Chapter XXXV: Part IV: Diplomatic Papers Relating to the Origin of the War, (1)

COLLATED FROM THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Realizing the importance of presenting its case to the neutral world, each of the warring nations published its diplomatic correspondence leading up to the outbreak of the war, at a period during hostilities when the publication seemed best calculated to serve the end in view.

THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

British White Papers, July 20 to September 1, 1914.

Belgian Gray Book, April 7, 1914, to September 30, 1914.

German White Book, July 23 to August 4, 1914.

French Yellow Book, March 17, 1913, to September 4, 1914.

Russian Orange Book, July 23 to August 6, 1914.

Serbian Blue Book, June 29 to August 4, 1914.

Austro-Hungarian Red Book, June 29 to August 24, 1914.

Official publications in the press by Great Britain, Russia,
Germany, and Italy, July 30 to December 6, 1914.

Various speeches by officers of the Governments.

It is from these official documents, cast into one form by rearranging all letters, telegrams, proclamations, speeches, etc., in their chronological order, that the following history of the diplomatic controversy is compiled.

It will be observed that, from the necessity of the case, the books of the six principal allies against the Teutonic Powers are threefold in number the books of those powers; and that, from choice of their promulgators the books of the Teutonic Powers are also disproportionately less in total volume, owing to the almost entire absence in them of communications between Austria-Hungary and Germany; while the correspondence between their adversaries is presented by these with a fulness which gives the neutral reader the impression that nothing of importance has been withheld--indeed, that the Allies (to use for convenience the popular designation of the anti-Teutonic powers) have laid all their cards face upward on the table. The intelligent reader will not have to be cautioned that this is a psychological, rather than logical, inference.

If any prevalent arguments on either side fail to be upheld by the evidence here given, it will be because this evidence does not appear in the official documents; the editors feel that their functions do not warrant their inclusion of pleas or testimony formed outside of the records mentioned above. The time will not come until long after the close of the war when the conflicting claims in the vast amount of propagandial literature issued by both parties can be judicially weighed by impartial historians, and presented at the bar of public opinion. In the meantime, however, we can bring before this court the case as officially presented by the contesting parties, a "perfect enumeration" of all the available. The editor acts merely in a reporting capacity. He does not discriminate between "Trojan and Tyrian," unless it be called discrimination to refuse by allotment of lesser space to inflict on the party neglecting fully to present its case a penalty beyond that which necessarily results, in adverse effect, on the mind of the reader from this omission.

In brief, the controversy is presented as a case in law. The evidence is given in the correspondence between ministers of state and the pleadings are presented in the words of responsible statesmen, who apply this evidence to the issues in question.

Since the validity of the evidence is based not only on its inherent motive but on the character and authority of those communicating it, and the force of the pleadings is even more dependent upon the character and authority of the advocates, it is necessary at the outset to state the offices held by the chief representatives of the parties to the controversy, and to present something of their past records, especially in the case of the more responsible statesmen. This will also serve to make graphic the story of the great trial before the bar of the world; it will visualize it as a contest, man to man, in which the distance between the combatants is eliminated, and they seem to be in each other's presence, testifying and arguing in behalf of their respective causes, as in a case at law. And, when it is borne in mind that these persons are representative of the dignity of great and sovereign peoples, the exponents and conservators of their national and individual rights and aspirations, their ideas and ideals of civilization, the contest will gain rather than lose in impressiveness by the concrete form in which it is presented. The sovereigns and statesmen of the anti-Teutonic allies are listed first; of the Teutonic allies next, and a few statesmen of neutral countries who were involved in the controversy last.

LIST OF SOVEREIGNS AND DIPLOMATS

GREAT BRITAIN

George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, and Sovereign of the entire British Empire.

Haldane, Richard Burdon (Viscount), Lord High Chancellor. Born 1856, studied German at Göttingen, member Parliament for Haddingtonshire 1885-1911; Secretary of State for War 1905-12; Lord High Chancellor 1912. As Secretary of State for War, Haldane, introduced into his department several innovations, the knowledge of which he had acquired during his residence at Göttingen and in his frequent visits to the Continent. He has been in public life since entering Parliament in 1885, and, despite his later removal from the office which he held at the outbreak of the war, is still recognized as one of Great Britain's most brilliant men. Previous to the war, he was looked on as an especially warm friend of Germany, and frequently went to Berlin in the interests of British amity with that country.

Grey, Sir Edward: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April 25, 1862, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1892-95; Secretary State for Foreign Affairs December, 1905.

Of the conduct of the British Foreign Office since 1906 Gilbert Murray in his "Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey" ("Clarendon Press," Oxford, 1915) says:

"In general, Grey is often supposed to represent the principle of continuity in foreign policy, but this is not quite exact. In certain very large issues the Liberal Government of 1906 and onward agreed entirely with the conservative policy of Lord Salisbury (Prime Minister), and Lord Lansdowne (Foreign Secretary), and therefore followed their action. On other issues it differed. For instance, it stopped indentured Chinese labor in the Transvaal, and it granted immediate self-government to South Africa. But in Europe the policy has been mostly continuous. The principles are conveniently stated in the House of Commons debate of foreign policy on November 27, 1911:

"'1. In my opinion the wise policy for this country is to expand as little as possible.' 'I say without any hesitation that we do not desire accessions of territory, and in saying that I am not speaking for one small section of the House. I believe I am speaking for the nation at large.' The first sentence comes from Sir Edward Grey, the second from Mr. Bonar Law (leader of the opposition).

"This is made a little clearer in a latter sentence of Sir Edward Grey's speech. 'If there are to be changes of territory brought about by good will and negotiation between other powers, then we are not an ambitious competing party.... And if it is wise policy not to go in for great schemes of expansion ourselves, then I think it would be morally and diplomatically wrong to indulge in a dog-in-the-manger policy in regard to others.' In particular, he explains, if Germany wishes, 'by friendly arrangement with other powers,' to extend her territories, we do not wish to stand in her way, or to claim 'compensations.'"

Nicholson, Sir Arthur: Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Bertie, Sir Francis: Ambassador to France. Born August 17, 1844; private secretary to Hon. R. Bourke (Under-Secretary State), 1874-80; attached to Embassy, Berlin, 1878; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1894; Ambassador to Rome, 1903; Paris, 1905.

Buchanan, Sir George: Ambassador to Russia. Born Copenhagen November 25, 1854; entered Diplomatic Service 1875; Third Secretary, Rome, 1878; Second Secretary, Tokyo, 1879; Second Secretary, Vienna, 1882; Berne, 1889; British Agent to Venezuela Arbitration Tribunal, 1898; Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1900; Berlin, 1901-3; Minister Plenipotentiary, Sofia, 1903-8; Hague, 1908-10; St. Petersburg, 1910.

Goschen, Sir Edward: Ambassador to Germany. Born July 18, 1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; Attaché, Madrid, 1870; Buenos Aires, 1873; Second Secretary, Rio de Janeiro, 1877; Constantinople, 1881; Secretary Legation, Peking, 1885; Copenhagen, 1888; Lisbon, 1890; Secretary Embassy, Washington, 1893; St. Petersburg, 1894; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Belgrade, 1898-1900; Copenhagen, 1900-5; Ambassador, Vienna, 1905-8; Berlin, 1908.

Rumbold, Sir Horace: Counsellor German Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires. Born February 5, 1869; Attaché, Hague, 1888; Chargé d'Affaires, Munich, 1908; served at Cairo, Teheran, and Athens; Counsellor Embassy, Tokyo, 1909; learned in Arabic, Persian, and Japanese.

De Bunsen, Sir Maurice: Ambassador in Austria. Born January 8, 1852; entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Secretary Legation, Tokyo, 1891; Secretary Embassy, Constantinople, 1897-1902; Paris, 1902-5; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Lisbon, 1905; Ambassador, Madrid, 1906-13; Vienna, 1913.

Beaumont, Henry Dawson: Chargé d'Affaires, Turkey. Born February 4, 1867; entered Diplomatic Service, 1892; served in Copenhagen, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, St. Petersburg, and Montenegro; Chargé d'Affaires, Turkey, 1914.

Villiers, Sir Francis: Minister to Belgium. Born August 13, 1852; entered Foreign Office, 1870; Assistant Under-Secretary State Foreign Affairs, 1896-1905; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Portugal, 1905-11; Belgium, 1911.

Des Graz, Charles Louis: Minister to Serbia. Born March 2, 1860; entered Diplomatic Service, 1884; Constantinople, Teheran, Athens; Counsellor Embassy, Rome, 1905; Chargé d'Affaires, Cettinje, 1906; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Peru and Ecuador, 1908-13; Minister, Serbia, 1913.

Crackanthorpe, Dayrell Eardley Montague: First Secretary of Legation to Serbia. Born September 9, 1871; entered Diplomatic Service, 1896; Madrid, Washington, Brussels, Bucharest, Vienna, Belgrade, 1913.

Rodd, Sir Rennell: Ambassador to Italy. Born November 9, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1883; Berlin, Athens, Rome, Paris; Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1901-4; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Sweden, 1904-8; Ambassador, Italy, 1908.

FRANCE

Poincaré, Raymond: President of the Republic.

Viviani, René: President of the Council, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Premier of the Cabinet. Had been Minister of Instruction in the Cabinet of Gaston Doumergue, which resigned June 2, 1914; Poincaré asked him at that time to form a cabinet, but Ambassador Paléologue intimated from St. Petersburg that the Czar feared a Viviani ministry would modify the three years' military service law, and therefore another was sought for this position. After the failure of the Ribot Cabinet on June 12, 1914, he was again called upon, and, no objections being made, he formed the ministry acting at the outbreak of the war. After the beginning of the hostilities he retained the position of President of the Council without portfolio.

Jonnart, Charles Celestin: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born December 27, 1857; Governor General Algiers and Minister of the Interior.

Pichon, Stephen: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born August 10, 1857 Diplomatic Service in Hayti, San Domingo, Rio de Janeiro, and at Peking during the Boxer Rebellion.

Bienvenu-Martin, Jean Baptiste: Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born July 22, 1847; Minister Instruction, 1905; in public life since 1878.

Doumergue, Gaston: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born 1863; Minister Colonies, 1902-5; Commerce, 1906-7; Premier, resigning, June 2, 1914.

Delcassé, Théophile: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born March 1, 1852; started life as journalist; Counsellor General; Under-Secretary Colonies, 1893; Colonial Minister, 1894-5; Foreign Minister, 1898-1905; Minister Marine, 1905-13; Mediator between Spain and the United States, 1899; Ambassador, St. Petersburg, 1913; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913. Is one of the strong men of France; in 1904 was the French negotiator of the Anglo-French Convention (the "Entene") concerning Egypt and Morocco; was sacrificed to assuage German feeling at the time of the Algeciras conference; called the "Deadly Enemy of Germany."

Berthelot: Political Director.

Cambon, Paul; Ambassador to Great Britain. Born January 20, 1843; Ambassador Madrid, Constantinople, and at London, 1898.

Fleuriau, M. De: Chargé d'Affaires, London.

De Manneville: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany. Born February 27, 1865; entered Diplomatic Service at Berlin, 1893; later at London; a Minister of the First Class in 1904.

Paléologue, Maurice: Ambassador to Russia. Born January 13, 1859; served in Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service at Rome, Berlin, Peking, Korea, and in Bulgaria.

Cambon, Jules: Ambassador to Germany. Born April 5, 1845; entered Diplomatic Service, 1874; Ambassador, Washington, 1897; Madrid, 1902; Berlin, 1907.

Allizé: Minister at Munich, Germany.

Ronssin, P.: Consul General at Frankfort, Germany.

Dumaine, Chilhaud: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

d'Apchier-le-Maugin: Consul General at Budapest.

Bompard, Maurice: Ambassador to Turkey. Born May 17, 1854; Minister, First Class, 1898; Ambassador to Russia, 1902.

Klokowski, Antony: Minister to Belgium. Born September 23, 1855; served at Yokohoma, Calcutta, and Bangkok.

Boppé, Jules: Minister to Serbia. Born June 26, 1862; entered Diplomatic Service, 1890; served at Constantinople and St. Petersburg.

Barrère, Camille: Ambassador to Italy.

Bapst, Constant: Minister to Holland.

Mollard, Armard: Minister to Luxemburg.

Chevalley: Minister to Norway.

Thiébaut, Eugene: Minister to Sweden.

Farges: Consul General at Basle, Switzerland.

RUSSIA

Nicholas II: Emperor (Czar).

Sazonof: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Suchomlinof, Vladimir Alexandrovitch: Minister for war. In 1890 at the age of forty-eight Suchomlinof was made a major general, and in 1904 became commander of Russia's most important military zone--Kiev. In 1909 he was appointed to the post which he has since relinquished, and the amazing rapidity with which Russia mobilized her army in August, 1914, can be accredited to the methods which he instituted. As a writer he is known as "Shpioa" (Spur), and is the biographer of Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Murat.

Benckendorff, Count A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born in Berlin, August 1, 1849; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; served at Rome, Vienna; Minister Copenhagen, 1897-1903; Ambassador London, 1903.

Isvolsky, Alexander P.: Ambassador to France; was Russian negotiator of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 regarding Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

Swastopoulo: Chargé d'Affaires, France.

Swereiev, S. N.: Ambassador to Germany.

Broniersky, A.: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany.

Schebeko, N.: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Koudacheff, Prince Nicholas: Chargé d'Affaires, Austria-Hungary.

Salviatti, A.: Consul General at Fiume.

Kazansky: Acting Consul General at Prague.

Strandtman: Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia.

BELGIUM

Albert: King of the Belgians.

Davignon, M. J.: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Elst, van der, Baron: Secretary General.

Renkin, J.: Colonial Minister.

Lalaing H. de, Count: Minister to Great Britain. Entered Foreign Office, 1879; served Vienna, Bucharest, Berlin, Hague, London; Minister, Brazil, 1893; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Bucharest, 1898; Berne, 1899; London, 1903.

Guillaume, Baron: Minister to France.

Beyens, Baron: Minister to Germany.

De Dudzeele, Errembault, Count: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

De Welle, Michotte, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Grenier, A., Baron: Minister to Spain.

Fallon, Baron: Minister to Holland.

SERBIA

Peter Karageorgevitch: King.

Pashitch, Nikola P.: Prime Minister. In 1878, at the age of thirty-two, M. Pashitch entered the Serbian Parliament, and in three years he became leader of the "Old Radicals." Always a champion of liberty, he joined the Zayenchar Mutiny of 1883, and, of twenty-two, he alone escaped execution by flight. Upon his return he was appointed Mayor of Belgrade and in 1893 Minister to Russia, where he made a lasting impression. In 1899 he was again accused of hatching a conspiracy, but Russia served him well and intervention saved him. To him, in no slight degree, does Serbia owe Russia's friendship, and to his efforts has been attributed the Balkan Alliance.

Patchou, Dr. Laza: Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Boschkovitch: Minister to Great Britain.

Vesnitch, M. R.: Minister to France.

Spalaikovitch, Dr. M.: Minister to Russia.

Yovanovitch, Dr. M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.

Yovanovitch, Yov. M.: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

Georgevitch, M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey.

Michailovitch, Ljub: Minister to Italy.

ITALY

Victor Emmanuel (Vittorio Emanuele) III.: King.

San Giuliano, Antonio di, Marquis: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born Catania, December 10, 1852; Mayor Catania, 1879; member Chamber Deputies, 1882-1904; Senate, 1904; Under-Secretary for Industry and Commerce, 1892-3; Minister Posts and Telegraph, 1899-1900; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1905-6; Ambassador, London, 1906-10; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1910. His opposition to war with Austria precipitated his downfall. Said to be the repository of more European secrets than any European statesman since Bismarck.

D'Avarna, Duke: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Salandra: Premier. Appointed November 5, 1914.

Sonnino, Baron Sidney: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born March 11, 1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1867; Parliament, 1880; Minister Finance, 1893-4; Treasury, 1894-96; Interior, 1906 and 1909-10; Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1914.

JAPAN

Yoshihito: Emperor.

Shigenobu Okuma, Count: Prime Minister.

Takaaki Kato, Baron: Minister Foreign Affairs.

GERMANY

William (Wilhelm) II.: Kaiser of Germany, King of Prussia.

Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Theobald von: Imperial Chancellor. Born November 29, 1856, at Hohenfinow, Brandenburg; entered Civil Service, 1879; Prussian Minister Interior, 1905; Imperial Secretary of State and Vice President of Prussian Council, 1907; Imperial Chancellor, 1909; member of Reichstag since 1890. His actions before the present war seemed to indicate an earnest desire for the peace of Europe; he appeared to oppose the military party and align himself with the moderates. His manner is frank to the point of bluffness.

Jagow, Gottlieb von: Secretary of State. Born June 26, 1863; entered Diplomatic Service, 1895, at Rome; Minister to Rome, 1907; Ambassador, 1908; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913; credited with postponing the inevitable conflict between Italy and Austria while at Rome.

Zimmerman, von: Under-Secretary of State. Appointed 1911; previously Vice Consul Shanghai; Consul at Tientsin and in Diplomatic Corps.

Lichnowsky, Prince Karl Maximilian: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born 1860; Attaché, London, 1885; Counsellor Embassy, Vienna; Foreign Office, Berlin; Ambassador to London, 1912. Member Roman Catholic party. Did all he could to prevent rupture between Great Britain and Germany. Was very popular in England.

Schoen, Baron Wilhelm von: Ambassador to France. Born June 3, 1851; entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Madrid, Hague, Athens, Berne, Paris, Copenhagen, St. Petersburg; Ambassador, Paris, 1910.

Pourtalès, Count Frederic: Ambassador to Russia. Born October 24, 1853; appointed St. Petersburg, 1908.

Tschirschky, Heinrich von: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Born August 15, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1873; Constantinople, Vienna, St. Petersburg; Ambassador to Vienna, 1907.

Below Saleske, Konrad von: Minister to Belgium. Born April 18, 1866; Secretary Legation, Athens; Ambassador, Constantinople, 1907.

Storck, von: Secretary Legation in Serbia.

Flotow, Hans von: Ambassador to Italy. Born September 10, 1862; entered Diplomatic Service, 1893; Second Secretary Legation, Washington, Hague, Paris.

Buch, von: Minister to Luxemburg.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Francis Joseph (Franz Josef): Emperor.

Berchtold, Count Leopold: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April 18, 1863; saw Diplomatic Service in Paris. London; Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 1906; appointed Secretary of State, 1914; emulated his predecessor, Count d'Herenthal, the annexor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in strong foreign policy.

Macchio, Dr. K., Baron: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Forgach, Count: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Service in Belgrade and Dresden.

Tisza, Count Stephen: President of the Ministry of Hungary. Born April 22, 1861; served as President Ministry, 1903-06.

Mensdorff, A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born September 5, 1861; Diplomatic Service in Paris, London, St. Petersburg; Secretary Ambassador, London, 1896-1904; Minister Plenipotentiary, 1903-04; Ambassador, 1904.

Szécsen, Count Nicolaus: Ambassador to France.

Szápáry, Count Josef: Ambassador to Russia.

Czernin, Count Jaromir: Chargé d'Affaires, Russia.

Szögyény, Count Ladislaus: Ambassador to Germany.

Zehlitschka: Consul General in Turkey.

Clary, S., Count: Minister to Belgium.

Giesl von Gieslingen, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Hoflehner: Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia.

TURKEY

Mohammed V: Sultan.

Said Halim Pasha, Prince: Grand Vizier.

Tewfik Pasha: Ambassador to Great Britain.

NEUTRAL NATIONS

Loudon: Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Eyschen, Dr.: Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg.

Gerard, James Watson: American Ambassador to Germany.

Penfield, Frederic Courtland: American Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Whitlock, Brand: American Minister to Belgium.

* * * * *

It will be convenient for the reader, before entering into the diplomatic history of the war, to have before him the dates of the war marking diplomatic crises.

IMPORTANT DATES PRECEDING THE WAR

June 28, 1914. Assassination of Austrian hereditary Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

July 23, 1914. Austria-Hungary hands note to Serbia.

July 24, 1914. Russia proposes extension of time limit in note; decides on mobilization in South Bosnia; and seeks unconditional support of Great Britain in conflict with Austria-Hungary. Great Britain proposes four-power intervention.

July 25, 1914. Austria-Hungary sends memorandum to powers containing _dossier_ of evidence discovered at Sarajevo trial, and declares dispute lies wholly between her and Serbia. Serbia replies to note, having previously ordered mobilization. Austro-Hungarian Legation leaves Belgrade. Germany refuses to enter mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, wishing to "localize" the conflict, and proposes mediation of powers between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Russia mobilizes fourteen army corps on Austro-Hungarian frontier. Great Britain asks Austria-Hungary to extend time limit and suspend hostilities pending four-power conference.

July 26, 1914. Russia proposes direct conversations to Austria-Hungary. France and Italy accept four-power conference in London.

July 27, 1914. William II returns from Norway cruise to Potsdam. Austria-Hungary informs Russia she will respect Serbian integrity and independence. Russia agrees to four-power conference if direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary fail.

July 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary breaks off direct negotiations with Russia; refuses four-power mediation; declares war on Serbia, and mobilizes eight army corps. Russia begins partial mobilization. Great Britain asks Germany her plan of mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

July 29, 1914. Germany attempts to secure neutrality of Great Britain in case of Austro-Hungarian and Russian war. Great Britain warns Germany that if France is involved in war she will support her.

July 30, 1914. Austria-Hungary, advised by Germany, agrees to resume negotiations with Russia, but not on basis of Serbian reply. Germany asks Russia's explanation of her mobilization. Russia agrees to stop mobilization if Austria-Hungary respects Serbian sovereignty. After negotiations with Austria-Hungary, Russia orders general mobilization of army and navy. France reminds Great Britain of her naval agreement. Great Britain refuses Germany's proposal that she remain neutral if French territory in Europe is respected, and proposes that Germany occupy Belgrade and force mediation by the powers.

July 31, 1914. Austria-Hungary accepts Anglo-German proposal for four-power mediation on basis of temporary prosecution of military measures against Serbia. Russia agrees to take no military action pending negotiations. Germany refuses to press Austria-Hungary so long as Russia mobilizes; sends ultimatum to Russia and France, and refuses to answer about respecting neutrality of Belgium. France agrees to respect this neutrality.

August 1, 1914. Austria orders general mobilization, but continues discussion with Russia, and gives way on only point remaining at issue. Germany orders general mobilization and declares war on Russia. France orders general mobilization. Great Britain refuses Germany's request to secure French neutrality in Russo-German war, and to remain neutral herself if Germany respect Belgian neutrality. Belgium declares she will uphold neutrality. Italy decides to remain neutral.

August 2, 1914. Great Britain agrees to give naval aid to France in event of German attack. Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium about passage of troops. German troops enter Luxemburg.

August 3, 1914. Germany declares war on France and bids for British neutrality by offering not to attack northern French coast nor use Belgium and Dutch ports as bases. Great Britain refuses offer. Belgium refuses Germany's ultimatum.

August 4, 1914. Germany sends second ultimatum to Belgium, threatening force, and offers Great Britain not to annex Belgian territory. Great Britain demands that Germany respect Belgian neutrality, and in default of reply declares war on Germany.

August 5, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.

August 6, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 9, 1914. Serbia declares war on Germany.

August 10, 1914. France declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Germany.

August 23, 1914. Japan declares war on Germany.

August 27, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Japan.

August 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.

November 3, 1914. Russia declares war on Turkey.

November 5, 1914. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey.

May 23, 1915. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.

June 3, 1915. San Marino declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 20, 1915. Italy declares war on Turkey.

October 14, 1915. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.

October 15, 1915. Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria.

October 19, 1915. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria.

WARNINGS OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS

The first evidence presented before the court of nations was that of France, in regard to the hostile intentions of Germany. To this Germany has made no official answer in the form of documentary evidence, and any inference as to the hostile intentions of France against Germany, if there were any, must be inferred by the reader without any help from cross-examination by the official advocates of Germany. The value of the French evidence must be judged by later events. Have they, or have they not, corroborated the anticipations of France, held for a year before the war, as to an attack upon her by Germany?

On March 17, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, transmitting reports by French military and naval attachés in Berlin to their respective French departments on German military affairs, and called his attention to the importance of the documents. Delay, he said, in the publication of the reports was due to lack of funds wherewith to provide for these military measures. The rich classes objected to a forced levy in times of peace, and the Federal states to the Imperial Government adopting direct taxation which had heretofore been reserved to them.

"However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German
army the empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event
of a possible crisis.

"The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that
country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the [French]
Republic to reestablish the three years' service, and the manly
determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in
France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals of insisting
on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military
strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our
own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort
which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German
initiative.

"The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic
sentiment. Every day the emperor delights to revive memories of
1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the
streets of Berlin, speeches were delivered in which the present
situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago.... It was
of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked
up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare
the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If,
to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a
hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who
aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a
counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation
seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

"Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in
both countries makes the situation grave."

The first inclosure in M. Cambon's letter was the report of Lieutenant Colonel Serret. He speaks of a "virulent" article in the "Kölnische Zeitung" ("Cologne Gazette") on the menace of France, which, though immediately disavowed by the Government, cannot be disregarded, since its sentiments have been approved by other prominent newspapers, and it appears to express a "real feeling" among the people, a "latent anger." It throws light on the present German armaments.

"For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet
people who declare that the military plans of France are
extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the
Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years'
service in France, went so far as to say: 'It is a provocation;
we will not allow it.' More moderate persons, military and civil,
glibly voice the opinion that France with her 40,000,000
inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

"To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the
shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people
pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry
at realizing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year,
continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be
possible this time to outrun France completely.

"To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with
her, is Germany's real aim....

"At the moment when German military strength is on the point of
acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion
arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction,
France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said:
'her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection.' The disgust
of Germany can well be understood.

"Of course the Government points to the general situation in
Europe and speaks of the 'Slav Peril.' As far as I can see,
however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this
'Peril,' and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with
welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws....

"To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France,
as does the 'Kölnische Zeitung,' we are in fact, and shall long
remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our
40,000,000 of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too
large.

"Germans wish for peace--so they keep on proclaiming, and the
emperor more than anyone--but they do not understand peace as
involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments.
They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making
the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national
vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in
the enormous superiority of its army will be favorable to an
explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation
of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

"It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing
everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with
éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

"The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more
or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should
justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first
decisive blows being struck at France."

The second inclosure in M. Cambon's letter is the report of M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché. He says that there will be no increase in the German fleet this year, and that the whole military effort will be directed against France.

By October 1, 1914, the imperial army will be increased from 720,000 to 860,000 men, and proposed legislation will place the army corps near the French frontier most nearly on a war footing, in order on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations....

"William II cannot allow a retreat to enter into his
calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day
what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die
at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last
elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that
the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of
twenty-five, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of
young men from twenty to twenty-five, must contain in its ranks a
considerable proportion of Socialists.

"It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists
will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany
come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial
Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the
aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence
in the direction of the campaign and its final result....

"And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such
an incalculable effect on the empire that we find in all the
plans worked out by the general staff proposals for a crushing
offensive movement against France.

"In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to
meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of
France that the danger seems to them greatest....

"In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a
conversation which a member of our embassy had the other evening
with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to
reflect the opinions which dominate court circles.

"Referring to the new German military proposals Prince
Donnersmarck spoke as follows:

"'French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbor evil
designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular
opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on
us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion,
which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the
Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish
to protect ourselves.'"

The prince, a veteran of the French war, expressed the opinion that Germany would again conquer France in event of another war.

"Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as
punctual as Germans in the fulfillment of their duty. In the
coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the
top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute
exactitude, however important or small it may be. And Prince
Donnersmarck added: 'An exactitude which played so great a rôle
forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far
greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of
moving masses far more numerous.'

"In this way the old prince gave expression to the confidence
shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military
organization."

The attaché then discusses German finances.

He mentions particularly the large loans raised by the empire and
Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on January 29, 1912, and 350,000,000
marks on March 7, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans
must have been applied to military expenses.

"The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional
financial measures.

"According to the indications given by the semiofficial press,
the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will amount to a milliard marks,
while the 'permanent' annual expenditure resulting from the
increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

"It seems certain that the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will be
covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes
would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject
to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would
not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in
accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of
the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which
assure its being carried into effect."

The attaché then discusses a subject already mentioned--the persuasion of the rich and bourgeois classes by the Government to submit to the increased taxation by "noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence" in order to convince them of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

"If it is established that the German Government are doing their
utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be
made in full, and not by way of installment, and if, as some of
the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before
July 1, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us,
for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military
authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a
milliard."

On April 2, 1913, M. Etienne, French Minister of War, wrote to M. Jonnart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a German official secret report concerning strengthening of the army. This report is interesting in that it mentions knowledge that, as a result of her entente with France and Russia, Great Britain was prepared to send an expeditionary force of 100,000 to the Continent, and confesses that Germany refrained from declaring war on France at the time of the Agadir incident because of "the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, and the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns."

"Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the
active army, which would ensure Germany an honorable peace and
the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs
of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which
should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this
end....

"Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists,
nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of
the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending
_Deutschtum_ (German influence) all the world over.

"The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day
increase their population. The employment of an army of black men
in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long
time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

"Our new army law is only an extension of the military education
of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater
sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has
been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defense as well
as for offense. _We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of
our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and
policy of the French._ We must accustom them to think that an
offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the
provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as
not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might
injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that
under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable
sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak
(_Losschlagen_) should be considered as a relief, because after
it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We
must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is
much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the
distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which
cannot be concealed.

"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final
result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we
must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is
a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is,
therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations,
by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt,
Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures
which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course
in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies;
and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the
advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of
realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago
opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these
relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it
or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this
kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

"Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be
carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out
simultaneously with the destruction of the means of
communication; they must have a controlling head to be found
among the influential leaders, religious or political. The
Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and
more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the
Mohammedan world.

"However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at
one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the
next European war it will also be necessary that the small states
should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain
conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly
conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with
Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from
gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations
against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from
Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall
provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable
of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most
unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to
abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would
already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern
army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch
formations, would oppose a very active defense to any offensive
measures from this quarter.

"In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and
we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against
France, and thus protecting our flank.

"As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small
states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the
same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim
must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the
first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate
a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which
will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain
inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them
in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states
to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to
constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon
the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganization,
particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it
might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the
contrary, their defensive organization was established against
us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the West,
we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guaranty for the
security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to
our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our
interests.

"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope
that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after
the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An
ultimatum with a short-time limit, to be followed immediately by
invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action
in international law.

"Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a
striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us,
or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a
hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his
flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him
harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient
German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of
Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of
brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the
Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former
possessions should be restored to her."

REPORT OF M. CAMBON IN 1913

On May 6, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, giving an account of an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, concerning the conference of ambassadors in London on May 5th, and the results there obtained. It was agreed by Cambon and Von Jagow that the immediate crisis was over. Cambon submitted proofs of the anxiety of the German Government over the crisis.

"1. Von Jagow had questioned a colleague of Cambon about Russia's
situation in the Far East, whether there was cause for Russia to
fear difficulties in that quarter which would cause her to retain
troops there. The ambassador answered him that he knew of
absolutely no trouble in the Far East, and that Russia had her
hands free for Europe.

"2. The mobilization of the German army is not restricted to the
recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a
preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in
warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready
for the call, in order that they may make the necessary
arrangements. It is a general call to 'attention' and it requires
an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such
as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible.
If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run
through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next
day....

"The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We
must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces
as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become
necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to
place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies
war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to
mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her
eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a
position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France.
Accordingly,' added the general, 'we must anticipate our
principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of
going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to
crush all resistance.'

"This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it
corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do
not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary
enemy....

"From these events the following conclusions may be drawn ...
these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its
possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps.
_They wish to be always ready._

"As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of
persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may
form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the
[French] Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening
the defenses of the country."

On July 30, 1913, M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an official report on the state of German public opinion, as derived from French diplomatic and consular agents. It said that:

"1. The treaty of November 4, 1912, is considered a
disappointment for Germany.

"2. France--a new France--undreamed of prior to the summer of
1911, is considered ... to want war.

"Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the
Conservatives to the Socialists [and of all classes of the
people] are unanimous on these two points, with very slight
differences corresponding to their position in society or their
political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:

"The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the
incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the
Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the
empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national
humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German
prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military
supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the
powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma....

"And the attitude of France, her calmness, her reborn spiritual
unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the
end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war,
these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of
anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion....

"German public opinion is divided into two currents on the
question of the possibility and proximity of war.

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are
unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war
would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride,
Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor
plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war
would profit Great Britain.

"The forces consist of the following elements:

"The bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace
loving by instinct.

"Those members of the nobility detached from military interests
and engaged in business, such as the _grands seigneurs_ of
Silesia and a few other personages very influential at court who
are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political
and social consequences of war, even if successful.

"Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate
way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean
bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are
chiefly supported by foreign capital.

"Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and
Schleswig-Holstein--conquered, but not assimilated and suddenly
hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these
annexed Germans.

"Finally, the governments and the governing classes in the large
southern states--Saxony, Bavaria, Württemburg, and the Grand
Duchy of Baden--are divided by these two opinions: an
unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they
have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would
profit only Prussia and Prussianization, against which they have
difficulty in defending their political independence and
administrative autonomy.

"These classes of people either consciously or instinctively
prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in
political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or
they are silent social forces, passive, and defenseless against
the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

"An example will make this idea clear: The 110 Socialist members
of the Reichstag are in favor of peace. They would be unable to
prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the
Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater
part of their number would join the rest of the country in a
chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

"Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace
believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other
solution for the present situation. In certain contracts,
especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced
cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however,
that the will of the emperor on the one side, France's
difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a
guaranty of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free
play to those who favor war....

"On the other hand there is a war party with leaders and
followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose
of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and
formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to
work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a
determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each
of these derives from its social caste, its class, its
intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates,
special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and
increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike
desire.

"Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it
is _inevitable_. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner
the better.

"Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on
overpopulation, overproduction, the need for markets and outlets;
or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the outside interests
that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the
democratic and socialist masses.

"Others, uneasy for the safety of the empire, and believing that
time is on the side of France, think that events should be
brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the
course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets,
the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a
regenerated France are two historical facts mutually
incompatible.

"Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed.
They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into
discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of
law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not
always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they
have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they
derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former
exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the
events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying
force of the _Wehrvereine_ [defense leagues] and other
associations of Young Germany.

"Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary
France; others, finally, from a feeling of rancor. These last the
people who heap up pretexts for war.