Chapter LXVIII: Section 4: The United States shall guarantee to every State in (1)

this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

A Republican Form of Government

It was established in the pioneer case of Luther _v._ Borden,[280] that questions arising under this section are political, not judicial, in character, and that "it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State * * * as well as its republican character."[281] Upon Congress also rested the duty to restore republican governments to the States which seceded from the Union at the time of the Civil War. In Texas _v._ White[282] the Supreme Court declared that the action of the President in setting up provisional governments at the end of the war was justified, if at all, only as an exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief and that such governments were to be regarded merely as provisional regimes to perform the functions of government pending action by Congress. On the ground that the questions were not justiciable in character, the Supreme Court has refused to consider whether the adoption of the initiative and referendum,[283] or the delegation of legislative power to other departments of government[284] is compatible with a republican form of government. This guarantee does not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review a decision of a State court sustaining a determination of an election contest for the office of governor made by a State legislature under the authority of a State constitution.[285] Inasmuch as women were denied the right to vote in most, if not all, of the original thirteen States, it was held, prior to the adoption of Amendment XIX, that a State government could be challenged under this clause by reason of the fact that it did not permit women to vote.[286]

Protection Against Domestic Violence

The Supreme Court also held in Luther _v._ Borden[287] that it rested with Congress to determine upon the means proper to fulfill the constitutional guarantee of protection to the States against domestic violence. Chief Justice Taney declared that Congress might have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened which required the Federal Government to interfere. Instead, Congress had, by the act of February 28, 1795,[288] authorized the President to call out the militia in case of insurrection against the government of any State. It followed, said Taney, that the President "must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the duty imposed upon him by the act of Congress"[289] and that his determination was not subject to review by the courts.

DECLINE IN IMPORTANCE OF THIS GUARANTY

With the recognition in the Debs Case[290] of the power and duty of the Federal Government to use "the entire strength of the Nation * * * to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care,"[291] this clause has declined in importance. When that Government finds it necessary or desirable to use force to quell domestic violence, its power to protect the property of the United States, to remove obstructions to the United States mails, or to protect interstate commerce from interruption by labor disputes or otherwise, usually will furnish legal warrant for its action, without reference to this provision.[292]

Notes

[1] Clark _v._ Graham, 6 Wheat. 577 (1821), is an early case in which the Supreme Court enforced this rule.

[2] Stat. 122 (1790); 2 Stat. 299 (1804), R.S. Sec. 905 28 U.S.C. Sec. 687.

[3] Mankin _v._ Chandler & Co., 2 Brock. 125, 127 (1823).

[4] 7 Cr. 481 (1813). _See_ also Everett _v._ Everett, 215 U.S. 203 (1909); Mutual L. Ins. Co. _v._ Harris, 97 U.S. 331 (1878).

[5] On the same basis, a judgment cannot be impeached either in or out of the State by showing that it was based on a mistake of law. American Exp. Co. _v._ Mullins, 212 U.S. 311, 312 (1909); Fauntleroy _v._ Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Hartford L. Ins. Co. _v._ Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917); Hartford L. Ins. Co. _v._ Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915).

[6] 3 Wheat. 234 (1818).

[7] 13 Pet. 312 (1839). _See also_ Bacon _v._ Howard, 20 How. 22, 25 (1858); Bank of Ala. _v._ Dalton, 9 How. 522, 528 (1850); Great Western Telegraph Co. _v._ Purdy, 162 U.S. 329 (1896); Christmas _v._ Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 301 (1866); Wisconsin _v._ Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292 (1888).

[8] Cole _v._ Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 112 (1890). _See also_ Stacy _v._ Thrasher, use of Sellers, 6 How. 44, 61 (1848); Milwaukee County _v._ White (M.E.) Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).

[9] Chicago & A.R. Co. _v._ Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887); Hanley _v._ Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1, 3 (1885). _See also_ Bigelow _v._ Old Dominion Copper Min. & S. Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Green _v._ Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 140 (1869); Roche _v._ McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Ohio _v._ Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933).

[10] Sistare _v._ Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).

[11] Michigan Trust Co. _v._ Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913). _See also_ Fall _v._ Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).

[12] Milwaukee County _v._ White (M.E.) Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275-276 (1935).

[13] Board of Public Works _v._ Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521 (1873); Robertson _v._ Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 610 (1883).

[14] Kersh Lake Drainage Dist. _v._ Johnson, 309 U.S. 485 (1940). _See also_ Texas & P.R. Co. _v._ Southern P. Co., 137 U.S. 48 (1890).

[15] National Exchange Bank _v._ Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 265 (1904). _See also_ Grover & B. Sewing-Mach. Co. _v._ Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890).

[16] Harding _v._ Harding, 198 U.S. 317 (1905). The following cases further illustrate the application of the clause when its protection is sought by a defendant. Such claim must be specific, Wabash R. Co. _v._ Flannigan, 192 U.S. 29, 37 (1904). _See also_ American Exp. Co. _v._ Mullins, 212 U.S. 311 (1909). The burden is upon the party making it to establish the failure of a court to give to decrees of a federal court and the court of another State the due effect to which they are entitled. Commercial Pub. Co. _v._ Beckwith, 188 U.S. 567, 573 (1903). However, by defending on the merits, after pleading and relying upon a foreign judgment, a party does not waive the benefits of an alleged estoppel arising from the foreign judgment. Harding _v._ Harding, 198 U.S. 317, 330 (1905). Nor is a decree of dismissal, not on the merits, a bar to suit in another jurisdiction. Swift _v._ McPherson, 232 U.S. 51 (1914). Nor is an entry of discontinuance. In allowing the plaintiff to show that such entry of discontinuance was not intended by the parties as a release and satisfaction of the cause of action, but was the result of a promissory agreement by the defendant which was never complied with, the Court in the forum State was not refusing full faith and credit to the judgment. Such evidence was properly allowed, not to contradict the legal import of said judgment, but to show the true meaning of the parties to the suit in agreeing upon its discontinuance. Jacobs _v._ Marks, 182 U.S. 583, 593 (1901).

[17] Anglo-American Provision Co. _v._ Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).

[18] Fauntleroy _v._ Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). Justice Holmes, who spoke for the Court in both cases, asserted in his opinion in the latter that the New York statute was "directed to jurisdiction," the Mississippi statute to "merits," but four Justices could not grasp the distinction.

[19] Kenney _v._ Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411 (1920), and cases there cited. Holmes again spoke for the Court. _See also_ Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 Yale L.J. 421, 434 (1919).

[20] Broderick _v._ Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935), affirmed in Hughes _v._ Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).

[21] Union National Bank _v._ Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (1949); _see also_ Roche _v._ McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928).

[22] Embry _v._ Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).

[23] Titus _v._ Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 291-292 (1939).

[24] Morris _v._ Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947).

[25] Thus why should not a judgment for alimony be made directly enforceable in sister States instead of merely furnishing the basis of an action in debt? _See_ Thompson _v._ Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913).

[26] Board of Public Works _v._ Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 528 (1873). _See also_ Spokane & I.E.R. Co. _v._ Whitley, 237 U.S. 487 (1915); Bigelow _v._ Old Dominion Copper Min. & S. Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Brown _v._ Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82 (1908); Wisconsin _v._ Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291 (1888); Huntington _v._ Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 685 (1892). However a denial of credit, founded upon a mere suggestion of want of jurisdiction and unsupported by evidence, violates the clause. _See also_ Rogers _v._ Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1904); Wells Fargo & Co. _v._ Ford, 238 U.S. 503 (1915).

[27] _See_ Cooper _v._ Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 (1870).

[28] 11 How. 165 (1850).

[29] Justice Johnson, dissenting in Mills _v._ Duryee, 7 Cr. 481 (1813), had said: "There are certain eternal principles of justice which never ought to be dispensed with, and which Courts of justice never can dispense with but when compelled by positive statute. One of those is, that jurisdiction cannot be justly exercised by a State over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not owing them allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction, by being found within their limits." Ibid. 486.

[30] 95 U.S. 714 (1878).

[31] McDonald _v._ Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917). _See also_ Wetmore _v._ Karrick, 205 U.S. 141 (1907).

[32] Grover & B. Sewing-Mach. Co. _v._ Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). _See also_ Brown _v._ Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82 (1908); Galpin _v._ Page, 18 Wall. 350 (1874); Old Wayne Mutual Life Asso. Co. _v._ McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907).

[33] Reynolds _v._ Stockton, 140 U.S. 254 (1891).

[34] Renaud _v._ Abbott, 116 U.S. 277 (1886); Jaster _v._ Currie, 198 U.S. 144 (1905).

[35] Milliken _v._ Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).

[36] Adam _v._ Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62 (1938).

[37] Hancock National Bank _v._ Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900).

[38] Stacy _v._ Thrasher, use of Sellers, 6 How. 44, 58 (1848).

[39] Bigelow _v._ Old Dominion Copper Min. & S. Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).

[40] 18 How. 404 (1856).

[41] To the same effect is Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co. _v._ Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).

[42] Simon _v._ Southern Ky., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).

[43] Goldey _v._ Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); Riverside Mills _v._ Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).

[44] International Harvester Co. _v._ Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Riverside Mills _v._ Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).

[45] International Harvester Co. _v._ Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).

[46] Kane _v._ New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess _v._ Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Limited in Wuchter _v._ Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).

[47] 18 Wall. 457 (1874).

[48] _See_ 1 Black, Judgments Sec. 246 (1891).

[49] _See also_ Simmons _v._ Saul, 138 U.S. 439, 448 (1891). In other words, the challenge to jurisdiction is treated as equivalent to the plea _nul tiel record_, a plea which was recognized even in Mills _v._ Duryee as always available against an attempted invocation of the full faith and credit clause. What is not pointed out by the Court, is that it was also assumed in the earlier case that such a plea could always be rebutted by producing a transcript, properly authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress, of the judgment in the original case. _See also_ Brown _v._ Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82 (1908); German Savings Society _v._ Dormitzer, 192 U.S. 125, 128 (1904); Grover & Sewing-Mach. Co. _v._ Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287, 294 (1890).

[50] Cheever _v._ Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (1870).

[51] Andrews _v._ Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). _See also_ German Savings Society _v._ Dormitzer, 192 U.S. 125 (1904).

[52] 201 U.S. 562 (1906). _See also_ Thompson _v._ Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913).

[53] 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901).

[54] 317 U.S. 287 (1942); 325 U.S. 226 (1945).

[55] 305 U.S. 32 (1938).

[56] 317 U.S. 287, 298-299 (1942).

[57] Ibid. at p. 302.

[58] 317 U.S. 287, 312, 315, 321 (1942).

[59] 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).

[60] Bell _v._ Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Andrews _v._ Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903).

[61] Strong dissents were filed which have influenced subsequent holdings. Among these was that of Justice Rutledge which attacked both the consequences of the decision as well as the concept of jurisdictional domicile on which it was founded.

"Unless 'matrimonial domicil,' banished in _Williams_ I [by the overruling of Haddock _v._ Haddock], has returned renamed ['domicil of origin'] in _Williams_ II, every decree becomes vulnerable in every State. Every divorce, wherever granted, * * *, may now be reexamined by every other State, upon the same or different evidence, to redetermine the 'jurisdictional fact,' always the ultimate conclusion of 'domicil.' * * *

"The Constitution does not mention domicil. Nowhere does it posit the powers of the states or the nation upon that amorphous, highly variable common-law conception. * * * No legal conception, save possibly 'jurisdiction,' * * *, affords such possibilities for uncertain application. * * * Apart from the necessity for travel, [to effect a change of domicile, the latter], criterion comes down to a purely subjective mental state, related to remaining for a length of time never yet defined with clarity. * * * When what must be proved is a variable, the proof and the conclusion which follows upon it inevitably take on that character. * * * [The majority have not held] that denial of credit will be allowed, only if the evidence [as to the place of domicile] is different or depending in any way upon the character or the weight of the difference. The test is not different evidence. It is evidence, whether the same or different and, if different, without regard to the quality of the difference, from which an opposing set of inferences can be drawn by the trier of fact 'not unreasonably.' * * * But * * * [the Court] does not define 'not unreasonably.' It vaguely suggests a supervisory function, to be exercised when the denial [of credit] strikes its sensibilities as wrong, by some not stated standard. * * * There will be no 'weighing' [of evidence], * * * only examination for sufficiency."--(325 U.S. 226, 248, 251, 255, 258-259 (1945)).

No less disposed to prophesy undesirable results from this decision was Justice Black in whose dissenting opinion Justice Douglas concurred.

"The full faith and credit clause, as now interpreted, has become a disrupting influence. The Court in effect states that the clause does not apply to divorce actions, and that States alone have the right to determine what effect shall be given to the decrees of other States. If the Court is abandoning the principle that a marriage [valid where made is valid everywhere], a consequence is to subject people to bigamy or adultery prosecutions because they exercise their constitutional right to pass from a State in which they were validly married on to another which refuses to recognize their marriage. Such a consequence violates basic guarantees."

North Carolina's interest was to preserve a bare marital status as to two persons who sought a divorce and two others who had not objected to it. "It is an extraordinary thing for a State to procure a retroactive invalidation of a divorce decree, and then punish one of its citizens for conduct authorized by that decree, when it had never been challenged by either of the people most immediately interested in it." The State here did not sue to protect any North Carolina property rights nor to obtain support for deserted families. "I would not permit such an attenuated state interest to override the Full Faith and Credit Clause * * *" (325 U.S. 226, 262-267 (1945)).

The unsettling effect of this decision was expressed statistically by Justice Black as follows: "Statistics indicate that approximately five million divorced persons are scattered throughout the forty-eight States. More than 85% of these divorces were granted in uncontested proceedings. Not one of this latter group can now retain any feeling of security in his divorce decree. Ever present will be the danger of criminal prosecution and harassment." Ibid. 262-263.

As to the conclusion that the Supreme Court as well as the State courts should reach in like situations, Justice Black asserted that "until Congress has commanded a different 'effect' for divorces granted on a short sojourn within a State, we should stay our hands. * * * If we follow that course, North Carolina cannot be permitted to disregard the Nevada decrees without passing upon the 'faith and credit' which Nevada itself would give to them under its own 'law or usage.' * * * For in Nevada, even its Attorney General could not have obtained a cancellation of the decree * * *." Ibid. 267, 268.

The reader should take note of the effect in some of the above opinions to weigh competing interests against one another and the implication that the court's relation to the full faith and credit clause is that of an arbitral tribunal rather than of a court in the conventional sense of a body whose duty is to maintain an established rule of law.

[62] 325 U.S. 279 (1945).

[63] Ibid. 281-283.

[64] 334 U.S. 541 (1948). _See also_ the companion case of Kreiger _v._ Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948).

[65] Esenwein _v._ Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 280 (1945).

[66] Because the record, in his opinion, did not make it clear whether New York "law" held that no "_ex parte_" divorce decree could terminate a prior New York separate maintenance decree, or merely that no "_ex parte_" decree of divorce of _another State_ could, Justice Frankfurter dissented and recommended that the case be remanded for clarification. Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that under New York law, a New York divorce would terminate the wife's right to alimony; and if the Nevada decree is good, it is entitled to no less effect in New York than a local decree. However, for reasons stated in his dissent in the First Williams Case, 317 U.S. 287, he would prefer not to give standing to constructive service divorces obtained on short residence. 334 U.S. 541, 549-554 (1948). These two Justices filed similar dissents in the companion case of Kreiger _v._ Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555, 557 (1948).

[67] 334 U.S. 343 (1948).

[68] 334 U.S. 378 (1948).--In a dissenting opinion filed in the case of Sherrer _v._ Sherrer, but applicable also to the case of Coe _v._ Coe, Justice Frankfurter, with Justice Murphy concurring, asserted his inability to accept the proposition advanced by the majority that "regardless of how overwhelming the evidence may have been that the asserted domicile in the State offering bargain-counter divorces was a sham, the home State of the parties is not permitted to question the matter if the form of a controversy had been gone through."--334 U.S. 343, 377 (1948).

[69] 336 U.S. 674 (1949).--Of four Justices dissenting (Black, Douglas, Rutledge, Jackson), Justice Jackson alone filed a written opinion. To him the decision is "an example of the manner in which, in the law of domestic relations, 'confusion now hath made his masterpiece,'" but for the first Williams case and its progeny, the judgment of the Connecticut court might properly have held that the Rice divorce decree was void for every purpose because it was rendered by a State court which never obtained jurisdiction of the nonresident defendant. "But if we adhere to the holdings that the Nevada court had power over her for the purpose of blasting her marriage and opening the way to a successor, I do not see the justice of inventing a compensating confusion in the device of divisible divorce by which the parties are half-bound and half-free and which permits Rice to have a wife who cannot become his widow and to leave a widow who was no longer his wife." Ibid. 676, 679, 680.

[70] Vermont violated the clause in sustaining a collateral attack on a Florida divorce decree, the presumption of Florida's jurisdiction over the cause and the parties not having been overcome by extrinsic evidence or the record of the case. Cook _v._ Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951). The Sherrer and Coe cases were relied upon. There seems, therefore, to be no doubt of their continued vitality.

[71] Barber _v._ Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 84 (1944).

[72] Sistare _v._ Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 11 (1910). _See also_ Barber _v._ Barber, 21 How. 582 (1859); Lynde _v._ Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 186-187 (1901); Bates _v._ Bodie, 245 U.S. 520 (1918); Audubon _v._ Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901); Yarbrough _v._ Yarbrough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Loughran _v._ Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934).

[73] Griffin _v._ Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).

[74] Ibid. 228. An alimony case of a quite extraordinary pattern was that of Sutton _v._ Leib. On account of the diverse citizenship of the parties, who had once been husband and wife, the case was brought by the latter in a federal court in Illinois. Her suit was to recover unpaid alimony which was to continue until her remarriage. To be sure, she had, as she confessed, remarried in Nevada, but the marriage had been annulled in New York on the ground that the man was already married, inasmuch as his divorce from his previous wife was null and void, she having neither entered a personal appearance nor been personally served. The Court, speaking by Justice Reed, held that the New York annulment of the Nevada marriage must be given full faith and credit in Illinois, but left Illinois to decide for itself the effect of the annulment upon the obligations of petitioner's first husband. Sutton _v._ Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).

[75] Halvey _v._ Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947).

[76] Johnson _v._ Muelberger, 341 U.S. 581 (1951).

[77] Tilt _v._ Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907); Burbank _v._ Ernst, 232 U.S. 162 (1914).

[78] Riley _v._ New York Trust Company, 315 U.S. 343 (1942).

[79] Brown _v._ Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82, 90 (1908). _See also_ Stacy _v._ Thrasher, Use of Sellers, 6 How. 44, 58 (1848); McLean _v._ Meek, 18 How. 16, 18, (1856).

[80] Tilt _v._ Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907). In the case of Borer _v._ Chapman, 119 U.S. 587, 599 (1887) involving a complicated set of facts, it was held, in 1887, that a judgment in a probate proceeding, which was merely ancillary to proceedings in another State and which ordered the residue of the estate to be assigned to the legatee and discharged the executor from further liability, did not prevent a creditor, who was not a resident of the State in which the ancillary judgment was rendered, from setting up his claim in the State probate court which had the primary administration of the estate.

[81] Blodgett _v._ Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).

[82] Kerr _v._ Devisees of Moon, 9 Wheat. 565 (1824); McCormick _v._ Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192 (1825); Clarke _v._ Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900). The controlling principle of these cases is not confined to proceedings in probate. A court of equity "not having jurisdiction of the _res_ cannot affect it by its decree nor by a deed made by a master in accordance with the decree." _See_ Fall _v._ Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 (1909).

[83] Robertson _v._ Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 611 (1883). _See also_ Darby _v._ Mayer, 10 Wheat. 465 (1825); Gasquet _v._ Fenner, 247 U.S. 16 (1918).

[84] Olmsted _v._ Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910).

[85] Hood _v._ McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915).

[86] Harris _v._ Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). _See also_ Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry _v._ Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899); King _v._ Cross, 175 U.S. 396, 399 (1899); Louisville & N.R. Co. _v._ Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (1906); Baltimore & O.R. Co. _v._ Hostetter, 240 U.S. 620 (1916).

[87] Christmas _v._ Russell, 5 Wall. 290 (1866); Maxwell _v._ Stewart, 21 Wall. 71 (1875); Hanley _v._ Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885); Wisconsin _v._ Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888); Simmons _v._ Saul, 138 U.S. 439 (1891); American Express Co. _v._ Mullins, 212 U.S. 311 (1909).

[88] Fauntleroy _v._ Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).

[89] Anglo-American Provision Co. _v._ Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).

[90] 133 U.S. 107 (1890).

[91] The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123 (1825). _See also_ Wisconsin _v._ Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).

[92] 146 U.S. 657 (1892). _See also_ Dennick _v._ R.R. 103 U.S. 11 (1881).

[93] Milwaukee County _v._ White (N.E.) Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). _See also_ Moore _v._ Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).

[94] Bank of Augusta _v._ Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589-596 (1839). _See_ Kryger _v._ Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916); Bond _v._ Hume, 243 U.S. 15 (1917).

[95] 19 How. 393, 460 (1857); Bonaparte _v._ Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1882), where it was held that a law exempting from taxation certain bonds of the enacting State did not operate extraterritorially by virtue of the full faith and credit clause.

[96] Chicago & Alton R. Co. _v._ Wiggins Ferry, 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887).

[97] Smithsonian Institution _v._ St. John, 214 U.S. 19 (1909). When, in a State court, the validity of an act of the legislature of another State is not in question, and the controversy turns merely upon its interpretation or construction, no question arises under the full faith and credit clause. _See also_ Western Life Indemnity Co. _v._ Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914), citing Glenn _v._ Garth, 147 U.S. 360 (1893); Lloyd _v._ Matthews, 155 U.S. 222, 227 (1894); Banholzer _v._ New York L. Ins. Co., 178 U.S. 402 (1900); Allen _v._ Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458, 465 (1905); Texas & N.O.R. Co. _v._ Miller, 221 U.S. 408 (1911). _See also_ National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Asso. _v._ Brahan, 193 U.S. 635 (1904); Johnson _v._ New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 491, 495 (1903); Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. _v._ Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).

[98] Alaska Packers Asso. _v._ Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Bradford Electric Light Co. _v._ Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).

[99] Dennick _v._ R.R., 103 U.S. 11 (1881) was the first of the so-called "Death Act" cases to reach the Supreme Court. _See also_ Stewart _v._ B.& O.R. Co., 168 U.S. 445 (1897). Even today the obligation of a State to furnish a forum for the determination of death claims arising in another State under the laws thereof appears to rest on a rather precarious basis. In Hughes _v._ Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), the Court, by a narrow majority, held invalid under the full faith and credit clause a statute of Wisconsin which, as locally interpreted, forbade its courts to entertain suits of this nature; and in First National Bank _v._ United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952), a like result was reached as to an Illinois statute. In both cases the same four Justices dissented.

[100] 119 U.S. 615 (1887).

[101] Northern Pac. R.R. _v._ Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. _v._ Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 67 (1909).

[102] Glenn _v._ Garth, 147 U.S. 360 (1893).

[103] Tennessee Coal Co. _v._ George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).

[104] Klaxon Co. _v._ Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. _v._ Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) distinguished.

[105] Modern Woodmen of Am. _v._ Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925).

[106] Converse _v._ Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912); Selig _v._ Hamilton, 234 U.S. 652 (1914); Marin _v._ Augedahl, 247 U.S. 142 (1918).

[107] Broderick _v._ Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). _See also_ Thormann _v._ Frame, 176 U.S. 350, 356 (1900); Reynolds _v._ Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 264 (1891).

[108] Hancock Nat. Bank. _v._ Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900).

[109] 237 U.S. 531 (1916); followed in Modern Woodmen of Am. _v._ Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925).

[110] 305 U.S. 66, 75, 79 (1938).

[111] 331 U.S. 586, 588-589, 637 (1947).

[112] New York Life Ins. Co. _v._ Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); Aetna Life Ins. Co. _v._ Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).

[113] 193 U.S. 635 (1904).

[114] National Mutual B. & L. Asso. _v._ Brahan, 193 U.S. 635 (1904).

[115] New York Life Ins. Co. _v._ Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900). _See also_ American Fire Ins. Co. _v._ King Lumber Co., 250 U.S. 2 (1919).

[116] Griffin _v._ McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).

[117] 314 U.S. 201, 206-208 (1941). However, a decree of a Montana Supreme Court, insofar as it permitted judgment creditors of a dissolved Iowa surety company to levy execution against local assets to satisfy judgment, as against title to such assets of the Iowa insurance commissioner as statutory liquidator and successor to the dissolved company, was held to deny full faith and credit to the statutes of Iowa.--Clark _v._ Willard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934).

[118] 324 U.S. 154, 159-160 (1945).

[119] Bradford Electric Co. _v._ Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 158 (1932).

[120] The Court had earlier remarked that "workmen's compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of implied contract." Cudahy Packing Co. _v._ Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923). In contrast to the above cases, _see_ Kryger _v._ Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916), where it was held that the question whether the cancellation of a land contract was governed by the _lex rei sitae_ or the _lex loci contractus_ was purely a question of local common law; _also_ Bond _v._ Hume, 243 U.S. 15 (1917).

[121] Pacific Ins. Co. _v._ Comm'n., 306 U.S. 493, 497, 503-504 (1939).

[122] 320 U.S. 430 (1943).

[123] Industrial Comm'n. _v._ McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).

[124] Cardillo _v._ Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).

[125] Reviewing some of the cases treated in this section, a writer in 1925 said: "It appears, then, that the Supreme Court has quite definitely committed itself to a program of making itself, to some extent, a tribunal for bringing about uniformity in the field of conflicts * * * although the precise circumstances under which it will regard itself as having jurisdiction for this purpose are far from clear." E.M. Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926), 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533-562. It can hardly be said that the law has been subsequently clarified on this point.

[126] Walter W. Cook, The Power of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1919), 28 Yale L.J. 430.

[127] Cooper _v._ Newell, 173 U.S. 555, 567 (1899). _See also_ Wisconsin _v._ Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291 (1888); Swift _v._ McPherson, 232 U.S. 51 (1914); Pennington _v._ Gibson, 16 How. 65, 81 (1854); Cheever _v._ Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 123 (1870); Baldwin _v._ Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso., 283 U.S. 522 (1931); American Surety Co. _v._ Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); Sanders _v._ Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934).

[128] Milwaukee County _v._ White (M.E.) Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).

[129] Equitable L. Assur. Soc. _v._ Brown, 187 U.S. 308 (1902). _See also_ Gibson _v._ Lyon, 115 U.S. 439 (1885).

[130] Embry _v._ Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9 (1883). _See also_ Northern Assur. Co. _v._ Grand View Bldg. Asso., 203 U.S. 106 (1906); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. _v._ Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909); Knights of Pythias _v._ Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 33 (1924); Louisville & N.R. Co. _v._ Central Stockyards Co., 212 U.S. 132 (1909); West Side Belt R. Co. _v._ Pittsburgh Constr. Co., 219 U.S. 92 (1911).

[131] No right, privilege, or immunity is conferred by the Constitution in respect to judgments of foreign states and nations.--Aetna Life Ins. Co. _v._ Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912). In Hilton _v._ Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895) where a French judgment offered in defense was held not a bar to the suit. Four Justices dissented on the ground that "the application of the doctrine of _res judicata_ does not rest in discretion; and it is for the Government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if deemed under any circumstances desirable or necessary." At the same sitting of the Court, an action in a United States circuit court on a Canadian judgment was sustained on the same ground of reciprocity. Ritchie _v._ McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895). _See also_ Ingenohl _v._ Olsen, 273 U.S. 541 (1927), where a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was reversed for refusal to enforce a judgment of the Supreme Court of the British colony of Hongkong, which was rendered "after a fair trial by a court having jurisdiction of the parties." In 1897 Foreign Relations of the United States 7-8, will be found a three-cornered correspondence between the State Department, the Austro-Hungarian Legation, and the Governor of Pennsylvania, in which the last named asserts that "under the laws of Pennsylvania the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in Croatia would be respected to the extent of permitting such judgment to be sued upon in the courts of Pennsylvania." Stowell, _op. cit. supra_ note I, at 254-255. Another instance of international cooperation in the judicial field is furnished by letters rogatory. "When letters rogatory are addressed from any court of a foreign country to any district court of the United States, a commissioner of such district court designated by said court to make the examination of the witnesses mentioned in said letters, shall have power to compel the witnesses to appear and depose in the same manner as witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify in courts," 28 U.S.C.A., _supra_ note II, Sec. 653. Some of the States have similar laws. _See_ 2 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906) 108-109.

[132] David K. Watson, The Constitution of the United States, vol. II, 1206 (1910).

[133] The Federalist No. 42.

[134] 16 Wall. 36 (1873).

[135] Ibid. 75.

[136] Scott _v._ Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).

[137] Ibid. 518, 527-529.

[138] 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).

[139] 135 U.S. 492 (1890).

[140] Slaughter-House Case, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8408 (1870); Chambers _v._ Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907); Whitfield _v._ Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).

[141] 16 Wall. 36 (1873).

[142] Ibid. 77.

[143] Bradwell _v._ Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 138 (1873). _See also_ Cole _v._ Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890).

[144] Blake _v._ McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 246 (1898); Travis _v._ Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).

[145] La Tourette _v._ McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Douglas _v._ New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); _cf._ Maxwell _v._ Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).

[146] United States _v._ Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1883). _See also_ Baldwin _v._ Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887).

[147] United States _v._ Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).

[148] Scott _v._ Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857)

[149] Ibid. 403-411.

[150] Ibid. 572-590.

[151] 13 Pet. 519 (1939).

[152] Ibid. 586.

[153] 8 Wall. 168 (1869).

[154] Ibid. 181.

[155] Crutcher _v._ Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891). _See also_ pp. 193-198, 1049-1056.

[156] Hemphill _v._ Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928).

[157] 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,230, 546, 550 (1823).

[158] Ibid. 551-522.

[159] Ibid. 552.

[160] Corfield _v._ Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3230, 546, 552 (1823).

[161] Ibid. 552.

[162] 94 U.S. 391 (1877).

[163] 161 U.S. 519 (1896).

[164] 209 U.S. 349 (1908).

[165] 334 U.S. 385 (1948).

[166] Ibid. 403. In Mullaney _v._ Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) an Alaska statute providing for the licensing of commercial fishermen in territorial waters and levying a license fee of $50.00 on nonresident and only $5.00 on resident fishermen was held void under Art. IV, Sec. 2 on the authority of Toomer _v._ Witsell, cited above.

[167] 172 U.S. 239 (1898).

[168] Ibid. 256.

[169] La Tourette _v._ McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).

[170] Doherty and Co. _v._ Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).

[171] Hess _v._ Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).

[172] Ferry _v._ Spokane P. & S.R. Co., 258 U.S. 314 (1922), followed in Ferry _v._ Corbett, 258 U.S. 609 (1922).

[173] Conner _v._ Elliott, 18 How. 591, 593 (1856).

[174] Blake _v._ McClung, 172 U.S. 230, 248 (1898).

[175] Williams _v._ Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 184 (1878).

[176] Chambers _v._ Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); McKnett _v._ St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934); Miles _v._ Illinois C.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 704 (1942).

[177] Canadian N.R. Co. _v._ Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920).

[178] Ibid. 563.

[179] Chemung Canal Bank _v._ Lowery, 93 U.S. 72, 76 (1876).

[180] Douglas _v._ New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).

[181] Chambers _v._ Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907).

[182] 12 Wall. 418, 424 (1871). _See also_ Downham _v._ Alexandria, 10 Wall. 173, 175 (1870).

[183] Chalker _v._ Birmingham & M.W.R. Co., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).

[184] 252 U.S. 60 (1920).

[185] Ibid. 62-64. _See also_ Shaffer _v._ Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).

[186] 252 U.S. 60, 79-80 (1920).

[187] Williams _v._ Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).

[188] Haavik _v._ Alaska Packers' Asso., 263 U.S. 510 (1924).

[189] Travelers' Ins. Co. _v._ Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364, 371 (1902).

[190] Maxwell _v._ Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).

[191] Kirtland _v._ Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 499 (1879). _Cf._ Colgate _v._ Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) in which discriminatory taxation of bank deposits outside the State owned by a citizen of the State was held to infringe a privilege of national citizenship, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision in Colgate _v._ Harvey was overruled in Madden _v._ Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940).

[192] 1 Stat. 302 (1793).

[193] Roberts _v._ Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94 (1885). _See also_ Innes _v._ Tobin, 240 U.S. 127 (1916). Said Justice Story: "... the natural, if not the necessary conclusion is, that the national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution"; [and again] "... it has, on various occasions, exercised powers which were necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly given, and duties expressly enjoined thereby." Prigg _v._ Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 616, 618-619 (1842).

[194] Taylor _v._ Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 371 (1873).

[195] 24 How. 66 (1861); _Cf._ Prigg _v._ Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 612 (1842).

[196] 24 How. 66, 107 (1861).

[197] 48 Stat. 782 (1934).

[198] Roberts _v._ Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885). _See also_ Strassheim _v._ Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); Appleyard _v._ Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 (1906); Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 650 (1885).

[199] Drew _v._ Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 439 (1914).

[200] Innes _v._ Tobin, 240 U.S. 127 (1916).

[201] Bassing _v._ Cady, 208 U.S. 386 (1908).

[202] Hyatt _v._ New York ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903).

[203] Kentucky _v._ Dennison, 24 How. 66, 103 (1861).

[204] Taylor _v._ Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 375 (1873).

[205] Kentucky _v._ Dennison, 24 How. 66, 104 (1861); Pierce _v._ Creecy, 210 U.S. 387 (1908). _See also_ Marbles _v._ Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); Strassheim _v._ Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); Re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 325 (1905).

[206] Munsey _v._ Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905); Pettibone _v._ Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906).

[207] Drew _v._ Thaw, 235 U.S. 432 (1914).

[208] Pettibone _v._ Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 216 (1906).

[209] Biddinger _v._ Police Comr., 245 U.S. 128 (1917). _See also_ Rodman _v._ Pothier, 264 U.S. 399 (1924).

[210] Hyatt _v._ New York ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903). _See also_ South Carolina _v._ Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1933).

[211] Munsey _v._ Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 375 (1905).

[212] Ker _v._ Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Mahon _v._ Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 707, 712, 714 (1888).

[213] Cook _v._ Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 193 (1892); Pettibone _v._ Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 215 (1906).

[214] Lascelles _v._ Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 543 (1893).

[215] United States _v._ Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886).

[216] Prigg _v._ Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 612 (1842).

[217] 1 Stat. 302 (1793).

[218] Jones _v._ Van Zandt, 5 How. 215, 229 (1847); Ableman _v._ Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859).

[219] Prigg _v._ Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 625 (1842).

[220] Moore _v._ Illinois, 14 How. 13, 17 (1853).

[221] Escanaba & L.M. Transp. Co. _v._ Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883).

[222] Madison, Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution, 89 (Hunt's ed., 1908).

[223] Ibid. 274.

[224] Ibid. 275.

[225] Pollard _v._ Hagan, 3 How. 212, 221 (1845).

[226] 2 Stat. 701, 703 (1812).

[227] Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court in United States _v._ Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 634 (1892); 9 Stat. 108.

[228] Permoli _v._ New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (1845); McCabe _v._ Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Illinois Central R. Co. _v._ Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892); Knight _v._ United Land Asso., 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Weber _v._ State Harbor Comrs., 18 Wall. 57, 65 (1873).

[229] Coyle _v._ Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).

[230] Ibid. 567.

[231] United States _v._ Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950); Stearns _v._ Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900).

[232] Pollard _v._ Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845); McCabe _v._ Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).

[233] Van Brocklin _v._ Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 167 (1886).

[234] Wilson _v._ Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946).

[235] Permoli _v._ New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (1845); Sands _v._ Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U.S. 288, 296 (1887); _see also_ Withers _v._ Buckley, 20 How. 84, 92 (1858); Willamette Iron Bridge Co. _v._ Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 9 (1888); Cincinnati _v._ Louisville & N.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390 (1912); Huse _v._ Glover, 119 U.S. 543,(1886).

[236] Draper _v._ United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) following United States _v._ McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).

[237] Dick _v._ United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908); Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912).

[238] United States _v._ Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1914).

[239] Boyd _v._ Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 170 (1892).

[240] Baker _v._ Morton, 12 Wall. 150, 153 (1871).

[241] Freeborn _v._ Smith, 2 Wall. 160 (1865).

[242] John _v._ Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913).

[243] Hunt _v._ Palao, 4 How. 589 (1846). _Cf._ Benner _v._ Porter, 9 How. 235, 246 (1850).

[244] 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900).

[245] How. 212, 223 (1845). _See also_ Martin _v._ Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842).

[246] United States _v._ California, 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947); United States _v._ Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).

[247] 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950).

[248] Brown _v._ Grant, 116 U.S. 207, 212 (1886).

[249] Shively _v._ Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894). _See also_ Joy _v._ St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906).

[250] United States _v._ Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378 (1905); Seufert Bros. Co. _v._ United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919). A fishing right granted by treaty to Indians does not necessarily preclude the application to Indians of State game laws regulating the time and manner of taking fish. Kennedy _v._ Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916). But it has been held to be violated by the exaction of a license fee which is both regulatory and revenue-producing. Tulee _v._ Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).

[251] Ward _v._ Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510, 514 (1896).

[252] 14 Pet. 526 (1840).

[253] Ibid. 533, 538.

[254] Ashwander _v._ Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 335-340 (1936). _See also_ Alabama Power Co. _v._ Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).

[255] United States _v._ Fitzgerald, 15 Pet. 407, 521 (1841). _See also_ California _v._ Deseret Water, Oil & Irrig. Co., 243 U.S. 415 (1917); Utah Power & Light Co. _v._ United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).

[256] Sioux Tribe _v._ United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942); United States _v._ Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915).

[257] Gibson _v._ Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 99 (1872); _see also_ Irvine _v._ Marshall, 20 How. 558 (1858); Emblem _v._ Lincoln Land Co., 184 U.S. 660, 664 (1902).

[258] Bagnell _v._ Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, 450 (1839). _See also_ Field _v._ Seabury, 19 How. 323, 332 (1857).

[259] Tameling _v._ United States Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 663 (1877). _See also_ United States _v._ Maxwell Land-Grant and R. Co., 121 U.S. 325, 366 (1887).

[260] Ruddy _v._ Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918).

[261] Light _v._ United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911). _See also_ Hutchings _v._ Low, 15 Wall. 77 (1873).

[262] Camfield _v._ United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897). _See also_ Jourdan _v._ Barrett, 4 How. 169 (1846); United States _v._ Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).

[263] United States _v._ McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).

[264] United States _v._ San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).

[265] Van Brocklin _v._ Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886); _cf._ Wilson _v._ Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946).

[266] Gibson _v._ Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, 99 (1872). _See also_ Irvine _v._ Marshall, 20 How. 558 (1858); Emblem _v._ Lincoln Land Co., 184 U.S. 660, 664 (1902).

[267] Wilcox _v._ Jackson ex dem. M'Connel, 13 Pet. 498, 517 (1839).

[268] Oklahoma _v._ Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 595 (1922).

[269] United States _v._ Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 28 (1935).

[270] Simms _v._ Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899). _See also_ United States _v._ McMillan, 165 U.S. 504, 510 (1897); El Paso & N.E.R. Co. _v._ Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87 (1909); First Nat. Bank _v._ Yankton County, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880).

[271] Binns _v._ United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491 (1904). _See also_ Sere _v._ Pitot, 6 Cr. 332, 336 (1810); Murphy _v._ Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885).

[272] Walker _v._ New Mexico & S.P.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 604 (1897); Simms _v._ Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 163 (1899); Wagoner _v._ Evans, 170 U.S. 588, 591 (1898).

[273] 24 Stat. 170 (1886).

[274] Downes _v._ Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 271 (1901). _See also_ Interstate Commerce Commission _v._ United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912); Church of Jesus Christ of L.D.S. _v._ United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890).

[275] Dorr _v._ United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904). _See also_ Balzac _v._ Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).

[276] Rassmussen _v._ United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).

[277] Hawaii _v._ Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); R.M.C. Littler, The Governance of Hawaii, Chap. III (1929).

[278] American Ins. Co. _v._ Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 546 (1828). _See also_ Romeu _v._ Todd, 206 U.S. 358, 368 (1907); United States _v._ McMillan, 165 U.S. 504, 510 (1897); McAllister _v._ United States, 141 U.S. 174, 180 (1891); The "City of Panama" _v._ Phelps, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1880); Reynolds _v._ United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1879); Hornbuckle _v._ Toombs, 18 Wall. 648, 655 (1874); Clinton _v._ Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 447 (1872).

[279] American Ins. Co. _v._ Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 545 (1828).

[280] 7 How. 1 (1849).

[281] Ibid. 42. _See also_ Ohio ex rel. Bryant _v._ Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930); Mountain Timber Co. _v._ Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917).

[282] 7 Wall. 700, 729 (1869).

[283] Pacific States Teleph. & Teleg. Co. _v._ Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan _v._ Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Ohio ex rel. Davis _v._ Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).

[284] Ohio ex rel. Bryant _v._ Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930); O'Neill _v._ Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Highland Farms Dairy Inc. _v._ Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Forsyth _v._ Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897).

[285] Taylor _v._ Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900). _See also_ Marshall _v._ Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1914).

[286] Minor _v._ Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 175 (1875).

[287] 7 How. 1 (1849).

[288] 1 Stat. 424 (1795).

[289] 7 How. 1, 43 (1849).

[290] 158 U.S. 564 (1895).

[291] Ibid. 582.

[292] On the decline in observance of the formalities required by the provision both before and during World War I, _see_ Corwin, The President, Office and Powers (3d ed., 1948), 164-166.

ARTICLE V

MODE OF AMENDMENT

Page
Amendment of the Constitution 711
Scope of the amending power 711
Procedure of adoption 712
Submission of amendment 712
Ratification 712
Authentication and proclamation 713
Judicial review under article V 714

MODE OF AMENDMENT

Article V

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Amendment of the Constitution

SCOPE OF AMENDING POWER

When this Article was before the Constitutional Convention, a motion to insert a provision that "no State shall without its consent be affected in its internal policy" was made and rejected.[1] A further attempt to impose a substantive limitation on the amending power was made in 1861, when Congress submitted to the States a proposal to bar any future amendments which would authorize Congress to "interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, * * *."[2] Three States ratified this article before the outbreak of the Civil War made it academic.[3] Many years later the validity of both the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments was challenged because of their content. The arguments against the former took a wide range. Counsel urged that the power of amendment is limited to the correction of errors in the framing of the Constitution; that it does not comprehend the adoption of additional or supplementary provisions. They contended further that ordinary legislation cannot be embodied in a constitutional amendment and that Congress cannot constitutionally propose any amendment which involves the exercise or relinquishment of the sovereign powers of a State.[4] The Nineteenth Amendment was attacked on the narrower ground that a State which had not ratified the amendment would be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate because its representatives in that body would be persons not of its choosing, i.e., persons chosen by voters whom the State itself had not authorized to vote for Senators.[5] Brushing aside these arguments as unworthy of serious attention, the Supreme Court held both amendments valid.

PROCEDURE OF ADOPTION

Submission of Amendment

When Madison submitted to the House of Representatives the proposals from which the Bill of Rights evolved, he contemplated that they should be incorporated in the text of the original instrument.[6] Instead the House decided to propose them as supplementary.[7] It ignored a suggestion that the two Houses should first resolve that amendments are necessary before considering specific proposals.[8] In the National Prohibition Cases[9] the Supreme Court ruled that in proposing an amendment the two Houses of Congress thereby indicated that they deemed it necessary. That same case also established the proposition that the vote required to propose an amendment was a vote of two thirds of the members present--assuming the presence of a quorum--and not a vote of two thirds of the entire membership present and absent.[10] The approval of the President is not necessary for a proposed amendment.[11]

Ratification