Chapter XIII: Section I: Reid

DR. THOMAS REID attained distinction as an opponent of scepticism on the principles of common sense. He was born on the 26th of April, 1710, in the parish of Strachan, Kincardineshire, where his father was minister for the long period of fifty years. Dr. Reid was educated at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and having studied for the Church, was appointed pastor of the parish of New Machar in 1737. In this position he quietly performed his parochial duties for fifteen years, and gained the esteem of the inhabitants of the parish. In 1752, he was elected Professor of Philosophy in King’s College, Aberdeen, an office which he held for eleven years. He was chosen in 1763 to succeed Adam Smith in the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, and in this famed seat of learning continued to instruct a large class of students for a period of eighteen years.¹ Thus, Reid performed the functions of a professor for a period of nearly thirty years.

¹ Stewart’s _Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid_.

He was gifted by nature with a strong constitution. Although rather under the middle height, his frame was vigorous, and his muscular force unusually great. To these advantages he joined habits of exercise and temperance and an unclouded serenity of temper. “His countenance was strongly expressive of deep and collected thought; but when brightened up by the face of a friend, what chiefly caught the attention was a look of goodwill and kindness.”¹

¹ Stewart’s _Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid_.
Stewart says:――“The merits of Dr. Reid as a public teacher
were derived chiefly from that rich fund of original and
instructive philosophy which is to be found in his writings,
and from his unwearied assiduity in inculcating principles
which he conceived to be of essential importance to human
happiness. In his elocution and mode of instruction, there
was nothing peculiarly attractive. He seldom, if ever,
indulged himself in the warmth of extempore discourse;
nor was his manner of reading calculated to increase the
effect of what he had committed to writing. Such, however,
was the simplicity and perspicuity of his style, such
the gravity and authority of his character, and such the
general interest of his young hearers in the doctrines which
he taught, that, by the numerous audiences to which his
instructions were addressed, he was heard uniformly with the
most silent and respectful attention. On this subject, I can
speak from personal knowledge; having had the good fortune,
during a considerable part of the winter of 1772, to be one
of his pupils.”――_Ibid._, section 1.

Dr. Reid’s writings consist of――(1) _An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense_, published in 1764; (2) _Essays on the Intellectual Powers of the Mind_, 1785, and _Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind_, 1788; (3) _An Account of Aristotle’s Logic_; (4) _An Account of the University of Glasgow_; (5) _An Essay on Quantity_.

The most polished of his works is the _Inquiry into the Human Mind_. It consists of seven chapters, each of which is divided into a number of sections. Excepting the first and the concluding chapters, the work is mainly occupied with the treatment of the five external senses: an analysis of sensation, in the following order:――Smelling, tasting, hearing, touching, and seeing. The work throughout has a somewhat polemical tone, with occasional touches of sarcasm; still it has rare merits. His treatment of the senses is often accurate, though not always. In the history of philosophical opinions he is frequently inaccurate, and sometimes quite wrong; imperfect knowledge of previous systems of thought was his weakest point.

Reid avows that it was Hume’s _Treatise of Human Nature_ which prompted him to undertake his own _Inquiry into the Mind_, and to reclaim against the principles which had issued in such sceptical conclusions. He desired to place the fundamental principles of knowledge upon firmer grounds, though, in the execution of his task, he often declaims rather than reasons on some of the questions at issue.

His treatment of the external senses, especially of sight and touch, is valuable. He makes true and ingenious remarks on natural language and signs. Such signs he conceived to be of two kinds――(1) those which have their meaning assigned by tacit agreement; and (2) those which, prior to all agreement, have a distinct meaning which man understands by the principles of his nature. Thus “language, so far as it consists of artificial signs, may be called artificial; so far as it consists of natural signs, I call it natural.” He argues that, if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one. He thinks that the signs which are naturally expressive of man’s thoughts may be reduced to three kinds――modulations of the voice, gestures, and features. His explanation of this subject is interesting and instructive.¹

¹ Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume I., pages 95‒96, 117‒118, _et seq._

Reid’s doctrine of signs is connected with his view of perception. He distinguished perception from sensation, and stated that the simplest operations of the mind do not admit of logical definition. He often states that the sensations are merely signs, and that the objects themselves are the things signified; but he does not maintain that the sign resembles the original. He observes that the same mode of expression is used to denote sensation and perception, but sensation has more of the element of feeling in it than perception: mere sensation consists in its being felt and in nothing else; when it is not felt, it is not. Thus a sensation of pain signifies no more than the feeling of pain: the agreeable odour of a rose considered by itself is a pure sensation, which affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without any thought of the rose. This doctrine, according to Reid, is applicable to every other mere sensation.¹

¹ _Ibid._, Volume I., page 182, _et seq._; and in _Essays on
the Intellectual Powers_, page 310.

On the other hand, perception, as understood by Reid, has always an external object, or an object distinct from the act by which it is perceived――an object which may exist whether it be perceived or not. He maintained that we have an immediate perception, a direct intuition of the primary qualities of bodies. Our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of these qualities, as to what they are in themselves; but of the secondary qualities of bodies, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion.

An act of perception of an external object he thus describes:――(1) “We have some conception or notion of the object perceived; (2) a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; (3) that this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning.” He also distinguishes perceptions into two classes――those which are original, and those which are acquired by experience.¹

¹ _Ibid._, Volume I., pages 313‒314, 258.

Thus Reid’s doctrine of perception seems to be explicit. It has to be observed, however, that in his accounts of the views of other philosophers, and in his criticisms on them, he did not search out the various theories of representative or mediate perception. This lack of exhaustive discrimination unintentionally led him into some mistakes which partially vitiated his criticisms of the doctrines of other philosophers, and rendered even the cardinal point of his own doctrine doubtful; for some hold that he is an idealist, and others that he is a realist. A brief explanation of this seems to be requisite.

1. First, then, some philosophers admit an immediate knowledge of a not-ego, but not of an external not-ego; while they do not limit the immediate knowledge of the mind to its own states, yet conceiving it impossible that the external reality can be brought within the sphere of consciousness, they suppose that it is represented by an image, numerically different from the mind, but placed somewhere, either in the brain or mind, within the sphere of consciousness. 2. Others deny to the mind any consciousness of a not-ego at all, and hold that what the mind immediately perceives, and mistakes for an external object, is merely the ego itself peculiarly modified. Each of these chief theories of a representative perception, admits of several subordinate varieties.

Thus, taking the first of the above hypotheses, it is subdivided according as the immediate object of perception is viewed――(1) as material, (2) as immaterial, (3) or as neither, (4) or as both, as something physical, as propagated from the external object, as generated in the medium or as fabricated in the mind itself; and the latter either in the intelligent mind or in the animal life, as infused by God or by angels, or as identical with the divine substance――as in the system of Spinoza, and in other pantheistic theories. In the second, the representative modification has been sometimes viewed as a mere product of the mind itself; or as innate, and so independent of any mental energy.¹

¹ Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume II., pages 816‒819; _Lectures on
Metaphysics and Logic_, Volume II., pages 29‒30.

Now Reid never adequately distinguished these views of representative perception, either in their historical relation or as possible in theory, but directed his attacks against what he usually calls the “common theory of ideas,” which was merely one of the cruder forms of the representative theory of perception; and thus it happens that his onslaughts on Berkeley and Hume are often misdirected and ineffective, as he did not establish the fact of the two cognitions, the presentative and the representative, single out their contents or evolve their conditions; and, in particular, did not show which of these was the kind of cognition competent in our perception of the external world. He failed to observe that representation is possible under two forms――the egoistical and the non-egoistical; and each of which, if perception be reduced to a representative faculty, affords premises equally available to the absolute idealist and the sceptic. Hence he was led into various inconsistences of a historical character, especially in the exposition of his own doctrine of perception.¹

¹ Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume I., pages 106, 128, 130, 131, 210,
226, 256, 257, 269, 274, 277, 293, 299, 318, 427.

Yet, notwithstanding these defects of development and exposition, Reid performed good service to psychology by banishing the imaginary images interposed between perception and its objects.

Having indicated Reid’s view of perception, I proceed to give a brief account of his treatment of the other phenomena of the mind. He divides the mental phenomena into the intellectual powers and the active powers; and he classified the intellectual powers thus:――(1) The External Senses; (2) Memory; (3) Conception or Simple Apprehension; (4) Abstraction; (5) Judgment――First Truths; (6) Reasoning; (7) Taste. He distributed the active powers into three parts:――I. Mechanical principles of actions――(1) Instinct, (2) Habit; II. Animal principles ――(1) Appetites, (2) Desires, (3) Affections; III. Rational principles ――(1) Self-love, (2) Duty.¹

¹ This classification is not founded upon any essential
principle of division of mental phenomena.

Following the order just indicated, the first essay is devoted to an explication of terms and principles taken for granted. The second essay treats of the external senses, which we have already considered; in it also he reviews at great length the opinions of various philosophers touching the perception of the external world. He then passes to memory, which he treats at length, and affirms that it is an original faculty. He states that by memory we have an immediate knowledge of things in the past,¹ and that it is always accompanied with the belief of that which we remember. Under the head of memory he discusses duration and personal identity. Of the latter he says:――“The conviction which every man has of his identity, as far back as his memory reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it; and no philosophy can weaken it, without first producing some degree of insanity.... A person is something indivisible, and is what Leibnitz calls a monad.... The identity of a person is a perfect identity; wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees, and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a monad, and is not divisible into parts.”²

¹ This is a mistake: we can only have a mediate knowledge
of past things or events――that is, only a representative
knowledge.

² Hamilton’s _Reid_, Volume I. pages 339‒345.

He describes conception, and says that conceiving, imagining, apprehending, and understanding are words used to express that operation of the mind called simple apprehension; the having an idea of a thing is, in common language, used in the same sense. He refers to the train of thought in the mind, but he adduces nothing specially original on the association of thoughts and ideas, and in fact he was behind some of his predecessors in this important branch of mental science.

In his essay on abstraction, he explains general words, general conceptions, and the process of classification. Then, under the general heading of judgment, he discusses common sense and first principles. Common sense he regards as a special faculty, and the following quotation will indicate what Reid meant by this phrase:――

“In common language, sense always implies judgment. A man of sense is a man of judgment. Nonsense is what is evidently contrary to right judgment. Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business.... Men rarely ask what common sense is; because every man believes himself possessed of it, and would take it for an imputation upon his understanding to be thought unacquainted with it.

“It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense. It is indeed the first-born of reason, and as they are commonly joined together in speech and in writing, they are inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense.”¹

¹ _Ibid._, Volume I., pages 421‒425.

Thus Reid considered it the province of common sense to judge of first principles; and he further avers that, to judge of first principles require no more than a sound mind free from prejudice and a clear conception of the question. The learned and the unlearned, the philosopher and the day-labourer, are upon a level, and will pass the same judgment, when they are not misled by some bias. He then proceeds to deliver his views of first principles.

Although first principles are self-evident, and cannot be proved by arguments, yet a certain kind of reasoning may be applied in their support:――1. To show that the principle rejected stands upon the same footing with others that are admitted. 2. As in mathematics, a reduction to absurdity may be employed. 3. The consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned, ought to have great authority with regard to first principles, where every man is a competent judge. 4. Opinions that appear so early in the mind, that they cannot be the effect of education, or of false reasoning, have a good claim to be considered as first principles.

He asks whether the conclusions of common sense can be enumerated and digested in such a form as all reasonable men will assent to it. He recognises the difficulties besetting this, and admits that his own enumeration is not perfectly satisfactory. His classification proceeds on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, and may be summarised thus:――

(A.) Principles of Contingent Truths:――1. Everything that I am conscious of exists.¹ The irresistible conviction of the reality of what we are conscious of is not the effect of reasoning; it is immediate and intuitive, and therefore a first principle. 2. The thoughts that I am conscious of are the thoughts of a being that I call myself, my mind, my person. 3. Those things did really happen that I distinctly remember. 4. Our own personal identity and continued existence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly. 5. Those things do really exist that we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. 6. We have some degree of power over our actions and the determinations of our will. The origin of our idea of power is not easily assigned. Power is not an object of sense or consciousness. We see events as successive, but not the power whereby they are produced. We are conscious of the operations of our minds; but power is not an operation of the mind. It is evidently, however, implied in every act of volition, and in all deliberation and resolution. Likewise, when we approve or disapprove, we believe that men have power to do or not to do. 7. The natural faculties, whereby we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. 8. Our fellow-men with whom we converse are possessed of life and intelligence. 9. Certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind. The signification of those things we do not learn by experience, but by a kind of natural perception. Children, almost as soon as they are born, may be frightened by an angry or threatening tone of voice. 10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion. 11. There are many events depending on the will of man, possessing a self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances; as in men of sound mind we expect a certain degree of regularity in their conduct. 12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. Hume has shown that this principle is not grounded on reason, and has not the intuitive evidence of mathematical axioms.

¹ Reid treats consciousness as a special faculty which cannot
be defined.

(B.) Principles of Necessary Truths. Regarding those Reid deemed it enough to divide them into classes, and to mention some of each class.

I. Grammatical Principles:――1. Every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood. 2. Every complete sentence must have a verb.

II. Logical Principles:――1. Any contexture of words that does not make a proposition is neither true nor false. 2. Every proposition is either true or false. 3. No proposition can be both true and false at the same time. 4. Reasoning in a circle proves nothing. 5. Whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus may be truly affirmed of all its species, and of all the individualps belonging to that species.

III. The Mathematical Axioms.

IV. The Principles of Taste:――1. The fundamental rules of poetry, music, eloquence, and dramatic action; and 2. those of painting have always been the same, and will be so to the end of the world.

V. First Principles in Morals:――1. An unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one. 2. A generous action has more merit than a merely just one. 3. No man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder.

VI. Metaphysical Principles:――1. The qualities that we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we call body, and the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind. The distinction between sensible qualities and the substance to which they belong is not the invention of philosophers, but is found in the structure of all languages. 2. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause. 3. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks or signs of them in the effect.

Reid has sometimes been severely handled for his multiplication of first principles; and it must be admitted that his scheme is crude, lacking in discrimination, in logical consistency, and in precision of statement; that it includes various truths as first principles which have no real claim to such a character; still it embodies, in a plain form, a considerable quantity of important truths.

He concludes his exposition of the intellectual powers with an essay on Taste. He notices the force of custom, of fancy, and of casual associations, in modifying taste; and observes that men differ more in their standard of taste than their judgments in matters of truth and error.

His treatment of the active powers of the mind occupies five essays. In the first, he treats of active powers in general; in the second, of the will; in the third, of the principles of action, which he distinguishes as already stated; in the fourth, he discusses the liberty of moral agents; and the fifth and last essay deals with morals.

Touching the sense of duty, he recognises and insists that we have an original moral faculty, which we call conscience. We have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation; and by this faculty we perceive some things to be right in human conduct and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of the same faculty, and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates as upon the determinations of our senses, or our other natural faculties.

Reid contends earnestly for the freedom of the will, and discusses the counter doctrine of necessity at length, and with much vigour.¹ In the concluding essay, he attacks the utilitarian theory of morals as propounded by Hume, and his objections to several points of it were well and effectively directed. He showed that this theory did not recognise or take account of moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends, and that it failed to distinguish between obligatory and non-obligatory useful acts.

¹ In 1793, _An Essay on Philosophical Necessity_ appeared,
by Alexander Crombie, A.M., and in which the views of Dr.
Reid on the freedom of the will are adversely discussed and
criticised, with much acuteness and ingenuity.

To sum up, though Reid’s writings are in many points imperfect, yet they have much psychological merit and interest. His intellect was active and vigorous, but not of the highest and widest order; his analytic and critical powers were limited; but he was painstaking and patient in investigation. In truth, the natural bent of his mind drew him more to the concrete and practical side of philosophy than to speculation in the higher region of thought; subjectively, he was not strong. Still his thinking power in certain directions, his native sagacity and force of character, his candour and fairness, and the favourable circumstances in which he was placed, enabled him to found a school, in which some of his disciples have outvied their master in analytic power and speculative thought.