Chapter X: Part 10

Our true situation appears to me to be this,--a new extensive Country containing within itself the materials for forming a Government capable of extending to its Citizens all the blessings of Civil & religious liberty--capable of making them happy at home. This is the great end of Republican Establishments. We mistake the object of our Government, if we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object of republican Systems. If they are sufficiently active & energetic to rescue us from contempt & preserve our domestic happiness & security, it is all we can expect from them,--it is more than almost any other Government ensures to its citizens.

I believe this observation will be found generally true:--that no two people are so exactly alike in their situation or circumstances as to admit the exercise of the same Government with equal benefit; that a system must be suited to the habits & genius of the People it is to govern, and must grow out of them.

The people of the U. S. may be divided into three classes--_Professional men_ who must from their particular pursuits always have a considerable weight in the Government while it remains popular--_Commercial men_, who may or may not have weight as a wise or injudicious commercial policy is pursued.--If that commercial policy is pursued which I conceive to be the true one, the merchants of this Country will not or ought not for a considerable time to have much weight in the political scale.--The third is the _landed interest_, the owners and cultivators of the soil, who are and ought ever to be the governing spring in the system.--These three classes, however distinct in their pursuits are individually equal in the political scale, and may be easily proved to have but one interest. The dependence of each on the other is mutual. The merchant depends on the planter. Both must in private as well as public affairs be connected with the professional men; who in their turn must in some measure depend on them. Hence it is clear from this manifest connection, & the equality which I before stated exists, & must for the reasons then assign, continue, that after all there is one, but one great & equal body of Citizens composing the inhabitants of this Country among whom there are no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of fortune.

For a people thus circumstanced are we then to form a Government & the question is what sort of Government is best suited to them.

Will it be the British Gov^t? No. Why? Because G. Britain contains three orders of people distinct in their situation, their possessions & their principles.--These orders combined form the great body of the Nation. And as in national expences the wealth of the whole community must contribute, so ought each component part to be properly & duly represented.--No other combination of power could form this due representation, but the one that exists.--Neither the peers or the people could represent the royalty, nor could the Royalty & the people form a proper representation for the Peers.--Each therefore must of necessity be represented by itself, or the sign of itself; and this accidental mixture has certainly formed a Government admirably well balanced.

But the U. States contain but one order that can be assimilated to the British Nation,--this is the order of Commons. They will not surely then attempt to form a Government consisting of three branches, two of which shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an Executive & Senate (hereditary) because the King & Lords of England are so. The same reasons do not exist and therefore the same provisions are not necessary.

We must as has been observed suit our Governm^t to the people it is to direct. These are I believe as active, intelligent & susceptible of good Governm^t as any people in the world. The Confusion which has produced the present relaxed State is not owing to them. It is owing to the weakness & (defects) of a Gov^t incapable of combining the various interests it is intended to unite, and destitute of energy.--All that we have to do then is to distribute the powers of Gov^t in such a manner, and for such limited periods, as while it gives a proper degree of permanency to the Magistrate, will reserve to the people, the right of election they will not or ought not frequently to part with.--I am of opinion that this may easily be done; and that with some amendments the propositions before the Committee will fully answer this end.

No position appears to me more true than this; that the General Gov^t cannot effectually exist without reserving to the States the possession of their local rights. They are the instruments upon which the Union must frequently depend for the support & execution of their powers, however immediately operating upon the people, and not upon the States.

Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing the distinction of State Governments, & having but one general System. Suffer me for a moment to examine this question.[107]

[107] The residue of this speech was not furnished, like the
above, by Mr. Pinckney.--Madison's Note.

Yates' report of the speech is meagre. The closing
paragraph, apparently the part lacking in Madison's report,
is:

"While we were dependent on the crown of Great Britain, it
was in contemplation to form the whole into one; but it was
found impracticable. No legislature could make good laws for
the whole, nor can it now be done. It would necessarily
place the power in the hands of the few nearest the seat of
government. State governments must therefore remain, if you
mean to prevent confusion. The general negative powers will
support the general government. Upon these considerations, I
am led to form the second branch differently from the
report. These powers are important, and the number not too
large, upon the principle of proportion. I have considered
the subject with great attention; and I propose this plan
(reads it), and if no better plan is proposed, I will then
move its adoption."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 163.

The mode of constituting the 2^d branch being under consideration.

The word "national" was struck out, and "United States" inserted.

M^r Ghorum, inclined to a compromise as to the rule of proportion. He thought there was some weight in the objections of the small States. If V^a should have 16. votes & Del^{re} with several other States together 16, those from Virg^a would be more likely to unite than the others, and would therefore have an undue influence. This remark was applicable not only to States, but to Counties or other districts of the same State. Accordingly the Constitution of Mass^{ts} had provided that the representatives of the larger districts should not be in an exact ratio to their numbers, and experience he thought had shewn the provision to be expedient.

M^r Read. The States have heretofore been in a sort of partnership. They ought to adjust their old affairs before they open a new account. He brought into view the appropriation of the co[~m]on interest in the Western lands, to the use of particular States. Let justice be done on this head; let the fund be applied fairly & equally to the discharge of the general debt, and the smaller States who had been injured; would listen then perhaps to those ideas of just representation which had been held out.

M^r Ghorum, did not see how the Convention could interpose in the case. Errors he allowed had been committed on the subject. But Cong^s were now using their endeavours to rectify them. The best remedy would be such a Government as would have vigor enough to do justice throughout. This was certainly the best chance that could be afforded to the smaller States.

M^r Wilson, the question is shall the members of the 2^d branch be chosen by the Legislatures of the States? When he considered the amazing extent of Country--the immense population which is to fill it, the influence which the Gov^t we are to form will have, not only on the present generation of our people & their multiplied posterity, but on the whole Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object. The project of Henry the 4^{th} & his Statesmen was but the picture in miniature of the great portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an election by the State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it was necessary to observe the twofold relation in which the people would stand, 1. as Citizens of the Gen^l Gov^t 2. as Citizens of their particular State. The Gen^l Gov^t was meant for them in the first capacity: the State Gov^{ts} in the second. Both Gov^{ts} were derived from the people--both meant for the people--both therefore ought to be regulated on the same principles. The same train of ideas which belonged to the relation of the Citizens to their State Gov^{ts} were applicable to their relation to the Gen^l Gov^t and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed, by abstracting as much as possible from the idea of the State Gov^{ts}. With respect to the province & object of the Gen^l Gov^t they should be considered as having no existence. The election of the 2^d branch by the Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests & local prejudices. The Gen^l Gov^t is not an assemblage of States, but of individuals for certain political purposes--it is not meant for the States, but for the individuals composing them; the _individuals_ therefore not the _States_, ought to be represented in it: A proportion in this representation can be preserved in the 2^d as well as in the 1^{st} branch; and the election can be made by electors chosen by the people for that purpose. He moved an amendment to that effect which was not seconded.

M^r Elseworth saw no reason for departing from the mode contained in the Report. Whoever chooses the member, he will be a Citizen of the State he is to represent & will feel the same spirit & act the same part whether he be appointed by the people or the Legislature. Every State has its particular views & prejudices, which will find their way into the general Councils, through whatever channel they may flow. Wisdom was one of the characteristics which it was in contemplation to give the second branch. Would not more of it issue from the Legislatures; than from an immediate election by the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining the existence, & agency of the States. Without their co-operation it would be impossible to support a Republican Gov^t over so great an extent of Country. An army could scarcely render it practicable. The largest States are the worst Governed. Virg^a is obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to extend her Gov^t to Kentuckey. Mass^{ts} cannot keep the peace one hundred miles from her capitol and is now forming an army for its support. How long Pen^a may be free from a like situation cannot be foreseen. If the principles & materials of our Gov^t are not adequate to the extent of these single States; how can it be imagined that they can support a single Gov^t throughout the U. States. The only chance of supporting a Gen^l Gov^t lies in grafting it on that of the individual States.

Doc^r Johnson urged the necessity of preserving the State Gov^{ts} which would be at the mercy of the Gen^l Gov^t on M^r Wilson's plan.

M^r Madison thought it w^d obviate difficulty if the present resol: were postponed, & the 8{th} taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage in the 2^d branch.

Doc^r Williamson professed himself a friend to such a system as would secure the existence of the State Gov^{ts}. The happiness of the people depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate untill he knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain this, he moved to insert these words after "2^d branch of the Nat^l Legislature"--"who shall bear such proportion to the n^o of the 1^{st} branch as 1 to ----." He was not seconded.

M^r Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficient Gov^t is necessary that to render it such it ought to have the faculty of self defence, that to render its different branches effectual each of them ought to have the same power of self defence. He did not wonder that such an agreement should have prevailed in these points. He only wondered that there should be any disagreement about the necessity of allowing the State Gov^{ts} the same self-defence. If they are to be preserved as he conceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have this power. And the only mode left of giving it to them, was by allowing them to appoint the 2^d branch of the Nat^l Legislature.

M^r Butler observing that we were put to difficulties at every step by the uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representation w^d prevail finally in the 2^d branch, moved to postpone the 4^{th} Resol: & to proceed to the Resol: on that point. M^r Madison seconded him.

On the question

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no.
Del. no. M{d.} no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a question to postpone the 4 and take up the 7 Resol: ays, Mary^d V^a N. C. S. C. Geo;--Noes, Mass. C^t N. Y. N. J. P^a Del:

On the question to agree "that the members of the 2^d branch be chosen by the indiv^l Legislatures" Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.[108]

[108] Madison's Note:

It must be kept in view that the largest States particularly
Pennsylvania & Virginia always considered the choice of the
2^d Branch by the State Legislatures as opposed to a
proportional representation to which they were attached as a
fundamental principle of just Government. The smaller States
who had opposite views, were reinforced by the members from
the large States most anxious to secure the importance of
the State Governments.

On a question on the clause requiring the age of 30 years at least,--it was agreed to unanimously:

On a question to strike out the words, "sufficient to ensure their independency" after the word "term" it was agreed to.

That the 2^d branch hold their offices for a term of seven years, considered.

M^r Ghorum suggests a term of "4 years," 1/4 to be elected every year.

M^r Randolph, supported the idea of rotation, as favorable to the wisdom & stability of the Corps, which might possibly be always sitting, and aiding the Executive.

And moves after "7 years," to add, "to go out in fixt proportion" which was agreed to.

M^r Williamson suggests "6 years," as more convenient for Rotation than 7 years.

M^r Sherman seconds him.

M^r Reed proposed that they s^d hold their offices "during good behaviour." Mr. R. Morris seconds him.

Gen^l Pinkney, proposed "4 years." A longer term w^d fix them at the seat of Gov^t. They w^d acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer their property & lose sight of the States they represent. Under these circumstances the distant States w^d labour under great disadvantages.[109]

[109] According to Yates, Madison followed Pinckney:
"Mr. Madison. We are proceeding in the same manner that was
done when the Confederation was first formed. Its original
draft was excellent, but in its progress and completion it
became so insufficient as to give rise to the present
Convention. By the vote already taken, will not the temper
of the state legislatures transfuse itself into the Senate?
Do we create a free government?"--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 168.

M^r Sherman moved to strike out "7 years" in order to take questions on the several propositions.

On the question to strike out "seven"

Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the question to insert "6 years", which failed 5 St^s being ay. 5 no, & 1 divided

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were 5 for 5 ag^{st} it & 1 divided,--Con. N. J. P^a Del. V^a ay. Mass^{ts} N. Y. N. C. S. C. Geo: no. Mary^d divided.

On the question for "5 years" it was lost.

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Adj^d.

TUESDAY, JUNE 26. IN CONVENTION

The duration of the 2^d branch under consideration.

M^r Ghorum moved to fill the blank with "six years," one third of the members to go out every second year.

M^r Wilson 2^{ded} the motion.

Gen^l Pinkney opposed six years in favor of four years. The States he said had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina in particular were different from the Northern. If the Senators should be appointed for a long term, they w^d settle in the State where they exercised their functions; and would in a little time be rather the representatives of that than of the State appoint^g them.

M^r Reed mov^d that the term be nine years. This w^d admit of a very convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He w^d still prefer "during good behaviour," but being little supported in that idea, he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.

M^r Broome 2^{ded} the motion.

M^r Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were first to protect the people ag^{st} their rulers; secondly to protect the people ag^{st} the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of Gov^t most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charg^d with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution ag^{st} this danger w^d be to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each other. In this they w^d be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Gov^t, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass thro' separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It w^d next occur to such people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of information as to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection w^d naturally suggest that the Gov^t be so constituted as that one of its branches might have an opp^y of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, w^d be that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence ag^{st} this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose ag^{st} impetuous councils. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on a Gov^t for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might under sudden impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized Countries the people fall into different classes hav^g a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors & debtors; farmers, merch^{ts} & manufacturers. There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observ^d (by M^r Pinkney) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Gov^{ts} as well as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot however be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we sh^d not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain quarters, to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded ag^{st} on the republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded ag^{st}? Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Gov^t sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed Gov^t he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long term allowed to the 2^d branch should not commence till such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to be re-elected little inconvenient either in a public or private view. He observed that as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan which in its operation w^d decide for ever the fate of Republican Gov^t we ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its preservation c^d require, but be equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience had particularly pointed out.

M^r Sherman. Gov^t is instituted for those who live under it. It ought therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Gov^t. Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the Government, by preserving that good behavior, because it ensures their re-election. In Connecticut elections have been very frequent, yet great stability & uniformity both as to persons & measures have been experienced from its original establishm^t to the present time; a period of more than a 130 years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness & wisdom in the system to be adopted; but he thought six or four years would be sufficient. He sh^d be content with either.

M^r Read wished it to be considered by the small States that it was their interest that we should become one people as much as possible; that State attachments sh^d be extinguished as much as possible; that the Senate, sh^d be so constituted as to have the feelings of Citizens of the whole.

M^r Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He concurred with M^r Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever the fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among ourselves, disgraced & lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their Government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in which it was most eligible.--He concurred also in the general observations of (M^r Madison) on the subject, which might be supported by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true that nothing like an equality of property existed; that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great & fundamental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial power had levelled the boundary between the _patricians_ & _plebeians_, what followed? The distinction between rich & poor was substituted. He meant not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark that (M^r Sherman) seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed Gov^t was so formed, as to render it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Con^t. Under the British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers appertaining to Gov^t particularly all those relating to foreign Nations were not in the hands of the Gov^t there. Their internal affairs also were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of late the Governm^t had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks M^r S. whether the State at this time dare impose & collect a tax on y^e people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections, the effect as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.

M^r Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent Gov^t. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to the means. One circumstance He thought should be carefully attended to. There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not ag^{st} every approach towards Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which seems to make such an approach. The Convention ought to be extremely cautious in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be proposed will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect to the quarter it proceeds from as well as from an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion will ensue, and it is even possible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He did not deny the position of M^r Madison, that the majority will generally violate justice when they have an interest in so doing: But did not think there was any such temptation in this Country. Our situation was different from that of G. Britain; and the great body of lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had marked many of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue for the purpose of Gov^t. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of elections; and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the people.

M^r Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but w^d add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested. Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2 to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within, but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depository of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations. The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Gov^t an advantage in this respect over Monarchy itself. In a Monarchy much must always depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal character will be lost in the political. He w^d add another observation. The popular objection ag^{st} appointing any public body for a long term was that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It would be a satisfactory answer to this objection that as 1/3 would go out triennially, there would be always three divisions holding their places for unequal times, and consequently acting under the influence of different views, and different impulses.--On the question for 9 years, 1/3 to go out triennially,

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t, no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question for 6 years,[110] 1/3 to go out biennially

Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

[110] Yates has the question on _five_ years, but this is
obviously a mistake.--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 172.

"To receive fixt stipends by which they may be compensated for their services" considered.

General Pinkney proposed "that no Salary should be allowed." As this (the Senatorial) branch was meant to represent the wealth of the Country, it ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if no allowance was to be made the wealthy alone would undertake the service. He moved to strike out the clause.

Doct^r Franklin seconded the motion. He wished the Convention to stand fair with the people. There were in it a number of young men who would probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be recommended we might be chargeable with having carved out places for ourselves. On the question,--Mas^{ts} Connecticut[111] P^a M^d S. Carolina ay. N. Y. N. J. Del. Virg^a N. C. Geo. no.

[111] Quer. whether Connecticut should not be, no. & Delaware,
ay.--Madison's Note.

M^r Williamson moved to change the expression into these words to wit "to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service." The motion was seconded by M^r Elseworth, and agreed to by all the States except S. Carol^a. It seemed to be meant only to get rid of the word "fixt" and leave greater room for modifying the provision on this point.

M^r Elseworth moved to strike out "to be paid out of the Nat^l Treasury" and insert "to be paid by their respective States." If the Senate was meant to strengthen the Gov^t it ought to have the confidence of the States. The States will have an interest in keeping up a representation, and will make such provision for supporting the members as will ensure their attendance.

M^r Madison considered this as a departure from a fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a duration of 6 years. They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State Legislatures. One great end of the institution was, that being a firm, wise and impartial body, it might not only give stability to the Gen^l Gov^t in its operations on individuals, but hold an even balance among different States. The motion would make the Senate like Congress, the mere Agents & Advocates of State interests & views, instead of being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice and the general Good. Cong^s had lately by the establishment of a board with full powers to decide on the mutual claims between the U. States & the individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging this part of the business referred to them by the Confederation.

M^r Dayton[112] considered the payment of the Senate by the States as fatal to their independence, he was decided for paying them out of the Nat^l Treasury.

[112] "Cap. Dayton is a young Gentleman of talents, with
ambition to exert them. He possesses a good education and
some reading; he speaks well, and seems desirous of
improving himself in Oratory. There is an impetuosity in his
temper that is injurious to him; but there is an honest
rectitude about him that makes him a valuable Member of
Society, and secures to him the esteem of all good Men. He
is about 30 years old, served with me a Brother Aid to
General Sullivan in the Western Expedition of
'79."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.

On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the States as moved by M^r Elseworth.

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint an idea which seemed to be proper for consideration. One important object in constituting the Senate was to secure the rights of property. To give them weight & firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in office was thought necess[~a]y. But a longer term than 6 years, would be of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be appointed. He suggested therefore the propriety of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He thought this would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man.

A question was then taken whether the words "to be paid out of the public treasury," should stand.

Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to _State offices_.

Mr. Williamson seconded the motion.[113]

[113] According to Yates, before Wilson spoke:

"Mr. Madison. Congress heretofore depended on state
interests; we are now going to pursue the same
plan."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 173.

M^r Wilson remarked the additional dependance this w^d create in the Senators on the States. The longer the time he observed allotted to the Officer, the more compleat will be the dependance if it exists at all.[114]

[114] After Wilson, according to Yates:

"Mr. Butler. This second branch I consider as the
aristocratic part of our government; and they must be
controlled by the states, or they will be too
independent."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 173.

Gen^l Pinkney was for making the States as much as could be conveniently done, a part of the Gen^l Gov^t. If the Senate was to be appointed by the States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to be paid by the States: and the States ought not to be barred from the opportunity of calling members of it into offices at home. Such a restriction would also discourage the ablest men from going into the Senate.

M^r Williamson moved a resolution so penned as to admit of the two following questions. 1. whether the members of the Senate should be ineligible to & incapable of holding offices _under the U. States_

2. Whether &c. under the _particular States_.

On the Question to postpone in order to consider Williamson's
Resol^n Mas^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Gerry & M^r Madison move to add to M^r Williamson's 1. Quest: "and for 1 year thereafter." On this amend^t

Mas^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On M^r Will[iam]son's 1 Question as amend^{ed} vz, inelig: & incapable &c. &c. for 1 year &c. ag^d to un[~a]mously.

On the 2. question as to ineligibility &c. to State offices,

Mass. ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The 5. Resol: "that each branch have the right of originating acts," was agreed to nem. con.

Adj^d.

WEDNESDAY JUNE 27. IN CONVENTION.

M^r Rutlidge moved to postpone the 6^{th} Resolution, defining the powers of Cong^s in order to take up the 7 & 8 which involved the most fundamental points; the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches which was agreed to nem. con.

A question being proposed on the Resol: 7; declaring that the suffrage in the first branch sh^d be according to an equitable ratio.

M^r L. Martin[115] contended at great length and with great eagerness that the General Gov^t was meant merely to preserve the State Govern^{ts} not to govern individuals: that its powers ought to be kept within narrow limits: that if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that if too much, it could never be resumed: that individuals as such have little to do but with their own States; that the Gen^l Gov^t has no more to apprehend from the States composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, that Gov^t over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects: that to resort to the Citizens at large for their sanction to a new Govern^t will be throwing them back into a state of Nature; that the dissolution of the State Gov^{ts} is involved in the nature of the process; that the people have no right to do this without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State purposes: through their tongues only they can speak, through their ears, only can hear: that the States have shewn a good disposition to comply with the Acts of Cong^s, weak, contemptibly weak as that body has been; and have failed through inability alone to comply: that the heaviness of the private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the chief causes of this inability; that he did not conceive the instances mentioned by M^r Madison of compacts between V^a & M^d between P^a & N. J. or of troops raised by Mass^{ts} for defence against the Rebels, to be violations of the articles of confederation--that an equal vote in each State was essential to the federal idea, and was founded in justice & freedom, not merely in policy: that tho' the States may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not: that the States like individuals were in a State of nature equally sovereign & free. In order to prove that individuals in a State of Nature are equally free & independent he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Summers--Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with States till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke & Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the States being equal cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving up their liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for 10 States: that as V^a Mass^{ts} & P^a have 42/90 of the votes they can do as they please without a miraculous Union of the other ten: that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over one of the ten to make them compleat masters of the rest; that they can then appoint an Execut^e & Judiciary & legislate for them as they please: that there was & would continue a natural predilection & partiality in men for their own States; that the States, particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws: that no State in Ratifying the Confederation had objected to the equality of votes; that the complaints at present run not ag^{st} this equality but the want of power: that 16 members from V^a would be more likely to act in concert than a like number formed of members from different States: that instead of a junction of the small States as a remedy, he thought a division of the large States would be more eligible.--This was the substance of a speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much exhausted he said to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should tomorrow, resume them.

[115] "Mr. Martin, the Attorney-General from Maryland, spoke
on this subject upwards of three hours. As his arguments
were too diffuse, and in many instances desultory, it was
not possible to trace him through the whole, or to methodize
his ideas into a systematic or argumentative
arrangement."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 174.

Adj^d.

THURSDAY JUNE 28TH. IN CONVENTION

M^r L. Martin resumed his discourse,[116] contending that the Gen^l Gov^t ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that if the States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by the Legislatures or the people; the smaller States would be equally enslaved; that if the large States have the same interest with the smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal vote; they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the large ones on that supposition without injuring themselves and if the interests, were not the same, the inequality of suffrage w^d be dangerous to the smaller States: that it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the people will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large States were weak at present in proportion to their extent; & could only be made formidable to the small ones, by the weight of their votes: that in case a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small States would have nothing to fear from their power; that if in such a case the three great States should league themselves together, the other ten could do so too; & that he had rather see partial Confederacies take place, than the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his discourse which was delivered with much diffuseness & considerable vehemence.

[116] Yates gives Martin's speech more fully:

"On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern
a majority--but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a
majority. In a federal government, a majority of states must
and ought to tax. In the local government of states,
counties may be unequal--still numbers, not property,
govern. What is the government now forming, over states or
persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the object
of a general government. These are already secured by their
guardians, the state governments. The general government is
therefore intended only to protect and guard the rights of
the states as states.

"This general government, I believe, is the first upon earth
which gives checks against democracies or aristocracies. The
only necessary check in a general government ought to be a
restraint to prevent its absorbing the powers of the state
governments. Representation on federal principles can only
flow from state societies. Representation and taxation are
ever inseparable--not according to the quantum of property,
but the quantum of freedom.

"Will the representatives of a state forget state interests?
The mode of election cannot change it. These prejudices
cannot be eradicated--Your general government cannot be just
or equal upon the Virginia plan, unless you abolish state
interests. If this cannot be done, you must go back to
principles purely federal.

"On this latter ground, the state legislatures and their
constituents will have no interests to pursue different from
the general government, and both will be interested to
support each other. Under these ideas can it be expected
that the people can approve the Virginia plan? But it is
said, the people, not the state legislatures, will be called
upon for approbation--with an evident design to separate the
interests of the governors from the governed. What must be
the consequence? Anarchy and confusion. We lose the ideas of
the powers with which we are intrusted. The legislatures
must approve. By them it must, on your own plan, be laid
before the people. How will such a government, over so many
great states, operate. Wherever new settlements have been
formed in large states, they immediately want to shake off
their independency. Why? Because the government is too
remote for their good. The people want it nearer home.

"The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the
freedom and the independency of the states composing it. The
states forming the amphictionic council were equal, though
Lacedemon, one of the greatest states, attempted the
exclusion of three of the lesser states from this right. The
plan reported, it is true, only intends to diminish those
rights, not to annihilate them--It was the ambition and
power of the great Grecian states which at last ruined this
respectable council. The states as societies are ever
respectful. Has Holland or Switzerland ever complained of
the equality of the states which compose their respective
confederacies? Bern and Zurich are larger than the remaining
eleven cantons--so of many of the states of Germany; and yet
their governments are not complained of. Bern alone might
usurp the whole power of the Helvetic confederacy, but she
is contented still with being equal.

"The admission of the larger states into the confederation,
on the principle of equality, is dangerous--But on the
Virginia system it is ruinous and destructive. Still it is
the true interest of all the states to confederate--It is
their joint efforts which must protect and secure us from
foreign danger, and give us peace and harmony at home.

"(Here Mr. Martin entered into a detail of the comparative
powers of each state, and stated their probable weakness and
strength.)

"At the beginning of our troubles with Great Britain, the
smaller states were attempted to be cajoled to submit to the
views of that nation, lest the larger states should usurp
their rights. We then answered them--your present plan is
slavery, which on the remote prospect of a distant evil, we
will not submit to.

"I would rather confederate with any single state, than
submit to the Virginia plan. But we are already
confederated, and no power on earth can dissolve it but by
the consent of _all_ the contracting powers--and four
states, on this floor, have already declared their
opposition to annihilate it. Is the old confederation
dissolved, because some of the states wish a new
confederation?"--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 177.

M^r Lansing & M^r Dayton moved to strike out "not," so that the 7 art. might read that the rights of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation."

M^r Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put till tomorrow; Govern^r Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and the representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.

M^r Williamson, thought that if any political truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was that if the States were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of votes would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition of new States from the Westward might be kept in view. They would be small States, they would be poor States, they would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers; their distance from market rendering the produce of their labour less valuable; they would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying burdens on com[~m]erce & consumption which would fall with greatest weight on the old States.