Chapter XV: Section III: Dugald Stewart

Ferguson was succeeded in the chair of moral philosophy by Dugald Stewart,¹ who discharged the duties of the chair for a period of twenty-five years with unmatched success. He was a son of Dr. Matthew Stewart, professor of mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, and was born in his father’s house in the old college buildings. When eight years of age, he was sent to the High School of Edinburgh, and at thirteen he entered the University and attended the arts classes. But with the object of completing his philosophical education, at the age of eighteen he went to Glasgow and studied a session under Dr. Reid, and greatly appreciated the spirit of the doctrines of his master.²

¹ Born in 1753; died in 1828.

² When speaking of Dr. Reid, Stewart says:――“Among the members
of this University (Edinburgh), Mr. Ferguson was the first
to applaud Reid’s success, warmly recommending to his pupils
a steady prosecution of the same plan, as the only effective
method of ascertaining the general principles of the human
frame, and illustrated happily, by his own profound and
eloquent disquisitions, the application of such studies to
the conduct of the understanding and the great concerns of
life. I recollect, too, when attending, about the year 1771,
the lectures of the late Mr. Russell, to have heard high
encomiums on the philosophy of Dr. Reid, in the course
of those comprehensive discussions concerning the objects
and the rules of experimental science, with which he so
agreeably diversified the particular doctrines of physics.
Nor must I omit this opportunity of paying a tribute to
the memory of my old friend, Mr. Stevenson, then professor
of logic, whose candid mind at the age of seventy gave a
welcome reception to a system subversive of the theories
which he had taught for forty years, and whose zeal for
the advancement of knowledge prompted him, when his career
was almost finished, to undertake the laborious task of new
modelling that useful compilation of elementary instruction
to which diffidence of his own powers limited his literary
exertions.

“It is with no common feelings of respect and gratitude
that I now recall the names of those to whom I owe my first
attachment to those studies, and the happiness of a liberal
occupation superior to the more aspiring aims of a servile
ambition.”――Stewart’s _Account of the Life and Writings of
Reid_.

In 1771, when only nineteen years of age, Stewart was entrusted by his father, whose health was failing, to teach the mathematical class in the University of Edinburgh; and, notwithstanding his youth, he maintained order and taught well. He was formally appointed to the chair of mathematics in 1775, and held it till 1785, when, as already mentioned, he obtained the chair of moral philosophy, a position more congenial to his taste and aspiration.

According to the best testimony, Stewart was a successful and eloquent professor, and was justly regarded as an ornament of this illustrious University. The lectures which he delivered to his class were declared by those who heard them to be surprisingly touching and elegant. He was a Liberal in politics, a follower and expounder of the economical doctrines of Adam Smith; and several scions of the Whig nobility were placed in Edinburgh under his care and instruction. His teaching, by means of his lectures and his writings, attained a wide influence and contributed to diffuse a taste for elegant literature and liberal opinions in politics throughout Scotland. Many of his pupils rose to eminence in law, politics, and literature.

Stewart’s teaching was influenced by the current of events and the circumstances of his time; and practical considerations greatly controlled all his opinions and speculations. He was deeply interested in the French Revolution, and intensely moved by the deplorable excesses which sprung out of it. A short quotation from the concluding sentences of his course of lectures on political economy will illustrate this and other features of his teaching:――

“It is not, however, to those who look forward to the pursuits of science that I have addressed myself in these lectures. The greater part of you are probably destined for the active walks of business; and under this impression, I have uniformly endeavoured, so far as I was able, to direct your attention to studies susceptible of a practical application to the great concerns of humanity, whether providence may allot to you the obscure but important duties of a private station, or may be pleased to call you to the great and arduous scenes of public affairs. In either event, I shall follow you with my affectionate wishes through the various fortunes which may await you. And, believe me, nothing will ever give me greater satisfaction than to hear that you have carried into the different departments of life for which you may be destined, these steady principles of religion, of integrity, and of beneficence which can alone render you happy in yourselves and bring blessings to mankind.”

This was delivered in 1804, and four years later he concluded the same course with these memorable words:――

“Now, gentlemen, when the connection is to be dissolved which has for some months past subsisted between us, may I not be permitted to express the hope which I am encouraged to entertain by the attention with which you have honoured me:――that long after the period of your academical education, you will recollect with satisfaction those studies of your youth; and that by fixing in some measure your principles concerning the nature, the duties, and the prospects of man, they may contribute, under the various vicissitudes of fortune that may yet await you, to fortify your virtuous resolutions, to elevate your views above the pursuits of a vulgar ambition, and cherish in your minds those habitual sentiments of religion, of humanity, of justice, and of fortitude, which can alone render these talents and accomplishments a source of permanent happiness and honour to yourselves, a blessing to your friends, and a pledge to your country for the perpetuity of that political fabric reared by the hand and cemented by the blood of your ancestors; now alas! standing alone amid the wreck of surrounding establishments, the last asylum and the only remaining bulwark of the liberties of Europe.”¹

¹ _Collected Works_, Volume IX., pages 452‒453, 464. The above
passages are admirably calculated for effect; and to have
heard them from the lips of Stewart, uttered with all the
grace, the gravity, and the dignity which he possessed, must
have produced a strong impression.

Some people, however, thought Stewart’s political opinions
too liberal, and that he had shown rather much favour
towards some of his French contemporaries; and he seems
to have had such parties in his mind when he composed the
following note:――“I think it proper for me now to add, that
at the period when this memoir was read before the Royal
Society of Edinburgh, it was not unusual, even among men
of some talents and information, to confound studiously,
the speculative doctrines of political economy, with the
discussions concerning the first principles of government,
which happened unfortunately at that time to agitate
the public mind. The doctrine of free trade was itself
represented as of a revolutionary tendency; and some, which
had formerly prided themselves on their intimacy with Smith,
and on their zeal for the propagation of his liberal system,
began to question the expediency of subjecting to the
disputations of philosophers the arena of state policy,
and the unfathomable wisdom of the feudal ages.”――Stewart’s
_Life of Adam Smith, in Collected Works_, Volume X., page 87.

Stewart’s works consist of――(1) _Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, extending to three volumes, which were published separately in the years 1792, 1814, and 1827; but in the interval between the publication of the first and third of these volumes, (2) his _Outlines of Moral Philosophy_ appeared in 1793; (3) his _Philosophical Essays_ in 1810; (4) his _Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy_ in 1814 and 1820; (5) his _Biographical Account of Adam Smith_ in 1793, _of Dr. Robertson_ in 1796, and _of Dr. Reid_ in 1802; (6) his work on the _Active and Moral Powers of Man_ appeared in 1828, the year of his death; (7) his _Lectures on Political Economy_ which were not prepared for publication by Stewart himself, but drawn up from imperfect manuscripts, and included in Hamilton’s collected editions of his works. This edition extends to ten volumes, and to it my references are uniformly made.

When Stewart entered on the duties of the chair of moral philosophy, his mind was well trained to scientific studies, which enabled him to take a comprehensive view of the subject. In the first volume of his _Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind_, he explained at length what he conceived to be the nature, the object, and the utility of mental study; but he did not in any of his writings develop his view of the precise relation of psychology to the philosophical sciences, nor specify the modes of their dependence on each other; although he stated, in general terms, the common relation which the different branches of knowledge bear to the human mind. He indicates his view thus:――“To the philosophy of the mind are to be referred all our inquiries concerning the divisions and the classification of the objects of human knowledge, and also all the various rules, both for the communication and the investigation of truth. These general rules of science, and these general rules of method, ought to form the subject of a rational and useful logic.... As a philosophical system of logic would assist us in our particular scientific investigations, by keeping steadily in our view the attainable objects of human curiosity; so, by exhibiting to us the relation in which they all stand to each other, and the relation which they all bear to what ought to be their common end――the advancement of human happiness, it would have a tendency to confine industry and genius to inquiries that are of real practical utility.... From such a system of logic, too, important assistance might be expected for reforming the established plan of academical education. It is melancholy to reflect on the manner in which this is carried on in most, perhaps I should say in all the countries of Europe; and that in an age of comparative light and liberty, the intellectual and moral characters of youth should continue to be formed on a plan devised by men, who were not only strangers to the business of the world, but who felt themselves interested in opposing the progress of useful knowledge.”¹

¹ _Works_, Volume II., pages 55‒59, 77‒80; also Volume I.
(Dissertation, pages 477, 478.) Stewart’s remarks on
education are still worth reading.

Although he explicitly recognised the contrast of mind and matter, and the branches of science to which the investigation of the opposite phenomena gives rise, still he purposely refrained from attempting their scientific organisation. The leading aim of his efforts was to contribute what he could to general psychology, to diffuse a taste for reflective studies, and to induce a noble and hopeful life in man; thus raising a liberal culture upon the firm basis of self-knowledge.¹ After he had discussed and pointed out the shortcomings in the existing state of things, he enounced his own purpose in the following words:――“I have thus endeavoured to point out and illustrate a few of the important purposes to which the philosophy of the human mind is subservient. It will not, however, I flatter myself, be supposed by any of my readers that I mean to attempt a systematic work on all or any of the subjects I have now mentioned, the most limited of which would furnish matter for many volumes. What I have aimed at has been to give, in the first place, as distinct and complete an analysis as I could of the principles, both intellectual and active, of our nature; and, in the second place, to illustrate, as I proceed, the application of these general laws of the human constitution to the different classes of phenomena that result from them.... It will not, therefore, I hope, be objected to me, that I have been guilty of a blameable violation of unity in the plan of my work, till it be considered how far such a violation was useful for accomplishing the purposes for which I write.”²

¹ “It is almost unnecessary for me to remark, how much
individuals would be assisted in the proper and liberal
culture of the mind, if they were previously led to take a
comprehensive survey of human nature in all its parts, of
its various faculties, and powers, and sources of enjoyment,
and of the effects which are produced on these by particular
situations. It is such knowledge alone of the capacities
of the mind, that can enable a person to judge of his
own acquisitions; and to employ the most effective means
of supplying his defects, and removing his inconvenient
habits.... But education can never be systematically
directed to its proper objects, till we have obtained, not
only an accurate analysis of the general principles of our
nature, and an account of the most important laws which
regulate their operation; but also an explanation of the
various modifications and combinations of these principles,
which produce that diversity of talents, genius, and
character, we observe among men.”――Volume II., pages 61, 62.

² Volume II., pages 89, 90.

In the discrimination of ultimate principles, Stewart manifested admirable sagacity. He called truths “The Fundamental Laws of Belief, or the Primary Elements of Human Reason,” meaning by this generally what Reid termed First Principles, or the Dictates of Common Sense. The chief point in the treatment of these principles, in which Stewart differs from Reid, is in relation to mathematical demonstration. He makes no pretension to an exhaustive enumeration of these primary truths, but so far as he goes, his mode of discriminating them is reasonable and satisfactory.¹

¹ Volume III., page 41, _et seq._

His classification of cognition――the faculties of knowledge――is as follows:――1. Consciousness; 2. External Perception; 3. Attention; 4. Conception; 5. Abstraction; 6. Association of Ideas; 7. Memory; 8. Imagination; 9. Reasoning, including Logic.

This distribution of the intellectual faculties is redundant; and though consciousness is recognised as a separate attribute of the mind, it receives no satisfactory treatment. Attention, though an important function, is not a separate faculty, as it is acquired by a long series of efforts, and both its exercise and power depends upon the will.

In regard to perception Stewart followed the doctrines of Reid. Conception is explained as a power of the mind which enables us to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation formally felt; its function being to give us an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. He distinguishes his meaning of the term from imagination, and observes that he followed Reid in this application of the term.

A chapter is devoted to abstraction, which is treated at great length through eight sections, and in which there are many interesting observations. The last section dealt with the use and abuse of general principles in politics, and he endeavours to clear up some of the prevailing misconceptions of the economical system――an ideal theory of society. Stewart himself was always inclined to take a favourable view of the future progress of mankind and the improvement of political institutions; and in this section he directs his efforts to show that such a result was probable.¹

¹ Volume II., page 249.

Two chapters are given to the discussion of the association of ideas, which he considered from two points of view――(1) the influence of association in regulating the succession of our thoughts, and (2) its influence on the intellectual powers and on the moral character, by the more close and indissolvable combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and in early youth. His exposition of association extends to about a hundred pages, and it is interesting and well illustrated by appropriate instances and quotations. He enumerates, as obvious modes of associative connection, Resemblance, Contrariety, Vicinity in time and place; and as less obvious modes, Cause and Effect, Means and Ends, Premises, and Conclusions. In his concluding remarks he avers that “there is good reason for believing that many of the facts which consciousness would lead us to consider, upon a superficial view, as ultimate facts, are resolvable into other principles still more general.”¹

¹ Volume II., page 344.

In his treatment of memory, he endeavoured to show that it cannot be resolved into the principle of association, because association presupposes a conservative faculty in the mind itself; but, on the other hand, without the associative principle, our faculty of retention would be of little use. He discusses the varieties of memory manifested in different individuals, the improvement of memory, the connection between memory and philosophical genius; and on all these varied relations of memory Stewart says much that is interesting and instructive. There are three requisites to a good memory――“(1) to be susceptible, (2) to be retentive, (3) to be ready.”¹

¹ Volume II. page 365.

To imagination he assigns the function of making a selection of qualities and circumstances from a variety of different objects, and, by combining and arranging these, to form a new creation of its own. He gives it, however, the characteristics rather of a reproductive faculty than of a representative one. He treated imagination in its relation to some of the fine arts, and its relation to taste and genius. He also examined at length the influence of imagination on character and happiness.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 431‒435, 450, _et seq._

In the second volume of his _Elements of the Mind_, he treats of reasoning and deductive evidence; of the Aristotelian Logic; and of the method of inquiry according to the experimental or inductive logic. These mixed logical discussions contain much that is interesting, if not always profound. The third volume of his _Elements_ treats of language; of the principle or law of sympathetic imitation; of the varieties of intellectual character; comparisons between the faculties of man and those of the lower animals; and several other interesting subjects. His long chapter on the varieties of intellectual character is exceedingly interesting.

Stewart’s volume of philosophical essays contain some of his best compositions, and are partly historical, critical, and literary. More than one half of the volume is occupied with the discussion of topics relating to Taste――the beautiful, the sublime, and allied subjects. Explanations and criticisms of Locke, Berkeley, and the theories of ♦Hartley, Priestly, and Darwin, occupy the other parts of the volume.

♦ “Hartly” replaced with “Hartley”

He classified the active powers of the mind, the emotions, feelings, and desires thus:――

I. Instinctive { 1. Appetites.
Principles { 2. Desires = Knowledge, Esteem, Power, etc.
of Action. { 3. Affections = Benevolent and Malevolent.

{ 1. Prudence.
II. Rational and { 2. Moral Faculty.
Governing { 3. Decency, or regard to character.
Principles { 4. Sympathy.
of Action. { 5. The Ridiculous.
{ 6. Taste.

His treatment of these varied phenomena of the mind is always interesting, cautious, humane, and marked by sound judgment and sagacity; occasionally original, and, on the whole, the most valuable part of his writings.

He stated the aim of moral inquiry thus:――“The object of moral philosophy is to ascertain the general rules of a wise and virtuous conduct in life, in so far as these rules may be discovered by the unassisted light of nature, that is, by an examination of the human constitution, and of the circumstances in which man is placed.” With this end, our inquiries may be arranged under three heads, according as they refer to the intellectual powers of man; to his active and moral powers, or to consideration of man as a member of a political body.¹

¹ _Outlines of Moral Philosophy._

In short, to sum up his chief moral doctrines, he maintained――1. That the Moral Faculty is an original principle of the mind; he argued this point earnestly and at length. 2. He argued against the ethical systems founded on Utility. 3. But he objected strongly to the doctrine which makes morality depend on the will of God. 4. On the question of Freewill, he contends for liberty. 5. Concerning the relation of Morality to Religion, he assumes the benevolence of the Deity, and avers that “when we are convinced that God is infinitely good, and that He is the friend and protector of virtue, this belief affords the most powerful inducements to the practice of every branch of our duty.” 6. He elaborately discussed the subject of Happiness, and presented a classification of the most important pleasures under the following heads:――(1) The pleasures of activity and repose; (2) the pleasures of sense; (3) the pleasures of the imagination; (4) the pleasures of the understanding; (5) the pleasures of taste, or fine art.

In forming an opinion upon his merits as a writer, the aims which he had in view, and the circumstances in which his works originated, should be remembered. Stewart cannot be called a great original thinker; but he was an able teacher and a good expositor. Most of his writings could have been much improved by a process of pruning and condensation.

His style is graceful, ornate, and flowing, and enriched by a liberal culture. He had the power of rendering a difficult subject attractive and easily comprehended; yet he was not, in the higher sense, a master of method. Hence his _Dissertation on the History of Mental Philosophy_ is very defective in arrangement and in consecutive exposition. In short, the main defects of his style is diffuseness and repetition, and a lack of force and strength, with a singular and lamentable want of brief and orderly recapitulation, at the proper places. He hardly seems to have been aware of the value of a concise and luminous statement at the close or the beginning of a great subject as an aid to the understanding. But after all reasonable deductions, Stewart’s works remain a noble monument of his talents, industry, humane culture, and his kindly nature and goodness of heart.