Chapter XVI: Section IV: Gerard, Beattie, Campbell, Alison

Dr. Alexander Gerard was appointed professor of divinity in Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1759, an office which he held for about twelve years. He is the author of an ingenious _Essay on Taste_ which appeared in 1758, and a second edition in 1764. The essay is divided into three parts, and he handled the subject in the following order:――In the first part, Taste is resolved into its simple principles, which consist of the sense or taste of novelty; of the sense of sublimity; of beauty; of imitation; of harmony; of oddity and ridicule; and of virtue. In the second part, the formation of taste by the union and improvement of its simple principles is explained. In the third part, the province and importance of taste is discussed.¹

¹ To the second edition of this essay were annexed three other
essays on the same subject, by Voltaire, d’Alembert, and
Montesquieu.

He began by remarking that “a fine taste is neither wholly the gift of nature, nor wholly the effect of art. It derives its origin from certain powers natural to the mind; but these powers cannot attain their full perfection, unless they be assisted by proper culture. Taste consists chiefly in the improvement of those principles which are commonly called the powers of imagination, and are considered by modern philosophers as internal or reflex senses,¹ supplying us with finer and more delicate perceptions than any which can be properly referred to our external organs.” And he reduces these reflex senses in the way indicated in the preceding paragraph.

¹ The reference to modern philosophers was to Hutcheson’s
_Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue_ and his _Essay on the
Passions_; and Dr. Gerard’s _Treatise on Taste_ is only one
of the many proofs of the influence of Hutcheson’s writings
in Scotland.

The subject is well worked out, and his style is exceedingly clear, simple, and easy. He observes that the internal senses are assisted by a delicacy of feeling or passion; and, applying this to the pathetic, he says――“Since, therefore, the pathetic is a quality of so great moment in works of taste, a man who is destitute of sensibility of heart must be a very imperfect judge of them. He is a stranger to those feelings which are of the greatest importance to direct his judgment. If a person possessed all the internal senses in perfection, without delicacy of passion, he could estimate the principal works of genius, only by their inferior qualities.... Delicacy of passion may interest a person so much, that he cannot for some time examine a performance with critical exactness; but it gives him exquisite delight in the meantime, and enables him to pass a just sentence at last.”¹

¹ Page 83.

Dr. James Beattie¹ was elected professor of moral philosophy in Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1760. In 1770, his _Essay on the Immutability of Truth_ appeared, which was intended to be a refutation of Hume’s scepticism. It is rather a vehement than reasonable production, and strong in passionate assertion, but weak in argument; yet it was popular for a time, and passed through several editions.

¹ Born in 1735; died in 1803.

He is the author of a work entitled _Elements of Moral Science_, which was published in 1790‒93, in two volumes; which are mainly a summary of the lectures on moral philosophy delivered to his class in Marischal College. The work consists of two main divisions:――1. Psychology, under which is included cognition; the active powers――will, feelings, sentiments and passions; natural theology――the existence and attributes of God; and the nature and immortality of the soul. 2. Ethics or moral philosophy, which is followed by economics――the family and domestic relations; then politics; and finally rhetoric and logic. Such is an indication of Beattie’s scheme of philosophy, and the method of his system of instruction.

But his treatment of logic is limited to remarks on evidence; rhetoric, however, is treated at length through one hundred and ninety-three pages, and perhaps this is one of the most interesting parts of his work. Beattie’s style is orderly, his sentences are generally simple, and his line of thought easily followed; but it has not much animation or ornament, and lacks the qualities of strength and incisiveness.

Dr. George Campbell,¹ a minister of the Church of Scotland, became Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1759. His first work, _A Dissertation on Miracles_, was published in 1762. It consists of two parts, and presented an examination of the principles advanced by Hume in his _Essay on Miracles_. In the first part, Campbell argues that miracles can be proved by testimony, “and religious miracles are not less capable of this evidence than others;” in the second part, he maintains that “the miracles on which the belief of Christianity is founded are sufficiently attested.” These chief points are well and ably worked out. His mode of controversy is candid and generous; and his examination of Hume’s principle, for there was but one principle at the root of it――namely, experience――is carried on throughout with admirable fairness and sagacity.

¹ Born in 1719; died in 1796.

Campbell insists that Hume’s chief argument from experience is founded on a false hypothesis; as it supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is not the case. “Testimony, it is acknowledged, is a weaker evidence than sense. But it has been already evinced that its evidence for particular facts is infinitely stronger than that which the general conclusions from experience can afford us. Testimony holds directly of memory and sense. Whatever is duly attested must be remembered by the witness; whatever is duly remembered must once have been perceived. But nothing similar takes place with regard to experience, nor can testimony, with any appearance of meaning, be said to hold of it.

“Thus I have shown, as I proposed, that the author’s reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis.――It supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false.――It supposes, by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknowledged principles of ♦human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evidently shows that they have not.――It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidence, which, in the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which it is impossible, by any explication, to render of real use.”¹

¹ Part I., section 1, pages 63, 64 (1797).

♦ “hnman” replaced with “human”

Thus far, it seems Campbell did sway the balance somewhat against Hume’s chief principle of estimating evidence. But his dissertation itself must be read, for a full appreciation of the accurate, masterly, and analytic power which it displays. Shortly after it appeared, it was translated into the French, Dutch, and German languages.

Campbell’s _Philosophy of Rhetoric_, which appeared in 1776, is a valuable and ingenious work. It was universally recognised as the greatest work on the subject which had appeared since the time of Aristotle. His style is clear and terse, and always manifests a comprehensive grasp of the subject.

The Rev. Archibald Alison¹ was a son of an Edinburgh magistrate, and educated at Glasgow and Oxford, and finally settled down in Edinburgh as an Episcopal minister. He was the father of the well-known historian, Sir Archibald Alison, and also of William P. Alison, an eminent physician and professor in the University of Edinburgh. He himself is the author of _An Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste_, which appeared in 1790, and has passed through six or seven editions.

¹ Born in 1757; died 1839.

It is a pretty elaborate production, and its leading characteristic is an attempt to explain the æsthetic emotions and feelings on the principles of association. It is a work of real merit and value, and has had a considerable influence on subsequent theories of taste and beauty.