Chapter V: The Origin of the Moral Emotions

We may feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive kindly emotion, on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly interest, p. 108.--Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. 109 _sq._--Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions, p. 110 _sq._--Sympathetic resentment to be found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. 111 _sq._--Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. 113 _sq._--Sympathetic resentment may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.), pp. 114-116.--Disinterested antipathies, p. 116 _sq._--Sympathy springing from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion, p. 117.--Disinterested likings, _ibid._--Why disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions, p. 117 _sq._--Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct, p. 118.--Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. 118 _sq._--In early society customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. 119.--The characteristics of moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. 120.--Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality, p. 120 _sq._--Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a moral rule, p. 121 _sq._--As public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. 122.--Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably connected with the feelings of any special society, p. 122 _sq._--Yet they remain to the last public emotions if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. 123.--Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness has been the individual's own conscience, p. 123 _sq._--The antiquity of moral resentment, p. 124.--The supposition that remorse is unknown among the lower races contradicted by facts, p. 124 _sq._--Criticism of Lord Avebury's statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in moral feeling, pp. 125-129.--The antiquity of moral approval, p. 129 _sq._

{x} CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS

Our analysis to be concerned with moral concepts formed by the civilised mind, p. 131.--Moral concepts among the lower races, pp. 131-133.--Language a rough generaliser, p. 133.--Analysis of the concepts _bad_, _vice_, and _wrong_, p. 134.--Of _ought_ and _duty_, pp. 134-137.--Of _right_, as an adjective, pp. 137-139.--Of _right_, as a substantive, p. 139 _sq._--Of the relations between _rights_ and _duties_, p. 140 _sq._--Of _injustice_ and _justice_, pp. 141-145.--Of _good_, pp. 145-147.--Of _virtue_, pp. 147-149.--Of the relation between _virtue_ and _duty_, p. 149 _sq._--Of _merit_, p. 150 _sq._--Of the relation between _merit_ and _duty_, p. 151 _sq._--The question of the _super-obligatory_, pp. 152-154.--The question of the morally _indifferent_, pp. 154-157.