Chapter VI: Part 6

Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

M^r Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointm^{ts} to the 2^d branch of the National Legislature with the words "7 years."

M^r Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which w^d be between the terms of the 1^{st} branch & of the executive.

M^r Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs had arisen in England from their septennial Act which was reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.

M^r Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this 2^d branch is to controul the democratic branch of the Nat^l Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness & independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution ag^{st} encroachments of the Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch.

M^r Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we wished was to give to the Gov^t that stability which was every where called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The Constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Mary^d created just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances perhaps it may have erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates, were chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature, and held their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check whatever ag^{st} the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived it to be of great importance that a stable & firm Gov^t, organized in the republican form should be held out to the people. If this be not done, and the people be left to judge of this species of Gov^t by y^e operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is much to be feared the time is not distant when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.

On the question for "seven years" as the term for the 2^d branch

Mass^{ts} divided. (M^r King, M^r Ghorum ay, M^r Gerry, M^r
Strong, no) Con^t no. N. Y. div^d N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Butler and M^r Rutlidge proposed that the members of the 2^d branch should be entitled to no salary or compensation for their services. On the question,[81]--

Mass^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

[81] (It is probable y^e votes here turned chiefly on the idea
that if the salaries were not here provided for, the members
would be paid by their respective States) This note for the
bottom margin.--Madison's Note.

It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the stipends & ineligibility of the 2^d branch be the same as, of the 1^{st} branch:--Con: disagreeing to the ineligibility.

It was moved & 2^{ded} to alter the Resol: 9. so as to read "that the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear & determine in the dernier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."

It was moved & 2^{ded} to strike out "all piracies & felonies on the high seas," which was agreed to.

It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures from an enemy."

It was moved & agreed to strike out "other States" and insert "two distinct States of the Union."

It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of the Resolution 9, relating to the Judiciary:

The Com^e then rose & the House Adjourned.

WEDNESDAY JUNE 13.[82] IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE

[82] Edward Carrington wrote to Madison from New York, June 13,
1787:

"The public mind is now on the point of a favourable turn to
the objects of your meeting, and, being fairly met with the
result, will, I am persuaded, eventually embrace it--being
calculated for the permanent fitness, and not the momentary
habits of the country, it may at first be viewed with
hesitation, but derived and patronized as it will be, its
influence must extend into an adoption as the present fabric
gives way--the work once well done will be done forever, but
patched up in accommodation to the whim of the day, it will
soon require the hand of the cobbler again, and in every
unfortunate experiment the materials are rendered the less
fit for that monument of civil liberty which we wish to
erect.--Constitute a federal Government, invigorate & check
it well--give it then independent powers over the Trade the
Revenues, and force of the Union, and all things that
involve any relationship to foreign powers--give it also the
revisal of all State acts--unless it possesses a compleat
controul over the State Governments, the constant effort
will be to resume the delegated powers,--nor do I see what
inducement the federal sovereignty can have to negative an
innocent act of a State--Constitute it in such shape that,
its first principles being preserved, it will be a good
republic--I wish to see that system have a fair
experiment--but let the liability to encroachment be rather
from the federal, than the State, governments--in the first
case we shall insensibly glide into a monarchy: in the
latter nothing but anarchy can be the consequence.

"Some Gentlemen think of a total surrender of the State
Sovereignty--I see not the necessity of that measure for
giving us national stability in consequence--the negative of
the federal sovereignty will effectually prevent the
existence of any licentious or inconsiderate act--and I
believe that even under a new monarchy it would be found
necessary thus to continue the local administration--general
Laws would operate many particular [undecipherable] and a
general legislature would be found incompetent to the
formation of local ones--the interest of the United States
may be well combined for the common good--but the affairs of
so extensive a country are not to be thrown into one
mass--an attempt to confederate upon terms materially
opposed to the particular Interests would in all probability
occasion a dismemberment, and in that event, within a long
time yet to come, the prospects of commerce will be at an
end as to any degree of national importance, let her fate be
what it may as to freedom or vassalage."--_Mad. MSS._

Resol: 9 being resumed

The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the Nat^l tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room for their organization.

M^r Randolph & M^r Madison, then moved the following resolution respecting a National Judiciary,viz "that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed to.

M^r Pinkney & M^r Sherman moved to insert after the words "one supreme tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the National Legislature."

M^r Madison, objected to an app^t by the whole Legislature. Many of them were incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.

M^r Sherman & M^r Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the app^t by the Senate was ag^d to nem. con.

M^r Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the Purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills, they w^d repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of representatives in the other branch who will fall into their snares.

M^r Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always following the British Constitution when the reason of it did not apply. There was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the body proposed to be established. If the Senate should be degraded by any such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving in it in favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills.

M^r Madison observed that the Comentators on the Brit: Const: had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1^{st} branch. If they s^d have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it w^d be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to the _amendment_, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an addition of a given sum w^d be equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.

M^r King differed from M^r Gerry, and concurred in the objections to the proposition.

M^r Read favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to the case of amendments.

M^r Pinkney thinks the question premature. If the Senate sh^d be formed on the _same_ proportional representation as it stands at present, they s^d have equal power, otherwise if a different principle s^d be introduced.

M^r Sherman. As both branches must concur, there can be no danger whichever way the Senate be formed. We establish two branches in order to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the finance business--The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the representatives of the people. What a man does by another, he does by himself is a maxim. In Con^t both branches can originate in all cases, and it has been found safe & convenient. Whatever might have been the reason of the rule as to The H. of Lords, it is clear that no good arises from it now even there.

Gen^l Pinkney. This distinction prevails in S. C. and has been a source of pernicious disputes between y^e 2 branches. The Constitution is now evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed from y^e Senate to the other House.

M^r Williamson wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-discussion. The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in the lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.

On the question for excepting money bills, as prop^d by M^r
Gerry, Mass. no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.[83]

[83] According to the Journal (121) Pennsylvania was
among the noes.

Committee rose & M^r Ghorum made report, which was postponed till tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The report was in the words following:

Report of the Committee of Whole on M^r Randolph's propositions.

1. Res^d that it is the opinion of this Committee that a
National Governm^t ought to be established, consisting of a
supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.

2. Resol^d that the National Legislature ought to consist of two
branches.

3. Res^d that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several
States for the term of three years, to receive fixed Stipends by
which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to
public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury: to be
ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly
belonging to the functions of the first branch), during the term
of service, and under the national Government for the Space of
one year after its expiration.

4. Res^d that the members of the second branch of the Nat^l
Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures,
to be of the age of 30 years at least, to hold their offices for
a term sufficient to ensure their independency, namely, seven
years, to receive fixed stipends by which they may be
compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to
be paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible to any
office established by a particular State, or under the authority
of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the
functions of the second branch) during the term of service, and
under the Nat^l Gov^t for the space of one year after its
expiration.

5. Res^d that each branch ought to possess the right of
originating Acts.

6. Res^d that the Nat^l Legislature ought to be empowered to
enjoy the Legislative rights vested in Cong^s by the
Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which
the separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of
the U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the
articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the
authority of the Union.

7. Res^d that the rights of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch of the
National Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule
established in the articles of confederation but according to
some equitable ratio of representation, namely, in proportion to
the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants,
of every age sex and condition, including those bound to
servitude for a term of years, & three fifths of all other
persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except
Indians not paying taxes in each State.

8. Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2^d branch of the
National Legislature ought to be according to the rule
established for the first.

9. Resolved that a National Executive be instituted to consist
of a single person, to be chosen by the Nat^l Legislature for
the term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the
national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise
provided for--to be ineligible a second time, & to be removeable
on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of
duty--to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated
for the devotion of his time to public service to be paid out of
the national Treasury.

10. Resol^d that the Nat^l Executive shall have a right to
negative any Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards
passed unless by two thirds of each branch of the National
Legislature.

11. Resol^d that a Nat^l Judiciary be established, to consist of
one supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to be appointed by the
2^d branch of the Nat^l Legislature, to hold their offices
during good behaviour, & to receive punctually at stated times a
fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or
diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually
in office at the time of such increase or diminution.

12. Resol^d that the Nat^l Legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior Tribunals.

13. Res^d that the jurisdiction of the Nat^l Judiciary shall
extend to all cases which respect the collection of the Nat^l
revenue, impeachments of any Nat^l Officers, and questions which
involve the national peace & harmony.

14. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the admission of
States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States,
whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory or
otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the Nat^l
Legislature less than the whole.

15. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day
after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and
for the completion of all their engagements.

16. Res^d that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws
ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States.

17. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the amendment of
the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. Res^d that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers
within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support
the articles of Union.

19. Res^d that the amendments which shall be offered to the
confederation by the Convention ought at a proper time or times
after the approbation of Cong^s to be submitted to an Assembly
or Assemblies recommended by the several Legislatures to be
expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.

THURSDAY JUNE 14. IN CONVENTION.

M^r Patterson, observed to the Convention that it was the wish of several deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have such an one ready by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention: And the Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the purpose.

FRIDAY JUNE 15^{TH} 1787

M^r Patterson, laid before the Convention the plan which he said several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by M^r Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it should be referred to a Committee of the Whole, and that in order to place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recommitted. At the earnest request of M^r Lansing[84] & some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go into Co[~m]ittee of the whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of the plan proposed by M^r Patterson w^d be better prepared to explain & support it, and all would have an opportu^y of taking copies.[85]

[84] "Mr. Lansing is a practising Attorney at Albany, and Mayor
of that Corporation. He has a hisitation in his speech, that
will prevent his being an Orator of any eminence;--his legal
knowledge I am told is not extensive, nor his education a
good one. He is however a Man of good sense, plain in his
manners, and sincere in his friendships. He is about 32
years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 327.

[85] (This plan had been concerted among the deputations or
members thereof, from Con^t N. Y. N. J. Del. and perhaps M^r
Martin from Mary^d who made with them a common cause though
on different principles. Con^t & N. Y. were ag^{st} a
departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing
rather to add a few new powers to Cong^s than to substitute,
a National Gov^t. The States of N. J. & Del. were opposed to
a National Gov^t because its patrons considered a
proportional representation of the States as the basis of
it. The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a
Nat^l Gov^t from these different motives began now to
produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention.
M^r Dickenson said to M^r Madison You see the consequence of
pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small
States wish for two branches in the General Legislature, and
are friends to a good National Government; but we would
sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived
of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the
legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of
the large States.)--Madison Note.

"Mr. Madison moved for the report of the committee, and the
question may then come on whether the convention will
postpone it in order to take into consideration the system
now offered.

"Mr. Lansing is of opinion that the two systems are fairly
contrasted. The one now offered is on the basis of amending
the federal government, and the other to be reported as a
national government, on propositions which exclude the
propriety of amendment. Considering therefore its
importance, and that justice may be done to its weighty
consideration, he is for postponing it a day.

"Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either
plan--supposes both might again be considered as federal
plans, and by this means they will be fairly in committee,
and be contrasted so as to make a comparative estimate of
the two."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 121, 122.

The propositions from N. Jersey moved by M^r Patterson were in the words following.

1. Res^d that the articles of Confederation ought to be so
revised, corrected, & enlarged, as to render the federal
Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the
preservation of the Union.

2. Res^d that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States
in Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation,
they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by
levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign
growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States,
by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all
letters or packages passing through the general post-office, to
be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper &
expedient; to make rules & regulations for the collection
thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in
such manner as they shall think proper, to pass Acts for the
regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign Nations as
with each other: provided that all punishments, fines,
forfeitures & penalties to be incurred for contravening such
acts rules and regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law
Judiciaries of the State in which any Offence contrary to the
true intent & meaning of such Acts rules & regulations shall
have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing
in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose
in the Superior Common law Judiciary in such State, subject
nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law &
fact in rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the
U. States.

3. Res^d that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead
of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of
Confederation, the United States in Cong^s be authorized to make
such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white &
other free citizens & inhabitants of every age Sex and condition
including those bound to servitude for a term of years & three
fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing
description, except Indians not paying taxes; that if such
requisitions be not complied with, in the time specified
therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non complying
States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing &
authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby
vested in the U. States in Cong^s shall be exercised without the
consent of at least ---- States, and in that proportion if the
number of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or
diminished.

4. Res^d that the U. States in Cong^s be authorized to elect a
federal Executive to consist of ---- persons, to continue in
office for the term of ---- years, to receive punctually at
stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which
no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the
persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or
diminution, to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be
incapable of holding any other office or appointment during
their time of service and for ---- years thereafter: to be
ineligible a second time, & removeable by Cong^s on application
by a majority of the Executives of the several States; that the
Executives besides their general authority to execute the
federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise
provided for, & to direct all military operations; provided that
none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall on any
occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct
any enterprise as General or in any other capacity.

5. Res^d that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a
supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the
Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to
receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for
their services in which no increase nor diminution shall be
made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time
of such increase or diminution: that the Judiciary so
established shall have authority to hear & determine in the
first instance on all impeachments of federal Officers, & by way
of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights
of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all
cases of piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in
which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any
treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for
the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal
Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they
remain in office be capable of receiving or holding any other
office or appointment during their term of service, or for ----
thereafter.

6. Res^d that all Acts of the U. States in Cong^s made by virtue
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the Articles of
Confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified
under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of
the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties
shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the
Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their
decisions any thing in the respective laws of the Individual
States to the Contrary notwithstanding: and that if any State,
or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent y^e
carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal
Executive shall be authorized to call forth y^e power of the
Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to
enforce and compel an Obedience to such Acts, or an observance
of such Treaties.

7. Res^d that provision be made for the admission of new States
into the Union.

8. Res^d that the rule for naturalization ought to be same in
every State.

9. Res^d that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in
another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same
offence as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in
which the offence was committed.[86]

[86] This copy of M^r Patterson's propositions varies in
a few clauses from that in the printed Journal
furnished from the papers of M^r Brearley a
colleague of M^r Patterson. A confidence is felt,
notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in
the Journal is not entirely correct is shewn by the
ensuing speech of M^r Wilson (June 16) in which he
refers to the mode of removing the Executive by
impeachment & conviction as a feature in the Virg^a
plan forming one of its contrasts to that of M^r
Patterson, which proposed a removal on the
application of a majority of the Executives of the
States. In the copy printed in the Journal, the two
modes are combined in the same clause; whether
through inadvertence, or as a contemplated
amendment, does not appear.--Madison's Note.

The Journal contains: "6. Resolved, that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within
the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to
support the articles of union," and "9. Resolved,
that provision ought to be made for hearing and
deciding upon all disputes arising between the
United States and an individual state, respecting
territory."--_Journal of the Federal Convention_,
126.

Adjourned.

SATURDAY JUNE 16. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
on Resolutions propos^d by M^r P. & M^r R.

M^r Lansing called for the reading of the 1^{st} resolution of each plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast; that of M^r Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of M^r Randolph destroys it: the latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain general powers for the general good. The plan of M^r R. in short absorbs all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He grounded his preference of M^r P's plan, chiefly on two objections ag^{st} that of M^r R. 1. want of power in the Convention to discuss & propose it. 2. the improbability of its being adopted, 1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of the States, the Co[~m]issions produced by the several deputations all proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary & improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his State. N. York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and a National Government.

2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme, which they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far exceeded what they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several Acts particularly in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Cong. in 1783, not authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed to have already taken place. To rely on any change which is hereafter to take place in the sentiments of the people would be trusting to too great an uncertainty. We know only what their present sentiments are. And it is in vain to propose what will not accord with these. The States will never feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government to give it a negative on their laws. The Scheme is itself totally novel. There is no parallel to it to be found. The Authority of Congress is familiar to the people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily approved by them.

M^r Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments on the plan proposed by M^r R. he would now avoiding repetition as much as possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He preferred it because it accorded 1. with the powers of the Convention, 2 with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governm^t as may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. If we argue the matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If a proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of it. He reads the 5^{th} art: of Confederation giving each State a vote--& the 13^{th} declaring that no alteration shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed (by M^r Wilson) that the larger State gave up the point, not because it was right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser States. The larger States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland were the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant territory to the benefit of the whole.--If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether the Citizens of Mass^{ts} Pen^a & V^a accede to it. It will be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or from the individuals; and according to his plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as according that of M^r R. A distinct executive & Judiciary also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in the Legislature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the reason of the precaution is not applicable to this case. Within a particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check may be necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and besides, the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Do the people at large complain of Cong^s? No, what they wish is that Cong^s may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno', the people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers Cong^s will act with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Nat^l Legislature; being fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by the mode of election. The plan of M^r R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del. two representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch and you have 270, coming once at least a year from the most distant as well as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged State of our finances can so expensive a System be seriously thought of? By enlarging the powers of Cong^s the greatest part of this expence will be saved, and all purposes will be answered. At least a trial ought to be made.

M^r Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last proposed. These points were 1. in the Virg^a plan there are 2 & in some degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to be a _single_ legislature only--2. Representation of the people at large is the basis of one: the State Legislatures, the pillars of the other--3. proportional representation prevails in one;--equality of suffrage in the other--4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one:--a plurality is held out in the other.--5. in the one the majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:--in the other a minority may prevail. 6. the Nat^l Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent &:--in place of this Cong^s are to have additional power in a few cases only--7. A negative on the laws of the States:--in place of this coertion to be substituted--8. The Executive to be removable on impeachment & conviction;--in one plan: in the other to be removable at the instance of a majority of the Executives of the States--9. Revision of the laws provided for in one:--no such check in the other--10. inferior national tribunals in one:--none such in the other. 11. In one y^e jurisdiction of Nat^l tribunals to extend &c.--; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all cases affecting the Nation^l peace & harmony; _there_ a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally y^e ratification is in this to be by the people themselves:--in that by the legislative authorities according to the 13 art: of the Confederation.

With regard to the _power of the Convention_, he conceived himself authorized to _conclude nothing_, but to be at liberty to _propose any thing_. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the two plans.

With _regard to the sentiments of the people_, he conceived it difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not persuade himself that the State Gov^{ts} & Sovereignties were so much the idols of the people, nor a Nat^l Gov^t so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why s^d a Nat^l Gov^t be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of _Deleware_ be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the _United States_? Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Gov^{ts}? no, Sir. It is from the Nat^l Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a National Gov^t and it will be a further recommendation of M^r R'^s plan that it is to be submitted to _them_, and not to the _Legislatures_, for ratification.

Proceeding now to the 1^{st} point on which he had contrasted the two plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could ever consent to give powers to Cong^s he had two reasons either of w^{ch} was sufficient, 1. Cong^s as a Legislative body does not stand on the people. 2. it is a _single_ body. 1. He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation, he would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every branch of Gov^t. In G. Britain where this poison has had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to the purity of her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source of influence must also be stronger in small than large bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the _smallest_ of them. There are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing over others, he will only remark that the _Impost_, so anxiously wished for by the public was defeated not by any of the _larger_ States in the Union. 2. _Congress is a single Legislature._ Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.

On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first Cæsar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time he w^d not he s^d, proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of them, the fate of the others will depend.

M^r Pinkney,[87] the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Nat^l system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length in recommending; which they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this Convention.

[87] Yates states it was C. C. Pinckney who said this.--_Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 123.

M^r Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the U.S. should remain in Cong^s" This was not seconded, though it seemed better calculated for the purpose than the 1^{st} proposition of M^r Patterson in place of which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.

M^r Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the Salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts relating to the Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he observed that as each State acted separately in the case, it would have been indecent for it to have charged the existing Constitution with all the vices which it might have perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this experiment would not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There are certainly reasons of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them. He w^d not as far as depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.

The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by which the end of a Gen^l Gov^t can be attained: the 1^{st} is by coercion as proposed by M^r P's plan 2. by real legislation as prop^d by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be _impracticable_, _expensive_, _cruel to individuals_. It tended also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the Spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of Ambition. We must resort therefore to a National _Legislation over individuals_, for which Cong^s are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the rec^d maxim on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Cong^s has been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body. Cong^s are moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures who retain even a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the views of the States, who are always encroaching on the authority of the U. States. A provision for harmony among the States, as in trade, naturalization &.--for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear its crest--and for certain other general benefits, must be made. The powers for these purposes can never be given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in point of representation, elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A Nat^l Gov^t alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered that the present is the last moment for establing one. After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.

The Committee rose & the House adjourned.

MONDAY JUNE 18. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
on the propositions of M^r Patterson & M^r Randolph.

On motion of M^r Dickinson to postpone the 1^{st} Resolution in M^r Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following viz--"that the Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the exigencies, the preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.

Mr. Hamilton,[88] had been hitherto silent on the business before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age & experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleages, he could by no means accede. This crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted.--As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A _federal_ Gov^t he conceived to mean an association of independent Communities into one. Different Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet--& among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from the _federal_ idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman from V^a (M^r R.) that we owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The States sent us here to provide for the exigencies of the Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said that the _States_ cannot _ratify_ a plan not within the purview of the article of the Confederation providing for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason assigned ag^{st} it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.

[88] Hamilton happened to call upon Madison while the latter was
putting the last touches to this speech and "acknowledged
its fidelity, without suggesting more than a few verbal
alterations which were made."--(Cf. _Madison's Writings_,
vol. ii.). A brief of the speech from the Hamilton Papers is
given in Lodge's _Works of Hamilton_, i., 353, where (i.,
375) Yates's report also is quoted.