Chapter IX

THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL EVENTS

Cases in which no distinction is made between intentional and accidental injuries, pp. 217-219.--Yet even in the system of self-redress intentional or foreseen injuries often distinguished from unintentional and unforeseen injuries, pp. 219-221.--A similar distinction made in the punishments inflicted by many savages, p. 221 _sq._--Uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse, or do not punish, persons for injuries which they have inflicted by mere accident, p. 222 _sq._--Peoples of a higher culture who punish persons for bringing about events without any fault of theirs, pp. 223-226.--At the earlier stages of civilisation gods, in particular, attach undue importance to the outward aspect of conduct, pp. 226-231.--Explanation of all these facts, pp. 231-237.--The great influence which the outward event exercises upon moral estimates even among ourselves, pp. 238-240. --Carelessness generally not punished if no injurious result follows, p. 241.--An unsuccessful attempt to commit a criminal act, if punished at all, as a rule punished much less {xii} severely than the accomplished act, p. 241 _sq._--Exceptions to this rule, p. 242.--The question, which attempts should be punished, p. 243.--The stage at which an attempt begins to be criminal, and the distinction between attempts and acts of preparation, p. 243 _sq._--The rule that an outward event is requisite for the infliction of punishment, p. 244 _sq._--Exceptions to this rule, p. 245.--Explanation of laws referring to unsuccessful attempts, pp. 245-247.--Moral approval influenced by external events, p. 247.--Owing to its very nature, the moral consciousness, when sufficiently influenced by thought, regards the will as the only proper object of moral disapproval or praise, p. 247 _sq._