Chapter XII: Section II: Adam Smith

Adam Smith was one of Hume’s most beloved and intimate friends. Smith ultimately limited his researches to special departments of moral and economical science. In these he was the more exhaustive thinker of the two, even if his efforts were less striking than those of his illustrious contemporary.

He was born at Kirkcaldy in 1723, and he lived till 1790. He was educated at the University of Glasgow, and attended the lectures of Hutcheson, then professor of moral philosophy. From Glasgow he went to Oxford, where he seems to have greatly widened the range of his culture, and thus laid the foundation of the vast stores of information, which he ultimately turned to so good account. He returned to Scotland in 1746, with the hope of obtaining a professorship in one of the Universities. In 1748, under the patronage of Lord Kames, Smith delivered a course of lectures on rhetoric in Edinburgh. He was appointed professor of logic in the University of Glasgow, in 1751; but in the following year he was transferred to the chair of moral philosophy, a position more in accord with his taste and aspiration.

In this chair his teaching covered a wide field. He divided his course of lectures into four parts:――(1) natural theology; (2) ethics; (3) justice, or that part of morality which can be stated under precise rules; (4) political science, in which he delivered some of the thoughts, afterwards embodied in his _Wealth of Nations_. In 1763, he was persuaded to resign his chair, and undertake the education of the young Duke of Buccleuch.

He travelled with his pupil abroad for about three years, chiefly in France, where he became personally acquainted with some of the leading men of letters and philosophers of that nation. On his return to Scotland, he retired to Kirkcaldy; and there, in the society of his mother, intently applied himself for ten years to inquiry and study, the results of which appeared in 1776, in his famous work, _The Wealth of Nations_. During the last twenty years of his life he held the post of Commissioner of Customs in Scotland. A few days before his death, he caused all his unpublished manuscripts to be burned, except a few comparatively short essays.¹

¹ These were published in a volume after his death, and
consist of six, on the following subjects:――“A History of
Astronomy;” “A History of Ancient Physics;” “A History of
Ancient Logic and Metaphysics;” “An Essay on the Imitative
Arts;” “On certain English and Italian Verses;” “On the
External Senses.” His earliest efforts were a review of
Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary and _Observations on the State of
Learning in Europe_, which appeared in 1755, in a periodical
called the _Edinburgh Review_.

Personally, Adam Smith was a grave-looking man, of a stout middle height, with prominent features and grey eyes. He was simple, warm-hearted, and kindly in disposition. His intellectual operations were calm, regular, and patient. He mastered a subject slowly but thoroughly, and carried his principles with a steady tenacity and invincible persistence through immense masses of facts and details on to wonderfully successful results. He was gifted with a remarkably strong memory, and had acquired a wide knowledge of English, French, and Italian literature; indeed the learning which he brought to bear on the subject of his chief work was amazingly various and great. But I will first direct attention to his charming work on Morals.

His _Theory of Moral Sentiments_ was first published in 1757; and soon became popular, as one of the most interesting and attractive books in the circle of ethical literature. Its distinctive feature is that the operation of human sympathy is the prime factor of moral sentiments: that mankind are so constituted as to sympathise with each other’s feelings, and to feel pleasure in the consonance of these feelings, are the simple facts on which Smith’s moral theory is founded.

His treatise is divided into seven parts, in the following order:――(1) of the propriety of action; (2) of merit and demerit, or the objects of reward and punishment; (3) of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct; (4) of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation; (5) of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation; (6) of the character of virtue; (7) of systems of moral philosophy. Such is the arrangement of the main heads of his theory, as given in the sixth edition; I will show its general scope, without entering into details.

The influence of Hutcheson and of Hume can be traced in several parts of Smith’s work, although his conception and application of the fundamental idea of his system differs from theirs. He is really original in his applications and illustrations. Analytically, his treatise is not remarkable; its merits rather lie in the practical and hortatory discourse, in the eloquent criticisms of character, and the fine illustrations of virtuous conduct with which it abounds, and are presented in a naturally copious, easy, flowing, and fascinating style. The chief blemish of his style is an excess of language――a running into redundance.

In Smith’s time the chief questions agitated, touched the foundation of morality――the standard of right and wrong, and the nature of the moral faculty.

He begins by stating that sympathy is the origin and source of moral approbation. “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he desires nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.” Thus, sympathy being one of the original passions of human nature, we may see it in the immediate passing of an emotion from one person to another, even when one does not know the cause of another’s grief or joy. Sympathy originates in the imagination, which alone enables us to enter into the sentiments and feelings of others; as we can easily imagine ourselves in the position of another, by simply changing places with him in fancy, by reflecting on what our own sentiments would be in a similar difficulty. Thus we can feel in some degree what the suffering or joy of another really is; so the feeling of a spectator corresponds to what, by bringing the case of another home to himself, he imagines should be that other’s sentiments; since sympathy is based on an original tendency to reflect the emotional states of those around us. We therefore form our moral ideas from observation and reflection on the sentiments and emotions of our neighbours.¹

¹ The following remarks on the operations of sympathy are
from Mr. Sully’s able, careful, and valuable work, _Outlines
of Psychology_, published in 1884:――“Sympathy in its
simplest form shows itself in an unconscious reproduction
or imitation of another’s feeling. The mind of the person
affected does not consciously represent or dwell on the
feeling which affects him, but simply vibrates in unison
with it.

“This tendency manifests itself very early. There is
possibly some instinctive knowledge of the signs of
feeling, and connected with this, a native disposition to
answer smile with smile.... But some amount of individual
experience is needed for fixing the connection between the
several feelings and their external expression. When this is
acquired the child tends automatically to take on the moods
of hilarity, anxiety, depression, of those about him. This
appears to be due to the working of an imitative impulse
which leads to the more or less complete adoption of
the external attitude, gesture, tone,” etc. In a note he
says――“That the child has a vague intuitive knowledge of
other’s feelings seems to be shown by the fact that he
responds to the smile of his mother long before his own
experience could have taught him to associate pleasurable
feeling with this particular facial movement.”――Pages
508‒511.

I have for a long period specially observed the early
development of conscious feeling, and intelligence in
infants; and my observation as to the primitive nature
of sympathy agrees with Mr. Sully’s view.

But concerning the record of the signs of intelligence
which Mr. Darwin has given of several of his own infants, my
observation of infants does not tally with his. Taking the
ages by months, I have found more signs of intelligence in
infants than he did. For instance, I have found unmistakable
signs of memory in relation to external and inanimate
objects, in infants of three and four months old. Again,
with regard to vision, I have observed an infant of four
months old, fixing its eyes, and looking steadily at the
flag on the top of the mast of a ship, at a considerable
distance off.

Accord of feeling produces pleasure, and consciousness of its absence pain. As the sympathy of others is more necessary for us in grief than in joy, we are more desirous to communicate to others our disagreeable feelings than our agreeable ones. “The agreeable passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure. The bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing consolation of sympathy.” But we are pleased ourselves if we can sympathise with another’s success or misfortune, and pained if we cannot.

The amount of pleasure or pain felt by one person in the conduct or feelings of another is the measure of his approbation or the contrary. Thus the sentiments of anyone are just and proper, or the reverse, according as they coincide or not with the sentiments of someone else, who observe them; while his approbation varies according to the degree in which he can sympathise with them. A full accord of sentiments means perfect approbation. Just as a man’s sympathetic indignation fails to correspond to mine, according as his compassion falls short of my grief, does he feel a stronger or weaker disapproval of my feelings. Moral and intellectual approbation admits of a similar explanation: for to approve or disapprove of the opinions of others is only to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own; so to approve or disapprove of their feelings and emotions is merely to mark a similar agreement or disagreement between our own and theirs. Thus it appears that the sentiments of each individual are the standard of the correctness of another’s, for we can hardly judge of matters of sentiment by any other canon than the correspondent affections in ourselves; and the only measure by which any man can judge of the faculty of another is by his own faculty of a similar kind. On our efforts to sympathise with the feeling and passion of others are founded the gentle virtues of condescension, toleration, and humanity; while the sterner virtues of self-denial and self-command are founded on our effort to attune our passions and feelings to such a pitch as others can approve. The harmonious operation of these two sides of virtue, feeling much for others, and little for ourselves, restraining our selfish, and cultivating our benevolent affections, constitutes the highest perfection of human nature.¹

¹ Smith’s work must be read itself to attain a full conception
of the richness of its illustrations and its attractive
character.

He does not directly face the problem of the supreme end of life, nor propose the question whether virtue and morality are only means to the attainment of happiness; but it is pretty evident that he admits the utilitarian view of happiness. He makes no great effort to analyse human happiness, but says that it consists in tranquility and enjoyment; for without tranquility there can be no enjoyment, and with it there is scarcely anything that may not prove a source of pleasure. “In ease of body and peace of mind all the different ranks of life are nearly on a level, and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the highway possesses that security which kings are fighting for.... What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is not in debt, and has a clear conscience? If you would live freely, fearlessly, and independently, never come within the circle of ambition.... Power and riches are enormous and operose machines, consisting of springs the most nice and delicate, and which, in spite of all our care, are ready every moment to burst into pieces, and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessors.”

One of the most interesting parts of his book is the account which he gives of the many fortuitous circumstances which affect the sentiments and moral judgments of men. The most important of these irregular influences spring from the different positions of prosperity and adversity, custom or fashion. As those in high social positions are not exactly judged with the same strictness as the poor and humble, in equal degrees of merit there is hardly anyone who does not show more respect for the rich and great than for the poor and humble; while an equal, or even a far greater, amount of vice and folly is regarded with less aversion and contempt in the former, than in the latter. He explains that this arises in our sympathetic emotions: as these enter more vividly into the joys than into the sorrows of others, we consequently feel far more pleasure in the condition of the rich than in that of the poor; for we are apt to imagine the one class happy, but the other wretchedly unhappy. So, it is agreeable to sympathise with joy, but painful to enter into grief; and where there is no envy in the case, our inclination to sympathise with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathise with sorrow; and hence our disposition to admire the rich and powerful, and to despise the poor and lowly.

The longest and concluding division of his treatise is devoted to a review of other systems of moral philosophy; and from his own standpoint he gives an able and interesting account of them.

To sum up according to Smith, conscience is a derived faculty:――1. We do not begin with a moral consciousness by which we learn to judge of others, but from our judgments about others we acquire a moral consciousness of ourselves. Thus conscience is formed from the central principle of sympathy. 2. The general rules of morality are ultimately founded on experience of what, in particular instances, our moral sentiments approve or condemn; they are not intuitions supplied by nature. Moral rules are formed from experience, by an inductive process, not deduced from a general principle. The sense of duty and the feeling of obligation are both acquired from experience. 3. He recognises the existence of a benevolent and all-wise Being, who will ultimately redress all injustice; but what the Supreme Being approves must be inferred from the principles of benevolence. Our regard for Him should be shown, not in frivolous observances and ceremonies, but by a course of just and beneficent action.

Although his theory of morals cannot be accepted as satisfactory, still it holds an important place in the history of ethical systems. Its defects have often been pointed out, and it is unnecessary to enter into any further criticism of it. Smith did great service in developing the varied operations and manifestations of the sympathetic principle.

Let us now turn to his other famous work, _The Wealth of Nations_. It consists of five Books, each of which are divided into a number of chapters, but many of the chapters are again divided into parts and articles; and although there is a principle of method in it, still it is defective in the arrangement of materials, and abounds with digressions. Some of the subjects embraced in it are not economical, except in the most general sense; and though this wide range of topics enhances the value of the work, the task of presenting a just account of it is rendered more difficult.

The first book deals with the causes of improvement in the productive powers of labour, and of the order in which its produce is naturally distributed among the people. The treatment of this subject extends to eleven chapters, with a long digression concerning the variations in the value of silver throughout the four preceding centuries; the variations in the proportion between the respective values of gold and silver; and the different effects of the progress of improvement upon three different kinds of rude produce. This digression occupies about a third of the book; but it contains a vast and varied mass of facts and economical information.

Smith begins his great exposition with the simple proposition that labour is the real source of wealth; that the amount of labour expended upon any article is the true measure of its value, and that when this is ascertained as between different commodities, their exchange value will, in the long run, be regulated by it; that all exchangeable commodities are wealth, and not gold and silver only. “What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body.... Labour is the first price, the original purchase money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to those who possess it and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.... But, though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is often difficult to ascertain the proportions between the two different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different kinds of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and the ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account,” and many other circumstances.¹

¹ Introduction, Book I., chapter 5, pages 31, 32. I uniformly
refer to Rogers’ edition of _The Wealth of Nations_, in two
volumes, published in 1869. Touching labour, Smith further
says:――“Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only
universal, as well as the only accurate measure of value,
or the only standard by which we can compare the values of
different commodities at all times and places.”――_Ibid._,
page 38.

He explains the division of labour; the origin and use of money; the component parts of the price of commodities; the natural and market price of commodities; wages; the profits of stock; wages and profits in the different employments of labour and stock; inequalities arising from the nature of the employments themselves, and inequalities occasioned by the policy of Europe. Then comes a long chapter on the rent of land, concerning which he is explicit and exceedingly interesting. Among other things he says:――

“As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they have never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them, and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land.”

He states that the landlord exacts from the tenant for the use of a portion of land the highest rent which the latter can afford to pay in the circumstances, and that he even sometimes demands rent for what is utterly incapable of human improvement. He adduces telling evidence of this, in connection with the kelp trade and the fishing trade, in Scotland, thus:――“Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline salt, useful for making glass, soap, and several other purposes. It grows in several parts of Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon such rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice every day covered with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by human industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded by a kelp-shore of this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn-fields.

“The sea in the neighbourhood of the Islands of Shetland is more than commonly abundant in fish, which make a great part of the subsistence of their inhabitants. But in order to profit by the produce of the water, they must have a habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord is in proportion, not to what the farmer can make by the land, but to what he can make both by the land and by the water. It is partly paid in sea-fish; and one of the very few instances in which rent makes a part of the price of that commodity is to be found in that country.

“The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford to give.”¹

¹ Book I., chaps. 6, 7, Volume I., pages 52, 153, 171, 175,
_et seq._ Smith treats the subject of land rent at great
length, and with marked ability; although his exposition
in some points is defective, still he comes much nearer the
truth than Ricardo, who accounts for the origin of rent on
merely abstract and imaginary grounds.

In the second book, he treats of the nature, the accumulation, and the employment of stock; and through five chapters expounds this division of political economy. He explicates the nature of stocks, the effects of its accumulation into capitals of different kinds; the effect of the different employments of these kinds of capital; the nature and operation of money, considered as a particular branch of the general stock of society; and the different effects which the different employments of capital immediately produce upon the quantity both of national industry and of the annual produce of land and labour.

His exposition of these matters is minute and exhaustive. Commencing with the man of the most limited means, or the individual who has no income but what he derives from his labour, he then proceeds to show how the man who possesses stock and capital, after reserving a sufficient quantity for his own immediate consumption, may employ his capital in manufacturing wares, producing goods, and selling them again for a profit. Or it may be employed in the improvement of land, and in many other ways.

Extending his view, he states that the general stock of any civilised country is the same with that of all its inhabitants, and naturally divides itself into three portions, each of which has a different function. The first portion is reserved for immediate consumption, and its characteristic is, that it affords no profit, as it consists of the stock of food, clothes, household furniture, and so on. The second portion of the general stock is the fixed capital, and its characteristic is that it affords a revenue without circulating or changing masters. It consists chiefly of the following things:――(1) All useful machines and instruments which facilitate or abridge labour; (2) all those profitable buildings which are the means of procuring a revenue, not only to their proprietor, who lets them for a rent, but to the person who occupies them, and pays that rent for them――such as shops, warehouses, workshops, halls, farmhouses, and so on; (3) improvements of land, by clearing, draining, enclosing, manuring, and reducing it to the fittest condition for tillage; (4) the acquired and useful abilities of all the members of the community, which represent a considerable amount of fixed capital, yielding income. The third and last portion of the general stock is the circulating capital, and its characteristic is that it affords profit only by circulating or changing masters. He explains the functions of money at great length, and shows that it is merely a circulating medium of convenience and exchange. “The great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the society to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in the course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man the revenue which properly belongs to him, make themselves no part of that revenue.”¹

¹ Book II., chapters 2, 5; Volume I., pages 287, 289, 290, 379.
Mr. Rogers gives some very interesting notes on capital, of
which the following is a part:――“Most writers on political
economy, misled by the fact that the advances of the
capitalist are the means by which labour is for a certain
present period supported, have given excessive prominence
to the doctrine of a ‘labour fund,’ and have exaggerated the
importance of this fund to those who live by wages. The fact
is, the capitalist employer is nothing but a representative
of the division of labour, or of employments.... The
capitalist is only a convenience to labourer and consumer.
This distinction is very important. There is no fund, except
temporarily, between the capitalist and the labourer. Both
are paid wages, one for producing, the other distributing;
and the consumer pays the wages of both.”――Note by Rogers,
Volume I., page 362.

His third book is the most interesting in the work. It is mainly historical, and deals with the progress of opulence in different nations. He first explains the natural progress of opulence; then the state of agriculture in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire; the rise and progress of cities after the fall of the Empire; and, finally, how the commerce of the towns contributed to the improvement of the country. On all these subjects, though his evidence was necessarily incomplete, Smith manifested a wonderful sagacity and accuracy in his general conclusions.

Within the compass of little more than forty pages, he presents a luminous exposition of the important topics indicated in the preceding paragraph; and in no part of his work was his peculiar powers and insight exhibited to better advantage. In subjects on which I have made special inquiries, I find his statements, in general, very accurate. But it is in the clear explanation of the causes of change and progress, that this book specially excels.

The fourth book treats on systems of political economy――that is, the mercantile system――and those systems which represent land as either the sole or the principal source of the revenue and wealth of every country. In this book also he dealt with the subject of colonies; the advantages which Europe has derived from the discovery of America, and from the discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, and treaties of commerce.

He discusses the mercantile system then in vogue with great force, and exposed its errors and inconsistencies most effectively. The prevailing notion was that wealth consisted in money, in pieces of metal, and therefore the great affair always was to get money; to grow rich was to get money, and wealth and money were, in common language, considered exactly synonymous. “In consequence of these popular notions, all the different nations of Europe have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries.” Accordingly, they have either prohibited their exportation, or subjected it to a considerable duty. He shows the fatuity of these notions, and exposes the common theory of commerce or protection at great length, and with a weight of argument and a fullness of illustration as yet unmatched. He discusses the subjects of drawbacks, of bounties, the corn trade, and the corn laws; and throughout argues in favour of free trade.¹

¹ Book IV., chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Volume II., pages 2‒3,
62‒63, 108‒109, _et seq._

It was in this book also that Smith made his memorable attack upon the East India Company. For once he thoroughly exposed the pretentions of this Company, the mischievous character of its government, and the wrongs which it was committing, in the most fearless and effective style. He showed that something more and higher was required of the rulers of a great country with a dense population, than the mere mercantile spirit of buying and selling――making profits and paying large dividends. He demonstrated that the selfish interests of the Directors of the Company as merchants and traders utterly disqualified them for being wise and just rulers of the vast population under their sway; moreover, all the servants of the Company, from the highest to the lowest, were actuated by the same self-seeking, money-making, and trading spirit. These servants all traded more or less on their own account, as Smith puts it:――

“All the members of the administration, besides, trade more or less upon their own account, and it is vain to prohibit them from so doing. Nothing can be more foolish than to expect that the clerks of a great counting-house at ten thousand miles’ distance, and consequently almost quite out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their masters, give up at once doing any sort of business upon their own account, abandon for ever all hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in their hands, and content themselves with the moderate salaries which those masters allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can seldom be augmented, being commonly as high as the real profits of the company’s trade can afford. In such circumstances, to prohibit the servants of the Company from trading upon their own account can have scarce any other effect than to enable the superior servants, under the pretence of executing their master’s orders, to oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure. The servants naturally endeavour to establish the same monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of the Company. If they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will establish the monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles in which they choose to deal; and this is, perhaps, the best and least oppressive way of establishing it. But if, by an order from Europe, they were prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to establish a monopoly of the same kind, secretly and directly, in a way that is more destructive to the country. They will employ the whole authority of the Government, and pervert the administration of justice, in order to harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of commerce, which, by means of agents, either concealed, or at least not publicly avowed, they chose to carry on.”

He states that the interests of the masters of the Company are the same as that of the country which they govern, but that the greed of the mercantile spirit prevents them from seeing this. The real interests of the servants of the Company, however, were very different from the interests of the country: the sole aim of these servants was to make fortunes to themselves by whatever means they could. “It is a very singular government in which every member of the administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has left it, and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake.”¹

¹ Book IV., chapter 7, Volume II., pages 221‒225.

The fifth and last book of this great work treats of the revenue of the Commonwealth, and in connection with this Smith handles many important subjects, such as the defence of the State, which leads him into a discussion of military organisation and standing armies, the administration of justice, and the expense of public works. In relation to the latter subject, he treats at length on education; and following his usual historical method on this subject, he is exceedingly interesting. He gives a clear and instructive account of educational institutions, the systems of thought taught in the Universities and schools, including the Church and religious instruction. Space will not permit me to follow him into details, but a quotation or two will indicate some of his views.

The common course of philosophical education in the greater number of the Universities of Europe was this:――“Logic was first taught; ontology in the second place; pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human soul, and the Deity, in the third; and in the fourth followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which was considered as immediately connected with the doctrine of pneumatology, with the immortality of the human soul, and with the rewards and punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: a short and superficial system of physics usually concluded the course.

“The alterations which the Universities of Europe thus introduced into the ancient course of philosophy, were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics, and to render it a more proper introduction to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry and the ascetic morality which these alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely to improve the understanding or to mend the heart.”¹

¹ “This course of philosophy is what still continues to be
taught in the greater part of the Universities of Europe,
with more or less diligence, according as the constitution
of each particular University happens to render diligence
more or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the
richest and best endowed Universities, the tutors content
themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and
parcels of this corrupted course; and even these they
commonly teach very negligently and superficially.

“The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in
the several different branches of philosophy, have not, the
greater part of them, been made in Universities; though some
no doubt have. The greatest part of Universities have not
even been very forward to adopt those improvements after
they were made; and several of these learned societies have
chosen to remain for a long time the sanctuaries in which
exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and
protection, after they had been hunted out of every corner
of the world. In general, the richest and best endowed
Universities have been the slowest in adopting these
improvements, and the most averse to permit any considerable
change in the established plan of education. These
improvements were more easily introduced into some of the
poorer Universities, in which the teachers, depending upon
their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence,
were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions
of the world.”――Book V., chapter 1, Volume II., pages
356‒357.

He touches on the question whether the State ought to give any attention to the education of the people, and if so, in what manner should it be attempted. In connection with this, he notices a very serious result of the minute division of labour――namely, that it reduces the greater part of workers physically and mentally to a comparatively helpless state; in fact, to be incapable of doing anything, save the one or two simple operations to which they have been accustomed. “But the understanding of the greater part of men is necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.... The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind ... and even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilised society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless the government takes some pains to prevent it.”¹

¹ Book V., chapter 1; Volume II., pages 364‒366. The
manufacturing population of our large towns are not quite so
bad as they seem to have been in Smith’s time; still there
is no doubt of the truth of the tendency of the minute
division of labour which he points out.

He argues that the public should encourage and assist the education of the whole people, but he does not say that it should be made compulsory. He insists upon its utility from various points of view, especially from the political side.

He treats at length on the institutions for the religious instruction of the people in all ages, and his long article on this is especially well worth reading and study. Smith himself was singularly free from prejudice, sectarian or narrow views, and in this respect he is greatly superior to Hume.

The concluding chapters deal with the revenue of the State, taxes, and national debts. His treatment of the general subject of taxation is comprehensive and enlightened, and, like the other parts of his work, full of information, suggestion, and instruction. He has good articles on taxes upon land.

Finally, we may aver that few works have had more influence in stimulating industry, controlling legislation, and promoting reform than the _Wealth of Nations_. But whether this influence will be permanent in its results――whether capital will still continue to dominate labour as it has done in the past――is a social problem, which is constantly coming more and more to the front, and it must ere long be resolutely met.