Chapter XXXIX: Hamilton――Ferrier――and Robertson (2)

A vigorous power of imagination――of representing objects, is indispensable in every department of thought; but there are many kinds and degrees of imagination. There is the imagination of abstraction, representing to us certain phases of an object to the exclusion of others; the imagination of reason, which represents a principle in connection with its consequences, the effect in dependence on its cause; the imagination of feeling, which represents the accessory images allied to some particular sentiment, which thus confer on it greater compass and intensity; the imagination of the passions, and so on.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 263‒266. Hamilton holds, that the organs
which imagination employs in the representation of sensible
objects, are the organs of sense themselves, on which the
original impressions were made, and through which they were
originally perceived. This is the same as Hobbes’ view.

He discusses the elaborative faculty――comparison, or faculty of relations, at length, and in an exceedingly interesting style, under the heads of classification, abstraction, generalisation, judgment, and reasoning. A class of subjects which form the transition from psychology to logic, from the analysis and laws of the mental phenomena, “to the science of thought as thought.” In connection with these, he discusses, in his usual historic form, the interesting subjects of nominalism and conceptionalism, and also the curious question as to “the primum cognitum,” the first cognition, as it was called in the schools. The latter question assumes this character, Does language originate with general names or proper names? Did mankind in the evolution of language, and do children in their first applications of it, begin with general terms or with particular words; or, in other words, does knowledge begin with general notions, or particular notions? There are many illustrious philosophers on each side of the question. Hamilton himself held that our knowledge neither begins with the general nor the particular, but with the vague and confused, and thence proceeds by degrees to evolve both the general and the particular.¹

¹ Volume II., page 279.

The reduction of complicated processes to greater simplicity, or to a single principle, was a marked feature of Hamilton’s intellect; and the following statement touching comparison is an instance in point. “In opposition to the views hitherto promulgated in regard to comparison, I will show that this faculty is at work in every, the simplest, act of mind; and that from the primary affirmation of existence in an original act of consciousness to the judgment contained in the conclusion of an act of reasoning, every operation is only an evolution of the same elementary process,――that there is a difference in the complexity, none in the nature of the act; in short, that the various products of analysis and synthesis, of abstraction and generalisation, are all merely the results of comparison, and that the operations of conception or simple apprehension, of judgment, and reasoning, are all only acts of comparison, in various applications and degrees.”¹

¹ Volume II., pages 319, 335.

He proceeds to develop and to prove this view of comparison. The process of classification is simply an act of comparison, determined by the necessities of the mind――the nature and limits of its powers. In classifying, the mind greatly depends on language for its success, on general names, general and abstract terms, which are used to denote complex and abstract notions. Abstraction, or rather exclusive attention to a particular object or quality of an object, is evidently the work of comparison; it is a process quite familiar to the most uncultured minds. Generalisation is dependent on abstraction, and supposes it; but abstraction does not involve generalisation. It is the process through which we obtain general notions and ideas; thus the points in which a number of objects or things agree, having been discovered, we arrange them by these common points of agreement or similarity, into classes; and from the lowest class ascending step by step till we reach at the highest class.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 279‒283, 293‒295.

Under the last of the special faculties of cognition――the regulative faculty, which is not, properly speaking, an active faculty――he included those primary notions of intelligence or common sense, variously designated as the fundamental principles of intelligence, laws of thought, necessary cognitions, primary data of consciousness. “There are cognitions in the mind which are not contingent,――which are necessary, which we cannot but think, which thought supposes as its fundamental condition. These cognitions, therefore, are not mere generalisations from experience. But if not derived from experience, they must be native to the mind.... These native――these necessary cognitions, are the laws by which the mind is governed in its operations, and which afford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge. These necessary laws, or primary conditions of intelligence, are phenomena of a similar character; and we must, therefore, generalise them or collect them into a class; and on the power possessed by the mind of manifesting these phenomena, we may bestow the name of the Regulative Faculty.”

It should be observed that the primary and necessary notions of the mind here announced as the laws which afford the conditions of knowledge, are embodied by Hamilton in his philosophy of the conditioned. He recognised a considerable number of primary or ultimate notions and principles; but did not pretend to give an exhaustive and complete enumeration of such notions. What he really did, was to argue that there was such a class of notions and principles, and actually employed a certain number of them in the construction of his psychology, his philosophy of the conditioned, and his logic.

With regard to the essential characteristics for discriminating the principles of common sense――the original data of consciousness, he says: “These characters, I think, may be reduced to four: (1) Their incomprehensibility, (2) their simplicity, (3) their necessity and absolute universality, (4) their comparative evidence and certainty.”¹

¹ Hamilton’s _Reid_, page 754.

What has just been stated, taken in connection with what was said before, of the immediate facts of consciousness, and the intuitive character of perception, will be sufficient to indicate Hamilton’s view of the primary and ultimate notions of the mind. Thus far I have signalised three of the fundamental and distinctive principles of his philosophy. But to complete the exposition of his psychology, it is requisite to notice briefly his treatment of the feelings.

These, the second great class of mental phenomena, in his classification, is not exhaustively treated; but so far it is satisfactory, and exceedingly interesting. He devoted six lectures to the feelings, one of which is occupied with an historical account of the theories of pleasure and pain. His classification and division of the feelings may be indicated thus:

I. First, sensations――the five senses and organic sensations. II. The sentiments and internal feelings: first, the contemplative, subdivided into (1) those of the subsidiary faculties, including those of self-consciousness, and (2) those of imagination, order, symmetry, unity in variety; (3) those of the elaborative faculty, wit, the pleasures of truth and science, and the gratification of adapting means to ends; (4) beauty and sublimity springing from the conjoint energy of the imagination and the understanding. III. The practical feelings relate to (1) self-preservation――hunger and thirst, loathing, sorrow, bodily pain, anxiety, etc.; (2) the enjoyment of our existence; (3) the preservation of the species; (4) the tendency towards development and perfection; and (5) moral law.

He delivered a theory of pleasure and pain, and applied it to explain this general mental phenomena; in other words, he considered the feelings as causes――causes of pleasure and pain; and he then considered them as effects, or products of the action of our different powers. The scope of his standpoint is thus stated by himself:――

“What are the general conditions which determine the existence of pain; for pleasure and pain are the phenomena which constitute the essential attribute of true feeling, under all its manifestations?... I shall, first of all, state the abstract theory of pleasure and pain, in other words, enounce the fundamental law by which these phenomena are governed, in all their manifestations.” Under the ninth and last head of his theory, the following is enounced:――“Pleasure is thus the result of certain harmonious relations――of certain agreements; pain, on the contrary, the effect of certain unharmonious relations――of certain disagreements. The pleasurable is, therefore, not inappropriately called the agreeable; the painful, the disagreeable; and in conformity to this doctrine, pleasure and pain, may be thus defined:――Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious. Pain a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power.” As already stated, he illustrates the application of his theory in the explanation of pleasure and pain at some length,¹ with keen insight and rare breadth of view. In the two last lectures, he treats the feelings as effects――as products of the action of our different powers; and thus considered, his exposition is often very happy.

¹ Volume II., pages 434‒440, _et seq._

Hamilton’s Philosophy of the Conditioned is simply an attempt to systematise the conditions of the thinkable, in the form of an Alphabet of human thought. In its fundamental conception it is restrictive and conservative. Probably he was as well informed and aware of the many aberrations of human thought and speculation as any man that ever lived; and he was fully cognisant of the systems and speculations of those philosophers who had pretended to walk through the dark mountains of eternity and infinity without stumbling, and to return with positive knowledge. Knowing this, he was, therefore, well entitled to make an effort to lay down the conditions and limits of human thought; and thus he has done great service to real philosophy, to science, and mankind.

He grounded his own theory of the Conditioned upon the recognised laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and the law of relativity. Thus when he speaks of the Conditioned it is in special reference to relativity; and by existence conditioned is meant existence thought under relation. Relation may be understood to contain all the categories and forms of positive thought. We should not, however, think it as a law of things, but simply as a law of thought; for we find that there are contradictory opposites, one of which, by the rule of Excluded Middle, must be true, but neither of which can be positively thought, as possible. Thinking, under this condition, is synthetic. The condition of Relativity is brought to bear under three principal relations: the first springs from the subject of knowledge――the mind thinking, the relation of knowledge; the second and third from the object of knowledge――the thing thought about, the relations of Existence.

1. The relations of knowledge are those arising from the reciprocal dependence of the subject and of the object of thought, self and not-self――subjective and objective. Everything that comes into consciousness is thought by us, either as belonging to the mental self exclusively, or as belonging to the not-self exclusively, or as belonging partly to both.

2. The relations of Existence arising from the object of knowledge are twofold; as the relation is either Intrinsic or Extrinsic. As the relation of Existence is Intrinsic, it is that of Substance and Quality. It may be called qualitative. But, as the relation of Existence is Extrinsic, it is threefold; and as formed by three kinds of quantity, it may be called quantitative. It is realised in or by: (1) Protensive quantity, or time; (2) Extensive quantity, Extension or Space; (3) Intensive quantity, or degree.

3. Time, or protensive quantity, called also Duration, is a necessary condition of thought; and it may be considered both in itself and in the things which it contains.

Considered in itself, Time is positively inconceivable, if we attempt to construe it in thought; on the one side, as absolutely commencing or absolutely terminating, or on the other, as infinite or eternal. It is positively conceivable, if conceived as an indefinite past, present, or future; and as an indeterminate mean between the two unthinkable extremes of an absolute least and an infinite divisibility: for thus it is relative.

Things in Time are either coinclusive or coexclusive. Things coinclusive, if of the same time, are identical, apparently and in thought; if of different times, as causes and effect, they appear as different, but are thought as identical. Things coexclusive are mutually either prior and posterior, or contemporaneous.

The impossibility we experience of thinking as non-existent, non-existent, consequently, in time, aught which we have conceived as existent,――this impossibility affords the principle of Causality, which will be subsequently explained.

Time applies to both Substance and Quantity; and includes the other quantities, Space and Degree.

4. Space, extension or extensive quantity, is likewise a necessary condition of thought; and may also be considered, both in itself and in the things which it contains.

Considered in itself, Space is positively inconceivable: as a whole, either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded; as a part, either infinitely divisible, or absolutely indivisible. Space is positively conceivable, as a mean between these extremes; that is, we can think it either as an indefinite whole, or as an indefinite part. For thus it is relative.¹ So much touching the foundation of the philosophy of the Conditioned.

¹ _Discussions_, pages 577‒582.

He enounced the Law of the Conditioned thus:――“All positive thought lies between two extremes, neither of which we can conceive as possible, and yet, as mutually contradictory, the one or the other must necessarily be true.”¹ We have already seen that we cannot think past time as beginning to be; on the other hand, we cannot conceive it going backwards without limit――eternity baffles our imagination. But time either had a beginning or it had not. So of space, we are unable to conceive space as finite or bounded; we are equally powerless to realise in thought an idea of infinite space. “You may launch out in thought beyond the solar walk, you may traverse in fancy over the universe of matter, and rise from sphere to sphere in the regions of empty space, until imagination sinks exhausted;――with all this what have you done? You have never got beyond the finite, you have attained at best only to the indefinite, and the indefinite, however expanded, is still always the finite.... The infinite is infinitely incomprehensible.” Thus the conceivable or the thinkable “lies always between two inconceivable extremes, as illustrated by every other relation of thought.”²

¹ _Discussions_, page 591; also Reid’s _Works_, page 911.
Hamilton states the Law of the Conditioned repeatedly in his
different writings; and some of its positions are stated at
greatest length in the second volume of his _Lectures_.

² _Discussions_, page 591; _Lectures_, Volume II., pages
366‒372.

The chief applications of the Law of the Conditioned are to the principles of substance and causality: and taking substance first, which he has not treated with much detail. We cannot think a quality existing entirely in or of itself. We are constrained to think it as inhering in some substance; but this substance is only conceived by us the unapparent――the inconceivable correlative of certain appearing qualities. If we attempt to think it positively, we only think it by transforming it into a quality or bundle of qualities, which again we refer to an unknown substance, now supposed for their incognisable basis. Thus, everything may be conceived as the quality, or as the substance of something else; but absolute substance and absolute quality are both inconceivable.¹

¹ _Discussions_, page 580.

The phenomenon of causality is the Law of the Conditioned applied to a thing thought as existing in time. We cannot know, nor think a thing, except under the attribute of existence, and existing in time; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it absolutely to commence. This imposes on us the judgment of causality. An object is given to us by our perceptive faculties, as given, we cannot but think it existent, and existent in time; but to say this, is to say, that we are unable to think it non-existent,――to annihilate it in thought, and this we cannot do; for once thinking it to exist, we cannot think it not to exist. This will be admitted of the present, but probably denied of the past and future, under the belief that we can think creation or annihilation. Matter or objects may change their forms in innumerable ways; but we cannot conceive that there can be an atom absolutely added to, or taken away from, existence as a whole. Let us try it:――

“We are able to conceive the creation of a world; this indeed as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination at its very crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after the universe flashed into material reality, into manifest being, that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its author together, than the moment before there subsisted in the Deity alone? This we are unable to imagine. And what is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no real annihilation, no absolute sinking of something into nothing. But, as creation is cogitable by us, only as a putting forth of divine power, so is annihilation by us only conceivable as a withdrawal of that same power.... In short, it is impossible for the human mind to think what it thinks existent, lapsing into non-existence, either in time past or in time future.”¹

¹ _Discussions_, pages 591‒593; _Lectures_, Volume II. pages
400‒406.

He thinks that his theory of causality is preferable to others, because to explain the phenomenon of the causal judgment, it postulates no new or express principle, not even a positive power; while it shows that the phenomenon is only one of a class, it assigns as their common cause, only a negative impotence. He also thinks that it affords a philosophical defence of the freedom of the will. He points out the inconsistencies and contradictions of his predecessors; but he admits that speculatively we are unable to understand how moral liberty is possible in man. But practically, our consciousness of the moral law gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act, if we are accountable for our actions. That the philosophy of the Conditioned has a real foundation in the human mind, appears to be evident, when considered in its relation to the universe. The necessities of its capacities and faculties of knowledge, their limits and imperfection, as well as the actual position in which man finds himself in the universe of nature, all plainly indicate that his powers of knowledge are anything rather than absolute and infinite. This much may be averred; still, it is open to anyone to question, if Hamilton’s applications of his own theory were in all points the most legitimate. I will now proceed to his logic.

He viewed Logic as a formal science, and divided it into pure and modified. In his lectures on this subject, he proceeds on a definite and interesting style of exposition; he first states the leading doctrines in separate paragraphs, and then in a running commentary explains and illustrates them. The first paragraph is this:――“A system of logical instruction consists of two parts――(1) Of an introduction to the science; (2) of a body of doctrine constituting the science itself.” These he discussed in their order: the introduction to logic should afford answers to the five following questions: What is logic? what is its value? what are its divisions? what is its history? what are the best books on the subject? These questions are treated in a concise and animated style; and the answer to the first one is given in his definition of logic, which is this:――“Logic is the Science of Thought as thought.” But he says that this definition cannot be understood without a clear exposition of its several parts, which he proceeds to present.

What he meant by “the laws of thought as thought,” is thus explained: the term thought is used in two significations, in a wider, and in a narrower and stricter sense, and it is with thought in the latter sense――thought proper, that logic is concerned. “All thought is a comparison, a recognition of similarity or difference; a conjunction or disjunction, in other words, a synthesis or analysis of its objects.... But thought simply is still too undetermined; the proper object of logic is something still more definite; it is not thought in general, but thought considered merely as thought, of which this science takes cognisance.... What is meant by thought as thought? It is the recognition of a thing as coming under a concept; in other words, the marking an object by an attribute or attributes previously known as common to sundry objects, and to which we have accordingly given a general name. Logic is properly conversant with the form of thought to the exclusion of the matter.

“But the limitation of the object――matter of logic to the form of thought, is not yet enough to determine its province from that of other mental sciences; for psychology is, in like manner, among other mental phenomena, conversant about the phenomena of formal thought. A still further limitation is, therefore, requisite; and this is given in saying, that logic is the science not merely of thought as thought, but the laws of thought as thought, ... or the science of the formal laws of thought, or the science of the laws of the form of thought; these being three various expressions of the same thing.”¹

¹ _Lectures_, Volume III., pages 3‒26.

He gives further explanations, of which this is one:――“Abstract logic considers the laws of thought as potentially applicable to the objects of all arts and sciences, but as not actually applicable to those of any; concrete logic considers these laws in their actual and immediate application to the object-matter of this or that particular art or science. The former of these is one, and alone belongs to philosophy, whereas the latter is as multiform as the arts and sciences to which it is relative.”¹

¹ Volume III., page 53.

Abstract logic is divided into pure and modified; and the former he divides into two parts: (1) The Doctrine of Elements, which are either laws or products; and (2) Methodology, or the doctrine of Method――the means of thinking well. Modified logic falls into three parts: (1) The first treats of the nature of Truth and Error, and of the higher laws for their discrimination; (2) the second of the Impediments to thinking, with the means of their removal; (3) the third of the Aids of thinking.

In passing, I may remark that Hamilton’s treatment of modified logic, although not exhaustive, is exceedingly clear and valuable so far as it goes. This part of his lectures should be attentively read by those who wish to cultivate their minds, or to study the laws of criticism and historical evidence.

The following is his tabular view of the divisions of logic:

{ { i. Doctrine { 1. Noetic: Nomology.
{ { of Elements. {
{ { { 2. Dianoetic: { a. Conception.
{ { { Dynamic. { b. Judgment.
{ I. Pure. { { { c. Reasoning.
{ {
{ { ii. { Clear thinking: 1. Definition.
General { { Method- { Distinct thinking: 2. Division.
or { { ology. { Connected thinking: 3. Probation.
Abstract {
Logic. { { i. Truth and Error: Certainty and Illusion.
{ {
{ { ii. Impediments { 1. The Mind.
{ { to thinking, { 2. The Body.
{ II. Mod- { with { 3. External circumstances.
{ ified. {
{ { iii. Aids or { 1. The Acquisition
{ { Subsidiaries { of Knowledge.
{ { to thinking, { 2. The Communication
{ { through { of Knowledge.

After stating the fundamental laws of thought, he proceeds to the doctrine of Elements――to the exposition of concepts, judgment, and reasoning. Five lectures are given to an explication of concepts or notions: (1) Their general character is described; (2) then their special objective relation, in regard to quantity; (3) their subjective relation, in regard to quality; (4) their imperfection; (5) their reciprocal relation, in regard to the quality of extension ――subordination and co-ordination; (6) their reciprocal relations in regard to the quantity of comprehension, which are all explained with remarkable clearness.¹

¹ Volume III., page 137, _et seq._

He expounds his doctrine of judgments in two lectures, and it is in connection with the quantification of the predicate of propositions or judgments that Sir William claims to have made improvements on formal logic.¹ I am aware that his claim, even on this point, has been disputed since his death, but my limits will not permit me to enter into a discussion of the subject; yet I think that the varied materials printed in the second volume of his _Lectures on Logic_ afford the means of placing it in its true light. Hamilton there notices many partial anticipations of this doctrine.

¹ In a footnote to his article on Logic, he says:――“It will be
seen from the tenor of the text, that, by the year 1833, I
had become aware of the error in the doctrine of Aristotle
and the logicians, which maintains that the predicate in
affirmative propositions could only be formally quantified
as particular, nay, that Aristotle, in his practice in the
inductive syllogism, virtually contradicts the speculative
precept which he, over and over, expressly enounces for
syllogism in general.... The doctrine of a thorough-going
quantification of the predicate, with its results, I have,
however, publicly taught since the year 1840, at the latest.”
――_Discussions_, page 162.

As already stated, his projected work on logic was never finished. He introduced, however, several modifications in syllogistic theory, and signalised various distinctions, tending toward more simplicity, and constructed an ingenious scheme of logical notation.¹ There can be no doubt that he spent a considerable part of his life in prosecuting inquiries connected with logic.

¹ See _Discussions_, pages 614‒620, and the appendices to the
second volume of his _Lectures on Logic_. His final scheme
of logical notation is inserted at the end of this volume.
I can only notice a few points:――

1. “That we can only rationally deal with what we already
understand, determines the simple logical postulate――to
state explicitly what is thought implicitly.

2. “All mediate inference is one――that incorrectly called
Categorical; for the Conjunctive and Disjunctive forms of
hypothetical reasoning are reducible to immediate inferences.

“Mentally one, the Categorical Syllogism, according to its
order of enouncement, is either Analytic (A) or Synthetic
(B). Analytic, if what is inappropriately styled the
conclusion be expressed first, and what are inappropriately
styled the premisses be then stated as its reasons.
Synthetic, if the premisses precede, and, as it were,
effectuate the conclusion. These general forms of syllogism
can with ease be distinguished by a competent notation;
and every special variety in the one has its corresponding
variety in the other.

“Taking the syllogism under the latter form (B), which,
though perhaps less natural, has been alone cultivated by
logicians, and to which therefore, exclusively all logical
nomenclature is relative,――the syllogism is again divided
into the non-figured (a) and figured (b).”――_Discussions_,
pages 614‒616.

3. “Quantity and quality combined constitute the only real
discrimination of syllogistic mood. Syllogistic figure
vanishes, with its perplexing apparatus of special rules;
and even the general laws of syllogism proper are reduced
to a single compendious canon....

“We have shown that a judgment or proposition is only
a comparison resulting in a congruence, an equation, or
non-equation of two notions in the quantity of extension;
and that these compared notions stand to each other, as the
one subject and the other predicate, as both the subject,
or as both the predicate of the judgment. If this be true,
the transposition of the terms of a proposition sinks into
a very easy and a very simple process; whilst the whole
doctrine of logical conversion is superseded as operose and
imperfect, as useless and erroneous.”――_Lectures_, Volume
IV., Appendix, pages 275‒276.

He also wrote very effectively on Education, chiefly on the higher branches, and in reference to University reform. His views were comprehensive, enlightened, and liberal, far in advance of his time. But occasionally he was extremely outspoken and severe on the prevailing abuses and shortcomings of the Universities. He did not limit himself to Scotland, but wrote powerfully on the state of the English Universities, with especial reference to Oxford. He argued that dissenters ought to be admitted into the public Universities. Altogether, his articles on education contain a body of varied, curious, interesting, and valuable information.

To sum up, I have presented a brief account of Hamilton’s psychology and philosophy; its fundamental principles have been explained. He taught the doctrine that man, in so far as he is a mean for the glory of God, must be an end to himself, inasmuch as his perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his activity. He seemed to value the pursuit of truth more than its possession, or rather that its pursuit afforded man more pleasure than its possession, which is quite true. He embraced the doctrine of intuitive perception――natural realism; and drew up a scheme of all the possible theories of perception. He maintained that the human mind possesses native notions, necessary cognitions, which afford the requisite conditions of knowledge. His own vast and varied knowledge of recorded thought and philosophical systems afforded him innumerable instances of the aberrations of thought, contradictions, and vain presumptions; and so he constructed his Philosophy of the Conditioned, which indicates the limits of human thought. He took a strictly formal and limited view of the province of logic; and upon this conception his exposition of the science is clear and masterly. He also endeavoured to simplify the common syllogistic system, and introduced several useful improvements.

His conception of method, his skill and care in arrangement, and in brief and clear summaries, are admirable; while his powers of exposition were of the highest order. The style of his lectures is lighted with a fire and glow of thought and a genuine human feeling rarely found in philosophical literature.

Hamilton attained a European reputation in his own lifetime, chiefly through his articles in the _Edinburgh Review_, and his teaching in the University of Edinburgh. Since his death his writings have had a considerable influence. He had of course a certain number of direct followers, very few of whom are now alive. But several other schools of thought are indebted to Hamilton; and perhaps Herbert Spencer is more indebted to him for the fundamental conceptions and principles of his system of philosophy than to any other philosopher. This of course, mainly refers to Spencer’s _First Principles_, but partly also to his _Psychology_. On the other hand, Hamilton’s philosophy has been subjected to severe criticism from various quarters.¹ I can, however, only mention the fact, and must refrain from entering into any discussion.

¹ J. S. Mill’s _Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy_ is
well known, and it is an able and acute work; but I affirm
that Mill did not, in all respects, present a fair and
just estimate of Hamilton. He did not take any account
of the circumstances in which Hamilton was placed; and so
when reckoning up the little that Hamilton had produced
in philosophy in comparison to what he might have done,
and began to seek for reasons to explain this, it never
occurred to him to assign any weight to these circumstances.
Unfortunately Hamilton’s father died when he was an infant;
Mill’s father not only lived to bring him up, but also to
educate him personally, and to cram him with all kinds of
knowledge and science, so that long ere he reached the years
of manhood, he was a prodigy; then, when he came of age,
his father got him into a position in the Indian Office,
where he had only to work a few hours a day. Thus his father
did everything for him that could be done. Mill never knew
the difficulties of finding a post for himself, or the
humiliation of going about seeking employment. Hamilton had
to face a very different career, as he had to struggle hard
for existence, and fight many a battle ere he attained a
position.

But Mill himself avows that he wrote his _Examination of
Hamilton’s Philosophy_ for the express purpose of reducing
his too great reputation, and explicitly declares in his own
_Autobiography_ that it had fully effected its original aim!

Dr. J. F. Ferrier was an intimate friend of Sir William Hamilton, and at one time he was professor of civil history in the University of Edinburgh; but in 1846 he was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy in the University of St. Andrews, which he held until his death in 1864. When the chair of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh became vacant on the death of Hamilton, Ferrier entered the field as a candidate for it, but he was not successful. However, in connection with this he published a pamphlet in 1856, entitled _Scottish Philosophy, the Old and the New_, the new being his own. In this pamphlet he complained against the town council of Edinburgh for allowing themselves to be influenced by certain outside parties in favour of candidates who professed to teach the old Scottish philosophy in preference to the new. It seems that he was greatly disappointed when he failed to obtain the Edinburgh chair.¹

¹ In this pamphlet he replied to criticisms on his own
metaphysics, and says:――“It has been asserted that my
philosophy is of German origin and complexion. A broader
fabrication than that never dropped from human lips or
dribbled from the point of pen. My philosophy is Scottish
to the very core; it is national in every fibre and
articulation of its frame. It is a natural growth of old
Scotland’s soil, and has drunk in no nourishment from any
other land.” (page 12).

Ferrier’s _Institutes of Metaphysics, the Theory of Knowing and Being_, appeared in 1854. It consists of an introduction, partly historical and partly critical, and three sections, the first of which treats of the theory of knowledge, the second of the theory of ignorance, and the third of the theory of being. He adopted the demonstrative method of exposition, states his propositions and counter propositions in a series, and reasons them out in a precise and rigorous form. His thinking is acute, definite, vigorous, and easily followed. In short, his style is unusually clear, simple, and concise.

Ferrier’s first proposition is headed, “The primary law or condition of knowledge,” and it is worded thus:――“Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.” This is a very primitive truth, and he tells us over and over that it is the keystone of his system. “Looked at in itself, or as an isolated truth, our first proposition is of no importance; but viewed as the foundation of the whole system, and as the single staple on which all the truths subsequently to be advanced depend, it cannot be too strongly insisted on or too fully elucidated. Everything hinges on the stability which can be given to this proposition, on the acceptance it may meet with. If it falls, the system entirely fails; if it stands, the system entirely succeeds. It is to be hoped that the reader will not be stopped or discouraged by the apparent truism which it involves. He may think that if the main truth which this philosophy has to tell him is that all his cognitions and perceptions are known by him to be his own, he will have very little to thank it for. Let him go on and see what follows.”

He remarks that if this first proposition is not very clearly confirmed by experience, it is not refuted by experience; for by no effort can anyone ever apprehend a thing to the entire exclusion of himself. A man cannot leave himself altogether out of his account and proceed to the consideration of the surrounding objects. But experience can only establish it as a limited matter of fact, and this is insufficient for the purposes of his subsequent demonstrations. “It is reason alone that can give to this proposition the certainty and extension which are required to render it a sure foundation for all that is to follow.... It must be established as a necessary truth of reason――as a law binding on intelligence universally――as a conception the opposite of which is a contradiction and an absurdity.

“Strictly speaking, the proposition cannot be demonstrated, because, being itself the absolute starting point, it cannot be deduced from any antecedent data; but it may be explained in such a way as to leave no doubt as to its axiomatic character. It claims all the stringency of a geometrical axiom, and its claims, it is conceived, are irresistible.... A man has knowledge, and is cognisant of perceptions only when he brings them home to himself. If he were not aware that they were his, he could not be aware of them at all. Can I know without knowing that it is I who know? No, truly. But if a man in knowing anything, must always know that he knows it, he must always be self-conscious.”

But this had been fully recognised before by the Scottish School. For there is nothing more explicit in Hamilton, than that consciousness is the primary, the necessary, and the universal condition of knowing, and of knowledge. It would be unfair, however, to adduce this as detracting in any way from the candour and the merit of Ferrier’s work; and I shall quote a part of what he says regarding anticipations of his own first proposition:――

“But passing over all intermediate approximations, we find anticipations of this first principle in the writings of the philosophers of Germany. It has no claim to novelty, however novel may be the uses to which these institutes apply it. Kant had glimpses of the truth; but his remarks are confused in the extreme, in regard to what he calls the analytic and synthetic of consciousness. This is one of the few places in his works from which no meaning can be extracted. In his hands the principle answered no purpose at all. It died in the act of being born, and was buried under a mass of subordinate considerations before it can be said to have even breathed. Fichte got hold of it, and lost it; got hold of it, and lost it again, through a series of eight or ten different publications, in which the truth slips through his fingers when it seems just on the point of being turned to some account. Schelling promised magnificent operations in the heyday of his youth, on a basis very similar to that laid down in this first proposition. But the world has been waiting for the fulfilment of these promises――for the fruits of that exuberant blossom――during a period of more than fifty years.... Hegel――but who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel? Not any of his countrymen, not any foreigner――seldom even himself. With peaks, here and there, more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe. Hegel had better not be meddled with just at present. It is impossible to say to what extent this proposition coincides, or does not coincide, with his opinions; for whatever truth there may be in Hegel, it is certain that his meaning cannot be wrung from him by any amount of mere reading, any more than the whisky which is in bread――so at least we have been informed――can be extracted by squeezing the loaf into a tumbler. He requires to be distilled, as all philosophers do, more or less, but Hegel to an extent which is unparalleled.”¹

¹ Pages 82‒84, 90‒92. Since the above passage was written,
a considerable change has occurred in Scotland with regard
to Hegel. Dr. Stirling’s efforts to explain Hegel are well
known; and Dr. Seth, now Professor of Logic and Metaphysics
in the University of Edinburgh, after criticising the
principle of the Relativity of Knowledge, and generally
commenting unfavourably on Hamilton’s principles, speaks
of Hegel thus:――

“So far as I can see, Hegel alone of all metaphysicians
lifts us completely clear of Relativism. He alone has gone
systematically to work to lay bare the abstractions on
which it depends; and in so doing he has to a great extent
transformed the character of metaphysics, and so rendered
unjust many of the epithets which popular phraseology still
associates with the science.

“We have Hegel’s own word for it that the method is nothing,
unless we bring the whole nature of thought with us....
The Method sums up a thought which may almost be said
to constitute Hegel’s philosophy, and one which, in my
opinion, gives him a signal advantage over all his modern
predecessors.

“The thought in question is primarily a logical principle;
a fact which may partly explain why Hegel made his logic
the centre of his system. It is the principle to which we
have already referred so often, the systematic recognition
of the fact that thought is founded upon difference;
whereas identity had hitherto been the god of the logician’s
idolatry.... I do believe that here we have a principle, not
of arbitrary invention, but drawn from the heart of things,
from the nature of the self-conscious spirit itself....
The essential point in a systematic philosophy is simply
the possession of some outline or scheme, by reference to
which each conception may be judged and receive its place
and meaning. In self-consciousness, Hegel seems to hold
a position, from which, in the nature of the case, it is
impossible to dislodge him.”――Seth’s _Lectures on Scottish
Philosophy_, pages 167, 171, 174, ♦183, 195‒197.

♦ “83” replaced with “183”

His theory of Ignorance seems the most effective section of his _Institutes_. Its principle is that ignorance is a defect, privation, or shortcoming; and that there can be an ignorance only of that which can be known. But Ferrier’s _Institutes_, and also several dissertations published after his death, are almost entirely occupied in clearing the ground of prevailing contradictions and inconsistencies of thought. His own positive views consist of a few remarks and brief indications.

George Croom Robertson was born in Aberdeen on the 10th of March, 1842. He was educated at the Grammar School there, and at the University of Aberdeen, where, after a very distinguished career, he graduated in 1861 with highest honours in classics and mental philosophy. The same year he gained the Ferguson Scholarship, in these two subjects, one of the great prizes open to all Scottish graduates. Subsequent to this Mr. Robertson pursued his philosophic studies for upwards of two years at Heidelberg, Berlin, Göttingen, and Paris, where he made the acquaintance of Trendeleburg, Du Bois, Reymond, Bona Meyer, Lotze, and other distinguished teachers and thinkers, and profited greatly by their instruction and intercourse. He returned to Aberdeen in 1863, and continued to devote his attention to philosophical study.

Having elaborated a number of valuable and interesting notes from his German studies, he assisted Dr. Bain in the revision and amplification of his work, entitled, _The Senses and the Intellect, the Emotions and the Will_, for a second edition. He also aided Dr. Bain in the ethical part of the excellent manual――_Mental and Moral Science_, and contributed to it the articles on the Neo-Platonists, the Scholastic Ethics, Hobbes, Cumberland, Cudworth, Kant, Cousin, and Jouffroy. In these there is ample evidence of Robertson’s philosophic, critical, and literary powers, scholarship, and research.

In 1864 he was appointed assistant to Professor Geddes in the University of Aberdeen, and held the post for two sessions; he also assisted in teaching the Greek classes. In December, 1866, he was appointed to the Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic in University College, London, and opened his class in January, 1867. He carefully prepared courses of lectures for his classes on Systematic Psychology, Ethical Theory, and Logic――inductive and deductive. He mainly directed his teaching to the elaboration and explication of psychological doctrines, and the history of philosophy. His knowledge of recorded thought, and of the great philosophical systems, ancient and modern, was wide and accurate, while his clear style of stating psychological doctrines and expository powers were remarkable.

For ten years he was Examiner in Philosophy in the University of London. He also acted as Examiner in the University of Aberdeen for two terms. Occasionally he delivered popular lectures at Manchester, Newcastle, and the Royal Institution, London. For several years he gave the philosophical course of lectures to the College of Preceptors. He took an active interest in the business and management of University College, as a member of the Senate, and subsequently as one of the Senate’s Representatives on the Council.

In 1874 Dr. Bain originated a proposal for establishing a Quarterly Journal of Philosophy, and consulted Robertson on the subject. Dr. Bain desired that Professor Robertson should be editor, and after consideration he accepted the editorship. Time, however, was required to obtain the approbation and promise of support from, at least, some of the eminent living writers on philosophy. Accordingly both made efforts by personal interviews and correspondence, and they received sufficient encouragement to make arrangements for the publication. Under the title of _Mind: a Quarterly Journal of Psychology and Philosophy_, the first number appeared in January, 1876. Robertson was editor of _Mind_ for sixteen years, and expended a great amount of thought and labour upon it. Besides his own original articles, and many reviews of works on psychology, ethics, and philosophy, he carefully revised most of the articles contributed by others before they appeared in the pages of _Mind_. This quarterly publication――the first entirely devoted in the English language to the discussions of mental philosophy, has, during the last twenty years, had a considerable influence upon philosophic thought.

Professor Robertson’s health began to fail twelve years before his death. During the sessions from 1883 to 1888 he had several times to employ substitutes for his teaching work in the College. In the later years of his life he suffered much severe pain, which he bore with great patience. He resigned his Chair in the College on the 7th of May, 1892. His wife died on the 29th of May, the same year; and he himself died on the 20th of September following.¹

¹ _Philosophical Remains of George Croom Robertson, with a
Memoir_, 1894. This volume was edited by Dr. Bain and Mr.
T. Whittaker, who had long acted as Robertson’s assistant
in preparing notices for _Mind_.

Owing to weak health in the later part of his life, and his death at the comparatively early age of fifty, his writings are not voluminous. Yet they touch on a considerable variety of subjects of much interest, embracing biography, psychology, and philosophy treated historically and associated with the characteristics of an elevated and candid criticism.

He contributed to the _Dictionary of National Biography_ biographies of George Grote, the historian, and his wife, and two of the historian’s brothers――John and Arthur. His contributions to the ninth edition of the _Encyclopædia Britannica_ extended to eight articles, two of which were historical. One of these dealt with Abelard, the famous lecturer and teacher of the twelfth century, a very able and interesting article. Another article was on the remarkable philosopher, Hobbes, a subject to which he had given much attention, and subsequently treated in a book. The remaining articles were philosophical, and treated on Analogy, Analysis, Analytic Judgments, Autonomy, Association, and Axion. All these are admirable specimens of method, clear thought, polished style, and lucid exposition of difficult mental processes.

At an early stage of his life he intended to write a large work on Hobbes, and to treat the subject on comprehensive historic lines. He rightly formed the conception that Hobbes was an important historic character, as he lived and wrote in one of the stirring and revolutionary periods of the history of the Island. He had made some progress in research and had prepared much material for such a work, but untoward circumstances of health prevented him from realising his original conception. He, however, as mentioned before, contributed an article on Hobbes to the _Encyclopædia_; and in 1886 a volume on Hobbes appeared as one of the series, entitled _Philosophical Classics for English Readers_. It is not written on a large scale, yet it is a compact and excellent treatise. He shows a fine historic insight into the social and political conflicts of the period, with reference to their influence upon Hobbes’s views and opinions. Robertson’s remarkable historic faculty is clearly manifested in this volume. His appreciation and criticism of Hobbes’ works, and his influence on subsequent writers, is marked by thoroughness, candour, and accuracy. The treatise is a model of its kind, and is recognised as the best existing monograph on the subject.

To conclude, the preceding account of Scottish Philosophy covers nearly two centuries. The Scottish Philosophers mainly concentrated their efforts on mental philosophy――the explication of the human mind, psychology, moral and political science. Their works present a body of doctrines and reflective thought which are well worth careful study. For the mind alone constitutes the distinctive glory and dignity of man. Insomuch, that it is only by the culture of the mind and the moral sentiments that mankind can hope to attain a more elevated and higher stage of civilisation.