Chapter XXXV: History of Scottish Philosophy――Carmichael――Hutcheson

IN the closing chapter of the third volume an outline of the history of European philosophy in the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth was given, as a preliminary to the history of Scottish philosophy. It was shown that although this speculative movement had arisen and assumed importance in the seventeenth century, it was not felt in Scotland in its philosophical form till during the century following. This movement, with its scrutinising spirit, was partly a result of the great religious revolution of the sixteenth century, with which, in its religious and political consequences, Scotland was deeply affected. On the continent the earlier efforts of the movement were somewhat halting, wavering, and doubtful; but at last the human mind launched into the regions of speculation and scientific investigation with vigour and freedom, and on the scientific side attained a marked degree of success. The sources whence Scottish philosophy drew the materials which were not original to itself, may be indicated thus:――1. The mental philosophy of Greece, especially the ethics and metaphysics of Aristotle, chiefly by Hutcheson, and the later development of Hamilton. 2. The mental philosophy of France, slightly marked in Stewart, to a greater degree in Brown, and also partly in Hamilton. 3. English philosophy, mostly from Locke’s _Essay on the Understanding_ and Berkeley’s writings, notably in Hume, Reid, and Stewart; in a less degree in Brown and Hamilton. 4. German philosophy, almost restricted to Hamilton, at least till quite recent times. Such is a very general indication of the various sources to which Scottish philosophy was partly indebted for its materials; but, except in the cases of Hume and Hamilton, they are not particularly marked.

This history of Scottish philosophy will present a brief account of the origin of the school. The subsequent chapters will treat the views and speculations of Hume, Adam Smith, Reid, Ferguson, Stewart, Brown, Mackintosh, Hamilton, Ferrier, and others. It has not been deemed advisable to discuss the writings of living philosophers. As the main aim is historic exposition in relation to the progress of civilisation, the relative importance of the many subjects which come within the scope of the work, has determined the method and the limits of their treatment.

In the early part of the eighteenth century mental philosophy was at a low ebb in Scotland. As stated in the last volume, the old method of teaching in the Universities was continued in some of them till past the middle of the century; although the College of Edinburgh, in 1708, adopted in the Arts Faculty the specialised method of instruction――a distinct branch of study was assigned to each professor. It appears that before 1741, Stevenson, the professor of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, used an abridgment of Locke’s _Essay on the Human Understanding_ as one of his text-books.

In the University of Glasgow, the regents were restricted to the teaching of special subjects in 1727; and in that year Gershom Carmichael was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy. It is reported that he was a successful teacher; but he died in 1729. He was the author of a short treatise on Logic, which reached a second edition in 1722; and in 1720 published an edition of Puffendorff’s treatise, _De Officio Hominis et Civis_, for the use of students, to which he wrote notes and supplements. Hutcheson said that Carmichael’s notes were of more value than the text. Carmichael’s latest work, _Synopsis Theologiæ Naturalis_, appeared in 1729, shortly before his death. In his effort to prove the existence and perfections of God, he showed considerable discrimination and reasoning power; he considered the arguments of Descartes and Clarke as unsatisfactory, and insisted that the existence of God should be proved on _a posteriori_ arguments.¹

¹ Sir William Hamilton in a note to Reid’s _Works_, says
――“Carmichael was Hutcheson’s immediate predecessor in the
chair of moral philosophy, and may be regarded, on good
grounds, as the real founder of Scottish philosophy.”
――Volume I., page 30.

Francis Hutcheson, who has usually been considered the founder of the Scottish School of mental philosophy, was a native of the north of Ireland, but originally of Scotch descent.¹ He was educated at the University of Glasgow, where he studied for six years, and enjoyed the instruction of Carmichael, who was then acting as a regent. On his return to Ireland, he was ♦licensed to preach among a dissenting body. But he soon left this profession, and opened a school in Dublin, where he taught the higher branches of education with much success for about eight years. Having become known by his writings, he was elected professor of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow in 1729――an office which he held until his death, in the fifty-third year of his age.

¹ Born in 1694, died in 1747. He was descended from an Ayrshire
family.

♦ “licenced” replaced with “licensed” for consistency

As a professor of moral philosophy, he was very successful. He entered on his task with the ardour of a man of keen sensibilities and all the glow of genius, and worked hard. Hence his class soon became large, and he was enabled to exercise a wide influence; in short, he was himself animated with a genuine love of knowledge, of liberty, and of virtue; and thus he contributed much to diffuse a taste for the higher literature in Scotland. He lectured on five days in the week――on natural religion, morals, jurisprudence, and government; and, besides, he lectured other three days of the week on some of the best Greek and Latin writers, explaining their moral views, and also their style. Further, on the Sunday evenings, he delivered a course of lectures on the truth and evidence of Christianity; which is said to have been attended by larger auditories than any of his other courses of lectures; indeed, his Sunday lectures were attended by all the different classes of students.¹

¹ Leechman’s “Account of Hutcheson’s Life and Writings,”
prefixed to Hutcheson’s _Moral Philosophy_, pages 26‒37;
see also Rev. Alexander Carlyle’s _Autobiography_. Carlyle
says――“I attended Hutcheson’s class this year (1743) with
great satisfaction and improvement. He was a good-looking
man, of an engaging countenance. He delivered his lectures
without notes, walking backwards and forwards in the area of
his room. As his elocution was good and his voice and manner
pleasing, he raised the attention of his hearers at all
times; and when the subject led him to explain and enforce
the moral virtues and duties, he displayed a fervent and
persuasive eloquence which was irresistible.”
――_Autobiography_, page 70.

Hutcheson’s writings are these:――1. _An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue_, 1725; 2. _An Essay on the Passions and Affections_, 1728; 3. _Metaphysical Synopsis_, 1742; 4. _Logical Compendium_, a short but useful treatise; 5. his _System of Moral Philosophy_, which was published by his son in 1755, from the original manuscript. This last work presented a complete view of his system, and consists of three Books――the first of which treats on the constitution of human nature; the second presents a deduction of the more special laws and duties of life, previous to civil government; and the third treats on civil polity or government.

Although it is chiefly as a moralist that he attained distinction in the history of philosophy, his psychology was in advance of his time, and on some points it is still worth attention. He distinguished sensation from perception; and stated that the common division of the external senses into five classes is imperfect; he made many ingenious and just remarks on the origin and character of our ideas of beauty; and his view of the formation of acquired desires is natural and reasonable.

As a moralist, Hutcheson insists much on disinterested affections and a distinct moral faculty as essential constituents of human nature. He explains the objects which the moral sense approves, as those having “a tendency to the happiness of others, and the general perfection of the mind possessing them.” His definition of the moral sense or faculty itself is to this effect:――It is a power of which anyone by close attention and reflection may convince himself, being “a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our senses or by reasoning.... It may be a constant, settled determination in the soul itself, as much as our power of judging and reasoning.” He maintained that reason is only a subordinate factor in our ultimate determination both of will and perception. “The ultimate end is settled by some sense and some determination of will; by some sense we enjoy happiness, and self-love determines to it without reasoning. Reason can only direct to the means, or compare two ends previously constituted by some other immediate powers.... This moral sense from its very nature appears to be designed for regulating and controlling all our powers. This dignity and commanding nature we are immediately conscious of, as we are conscious of the power itself. Nor can such matters of immediate feeling be otherwise proved but by appeals to our own hearts.... We immediately discern moral good to be superior in kind and dignity to all others which are perceived by the other perceptive powers.... By this sense the heart can not only approve itself in sacrificing every other gratification to moral goodness, but have the highest self-enjoyment and approbation of its own disposition in doing so, which plainly shows this moral sense to be naturally destined to command all the other powers.”¹

¹ _System of Moral Philosophy_, Book I., chapter 1, sections
1, 5, 6, and chapter 4 throughout.

Still, he explicitly argues that this moral sense, like all our other faculties, needs to be cultivated and improved, and adduces very obvious illustrations――that special culture improves our taste, as more accurate knowledge and reflection aid us in forming sound judgments.

Hutcheson treated happiness at great length, and with much elegance and fine feeling. He placed our supreme happiness in the exercise of the highest virtue and the gratification of our widest affections. He sums up the subject thus:――“It is plain our supreme and complete happiness, according to the universal doctrine of the wisest men in all ages, must consist in the complete exercise of those nobler virtues, especially that entire resignation to God, and of all the inferior virtues which do not conflict with the superior, and in the enjoyment of such external prosperity as we can, consistently with virtue, obtain.

“A just estimation of the value of life, and of the several sorts of evil we are exposed to, must be equally necessary. If moral evils and some sympathetic sufferings are worse than any external ones, and can make life shameful and miserable amidst all the affluence of other things, as we have shown above; if at best life is but an uncertain possession we must soon lose, we shall see something that is more to be dreaded than death, and many just reasons why it may on certain occasions be our interest to incur the danger of it.... Many are discouraged from a virtuous culture of their minds for the reception of all virtues by a rash prejudice. We are dazzled with the conspicuous glories of some great successful actors in higher stations; we can allow such virtues to be the noblest enjoyments, but they are placed so high that few have access to them, Nay, persons in the highest positions often despair when their power is not absolute.

“To arm the soul against prejudice, we should remember that the reality and the perfection of virtue, and the inward satisfaction of it too, to a calm mind, depends not on external success, but upon the inward temper of the soul. Persisting under these doubts about the success of glory in the public offices of virtue, or, if we are excluded from them, in all the lower private offices――in a constant sweetness of deportment in obscurity, and a constant resignation to the Supreme Mind――embracing cheerfully the lot appointed for us, repressing every envious notion and every repining thought against providence, resolving to go steadfastly on in the path pointed out to us by God and nature, till our mortal part fall down to that earth whence it sprung――must appear rather more noble and heroic to an All-seeing Eye, and to the judgment of every wise man, than the more glittering virtues of a prosperous fortune.

“When we despair of glory, and even of executing all the good we intend, it is a sublime exercise to the soul to persist in acting the rational and social part as it can; discharging its duty well, and committing the rest to God. Who can tell what greater good might be attainable if all good men exerted their powers even under great uncertainties, and great dangers of misrepresentation and obloquy? Or how much worse should all matters proceed, if all good men desponded and grew remiss under such apprehensions? If virtue appears more glorious by surmounting external dangers and obstacles, is not its glory equally increased by surmounting these inward discouragements, and persisting without the aids of glory or applause, conquering even the ingratitude of those it serves, satisfied with the silent testimony of our hearts and the hope of divine approbation? Thus, the most heroic excellence, and its consequent happiness and enjoyment, may be attained under the worst circumstances of fortune; nor is any station of life excluded from the enjoyment of the supreme.”¹

¹ _System of Moral Philosophy_, Book I., chapter 2.

In the above passages there is evidence, not only of Christian sentiment and resignation to the Supreme Mind, but also of classic culture; the very spirit of the noble and heroic sages of ancient Greece and Rome breathes in them.

Hutcheson placed the object of moral approbation in general benevolence. The calm kind of affections are more approved than the passions; and the calm desire of private good, though not approved as virtue, is far from being condemned as vice; and none of the truly natural appetites and passions when restrained within proper limits are of themselves condemned as evil, although they are not referred by the agent to any public interest. But the disposition which is most excellent, and naturally attains the highest moral approbation, “is the calm, stable, universal goodwill to all, or the most extensive benevolence. This seems the most distinct notion we can form of the moral excellence of the Deity.” The love of moral excellence itself is a very high object of approbation, when by reflection we find it in ourselves or observe it in others.¹

¹ Book I., chapter 4, sections 7, 10.

Although Hutcheson coincided with Shaftesbury touching disinterested affections, he is more distinct than his predecessor; and his theory of the moral faculty is better developed. In short, his ethical ideas were higher than Shaftesbury’s, while his grasp of mind and analytic powers were also much greater.

Touching the relation of morality to religion, he stated that the highest exercise of the moral faculty and the highest happiness are found in the recognition and worship of God.

In the second book of his _System of Moral Philosophy_, Hutcheson treats at length on the subjects of natural rights, society, the foundation of private property, laws, and contracts; and the third book treats of government, embracing domestic and civil rights. But in these parts of his system, his conclusions are often founded on speculative and imaginary grounds. As an example of his method, his view of the establishment of government may be cited:――Civil power is most naturally founded by these three different acts of the whole people ――(1) an agreement or contract of each one with all the rest, that they will unite into one society or body, to be governed in all their common interests by one council; (2) a decree or designation made by the whole of the people, of the form or plan of power, and of the persons to be entrusted with it; (3) a mutual agreement or contract between the governors thus constituted and the people, the former obliging themselves to a faithful administration of the powers vested in them for the common interest, and the latter obliging themselves to obedience.¹

¹ Book III., chapter 5, section 2.

This is merely a statement of the famous _Contract Theory of the Origin of Government_, and substantially the same as enunciated by Hobbes, Locke, and others. Although Hutcheson’s general views of government are more sober and liberal than Hobbes’, yet both start from the same unhistorical and imaginary basis. He maintained the doctrine that all states have in themselves the causes of dissolution and death.¹

¹ “States themselves have within them the seeds of death
and destruction; what in the temerity, imprudence, or
superstition of the first contrivers; what in the selfish
ambition or other meaner passions of the governors and their
subjects, jarring with each other and among themselves;
what in the opposition of those seeming interests which
such persons pursue; what in the weakness and inconstancy
of human virtue; and in the proneness of men to luxury and
present pleasure, without attention to the consequences.
These seeds, along with external force and jarring national
interests, have always occasioned the dissolution and death
of every political body, and will occasion it as certainly
as the internal weakness of the animal body and external
causes will at last bring it to its final period. Good men
indeed study, by all the art they are masters of, to ward
off and delay these ♦catastrophes as long as they can, from
their friends or their country; such kind of offices are
the most honourable and delightful employment they can have
while they live. But he must little think of the order of
nature who sees not that all our efforts will be defeated at
last, whether for the preservation of individuals or of the
political body.”――Book III., chapter 11.

♦ “catastrophies” replaced with “catastrophes”

In conclusion, according to Hutcheson, the ethical standard is identical with the moral faculty. His general views obtained in the first instance a pretty wide circulation from his own teaching in the University of Glasgow, and his ethical writings have exercised a considerable influence since his death. His first course of lectures in Glasgow was delivered in 1730, and we shall find that both Hume and Adam Smith were somewhat indebted to Hutcheson. He agreed with his contemporary Butler in holding that the moral faculty is an essential part of human nature.