Chapter XXXIX: Hamilton――Ferrier――and Robertson (1)

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON,¹ the most learned of all the Scottish philosophers, was the son of Dr. William Hamilton, professor of anatomy in the University of Glasgow, a position formerly held by his grandfather, Dr. Thomas Hamilton. Sir William was the lineal representative to the title of Sir Robert Hamilton, the leader of the Covenanting army at Drumclog, and he manifested at least one feature of the spirit of his ancestors――the energy and will to combat when occasion occurred. His father died when he was an infant, but he received an excellent education. He passed through the arts classes at the University of Glasgow, and studied medicine one session at Edinburgh, having intended at first to follow the hereditary profession of the family. But in 1807, having obtained a Snell exhibition, he went to Oxford. There he entered deeply into the study of ancient philosophy, and finally graduated in the highest class. He returned to Scotland in 1811, studied law, and was called to the bar in 1816.

¹ Born in 1788; died in 1856.

In 1820, Hamilton became a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy, vacant by the death of Dr. Brown. The contest for the chair was very keen, and finally lay between Hamilton and John Wilson. But Hamilton was a Whig, Wilson a Tory; and as the appointment turned upon political grounds, the majority of the town council of Edinburgh,――the patrons of the chair, voted for Wilson, who accordingly obtained it. It should be observed, however, that neither of the two gentlemen had up to that time published anything which could be referred to as evidence of their special qualifications for the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.¹

¹ In reality, Wilson was quite out of his element in the chair
of moral philosophy. But “the chair of moral philosophy in a
Scottish university seems to be elastic in its adaptability.
Brown made it a chair of psychology; Ferrier, at St. Andrews,
a chair of metaphysics; Wilson made it a chair of rhetoric
and Belles Letters. It is true that he treated of the
passions, virtues, duties, and so on, but he dealt with them
in the concrete, with illustrations from literature.”――Sir
A. Grant’s _Story of the University of Edinburgh_, Volume
II., pages 345‒346.

The following year Sir William obtained the chair of civil history in the University of Edinburgh, and he entered on his duties with ardour and energy; yet his success was comparatively limited. The salary attached to the chair was only one hundred pounds a year. His wide range of historical knowledge enabled him to handle the subject in a comprehensive and attractive manner, and for some years he had a class of about thirty students. He petitioned the Senatus in 1824 to include his subject in the arts curriculum, but the arts faculty gave him no encouragement. Hamilton then, in 1828, enunciated his views to the Royal Commission, but the commissioners, instead of protecting the chair of history, recommended its abolition. In 1833, when the city became bankrupt, the small salary of the chair ceased to be paid, and Hamilton ceased lecturing.¹

¹ This chair of civil history continued in an anomalous
position, though sometimes held by able men, such as
Professor Ferrier and Cosmo Innes, until 1862, when the
Executive Commission changed the title of the chair to that
of history, and then made the lectures of the professor on
constitutional law and history necessary for a degree in law.

In 1836, Dr. Ritchie resigned the chair of logic and metaphysics, which he had held for a period of twenty-eight years, and four candidates entered the field for the vacant office――namely, Sir William Hamilton, Isaac Taylor, Patrick C. Macdougall, and George Combe, the popular phrenologist. It was seen that the real contest would be between the first two candidates; and after a hard struggle, of which the issue seemed doubtful, when the final decision was taken, out of thirty-two votes Hamilton had eighteen――a majority of four. Although then in his forty-eighth year, he entered on his new task with all the emotion and ardour of youth, and threw his heart and intellect into the work.

With his exact method and lofty ideal of philosophical style, he felt much difficulty in deciding on the character of the course of lectures on philosophy which would meet the wants of the young students, and at the same time do justice to the subject; and, after three months of intense thought and reflection, at the opening of the session he had only a few of his lectures written. Thus it happened that his lectures on metaphysics were composed during the first session which he taught. He often sat up nearly all the preceding night preparing his lecture for the next day, with his loving wife by his side acting as his amanuensis. These lectures being composed in such circumstances, and solely designed for the instruction of his own class, it is not surprising that they may not at all points present a consistent and complete exposition of his philosophical views; still, so far as they go, they may be fairly assumed to contain a reliable statement of his chief doctrines. His lectures on logic were composed during the next session, and under the same pressure as the former course.

Hamilton greatly felt the want of text-books suitable for his purposes, so he resolved to edit an edition of Reid’s works, and projected a new work on logic. It has been affirmed by some that the dedication of his powers to the service of Reid was a great mistake, that he should have built entirely upon his own foundation. Be this as it may, the form of exposition which he selected was in some respects unfortunate. His numerous footnotes to Reid’s works were written as the text was passing through the press in 1837 and 1838, and the supplementary dissertations to the end of D were written and stereotyped in 1841 and 1842.

But, in 1838, a quarrel arose between Hamilton and the town council of Edinburgh about his lectures, which had the effect of preventing him from delivering a separate and more advanced course of lectures on metaphysics.¹ Then his brother died, to whom he was warmly attached. Next came the threatened disruption of the Church of Scotland, which he struggled hard to avert; and in 1844, in the midst of his arduous labour and duties, a severe paralytic stroke almost deprived him of the use of his right side for the rest of his life. Though he partly recovered, and his mental faculties seemed unimpaired, he never regained his former energy and health.²

¹ “It was a loss to the University that Sir W. Hamilton’s
separate class in metaphysics was put a stop to; but this
was due to his own uncompromising temper, as well as to the
somewhat ignorant interference of the town council.”――Sir A.
Grant’s _Story of the University of Edinburgh_, Volume II.,
pages 62‒65. I may add that it was a loss to the nation and
to philosophy.

² Veitch’s _Memoir of Sir W. Hamilton_, pages 266, 270, 278,
_et seq._

So when his edition of Reid’s works was issued in 1846, it still remained incomplete; one of his supplementary dissertations breaking off in the middle of a sentence; and although afterwards added to, it was never completed. The fragmentary materials which his editors collected and published, after his death, form but a small portion of what Hamilton originally intended to present; while only an outline of his projected work on logic ever appeared. All hope of revising his lectures seems to have been relinquished, save by occasional oral interpolations. But he continued to lecture and instruct his classes, though sometimes an assistant read his lectures, when the effort of delivery had become too painful for himself. He expired shortly after the close of the session of 1856, tended in his last moments by his faithful wife, and surrounded by his children.

Hamilton was much beloved by his pupils; and all who called on him for information were kindly treated. Although his temper was warm and sometimes easily roused; on the whole, however, his life was a noble struggle; and, if he occasionally manifested an impatience of ignorant opposition, it was only natural and human. Yet, in one or two of his controversies with opponents of his special doctrines, his vehemence passed the limits of fair discussion.

His writings consist of:――1. Sixteen articles contributed to the _Edinburgh Review_, chiefly on philosophy, education, University reform and methods of teaching, and on literature; the first of these appeared in 1829, and he republished the whole of them in 1852, with large additions. 2. His notes and supplementary dissertations to Reid’s works. 3. His lectures on metaphysics. 4. His lectures on logic. All his writings bristle with quotations and references to the views of previous thinkers; his erudition was vast and varied.

In order to give his views the justice to which they are well entitled, and to mark the gratitude for his memory which I warmly feel,¹ I will indicate the lines on which his philosophy may be justly appreciated and fairly expounded. The first requisite is to understand the purpose of a writer’s works, and in the case of Hamilton, to take special account of the immediate aims which he had in view; guided by these considerations, I will begin the exposition of his system with his lectures on metaphysics――his psychology, then the philosophy of the conditioned, and close with his logic. The fundamental principles are these:――(1) His peculiar view of the end of speculation; (2) his theory of external perception――natural realism; (3) his doctrine of _a priori_ laws or native notions of the mind; (4) his philosophy of the conditioned; (5) his conception of logic, and the peculiarities of his logical system.

¹ I never had the gratification of even seeing Sir W. Hamilton;
yet I may be permitted to state, that the first philosophical
writings which I ever read with interest was his volume of
discussions, which I perused shortly after the date of his
death. His edition of Reid soon after came into my hands;
and his four volumes of lectures, almost immediately after
their publication. And I now gratefully record, that his
writings first roused me to think for myself.

In his introductory lectures he explained to the students the utility of philosophy on its subjective and objective sides; its absolute utility viewed simply in itself, and its value viewed in relation to other sciences. He endeavoured to impress their minds with just ideas of the importance of philosophy, and to clear away all superficial misconceptions of the end and objects of education. He discussed philosophy as means and ends in relation to the culture and happiness of man. While man himself, being in so far a mean for the glory of God, “must be an end unto himself, for it is only in the accomplishment of his own perfection that, as a creature, he can manifest the glory of his Creator.... I say it is manifest that man is by nature necessarily an end to himself――that his perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his activity, to which he tends, and ought to tend, when not diverted from this, his general and native destination, by peculiar and accidental circumstances.” In the realities of social life, however, “each man, instead of being solely an end to himself――instead of being able to subordinate everything to that full and harmonious development of his own faculties, in which his real perfection and his true happiness consists――is, in general, compelled to turn himself into the mean towards the accomplishment of some end, external to himself, and for the benefit of others. So the perfection of man as an end, and the perfection of man as a mean or instrument are not only not the same, but in reality they are generally opposed ... even admitting, therefore, that the study of the mind is of no immediate advantage in preparing the student for many of the subordinate parts in the mechanism of society, its utility cannot on that account be called in question, unless it be asserted that man ‘liveth by bread alone,’ and has no higher destination than that of the calling by which he earns his subsistence.”¹

¹ Volume I., pages 2, 7.

He drew a distinction between the mere possession of truth and intellectual development; by the latter he meant the power acquired through the exercise of the higher faculties of a more varied and vigorous mental activity. This led him to his peculiar view of the end of speculation, and he asks:――“Is truth or is the mental exercise in the pursuit of truth, the superior end? this is perhaps the most curious theoretical, and certainly the most important practical, problem in the whole compass of philosophy. For, according to the solution at which we arrive, must we accord the higher or lower rank to certain great departments of study: and, what is of more importance, the character of its solution, as it determines the aim, regulates from first to last the method which an enlightened science of education must adopt.”

In practical knowledge it is clear that truth is not the ultimate end; as the knowledge of a moral truth, a political, or a religious one, is of value only as it affords the condition of its exercise. But Sir William further held, “that speculative truth is only pursued, and is only held of value, for the sake of intellectual activity.... A truth, once known, falls into comparative insignificance. It is now prized, less on its own account than as opening up new ways to new activity, new suspense, new hopes, new discoveries, new self-gratulation.... Accordingly, the sciences always studied with the keenest interest are those in a state of progress and uncertainty; absolute certainty and absolute completion would be the paralysis of any study....

“But if speculative truth itself be only valuable as a mean of intellectual activity, these studies which determine the faculties to a more vigorous exertion will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, absolutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken them to a less intense, and consequently a less improving, exercise. It is on this ground that I would rest one of the permanent utilities of mental philosophy.” This doctrine is stated in other parts of his writings;¹ and he had sounded the range of its consequences pretty definitely.

¹ Volume I., pages 8‒13. In the _Discussions_ he says:――“We
exist only as we energise; pleasure is the reflex of
unimpeded energy; energy is the mean by which our faculties
are developed; and a higher energy the end of which their
development proposes.... Speculative truth is subordinate
to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured
by the quantity of energy it occasions immediately in its
discovery, mediately through its consequences” (page 39).

In his opening lecture he told his class that the communication of knowledge was a high, but not the highest, aim of instruction; and that he would not merely deliver lectures――“By all the means in my power I shall endeavour to rouse you, gentlemen, to the free and vigorous exercise of your faculties; and shall deem my task accomplished, not by teaching logic and philosophy, but by teaching to reason and philosophise.”¹

¹ Volume I., page 18.

In these introductory lectures he also explained the nature and comprehension of philosophy, its causes, and the disposition with which it ought to be studied. Touching the method of philosophy, Hamilton affirms that there is only one possible method――a combination of analysis and synthesis, and the purity and equilibrium of these two elements constitute its perfection.

Concerning the divisions of the philosophy of the mind, he adopted, from Kant, the threefold division of mental phenomena; and the whole subject is enounced in these three questions:――1. What are the facts or phenomena to be observed? 2. What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? 3. What are the real results, not immediately manifested, which these phenomena warrant us in drawing?

First, we should investigate the facts; second, discover their laws; and third, ascertain by legitimate inference their ultimate results. Thus we obtain three branches of mental science, which he designates as phenomenal psychology, nomological psychology, and ontology. Each of these chief classes of the phenomena of mind has a science, which is conversant about its laws. But there is no general science of the cognitive faculties; and the only one of these faculties, whose laws form the object matter of a separate science, is the understanding, the faculty of relations, of thought proper――logic, the science of the laws of thought, in relation to the end which our cognitive faculties propose, that is the true. To this head might be referred universal grammar――philosophical grammar, or the science conversant with the laws of language as the instrument of thought.

The science of the laws of our capacities of enjoyment, in relation to the end which they propose, that is, the pleasurable, has no precise name in English. It has sometimes been called the philosophy of taste, the theory of the fine arts, the science of the beautiful and sublime; and on the Continent it has been termed Æsthetic; but none of these are quite appropriate.

The nomology of our exertive powers and tendencies constitute practical philosophy; for it is simply the science of the laws which regulate our will and desire, in relation to the end which our conative powers propose, that is, the good. This, as it treats these laws in relation to man as an individual, or in relation to man as a member of society, will fall to be divided into two branches――Ethics and Politics; and these again admit of various sub-divisions――such as jurisprudence and legislation.

Empirical psychology is limited to the facts afforded in consciousness, considered exclusively in themselves. But these may be such as not only to be objects of knowledge in themselves, but may also afford us the grounds of inference to something out of themselves. As effects of a peculiar character, they may enable us to infer the analogous character of their unknown causes; as phenomena of particular qualities, they may warrant us in drawing many conclusions regarding the character of that unknown principle, of that unknown substance, of which they are the manifestations. It is true, that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are not presented to us as phenomena, or as objects of immediate knowledge; still, if the phenomena actually given do inevitably render it requisite, for their rational explanation, then the hypotheses of immortality and of God, we are certainly entitled, from the existence of the former, to infer the reality of the latter. Now, the science which treats of all such inferences of unknown being from its known manifestations, is called ontology, or metaphysics proper.

The following is his tabular view of the distribution of mental philosophy:――

{ Facts,―― { Cognitions.
{ Phenomenology. { Feelings.
{ Empirical { Conative Powers
{ Psychology. { (Will and Desire).
{
{
Mind or { Laws,――Nomology. { Cognitions,――Logic.
Consciousness { Rational { Feelings,――Æsthetic.
affords. { Psychology. { Conative { Moral Philosophy.
{ { powers. { Political Philosophy.
{
{ Results,―― {
{ Ontology. { Being of God.
{ Inferential { Immortality of the Soul, etc.
{ Psychology. {

Hamilton considered this distribution of philosophy as the simplest and most exhaustive; and he specially marked out the branches which belonged to his course of instruction.¹ In his lectures he treats only one of the three main groups――empiric al psychology――and even this he has not treated exhaustively; only cognitions――the cognitive faculties are fully discussed; but one division of the second group is treated in his lectures on logic. Will and desire receive only incidental notice.

¹ Volume I., pages 120‒128. As already mentioned, he originally
intended to deliver a more advanced course, and the following
sentences, bearing on the point, appear in the manuscript
of his seventh lecture:――“The plan which I propose to adopt
in the distribution of the course, or rather courses, is the
following: I shall commence with mental philosophy, strictly
so-called, with the science which is conversant with the
manifestations of mind――phenomenology or psychology. I shall
then proceed to logic, the science which considers the laws
of thought; and finally to ontology, or metaphysics proper,
the philosophy of results. Æsthetic, or the theory of the
pleasurable, I should consider subsequent to logic, and
previously to ontology” (page 128).

A large part of the first volume is occupied with the discussion of Consciousness, which in his system is the primary and fundamental characteristic of mind, and the universal condition of intelligence. He discusses the special conditions of consciousness; its relation to the cognitive faculties; consciousness and attention; the evidence and authority of consciousness; and violations of its authority. Many other interesting questions are discussed, such as the general phenomena of consciousness; whether the mind is always consciously active, or if it is ever unconsciously modified; and an exceedingly interesting lecture on the difficulties and facilities of studying mental science.

While consciousness cannot be logically defined, it may be philosophically analysed. This is effected by observing and holding fast the facts of consciousness, comparing these, and then evolving the universal conditions under which alone an act of consciousness is possible. It is by following this method that we can attain to accurate knowledge of the contents of consciousness.

The nature of the act of consciousness may be shown thus: “When I know, I must know that I know; when I feel, I must know that I feel; when I desire, I must know that I desire. The knowledge, the feeling, the desire, are possible only under the condition of being known by me. For if I did not know that I knew, I would not know; if I did not know that I felt, I would not feel; if I did not know that I desired, I would not desire.... The expressions I know that I know, I know that I feel, I know that I desire, are thus translated by: I am conscious that I know, I am conscious that I feel, I am conscious that I desire. Consciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the mind of its own acts and affections; in other words, the self-affirmation that certain modifications are known by me, and that these modifications are mine. But, on the other hand, consciousness is not to be viewed as anything different from these modifications themselves, but is, in fact, the general condition of their existence within the sphere of intelligence. Though the simplest act of the mind, consciousness thus expresses a relation subsisting between two terms. These terms are, on the one hand, an I or self, as the subject of a certain modification; and, on the other hand, some modification, state, quality, effection or operation belonging to the subject. Consciousness thus in its simplicity necessarily involves three things: (1) a recognising or knowing subject; (2) a recognised or known modification; and (3) a recognition or knowledge by the subject of the modification.”¹

¹ Volume I., pages 189, 190‒193.

He explains and illustrates this fundamental characteristic of mind at great length, and with an analytic power and clearness of statement as yet unmatched in the annals of philosophy: “Every mental phenomena may be called a fact of consciousness. But as we distinguish consciousness from the special faculties, though these are all only modifications of consciousness, only branches of which consciousness is the trunk, so we distinguish the special and derivative phenomena of mind from those that are primary and universal, and to give the latter the name of facts of consciousness, as more eminently worthy of that appellation.... A fact of consciousness in this sense is a simple, and, as we regard it, either an ultimate or a primary datum of intelligence. It obtains also various denominations; sometimes it is called a principle, sometimes a fundamental law of mind, sometimes a transcendental condition of thought, etc.” He insists on its characteristics of ultimate priority and necessity; that, as an ultimate fact, it is also given to us with a belief of its reality. It reveals what it is, but not why or how it is. “To ask how any fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how consciousness itself is possible; and to ask how consciousness is possible, is to ask how an intelligent being like man is possible.... But as we did not create ourselves, and are not even in the secret of our creation, we must take our existence and our knowledge upon trust.”

The result of this inquiry concerning consciousness is――(1) The facts which are given in the act of consciousness itself; and (2) the facts which consciousness does not at once give, but to the reality of which it only bears evidence. As to the first class of facts, no doubt can be or ever has been entertained; it is only the authority of these facts as evidence of something beyond themselves, only thus the second class of facts, which become matter of discussion; it is not the reality of consciousness, but its veracity, that may be questioned.¹

¹ Volume I., pages 269‒276, _et seq._, and _Discussions_,
page 62.

As psychology is only a developed consciousness, a scientific evolution of the facts of which consciousness is the guarantee and revelation; thus the Positive philosopher has a primary presumption in favour of the elements out of which his system is constructed, whilst the sceptical philosopher must be content to argue back to the falsehood of these elements, from the impossibility which the dogmatist may experience in combining them into the harmony of truth. For truth is one, and the end of philosophy is the intuition of unity. He repeated that:――“Philosophy is a systematic evolution of the contents of consciousness by the instrumentality of consciousness; it therefore necessarily supposes in both respects the veracity of consciousness.”¹

¹ _Discussions_, page 85; _Lectures_, Volume I., page 267.

His theory of attention is stated thus:――“The greater the number of objects to which our consciousness is simultaneously extended, the smaller is the interest with which it is able to consider each, and consequently the less vivid and distinct will be the information it obtains of the several objects. Such being the law, it follows, when our interest in any particular object is excited, and when we wish to obtain all the information concerning it in our power, it behoves us to limit our consideration to that object, to the exclusion of others. This is done by an act of volition or desire, which is called attention. But to view attention as a special act of intelligence, and to distinguish it from consciousness is utterly inapt. Consciousness may be compared to a telescope, attention to the pulling out or in of the tubes in accommodating the focus to the object; and we might with equal justice distinguish in the eye the adjustment of the pupil from the general organ of vision, as in the mind distinguish attention from consciousness as a separate faculty. Not, however, that they are to be accounted the same. Attention is consciousness, and something more. It is consciousness voluntarily applied, under its law of limitations, to some determinate object; it is consciousness concentrated.”

Thus, though attention is not a special and separate faculty of mind, it is an interesting and important subject, and he proceeds to consider it in its various relations, as a general phenomena of consciousness. As to the number of objects which the mind can attend to at once, Stewart supposed that we could only attend to one thing at one and the same instant; but Hamilton supposes that consciousness can simultaneously apprehend six objects. Taking this number of objects as the highest which it can embrace at once, the limitation of consciousness to five, four, three, two, or one, will all be acts of attention, differing only in degree.¹

¹ Volume I., pages 231‒239, _et seq._

Hamilton rightly holds, that even an act of comparison or discrimination supposes that we are able to comprehend, in the unity of consciousness, the different objects to be discriminated. Instead, therefore, of consciousness not being competent to cognise two things at once, it is only possible under this condition.

He distinguishes three kinds of attention: (1) a mere vital and irresistible act, such as when we open our eyes, we cannot by an act of will avert our mind from all perception of sight; (2) an act determined by desire, which, though involuntary, may be resisted by the will; (3) and an act determined by a deliberate volition. It is the third kind of attention which is really of importance in thinking.

He again refers to the law of limitation in relation to attention, and then says:――“But whatever be its relation to the special faculties, attention doubles all their efficiency, and affords them a power of which they would otherwise be destitute. It is, in fact, as we are at present constituted, the primary condition of their activity.”¹

¹ Volume I., pages 246‒248, _et seq._ Hamilton gives a
clear and interesting explanation of the difficulties of
commencing real intellectual efforts, the obstacles that
must be overcome before the power of concentrated attention,
of continuous thinking, is acquired.

It may not be quite out of character to state briefly my
own experience on the subject of attention, or the acquired
power of concentration. I admit that Hamilton’s statement
of the difficulties of commencing real intellectual efforts
is quite true, so far as it goes; yet it appears that in
many circumstances, the numerous difficulties which have to
be overcome at the initial stages are greater than what he
represents them to be. In my own case the initial stage was
extremely difficult; the circumstances were unpropitious
to the acquisition of the power of concentrating attention,
as I was almost constantly in the midst of bustle, and
seldom alone. By a prolonged course of persistent efforts,
I gradually acquired a complete power of concentrating my
mind, by an act of will, upon whatever subject I wished
to investigate. This will be understood, when I state that
the whole of this history was written, and the proof sheets
revised, upon the counter of my own small shop, in the midst
of the clattering of a stirring street, and at the same
time attending to customers coming in and out. Thus, though
often interrupted, I mentally work on, unconscious of noise.
The power of attention, of concentration, and of continuous
thinking, essentially depends on the strength of the
acquired command of the will.

Hamilton’s whole account of attention is exceedingly interesting and valuable, and especially what he says of it in its higher degree, as a direct act of the will, consummated in the habit of deliberate concentration of thought. His view of this, the highest exercise of mind, is as true as it is lucidly expressed.

Among the general phenomena of consciousness, he discusses the question whether we are always consciously active? and begins by averring that there is no pure activity or passivity in creation: that all things in the universe of nature are in a state of continual action and counteraction, being always active and passive at once. “God alone must be thought of as a Being active without any mixture of passivity, as His activity is subject to no limitation. But precisely because it is unlimited, it is for us wholly incomprehensible.”

We are never directly conscious of passivity; so far as we are conscious, we are active; but whether there may be a mental activity of which we are unconscious, is another question. He touches upon the phenomena of dreaming, talking during sleep, and somnambulism, with the view of ascertaining whether the mind be at any moment wholly unconscious. He refers, as usual, to the opinions of other philosophers, but also gives his own personal experience, that the mind remains conscious during sleep.¹

¹ Volume I., pages 310‒312, 323‒337.

He also discussed the subject of latent mental modifications. He observes, that the possessions of our mind are not to be measured by its present monetary activities, but by the amount of its acquired habits. Thus one knows a science or a language, not merely when he is making a temporary use of it, but inasmuch as he can apply it when and how he pleases, at the command of his will: and so the greater part of our mental treasures lies always behind the sphere of consciousness, hid in the recesses of the mind; this is the first degree of latency. The second degree of latency exists when the mind contains certain systems of knowledge, or habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of possessing in its ordinary state, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations of its powers. Such as the abnormal states of madness, febrile delirium, somnambulism, catalepsy, etc., when they may flash out into consciousness, and throw into the shade of unconsciousness those other systems by which they had for long been eclipsed and even extinguished. He insists that the theory of latent modifications enables us to account for some of the most perplexing phenomena of mind.¹

¹ Volume I., pages 339‒352, 366, _et seq._

Sir William’s second volume of lectures commenced with his exposition of the phenomena of cognition; and he classified the special faculties of knowledge thus:――

{ I. Presentative, { External = Perception.
{ { Internal = Self-consciousness.
{
{ II. Conservative, = Memory.
{
{ III. Reproductive, { Without Will = Suggestion.
Cognitive { { With Will = Reminiscence.
Faculties. {
{ IV. Representative, = Imagination.
{
{ V. Elaborative, = Comparison = Faculty of
{ Relations.
{
{ VI. Regulative, = Reason = Common Sense.

Such is Hamilton’s distribution of the intellectual powers, which he terms the cognitive faculties. He explains distinctly what he meant by a mental faculty,――it is merely a mode of designating a certain class or group of mental energies. In short, all mental powers are only names determined by various orders of mental phenomena; but as these differ from and resemble each other in various ways, various modes of classification may be adopted, and consequently various faculties, in different views, may be the result. “System is only valuable when it is not arbitrarily devised, but arises naturally out of an observation of the facts, and of the whole facts, themselves. On the other hand, to despise system is to despise philosophy; for the end of philosophy is the detection of unity.”¹

¹ Volume II., pages 3‒5; also footnotes to Reid, pages 221,
242, 511.

1. The presentative faculty on its two sides――perception of external objects, and self-consciousness or reflection, forms the faculty of experience; and it affords us all our contingent knowledge. It enables us to cognise an object, when presented within the sphere of external or internal consciousness; but if our knowledge terminated with this, it would be small indeed. 2. So we have not only a faculty of acquiring knowledge, but also a faculty of retaining it――which is properly called Memory. 3. The reproductive faculty enables us to recall our knowledge out of memory into consciousness; it is the power which regulates the succession of our thoughts, or the laws of mental association. 4. But the general capacity of knowledge renders it requisite that, besides the power of evoking out of unconsciousness one portion of our retained information in preference to another, we have the faculty of representing in consciousness what is thus evoked; and this is effected by the representative faculty, Imagination. 5. The four preceding faculties, or varied acts of acquisition, conservation, reproduction, and representation, form, as it were, a subsidiary class of faculties, furnishing the materials to a higher faculty, which elaborates these; this is the Elaborative faculty, Comparison, or the faculty of relations; and its chief functions are conception, judgment, reasoning, abstraction, and generalisation. 6. The last of the faculties of cognition he called the Regulative faculty――reason or common sense, under which is included all notions, principles, and laws, not derived from experience, but native to the mind, being at once the laws which govern the mind and afford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 10‒26.

His treatment of perception is somewhat marred by his rather vehement polemic with Dr. Brown; yet his own doctrine may be disentangled from the discussions with which it is mixed up. He is distinguished both as a historian and critic of the theories of perception; but, leaving the historical points as much as possible out of account, his own theory of perception, and his doctrine of Natural Realism, is as follows:――

“The question to be determined is this, Is our perception, or our consciousness of external objects, mediate or immediate?” He gives a general historical account of the views of philosophers touching this subject, discusses and criticises them, with much acuteness and great ability; the objections to natural realism are canvassed; and finally, he takes up the consideration of the general questions of the relation of the senses to the external world, with special reference to the views of Dr. Reid, Stewart, and Dr. Brown. The discussion occupies nearly nine lectures, and the same subject is treated in his Discussions, and in the Supplementary Dissertations to Reid’s works.¹

¹ I originally intended to present a more detailed account of
Hamilton’s views concerning the theories of perception, and
other points, but want of space has forced me to relinquish
this.

He explains his own doctrine thus: “The only object ever perceived is the object in immediate contact――in immediate relation with the organ. What Reid and philosophers in general call the distant object, is wholly unknown to perception; by reasoning we may connect the object of perception with certain antecedents――certain causes, but these, as the result of inference, cannot be the object of perception. The only objects of perception are in all senses equally immediate. Thus the object of my vision at present is not the paper or letters at a foot from my eye, but the rays of light reflected from these upon the retina. The object of your hearing is not the vibrations of my language, nor the vibrations of the intervening air; but the vibrations determined thereby in the cavity of the internal ear, and in immediate contact with the auditory nerves. In both senses, then, the external object perceived is the last effect of a series of unperceived causes. But to call these unperceived causes the object of perception, and to call the perceived effect, the real object, only the medium of perception, is either a gross error or an unwarranted abuse of language. My conclusion is, therefore, that in all the senses, the external object is in contact with the organ, and thus, in a certain signification, all the senses are only modifications of touch. This is the simple fact, and any other statement of it is either the effect or the cause of misconception.

“In the second place――in relation to the number and consecution of the elementary phenomena――it is, and must be, admitted, on all hands, that perception must be preceded by an impression of the external object on the sense.... On this point there can be no dispute. But the case is different in regard to the two following. It is asserted by philosophers in general: (1) That the impression made on the organ must be propagated to the brain, before a cognition of the object takes place in the mind,――in other words, that an organic action must precede and determine the intellectual action; and (2) That sensation proper precedes perception proper. In regard to the former assertion, if by this were only meant, that the mind does not perceive external objects out of relation to its bodily organs, and that the relation of the object to the organism, as the condition of perception, must, therefore, in the order of nature, be viewed as prior to the cognition of that relation, no objection could be made to the statement. But if it be intended, as it seems to be, that the organic affection precedes in the order of time the intellectual cognition, of this we have no proof whatever. The fact as stated would be inconsistent with the doctrine of an intuitive perception: for, if the organic affection were chronologically prior to the act of knowledge, the immediate perception of an object different from our bodily senses would be impossible, and the external would thus be represented only in the subjective affections of our own organism. It is, therefore, more correct to hold, that the corporeal movement and the mental perception are simultaneous after the bodily has terminated,――in place of holding that the mind is connected with the body only at the central extremity of the nervous system, it is more simple and philosophical to suppose that it is united with the nervous system in its whole extent.”

Touching the latter assertion, that a perception proper is always preceded by a sensation, though maintained by Reid and Stewart, is more erroneous than the former assertion concerning the precedence of an organic to a mental action. In fact, sensation and perception both exist only as they co-exist. “They do not, indeed, co-exist in the same degree of intensity, but they are really equally original; and it is only by an act, not of the easiest abstraction, that we are able to discriminate them scientifically from each other.”¹

¹ Volume II., pages 185‒189.

The following is a concise statement of his doctrine of Natural Realism:――1. In an act of external perception, “I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived, and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible moment of intuition. 2. The knowledge of the subject does not precede nor follow the knowledge of the object; neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. 3. The two terms of correlation stand in mutual counterpoise and equal independence; they are given as connected in the synthesis of knowledge, but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence. 4. Consciousness declares our ♦knowledge of material qualities to be intuitive. Nor is the fact, as given, denied even by those who disallow its truth. So clear is the deliverance, that even the philosophers who reject an intuitive perception find it impossible not to admit that their doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the voice of consciousness, and the natural conviction of mankind.” 5. This doctrine of Natural Realism is partly supported upon the distinction of the qualities of matter.¹

♦ “knowlege” replaced with “knowledge”

¹ _Discussions_, pages 53‒54; also his _Dissertations to
Reid’s Works_. In short, his _Dissertations to Reid_
contain a body of valuable philosophical and critical matter
relating to the science of the mind. He has endeavoured to
present an exhaustive classification of all the possible
theories of perception, and his distinctions, explanations,
and critical remarks are admirable specimens of logical
power and historic genius. This is especially applicable to
his important dissertations on the “Qualities of Matter,” of
which I had prepared an abstract, and regret that I cannot
afford space for it.

Sir William himself says, “that Natural Realism and Absolute
Idealism are the only systems worthy of a philosopher;
for, as they alone have any foundation in consciousness,
so they alone have any consistency in themselves.... The
scheme of Natural Realism may be ultimately difficult, for,
like all other truths, it ends in the inconceivable; but
Hypothetical Realism, in its origin, in its development, in
its result, although the favourite scheme of philosophers,
is philosophically absurd.”――_Dissertations to Reid_, Note
C, page 817.

Having explicated two of the fundamental peculiarities of Hamilton’s system――his view of the end of speculation, and natural realism――I resume the exposition of his views of the cognitive faculties.

Through the powers of internal and external perception, we are enabled to acquire information, experience; but this acquisition is not of itself independent and complete. It supposes that we are also able to retain the knowledge acquired, as we cannot be said to obtain what we are unable to keep. Thus the faculty of acquisition is only realised through the faculty of memory. We have here two distinct elementary phenomena, each depending on the other for its realisation; for without a power of acquisition a power of retention could not be exerted, and without the latter the former would be fruitless, for we should lose as fast as we acquired. Further, the faculty of acquisition would be ineffective without the faculties of reproduction and imagination, for though the mind retained beyond the sphere of consciousness a treasury of knowledge, this would be of no avail, if it did not possess the power of reproducing and representing such knowledge in consciousness. Although the faculty of memory would be fruitless without the faculties of reproduction and imagination, we are not to confound these faculties, or to view the act of mind which is their joint result, as a simple and elementary power; while they mutually depend on each other, the faculties of memory, reproduction, and imagination are governed by different laws, and in different individuals are found to vary greatly in their comparative vigour.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 205‒207. Further on he says: “By memory,
you will see, is only meant the condition of reproduction;
and it is, therefore, evident that it is only by an
extension of the term, that it can be called a faculty, that
is, an active power ... it ought perhaps to receive rather
the appellation of a capacity” (page 209).

Touching memory, Hamilton held that all mental energies must persist and endure; we never wholly lose them, but they become obscure. It is only the more vivid changes which sufficiently affect our consciousness to become objects of its apprehension. Thus we are only conscious of the more prominent series of changes in our mental states; the others remain mostly latent. The law of retention extends over all the phenomena of mind. Hence a good memory is one main condition of reproduction.

There is probably no mental power in which such extreme differences appear in individuals as in memory. In a good memory two chief qualities are requisite――the capacity of retention and the power of reproduction.¹ To the latter I now proceed.

¹ Volume II., pages 211‒218. I may state that at one period I
could repeat a sermon or a lecture the morning after hearing
it. Although I state the fact of my own experience, I do not
at all approve of such stretches of verbal memory, and many
years ago I ceased from making any such efforts, and instead
cultivated the reproductive and representative faculties.

By the faculty of reproduction, Hamilton meant the process of awakening that which is lying dormant in the memory, as contra-distinguished from the representation of it in consciousness as awakened. He was not satisfied with the term reproductive, because it did not precisely of itself mark what he wished to express. And he was right; for no single term could be chosen which would exactly mark the process and at the same time distinguish it from another closely related process as he wished. “I am not satisfied, I say, with the term reproduction for the process by which the dormant thought or affection is aroused, for it does not clearly denote what it is intended to express....

“The phenomena of reproduction is one of the most wonderful in the whole compass of psychology, and it is one in the explanation of which philosophers have been more successful than in almost any other.... The faculty of reproduction is governed by the laws which regulate the association of the mental train, or, to speak more correctly, reproduction is nothing but the result of these laws. Everyone is conscious of the ceaseless succession of thoughts, one thought suggesting another, which again is the cause of exciting a third, and so on. In what manner, it may be asked, does the presence of any thought determine the introduction of another? Is the train subject to laws, and, if so, by what laws is it regulated?”

He gives, as usual, an indication of the views of other philosophers touching the laws of mental association, and he himself endeavoured to carry up all the laws of association into the “law of redintegration,” which he announced thus:――“Those thoughts suggest each other which had previously constituted parts of the same entire act of cognition. Now, to the same entire or total act belong, as integral or constituent parts, in the first place, those thoughts which arose at the same time, or in immediate consecution; and in the second, those thoughts which are bound up into one by their mutual affinity. Thus, therefore, the two laws of simultaneity and affinity are carried up into unity in the higher law of redintegration of totality; and by this one law the whole phenomena of association may be easily explained.”¹

¹ Volume II., pages 227‒229, 231‒238. In one of his
_Dissertations to Reid_, Hamilton gives a “Contribution
towards a history of mental suggestion or association;”
this, however, deals chiefly with the views of Aristotle and
Themistitus. But he also presents an outline of a “theory
of mental reproduction, suggestion, or association,” setting
forth his own views. The outline is more developed in
thought than what is given in his lectures, but it was left
incomplete.

I. In it he distinguishes the general laws of mental
succession from those of reproduction proper; and of this
class he specifies five laws――1. The law of succession. 2.
The law of variation. 3. The law of dependence or determined
consecution. 4. The law of relativity or integration. 5. The
law of intrinsic or objective relativity; under this head he
would also include the law of the conditioned.

II. General laws of mental succession, as of reproduction
proper――1. The law of repetition. 2. The law of
redintegration. 3. The law of preference.

III. Special laws of mental suggestion――1. The law of
similars. 2. The law of contrast. 3. The law of coadjacency.

Herbert Spencer, following some of the lines indicated by Hamilton, insists that the cohering of impressions with previously experienced impressions of the same class is the sole law of association. This is not the only principle which the evolution philosophy has adopted from Sir William’s writings; the cast of Hamilton’s intellect itself was essentially evolutionary.

Hamilton shows that the processes of representation and reproduction are closely related; though they are discriminated by differences quite decisive. Reproduction operates, in part, at least, out of consciousness; while representation is only realised as far as it is realised in consciousness, the vivacity of the representation being always in proportion to the vivacity of our consciousness of its reality. The energies of representation and reproduction are not always exerted by the same individual in equal intensity, any more than the energies of reproduction and retention.¹

¹ “Some minds are distinguished by a higher power of
manifesting one of these phenomena; others for manifesting
another; and as it is not always the person who forgets
nothing who can most promptly recall what he retains, so
neither is it always the person who recalls most easily
and correctly who can exhibit what he remembers in the
most vivid colours. It is to be recollected, however, that
retention, reproduction, and representation, though not in
different persons of the same relative vigour, are, however,
in the same individuals, all strong or weak in reference
to the same class of subjects. For example, if a man’s
memory be more peculiarly retentive of words, his verbal
reminiscence and imagination will, in like manner, be more
particularly energetic.” (Volume II., page 260.)

According to Hamilton’s view of the fundamental processes of the mind, the function of representation is simply the energy of the mind in holding up to its contemplation what it is determined to represent. But he distinguishes as essentially different, the representation, and the determination to represent; for the reproductive faculty is the immediate source whence the representative receives both the material and the determination to represent; and the laws which control the reproductive faculty also control the representative. So if there were no other laws in the combination and construction of thought than those of association, the representative faculty would be solely determined in its manifestation by the reproductive faculty; but comparison――the faculty of relations also comes into operation. Comparison plays an important part in determining in what combinations objects are represented. By its aid, the complex groups of phenomena called up by the representative faculty undergo various operations; they are separated into parts, analysed into elements; and these parts and elements are again compounded and combined in innumerable ways. While in all this, the representative faculty――imagination co-operates; as it first exhibits the facts as called up by the laws of association; it then exhibits them as variously arranged by the analysis and synthesis of the comparative faculty, thus acting as a subsidiary both to the reproductive and elaborative faculties. Still, in these operations the imaginative power is often the most active element in the process; it is a condition of the analytic operations, as it holds up the objects in a vivid light to the analytic grasp, that it may observe the various circumstances of relation, and the new reconstruction――the result of its own elaboration.