Chapter III: Part 3

On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. Pen^a no. Del. no. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. G^a no.

So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan.

The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question whether each branch sh^d originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the Legislative power of the existing Cong^s to this Assembly, there was also a silent affirmative nem. con.

On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent,"

M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutledge[48] objected to the vagueness of the term _incompetent_, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition.[49]

[48] "Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly
mounted at the commencement of the late revolution;--his
reputation in the first Congress gave him a distinguished
rank among the American Worthies. He was bred to the Law,
and now acts as one of the Chancellors of South Carolina.
This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as an Orator,
but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking to
be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undobotedly a man
of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune.
Mr. Rutledge was once Governor of South Carolina. He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 333.

[49] According to Pierce: "M^r Sherman was of opinion that
it would be too indefinitely expressed,--and yet it would be
hard to define all the powers by detail. It appeared to him
that it would be improper for the national Legislature to
negative all the Laws that were connected with the States
themselves.

"M^r Madison said it was necessary to adopt some general
principles on which we should act,--that we were wandering
from one thing to another without seeming to be settled in
any one principle.

"M^r Wythe observed that it would be right to establish
general principles before we go into detail, or very shortly
Gentlemen would find themselves in confusion, and would be
obliged to have recurrence to the point from whence they sat
out.

"M^r King was of opinion that the principles ought first to
be established before we proceed to the framing of the Act.
He apprehends that the principles only go so far as to
embrace all the power that is given up by the people to the
Legislature, and to the federal Government, but no farther.

"M^r Randolph was of opinion that it would be impossible to
define the powers and the length to which the federal
Legislature ought to extend just at this time.

"M^r Wilson observed that it would be impossible to
enumerate the powers which the federal Legislature ought to
have."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 319, 320.

M^r Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent of his meaning.

M^r Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion was fixed on this point.

M^r Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Gov^t as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.

On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not competent--Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t div^d. (Sherman no. Elseworth ay.) N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georg^a ay.

The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion of D^r Franklin) were agreed to with^t debate or dissent.

The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole ag^{st} a delinquent State came next into consideration.

M^r Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted, the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually.--A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force ag^{st} a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con.

The Committee then rose & the House

Adjourned.[50]

[50] "When the Convention first opened at Philadelphia,
there were a number of propositions brought forward as great
leading principles for the new Government to be established
for the United States. A copy of these propositions was
given to each Member with an injunction to keep everything a
profound secret. One morning, by accident, one of the
Members dropt his copy of the propositions, which being
luckily picked up by General Mifflin was presented to
General Washington, our President, who put it in his pocket.
After the debates of the Day were over, and the question for
adjournment was called for, the General arose from his seat,
and previous to his putting the question addressed the
Convention in the following manner,--

"'Gentlemen

"'I am sorry to find that some one Member of this Body, has
been so neglectful of the secrets of the Convention as to
drop in the State House, a copy of their proceedings, which
by accident was picked up and delivered to me this Morning.
I must entreat Gentlemen to be more careful, lest our
transactions get into the News Papers, and disturb the
public repose by premature speculations. I know not whose
Paper it is, but there it is [throwing it down on the
table,] let him who owns it take it.' At the same time he
bowed, picked up his Hat, and quitted the room with a
dignity so severe that every Person seemed alarmed; for my
part I was extremely so, for putting my hand in my pocket I
missed my copy of the same Paper, but advancing up to the
Table my fears soon dissipated; I found it to be in the hand
writing of another Person. When I went to my lodgings at the
Indian Queen, I found my copy in a coat pocket which I had
pulled off that Morning. It is something remarkable that no
Person ever owned the Paper."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 324.

FRIDAY JUNE 1^{ST} 1787

William Houston from Georgia took his seat.

The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. "that a national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature for the term of ---- years &c. to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the Executive powers of Congress &c."

M^r Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c. which would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one.

M^r Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. M^r C. Pinkney seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to consist of a single person, be instituted."

A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put the question, Doc^r Franklin[51] observed that it was a point of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.

[51] "D^r Franklin is well known to be the greatest phylosopher
of the present age;--all the operations of nature he seems
to understand,--the very heavens obey him, and the Clouds
yield up their Lightning to be imprisoned in his rod. But
what claim he has to the politician, posterity must
determine. It is certain that he does not shine much in
public Council,--he is no Speaker, nor does he seem to let
politics engage his attention. He is, however, a most
extraordinary Man, and he tells a story in a style more
engaging than anything I ever heard. Let his Biographer
finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses an
activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.

M^r Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer the public affairs best.

M^r Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.

M^r Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he considered strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.[52]

[52] According to King, Madison followed Wilson: "Madison agreed
with Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. _Ex vi
termini._ Executive power does not include the Power of War
and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited and defined. If
large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies.
Perhaps the best plan will be a single Executive of long
duration, with a Council and with Liberty to dissent on his
personal Responsibility."--King's _Life and Correspondence
of Rufus King_, i., 588.

According to Pierce:

"M^r Madison was of opinion that an Executive formed of one
Man would answer the purpose when aided by a Council, who
should have the right to advise and record their
proceedings, but not to control his authority."--Pierce's
Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 320.

M^r Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence.[53]

[53] King gives Gerry's remarks: "_Gerry._ I am in favor of a
Council to advise the Executive: they will be organs of
information respecting Persons qualified for various
offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable
to be called to account & impeached--in this way, their
Responsibility will be certain, and for misconduct their
Punishment sure."

Dickinson followed Gerry: "_Dickinson._ A limited yet
vigorous Executive is not republican, but peculiar to
monarchy--the royal Executive has vigour, not only by power,
but by popular Attachment & Report--an Equivalent to popular
Attachment may be derived from the Veto on the Legislative
acts. We cannot have a limited monarchy--our condition does
not permit it. Republics are in the beginning and for a time
industrious, but they finally destroy themselves because
they are badly constituted. I dread the consolidation of the
States, & hope for a good national Govt. from the present
Division of the States with a feeble Executive.

"We are to have a Legislature of two branches, or two
Legislatures, as the sovereign of the nation--this will work
a change unless you provide that the judiciary shall aid and
correct the Executive. The first Branch of the Legislature,
the H. of Representatives, must be on another plan. The
second Branch or Senate may be on the present scheme of
representing _the States_--the Representatives to be
apportioned according to the Quotas of the States paid into
the general Treasury. The Executive to be removed from
office by the national Legislature, on the Petition of seven
States."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_,
i., 588 _et seq._

M^r Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Govenm^t as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to consist of more than one.

M^r Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.

M^r Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz--"that a National Executive be instituted."[54]

[54] Williamson followed Wilson, according to King:
"_Williamson_--There is no true difference between an
Executive composed of a single person, with a Council, and
an Executive composed of three or more persons."--King's
_Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 590.

M^r Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice sh^d be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departm^t whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive sh^d be struck out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be instituted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment, in consequence of a suggestion by Gen^l Pinkney that improper powers might otherwise be delegated.

M^r Wilson seconded this motion.

M^r Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the "power to carry into effect the national laws."

M^r Randolph seconded the motion.

M^r Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.

In consequence of the motion of M^r Pinkney, the question on M^r Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by M^r Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pen^a, Del., N. C., & Geo. ag^{st} Mass., Virg^a & S. Carolina the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other States in the affirmative.

The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,

M^r Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Mass^{ts}, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.

M^r Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.

M^r Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided for.

M^r Pinkney moves for seven years.

M^r Sherman was for three years, and ag^{st} the doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.

M^r Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.

M^r Bedford[55] was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years. He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.

[55] "Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his
profession I am told, has merit. He is a bold and nervous
Speaker, and has a very commanding and striking manner;--but
he is warm and impetuous in his temper, and precipitate in
his judgment. Mr. Bedford is about 32 years old, and very
corpulent."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 330.

On the question for seven years,

Mass^{ts} divid^{d.} Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay.
Del. ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.

There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 div^d, a question was asked whether a majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was an affirmative vote.

The _mode of appointing_ the Executive was the next question.

M^r Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States;

Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that M^r Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.--the clause, "to be chosen by the National Legislature"--was accordingly postponed.--

M^r Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national Legislature.

The Committee then rose and the House

Adjourned.

SATURDAY JUNE 2^D IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE

William Sam^l Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Mary^d, & John Lansing J^r from N. York, took their seats.

It was mov^d & 2^{ded} to postpone ye Resol: of M^r Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up the 2^d branch of the Legislature; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: ag^{st} N. Y. Pen^a Mary^d. The mode of appointing the Executive was resumed.

M^r Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into ---- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect ---- members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at ---- and they or any ---- of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body ---- person-- in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested."

M^r Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.

M^r Gerry, opposed the election by the National legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates w^d bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to their friends. He liked the principle of M^r Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till the people should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States, instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions.

M^r Williamson[56] could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great trouble and expence.

[56] "Mr. Williamson is a Gentleman of education and talents. He
enters freely into public debate from his close attention to
most subjects, but he is no Orator. There is a great degree
of good humour and pleasantry in his character; and in his
manners there is a strong trait of the Gentleman. He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 332.

On the question for agreeing to M^r Wilson's substitute, it was negatived: Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y.[57] no. P^a ay. Del. no. Mar^d ay. Virg^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo^a no.

[57] New York, in the printed Journal, divided.--Madison's Note.

On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature for the term of seven years, it was agreed to, Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. Pen^a no. Del. ay. Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Doc^r Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute--"whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services." He said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the Committee read instead of speaking them. M^r Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted. The following is a literal copy of the paper:

Sir,

It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of
any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to
the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first
reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it
success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch
I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and
chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and
from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge
of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may
possibly change mine.--I think I see inconveniences in the
appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the
contrary, great advantages.

Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on
the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of
power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great
force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the
same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects.
Place before the eyes of such men, a post of _honour_ that shall
be at the same time a place of _profit_, and they will move
heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it
is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The
struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions
which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its
Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars,
and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of
peace.

And of what kind are the men that will strive for this
profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the
heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties,
tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the
wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men
fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the
men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their
selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your
Government and be your rulers.--And these too will be mistaken
in the expected happiness of their situation: For their
vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same
motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their
administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to
the people.

Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning
with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of
long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed
augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more
to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give
more to them. Hence as all history informs us, there has been in
every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the
Governing & Governed; the one striving to obtain more for its
support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone
occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either
in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people.
Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the
revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they
are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the
people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the
greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his
partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all
resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is
scarce a king in an hundred who would not, if he could, follow
the example of Pharoah, get first all the people's money, then
all their lands, and then make them and their children servants
for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish
Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from
Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than
five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among
Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore,
perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States,
may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I
think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not
sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our
posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we
do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number
will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a
King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly
expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.

It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and
that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive
department, without paying them well for their services. I
conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present
themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The
high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but
it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore
not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and
usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In
France, the office of Counsellor, or Member of their Judiciary
Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a
high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which
are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more
than three Per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as
legal interest is there at five PerC^t they in fact pay two
PerC^t for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the
Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the
burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not
however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our
Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the
pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect
such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some
minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public,
without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.

Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made
the experiment, and practised it with success more than one
hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule
with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their
controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and
yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear
the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences.
In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the
respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,
but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees or
perquisites. And indeed in all cases of Public service the less
the profit the greater the honor.

To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and
most important of our offices, that of General of our armies
executed for eight years together without the smallest salary,
by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and
this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other
brave men his military friends & companions, and the constant
anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding
three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit
enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal
term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that
our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our
Country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number
of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and
faithfully the office in question.

Sir. The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is
not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing
them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the
amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented
with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and
done my duty.

The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability.

M^r Dickinson moved,[58] "that the Executive be made removable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.

[58] "Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America for his
Farmers Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of
very extensive information. When I saw him in the Convention
I was induced to pay the greatest attention to him whenever
he spoke. I had often heard that he was a great Orator, but
I found him an indifferent Speaker. With an affected air of
wisdom he labors to produce a trifle,--his language is
irregular and incorrect,--his flourishes, (for he sometimes
attempts them,) are like expiring flames, they just shew
themselves and go out;--no traces of them are left on the
mind to chear or animate it. He is, however, a good writer
and will be ever considered one of the most important
characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old,
and was bred a Quaker."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 329.

M^r Bedford seconded the motion.

M^r Sherman contended that the national Legislature should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure.

M^r Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle of good Government.

M^r Madison & M^r Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent y^e removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues ag^{st} him in States where his administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied.

M^r Dickinson considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought to be made as independ^t as possible; but that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British Gov^t itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as _one_ of the best Governments in the world. It was not _certain_ that the same blessings were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times--the state of our affairs forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential to such a Gov^t could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But though a form the most perfect _perhaps_ in itself be unattainable, we must not despair. If antient republics have been found to flourish for a moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether.

As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property.[59]

[59] According to Pierce: "M^r Madison said it was far from being
his wish that every executive Officer should remain in
Office, without being amenable to some Body for his
conduct."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 321.

A motion being made to strike out, "on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States," and rejected, Connecticut, S. Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question on M^r Dickinson's motion for making Executive removable by Nat^l Legislature at request of majority of State Legislatures was also rejected all the States being in the negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.

The Question for making y^e Executive ineligible after seven years, was next taken and agreed to: Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. P^a div^d. Del. ay. Mary^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[60]

[60] In printed Journal Geo. ay.--Madison's Note.

M^r Williamson 2^{ded} by M^r Davie[61] moved to add to the last clause, the words--"and to be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty"--which was agreed to.

[61] "Mr. Davey is a Lawyer of some eminence in his State. He is
said to have a good classical education, and is a Gentleman
of considerable literary talents. He was silent in the
Convention, but his opinion was always respected. Mr. Davy
is about 30 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 332.

M^r Rutlidge & M^r C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the n^o of persons in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that no member would oppose the motion.

M^r Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishm^t of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department. 3. that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. that the appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the country.

M^r Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.

The motion was then postp^d, the Committee rose & the House Adj^d.

MONDAY JUNE 4. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

The Question was resumed on motion of M^r Pinkney, 2^{ded} by M^r Wilson, "shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single person?"

M^r Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the gentleman from Virg^a (Mr. Randolph) but the arguments used had not convinced him. He observed that the objections of M^r R. were levelled not so much ag^st the measure itself, as ag^{st} its unpopularity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it should form a part, though the part were an important one, yet he would give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination he could see no evidence of the alledged antipathy of the people. On the contrary he was persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a King. One fact has great weight with him. All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Govern^t. The idea of three heads has taken place in none. The degree of power is indeed different; but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a Unity, he would mention another. The _tranquillity_ not less than the vigor of the Gov^t he thought would be favored by it. Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, & violent animosities; which would not only interrupt the public administration; but diffuse their poison thro' the other branches of Gov^t, thro' the States, and at length thro' the people at large. If the members were to be unequal in power the principle of opposition to the Unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question. In the Legislative & Executive departm^{ts} questions have commonly many sides. Each member therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree.[62]

[62] According to Pierce, King followed Wilson:

"Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join
in the negative of a Law, because the Judges will have the
expounding of those Laws when they come before them; and
they will no doubt stop the operation of such as shall
appear repugnant to the Constitution."--Pierce's Notes, _Am.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 322.

M^r Sherman. This matter is of great importance and ought to be well considered before it is determined. M^r Wilson he said had observed that in each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the Gov^t. It was so he admitted, and properly so, and he wished the same policy to prevail in the federal Gov^t. But then it should be also remarked that in all the States there was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the King has a Council; and though he appoints it himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts the Confidence of the people.

M^r Williamson asks M^r Wilson whether he means to annex a Council.

M^r Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices.

M^r Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the Executive. It w^d be extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads.

On the question for a single Executive it was agreed to Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. Pen^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d no. Virg^a ay. (M^r R. & M^r Blair no--Doc^r McC^g M^r M. & Gen. W. ay. Col. Mason being no, but not in the house, M^r Wythe ay. but gone home). N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Georg^a ay.

First Clause of Proposition 8^{th} relating _to a Council of Revision_ taken into consideration.

M^r Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check ag^{st} encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being ag^{st} the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of y^e office to make them judges of the policy of public measures. He moves to postpone the clause in order to propose "that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by ---- parts of each branch of the national Legislature."

M^r King seconds the motion, observing that the Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation.

M^r Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment goes far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct & independent, The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without such a self-defence the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative.

On the question to postpone in order to take M^r Gerry's proposition into consideration it was agreed to, Mass^s ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d no. Virg^a no. N. C ay. S. C. ay. G^a ay.

Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before Committee, M^r Wilson & M^r Hamilton move that the last part of it (viz. "w^{ch} s^l not be afterw^{ds} passed "unless by ---- parts of each branch of the National legislature") be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: Hamilton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.

M^r Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legislature as the best men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches of it.

Doc^r Franklin, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it on this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pen^a. The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a mischevous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council, such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of G. B. had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at last eno' would be gotten to influence & bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.

M^r Sherman was ag^{st} enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature.

M^r Madison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness eno' to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes would not be able to withstand y^e unanimous and eager wishes of both houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this Country; its present temper at least.

M^r Wilson believed as others did that this power would seldom be used. The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pen^a formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as in the one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by a different & sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now proposed to be fixed by the Constitution, or if D^r F.'s idea should be adopted all salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large proportion of each House to overrule the Executive check might do in peaceable times; but there might be tempestuous moments in which animosities may run high between the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself.