Chapter VII: Part 7

The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans--prove that there were essential defects in both--and point out such changes as might render a _national one_, efficacious.--The great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States in favor of the federal Gov^t. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts--their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the controul of the Gen^l Government. It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Gen^l Gov^t as of the particular Gov^{ts}. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of Gov^t attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as Virg^a will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its importance and self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of the State Gov^t. Its sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize & endear a Gov^t to a people, are dispensed to them. 4. _Force_ by which may be understood a _coercion of laws_ or _coercion of arms_. Cong^s have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this Coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Mass^{ts} is now feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union will ensue. 5. _Influence._ he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an attachment to the Gov^t. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow into the stream of the Gen^l Gov^t. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Gen^l Gov^t and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force ag^{st} delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy affords another lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another.--How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the General Goverm^t as will turn all the strong principles & passions abovementioned on its side. Does the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct revenue to Cong^s but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves cannot be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort? Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia; France or Eng^d with other countries of Europe, Pen^a with N. Carol^a will the relative pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends too on _situation_. Con^t N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the Commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be drawn? from Commerce; even from exports which notwithstanding the co[~m]on opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that V^a & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they sh^d long abide by it. It shocks too much all ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in a Gov^t tho slow are sure in their operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether Cong^s at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. P'^s plan provides no remedy.--If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of Cong^s is such that they could never be properly & effectually exercised. The members of Cong^s being chosen by the States & subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is ag^{st} all the principles of a good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Cong^s. Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers to Cong^s must eventuate in a bad Gov^t or in no Gov^t. The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not do. What then is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged him. The expence of a general Gov^t was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Gov^{ts} as the case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great oeconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Gov^t. He did not mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand he saw no _other_ necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary. There must be district tribunals; corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States. The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the centre of the Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the 1^{st} branch would only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Gov^t. This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a Republican Gov^t could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of so many of the wise & good, that the British Gov^t was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still going on. It was once thought that the power of Cong^s was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming ag^{st} the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by M^r Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only Gov^t in the world "which unites public strength with individual security."--In every Co[~m]unity where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & Creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have the power, that each may defend itself ag^{st} the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier ag^{st} every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it.--Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of Gov^t is pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States whether experience had not there verified the remark.--As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on Republican Principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question; for can there be a good Gov^t without a good Executive. The English Model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad--and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of the institution at home, one of the weak sides of Republics was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of intermeddling Neibours. Sweden was a striking instance. The French & English had each their parties during the late Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the former.--What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require, so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes. But is this a Republican Gov^t, it will be asked? Yes if all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a process of election originating with the people. He was sensible that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but little of the power and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures, and as the object of his ambition w^d be to _prolong_ his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an _elective Monarch_, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Gov^t. He w^d reply that _Monarch_ is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate w^d be a monarch for life--the other prop^d by the Report from the Co[~m]ittee of the whole, w^d be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that elective monarchies w^d be the best if they could be guarded ag^{st} the _tumults_ excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the _Army_. In _Poland_ the election is made by great rival _princes_ with independent power, and ample means, of raising commotions. In the German Empire, The appointment is made by the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves as will defend the community ag^{st} these effects in any dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he sh^d prefer to either of those under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved--he sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies--he sees that a great progress has been already made & is still going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan of M^r R. w^d place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to the plan of M^r R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. He read his sketch in the words following; to wit

I. The supreme Legislative power of the United States of America
to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be
called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall
form the Legislature of the United States with power to pass all
laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.

II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to
serve for three years.

III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during
good behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for
that purpose by the people: in order to this the States to be
divided into election districts. On the death, removal or
resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of the
district from which he came.

IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be
vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good
behaviour--the election to be made by Electors chosen by the
people in the Election Districts aforesaid--The authorities &
functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative
on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws
passed; to have the direction of war when authorized or begun;
to have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power
of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the
heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers
(Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the
approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the power of
pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon
without the approbation of the Senate.

V. On the death resignation or removal of the Governour his
authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till
a Successor be appointed.

VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the
power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of
approving or rejecting all appointments of officers except the
heads or chiefs of the departments of Finance War and foreign
affairs.

VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in ---- Judges
to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and
permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in
all causes of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all
causes in which the revenues of the General Government or the
Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.

VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to
institute Courts in each State for the determination of all
matters of general concern.

IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States
to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and
upon conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for
holding any place of trust or profit--All impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief ---- or Judge of the
Superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall
hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent
salary.

X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the
Constitution or laws of the United States to be utterly void;
and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governour
or president of each State shall be appointed by the General
Government and shall have a Negative upon the laws about to be
passed in the State of which he is the Governour or President.

XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the militia
of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction
of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and
commissioned by them.

On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.[89]

[89] COPY OF A PAPER COMMUNICATED TO J. M. BY COL. HAMILTON,
ABOUT THE CLOSE OF THE CONVENTION IN PHILAD^A, 1787, WHICH
HE SAID DELINEATED THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HE WOULD HAVE
WISHED TO BE PROPOSED BY THE CONVENTION. HE HAD STATED THE
PRINCIPLES OF IT IN THE COURSE OF THE DELIBERATIONS.

The people of the United States of America do ordain &
establish this Constitution for the government of themselves
and their posterity.

ARTICLE I

§ 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct
bodies of men, one to be called the Assembly, the other the
Senate, subject to the negative hereinafter mentioned.

§ 2. The Executive power, with the qualifications
hereinafter specified, shall be vested in a President of the
United States.

§ 3. The Supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases
otherwise provided for in this Constitution, shall be vested
in a Court to be called the SUPREME COURT, to consist of not
less than six nor more than twelve Judges.

ARTICLE II

§ 1. The Assembly shall consist of persons to be called
representatives, who shall be chosen, except in the first
instance, by the free male citizens & inhabitants of the
several States comprehended in the Union, all of whom of the
age of twenty one years & upwards shall be entitled to an
equal vote.

§ 2. But the first Assembly shall be chosen in the manner
prescribed in the last article and shall consist of one
hundred members of whom N. Hampshire shall have five,
Massachusetts thirteen, Rhode Island two, Connecticut seven,
N. York nine, N. Jersey six, Pennsylvania twelve, Delaware
two, Maryland eight, Virginia sixteen, N. Carolina eight, S.
Carolina eight, Georgia four.

§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections
of Representatives, apportioning them in each State, from
time to time, as nearly as may be to the number of persons
described in the 4§ of the VII article, so as that the whole
number of Representatives shall never be less than one
hundred, nor more than ---- hundred. There shall be a Census
taken for this purpose within three years after the first
meeting of the Legislature, and within every successive
period of ten years. The term for which Representatives
shall be elected shall be determined by the Legislature but
shall not exceed three years. There shall be a general
election at least once in three years; and the time of
service of all the members in each Assembly shall begin,
(except in filling vacancies) on the same day, and shall
always end on the same day.

§ 4. Forty members shall make a House sufficient to proceed
to business; but their number may be increased by the
Legislature, yet so as never to exceed a majority of the
whole number of Representatives.

§ 5. The Assembly shall choose its President and other
officers, shall judge of the qualifications & elections of
its own members, punish them for improper conduct in their
capacity of Representatives not extending to life or limb;
and shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment
except in the case of the President of the United States;
but no impeachment of a member of the Senate shall be by
less than two thirds of the Representatives present.

§ 6. Representatives may vote by proxy; but no
Representative present shall be proxy for more than one who
is absent.[A]

[A] Quere, ? (to provide for distant States).--Note
in Madison's hand.

§ 7. Bills for raising revenue, and bills for appropriating
monies for the support of fleets and armies, and for paying
the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate
in the Assembly; but may be altered and amended by the
Senate.

§ 8. The acceptance of an office under the United States by
a Representative shall vacate his seat in the Assembly.

ARTICLE III

§ 1. The Senate shall consist of persons to be chosen,
except in the first instance, by Electors elected for that
purpose by the Citizens and inhabitants of the several
States comprehended in the Union who shall have in their own
right, or in the right of their wifes, an Estate in land for
not less than life, or a term of years, whereof at the time
of giving their votes there shall be at least fourteen years
unexpired.

§ 2. But the first Senate shall be chosen in the manner
prescribed in the last Article and shall consist of forty
members to be called Senators, of whom N. Hampshire shall
have ---- Mass^{ts} ---- R. Island ---- Connecticut ---- N.
York ---- N. Jersey ---- Pen^a ---- Delaware ---- Mary^d
---- Virg^a ---- N. Carol. ---- S. Carol. ---- Geo. ----.

§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections
of Senators, for which purpose the States respectively,
which have more than one Senator, shall be divided into
convenient districts to which the Senators shall be
apportioned. A State having but one Senator shall be itself
a district. On the death, resignation or removal from office
of a Senator his place shall be supplied by a new election
in the district from which he came. Upon each election there
shall be not less than six nor more than twelve electors
chosen in a district.

§ 4. The number of Senators shall never be less than forty,
nor shall any State, if the same shall not hereafter be
divided, ever have less than the number allotted to it in
the second section of this article; but the Legislature may
increase the whole number of Senators, in the same
proportion to the whole number of Representatives as forty
is to one hundred; and such increase beyond the present
number, shall be apportioned to the respective States in a
ratio to the respective numbers of their representatives.

§ 5. If States shall be divided, or if a new arrangement of
the boundaries of two or more States shall take place, the
Legislature shall apportion the number of Senators (in
elections succeeding such division or new arrangement) to
which the constituent parts were entitled according to the
change of situation, having regard to the number of persons
described in the 4 §. of the VII article.

§ 6. The Senators shall hold their places during good
behaviour, removable only by conviction on impeachment for
some crime or misdemeanor. They shall continue to exercise
their offices when impeached untill a conviction shall take
place. Sixteen Senators attending in person shall be
sufficient to make a House to transact business; but the
Legislature may increase this number, yet so as never to
exceed a majority of the whole number of Senators. The
Senators may vote by proxy, but no Senator who is present
shall be proxy for more than two who are absent.

§ 7. The Senate shall choose its President and other
officers; shall judge of the qualifications and elections of
its members, and shall punish them for improper conduct in
their capacity of Senators; but such punishment shall not
extend to life or limb, nor to expulsion. In the absence of
their President they may choose a temporary President. The
President shall only have a casting vote when the House is
equally divided.

§ 8. The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of
declaring war. No treaty shall be made without their advice
and consent; which shall also be necessary to the
appointment of all officers, except such for which a
different provision is made in this Constitution.

ARTICLE IV

§ 1. The President of the United States of America, (except
in the first instance) shall be elected in the manner
following--The Judges of the Supreme Court shall within
sixty days after a vacancy shall happen, cause public notice
to be given in each State, of such vacancy, appointing
therein three several days for the several purposes
following, to wit, a day for commencing the election of
electors for the purposes hereinafter specified, to be
called the first electors, which day shall not be less than
forty, nor more than sixty days, after the day of the
publication of the notice in each State--another day for
the meeting of the electors not less [than] forty nor
more than ninety days from the day for commencing their
election--another day for the meeting of electors to be
chosen by the first electors, for the purpose hereinafter
specified, and to be called the second Electors, which day
shall be not less than forty nor more than sixty days after
the day for the meeting of the first electors.

§ 2. After notice of a vacancy shall have been given there
shall be chosen in each State a number of persons, as the
first electors in the preceding section mentioned, equal to
the whole number of the Representatives and Senators of such
State in the Legislature of the United States; which
electors shall be chosen by the Citizens of such State
having an estate of inheritance or for three lives in land,
or a clear personal estate of the value of one thousand
Spanish milled dollars of the present standard.

§ 3. These first electors shall meet in their respective
States at the time appointed, at one place; and shall
proceed to vote by ballot for a President, who shall not be
one of their own number, unless the Legislature upon
experiment should hereafter direct otherwise. They shall
cause two lists to be made of the name or names of the
person or persons voted for, which they or the major part of
them shall sign & certify. They shall then proceed each to
nominate openly in the presence of the others, two persons
as for second electors, and out of the persons who shall
have the four highest numbers of nominations, they shall
afterwards by ballot by plurality of votes choose two who
shall be the second electors, to each of whom shall be
delivered one of the lists before mentioned. These second
electors shall not be any of the persons voted for as
President. A copy of the same list signed and certified in
like manner shall be transmitted by the first electors to
the Seat of the Government of the United States, under a
sealed cover directed to the President of the Assembly,
which after the meeting of the Second electors shall be
opened for the inspection of the two Houses of the
Legislature.

§ 4. The second electors shall meet precisely on the day
appointed and not on another day, at one place. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, or if there be no Chief
Justice, the Judge senior in office in such Court, or if
there be no one Judge senior in office, some other Judge of
that Court, by the choice of the rest of the Judges or of a
majority of them, shall attend at the same place and shall
preside at the meeting, but shall have no vote. Two thirds
of the whole number of the Electors shall constitute a
sufficient meeting for the execution of their trust. At this
meeting the lists delivered to the respective electors shall
be produced and inspected, and if there be any person who
has a majority of the whole number of votes given by the
first electors, he shall be the President of the United
States; but if there be no such person, the second electors
so met shall proceed to vote, by ballot for one of the
persons named in the lists who shall have the three highest
numbers of the votes of the first electors; and if upon the
first or any succeeding ballot on the day of their meeting,
either of those persons shall have a number of votes equal
to a majority of the whole number of second electors chosen,
he shall be the President. But if no such choice be made on
the day appointed for the meeting either by reason of the
non-attendance of the second electors, or their not
agreeing, or any other matter, the person having the
greatest number of votes of the first electors shall be the
President.

§ 5. If it should happen that the Chief Justice or some
other Judge of the Supreme Court should not attend in due
time, the second electors shall proceed to the execution of
their trust without him.

§ 6. If the Judges should neglect to cause the notice
required by the first section of this article to be given
within the time therein limited, they may nevertheless cause
it to be afterwards given; but their neglect if wilful, is
hereby declared to be an offence for which they may be
impeached, and if convicted they shall be punished as in
other cases of conviction on impeachment.

§ 7. The Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such
further regulations as may be necessary for the more orderly
election of the President; not contravening the provisions
herein contained.

§ 8. The President before he shall enter upon the execution
of his office shall take an oath or affirmation, faithfully
to execute the same, and to the utmost of his Judgment &
power to protect the rights of the people, and preserve the
Constitution inviolate. This oath or affirmation shall be
administered by the President of the Senate for the time
being in the presence of both Houses of the Legislature.

§ 9. The Senate and the Assembly shall always convene in
Session on the day appointed for the meeting of the second
electors and shall continue sitting till the President take
the oath or affirmation of office. He shall hold his place
during good behavior, removeable only by conviction upon
impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor.

§ 10. The President at the beginning of every meeting of the
Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to
business, shall convene them together at the place where the
Senate shall sit, and shall communicate to them all such
matters as may be necessary for their information, or as may
require their consideration. He may by message during the
Session communicate all other matters which may appear to
him proper. He may, whenever in his opinion the public
business shall require it, convene the Senate and Assembly,
or either of them, and may prorogue them for a time not
exceeding forty days at one prorogation; and if they should
disagree about their adjournment, he may adjourn them to
such time as he shall think proper. He shall have a right to
negative all bills, Resolutions or acts of the two Houses of
the Legislature about to be passed into laws. He shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. He shall be the
commander in chief of the army and Navy of the United States
and of the Militia within the several States, and shall have
the direction of war when commenced, but he shall not take
the actual command in the field of an army without the
consent of the Senate and Assembly. All treaties,
conventions and agreements with foreign nations shall be
made by him, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. He shall have the appointment of the Principal or
Chief officer of each of the departments of war, naval
Affairs, Finance and Foreign Affairs; and shall have the
nomination; and by and with the consent of the Senate, the
appointment of all other officers to be appointed under the
authority of the United States, except such for whom
different provision is made by this Constitution; and
provided that this shall not be construed to prevent the
Legislature, from appointing by name, in their laws, persons
to special and particular trusts created in such laws; nor
shall be construed to prevent principals in offices merely
ministerial, from constituting deputies.--In the recess of
the Senate he may fill vacancies in offices by appointments
to continue in force until the end of the next Session of
the Senate, and he shall commission all officers. He shall
have power to pardon all offences except treason, for which
he may grant reprieves, untill the opinion of the Senate &
Assembly can be had, and with their concurrence may pardon
the same.

§ 11. He shall receive a fixed compensation for his services
to be paid to him at stated times, and not to be increased
nor diminished during his continuance in office.

§ 12. If he depart out of the United States without the
Consent of the Senate and Assembly, he shall thereby
abdicate his office.

§ 13. He may be impeached for any crime or misdemeanor by
the two Houses of the Legislature, two thirds of each House
concurring, and if convicted shall be removed from office.
He may be afterwards tried & punished in the ordinary course
of law. His impeachment shall operate as a suspension from
office until the determination thereof.

§ 14. The President of the Senate shall be vice President of
the United States. On the death, resignation, impeachment,
removal from office, or absence from the United States, of
the President thereof, the Vice President shall exercise all
the powers by this Constitution vested in the President,
until another shall be appointed, or untill he shall return
within the United States, if his absence was with the
consent of the Senate and Assembly.

ARTICLE V

§ 1. There shall be a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
who together with the other Judges thereof, shall hold the
office during good behaviour, removable only by conviction
on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor. Each Judge
shall have a competent salary to be paid to him at stated
times, and not to be diminished during his continuance in
office.

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
causes in which the United States shall be a party, in all
controversies between the United States, and a particular
State, or between two or more States, except such as relate
to a claim of territory between the United States, and one
or more States, which shall be determined in the mode
prescribed in the VI article; in all cases affecting foreign
Ministers, Consuls and Agents; and an appellate jurisdiction
both as to law and fact in all cases which shall concern the
Citizens of foreign nations, in all questions between the
Citizens of different States, and in all others in which the
fundamental rights of this Constitution are involved,
subject to such exceptions as are herein contained and to
such regulations as the Legislature shall provide.

The Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the
Legislature shall also hold their places during good
behaviour, removeable only by conviction on impeachment for
some crime or misdemeanor, and shall have competent salaries
to be paid at stated times and not to be diminished during
their continuance in office; but nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from
abolishing such Courts themselves.

All crimes, except upon impeachment, shall be tried by a
Jury of twelve men; and if they shall have been committed
within any State, shall be tried within such State; and all
civil causes arising under this constitution of the like
kind with those which have been heretofore triable by Jury
in the respective States, shall in like manner be tried by
jury; unless in special cases the Legislature shall think
proper to make different provision, to which provision the
concurrence of two thirds of both Houses shall be necessary.

§ 2. Impeachments of the President and Vice President of the
U. States, members of the Senate, the Governours and
Presidents of the several States, the Principal or Chief
Officers of the Departments enumerated in the 10 §. of the
4^{th} Article, Ambassadors and other like Public Ministers,
the Judges of the Supreme Court, Generals, and Admirals of
the Navy shall be tried by a Court to consist of the Judges
of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice or first or
Senior Judge of the superior Court of law in each State, of
whom twelve shall constitute a Court. A majority of the
Judges present may convict. All other persons shall be tried
on impeachment by a court to consist of the Judges of the
Supreme Court and six Senators drawn by lot, a majority of
whom may convict.

Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular offence
for which the party accused is to be tried, and judgment
on conviction upon the trial thereof shall be either
removal from office singly, or removal from office and
disqualification for holding any future office or place
of trust; but no Judgment on impeachment shall prevent
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law;
provided that no Judge concerned in such conviction shall
sit as Judge on the second trial. The Legislature may remove
the disabilities incurred by conviction on impeachment.

ARTICLE VI

Controversies about the right of territory between the
United States and particular States shall be determined by a
Court to be constituted in manner following. The State or
States claiming in opposition to the United States as
parties shall nominate a number of persons, equal to double
the number of the Judges of the Supreme Court for the time
being, of whom none shall be citizens by birth of the States
which are parties, nor inhabitants thereof when nominated,
and of whom not more than two shall have their actual
residence in one State. Out of the persons so nominated the
Senate shall elect one half, who together with the Judges of
the Supreme Court, shall form the Court. Two thirds of the
whole number may hear and determine the controversy, by
plurality of voices. The States concerned may at their
option claim a decision by the Supreme Court only. All of
the members of the Court hereby instituted shall, prior to
the hearing of the Cause take an oath impartially and
according to the best of their judgments and consciences, to
hear and determine the controversy.

ARTICLE VII

§ 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have power
to pass all laws which they shall judge necessary to the
common defence and general welfare of the Union: But no
Bill, Resolution, or act of the Senate and assembly shall
have the force of a law until it shall have received the
assent of the President, or of the vice-President when
exercising the powers of the President; and if such assent
shall not have been given within ten days, after such bill,
resolution or other act shall have been presented to him
for that purpose, the same shall not be a law. No bill,
resolution or other act not assented to shall be revived in
the same Session of the Legislature. The mode of signifying
such assent, shall be by signing the bill act of [r]
resolution, and returning it so signed to either House of
the Legislature.

§ 2. The enacting stile of all laws shall be "Be it enacted
by the people of the United States of America."

§ 3. No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post
facto law; nor shall any title of nobility be granted by
the United States, or by either of them; nor shall any
person holding an office or place of trust under the United
States without the permission of the Legislature accept any
present, emolument office or title from a foreign prince or
State. Nor shall any Religious Sect, or denomination, or
religious test for any office or place, be ever established
by law.

§ 4. Taxes on lands, houses and other real estate, and
capitation taxes shall be proportioned in each State by the
whole number of free persons, except Indians not taxed, and
by three fifths of all other persons.

§ 5. The two Houses of the Legislature may by joint ballot
appoint a Treasurer of the United States. Neither House in
the Session of both Houses, without the consent of the other
shall adjourn for more than three days at a time. The
Senators and Representatives, in attending, going to and
coming from the Session of their respective houses shall be
privileged from arrest, except for crimes and breaches of
the peace. The place of meeting shall always be at the seat
of Government which shall be fixed by law.

§ 6. The laws of the United States, and the treaties which
have been made under the articles of the confederation, and
which shall be made under this Constitution shall be the
supreme law of the Land, and shall be so construed by the
Courts of the several States.

§ 7. The Legislature shall convene at least once in each
year, which unless otherwise provided for by law, shall be
on the first Monday in December.

§ 8. The members of the two Houses of the Legislature shall
receive a reasonable compensation for their services, to
be paid out of the Treasury of the United States and
ascertained by law. The law for making such provision shall
be passed with the concurrence of the first Assembly and
shall extend to succeeding Assemblies; and no succeeding
assembly shall concur in an alteration of such provision, so
as to increase its own compensation; but there shall be
always a law in existence for making such provision.

ARTICLE VIII

§ 1. The Governour or President of each State shall be
appointed under the authority of the United States, and
shall have a right to negative all laws about to be passed
in the State of which he shall be Governour or President,
subject to such qualifications and regulations, as the
Legislature of the United States shall prescribe. He shall
in other respects have the same powers only which the
Constitution of the State does or shall allow to its
Governour or President, except as to the appointment of
Officers of the Militia.

§ 2. Each Governour or President of a State shall hold his
office until a successor be actually appointed, unless he
die, or resign or be removed from office by conviction on
impeachment. There shall be no appointment of such Governor
or President in the Recess of the Senate.

The Governours and Presidents of the several States at the
time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue
in office in the same manner and with the same powers as if
they had been appointed pursuant to the first section of
this article.

The officers of the Militia in the several States may be
appointed under the authority of the U. States; the
Legislature whereof may authorize the Governors or
Presidents of States to make such appointments with such
restrictions as they shall think proper.

ARTICLE IX

§ 1. No person shall be eligible to the office of President
of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of
the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United
States.

§ 2. No person shall be eligible as a Senator or
Representative unless at the time of his election he be a
Citizen and inhabitant of the State in which he is chosen;
provided that he shall not be deemed to be disqualified by a
temporary absence from the State.

§ 3. No person entitled by this Constitution to elect or to
be elected President of the United States, or a Senator
or Representative in the Legislature thereof, shall be
disqualified but by the conviction of some offence for which
the law shall have previously ordained the punishment of
disqualification. But the Legislature may by law provide
that persons holding offices under the United States or
either of them shall not be eligible to a place in the
Assembly or Senate, and shall be during their continuance in
office suspended from sitting in the Senate.

§ 4. No person having an office or place of trust under the
United States shall without permission of the Legislature
accept any present emolument office or title from any
foreign Prince or State.

§ 5. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to the
rights privileges and immunities of Citizens in every other
State; and full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings
of another.

§ 6. Fugitives from justice from one State who shall be
found in another shall be delivered up on the application of
the State from which they fled.

§ 7. No new State shall be erected within the limits of
another, or by the junction of two or more States, without
the concurrent consent of the Legislatures of the United
States and of the States concerned. The Legislature of the
United States may admit new States into the Union.

§ 8. The United States are hereby declared to be bound to
guarantee to each State a Republican form of Government, and
to protect each State as well against domestic violence as
foreign invasion.

§ 9. All Treaties, Contracts and engagements of the United
States of America under the articles of Confederation and
perpetual Union, shall have equal validity under this
Constitution.

§ 10. No State shall enter into a Treaty, Alliance, or
contract with another, or with a foreign power without the
consent of the United States.

§ 11. The members of the Legislature of the United States
and of each State, and all officers Executive & Judicial of
the one and of the other shall take an oath or affirmation
to support the Constitution of the United States.

§ 12. This Constitution may receive such alterations and
amendments as may be proposed by the Legislature of the
United States, with the concurrence of two thirds of the
members of both Houses, and ratified by the Legislatures of,
or by Conventions of deputies chosen by the people in, two
thirds of the States composing the Union.

ARTICLE X

This Constitution shall be submitted to the consideration of
Conventions in the several States, the members whereof shall
be chosen by the people of such States respectively under
the direction of their respective Legislatures. Each
Convention which shall ratify the same, shall appoint the
first representatives and Senators from such State according
to the rule prescribed in the ---- § of the ---- article.
The representatives so appointed shall continue in office
for one year only. Each Convention so ratifying shall give
notice thereof to the Congress of the United States,
transmitting at the same time a list of the Representatives
and Senators chosen. When the Constitution shall have been
duly ratified, Congress shall give notice of a day and place
for the meeting of the Senators and Representatives from the
several States; and when these or a majority of them shall
have assembled according to such notice, they shall by joint
ballot, by plurality of votes, elect a President of the
United States; and the Constitution thus organized shall be
carried into effect.--_Mad. MSS._

"Col: Hamilton did not propose in the Convention any plan of
a Constitution. He had sketched an outline which he read as
part of a speech; observing that he did not mean it as a
proposition, but only to give a more correct view of his
ideas.

"Mr. Patterson regularly proposed a plan which was discussed
& voted on."--Madison to John Quincy Adams, Montpellier,
Nov. 2, 1818, _Dept. of State MSS._, Miscellaneous Letters.

Committee rose & the House Adjourned.

TUESDAY JUNE 19^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE ON
THE PROPOSITIONS OF M^R PATTERSON,--[90]

[90] This was the last session of the Convention in Committee of the
Whole.

The substitute offered yesterday by M^r Dickenson being rejected by a vote now taken on it; Con. N. Y. N. J. Del. ay. Mass. P^a V. N. C. S. C. Geo. no. Mary^d divided M^r Patterson's plan was again at large before the Committee.