objected, as the form of his reply precluded supplementary questions; and he presently intimated that the details would not be formulated unless the general principle were adopted and treated as a basis of agreement. Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson pressed for the details, and, in view of the Prime Minister's replies, a Vote of Censure was determined on. Incidentally, the Prime Minister endorsed the First Lord's speech at Bradford, and the latter was loudly cheered by the Liberals.

The Vote of Censure was moved by Mr. Bonar Law on March 19. It regretted the refusal of the Government to formulate their suggestions before the debate on the second reading of the Home Rule Bill. This moderation in its language was said to represent a reaction from the impatience manifested three days earlier. Mr. Bonar Law's tone, too, was more pacific. He laid stress on the danger of the situation and on his desire to avoid civil war; he and his colleagues had not closed and would not close the door hastily on any proposal put forward by the Government in the hope of securing peace. If the principle to which they were asked to agree was that Ulster was not to be driven out of the Imperial Parliament into a Nationalist Parliament, they accepted it as a basis of discussion; if Ulster was to be brought in automatically against its will, they would help Ulster to resist. He made a formal offer; if the new suggestions were put into the Home Rule Bill and accepted by the country on a Referendum, he had Lord Lansdowne's authority to say that, as far as his influence in the House of Lords went, he would not oppose the will of the people. That, he maintained, was a reasonable offer. Were Ulster brought in as a new Poland, what hope was there for a united Ireland? As to the Army, in a case merely of disorder, it would and ought to obey; if it were a question of civil war, "soldiers are citizens like the rest of us." If blood were shed in Ulster, there would be the same outburst of feeling in Great Britain as there was in the United States when the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter.

The Prime Minister, after protesting against Mr. Bonar Law's view as to the duty of the Army in the case of civil war, restated the aim of his proposal. Ulster was to be excluded for a term of years, to give the electorate of the United Kingdom an opportunity of expressing its opinion, and to enable it to be seen from the working of the Irish Legislature whether the objections of Ulster were well founded. Suppose the proposals accepted on a referendum of the United Kingdom, did the Unionist leaders hold that this would carry with it authority to coerce Ulster? (Mr. Bonar Law indicated assent.) Then, was not the Government's proposal more favourable? Would there be plural voting on the Referendum? (Mr. Bonar Law indicated that there need not.) And would Ulster accept the decision? (Sir Edward Carson offered to answer if it were a "firm offer.") On a Referendum it would be impossible to isolate the issue. He believed the proposals were fair, and the Government were quite satisfied with the Home Rule Bill as it stood. Even partial and temporary exclusion was an evil, but it was only because it offered the only avenue to a pacific settlement that the Government had felt compelled to take it.

Sir Edward Carson (U.) said that, in view of the First Lord's and Mr. Devlin's speeches, he felt that if this were the Prime Minister's last word he ought to be in Belfast. This Government of cowards, who had postponed dealing with the Ulster movement and would not remove the time-limit because of Mr. Redmond, were now going to entrench themselves behind the King's troops. They had been discussing at the War Office for the last two days how many they would require and whether they would mobilise. They wanted an outbreak as a pretext for putting the Ulstermen down. Gamble in anything else, but not in human life. After a bitter attack on Mr. Churchill, he suggested to the Prime Minister that the parts of Ulster in question should be excluded till Parliament further ordered, or till the question was reconsidered with a view to federation. Ulster, alone in Ireland, had always been on the best of terms with the Army; but under the direction of the Government the Army would become assassins.

After a scene, provoked by Mr. Devlin (N., _Belfast, W._), by denouncing Sir Edward Carson's desertion of the Liberal party, after Home Rule had been defeated in 1886, as that of "a man on the make," Sir E. Carson, who was very unwell, left--for Belfast, however, and amid a great Opposition demonstration--and Mr. Devlin, continuing, declared that the civil war in Ulster was a "masquerade" and a sham, organised by the Unionist party, which had no policy. He ridiculed some of the "critical incidents" which, according to _The Times_, had nearly brought about an earthquake, and pointed out that the eleven bye-elections since August, 1913, had shown 69,661 votes for Home Rule and 50,885 against it. He thought the exclusion proposals were needless, and at most only four counties would adopt them, possibly not one. He emphasised the Nationalist sacrifice, and believed that six years hence the Protestants would be contributing to the future power and glory of Ireland.

Among subsequent speakers Mr. Cave (U., _Kingston, Surrey_) suggested devolution to Irish provincial assemblies, Mr. Pirie (L., _Aberdeen, N._) moved an amendment, declaring that a settlement might be found in the exclusion of the Ulster counties until legislative provision for a general system of devolution for the whole of the United Kingdom was ready to come into operation, such provision to take place within six years. Mr. A. Ward (U., _Herts, Watford_) urged the Unionists to consider their position and press for the continuance of negotiations between the leaders. Mr. A. Chamberlain, summing up for the Opposition, complained of the provocative speech of Mr. Devlin, and dwelt on the dangers of the Government's proposal; he regretted that Mr. Cave's suggestions, anticipated by some Unionists in the autumn, had been ignored, and that the Prime Minister would not accept the Referendum. The Chief Secretary for Ireland, winding up for Ministers, said that it was a considerable advance to have got to discussing the compatibility of the exclusion of Ulster and Home Rule. He had thought Ulstermen would be inclined to accept this proposal on consideration. He laid stress on the patience of the Ulster Nationalists under provocation, and thought Mr. Cave's and Mr. Ward's speeches held out hopes of settlement.

The Vote of Censure was rejected by 345 to 252. The amendment was consequently not put.

Sir Edward Carson had left the House to go to Ulster; so had eight Ulster Unionist members. The belief that this portended a new stage in the crisis was heightened by military movements in Ulster, by reports that warrants were out for the arrest of "from 30 to 130" leaders of the Ulster Volunteer Force, and from rumours as to trouble with the officers at the Curragh. The Chief Secretary for Ireland (March 20) and the Attorney-General (March 21) endeavoured to reassure public opinion. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer's utterances at Huddersfield (March 21) had an opposite effect. In one speech he dealt with the land programme and made an eloquent plea for social reform; but earlier in the day he violently attacked the House of Lords and the Orangemen of Ulster, declaring that the former were threatening the doctrine of popular government, and had produced the doctrine of "optional obedience," and that the latter were threatening rebellion that they might not cease to be the dominant caste. He attacked the exclusion of Ulster, and objected that a Referendum would only produce a poll of 40 or 50 per cent. of the electorate, and a majority on that small poll would destroy reform. Let the Home Rule controversy be settled, in order to open the way to deliverance from social wretchedness.

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The Annual Register 1914Chapter II: The Session Until Easter (2)

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