Chapter XLIII: Section 2: Clause 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief (2)

But Justice Field's latitudinarian view of the effect of a pardon undoubtedly still applies ordinarily where the pardon is issued _before conviction_. He is also correct in saying that a full pardon restores a _convict_ to his "civil rights," and this is so even though simple completion of the convict's sentence would not have had that effect. One such right is the right to testify in court, and in Boyd _v._ United States the Court held that the disability to testify being a consequence, according to principles of the common law, of the judgment of conviction, the pardon obliterated that effect.[138] But a pardon cannot "make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or otherwise; it does not give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor does it impose upon the government any obligation to give it. The offence being established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. Neither does the pardon affect any rights which have vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for the offence, or which have been acquired by others whilst that judgment was in force. If, for example, by the judgment a sale of the offender's property has been had, the purchaser will hold the property notwithstanding the subsequent pardon. And if the proceeds of the sale have been paid to a party to whom the law has assigned them, they cannot be subsequently reached and recovered by the offender. The rights of the parties have become vested, and are as complete as if they were acquired in any other legal way. So, also, if the proceeds have been paid into the treasury, the right to them has so far become vested in the United States that they can only be secured to the former owner of the property through an act of Congress. Moneys once in the treasury can only be withdrawn by an appropriation by law."[139]

CONGRESS AND AMNESTY

Congress cannot limit the effects of a Presidential amnesty. Thus the act of July 12, 1870, making proof of loyalty necessary to recover property abandoned and sold by the government during the Civil War, notwithstanding any Executive proclamation, pardon, amnesty, or other act of condonation or oblivion, was pronounced void. Said Chief Justice Chase for the majority: "* * * the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change a law. Yet this is attempted by the provision under consideration. The Court is required to receive special pardons as evidence of guilt and to treat them as null and void. It is required to disregard pardons granted by proclamation on condition, though the condition has been fulfilled, and to deny them their legal effect. This certainly impairs the executive authority and directs the Court to be instrumental to that end."[140] On the other hand, Congress may itself, under the necessary and proper clause, enact amnesty laws remitting penalties incurred under the national statutes,[141] and may stipulate that witnesses before courts or other bodies qualified to take testimony shall not be prosecuted by the National Government for any offenses disclosed by their testimony.[142]

Clause 2. He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The Treaty-Making Power

PRESIDENT AND SENATE

The plan which the Committee of Detail reported to the Federal Convention on August 6, 1787 provided that "the Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court."[143] Not until September 7, ten days before the Convention's final adjournment, was the President made a participant in these powers.[144] The constitutional clause evidently assumes that the President and Senate will be associated throughout the entire process of making a treaty, although Jay, writing in The Federalist, foresaw that the initiative must often be seized by the President without benefit of Senatorial counsel.[145] Yet so late as 1818 Rufus King, Senator from New York, who had been a member of the Convention, declared on the floor of the Senate: "In these concerns the Senate are the Constitutional and the only responsible counsellors of the President. And in this capacity the Senate may, and ought to, look into and watch over every branch of the foreign affairs of the nation; they may, therefore, at any time call for full and exact information respecting the foreign affairs, and express their opinion and advice to the President respecting the same, when, and under whatever other circumstances, they may think such advice expedient."[146]

NEGOTIATION A PRESIDENTIAL MONOPOLY

Actually, the negotiation of treaties had long since been taken over by the President; the Senate's role in relation to treaties is today essentially legislative in character.[147] "He alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it," declared Justice Sutherland for the Court in 1936.[148] The Senate must, moreover, content itself with such information as the President chooses to furnish it.[149] In performing the function that remains to it, however, it has several options. It may consent unconditionally to a proposed treaty, or it may refuse its consent, or it may stipulate conditions in the form of amendments to the treaty or of reservations to the act of ratification, the difference between the two being that, whereas amendments, if accepted by the President and the other party or parties to the Treaty,[150] change it for all parties, reservations limit only the obligations of the United States thereunder. The act of ratification for the United States is the President's act, but may not be forthcoming unless the Senate has consented to it by the required two-thirds of the Senators present, which signifies two-thirds of a quorum, otherwise the consent rendered would not be that of the Senate as organized under the Constitution to do business.[151] Conversely, the President may, if dissatisfied with amendments which have been affixed by the Senate to a proposed treaty or with the conditions stipulated by it to ratification, decide to abandon the negotiation, which he is entirely free to do.[152]

TREATIES AS LAW OF THE LAND

Treaty commitments of the United States are of two kinds. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall in 1829; "A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infraterritorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States, a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract--when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the Court."[153] To the same effect, but more accurate, is Justice Miller's language for the Court a half century later, in Head Money Cases: "A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. * * * But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country."[154]

Origin of the Conception

How did this distinctive feature of the Constitution come about, by virtue of which the treaty-making authority is enabled to stamp upon its promises the quality of municipal law, thereby rendering them "self-executory," as it is said; in other words, enforceable by the courts? The answer is that article VI, paragraph 2 was, at its inception, an outgrowth of a major weakness of the Articles of Confederation. Although the Articles entrusted the treaty-making power to Congress, fulfillment of Congress' promises was dependent on the State legislatures. The result was that two highly important Articles of the Treaty of Peace of 1783 not only went unenforced, but were in some instances directly flouted by the local legislatures. These were articles IV and VI, which contained stipulations in favor, respectively, of British creditors of American citizens and of the former Loyalists; in short of _private persons_. Confronted with the reiterated protests of the British government, John Jay, Secretary of the United States for Foreign Affairs, suggested to Congress late in 1786 that it request the State legislatures to repeal all legislation repugnant to the Treaty of Peace, and at the same time authorize their courts in all cases arising from the said treaty to decide and adjudge according to the true intent and meaning of the same, "anything in the said acts * * * to the contrary notwithstanding." On April 13, 1787 Congress unanimously voted Jay's proposal, which on the eve of the assembling of the Federal Convention was transmitted to the State legislatures, by seven of which it was promptly adopted.[155]

TREATY RIGHTS VERSUS STATE POWER

The first case to arise under article VI, clause 2, was Ware _v._ Hylton.[156] The facts and bearing of the decision are indicated in the syllabus: "A debt, due before the war from an American to a British subject, was during the war, paid into the loan office of Virginia, in pursuance of a law of that State of the 20th of December, 1777, sequestering British property and providing that such payment, and a receipt therefor, should discharge the debt. Held: That the legislature of Virginia which from the 4th of July, 1776, and before the Confederation of the United States, * * * possessed and exercised all the rights of independent governments, had authority to make such law and that the same was obligatory, since every nation at war with another may confiscate all property of, including private debts due, the enemy. Such payment and discharge would therefore be a bar to a subsequent action, unless the creditor's right was revived by the treaty of peace, by which alone the restitution of, or compensation for, British property confiscated during the war by any of the United States could only be provided for. Held, that the fourth article of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States, of September 3, 1783, nullifies said law of Virginia, destroys the payment made under it, and revives the debt, and gives a right of recovery against the principal debtor, notwithstanding such payment thereof, under the authority of State law." In Hopkirk _v._ Bell[157] the Court further held that this same treaty provision prevented the operation of a Virginia statute of limitation to bar collection of antecedent debts. In numerous subsequent cases the Court invariably ruled that treaty provisions supersede inconsistent State laws governing the right of aliens to inherit real estate.[158] Such a case was Hauenstein _v._ Lynham,[159] in which the Court upheld the right of a citizen of the Swiss Republic, under the treaty of 1850 with that country, to recover the estate of a relative dying intestate in Virginia, to sell the same and to export the proceeds from the sale.[160]

Recent Cases

Certain more recent cases stem from California legislation, most of it directed against Japanese immigrants. A statute which excluded aliens ineligible to American citizenship from owning real estate was upheld in 1923 on the ground that the treaty in question did not secure the rights claimed.[161] But in Oyama _v._ California,[162] decided in 1948, a majority of the Court indicated a strongly held opinion that this legislation conflicted with the equal protection clause of Amendment XIV, a view which has since received the endorsement of the California Supreme Court by a narrow majority.[163] Meantime, California was informed that the rights of German nationals, under the Treaty of December 8, 1923 between the United States and the Reich, to whom real property in the United States had descended or been devised, to dispose of it, had survived the recent war and certain war legislation, and accordingly prevailed over conflicting State legislation.[164]

WHEN IS A TREATY SELF-EXECUTING?

What is the scope of the power of American courts under article VI, clause 2, to lend ear to private claims based on treaty provisions, on the ground that such provisions are self-executing? Jay had in mind certain intended victims of State legislation; and in fact the cases reviewed above all arose within the normal field of State legislative power. Nevertheless, as early as 1801, in United States _v._ Schooner Peggy,[165] the Supreme Court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, took notice of a treaty with France, executed after a court of admiralty had entered a final judgment condemning a captured French vessel, and finding it applicable to the situation before it, set the judgment aside and ordered the vessel restored to her owners. Since that time the Court has declared repeatedly in cases in which State law was not involved that when a treaty prescribes a rule by which private rights are to be determined, the courts are bound to take judicial notice thereof and to accept it as a rule of decision in any appropriate proceeding to enforce such rights.[166] In short, whether a given treaty provision is self-executing is a question for the Court; although it does not altogether lack guiding principles in deciding it, the most important of which is the doctrine of political questions.[167] _See_ pp. 426, 471-472.

CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO TREATIES

From the foregoing two other questions arise: first, are there types of treaty provisions which only Congress can put into effect? Second, assuming an affirmative answer to the above question, is Congress under constitutional obligation to supply such implementation? For such answer as exists to the first question resort must be had to the record of practice and nonjudicial opinion. The question arose originally in 1796 in connection with the Jay Treaty, certain provisions of which required appropriations to carry them into effect. In view of the third clause of article I, section 9 of the Constitution, which says that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law; * * *," it was universally agreed that Congress must be applied to if the treaty provisions alluded to were to be put into execution. But at this point the second question arose, to the solution of which the Court has subsequently contributed indirectly. (_See_ pp. 420-421). A bill being introduced into the House of Representatives to vote the needed funds, supporters of the treaty, Hamilton, Chief Justice Ellsworth, and others, argued that the House must make the appropriation willy nilly; that the treaty, having been ratified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was "supreme law of the land," and that the legislative branch was bound thereby no less than the executive and judicial branches.[168] Madison, a member of the House, opposed this thesis in a series of resolutions, the nub of which is comprised in the following statement: "When a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon, as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good."[169] The upshot of the matter was that the House adopted Madison's resolutions, while at the same time voting the required funds.[170]

THE TREATY-MAKING POWER AND REVENUE LAWS

On the whole, Madison's position has prospered. Discussion whether there are other treaty provisions than those calling for an expenditure of money which require legislation to render them legally operative has centered chiefly on the question whether the treaty-making power can of itself alone modify the revenue laws. From an early date spokesmen for the House have urged that a treaty does not, and cannot, _ex proprio vigore_, become supreme law of the land on this subject; and while the Senate has never conceded this claim formally, yet in a number of instances, "the treaty-making power has inserted in treaties negotiated by it and affecting the revenue laws of the United States, a proviso that they should not be deemed effective until the necessary laws to carry them into operation should be enacted by Congress, and the House has claimed that the insertion of such requirements has been, in substance, a recognition of its claim in the premises,"[171] although there are judicial dicta which inferentially support the Senate's position. Latterly the question has become largely academic. Commercial agreements nowadays are usually executive agreements contracted by authorization of Congress itself. Today the vital issue in this area of Constitutional Law is whether the treaty-making power is competent to assume obligations for the United States in the discharge of which the President can, without violation of his oath to support the Constitution, involve the country in large scale military operations abroad without authorization by the war-declaring power, Congress to wit. Current military operations in Korea appear to assume an affirmative answer to this question.

CONGRESSIONAL REPEAL OF TREATIES

It is in respect to his contention that when it is asked to carry a treaty into effect Congress has the constitutional right, and indeed the duty, to determine the matter according to its own ideas of what is expedient, that Madison has been most completely vindicated by developments. This is seen in the answer which the Court has returned to the question, as to what happens when a treaty provision and an act of Congress conflict. The answer is, that neither has any intrinsic superiority over the other and that therefore the one of later date will prevail _leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant_. In short, the treaty commitments of the United States in no wise diminish Congress's constitutional powers. To be sure, legislative repeal of a treaty as law of the land may amount to a violation of it as an international contract in the judgment of the other party to it. In such case, as the Court has said, "Its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress."[172]

TREATIES _Versus_ PRIOR ACTS OF CONGRESS

The cases are numerous in which the Court has enforced statutory provisions which were recognized by it as superseding prior treaty engagements. How as to the converse situation? Two early cases in which Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the Court, stand for the proposition that treaties, so far as self-executing, repeal earlier conflicting acts of Congress. In the case of the "_Peggy_,"[173] certain statutory provisions dealing with the trial of prize cases were held to have been modified by a subsequent treaty with France; and in Foster _v._. Neilson,[174] while holding--mistakenly as he later admitted[175]--that the treaty of January 24, 1818 with Spain was not self-executing with respect to certain land grants, he went on to say that if it had been it would have repealed acts of Congress repugnant to it. With one exception, however, judicial dicta which reiterate this idea are obiter, and are disparaged by Willoughby, as follows: "In fact, however, there have been few (the writer is not certain that there have been any) instances in which a treaty inconsistent with a prior act of Congress has been given full force and effect as law in this country without the assent of Congress. There may indeed have been cases in which, by treaty, certain action has been taken without reference to existing Federal laws, as, for example, where by treaty certain populations have been collectively naturalized, but such treaty action has not operated to repeal or annul the existing law upon the subject. Furthermore, with specific reference to commercial arrangements with foreign powers, Congress has explicitly denied that a treaty can operate to modify the arrangements which it, by statute, has provided, and, in actual practice, has in every instance succeeded in maintaining this point."[176] The single exception just alluded to is Cook _v._ United States,[177] which may be regarded as part of the aftermath of National Prohibition. Here a divided Court, speaking by Justice Brandeis, ruled that the authority conferred by Sec. 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922 and its reenactment in the tariff Act of 1930, upon officers of the Coast Guard to stop and board any vessel at any place within four leagues (12 miles) of the coast of the United States and to seize the vessel, if upon examination it shall appear that any violation of the law has been committed by reason of which the vessel or merchandise therein is liable to forfeiture, is, as respects British vessels suspected of being engaged in attempting to import alcoholic beverages into the United States in violation of its laws, modified by the Treaty of May 22, 1924, between the United States and Great Britain, so as to allow seizure of such vessels only within the distance from the coast which can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense.[178] Only one case is cited in support of the proposition that the treaty, being of later date than the act of Congress, superseded it so far as they were in conflict. This is Whitney _v._ Robertson,[179] in which an act of Congress was held to have superseded conflicting provisions of a prior treaty. Moreover, the act of Congress involved in the Cook case had, as above indicated, been reenacted subsequently to the treaty involved. The decision actually accomplishes the singular result of reversing the maxim _leges posteriores_. It may be suspected that it was devised to avoid a diplomatic controversy which in the low estate of Prohibition at that date would not have been worthwhile.[180]

INTERPRETATION AND TERMINATION OF TREATIES AS INTERNATIONAL COMPACTS

The repeal by Congress of the "self-executing" clauses of a treaty as "law of the land" does not of itself terminate the treaty as an international contract, although it may very well provoke the other party to the treaty to do so. Hence the question arises of where the Constitution lodges this power; also the closely related question of where it lodges the power to interpret the contractual provisions of treaties. The first case of outright abrogation of a treaty by the United States occurred in 1798, when Congress, by the act of July 7 of that year, pronounced the United States freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the Treaties of 1778 with France.[181] This act was followed two days later by one authorizing limited hostilities against the same country; and in the case of Bas _v._ Tingy[182] the Supreme Court treated the act of abrogation as simply one of a bundle of acts declaring "public war" upon the French Republic.

TERMINATION OF TREATIES BY NOTICE

The initial precedent in the matter of termination by notice occurred in 1846, when by the Joint Resolution of April 27, Congress authorized the President at his discretion to notify the British Government of the abrogation of the Convention of August 6, 1827, relative to the joint occupation of the Oregon Territory. As the President himself had requested the resolution, the episode supports the theory that international conventions to which the United States is party, even those terminable on notice, are terminable only by act of Congress.[183] Subsequently Congress has often passed resolutions denouncing treaties or treaty provisions which by their own terms were terminable on notice, and Presidents have usually carried out such resolutions, though not invariably.[184] By the La Follette-Furuseth Seamen's Act, approved March 4, 1915,[185] President Wilson was directed, "within ninety days after the passage of the act, to give notice to foreign governments that so much of any treaties as might be in conflict with the provisions of the act would terminate on the expiration of the periods of notice provided for in such treaties," and the required notice was given.[186] When, however, by section 34 of the Jones Merchant Marine Act of 1920 the same President was authorized and directed within ninety days to give notice to the other parties to certain treaties, which the act infracted, of the termination thereof, he refused to comply, asserting that he "did not deem the direction contained in section 34 * * * an exercise of any constitutional power possessed by Congress."[187] The same intransigent attitude was continued by Presidents Harding and Coolidge.

DETERMINATION WHETHER A TREATY HAS LAPSED

At the same time, there is clear judicial recognition that the President may without consulting Congress validly determine the question whether specific treaty provisions have lapsed. The following passage from Justice Lurton's opinion in Charlton _v._ Kelly[188] is pertinent: "If the attitude of Italy was, as contended, a violation of the obligation of the treaty, which, in international law, would have justified the United States in denouncing the treaty as no longer obligatory, it did not automatically have that effect. If the United States elected not to declare its abrogation, or come to a rupture, the treaty would remain in force. It was only voidable, not void; and if the United States should prefer, it might waive any breach which in its judgment had occurred and conform to its own obligation as if there had been no such breach. * * * That the political branch of the Government recognizes the treaty obligation as still existing is evidenced by its action in this case. * * * The executive department having thus elected to waive any right to free itself from the obligation to deliver up its own citizens, it is the plain duty of this court to recognize the obligation to surrender the appellant as one imposed by the treaty as the supreme law of the land as affording authority for the warrant of extradition."[189] So also it is primarily for the political departments to determine whether certain provisions of a treaty have survived a war in which the other contracting state ceased to exist as a member of the international community.[190]

STATUS OF A TREATY A POLITICAL QUESTION

All in all, it would seem that the vast weight both of legislative practice and of executive opinion supports the proposition that the power of terminating outright international compacts to which the United States is party belongs, as a prerogative of sovereignty, to Congress alone, but that the President may, as an incident of his function of interpreting treaties preparatory to enforcing them, sometimes authoritatively find that a treaty contract with another power has or has not been breached by the latter and whether, for that reason, it is or is not longer binding on the United States.[191] At any rate, it is clear that any such questions which arise concerning a treaty are of a political nature and will not be decided by the courts. In the words of Justice Curtis in Taylor _v._ Morton:[192] It is not "a judicial question, whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign has been violated by him; whether the consideration of a particular stipulation in a treaty, has been voluntarily withdrawn by one party, so that it is no longer obligatory on the other; whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested through his representative have given just occasion to the political departments of our government to withhold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty, or to act in direct contravention of such promise. * * * These powers have not been confided by the people to the judiciary, which has no suitable means to exercise them; but to the executive and the legislative departments of our government. They belong to diplomacy and legislation, and not to the administration of existing laws. And it necessarily follows, that if they are denied to Congress and the Executive, in the exercise of their legislative power, they can be found nowhere, in our system of government." Chief Justice Marshall's language in Foster _v._ Neilson[193] is to the same effect.

TREATIES AND THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE

What power, or powers, does Congress exercise when it enacts legislation for the purpose of carrying treaties of the United States into effect? When the subject matter of the treaty falls within the ambit of Congress's enumerated powers (those listed in the first 17 clauses of article I, section 8 of the Constitution), then it is these powers which it exercises in carrying such treaty into effect. But if the treaty deals with a subject which falls normally to the States to legislate upon, or a subject which falls within the national jurisdiction because of its international character, then recourse is had to the necessary and proper clause. Thus, of itself, Congress would have no power to confer judicial powers upon foreign consuls in the United States, but the treaty-power can do this and has done it repeatedly and Congress has supplemented these treaties by appropriate legislation.[194] Again, Congress could not confer judicial power upon American consuls abroad to be there exercised over American citizens, but the treaty-power can and has, and Congress has passed legislation perfecting such agreements and such legislation has been upheld.[195] Again, Congress of itself could not provide for the extradition of fugitives from justice, but the treaty-power can and has done so scores of times, and Congress has passed legislation carrying our extradition treaties into effect.[196] Again, Congress could not ordinarily penalize private acts of violence within a State, but it can punish such acts if they deprive aliens of their rights under a treaty.[197] Referring to such legislation the Court has said: "The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution as well the powers enumerated in section 8 of article I of the Constitution, as all others vested in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or the officers thereof, includes the power to enact such legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power."[198] In a word, the treaty-power cannot purport to amend the Constitution by adding to the list of Congress's enumerated powers, but having acted, the consequence will often be that it has provided Congress with an opportunity to enact measures which independently of a treaty Congress could not pass; and the only question that can be raised as to such measures will be whether they are "necessary and proper" measures for the carrying of the treaty in question into operation. The matter is further treated under the next heading.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF THE TREATY-MAKING POWER; MISSOURI _v._ HOLLAND

Our system being theoretically opposed to the lodgement anywhere in government of unlimited power, the question of the scope of this exclusive power has often been pressed upon the Court, which has sometimes used language vaguely suggestive of limitation, as in the following passage from Justice Field's opinion for the Court in Geofroy _v._ Riggs,[199] which was decided in 1890: "The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent. * * * But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country."[200] The fact is none the less, that no treaty of the United States nor any provision thereof has ever been found by the Court to be unconstitutional. The most persistently urged proposition in limitation of the treaty-making power has been that it must not invade certain reserved powers of the States. In view of the sweeping language of the supremacy clause, it is hardly surprising that this argument has not prevailed.[201] Nevertheless, the Court was forced to answer it as recently as 1923. This was in the case of Missouri _v._ Holland,[202] in which the Court sustained a treaty between the United States and Great Britain providing for the reciprocal protection of migratory birds which make seasonal flights from Canada into the United States and vice versa, and an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof which authorized the Department of Agriculture to draw up regulations to govern the hunting of such birds, subject to the penalties specified by the act. To the objection that the treaty and implementing legislation invaded the acknowledged police power of the State in the protection of game within its borders, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, answered: "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be found. (Andrews _v._ Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)). What was said in that case with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of the nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent to act. * * * The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved."[203] And again: "Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject-matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act. We are of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld."[204]

Justice Sutherland's later assertion in the Curtiss-Wright case[205] that the powers "to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties," etc., belong to "the Federal Government as the necessary concomitants of nationality" leaves even less room for the notion of a limited treaty-making power, as indeed appears from his further statement that "as a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States * * * are equal to the right and power of the other members of the international family."[206] No doubt there are specific limitations in the Constitution in favor of private rights which "go to the roots" of all power. But these do not include the reserved powers of the States; nor do they appear to limit the National Government in its choice of matters concerning which it may treat with other governments.[207]

INDIAN TREATIES

In the early cases of Cherokee Nation _v._ Georgia[208] and Worcester _v._ Georgia[209] the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, held, first, that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution which extends the judicial power of the United States to controversies "between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects"; secondly, that: "The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, had adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense."[210]

Later cases established that the power to make treaties with the Indian tribes was coextensive with the power to make treaties with foreign nations;[211] that the States were incompetent to interfere with rights created by such treaties;[212] that as long as the United States recognized the national character of a tribe, its members were under the protection of treaties and of the laws of Congress and their property immune from taxation by a State;[213] that a stipulation in an Indian treaty that laws forbidding the introduction of liquors into Indian territory was operative without legislation, and binding on the courts although the territory was within an organized county of the States;[214] that an act of Congress contrary to a prior Indian treaty repealed it.[215]

Present Status of Indian Treaties

Today Indian treaties is a closed account in the Constitutional Law ledger. By a rider inserted in the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871 it was provided "That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty: _Provided, further_, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe."[216] Subsequently, the power of Congress to withdraw or modify tribal rights previously granted by treaty has been invariably upheld. Thus the admission of Wyoming as a State was found to abrogate, _pro tanto_, a treaty guaranteeing certain Indians the right to hunt on unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon and to bring hunting by the Indians within the police power of the State.[217] Similarly, statutes modifying rights of members in tribal lands,[218] granting a right of way for a railroad through lands ceded by treaty to an Indian tribe,[219] or extending the application of revenue laws respecting liquor and tobacco over Indian territories, despite an earlier treaty exemption,[220] have been sustained. When, on the other hand, definite property rights have been conferred upon individual Indians, whether by treaty or under an act of Congress, they are protected by the Constitution to the same extent and in the same way as the private rights of other residents or citizens of the United States. Hence it was held that certain Indian allottees under an agreement according to which, in part consideration of their relinquishment of all their claim to tribal property, they were to receive in severalty allotments of lands which were to be nontaxable for a specified period, acquired vested rights of exemption from State taxation which were protected by the Fifth Amendment against abrogation by Congress.[221]

International Agreements Without Senate Approval

The capacity of the United States to enter into agreements with other nations is not exhausted in the treaty-making power. The Constitution recognizes a distinction between "treaties" and "agreements" or "compacts," but does not indicate what the difference is; and what difference there once may have been has been seriously blurred in practice within recent decades. The President's power to enter into agreements or compacts with other governments without consulting the Senate must be referred to his powers as organ of foreign relations and as Commander in Chief. From an early date, moreover, Congress has authorized executive agreements within the field of its powers, postal agreements, trade-mark and copyright agreements, reciprocal trade agreements. Executive agreements may also stem from treaties.[222]

ROUTINE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Many types of executive agreements comprise the ordinary daily grist of the diplomatic mill. Among these are such as apply to minor territorial adjustments, boundary rectifications, the policing of boundaries, the regulation of fishing rights, private pecuniary claims against another government or its nationals, in Story's words, "the mere private rights of sovereignty."[223] Crandall lists scores of such agreements entered into with other governments by the authorization of the President.[224] Such agreements are ordinarily directed to particular and comparatively trivial disputes and by the settlement the effect of these cease _ipso facto_ to be operative. Also there are such time-honored diplomatic devices as the "protocol" which marks a stage in the negotiation of a treaty, and the _modus vivendi_, which is designed to serve as a temporary substitute for one. Executive agreements become of constitutional significance when they constitute a determinative factor of future foreign policy and hence of the country's destiny. Within recent decades, in consequence particularly of our participation in World War II and our immersion in the conditions of international tension which have prevailed both before and after this war, Presidents have entered into agreements with other governments some of which have approximated temporary alliances. It cannot be justly said, however, that in so doing they have acted without considerable support from precedent.

LAW-MAKING EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

An early instance of executive treaty-making was the agreement by which President Monroe in 1817 brought about a delimitation of armaments on the Great Lakes. The arrangement was effected by an exchange of notes, which nearly a year later was laid before the Senate with a query as to whether it was within the President's power, or whether advice and consent of the Senate were required. The Senate approved the agreement by the required two-thirds vote, and it was forthwith proclaimed by the President without there having been a formal exchange of ratifications.[225] Of a kindred type, and owing much to the President's capacity as Commander in Chief, was a series of agreements entered into with Mexico between 1882 and 1896 according each country the right to pursue marauding Indians across the common border.[226] Commenting on such an agreement, the Court remarked, a bit uncertainly: "While no act of Congress authorizes the executive department to permit the introduction of foreign troops, the power to give such permission without legislative assent was probably assumed to exist from the authority of the President as commander in chief of the military and naval forces of the United States. It may be doubted, however, whether such power could be extended to the apprehension of deserters [from foreign vessels] in the absence of positive legislation to that effect."[227] Justice Gray and three other Justices were of the opinion that such action by the President must rest upon express treaty or statute.[228]

PRESIDENT McKINLEY'S CONTRIBUTION

Notable expansion of Presidential power in this field first became manifest in the administration of President McKinley. At the outset of war with Spain the President proclaimed that the United States would consider itself bound for the duration by the last three principles of the Declaration of Paris, a course which, as Professor Wright observes, "would doubtless go far toward establishing these three principles as international law obligatory upon the United States in future wars."[229] Hostilities with Spain were brought to an end in August 1898 by an armistice the conditions of which largely determined the succeeding treaty of peace,[230] just as did the Armistice of November 11, 1918, determine in great measure the conditions of the final peace with Germany in 1918. It was also President McKinley who in 1900, relying on his own sole authority as Commander in Chief, contributed a land force of 5,000 men and a naval force to cooperate with similar contingents from other Powers to rescue the legations in Peking from the Boxers; and a year later, again without consulting either Congress or the Senate, accepted for the United States the Boxer Indemnity Protocol between China and the intervening Powers.[231] Commenting on the Peking protocol Willoughby quotes with approval the following remark: "This case is interesting, because it shows how the force of circumstances compelled us to adopt the European practice with reference to an international agreement, which, aside from the indemnity question, was almost entirely political in character. * * *, purely political treaties are, under constitutional practice in Europe, usually made by the executive alone. The situation in China, however, abundantly justified President McKinley in not submitting the protocol to the Senate. The remoteness of Pekin, the jealousies between the allies, and the shifting evasive tactics of the Chinese Government, would have made impossible anything but an agreement on the spot."[232]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING FAR EASTERN RELATIONS

It was during this period, too, that John Hay, as McKinley's Secretary of State, initiated his "Open Door" policy, by notes to Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, which were soon followed by similar notes to France, Italy and Japan. These in substance asked the recipients to declare formally that they would not seek to enlarge their respective interests in China at the expense of any of the others; and all responded favorably.[233] Then in 1905 the first Roosevelt, seeking to arrive at a diplomatic understanding with Japan, instigated an exchange of opinions between Secretary of War Taft, then in the Far East, and Count Katsura, amounting to a secret treaty, by which the Roosevelt administration assented to the establishment by Japan of a military protectorate in Korea.[234] Three years later Secretary of State Root and the Japanese ambassador at Washington entered into the Root-Takahira Agreement to uphold the status quo in the Pacific and maintain the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.[235] Meantime, in 1907, by a "Gentlemen's Agreement," the Mikado's government had agreed to curb the emigration of Japanese subjects to the United States, thereby relieving the Washington government from the necessity of taking action that would have cost Japan loss of face. The final of this series of executive agreements touching American relations in and with the Far East was the product of President Wilson's diplomacy. This was the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, embodied in an exchange of letters dated November 2, 1917, by which the United States recognized Japan's "special interests" in China, and Japan assented to the principle of the Open Door in that country.[236]

THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

The question naturally suggests itself: What sort of obligation does an agreement of the above description impose upon the United States? The question was put to Secretary Lansing himself in 1918 by a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, as follows: "Has the so-called Lansing-Ishii Agreement any binding force on this country?" and replied that it had not; that it was simply a declaration of American policy so long as the President or State Department might choose to continue it.[237] Actually, it took the Washington Conference of 1921, two solemn treaties and an exchange of notes to get rid of it; while the "Gentlemen's Agreement," first drawn in 1907, was finally put an end to, after seventeen years, only by an act of Congress.[238] That executive agreements are sometimes cognizable by the courts was indicated earlier. The matter is further treated immediately below.

THE LITVINOV AGREEMENT OF 1933

The executive agreement attained its fullest development as an instrument of foreign policy under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, even at times threatening to replace the treaty-making power, if not formally yet actually, as a determinative element in the field of foreign policy. Mr. Roosevelt's first important utilization of the executive agreement device took the form of an exchange of notes on November 16, 1933 with Maxim M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, whereby American recognition was extended to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in consideration of certain pledges, the first of which was the promise to restrain any persons or organizations "under its direct or indirect control, * * *, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquillity, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States, * * *"[239]

United States _v._ Belmont

The Litvinov Agreement is also noteworthy for giving rise to two cases which afforded the Court the opportunity to evaluate the executive agreement in terms of Constitutional Law. The earlier of these was United States _v._ Belmont,[240] decided in 1937. The point at issue was whether a district court of the United States was free to dismiss an action by the United States, as assignee of the Soviet government, for certain moneys which were once the property of a Russian metal corporation whose assets had been appropriated by the Soviet government. The Court, speaking by Justice Sutherland, said "No." The President's act in recognizing the Soviet government, and the accompanying agreements, constituted, said the Justice, an international compact which the President, "as the sole organ" of international relations for the United States, was authorized to enter upon without consulting the Senate. Nor did State laws and policies make any difference in such a situation; for while the supremacy of treaties is established by the Constitution in express terms, yet the same rule holds "in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the National Government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several States."[241]

United States _v._ Pink; National Supremacy