Chapter V: Part 5

M^r Pinkney thought the 2^d branch ought to be permanent & independent; & that the members of it w^d be rendered more so by receiving their appointment from the State Legislatures. This mode w^d avoid the rivalships & discontents incident to the election by districts. He was for dividing the States into three classes according to their respective sizes, & for allowing to the 1^{st} class three members, to the 2^d two, & to the 3^d one.

On the question for postponing M^r Dickinson's motion referring the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in order to consider M^r Wilson's for referring it to the people.

Mass. no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary for the Nat^l Gov^t a certain portion must necessarily be left in the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to have some means of defending themselves ag^{st} encroachments of the Nat^l Gov^t. In every other department we have studiously endeavoured to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Nat^l Establishment. There is danger on both sides no doubt; but we have only seen the evils arising on the side of the State Gov^{ts}. Those on the other side remain to be displayed. The example of Cong^s does not apply. Cong^s had no power to carry their acts into execution, as the Nat^l Gov^t will have.

On M^r Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State Legislatures,

Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. Y. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Gerry gave notice that he w^d tomorrow move for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing the Nat^l Executive in order to substitute an appointm^t by the State Executives.

The Committee rose & The House adj^d.

FRIDAY JUNE 8^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Nat^l Legislature a negative on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the articles of Union, or Treaties with foreign nations,

M^r Pinkney moved "that the National Legislature sh^d have authority to negative all laws which they sh^d judge to be improper." He urged that such a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it effectual; that the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the States were left to act of themselves in any case, it w^d be impossible to defend the national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the acts of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated violations: that this universal negative was in fact the corner stone of an efficient national Gov^t; that under the British Gov^t the negative of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the _States_ are more one nation now, than the _Colonies_ were then.

M^r Madison seconded the motion. He could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a perfect System. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these mischiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to commit them. Should no such precaution be engrafted, the only remedy w^d lie in an appeal to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible? was it practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost enforce a national decree ag^{st} Mass^{ts} abetted perhaps by several of her neighbours? It w^d not be possible. A small proportion of the Community, in a compact situation acting on the defensive, and at one of its extremities, might at any time bid defiance to the National authority. Any Gov^t for the U. States formed on the supposed practicability of using force ag^{st} the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, w^d prove as visionary & fallacious as the Gov^t of Cong^s. The negative w^d render the use of force unnecessary. The States c^d of themselves pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed without the other. But in order to give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all cases. A discrimination w^d only be a fresh source of contention between the two authorities. In a word, to recur to the illustrations borrowed from the planetary system. This prerogative of the General Gov^t, is the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political System.

M^r Williamson was ag^{st} giving a power that might restrain the States from regulating their internal police.

M^r Gerry c^d not see the extent of such a power, and was ag^{st} every power that was not necessary. He thought a remonstrance ag^{st} unreasonable acts of the States w^d reclaim them. If it sh^d not force might be resorted to. He had no objection to authorize a negative to paper money and similar measures. When the confederation was depending before Congress, Massachusetts was then for inserting the power of emitting paper money am^g the exclusive powers of Congress. He observed that the proposed negative w^d extend to the regulations of the Militia, a matter on which the existence of a State might depend. The Nat^l Legislature with such a power may enslave the States. Such an idea as this will never be acceded to. It has never been suggested or conceived among the people. No speculative projector, and there are eno' of that character among us, in politics as well as in other things, has in any pamphlet or newspaper thrown out the idea. The States too have different interests and are ignorant of each other's interests. The Negative therefore will be abused. New States too having separate views from the old States will never come into the Union. They may even be under some foreign influence; are they in such case to participate in the negative on the will of the other States?

M^r Sherman thought the cases in which the negative ought to be exercised, might be defined. He wished the point might not be decided till a trial at least sh^d be made for that purpose.

M^r Wilson would not say what modifications of the proposed power might be practicable or expedient. But however novel it might appear the principle of it when viewed with a close & steady eye, is right. There is no instance in which the laws say that the individual sh^d be bound in one case, & at liberty to judge whether he will obey or disobey in another. The cases are parallel. Abuses of the power over the individual person may happen as well as over the individual States. Federal liberty is to the States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals, and States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political sovereignty, than the savage is to purchase Civil liberty by the surrender of the personal sovereignty, which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition of the cases in which the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable. A discretion must be left on one side or the other? will it not be most safely lodged on the side of the Nat^l Gov^t? Among the first sentiments expressed in the first Cong^s one was that Virg^a is no more, that Mass^{ts} is no [more], that P^a is no more &c. We are now one nation of brethren. We must bury all local interests & distinctions. This language continued for some time. The tables at length began to turn. No sooner were the State Gov^{ts} formed than their jealousy & ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavoured to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered down to the impotent condition in which it now stands. Review the progress of the articles of Confederation thro' Congress & compare the first & last draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of this convention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the whole over its parts. What danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy of each part, and will not the general interest be continually sacrificed to local interests?

M^r Dickenson deemed it impossible to draw a line between the cases proper & improper for the exercise of the negative. We must take our choice of two things. We must either subject the States to the danger of being injured by the power of the Nat^l Gov^t or the latter to the danger of being injured by that of the States. He thought the danger greater from the States. To leave the power doubtful, would be opening another spring of discord, and he was for shutting as many of them as possible.

M^r Bedford. In answer to his colleague's question, where w^d be the danger to the States from this power, would refer him to the smallness of his own State which may be injured at pleasure without redress. It was meant he found to strip the small States of their equal right of suffrage. In this case Delaware would have about 1/90 for its share in the General Councils, whilst P^a & V^a would possess 1/3 of the whole. Is there no difference of interests, no rivalship of commerce, of manufactures? Will not these large States crush the small ones whenever they stand in the way of their ambitious or interested views. This shews the impossibility of adopting such a system as that on the table, or any other founded on a change in the priñple of representation. And after all, if a State does not obey the law of the new System, must not force be resorted to as the only ultimate remedy, in this as in any other system. It seems as if P^a & V^a by the conduct of their deputies wished to provide a system in which they would have an enormous & monstrous influence. Besides, How can it be thought that the proposed negative can be exercised? Are the laws of the States to be suspended in the most urgent cases until they can be sent seven or eight hundred miles, and undergo the deliberation of a body who may be incapable of Judging of them? Is the National Legislature too to sit continually in order to revise the laws of the States?

M^r Madison observed that the difficulties which had been started were worthy of attention and ought to be answered before the question was put. The case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided for by some emanation of the power from the Nat^l Gov^t into each State so far as to give a temporary assent at least. This was the practice in the Royal Colonies before the Revolution and would not have been inconvenient if the supreme power of negativing had been faithful to the American interest, and had possessed the necessary information. He supposed that the negative might be very properly lodged in the senate alone, and that the more numerous & expensive branch therefore might not be obliged to sit constantly. He asked M^r B. what would be the consequence to the small States of a dissolution of the Union w^{ch} seemed likely to happen if no effectual substitute was made for the defective System existing, and he did not conceive any effectual system could be substituted on any other basis than that of a proportional suffrage? If the large States possessed the Avarice & ambition with which they were charged, would the small ones in their neighbourhood, be more secure when all controul of a Gen^l Gov^t was withdrawn.

M^r Butler was vehement ag^{st} the Negative in the proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States. The people there would not he was sure give it a hearing.

On the question for extending the negative power to all cases as proposed by (M^r P. & M^r M.) Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. div^d. M^r Read & M^r Dickenson ay. M^r Bedford & M^r Basset no. Mary^d no. V^a ay. M^r R. M^r Mason no. M^r Blair, Doc^r M^c C^g M^r M. ay. Gen^l W. not consulted. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo no.

On motion of M^r Gerry and M^r King tomorrow was assigned for reconsidering the mode of appointing the National Executive: the reconsideration being voted for by all the States except Connecticut & N. Carolina.

M^r Pinkney and M^r Rutlidge moved to add to the Resol^n 4. agreed to by the Com^e the following, viz. "that the States be divided into three classes, the 1^{st} class to have 3 members, the 2^d two, & the 3^d one member each, that an estimate be taken of the comparative importance of each State at fixed periods, so as to ascertain the number of members they may from time to time be entitled to." The Committee then rose and the House adjourned.

SATURDAY JUNE 9^{TH}[71] MR. LUTHER MARTIN FROM
MARYLAND TOOK HIS SEAT. IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE.

[71] Edward Carrington wrote to Jefferson from New York,
June 9, 1787:

"The debates and proceedings of the Convention are kept in
profound secrecy--opinions of the probable result of their
deliberations can only be formed from the prevailing
impressions of men of reflection and understanding--these
are reducible to two schemes--the first, a consolidation of
the whole Empire into one republic, leaving in the States
nothing more than subordinate courts for facilitating the
administration of the Laws--the second an investiture of the
foederal sovereignty with full and independent authority as
to the Trade, Revenues, and forces of the union, and the
rights of peace and war, together with a negative upon all
the acts of the State legislatures.

The first idea, I apprehend, would be impracticable, and
therefore do not suppose it can be adopted--general Laws
through a Country embracing so many climates, productions,
and manners as the United States, would operate many
oppressions & a general legislature would be found
incompetent to the formation of local ones, as a majority
would in every instance, be ignorant of, and unaffected by
the objects of legislation.... Something like the second
will probably be formed--indeed I am certain that nothing
less than what will give the foederal sovereignty a compleat
controul over the state Governments, will be thought worthy
of discussion--such a scheme constructed upon well adjusted
principles would certainly give us stability and importance
as a nation, and if the Executive powers can be sufficiently
checked, must be eligible--unless the whole has a decided
influence over the parts, the constant effort will be to
resume the delegated powers, and there cannot be an
inducement in the foederal sovereignty to refuse its assent
to an innocent act of a State.... The Eastern opinions are
for a total surrender of the state Sovereignties, and indeed
some amongst them go to a monarchy at once--they have verged
to anarchy, while to the southward we have only felt an
inconvenience, and their proportionate disposition to an
opposite extreme is a natural consequence."--_Jeff. MSS._

M^r Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved "that the national Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States whose proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the States in the election of the Senate." If the appointm^t should be made by the Nat^l Legislature, it would lessen that independence of the Executive which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and corruption between the Executive & Legislature previous to the election, and to partiality in the Executive afterwards to the friends who promoted him. Some other mode therefore appeared to him necessary. He proposed that of appointing by the State Executives as most analogous to the principle observed in electing the other branches of the Nat^l Gov^t; the first branch being chosen by the _people_ of the States, & the 2^d by the Legislatures of the States, he did not see any objection ag^{st} letting the Executive be appointed by the Executives of the States. He supposed the Executives would be most likely to select the fittest men, and that it would be their interest to support the man of their own choice.

M^r Randolph urged strongly the inexpediency of M^r Gerry's mode of appointing the Nat^l Executive. The confidence of the people would not be secured by it to the Nat^l magistrate. The small States would lose all chance of an appointm^t from within themselves. Bad appointments would be made; the Executives of the States being little conversant with characters not within their own small spheres. The State Executives too notwithstanding their constitutional independence, being in fact dependent on the State Legislatures will generally be guided by the views of the latter, and prefer either favorites within the States, or such as it may be expected will be most partial to the interests of the State. A Nat^l Executive thus chosen will not be likely to defend with becoming vigilance & firmness the National rights ag^{st} State encroachments. Vacancies also must happen. How can these be filled? He could not suppose either that the Executives would feel the interest in supporting the Nat^l Executive which had been imagined. They will not cherish the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs.

On the question for referring the appointment of the Nat^l Executive to the State Executives as prop^d by M^r Gerry Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. div^d. M^d no. V^a no. S. C. no. Geo. no.[72]

[72] "Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware
divided."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 111. The
Journal also includes North Carolina among the
noes.--_Journal of the Federal Convention_, 110.

M^r Patterson moves that the Committee resume the clause relating to the rule of suffrage in the Nat^l Legislature.

M^r Brearly[73] seconds him. He was sorry he said that any question on this point was brought into view. It had been much agitated in Cong^s at the time of forming the Confederation, and was then rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller States must have been destroyed instead of being saved. The substitution of a ratio, he admitted carried fairness on the face of it; but on a deeper examination was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of the States by the quota of Cong^s, Virg^a would have 16 votes, and Georgia but one. A like proportion to the others will make the whole number ninety. There will be 3 large states, and 10 small ones. The large States by which he meant Mass^{ts} Pen^a & Virg^a will carry every thing before them. It had been admitted, and was known to him from facts within N. Jersey that where large & small counties were united into a district for electing representatives for the district, the large counties always carried their point, and Consequently that the large States would do so. Virg^a with her sixteen votes will be a solid column indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgia with her Solitary vote, and the other little States will be obliged to throw themselves constantly into the scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all. He had come to the convention with a view of being as useful as he could in giving energy and stability to the federal Government. When the proposition for destroying the equality of votes came forward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it fair then it will be asked that Georgia should have an equal vote with Virg^a. He would not say it was. What remedy then? One only, that a map of the U. S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal parts.

[73] "Mr. Brearly is a man of good, rather than of brilliant
parts. He is a Judge of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and
is very much in the esteem of the people. As an Orator he
has little to boast of, but as a Man he has every virtue to
recommend him. Mr. Brearly is about 40 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 327.

M^r Patterson considered the proposition for a proportional representation as striking at the existence of the lesser States. He w^d premise however to an investigation of this question some remarks on the nature structure and powers of the Convention. The Convention he said was formed in pursuance of an Act of Cong^s that this act was recited in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Mass^{ts} which he required to be read: that the amendment of the Confederacy was the object of all the laws and Commissions on the subject: that the articles of the Confederation were therefore the proper basis of all the proceedings of the Convention. We ought to keep within its limits, or we should be charged by our Constituents with usurpation, that the people of America were sharpsighted and not to be deceived. But the Commissions under which we acted were not only the measure of our power, they denoted also the sentiments of the States on the subject of our deliberation. The idea of a National Gov^t as contradistinguished from a federal one, never entered into the mind of any of them, and to the public mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have no power to go beyond the federal Scheme, and if we had the people are not ripe for any other. We must follow the people; the people will not follow us.--The _proposition_ could not be maintained whether considered in reference to us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members composing it & sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all State distinctions must be abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation. He held up Virg^a Mass^{ts} & P^a as the three large States, and the other ten as small ones; repeating the calculations of M^r Brearly, as to the disparity of votes which w^d take place, and affirming that the small States would never agree to it. He said there was no more reason that a great individual State contributing much, should have more votes than a small one contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one. If the rateable property of A was to that of B as 40 to 1, ought A for that reason to have 40 times as many votes as B. Such a principle would never be admitted, and if it were admitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A has more to be protected than B so he ought to contribute more for the common protection. The same may be said of a large State w^{ch} has more to be protected than a small one. Give the large States an influence in proportion to their magnitude, and what will be the consequence? Their ambition will be proportionally increased, and the small States will have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by Galloway & some others that America should be represented in the British Parl^t and then be bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled to more than 1/3 of the n^o of Representatives which would fall to the share of G. B. Would American rights & interests have been safe under an authority thus constituted? It has been said that if a Nat^l Gov^t is to be formed so as to operate on the people, and not on the States, the representatives ought to be drawn from the people. But why so? May not a Legislature filled by the State Legislatures operate on the people who chuse the State Legislatures? or may not a practicable coercion be found. He admitted that there was none such in the existing System.--He was attached strongly to the plan of the existing Confederacy, in which the people chuse their Legislative representatives; and the Legislatures their federal representatives. No other amendments were wanting than to mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and provide for the use of coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to the hint thrown out heretofore by M^r Wilson of the necessity to which the large States might be reduced of confederating among themselves, by a refusal of the others to concur. Let them unite if they please, but let them remember that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. N. Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here but on his return home do every thing in his power to defeat it there.

M^r Wilson, hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a _majority_, that a _minority_ of the States would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation, stating for his first position that as all authority was derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal n^o of representatives, and different numbers of people different numbers of representatives. This principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of A. & B. stated by M^r Patterson, he observed that in districts as large as the States, the number of people was the best measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers were to form the ratio it would be the same. M^r P. admitted persons, not property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the Citizens of Pen^a equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former to balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective Constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not confederate on this plan, Pen^a & he presumed some other States, would not confederate on any other. We have been told that each State being sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a member of Civil Government. He can not. As little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal govern^t. If N. J. will not part with her sovereignty it is vain to talk of Gov^t. A new partition of the States is desirable, but evidently & totally impracticable.

M^r Williamson illustrated the cases by a comparison of the different States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State; observing that proportional representation was admitted to be just in the latter case, and could not therefore be fairly contested in the former.

The Question being about to be put M^r Patterson hoped that as so much depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the decision till tomorrow, which was done, nem. con.

The Com^e rose & the House adjourned.

MONDAY, JUNE 11^{TH} M^R ABRAHAM BALDWIN FROM
GEORGIA TOOK HIS SEAT. IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE.

The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the Nat^l Legislature postponed on Saturday was resumed.

M^r Sherman proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in the second branch or Senate, each State should have one vote and no more. He said as the States would remain possessed of certain individual rights, each State ought to be able to protect itself: otherwise a few large States will rule the rest. The House of Lords in England he observed had certain particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote with the House of Commons that they may be able to defend their rights.

M^r Rutlidge proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this rule he said could not be contested. M^r Butler urged the same idea: adding that money was power; and that the States ought to have weight in the Gov^t in proportion to their wealth.

M^r King & M^r Wilson,[74] in order to bring the question to a point moved "that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national Legislature ought not to be according [to] the rule established in the articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation." The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the first branch was postponed in order to consider this motion.

[74] In the printed Journal Mr. Rutlidge is named as the
seconder of the motion.--Madison's Note.

M^r Dickenson contended for the _actual_ contributions of the States as the rule of their representation & suffrage in the first branch. By thus connecting the interests of the States with their duty, the latter would be sure to be performed.

M^r King remarked that it was uncertain what mode might be used in levying a National revenue; but that it was probable, imposts would be one source of it. If the _actual_ contributions were to be the rule the non-importing States, as Con^t & N. Jersey, w^d be in a bad situation indeed. It might so happen that they w^d have no representation. This situation of particular States had been always one powerful argument in favor of the 5 Per C^t impost.

The question being ab^t to be put Doc^r Franklin s^d he had thrown his ideas of the matter on a paper w^{ch} Mr. Wilson read to the Committee in the words following--Mr. Chairman

It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point,
the proportion of representation, came before us, our debates
were carried on with great coolness & temper. If any thing of a
contrary kind, has on this occasion appeared. I hope it will not
be repeated; for we are sent here to _consult_, not to
_contend_, with each other; and declarations of a fixed opinion,
and of determined resolution, never to change it, neither
enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one side,
naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and
augment discord & division in a great concern, wherein harmony &
Union are extremely necessary to give weight to our Councils,
and render them effectual in promoting & securing the common
good.

I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better
if every member of Congress, or our national Council, were to
consider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than
as an Agent for the interests of a particular State; in which
case the proportion of members for each State would be of less
consequence, & it would not be very material whether they voted
by States or individually. But as I find this is not to be
expected, I now think the number of Representatives should bear
some proportion to the number of the Represented; and that the
decisions sh^d be by the majority of members, not by the
majority of the States. This is objected to from an apprehension
that the greater States would then swallow up the smaller. I do
not at present clearly see what advantage the greater States
could propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller, and
therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect
that in the beginning of this Century, When the Union was
proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch
Patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal
number of Representatives in Parliament, they should be ruined
by the superiority of the English. They finally agreed however
that the different proportions of importance in the Union, of
the two Nations should be attended to, whereby they were to have
only forty members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen in
the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of numbers! And yet
to this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in
the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland;
and whoever looks over the lists of Public officers, Civil &
Military of that nation will find I believe that the North
Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument.

But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally
in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater; and
this is mathematically demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7
smaller States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6 larger
to have one with another 6 members; and that upon a question,
two members of each smaller State should be in the affirmative
and one in the Negative, they would make

Affirmatives 14 Negatives 7

And that all the larger States
should be unanimously in
the Negative, they would
make Negatives 36
---
In all 43

It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the
43, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the
common practice of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.

The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to have their
property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller
are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An
honorable gentleman has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a
proposition of equalizing the States. It appears to me an
equitable one, and I should, for my own part, not be against
such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly,
indeed, when almost every province had a different Constitution,
some with greater others with fewer privileges, it was of
importance to the borderers when their boundaries were
contested, whether by running the division lines, they were
placed on one side or the other. At present when such
differences are done away, it is less material. The Interest of
a State is made up of the interests of its individual members.
If they are not injured, the State is not injured. Small States
are more easily well & happily governed than large ones. If
therefore in such an equal division, it should be found
necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to
the giving a part of it to N. Jersey, and another to Delaware.
But as there would probably be considerable difficulties in
adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first, it
would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants
in some States, and their fixed proportion in others; and thence
frequent occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose for
the consideration of the Committee another mode, which appears
to me to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and
more permanent in its nature.

Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it
is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the
Union.

Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal
proportion.

The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the
disposition of Congress.

The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of
Delegates from each State.

And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual members
voting.

If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions
not be sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer
and more powerful States for further aids, to be voluntarily
afforded, leaving to each State the right of considering the
necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or
less as it should be found proper.

This mode is not new. It was formerly practised with success by
the British Government with respect to Ireland and the Colonies.
We sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just
to accept; and in the last war carried on while we were united,
they gave us back in 5 years a million Sterling. We should
probably have continued such voluntary contributions, whenever
the occasions appeared to require them for the common good of
the Empire. It was not till they chose to force us, and to
deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary contributions
that we refused & resisted. Those contributions however were to
be disposed of at the pleasure of a Government in which we had
no representative. I am therefore persuaded, that they will not
be refused to one in which the Representation shall be equal.

My learned colleague (M^r Wilson) has already mentioned that the
present method of voting by States, was submitted to originally
by Congress, under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality,
and injustice. This appears in the words of their Resolution. It
is of Sep^r 6. 1774. The words are

"Resolved that in determining questions in this Cong^s each
Colony or province shall have one vote: The Cong^s not being
possessed of or at present able to procure materials for
ascertaining the importance of each Colony."

On the question for agreeing to M^r King's and M^r Wilson's motion it passed in the affirmative.

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

It was then moved by M^r Rutlidge, 2^{ded} by M^r Butler to add to the words "equitable ratio of representation" at the end of the motion just agreed to, the words "according to the quotas of contribution." On motion of M^r Wilson seconded by M^r Pinkney, this was postponed; in order to add, after the words "equitable ratio of representation" the words following: "in proportion to the whole number of white & other free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex & condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes, in each State," this being the rule in the Act of Congress agreed to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue on the States, and requiring a Census only every 5, 7, or 10 years.

M^r Gerry thought property not the rule of representation. Why then sh^d the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of representation more than the Cattle & horses of the North.[75]

[75] After Gerry spoke, according to Yates, "Mr. Madison was of
opinion at present, to fix the standard of representation,
and let the detail be the business of a
sub-committee."--_Secret Proceedings_, p. 116.

On the question,--Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Mary^d Virg^a N. C. S. C. & Geo: were in the affirmative: N. J. & Del: in the negative.

M^r Sherman moved that a question be taken whether each State shall have one vote in the 2^d branch. Every thing he said depended on this. The smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other principle than an equality of suffrage in this branch. M^r Elsworth[76] seconded the motion.

[76] "M^r Elsworth is a Judge of the Supreme Court in
Connecticut;--he is Gentleman of a clear, deep, and copius
understanding; eloquent, and connected in public debate; and
always attentive to his duty. He is very happy in a reply,
and choice in selecting such parts of his adversary's
arguments as he finds make the strongest impressions,--in
order to take off the force of them, so as to admit the
power of his own. M^r Elsworth is about 37 years of age, a
Man much respected for his integrity, and venerated for his
abilities."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 326.

On the question for allowing each State one vote in the 2^d branch,

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Wilson & M^r Hamilton moved that the right of suffrage in the 2^d branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1^{st} branch. On this question for making the ratio of representation the same in the 2^d as in the 1^{st} branch it passed in the affirmative;

Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Resol: 11, for guarantying Republican Gov^t & territory to each State, being considered--the words "or partition," were, on motion of M^r Madison added, after the words "voluntary junction;"

Mas. N. Y. P. V^a N. C. S. C. G. ay. Con: N. J. Del: M^d no.

M^r Read disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the idea of distinct States w^{ch} would be a perpetual source of discord. There can be no cure for this evil but in doing away States altogether and uniting them all into one great Society.

Alterations having been made in the Resolution, making it read, "that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States," the whole was agreed to nem. con.[77]

[77] Yates attributes this amendment to Madison. "Mr.
Madison moved an amendment, to add to or alter the
resolution as follows: The republican constitutions and the
existing laws of each state, to be guaranteed by the United
States."--_Secret Proceedings_, etc., 116.

Resolution 13. for amending the national Constitution hereafter without consent of the Nat^l Legislature being considered, Several members did not see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the propriety of making the consent of the Nat^l Legisl. unnecessary.

Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It would be improper to require the consent of the Nat^l Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that very account. The opportunity for such an abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendm^t.

M^r Randolph enforced these arguments.

The words, "without requiring the consent of the Nat^l Legislature" were postponed. The other provision in the clause passed nem. con.

Resolution 14. requiring oaths from the members of the State Gov^{ts} to observe the Nat^l Constitution & laws, being considered,[78]

[78] "Mr. Williamson. This resolve will be unnecessary, as the
union will become the law of the land."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 117.

M^r Sherman opposed it as unnecessarily intruding into the State jurisdictions.

M^r Randolph considered it necessary to prevent that competition between the National Constitution & laws & those of the particular States, which had already been felt. The officers of the States are already under oath to the States. To preserve a due impartiality they ought to be equally bound to the Nat^l Gov^t. The Nat^l authority needs every support we can give it. The Executive & Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding their nominal independence on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent on them, that unless they be brought under some tie to the Nat^l System, they will always lean too much to the State systems, whenever a contest arises between the two.

M^r Gerry did not like the clause. He thought there was as much reason for requiring an oath of fidelity to the States from Nat^l officers, as vice versa.

M^r Luther Martin moved to strike out the words requiring such an oath from the State officers, viz "within the several States," observing that if the new oath should be contrary to that already taken by them it would be improper; if coincident the oaths already taken will be sufficient.

On the question for striking out as proposed by Mr. L. Martin

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Question on whole Resolution as proposed by M^r Randolph;

Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Com^e rose & House Adj^d.

TUESDAY JUNE 12^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE

The Question taken on the Resolution 15, to wit, referring the new system to the people of the States for ratification it passed in the affirmative Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a[79] ay. Del. div^d. M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

[79] Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is
there entered as of June 11th.--Madison's Note.

M^r Sherman & M^r Elseworth moved to fill the blank left in the 4^{th} Resolution for the periods of electing the members of the first branch with the words, "every year;" Mr. Sherman observing that he did it in order to bring on some question.

M^r Rutlidge proposed "every two years."

M^r Jennifer[80] prop^d, "every three years," observing that the too great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them, and made the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service.

[80] "M^r Jenifer is a Gentleman of fortune in Maryland;--he is
always in good humour, and never fails to make his company
pleased with him. He sits silent in the Senate, and seems to
be conscious that he is no politician. From his long
continuance in single life, no doubt but he has made the vow
of celibacy. He speaks warmly of the Ladies notwithstanding.
M^r Jenifer is about 55 years of Age, and once served as Aid
de Camp to Major Gen^l Lee."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 330.

M^r Madison seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a Government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for and travelling to & from the seat of national business.

M^r Gerry. The people of New England will never give up the point of annual elections, they know of the transition made in England from triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections as the only defence of the people ag^{st} tyranny. He was as much ag^{st} a triennial House as ag^{st} a hereditary Executive.

M^r Madison, observed that if the opinions of the people were to be our guide, it w^d be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents were at this time; much less could he say what they would think if possessed of the information & lights possessed by the members here; & still less what would be their way of thinking 6 or 12 months hence. We ought to consider what was right & necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper Governm^t. A plan adjusted to this idea will recommend itself--The respectability of this convention will give weight to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it, and all the most enlightened & respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary & proper point, this influential class of Citizens, will be turned against the plan, and little support in opposition to them can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude.

M^r Gerry repeated his opinion that it was necessary to consider what the people would approve. This had been the policy of all Legislators. If the reasoning of Mr. Madison were just, and we supposed a limited Monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, tho' the genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it, and having no hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of the essential materials for such an innovation.

On the question for the triennial election of the 1^{st} branch

Mass. no. (M^r King ay.) M^r Ghorum wavering. Con^t no.
N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The words requiring members of y^e 1^{st} branch to be of the age of ---- years were struck out Maryland alone no. The words "_liberal compensation for members_," being consid^d M^r Madison moves to insert the words, "_& fixt_." He observed that it would be improper to leave the members of the Nat^l legislature to be provided for by the State Legisl^s, because it would create an improper dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own wages, was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat or some other article of which the average price throughout a reasonable period preceding might be settled in some convenient mode, would form a proper standard.

Col. Mason seconded the motion; adding that it would be improper for other reasons to leave the wages to be regulated by the States. 1. the different States would make different provision for their representatives, and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he thought they ought to be in all respects equal. 2. the parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so low that as had already happened in choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be not who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.

On the question for inserting the words, "and fixt"

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Doc^r Franklyn said he approved of the amendment just made for rendering the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word "_liberal_." He would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary to substitute any other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every case, to grow of themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the gratuitous provision for the Apostles, to the establishment of the papal system. The word "liberal" was struck out nem con.

On the motion of M^r Pierce, that the wages should be paid out of the National Treasury,

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay.

Question on the clause relating to term of service & compensation of 1^{st} branch,

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On a question for striking out the "_ineligibility_ of members of the Nat^l Legis: to _State offices_,"

Mass^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended,

Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a question for making members of the Nat^l Legislature _ineligible_ to any office under the Nat^l Gov^t for the term of 3 years after ceasing to be members,

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question for such ineligibility for one year,

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for striking out "incapable of re-election into 1^{st} branch of the Nat^l Legisl. for ---- years, and subject to recall" ag^d to nem. con.

On question for striking out from the Resol: 5 the words requiring members of the Senatorial branch to be of the age of ---- years at least

Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. div^d. S. C. no. Geo. div^d.

On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the qualification; it was agreed to,