Chapter XI: Motives

Motives considered only in proportion as the moral judgment is influenced by reflection, p. 283.--Little consideration for the sense of duty as a motive, _ibid._--Somewhat greater discrimination shown in regard to motives consisting of powerful non-volitional conations, p. 283 _sq._--Compulsion as a ground of extenuation, p. 284 _sq._--"Compulsion by necessity," pp. 285-287.--Self-defence, pp. 288-290.--Self-redress in the case of adultery, and other survivals of the old system of self-redress, pp. 290-294.--The moral distinction made between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately, in cold blood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment, on provocation, pp. 294-297.--Explanation of this distinction, p. 297 _sq._--The pressure of a non-volitional motive on the will as a ground of extenuation, p. 298 _sq._--That moral judgments are generally passed, in the first instance, with reference to acts immediately intended, and consider motives only in proportion as the judgment is influenced by reflection, holds good not only of moral blame, but of moral praise, pp. 299-302.

{xiii} CHAPTER XII

FORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS--CHARACTER

Why in early moral codes the so-called negative commandments are much more prominent than the positive commandments, p. 303.--The little cognisance which the criminal laws of civilised nations take of forbearances and omissions, p. 303 _sq._--The more scrutinising the moral consciousness, the greater the importance which it attaches to positive commandments, p. 304 _sq._--Yet the customs of all nations contain not only prohibitions, but positive injunctions as well, p. 305.--The unreflecting mind apt to exaggerate the guilt of a person who out of heedlessness or rashness causes harm by a positive act, _ibid._--Early custom and law may be anxious enough to trace an event to its source, pp. 305-307.--But they easily fail to discover where there is guilt or not, and, in case of carelessness, to determine the magnitude of the offender's guilt, p. 307 _sq._--The opinion that a person is answerable for all the damage which directly ensues from an act of his, even though no foresight could have reasonably been expected to look out for it, p. 308 _sq._--On the other hand, little or no censure passed on him whose want of foresight or want of self-restraint is productive of suffering, if only the effect is sufficiently remote, p. 309 _sq._--The moral emotions may as naturally give rise to judgments on human character as to judgments on human conduct, p. 310.--Even when a moral judgment immediately refers to a distinct act, it takes notice of the agent's will as a whole, p. 310 _sq._--The practice of punishing a second or third offence more severely than the first, p. 311 _sq._--The more a moral judgment is influenced by reflection, the more it scrutinises the character which manifests itself in that individual piece of conduct by which the judgment is occasioned, p. 312 _sq._--But however superficial it be, it always refers to a will conceived of as a continuous entity, p. 313.